Alexander of Aphrodisias

On Aristotle
On Sense Perception
This page intentionally left blank
Alexander of
Aphrodisias
On Aristotle
On Sense
Perception

Translated by
Alan Towey

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

 Bloomsbury Academic
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© Alan Towey (Editor’s Note, Richard Sorabji) 2000

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Acknowledgements
The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the
following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs,
an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy;
the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia
dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation;
the Humanities Research Board of the British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust;
the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; The Netherlands Foundation for Scientific
Research (NWO/GW). The editor wishes to thank Ivars Avotins, Han Baltussen,
John Finamore, Pamela Huby, Peter Lautner, Arthur Madigan, R.W. Sharples and
Teun Tieleman for comments on the MS, and Han Baltussen for preparing the volume for press.

Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain
 Contents

Editor’s Note vi
Preface vii
Introduction 1
Textual Emendations 11

Translation 17

Notes 157
Bibliography 189
English-Greek Glossary 191
Greek-English Index 204
Subject Index 227
 Editor’s Note
In On Sense Perception Aristotle discusses the material conditions of
perception, starting with the sense organs and moving to the material
basis of colour, flavour and odour. His Pythagorean account of hues as a
ratio of dark to light was enthusiastically endorsed by Goethe against
Newton as being true to the painter’s experience. Aristotle finishes with
three problems about continuity. In what sense are indefinitely small
colour patches or colour variations perceptible? Secondly, which percep-
tibles leap discontinuously, like light to fill a whole space, which have to
reach one point before another, and do observers of the latter perceive the
same thing, if they are at different distances? Thirdly, how does the control
sense permit genuinely simultaneous, rather than staggered, perception
of different objects?
Alexander’s highly explanatory commentary is most expansive on these
problems of continuity. His battery of objections to vision involving travel,
which would lead to collisions and interferences by winds, inspired a
tradition of grading the five senses in respect of degrees of immateriality
and of intentionality. He also introduces us to paradoxes of Diodorus
Cronus about the relation of the smallest perceptible to the largest percep-
tible size.

January 2000 R.R.K.S.

 Preface
The present volume is a translation of the commentary on the De Sensu of
Aristotle (to give it its Latin title) attributed to the Aristotelian commen-
tator Alexander of Aphrodisias. The De Sensu deals with sense perception
and is therefore referred to as ‘On Sense Perception’ both in the title of this
volume and elsewhere in the Ancient Commentators series. The Greek
title is Peri aisthêseôs kai aisthêtôn which for consistency with my trans-
lation policy (see notes 1 and 2 on p. 157 below) I have rendered as ‘On
Perception and Perceptibles’.
The aim of this translation is to express Alexander’s meaning accu-
rately whilst writing English which is clear and readable. Alexander is
fond of longer sentences than we find natural in English and in some
places I have broken these up. I have used angle brackets < > to enclose
words or phrases necessary to complete the meaning which are absent
from Alexander’s text.
The English-Greek Glossary indicates how I have chosen to translate
Alexander’s technical vocabulary. Whilst wishing to be consistent I have
had to take account of the fact that for some Greek words (logos is a good
example) the span of meaning is not matched by any one English word.
The alternative translations are listed in the Greek-English index and in
important cases explanations have been provided in the notes.
The translation of Alexander’s commentary on chapters three, six and
seven (pages 41,7 to 66,6 and pages 109,7 to 173,12) originally appeared
as an appendix to my PhD thesis Time, Change, and Perception: Studies
in the Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias (London, 1995). I am
grateful to the supervisor of my research, Professor R.R.K. Sorabji, for his
many helpful comments and in particular for allowing me to read his
unpublished commentary on the De Sensu. My thanks are also due to the
examiners of my thesis, Professors R.W. Sharples and M. Schofield.
Save where I have indicated in Textual Emendations, my translation
follows the edition of the text produced by Paul Wendland for the Berlin
Academy in 1901, which itself benefited from the earlier edition of Charles
Thurot as well as unpublished work by Hermann Usener. The survey of
the manuscript tradition found in the preface to Wendland’s edition
(Alexandri in Librum De Sensu Commentarium (CAG 3,1), Berlin 1901,
v-xiii) emphasises the large number of surviving manuscripts, including a
medieval Latin translation. However, all these manuscripts share serious
viii Preface
corruptions and lacunae and are presumed to derive from a single cor-
rupted early medieval archetype. Wendland candidly confesses that in
many places he allowed himself the licence of recovering Alexander’s
meaning rather than his actual words and acknowledges that he has left
several errors for others to correct. But he comments that in an age in
which hardly any readers of Alexander’s commentary can be found it is an
audacious man who expects to find anyone to undertake the task of textual
emendation. It will not, I am sure, be regarded as too audacious of me to
hope that the present volume will go some way to remedying the first
shortage, if not the second.

January 2000 A. Towey

 Introduction
1. Alexander of Aphrodisias
Alexander of Aphrodisias was appointed as a teacher of Aristotelian
philosophy at some time between AD 198 and 209.1 Although he was not
the first to write a commentary upon a work of Aristotle, he was one of the
earliest commentators, and certainly one of the most celebrated.2 Aris-
totle’s treatises require exegetical commentary because of the obscurity of
his expression. They also invite philosophical commentary because they
approach the issues they discuss in a spirit of inquiry which calls for
further reflection rather than acceptance as the last word on a subject. A
commentator on Aristotle therefore should do his job not merely by offer-
ing an exposition of the meaning but also by attempting to resolve the
philosophical problems that Aristotle has addressed. Alexander’s fame as
a commentator rests upon his achievement on both counts.
The Alexandrian corpus comprises commentaries on Aristotle, treat-
ises, and collections of shorter discussions, such as the Quaestiones.3
Alexander always presents himself to the world as a loyal follower of the
Aristotelian school. As Sharples points out, ‘in his independent treatises,
as well as in the commentaries, Alexander’s approach to the issues he
discusses is from Aristotle’s works – and above all from the esoteric works
– as a starting point’.4 On the other hand the five centuries which separate
Alexander from Aristotle had seen the advent of important philosophical
movements, notably the foundation of the Epicurean and Stoic schools.
These impinged on Alexander in two ways. Firstly, as a defender of
Aristotle he would have felt the need to resist the anti-Aristotelian teach-
ings of rival schools. Secondly, there is what Todd refers to as Alexander’s
‘general affinities to the contemporary philosophical culture’,5 which mani-
fest themselves both in his interest in topics not hitherto seen as Aristote-
lian6 and in his philosophical vocabulary much of which is derived from
the Stoics.7 In view of this Alexander’s own protestations8 that his role is
simply to set out Aristotle’s own doctrine as clearly as possible are not to
be taken at face value. Expressions of loyalty to the founder of one’s
philosophical school do not necessarily rule out intellectual independence9
and the commentaries no less than Alexander’s other works provide ample
opportunity for the development of Aristotle’s thought in new directions.
To provide some impression of what this means in practice I have set out
2 Introduction
below10 a case-study of the way in which Alexander goes beyond Aristotle
in the case of the commentary on the De Sensu.

2. The De Sensu
The De Sensu is the first of a series of short treatises now referred to as
the Parva Naturalia in which Aristotle discusses functions or activities
that are ‘common to body and soul’,11 the De Sensu itself dealing with the
activity of sense-perception (aisthêsis).12 As Aristotle indicates13 the De
Sensu is intended to be read as a sequel to the De Anima, a large part of
which was devoted to the subject of sense-perception.
Alexander describes14 the treatise as concerned with the sense-organs
and the perceptibles (the objects of the five senses). This is in some ways
misleading. Only one of the seven chapters (chapter two) is concerned with
sense-organs and the only sense-organ considered is the eye. Although
chapters three to seven do deal with objects of the senses, the discussion
is neither systematic nor exhaustive. Nevertheless Alexander’s descrip-
tion does accurately capture the central concern of the treatise, which
could broadly be described as examining the material or physical condi-
tions, both in the external environment and in the perceiving subject, that
are necessary for an act of sense-perception to occur.
As a philosophical text the De Sensu has had a long and flourishing
history. Together with Alexander’s commentary it was part of the corpus
studied by Arabic followers of Aristotle.15 The De Sensu itself was known
by the ninth century philosopher al-Kindi and was the subject of a lost
commentary by Abu al-Faraj in the eleventh century. It is included in the
epitome of the Parva Naturalia of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) completed in AD
1170. It was available in Latin from the thirteenth century when Aquinas
wrote his commentary on it and subsequently became a major source for
all discussions of the senses in the later middle ages. Aristotle’s assertion
at the end of chapter one that hearing makes a greater contribution to
learning than vision was for example frequently discussed in medieval
Aristotelianism.16 In the sixteenth century the De Sensu and Alexander’s
commentary upon it were (alongside Lucretius’ poem De Rerum Natura)
the most influential sources for the visual theories of ancient atomism.17
Aristotle’s De Sensu is of more than historical interest. The subject of
sense-perception embraces a number of problems of perennial interest to
philosophers both in epistemology (questions relating to the reliability of
our senses in providing our knowledge about the world) and in philosophi-
cal psychology (questions about the relationship between the psychological
processes involved in perception and the physical processes that underlie
them). Within the modern philosophical tradition it is the first grouping of
problems which has tended to monopolise attention, mainly because of the
influence of Descartes. Because the De Sensu has little directly to say on
epistemological questions it has not played a prominent role in these
 Introduction 3
discussions. The arrival of the computer age has moved the pendulum the
other way. Advances in neuroscience and the scientific challenge of creat-
ing artificial intelligence have both exerted an influence on contemporary
philosophers, bringing the problem of consciousness to centre stage. Part
of this general trend is the increased scrutiny now given to Aristotle’s
views on psychology. Aristotle’s De Anima, which considers perception
generally within the context of psychology as a whole, has been the focus
of most debate. But it has increasingly been recognised18 that the De
Anima can only be fully understood by considering the De Sensu.
One difficulty in using Aristotle’s psychological works as a starting-
point for consideration of issues in contemporary philosophy is that they
do not fit neatly into modern pigeon-holes. The De Sensu is a case in point.
Although its subject-matter suggests an affinity with modern concerns in
philosophical psychology, this is presented within a tradition of ancient
natural science which could not appear more remote from modern thought.
For example in chapter two Aristotle has much to say about the physiology
of the eye. But he says it in the context of a discussion of how the five
sense-organs are to be correlated with the four elements, earth, air, fire,
and water. The need for any such correlation will seem odd to any modern
physiologist. Moreover, although dissection was practised in the ancient
world, Aristotle apparently takes little account of the results of such
research in reaching a conclusion.19 A more fundamental difficulty relates
to the treatise’s avowed concern to examine the physical conditions re-
quired for sense-perception. For it is controversial whether we can even
attribute to Aristotle himself the view that an act of sense-perception is
constituted by anything which we would recognise today as a physiological
process. On the one side20 it is maintained that Aristotle’s view of the
material side of life is alien to modern thought and indeed is such that we
cannot take it seriously. The other side21 insist that on the Aristotelian
account sense-perception can be understood in terms of an activity that is
constituted by, but not reducible to, a physiological process. Clearly, in
view of its subject matter, the De Sensu has an important role to play in
the controversy, although it must be admitted that the precise nature of
that role is not clear cut. Indeed both the De Sensu and Alexander’s
commentary on it have been pressed into service on both sides of the
argument.22 Since the issue pervades the commentary it would be redun-
dant in this Introduction to discuss in detail the significance of the
evidence it presents. The translation, together with my notes and the
references they contain, will supply the reader with sufficient materials to
make up his or her mind. In the case-study that follows I will simply draw
attention to one way in which Alexander departs from Aristotle which has
a bearing on the controversy.
4 Introduction

3. Alexander’s Aristotelianism:
a case study
As has been pointed out, the De Sensu looks at the physical conditions that
must be present in the external environment for perception to arise. In
chapter three of the De Sensu Aristotle considers the conditions that give
rise to our perception of different colours. He argues against an account of
colour according to which colours other than black and white are composed
of black and white patches juxtaposed in different ratios (the juxtaposition
theory). He states without explanation that this theory presupposes that
imperceptible times exist. Alexander provides an explanation: he links the
juxtaposition theory to another theory of colour which Aristotle rejects, the
efflux theory, according to which colours are particles received in the eye.
Alexander says that the efflux theory requires imperceptible times be-
tween the arrival of individual particles to explain why the perceiver is not
aware of the particles arriving in the eye and that the juxtaposition theory
requires the existence of imperceptible times because it and the efflux
theory are different aspects of the same theory, the theory of vision held
by Empedocles, Democritus, and Leucippus.23 Alexander is in effect offer-
ing a historical explanation. But the explanation shows scant regard for
historical accuracy. Moreover it ignores the fact that the efflux and the
juxtaposition theories are offering rival accounts of colour.
Alexander has earlier linked the Democritean theory with the followers
of Epicurus24 and his motive in conflating the efflux and the juxtaposition
theories appears to be the polemical one of discrediting a philosophical
rival.25 For the conflated theory is on Alexander’s account saddled with two
absurdities, imperceptible times as already noted, but also imperceptible
magnitudes26 and these two commitments are shown to be absurd by
Aristotle in chapter seven.27
Alexander’s interpretation creates a serious difficulty, for in chapter six
Aristotle concludes that imperceptible magnitudes do exist.28 Alexander
explains this29 by distinguishing Epicurean imperceptible magnitudes
(imperceptible by their own nature) from Aristotelian ones (perceptible
were they not too small). But the price of removing inconsistency here is
only to introduce inconsistency elsewhere. For the magnitudes that the
conflated theory is committed to are Aristotelian ones.30
A further consequence of Alexander’s polemic is to put undue weight on
Aristotle’s arguments in chapter seven against imperceptible times and
magnitudes.31 These appear as a digression from Aristotle’s main concern
in the chapter, which is to argue that simultaneous perception is possible.
For they are introduced only to explain how, if simultaneous perception
were impossible, the appearance of simultaneous perception might arise.
Aristotle therefore has no reason requiring him to deny imperceptible
times or magnitudes and in fact assumes elsewhere32 that there are
imperceptible times. Alexander in contrast has to take them seriously and
 Introduction 5
cannot countenance imperceptible times in any theory he is defending.
This has an interesting consequence for his account of light. The propaga-
tion of light through a medium appears to take no time at all. Clearly it
could be explained as a process which takes time if one postulated an
imperceptible period of time during which the light moves to all parts of
the medium. But this postulate is not available to Alexander who must
defend the view that light really does take no time at all to spread. He does
this by means of the notion that light is a relational property like the
property of being on the right. The doctrine that light is a relation is
relevant to the controversy mentioned above over whether Aristotle re-
quires a physiological change in perception. For it has been used to support
the claim that he does not.33
The case-study therefore illustrates well some of the difficulties which
arise in using Alexander to explain Aristotle. For although it is tempting
simply to take the commentator at face value as providing an accurate
guide to Aristotle’s own meaning, it is evident that Alexander’s doctrine
that light is a relation cannot be viewed independently of his embargo on
imperceptible times and his attack on Epicureanism, both of which posi-
tions can be regarded as innovations that take Alexander beyond Aris-
totle.34

Notes
1. cf. R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation’,
Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 36.2, 1987, 1177-243, 1177. The
termini are supplied from the introduction to the treatise De Fato which is
dedicated to the Roman emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla in gratitude
for the appointment.
2. Earlier commentators include Aspasius and Adrastus. Cf. R.R.K. Sorabji, ‘The
Ancient Commentators on Aristotle’, in R.R.K. Sorabji (ed), Aristotle Transformed,
London 1990, 1-30, 16. For Alexander’s pre-eminence and the accolades recorded
by Simplicius see Sharples, op. cit. (n. 1), 1179.
3. A comprehensive survey of works by Alexander both extant and no longer
extant, including spurious works, can be found in Sharples, op. cit. (n. 1), 1182-99.
The authenticity of the commentary on the De Sensu has not been doubted,
although its date of composition relative to the other works is disputed (cf. I. Bruns,
Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora (Supplementum
Aristotelicum 2,1): De Anima Liber cum Mantissa, Berlin 1882, v, P. Accatino and
P. Donini, Alessandro di Afrodisia: L’anima, Rome 1996, vii.)
4. Sharples, op. cit. (n. 1), 1180.
5. R.B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, Leiden 1976, 17.
6. cf. the comment of R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, London
1983, 23, that Peripatetic interest in the concept of fate, the subject of Alexander’s
treatise De Fato, was largely stimulated by its central place in Stoicism.
7. cf. Todd, op. cit. (n. 5), 27-9.
8. cf. de Anima 2,4-9.
9. cf. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, volume I:
Translation of the principal sources with philosophical commentary, Cambridge
6 Introduction
1987, 5-6: ‘It was generally thought more proper to present new ideas as interpre-
tations or developments of the founder’s views’; Sharples, op. cit. (n. 1), 1180: ‘Even
when his own position is clearly a rejection of earlier Peripatetic theories [Alexan-
der] regards himself as providing a more Aristotelian solution.’
10. See section 3 below.
11. Sens. 1,436a7-8. The list given at 436a8-15 is discussed by Alexander at
5,20-6,25. The phrase ‘common to body and soul’ describes those activities of
animals which require a body, i.e. all activities other than the intellectual.
12. In Latin, sensus, hence the treatise’s traditional title. For the meaning of
aisthêsis see note 1 to the translation. According to Alexander perception needs to
be dealt with first because it is perception that all the other common activities
stand in need of (cf. 8,20-1).
13. 436a1-2; cf. 2,7-10.
14. 1,11-18.
15. cf. F.E. Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, The Oriental Translations and Commen-
taries on the Aristotelian Corpus, Leiden 1968, 45-6.
16. cf. T. Frangenberg, ‘Auditus visu prestantior: Comparisons of Hearing and
Vision in Charles de Bovelles’s Liber de sensibus’ in C. Burnett, M. Fend and P.
Gouk (eds), The Second Sense, Studies in Hearing and Musical Judgement from
Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, London 1991, 71-95, 89.
17. cf. Frangenberg, op. cit. (n. 16), 75, note 18.
18. cf. particularly C.H. Kahn, ‘Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s
Psychology’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 48, 1966, 43-81, and in J.
Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds), Articles on Aristotle 4. Psychology and
Aesthetics, London 1979, 1-31, esp. 6-17.
19. cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, ‘The Empirical Basis of the Physiology of the Parva
Naturalia’, in G.E.R. Lloyd, Methods and Problems in Greek Science, Cambridge
1991, 224-47, 236: ‘References to anatomical points are generally vague to the point
of serious obscurity’, a criticism that applies with equal force to Alexander’s
commentary.
20. cf. S. Broadie, ‘Aristotle’s Perceptual Realism’, Southern Journal of Philo-
sophy, volume XXXI, 1992, 137-59, M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Is an Aristotelian Philosophy
of Mind still Credible? A draft’, in M.C. Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty (eds), Essays on
Aristotle’s De Anima, Oxford 1992, 15-26, M.F. Burnyeat, ‘How Much Happens
when Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C? Remarks on De Anima 2.7-8’, in M.C.
Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty (eds), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, Oxford 1995
(paperback edition), 421-34, T.K. Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-organs, Cam-
bridge 1998.
21. cf. M.C. Nussbaum and H. Putnam, ‘Changing Aristotle’s Mind’, in M.C.
Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty (eds), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, Oxford 1992,
27-56, S.M. Cohen, ‘Hylomorphism and Functionalism’ in M.C. Nussbaum and A.O.
Rorty (eds), op. cit., 57-73, R.R.K. Sorabji, ‘Intentionality and Physiological Pro-
cesses: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception’, in M.C. Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty
(eds), op. cit., 195-225, H. Granger, ‘Aristotle and Perceptual Realism’, Southern
Journal of Philosophy, volume XXXI, 1992, 161-71, J.E. Sisko, ‘Material Alteration
and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle’s De Anima’, Phronesis, 1996, 138-57, S. Ever-
son, Aristotle on Perception, Oxford 1997.
22. cf. M.C. Nussbaum and H. Putnam, op. cit., 42, M.F. Burnyeat, op. cit. (n.
20), 424.
23. 59,21-4; cf. 56,8-16.
24. 24,18-20.
25. Alexander taught philosophy in direct competition with the Stoics, the
 Introduction 7
Epicureans, and the Platonists. For Alexander as a polemicist (against the Stoics)
see Todd, op. cit. (n. 5), 17, Sharples, op. cit. (n. 1), 1178.
26. The juxtaposition theory creates colours out of the juxtaposition of magni-
tudes invisible because of their small size (cf. 56,14-15).
27. cf. 62,4-6.
28. cf. 446a15-16.
29. cf. 61,7-24.
30. cf. 53,18-21 and see note 264 on p. 175 below. The fact that this inconsistency
does not trouble Alexander suggests that his real interest lies in the Epicurean
position.
31. 448a19-b12.
32. cf. Phys. 4.13, 222b14-15.
33. See M.F. Burnyeat, op. cit. (n. 20), 424: ‘But light is not only the condition
for the colour to produce its effect on the medium. In a way it is also the condition
for the colour itself to be present in actuality.’ On the doctrine itself Burnyeat
comments: ‘As usual, Alexander understands Aristotle very well.’
34. This is quite apart from the fact that the doctrine itself appears to go beyond
Aristotle. The important thing about relational change for Alexander is that it is
a change, but a change that takes no time to occur. But for Aristotle a relational
change is no real change at all: the category of relation is excluded from the list of
categories in respect of which change is possible (cf. Phys. 3.1, 200b33-201a9, 5.2,
225b11-13).
This page intentionally left blank
Alexander of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle
On Sense Perception
(On Perception
and Perceptibles)

Translation
This page intentionally left blank
 Textual Emendations

It should be noted that Wendland’s procedure has produced what is

by modern standards a strange text since in some cases he accepts
emendations by previous scholars in the main text but elsewhere he
gives the reading of the MSS and puts suggestions of his own or of
other scholars in the apparatus. My translation follows the text as
printed but (except where otherwise indicated) excludes words that
Wendland has square-bracketed. Other departures from Wendland’s
text are recorded in the notes as they occur and are summarised here.

2,5 Reading aisthêseôs for aisthêseôn (Usener)

5,29 Wendland suspects a lacuna here, since te in 5,28 cannot
be connected to anything in the next line. I have
translated it as if êrtêtai from 5,27 had been repeated,
and have commenced a new sentence at peri
6,3 Reading hekaterôn for hekaterou (Thurot)
10,15 Deleting hôsper
10,20 Deleting tôn and reading phthartikôn sêmantikoi, ha for
phthartikoi, hous (Wendland)
10,23 Reading euporei for euporian (Wendland)
10,24 Reading diakrinei tin’ for diakrinousi (Wendland)
12,15 Deleting toutôn
14,1 Reading kôphous for enneous (Thurot)
14,2 Deleting kôphous and reading kai enneous before tous
and mête for mêde (Thurot)
14,3 Reading tois kôphois ek genetês to kai for kôphois te kai
(Thurot)
15,8 Reading in the lacuna eis ta stoikheia anagontes
(Wendland)
15,9 Deleting the second pantes
17,1-2 Deleting kai tês aporias kai tês dia ti thlibomenê hê opsis
hautên horâi, êremousa de ou (Thurot)
18,2 Reading in the lacuna alla kai touto ou khalepon luein,
ei tis legoi hoti mê (Thurot)
18,20 Reading kai for kan (Thurot) 18,21-2. Reading, after
genomenê, kat’allo ti morion apo tês korês, hês en tini
allôi genomenês estai to diaphanes (Diels)
27,10 Reading dêla for dêlon (Thurot)
12 Textual Emendations
28,21 Reading ho for hou (MSS MT)
33,9 Reading ou for oude (Wendland)
33,25 Reading to for tên and idion for idiôn (Wendland)
34,9 Reading in the lacuna ei de asômaton, oud’ holôs
dunêsetai sumphuesthai to phôs (Wendland)
34,17 Reading korêi for khôrâi
38,1 Add alêthes after an (Wendland)
39,8 Supply a full stop after opsis and add Alla mên epei hê
opsis
39,9 Reading esti for eisi
44,20 Adding to de khrôma before the square-bracketed text
(the contents of which are not to be deleted)
44,27 Reading auta for auto (Wendland)
45,12 Reading phainein in the lacuna and reading gar for men
(Diels)
47,23 Reading toutou for the first touto with Thurot’s MSS BC
47,25 Reading phêsin in the lacuna (Thurot)
48,16 Add en before aoristôi and tôi before diaphanei with the
other Aristotelian MSS
49,15 Reading dêlon hoti ou tou sômatos in the lacuna
(Wendland)
50,9 Reading toutois aitia esti tou khrômatizesthai for toutôn
esti khrômatizesthai (Wendland dubitanter)
50,15 Reading khrôma oikeion ouk ekhonta in the lacuna
(Wendland)
52,20 Reading dê for the second de (Wendland)
53,7 Reading diaphanes with MSS TANa for diaphanesi
56,4 Reading kath’hauta for kat’auta
56,10 Reading dokousin enantioutai doxêi prokatabeblêmenêi
for dokei en hê en doxa prokatabeblêmenê (Wendland)
56,21 Reading tois ophthalmois aitia tou horan tôn
ophthalmôn haptetai all’ for ê horatheisôn and the
subsequent lacuna (Thurot)
56,22 Reading deon for dein (Diels)
58,15 Reading oukhi kan ep’ for kan (Wendland)
58,16 Reading ê exô ê en for ê ex hôn en (Diels)
58,20 Reading kai for ei (Diels)
59,17 Reading sômatôn for khrômatôn (Thurot)
60,17 Reading aph’henos for aphenes (Wendland)
64,15 Deleting touto
64,24 Reading hênômenon for hênômena (Wendland)
64,25 Reading tôi de for to te
65,12 Reading kata for kai (Diels)
69,10 Reading eipôn for eis (Diels)
69,23 Reading autous for auta
 Textual Emendations 13
69,30 Reading khuloi for khumoi (Thurot)
70,10 Reading ou gar toi for ê gar tôi (Wendland)
70,11 Reading diapherei monon for diapherein (Wendland)
75,23 Reading in the lacuna pathous hôs (Wendland)
78,24 Reading êi for esti (Thurot)
80,3 Reading entetheisês for enetheisês (Thurot)
80,8 Reading proskrinomenon for trephon (Wendland)
81,26 Reading in the lacuna men liparon kai to gluku diairoiê,
suntitheiê de to (Wendland, but with gluku for the
suggested hêdu)
82,1 Reading, for mête, ê amphotera and add kai ta deutera
before kai (Wendland)
86,19 Reading in the lacuna ou gar enantia tauta, hoti (Thurot)
90,14 Reading luthôsi for lutheien (Usener)
92,9 Reading in the lacuna osmês dektikon, osphranton houtô
ginomenon (Wendland)
94,7 Reading in the lacuna hupo tês enkhumou xêrotêtos
paskhein ti (Wendland)
95,9 Reading kôluonta for duo onta (Wendland)
96,9 Reading autês for autôn (Wendland)
97,7 Reading to apoton hêmin for ton apo tôn khumôn
(Thurot) and place a comma after rather than before
muron
99,8 Reading tôi aph’hou for tôn aph’hôn (Wendland)
99,9 Reading parekhontai for dekhontai (Diels)
100,1 Placing te in 100,1 after ergôi in 99,27 and omitting kai
in 100,1 (Thurot)
100,12-13 Reading aisthanetai for aisthanontai (Wendland)
101,16 Reading osphrêsamena for osphrêsan (Wendland)
101,19 Reading auton for auta (Wendland)
102,10-11 Transposing kai peri tên opsin to follow horatai
(Wendland)
103,3 Omitting ti (Thurot)
104,10 Adding allôn after tôn (Wendland)
104,27 Reading hautê for autôn (Thurot)
105,1 Reading threptikôn for geustikôn (Thurot)
105,17 Reading enapoplunomenôi for plunonti (Wendland)
106,24 Reading an eidê for anankê (Thurot)
109,21 Reading ginetai sunkrimati tês hapseôs for gar sunkrima
toutou opsesi (Diels)
113,1 Reading hôs for hôn and adunata for dunata (Diels)
118,12-13 Reading epeisi goun for epei oun (Wendland)
118,22 Reading oude dunamei for ouden (Wendland)
119,25 Reading di’hênômenôn for di’hôn (Wendland)
120,8 Reading presbutera hê for hê hustera (Wendland)
14 Textual Emendations
122,13 Reading meros tou for meros autou (Wendland)
125,1 I have not tried to fill the lacuna and have not
translated hoti or gar
126,23 Reading ginetai for gineta and omitting the contents of
the square brackets
127,23 Reading kai oukh hôs tou horan ouk ontos tôn pros ti in
the lacuna (Thurot)
129,9 (lacuna) I have not translated tôi
129,11 Reading kata for ta and tên for kata (Wendland)
130,24 Reading aisthanetai for aisthanesthai (Wendland)
132,18 Reading hôs deon for eis de (Diels)
132,21 Adding hêtis after kinêsis (Wendland)
134,2 Reading ho kai for ê (Wendland)
135,4 Reading esmen, all’ou khumôn oude pephuke paskhein
hupo pantos hugrou in the lacuna (Thurot)
135,18 Adding ho before edêlôsen (Wendland)
137,12 Reading tôi for hôs (Thurot)
137,12 Reading holôs allogenôn for holôn elattonôn (Wendland)
137,26 I have not tried to fill the lacuna. Reading toutois for
touto (Wendland)
138,3 Reading ti hê elattôn for tên elattô (Wendland)
138,5 Reading haplê men gar aisthêsis ouk an eiê for hapla
men gar ex isou kan eien (Wendland)
140,23 Reading tôi mêketi einai for aei (Wendland)
145,23 Reading touto for to (Thurot)
149,18 Reading alêthôs for alêthes (Wendland)
150,13 Reading a comma after tini
152,3 Reading to GB suntelei ti sunêmmenon tôi khronôi ei en
for to sunêmmenon tôi khronôi en (Wendland)
152,5 Reading ou gar for ouk (Wendland)
152,5 Reading GB for B (Wendland)
153,27 Reading ou gar hôs in the lacuna and adding tis after
dunatai (Wendland)
154,13 Reading kai tis diaphora in the lacuna (Wendland)
157,7 Deleting allêla
157,17 Reading atomôi for atomôs (Wendland)
158,1 Reading alêthês, legei for, legôn
160,22 Adding an before anêiroun (Wendland)
161,22 Reading touto in the lacuna (Wendland)
162,15 I have not tried to fill the first lacuna. Deleting ei gar.
Reading allou, allôi de in the second lacuna and
reading allou for allôs
163,23 Reading legei de, ei anankê hama allêlois in the lacuna
(Wendland)
 Textual Emendations 15
168,2 Reading hê dunamis hê aisthêtikê tês psukhês for hêde
psukhê (Thurot)
168,4 Deleting gar
169,6 Adding ouk ap’allou after horômenon kai and kai
aph’hou oukh horatai after horatai (Wendland)
170,21 Reading horaton to for to horan oukh (Wendland)
170,28 Reading ekeino for ekeinou (Wendland)
171,21-2 I have not tried to fill the lacunae. I have not translated
hama an ti eiê hopôs  ameres legein  hoion te ex
amerôn sunekhes ti ginesthai
172,2 Reading horaton in the lacuna (Wendland)
173,9 Reading touto megethos in the lacuna (Thurot)
This page intentionally left blank
 <The Commentary> of Alexander of Aphrodisias on 1,1
<Aristotle’s> On Perception1 and Perceptibles2

Book 1

In the treatise On the Soul <Aristotle> discussed the soul as a whole

in general and universally, and also each of its powers individually,
<saying> how many and what they are and what the existence of each 5
of them depends upon.3 Amongst these he discussed the perceptive
power, saying both what it is4 and into how many senses it is divided,5
going through each of the senses individually and saying what the
potentiality of each of them <is> from which perceiving <comes
about>, and what the actuality <is> and what <it is> concerned with.6
He also discussed the perceptible in respect of each sense so far as he 10
found it useful with reference to the actuality of the senses. In this
book he discusses the sense-organs,7 <saying> what the sense-organ
of each sense <is> and out of what <it is constituted>, since it is not
possible to perceive without a sense-organ. (For the actuality of the
perceptive soul <is> through a body just as the <actualities> of the
other <powers of the soul> are, or at least most of them.8) He also
discusses the perceptibles,9 <saying> what it is which is perceptible 15
by each sense and what it must be in its proper nature if being
perceptible is to belong to it. For being, for perceptibles, is not the
same as being perceptible and he had discussed them as percep-
tibles.10
Another indication of the purpose of the inquiry in the <book> is 2,1
the book’s title. Because he was discussing in it sense-organs and
perceptibles he entitled it ‘On Sense and sense objects’, since the
discussion of the sense-organs contributes to the inquiry concerning
the senses. For perception is common to soul and body.11 Alternatively 5
by ‘Sense’12 he means the sense-organs. For they call the sense-organs
senses.
He begins the book by saying firstly that what follows the inquiry
concerning the soul is <the inquiry> concerning animals and all
animate things and the <inquiry> concerning their activities, both
those that are common and those that are peculiar to each species13
of them. For the soul is a principle14 of all the things which possess 10
soul. He says which of the <activities> are common and which are
peculiar. He has explained that it is reasonable for a person discussing
 18 Translation
the activities of the soul to discuss the activities of animals and things
possessing life by saying that their activities, both those that are
common and those that are peculiar to each <species>, are almost all
15 common to the soul and the body. It is by means of this very point
that he confirms that the soul is <the> actuality of a natural body
which has organs.15 He offers as proof of the statement that the
activities of animate things are common to body and soul the point
that all <these activities> come about either by means of perception
or in conjunction with perception. It is reasonable that, having taken
it as obvious that perception and the activity in respect of it is common
20 to soul and body, he begins to discuss the sense-organs.16 For he has
already discussed the perceptive soul, and perception and the activity
in respect of it17 are common to soul and body, and it was necessary
for the person discussing the common <activities> to discuss percep-
tion first. For this is commonest to all animals and most evident of
the activities in respect of soul.

<CHAPTER 1>

3,1 436a1 Since it has already been determined concerning soul in

itself and concerning each of its powers part by part
He begins the book by showing that the inquiry in it follows the
<inquiry> concerning soul, as I said. For the discussion of soul is
5 followed by the <discussion> of animals and things possessing soul
and their activities, both those that are peculiar to each species and
those that are common. Their activities are not without body. For the
majority by and large <come about> by means of perception, and
perception is common to soul and body.18 He said that it had ‘been
determined concerning soul in itself ’, meaning <that it had been
determined> separately concerning soul as a whole generally and
10 universally, and separately concerning ‘each of its’ parts and ‘powers’.
For in On the Soul firstly he discussed soul universally and defined
it, since it was possible to give to those things which possess <soul>
within themselves both a first and more incomplete definition and a
second and more complete one. Next he discussed each of the powers
15 <of the soul>, the nutritive, the perceptive, the imaginative, and each
of the others.19 Alternatively, <he said that it had been determined>
‘concerning soul in itself ’ because <it had> not also <been deter-
mined> concerning the body, and existence for the soul is in conjunc-
tion with <the body>. For it is for this reason that he will now discuss
the sense-organs. After saying that <the> following task is ‘to make
inquiry concerning the animals’ (436a2-3) he added ‘and concerning
the things which possess life’ (436a3-4), because not all the things
which possess soul are animals, since the animal has been defined by
 Translation 19
perception, as has been stated in On the Soul.20 The nutritive soul is 20
before the perceptive and the things in which there is only <the
nutritive soul> are animate and have life but they are not animals.
Plants are of this sort. He would also say that the parts of animals
possess life. He showed what the inquiry concerning animals and the
things which possess life is by saying ‘which of them are peculiar21
actions and which are common’ (436a4). The phrase ‘which are 4,1
peculiar and which are common’ is equal to ‘concerning the peculiar
and the common’. For he is not proposing to make a division of them,
but to discuss them. He has used the word ‘action’ here, just as he is
accustomed to elsewhere,22 as a commoner alternative to activity. For 5
strictly action is activity which is rational, and none of the things
without reason can have a share of it.

436a5 And so <let> what has been said about soul <be supposed>.
He has said that the inquiry concerning animals and the things which
possess life follows what has been said about soul (the soul is a
potentiality and form23 of each of these). He has also divided the 10
discussion concerning these things into <discussion of> those of their
activities which are common and <discussion of> those which are
peculiar. First he will discuss those activities which are common
either to all things that are animate or at any rate to most of them.
After this he will discuss those activities which are peculiar to each
species of animals, having first examined animals. For there is utility
in the examination and division24 concerning animals with reference
to the activities which are peculiar to each species of animals and to 15
their parts. For25 the activities which are common to things which are
animate join together in a way with the general discussion concerning
soul.26 He will say next what these <common activities> are.
He is saying: let all the things which we have said concerning soul
be laid down as principles of what is about to be said. For men are in
the habit of describing as suppositions the principles which are
indemonstrable, which they also call axioms. But they also describe 20
as suppositions things which are demonstrable but which they take
as agreed and suppose without the demonstration that is proper <to
them>, because they will demonstrate them later but will use them
now as principles for other purposes. ‘And so’, he says, ‘let what has
been said about soul’ and what has been demonstrated be now laid
down as suppositions and principles of what is about to be said. For
they have already been demonstrated and he will not now discuss 25
them any longer.
By means of what he adds he himself makes it clear that he is 5,1
discussing the things which he proposed to discuss because they
followed the inquiry concerning soul, and this is the inquiry into what
 20 Translation
the activities of the animals are and why they come about, and <he
makes it clear that> it is not the case that, having proposed to discuss
animals, he first discusses certain other things, as some people
5 thought, discussing now sense-organs and perceptibles, next life and
death and sleep and waking and prophecy in sleep, and only after
that animals, but rather that these things also pertain to this inquiry
(for some of the common <activities> belong to all animals and others
even to the things which possess life). For having said, ‘Let what has
10 been said about soul be supposed’, he adds, ‘let us discuss what is left
and firstly what is first. The most important <functions> of animals,
both those that are common and those that are peculiar, are clearly
common to the soul and the body’ (436a5-8). He means that the most
important of the <functions> in accordance with the activities of
animals, both those that are common to them and those that are
15 peculiar to each genus, appear to be common to soul and body, and
not <peculiar> to the soul itself in itself. He is showing us that <we>
must inquire into them in this way, by inquiring at the same time
into the parts of the body in which and through which the activities
of the things which possess soul <come about>. He has already said
in On the Soul that the majority of the activities of the soul <come
about> through <the> body.27
20 Next he says what the functions are which are the most important
and common to the soul and the body. For ‘perception and memory
and spiritedness and desire and appetition generally and in addition
to these pleasure and pain’ (436a8-10) are very evident functions of
almost all animals and common activities of them. But these are all
25 common to soul and body, and most of them have already been
discussed in On the Soul,28 whilst some he will discuss later.29 Per-
ception, desire, pleasure, and pain are common to all, and spirited-
ness and memory <are common to> most. All these are dependent
upon perception. For memory is,30 as he will demonstrate31 (he will
discuss memory in the next treatise since he has not yet discussed it).
And he has shown in On the Soul that appetition, pleasure, and pain
30 follow for those who possess perception.32
In addition to these there are certain other <functions>, some
6,1 common to all things which partake of life, others to all animals,
others to the majority. He will inquire into these next in accordance
with his purpose. They are common to soul and body in the same way
as the <functions> already mentioned. For this reason he will discuss
each33 of the pairs at the same time. He lists what they are, saying:
5 ‘the most important of these are four pairs’ (436a12-3). He enumer-
ates them, and carries out his inquiry into them after the discussion
concerning sense-organs and perceptibles. But first he discusses
these and <gives> an explanation of why he will discuss them. The
phrase, ‘for these belong to almost all animals’ (436a10-1), explained
 Translation 21
why he will add <them>. For they are common no less than the others.
He says that it is the task of a natural philosopher ‘to see the first 10
principles concerning health and disease’ (436a17-8), i.e. <to see> out
of what first principles health and disease <come about> and what
first <principles they are> dependent on, because <they are> depend-
ent on a due proportion of the first potentialities, dry and moist and
hot and cold. He showed that the inquiry concerning these is proper
to the <inquiry> concerning animals by saying: ‘for neither health nor
disease can come about for those things which have been deprived of 15
life’ (436a18-9).
As for the four pairs which he has mentioned in advance, books
have come down to us <belonging to> his treatise on physics,34 in
which he dealt with them, and I mean On Waking and Sleep, On
Youth and Old Age, On Respiration, and On Life and Death. The On
Health and Disease, if it came about, is not preserved.35 Of these 20
<pairs> waking and sleep are common to all animals, unless there is
somewhere a genus of fishes that does not sleep, a point which he
investigates in Examination of Animals.36 Youth and old age are
common to all the things that partake of life, not only animals (for
there is youth and old age in plants, just as there is life and death),
and respiration and expiration are common to the majority of ani- 25
mals, all those which possess lungs.
He establishes (436a17-b1) that it is the task of the natural
philosopher and philosopher to inquire into what the first principles
of health and disease are from the fact that the majority of natural
philosophers have discussed them, and from the fact that physical
inquiry ceases with them whereas the most accomplished of doctors 7,1
begin their medical inquiries with them as being physical <principles>.
At the same time he shows us how medical <inquiry> is joined together
with physical <inquiry>, and that it is under physical <inquiry> and
takes its principles from it, just as optics <does> from geometry, musical 5
inquiry37 from arithmetic, and navigation from astronomy.
<He says> that ‘all the things mentioned are common to the soul
and the body’ (436b2-3). He said earlier that ‘the most important
<functions> of animals, both those that are common and those that
are peculiar, are clearly common to the soul and the body’ (436a6-8)
and then listed some of them (436a8-10) (these were perception, 10
memory, spiritedness, desire, pleasure, pain), and said that there
were also others besides these, some common to all the things which
possess life, and others <common to> certain animals (436a11-12),
setting forth the most important and evident of those that are
common, and indicating the five pairs which he professed to discuss
first, since they are first in nature.38 He shows that these are common 15
to the soul and the body by means of the point that none of them comes
about apart from perception.39 For all <come about> with perception,
 22 Translation
and things that <come about> with perception <come about> by
means of <the> body. He shows that none of them <come about> apart
from perception by saying, ‘for all come about with or by means of
20 perception’ (436b3-4). For waking <is> with perception since waking
<comes about> when nourishment is dispersed and the senses are
aroused and change from inactivity to activity. Similarly pleasure and
pain are with perception, and also health and disease. But youth and
old age are by means of perception. For each of these <is> dependent
upon the sense-organs’ being in a certain state.40
25 Sleep would be an affection of perception.41 For sleep <comes
about> when <perception> is affected in some way. For whenever the
vapour from nourishment, having been carried up all together into
the head and cooled by the <parts> around the brain, is carried back
down to the <part> below from which it was carried up, perception42
8,1 being weighed down by the moisture in <the vapour> is itself impeded
from being active and is at rest, and comes to be responsible for sleep
in animals. Perception would be a state.43 For existence for animals
<is> dependent upon possessing perception. Memories and recollec-
tions are ‘guardings and preservations’, and forgettings and death are
5 ‘destructions and privations’. That the pairs already mentioned are
with perception and not without perception is understood by means
of these points. Old age and youth, as common to more things, could
be applied to plants. Life and death are also in those animate things
which do not possess perception, but in animals at least these too are
with perception.
He says that it is understood ‘by means of an account that percep-
10 tion comes about by means of the body’, and obvious ‘apart from the
account’ (436b7-8). For it is at once obvious that perceptions come
about by means of bodily organs, and it is easier to show <it> by means
of the account. For to perceive is to apprehend perceptibles by means
of sense-organs, which are bodies.44

436b8 But concerning perception and perceiving there has

15 previously been discussion in On the Soul as to what it is and
why this affection comes about for animals.
He has shown that the common functions and affections of animals
<come about> by means of perception, and has also established that
perception is a function common to soul and body. It follows from what
has been said that he must discuss perception in advance of the
20 <functions> which are generated by animals by means of perception
or with perception. For <perception is> first among the common
<functions>, and the one which the others stand in need of. Since
some things have been said concerning perception and other things
are about to be said, he reminds us of what has been said (there has
 Translation 23
been discussion in On the Soul of the perceptive soul and the poten-
tiality and the actuality in respect of it45). Of these things he reminds 25
us – that they have been discussed and in which treatise –, and now
he will add the account of the sense-organs (for perception was
common to soul and body, with the result that the account of the
sense-organs is joined to the <account> of perception), and also of the
perceptibles, since the activity of perception <is> concerned with
these. These very subjects have already been discussed a little in On
the Soul,46 but they will now be discussed at greater length and with
greater accuracy. He reminds us both briefly and clearly of what he 30
has said and taught in On the Soul, <namely> that there is a necessity 9,1
for animals to possess perception: for it is by <perception> that
animals are separated from non-animals.47 He showed there that
<animals> are tangible48 and not simple but compound49 and have
their existence dependent upon a certain due proportion of the things
which underlie,50 and that if they did not engage in touching and
perceiving so as to preserve themselves from the things that are
capable of destroying them, they would be destroyed by the excesses 5
in the things touching them.51 He described perception as an affection
because perceiving <is> by means of an affection.
Not all the senses <are present> in all animals, but touch and taste
<are present> in all. For it was shown at <the> end of the third
<book> On the Soul that animals that have been deprived of touch
also cease from existing at the same time.52 (The destruction of touch
is <the> destruction of the mean state and due proportion of bodies, 10
and existence for animals <is> dependent upon <this mean state>.)
But <it was> also <shown53> that taste, being able to judge and
apprehend nourishment, <is> necessary for animals, since it is im-
possible for them to be preserved apart from being nourished. After
all, flavour is an affection of that part of the <parts> in us which is
capable of taste, i.e. the taste.54 Taste, by means of which we are
nourished,55 being a part of us, apprehends <flavour> and is in some 15
way affected by it. And the <part56> of us by means of which we taste,
which is the tongue, distinguishes what is pleasant. <The tongue>,
being affected by flavour, perceives it and tastes.
Having said, ‘For <taste> distinguishes what is pleasant and
painful to it in connection with nourishment so as to shun the latter
and pursue the former’ (436b15-17), he added the explanation,
<namely> that flavour, which we perceive, ‘is an affection of the part 20
capable of taste’ (436b17-18). For this reason it has been reasonably
stated by us that taste’s distinguishing what is pleasant and painful
in nourishment <is> dependent upon being affected.57 For that which
is capable of taste, which is a part of us, being affected by the
tasteable, distinguishes what is pleasant and painful and what is
nourishing and what is not.58 It is also written, instead of the ‘part
 24 Translation
25 capable of taste’, ‘an affection of the nutritive part’, and on this basis
flavour would be said to be an affection of the nutritive power of the
soul on the grounds that it is this power which is affected by flavour.
But it is absurd to say that the nutritive power is affected by flavour.59
For to be affected by flavours is to perceive flavours, but the nutritive
<part> <is> different to the perceptive <part>. For this reason it
10,1 would be better, if the text did say this, not to refer the nutritive to
the <nutritive> power of the soul, as Aspasius60 says the text should
be interpreted, but to the part by means of which we are nourished
(for flavour <is an affection> of this <part>), in order that he may be
saying that flavour, which taste <is> able to apprehend, is an affection
of the part that is able to nourish.61 But the first text mentioned is
5 better. It is also written as follows: ‘and generally flavour is an
affection of the part which is nutritive <and> capable of taste.’ If it
has been written thus what is being said is that flavour is an affection
of the part capable of taste which is nutritive, in order that the <part>
capable of taste may be <regarded> as a genus, and the nutritive and
not <nutritive> <as> a differentiation of that which is capable of
taste.62 Flavour is an affection of that which is nutritive <and>
capable of taste, which is a part or species of that which is capable of
10 taste, and what is capable of taste is the sense which is capable of
taste. This text would contain both the things said in the two texts
<mentioned> before it.
Touch and taste <are> common to all animals. But the senses
which come about through different media, such as the three
<senses> that are left, are not common to all animals, as he himself
15 has said in On the Soul.63 But64 in the animals in which they are
present they contribute to their preservation, as he has said in On the
Soul.65 For because <animals> cause movement and are subject to
change in respect of place they need sight, in order that they may be
preserved and not encounter things capable of destroying them, and
<they need> smell so that they may perceive nourishment in advance.
20 But the apprehension of sounds also contributes to preservation. For
many sounds indicate animals capable of destroying, which66 they are
<thereby> preserved from. Animals are also preserved from attacks
from each other by perceiving them in advance through the sound
which they make when they are approaching, withdrawing, or lying
in wait. But they are also often well supplied67 with food because the
sound signifies <it>. For many carnivores distinguish by sound ani-
25 mals that are easy for them to capture,68 and thus attack them.
All the senses are present in animals for the sake of preservation,
but some of them also contribute to wisdom in those able to receive
wisdom,69 so that they exist in them not only for the sake of what is
11,1 necessary, but also for that of well-being. ‘For’, he says, ‘they an-
nounce many differentiations, out of which wisdom comes into being
 Translation 25
afterwards both in regard to intelligibles and in regard to matters of
action’ (437a2-3). He says this with reference to sight and hearing, as
he himself makes clear as he proceeds. It is clear that the apprehen-
sions by means of <sight and hearing> and differentiations in the
things which they apprehend <are> origins of both action and inquiry.
Clearly the differentiations in visibles led us to a conception70 of light 5
and darkness, i.e. of day and night, beginning from which we inves-
tigated the things able to cause them.71 From this <there came about>
the inquiry concerning the universe and the things in it. Seeing these
things, which are able to cause night and day, coming about in turn
we had <the> thought of number, as Plato says.72 But also the fact
that the moon is not always illuminated in the same way led us to a 10
conception that this bright light is not proper to it. But <there are>
also the differentiations which are apparent in the movements and
magnitudes of the stars. (For sight in particular apprehends these,
even if these perceptibles <are> common to it and other <senses>.
For the magnitudes, the movements, the number, and the shapes of
all the bodies <are> perceptible to sight, since all bodies are seen by 15
being coloured. For each perception of the common <perceptibles>
comes about through and with the peculiar perceptibles. For this
reason hearing perceives only the magnitude in a sound and the
number in <a sound> and the movement in <a sound>, and the same
goes for each of the other senses.)73 <These differentiations> led us to 20
a conception concerning the regularity in respect of movement of <the
stars> and concerning their everlastingness and concerning the ex-
amination of their true magnitude. The observation <of the stars>
also led us to the investigation of the first cause, which is responsible
for such ordering and locomotion <as there is> in them.74 <Sight> also
educates us in a way with regard to actions.75 For actions <are>
concerned with particulars, which are perceptible and visible, and 25
from experience concerning these <there comes> the greatest part of
wisdom. And by observing, out of the things which result among
perceptibles, both the things that are beneficial and the things that
are harmful we take in an opinion universally concerning them,
saying that things of this sort are to be avoided and harmful, and
things of that sort are to be chosen and beneficial. From this <there 12,1
comes> our deliberating concerning the future. But also the concep-
tion of what is fine and what is shameful is strengthened in us by
sight. For shameful things are more detestable if they are seen, and
fine and exalted things more worthy of emulation. It is clear that
hearing also is useful for both action and inquiry, since it is by hearing 5
that we learn things in respect of the sciences.
In comparing sight and hearing,76 both of which he said contributed
to wisdom in those able to receive wisdom, both that pertaining to
action and that pertaining to inquiry, he says that sight <is> more
 26 Translation
useful in itself with regard to things that are necessary. (For the
things which it is able to apprehend in itself77 are useful for <the>
10 preservation of those who possess it. They show what they should be
on their guard against, and what things they should choose.) But he
says that accidentally hearing contributes more to knowledge. For it
is by means of <hearing> that learnings and inquiries <come about>.
He said ‘accidentally’ because, although primarily hearing is able to
apprehend sounds, it also <hears> words accidentally. For it is
15 because the word is a sound that hearing apprehends it.
He shows that sight is in itself more useful with regard to things
that are necessary whereas accidentally hearing <is more useful>
with regard to intellect and wisdom by making the point that sight
announces many differentiations, because all bodies are visible with
20 colour, and colours do not exist on their own.78 And so sight, in seeing
all the colours, comes to be responsible for choosing those that are
akin and avoiding and turning away from those that are alien. There
are very many differentiations of colours. <Sight>, which perceives
all bodies because they are coloured, is particularly perceptive of the
common perceptibles. For they particularly accompany bodies, which
<sight> perceives. For magnitude and shape and movement and
25 number <are> in these pre-eminently and strictly. For the thought of
number <comes about> from things that are numerable, and percep-
tibles are numerable, since they are numerable by being seen as
separated from each other. This sense perceives magnitude, move-
ment, shape, and number through the apprehension of colours. And
13,1 so sight reveals very many differences to us. This is useful for us in
choosing things that are beneficial and avoiding things that are
harmful, not only for those who are rational, but also for all who
possess sight.
5 Hearing is not perceptive of many differentiations. In itself it
distinguishes only the differentiations of sounds, with the result that
little that is useful is provided for the majority of those who possess
it. But for those who are rational and who possess a perception and
understanding of speech it signifies not only differentiations of
sounds but also of voice.79 Speech <is> responsible for acts of learning
by being audible (for <it is> itself a sound or <comes about> by means
10 of a sound. Hearing is accidentally perceptive of speech. For <hearing
is not perceptive of speech> as speech, but because being a sound is
attached to <speech> as an accident.) Because of this hearing comes
to be responsible for knowledge and inquiry in us. He showed why
hearing, being auditory of speech, comes to be a cause of learning in
us.80 And <he said that> it was because speech is put together out of
names, and names are symbols and signs of things. For names <are>
15 significant utterances (for by names here he also means verbs), since
speech is put together out of these. It is clear that hearing is acciden-
 Translation 27
tally responsible for our apprehending speech from the fact that we
hear people who are not speaking the same language in the same way,
but we do not understand what is said as speech. Understanding
<does> not consist in hearing, but <it comes about> because of
hearing. The sequence of the argument would be: ‘For speech <is>
responsible for learning, being audible accidentally but not in itself.’ 20
For <speech> is not audible in itself qua speech but qua sound.
He provided81 as a sign that hearing contributes more to wisdom
than sight does the point that, of people deprived of one of these two
senses since birth, the blind are more intelligent than the deaf and
the dumb, since they possess a cause of wisdom. By deaf82 (kôphous) 14,1
he means those unable to use their hearing and by dumb (enneous)
those who neither talk nor hear.83 For a consequence for those who
are deaf from birth is that they are also dumb.84 Sight would be
contributing more towards the investigation in the beginning and
<the> perception of the things under inquiry, hearing towards the 5
learning of what has been discovered.

<CHAPTER 2>

437a17 Concerning the power which each of the senses pos-

sesses there has been discussion previously.
It is evident that the account of perception <is> necessary for the
person who is giving the account of the common activities of animals,
an inquiry which is joined to that concerning soul. For perceiving <is 10
the> function commonest in all animals, and in addition each of the
other functions has been shown as coming about through perception
or with perception.85 But since perception, just like most of the other
activities in which animals are active, is common to body and soul,
and he has already discussed the perceptive power of the soul in On 15
the Soul,86 he reminds us of this, giving the reason for not discussing
this again, and he now87 proposes <discussion> of the body through
which perception comes about (and the sense-organs are this). He
says that some of those who have discussed <the> senses seek to make
each sense out of a single one of the bodily elements, and not finding 20
a way to correlate with four elements ‘<the senses> which are five
<they> seek concerning the fifth’ which body <they> should say it
consists of. This might be said about the opinion in the Timaeus,
which is attributed to the Pythagoreans and is described in the
Timaeus.88 For there Timaeus says that smell, and the genus of
smells, is intermediate and somehow mixable. ‘For when water 15,1
changes into air or air into water’, he says, ‘<smells> have come to be
in that which is between these.’ Smell would be this fifth <sense>
 28 Translation
‘about which they were striving.’ For of the other <senses> they made
sight of fire, hearing of air, taste of water, and touch of earth.89
5 Except that he says90 that all (pantes) make the eye out of fire,
either those who correlate the sense-organs with the elements or
those who speak otherwise about them. For they all without qualifi-
cation said that <the eye> consists of fire, but Democritus <said that
it consists> of water.91 Unless ‘all’ (pantes) <is> in place of ‘altogether’
(pantôs). Alternatively he has said, ‘those who correlate all (panta)
the sense-organs with the elements’,92 so that ‘all’ (pantes) <is> in
10 place of ‘all’ (panta).93 He says what it is they begin from in supposing
the eye to consist of fire: ‘because of being ignorant of the explanation
for an affection’ (437a23) which comes about concerning the eye. He
adds the affection, whose explanation they are ignorant of and which
leads them to say that <the eye> consists of fire: ‘For when the eye is
compressed and moved, fire appears to flash out’94 (437a23-4).
15 After proposing <to discuss> what comes about and what per-
suaded them to say <that the eye consists> of fire he adds what is
useful to him in showing that the eye does not flash because it consists
of fire. For he says: ‘This results by nature in darkness or when the
16,1 eye-lids are drawn down. For darkness comes about at that time’
(437a24-6). And so he will explain a little later how the fact that this
comes about in darkness is useful for him concerning the eye: ‘for
smooth <things> flash by nature in the dark’95 (437a31-2).
He says that the fact that ‘when the eye is compressed fire appears
5 to flash out’96 of it involves another difficulty,97 since the aforemen-
tioned fact will provide a difficulty for those who do not say that the
eye consists of fire or else because originally it was because of this
difficulty that some people were brought to the point of saying that
the eye consists of fire. For they present this as capable of resolving
the difficulty raised. For a difficulty is raised as to what is the cause
for fire’s seeming to flash out when the eye is compressed. But there
10 is this difficulty which he adds: ‘Unless it is possible for it to escape
his detection that he is perceiving and seeing’, with the result that he
seems to see but sees nothing that is seen.98 For if the eye sees
something at that time, clearly it sees itself. For there is not at that
time anything else seen by it. But if it is itself seeing itself one would
raise the difficulty of why it does not see itself when it is at rest and
not being compressed, and <one would raise a> still greater <diffi-
15 culty> of how <it sees> itself. For the sense-organs do not perceive
unless <there is> perception in relation to something and of some-
thing else.
Having raised preliminary difficulties he next attempts a resolu-
tion of them both, the <difficulty> of ‘the eye’s seeming to be fire’
(437a30-1) and the <difficulty> of its seeing itself, when it is com-
pressed and pushed aside, and no longer <doing so> when it is at rest.
 Translation 29
The cause of this and of its not resulting for the eye when at rest and99 17,1
generally of ‘the eye’s seeming to be fire must be taken from the
following’ (437a30-1). And he says, in resolving what has been said,
that ‘smooth things flash in the darkness by nature, but they do not
make light’ (437a31-2). He has already said this in On the Soul.100 For 5
all the things which we see when there is darkness, but which are not
the cause of <our seeing> other things, are things which glitter but
which do not make light. Such is ‘the black and middle <part> of the
eye’ (437a32-b1), which we call <the> pupil,101 ‘smooth’ (437b1) and
because of its smoothness glittering. Because it glitters in darkness
it too, like smooth things, is visible in darkness. This is why it is seen
at that time. For he said before that ‘this results by nature in darkness 10
or when the eye-lids have been drawn down. For darkness comes
about at that time also’ (437a25-6).
This results when the eye is moved, but not when it is at rest,
because perception is <one> of the things in relation to something and
in relation to <something> different.102 And so while <the eye> is at
rest with eyes closed, it is one and sees nothing. But when it is
compressed and moved, being one it somehow comes to be two in the
rapid pushing aside, being seen and seeing, being seen in the pushing 15
aside, but seeing in the return to its natural <position>.103 For it
glitters when it is pushed aside, and is a visible at that time as far as
<is> due to this, but it does not see, because it is one and it is itself
that by means of which we see, but not what we see. But when it is
rapidly moved in being pushed aside and in returning to its place, 20
because of the rapidity it comes to be both seeing and seen, appre-
hending the glitter in the pushing aside, which it caused itself in being
pushed aside before it ceased, because of the rapidity of the move-
ment, and seeing <it> as being generated from something else. For it
would see, if there were <a glitter generated> from a different thing
and not from itself. This would be the case if when it remained in 18,1
<its> place something else had been laid down glittering in the place
where it was itself pushed aside to. But there is no difficulty in
resolving the objection that104 it would not see the glitter from it with
the eyes shut, <the glitter> being inside the eye-lids. (For there is no
necessity for light in order to see the things that glitter, but things of
this sort are themselves sufficient to provide the cause of their being
seen, provided merely that they are in a transparent <medium>.)105 5
<The eye> does not see this <glitter> all the time that the eyes are
shut, since it is not from a different thing but from itself. But
whenever it is so moved that in some way two points106 come about
because of the rapidity of the movement, since there is a transparent
<medium> inside the eye also, for this reason it is seen glittering.
Why then is the middle <part> of the eye, which he describes as
flashing, not seen at night and by people looking into it, just as the 10
 30 Translation
other glittering things are, some of which he lists (for ‘heads of fishes’
(437b6-7) and ‘the liquid of the cuttle-fish’ (437b7) <flash in the dark>,
but so too do eyes of lions and of hares and of certain other animals
including the glow-worm)? Perhaps the skin which lies on it should
be held responsible for this. For this thin skin (humên) blocks the
15 glittering pupil so that it is not seen by the people <looking> from
outside. For not all eyes have the same thin skin lying on them. But
nor is the glitter of all smooth things the same. The rest of what is
said is reasonable, but perhaps it will seem to some hard to accept
that <the eye> can come to be both seeing and seen because it comes
to be one thing and another because of the rapidity of the pushing
20 aside. For if the glitter which comes about in the pushing aside could
persist even107 for a little time, <coming about> in another part away
from the pupil, there being that which is transparent elsewhere when
<the glitter> comes about,108 it was plausible that the eye, coming to
19,1 be in its proper place, still apprehends and sees the affection gener-
ated in it in the place where it was pushed aside. But this is impos-
sible. (For no such thing comes to be in the case of the other things
that glitter, but the glitter from them ceases at the same time as that
which glitters is turned away. For this comes about not only in the
5 case of the things that glitter but also in the case of everything which
is seen, since that which is transparent does not admit any colour in
itself in a way that involves its being affected,109 because <it does>
not <admit> even light <in this way> at all. For when <light> is
removed from the transparent it ceases in conjunction with that
which naturally illuminates.)
If this <is> so in all cases, how could the pupil, coming to be in its
natural <position>, if it were moved rapidly, apprehend the glitter
10 which is in it and which travels together with it? For just as it is not
able at the same time both to be and not to be in its proper place, even
if it is moved rapidly, so too <it is not able> to see its own glitter as
being in another place. And so one should never suppose that the eye
comes to be two in the movement, as if the same thing which sees and
is seen at the same time in the same respect comes to be two complete
15 things, when <in fact> a part is seen. For when it is so pushed aside
that it is not altogether out of its proper place and not remaining
altogether in its natural state (it was pushed aside to some degree in
such a way that what was left by it in its proper place can still see,
because it lies in a straight line with the veins through which it came
about that the movement which comes about in relation to seeing
transmits to the primary sense-organ110 the glitter which comes about
20 in the part which has been pushed aside as if <coming about> from
some other thing), <when this comes about> it sees part of itself as
something else, because <the part> has come to be visible instead of
seeing by coming to be in a place that is not natural. For this is true
 Translation 31
of that which is seen at that time, as the eye comes to be something
incomplete. It is also possible that all of it is pushed aside. In its
return to its natural <position> the part of it that has returned first
sees the <part> that is left still pushed aside. For we do not see by 20,1
means of a body without magnitude. This is also the cause of <the
eye’s> seeming to some people to be fire. For because fire glitters they
supposed that all that glitters is fire, evidently failing utterly in
respect of the conversion.111 For many things glitter without being
fire, like the things mentioned a little earlier. 5
The statement, ‘In that case the eye itself sees itself just as in
reflection’ is equal to ‘The eye itself sees itself in such a movement
and compression of the eye just as <it does> in mirrors and in all
things in which it sees itself by reflection.’ For in those cases also the 10
one <eye> comes to be two things as it were, one as appears and is
seen in the mirror, the other from which the appearance <comes>,
which is the one that sees. Those who are distorted in respect of their
eyes show that the eye sees even when it is not altogether in its own
place.

437b10 For, if <the eye> was fire, as Empedocles says112 and as

is written in the Timaeus,113 [and seeing resulted when light 15
comes out as if from a lantern, why would not the eye see in
darkness also?] (437b11-14)
Having shown the cause of the affection which comes about in the
compression of the eye and which persuaded some people to say that
the eye consisted of fire, he now shows that it is not possible that <the
eye> consists of fire, arguing against Empedocles and Plato, who
came to be of this opinion and who say that <the eye> consisting of
fire, sees by sending light out of itself, just as light is sent out from 20
lanterns. For if seeing comes about in this way, why, he says, does
the eye not see in darkness, since it sees in light, and it provided light
itself for itself by sending it out of itself?
Having said this he shows that the explanation which Plato gives
for the fact that the eye cannot see in darkness is ineffectual. For 25
<Plato> says that when this light which comes out from the eye comes
out in the daylight, it is preserved and, being mixed with the light 21,1
outside which is akin <to it>, it comes to be responsible for our seeing,
but when there is darkness it falls out onto what is a dissimilar
environment and it is extinguished. The text from the Timaeus by
means of which <Plato> says this is as follows: ‘They contrived that
there should come to be a body of fire which could not burn but could
provide gentle light114 proper to each day. For they caused the pure 5
fire inside us, <which is>115 a brother to this <fire>, to flow through
the eyes as a smooth and dense whole, and in particular, by compress-
 32 Translation
ing the middle of the eyes so as to keep in all <the fire> which is too
dense, <they caused it> to allow through only such <fire> as is pure.
And so whenever there is daylight around the stream from the eye,
<the stream> is at that time falling out onto <an environment>
10 similar to itself, and it comes to be compact, and it is established as
one body that has been made akin in a straight line from the eyes, in
whichever direction there stands firm that which impinges from
inside on that of the things from outside which it met.116 <The> whole
<stream> comes to be similar in affection because of <its> similarity,
and whatever it has laid hold of and whatever else <has laid hold of>
it, it transmits the movements of it117 all along its body as far as the
15 soul and provides this sense which we called seeing.118 But <the
stream> is cut off when the fire which is akin departs into night. For
if what comes out is dissimilar it is itself altered and extinguished,
no longer coming to be fused with the air nearby since <the air> does
not possess fire. And so it ceases to see, and furthermore comes to be
an inducer of sleep.’ But <Aristotle> shows that this statement – that
the light which comes out from the eyes is extinguished by the
20 darkness – is ineffectual. For in short ‘what extinguishing of light is
there?’ (437b15-16). For the hot and dry, i.e. fire, is naturally extin-
guished by the moist and cold,119 just as we see that the fire which is
in charcoal and firewood, and flame <are so extinguished>. He is
saying that neither of <hot or dry> is present in light, and the fire of
charcoal, or flame, is <hot and dry>. If this is so, light would not be
22,1 extinguished by the cold or the moist. Alternatively120 he is saying
that neither of the things by which fire is extinguished is present in
light. For <light> is not extinguished by either the moist or the cold.
Or rather the text is as follows: ‘The flame in light <seems to be> such
as the fire in charcoal seems to be. But neither is apparent as being
5 present concerning darkness. For this <is> neither moist nor cold,
<the affections> by which <fire> is extinguished.’ What is added is
consistent with this.

437b19 But if they are present but escape detection because of

<being present> to a slight degree [daylight would have to be
extinguished in rain and darkness would have to come about to
a greater degree in frosts. Flame and bodies that have been set
on fire are affected in this way. But in this case nothing of this
sort results.] (437b20-3)
For suppose someone says, ‘Either both of these are present in
darkness or one or the other. However, because it is present to a slight
10 degree, it escapes detection by us but it extinguishes light by means
of the power which exists in it but which is indistinct to us, since it
would be fine and easily affected.’ On this argument the things which
 Translation 33
extinguish flame, which is even stronger, would have to extinguish
day <light> both in rain because of the moisture and in frosts because
of the cold, so that darkness comes about in frosts. At any rate the
fire in charcoal and flame are seen to be affected in this way. But we 15
see no such thing come about. But if light is not extinguished by these
things, <the light> that is sent out from the eyes would not be
extinguished in darkness. But if, since it is not extinguished, it would
be necessary for us to see if it were sent out, but we do not see, so it
would not be sent out at all, as the Timaeus says. It is also clear from
the following that darkness is not moist and cold, the things which
are capable of extinguishing fire: for <darkness> comes about in dry 20
and hot places also, not only in <places> that are the opposite.
Moreover if seeing was by sending out light, there would need to be
no seeing of things in water. For how can fire and light remain such
in water and not be extinguished? Moreover it was more reasonable
that this little light which is sent out should be extinguished in
daylight rather than in darkness. For we see that the greater fire and 23,1
the greater light <are> capable of destroying the little <fire or light>.
For things which illuminate at night are weak when there is daylight.
Consequently it is more reasonable, if seeing <is> by sending out
light, that animals see at night rather than in the day.
After saying this about the opinion of Plato he turns to the opinion 5
of Empedocles. He says that sometimes he holds light that is sent out
from the eye responsible for seeing and sometimes certain effluxes
from the <bodies> being seen. Firstly he quotes the verses121 <of
Empedocles> which show that he too believes that light is fire and
that this <fire> is poured forth from the eyes and sent out and that 10
seeing comes about by this means. For through his verses he com-
pares the light which is sent out from the eye to the light <which is
sent out> by means of lamp-holders. Just as someone intending to
journey at night prepares a lamp and puts it in a lantern (for the
lantern excludes and keeps off the winds from outside, and allows
through to the outside the finest <part> of the fire, which is light), so,
he says, being enclosed in membranes the fire is surrounded by fine 15
thin skins, which exclude the things which, impinging from outside,
are capable of destroying the fire and do not allow them to trouble the
pupil, but which do allow through to the outside the finest <part> of
the fire. By amourgous he would mean the lanterns <called> ex-
cluders because they exclude the winds and protect the fire which
they surround. Alternatively by amourgous <he would mean> the 20
<lanterns> which are dense and which exclude the winds because of
their density. By tanaos <he would mean> the fire which is stretched
and able to escape through the dense <walls> because of its fine
nature. By kata bêlon <he would mean> throughout the heaven.
Homer <says>,122 ‘Seizing him he threw him apo bêlou, so that he
 34 Translation
might reach the earth in a feeble condition.’ By ‘it poured the round-
24,1 eyed pupil in the fine linens’ he meant ‘it enclosed the round pupil in
fine thin skins’, using linens poetically in place of thin skins with
reference to the word pupil. Having shown that he says this through
these verses, he adds that, ‘sometimes he says that seeing <comes
about> like this, and sometimes by effluxes from the <bodies> seen’,
(438a4-5) <saying> that certain things flow from <the bodies seen>,
5 which impinge on the eye and pass inside whenever they fit in the
passages in <the eye> by being commensurable <with them>, and
that seeing comes about in this way. Plato also in the Meno123
mentions this opinion as being that of Empedocles, and defines colour
in accordance with the opinion <of Empedocles> as being an efflux of
bodies commensurable with and perceptible to the eye.

10 438a5 Democritus is right in saying that <the eye> is water but

not correct in thinking that seeing is the appearance.
After arguing against those who make the eye out of fire he has turned
to the Democritean opinion, and he praises the fact that he says that
the eye consists of water, but he does not accept the way in which he
15 says seeing comes about. For Democritus says that to see is to admit
the appearance from the <bodies> seen.124 The appearance is the
appearing form in the pupil, and similarly in the other transparent
<bodies> which are able to preserve the appearance in themselves.
<Democritus> himself and before him Leucippus and subsequently
Epicurus125 and his followers believe that images flowing from <bod-
ies> and having similar shapes to the <bodies> from which they flow
20 (and these are visibles) fall on the eyes of the people seeing and that
seeing comes about in this way. He offers as evidence the fact that
the appearance and image of the <body> seen is always in the pupil
of the people seeing.126 <He says that> this is seeing. <Aristotle>
argues against this opinion of Democritus that this (meaning the
appearance) results because the eye is smooth. For all smooth things
25 naturally admit such an appearance from visibles, and not the eye
alone. ‘Not correct in thinking that seeing is the appearance’ is ‘Not
correct in thinking that the appearance is the cause of seeing.’

25,1 438a7 [For this results because the eye is smooth] and it is not
in that, but in that which sees. For the affection is reflection.
It seems to me that what is being said has been expressed with
extreme brevity, and for this reason is unclear. For what he is saying
5 is: ‘And seeing is not in that, i.e. seeing is not because of the appear-
ance and it is not in the appearance, but in that which sees, i.e. that
which possesses the visual capacity. For the appearance is a reflec-
 Translation 35
tion127 and affection.’ Alternatively ‘And it is not in that, but in that
which sees. For the affection is reflection’ is equal to ‘And seeing is
not in the appearance, but the reflection is in that which sees.’ The
added comment, ‘For the affection is reflection’, is demonstrative of
this.128 For because <the eye> is smooth the appearance <is> in the 10
eye, which is that which sees. For the appearance is an affection which
comes about by virtue of reflection in things, like the eye, that are
smooth and which possess a certain constitution, so as to be able to
preserve what appears when it is generated through the transparent
medium. For this reason also, since <the transparent medium> pos-
sesses the visible in itself, and this is the appearance, a transmission of 15
the appearance to something else comes about and <it is transmitted>
to the very person who sees. Therefore, because the eye is like this (for
<it is> smooth), there comes about in this too the appearance by virtue
of the reflection through the transparent medium, whenever it is such
in actuality. He uses the word reflection (anaklasis) as a more common
alternative to appearance (emphasis), since it is used in everyday speech
to refer to <reflections.>129 For in fact these things do not come about by 20
virtue of reflection, as seems <to be the case> to the mathematicians,130
but because of the messenger service (diakonia131) of the transparent,
which, being affected in some way by the <body> being seen, transmits
the affection which it undergoes to things that are smooth and able to
keep it in and preserve it, whenever these are placed in a straight line
to the <body> being seen, and being affected in turn from these things
as if from a starting-point, it transmits the affection to the things from
which it took the affection in the first place. <Aristotle> has stated this 25
when he described how we see in On the Soul.132
Having said that the thing seen is not the appearance but an
affection and reflection, he adds that perhaps it was not yet clear to
Democritus concerning appearances and reflections, either what
appearances are, or how they come about, or that not only eyes but 26,1
all things that are smooth and able to keep things in are able to
receive such appearances. Having said this he adds that it is absurd
that ‘it did not occur to him to raise a difficulty as to why’ only the
eye sees whereas several things admit appearances and, as he thinks,
images. For if he had attended to this it would not have seemed to 5
him that appearance is that which sees. For many inanimate things
admit this sort of appearance but do not see.

438a12 And so it is true that the eye consists of water but seeing
does not result <for the eye> qua water [but qua transparent.
This is common to air also. But water is more easily confined
and easier to hold (euüpolêptoteron) than air. For this reason the
pupil and the eye consist of water.] (438a14-16)
 36 Translation
10 He says that what is said by Democritus is true, namely that the eye
consists of water. However it is not because <the eye> is water and
consists of water that it sees but because being transparent attaches
to water as an accident.133 For seeing <comes about> through what is
transparent. This is why <it comes about> through water. For this
too is transparent. Next he adds the explanation why, given that what
15 we see with is obliged to be transparent, and given that air is
transparent to no lesser degree than water, the eye consists of water.
For he says: because water is more easily confined than air and more
able to be preserved in whatever it is shut up in (for air easily leaks
out and is hard to shut up because it leaks out easily), <the eye> would
consist of water, and <this is also true> because water is more
20 preservative of its place than air and has greater consistency (for the
word euüpolêptoteron <easier to hold>, which he uses, signifies this).
For <water> possesses consistency to a greater degree, since air is
unstable. Also air, because of its fine nature, is merely transparent
but water is both transparent and appearance-making.134 And so it is
sufficient if that through which we see is transparent, but that with
which we see must be appearance-making and such as to be able to
25 admit and preserve the forms of the <bodies> seen. Alternatively the
appearance contributes nothing to seeing but the transparency is
sufficient, as he said. Moreover there are two excesses in the trans-
parent and air is at the extreme in being loose-textured, whereas at
the other extreme transparent <bodies> which are determinate are
solid (these are the <bodies> which possess a boundary peculiar <to
27,1 themselves>, like glass and stones of this sort). Water is the mean
state between each of these extremes. That which was going to
apprehend each of the excesses had to be in a mean state between
each. (For if it were from one of the extremes, it would not apprehend
the other <extreme> which would be far away and a long way distant,
5 since, as he himself has said in the second <book> of On the Soul,135
that through which we perceive must be <in a mean state>.) Water
is such in relation to the other transparent <bodies>. And so it is
reasonable that the eye <consists> of <water>.
He also shows (438a17-18) by reference to the eyes themselves that
the pupil through which we see consists of water. For when these are
destroyed what flows out is clearly water. But he also says (438a18-
10 19) that in those embryos which are still completely new-born that
which is moist in the eyes is surpassing in cold and brightness. The
properties of the eye are also clear from dissections.136 For that which
is surrounded in the case where the pupil <is> is not anything other
than moist. He also says (438a20-2) that the white of the eye is
particularly oily in animals that are supplied with blood for this
reason, so that the moist in the <case> may remain unfrozen by being
15 warmed by means of this. For this reason the eye is very insensible
 Translation 37
to cold (438a22-4). Animals supplied with blood possess this help in
preventing the moist in their eyes from being frozen. Bloodless
<animals> do not have fat but they are hard-eyed because of the
solidity of the cases which surround the moist through which they see
and they are protected by these (438a24-5).

438a25 It is unreasonable generally <to say> that the eye sees 20

by something which comes out.
In the middle of discussing the opinion of Democritus he returns to
the <opinion> mentioned earlier.137 Since those who made the eye
consist of fire said that seeing came about when a certain light came
out from the eyes, in opposing generally the claim that seeing comes
about by something coming out from the eyes and in destroying this
claim he will destroy in conjunction with it the claim which followed 25
it.138 The claim which followed it is the claim that the eye consists of
fire. The claim that a reflection (anaklasis) comes about139 would also
be destroyed by the <contention> that seeing does not come about by
something coming out of the eyes. For, he says, it is unreasonable
generally that seeing comes about by something coming out from the
eyes. Of those who gave similar descriptions of how seeing is produced 28,1
some thought that what comes out from the eyes is extended as far
as the <body> being seen, as the mathematicians <think>, who say
that we see by means of rays which come out from the eyes and are
extended as far as the <bodies> being seen. (For they say that a cone
is generated from the rays having the eye as apex and the <body> 5
that is seen as base, and that the <bodies> that are seen are enclosed
by this cone and in this way are seen because the base of the cone
encloses them.) Others say that the light that is sent out from the
eyes proceeds as far as a certain point and then comes to be commin-
gled with the light outside and seeing comes about when this light,
which is established from both and fused together, impinges at its
boundary on the eyes and announces the affection to the eye, as seems 10
<to be the case> to Plato. <Aristotle> says that both opinions are
absurd. He says nothing else in argument against <the> mathemati-
cians but he does speak against those who say that light comes out
and is then fused together with light from the <bodies> seen, since
this is the opinion of those who say that the eye is fire, <an opinion>
which it has been his primary aim to destroy. 15
Firstly it could be said against them that what is sent out is
necessarily a body. For it is not possible for something without a body
to be moved in itself in respect of place. But, if what is sent out is a
body, how is it that the <bodies> seeing are not spent when they are
as far removed from the <body> being seen as the heaven is from us?
For even if the body which is sent out were to be outstanding in 20
 38 Translation
respect of its fine nature, nevertheless the great extent of the distance
is sufficient and more than enough to consume a body which140
animals have, even if someone resolves it into a very fine <body>. But
as it is animals are not seen to become any smaller, when they see
<bodies> from so great a distance, than they are when they shut their
eyes.
Furthermore if what is poured forth is so fine that it is able, even
25 when it is so extended, to avoid consuming in any evident way
anything of the body from which it is poured forth, how is it not easily
destroyed by some chance thing? For those bodies which are very fine
<are> easily affected. But this is clearly able to avoid being diverted
from its ordering in a straight line even by the most violent winds.
29,1 Furthermore if it is so fine, why is it not poured forth through the
passages in the eye-lid when we have our eyes shut? And why do we
not see at that time also? For the stream of rays is much finer than
the exudations which seep out through it. But when our eyes are shut
the eye-lids have not been so joined together that rays which are so
5 fine cannot escape. For if they can go through solid transparent
<bodies> (for we see <bodies> on the far side through such <bodies>,
just as <we do> through micae and stones of selenite),141 clearly they
could be poured forth through the skin of the eye-lid.
Furthermore why do the rays which are sent out not end in a
narrow <shape> just like all things that <are sent out> from things?
10 For we observe that water, when it flows from <somewhere>, becomes
narrow in its advance, and flame also ends in a sharp point. But they
say that these <rays> on the contrary widen as they are poured out
and end in <the> base of a cone. Next, if what is sent out is a body,
clearly it will occupy a place. But if there is no void, either a body will
pass through a body and two bodies will be in the same place at the
15 same time, or even more <than two> if there were several people
seeing the same thing, or there will be reciprocal replacement142 of air
if we see in air and of water if we see in water. And so into what <will>
the reciprocal replacement <come about>? For it is not possible to
admit into the eye and the pupil the water which exchanges places
with the rays, when we look at <things> in water. Nor is it possible
to admit <the water> through respiration. For we certainly do not
20 breathe in when we are in water. Therefore one should investigate in
the case of the reciprocal replacement of water what it is which
exchanges places with this body through which the cone travels. For
when one person sees, it would exchange places with his cone. But if
a second and third person were seeing the same thing how will there
still be reciprocal replacement in so far as the cones are colliding with
each other? For if part of the cone exchanges places with part of the
25 <other> cone, only one person would be seeing, the person the part of
whose cone occupies the place adjacent to the <body> seen. For how
 Translation 39
could these people still be seeing if parts of their cones had exchanged
places? But in fact they all see at the same time. Therefore the cones
must pass through each other and many bodies must occupy the same
place which the part of one person’s cone occupies. 30,1
Furthermore if all process <is> in time,143 and seeing <comes
about> because rays are poured out and stretched as far as the <body>
being seen, we will see in time. But in fact it is impossible for
something which is the same thing and is being moved at equal speed
to be moved in an equal time over this distance and over one as many 5
times as great. But, if there is light, we see at the same time as looking
both things that are near and those that are very far away.144
Furthermore if many people were to be seeing the same thing at the
same time from different places and the cones were to be travelling,
(or whatever it is which travels from the eye to the <body> seen from
all those who are seeing), the things that are travelling and enclosing
the <body> being seen would necessarily travel through each other.
In this way the cones would be divided by each other. If this comes 10
about, the continuity of the bodies which are sent out to the <body>
being seen is necessarily broken up, and if this <continuity> were
divided it would no longer be possible to see. This same thing would
necessarily come about also if the people seeing were two people
standing opposite each other, and there were something visible
placed in a straight line with each of the people seeing and they were
not seeing the things in a straight line with themselves but each of 15
them <were seeing> the thing that had been placed in a straight line
with the other person. For in this case necessarily the cones would
collide with each other in the middle and be divided by each other, or
one would pass through the other. In this case two bodies would again
come to be in the same <place>.
Furthermore how will those who see each other when they are
opposite each other be able to see? For either the cones will not
proceed when they meet each other, if they are of equal strength, with 20
the result that neither will see the other, or one will see the other but
the other will not see him. Furthermore if that which flows from the
eyes and with which we see is a body, either it will be air or fire. For
these are the finest of the bodies in us. But it is not reasonable <that
the body> is air. For there is air in front of the eyes and in front of
the pupil. And so <air> would be sent out from inside to no purpose. 25
But if that which is sent out is fire (for this is finer and more easily
moved), and if there is naturally a movement upward of fire, how is
it that we do not only see what is upward, but also what is below us
and downward, and at equal speed and in the same way? Or what
will there be which itself moves the fire downward by force after it
has been poured forth from the eyes? Furthermore how do we see 31,1
things under water? For all fire is extinguished in water, and the finer
 40 Translation
and smaller it is the more rapidly <it is extinguished>. But it is also
not reasonable that fire travels through the eye. For the pupil <con-
sists of> water. Furthermore if what is sent out is fire it would have
5 to be seen, if not during the day, then at least at night. But the air
around people seeing would be illuminated, if there were several
people enclosed in a small amount of air who were seeing at the same
time at night. For it is simple-minded to say that the fire which is
sent out of the eye at night is extinguished because of the density of
the dark air. For water which is much denser does not extinguish it.
10 If they were to say that what is sent out is light, it would need to be
demonstrated to them that it is without body and unable to be sent
out and poured forth, as they say. For <light> comes about depending
upon a relation between that which is naturally illuminated and that
which is able to illuminate. For this reason there is not a movement
of light. At any rate, so far as concerns things which can be illumi-
nated from the same distance by <that which naturally illuminates>,
we see both the things that are illuminated which are close to the
natural illuminant and those which are far away from it at the same
15 time. This would be impossible if light were a body. It is clear that
light is a relation,145 and is dependent upon a relation between the
illuminant and the illuminated, and is not a substance and body, from
the fact that <light> does not persist even for a little while when the
illuminant has been turned away.
These and similar points could be made against those who send a
20 body out from the eyes as far as the <bodies> being seen. And it is
equally unreasonable that something flowing from the <bodies> seen
impinges on the eyes, and that seeing comes about in this way. For
almost all the impossibilities which follow for those who say that
something flows from the eyes also follow for those <who say that
something flows> from the <bodies> being seen. But furthermore in
addition to those <impossibilities> there is also the impossibility of
any perception coming about of the distance between that which sees
25 and that which is seen, if seeing were to come about in this way.
Furthermore how will something be seen all together (athroon)? For
necessarily what is seen depends on what the pupil admits. For <one
can only see> as much of the efflux as <the pupil> will admit. And
how is it that the eye, which is so easily affected, does not grow weary
when so many, and such continuous, bodies are falling on it? But
discussion of these points has been given elsewhere at greater
length.146
32,1 Aristotle has said ‘It is unreasonable generally <to say> that the
eye sees by something which comes out and that <what comes out>
is extended as far as the stars, or that coming out as far as something
it is fused together, as some people said’147 (438a25-7), and he has
demonstrated the absurdity of one of the opinions by saying ‘that
 Translation 41
<what comes out> is extended as far as the stars’ (for it is totally 5
beyond reason that so great a body can be sent out from anyone of
those who see, so that it can be extended as far as the stars). He <now>
speaks against those148 who say that the light which is sent out is
fused together with the light outside: ‘For <it would be> better than
this <to say> that it is fused in <the> starting-point of the eye, but
this too is simple-minded’ (438a27-9). He says <this>, because rather
than saying that the light outside is fused together with the light sent 10
out from the eye, when it comes to be outside, it would be better to
say that the <light> outside is fused together with the <light> inside
before it is sent out <when it is> adjacent to the pupil and in the pupil.
For this is <what he means by> ‘that it is fused together in <the>
starting-point of the eye’. But why is this better? Is it because there
would be no need of the efflux of light from the eye, if <the light> itself
was not going to enclose the visible <body>149 but was going to be light 15
in between which provides the cause of the very fact that the <body>
seen is seen? For that, of which they say that it makes a contribution
itself to seeing by means of light which is sent out, could, even without
<light> which is sent out, make a contribution adjacent to the pupil
itself and apart from efflux. For how does the eye see by means of
light which is sent out and how is <the light which is sent out>
affected by the light outside? For <it is not affected by its> transmit-
ting the form of the visible <body>. And so it would be better to say 20
that <the form of the visible body> is transmitted to <the light> which
is inside by <the light outside>. For if the <parts> as far as the pupil
have been illuminated, why is there a need for a second light which
is sent out? And if there is darkness around the pupil, and the light
<outside> is farther away, the light which comes out into the dark-
ness will be extinguished before it comes to be fused with <the light
outside>, since the darkness is capable of extinguishing it, as some
people say.150 In this case it would be useful for nothing. This is why 25
it would be better, he says, to say that the light outside is fused with
the pupil and the light in it.
But this too is simple-minded, he says, and he adds why it is
simple-minded. ‘For what is it for light to be fused with light?’ 33,1
(438a29-30). For Plato said that a fusion came about of the light which
comes out from the eye and of the <light> outside. For, in giving the
explanation of the fact that the eye does not see when there is
darkness, he says: ‘But <the stream> is cut off when the fire which is
akin departs into night. For if what comes out is dissimilar it is itself 5
altered and extinguished, no longer coming to be fused with the air
nearby since <the air> does not possess fire.’ Therefore <Plato> is
saying that we see because the light which comes out of us is fused
with that air which possesses fire and light. But <Aristotle> says that
it is simple-minded to say that light is fused with light. For what does
 42 Translation
being fused signify? For <there is> no151 being fused of things without
10 bodies and chance things do not fuse with each other,152 but the things
being fused must firstly be bodies, and secondly they must have an
affinity for each other. To say that the eyes and the light from them
are fused with the light outside is totally absurd. For light is without
a body, and in addition it is obvious that no fusion comes about of
light with light. For we see that, whenever light comes about at the
same time as <other> light, <both lights being generated> from
15 different illuminants, no fusion of <the two lights> comes about, but
<each light> is again separated when the illuminants are separated.
And so when two lamps are burning in the same <place>, if someone
removes one, the light from it is clearly removed in conjunction with
it. For the <light> which is left comes to be smaller. And how is it
reasonable that we cannot see the same thing with our faculties of
20 sight,153 and with the light which is sent out through the eyes, but we
can see it by the aid of this light <which is sent out> when naturally
fused with our faculties of sight and with this light,154 whenever it
impinges on something visible? Then again if the faculties of sight of
several people impinge on the same light, are they all fused with <it>
and do they all see through one faculty of sight? Or what is the way
of fusion for them? And, when there is a fusion involving the light
25 peculiar to each of the people seeing, how is it divided into the light
of each person?155
Having raised the difficulty of how it is possible to say that light is
fused with light, he raises the further difficulty of how the light
34,1 outside is fused with the pupil and the light in it.156 For how is the
<light> inside the eye fused with the light outside? For if seeing is by
means of the fusion of the <light> from us with the <light> outside,
how is the <light> outside fused with the <light> inside? For the pupil
is not what sees and neither is the eye. ‘For the soul <is> not on the
extreme <part> of the eye and neither <is> that which is percep-
5 tive’,157 as he says, but that which is perceptive is in another <part>,
as he demonstrated in On the Soul.158 Therefore it is clear that the
<light> inside through which we see is in need of the light outside.
For everything must be disposed in the same way right up to the
perceptive starting-point. But in fact it is not possible to say that the
light outside is fused with the light inside. For the membrane (mên-
inx) which is in between will prevent this fusion, if light is a body,
<and if it is without body the light will not be able at all to be fused159>
10 since things without bodies are not fused with each other. Indeed if
the light inside must be fused with the light outside in order that the
soul may perceive and this is impossible unless light enters towards
<the soul>, <the soul> would not see. For if we see by means of mixed
light and the <light> inside is not mixed with the <light> outside, we
would not see by means of it. For we will not see by means of the
 Translation 43
extremity of the pupil. By ‘membrane’ (mêninx) <Aristotle> would
mean the case (khitôn) which surrounds the pupil. This is what 15
Empedocles was shown to mean a little before160 by ‘just so, when
primeval light, <was> enclosed in membranes (mêninxin), ’. Con-
sequently it is better than saying that the light inside is sent out to
the <light> outside <to say> immediately that <the light outside> is
fused with the pupil161 inside, but this too is impossible. For the light
outside would not be fused with the <light> inside because the
membrane is in between. And so seeing would not come about by
means of the fusion of the light, if light were a body and it needed to 20
touch that with which it is being fused.

438b2 Concerning the impossibility of seeing without light

35,1
there has been discussion elsewhere.
Having argued against those who say that seeing comes about by
means of something which comes out of the eye, and having shown
how absurd their statements are, he himself gives his own opinion.
He says that ‘concerning the impossibility of seeing without light 5
there has been discussion elsewhere’. He has discussed it in On the
Soul. For he said that colour, which is visible in itself,162 caused
movement in what was transparent in actuality,163 and that that
which is illuminated is transparent in actuality, since light was
postulated to be <the> actuality of the transparent qua transpar-
ent.164 And so, whether that which is between the <body> seen and 10
the eye which sees is light or illuminated air, the movement which is
generated through this by the visible is the cause of seeing.165 For the
visible causes movement in a nature of this sort. He said, ‘Whether
that which is between is light or air’, because, although light is
responsible, this cannot exist apart from air or something else trans-
parent. For he showed166 that light was <the> form and actuality of
a nature of this sort. And so ‘or air’ is equal to ‘or some body such that 15
it possesses light within itself.’
For this reason he says,167 ‘And it is reasonable that what is inside
consists of water’, (i.e. the pupil; for this is inside and not between
what is seen and the eye). For water is transparent and such as to
admit light. For just as the medium outside must be illuminated, so 20
too that which is inside must be illuminated as far as the sense-organ
and the perceptive capacity168 if something is going to be seen. For
just as it is impossible for something to be seen if there is no light
outside, so too nothing could be seen inside, unless <what is inside>
is illuminated as far as the perceptive soul. For this reason what is
inside must also be transparent and such as to be illuminated.
Therefore it is necessary that this be water since it is not air. He 25
assumed that what is inside the eye is not air, either because nobody
 44 Translation
says this, or because it is not apparent either in dissections or in
injuries that air is enclosed in there, or because, as he has said,169
36,1 what is inside the eye must be transparent, and water is more easily
confined and easier to hold than air, and it is more easily confined in
both respects,170 <firstly> because it is not only transparent but also
appearance-making,171 so as to admit to a greater degree the forms of
visibles, and <secondly> because it is better able to keep something
in and preserve it. For air is unsettled and liable to leak out.

5 438b8 For the soul is not on the extremity of the eye and neither
is that which is perceptive.
Having said, ‘And just as <the body seen> is not seen outside without
light so too <is it the case> with what is inside’ (438b6-7), he adds the
explanation of the fact that what is inside must also be transparent,
namely that the soul and the visual capacity are not in the eye.172 For
10 if it were on the extreme part of the eye, what is inside would not need
to be transparent.173 For what is outside would be sufficient. But it is
not there. (For, <if it were>, the same would be true of the other
sense-organs also. But if this were the case there would not be any
joint perception coming about, since different parts of the soul would
be in different <places> and ordered in different directions, and we
would not be able to judge that the things which we perceive with the
15 different sense-organs are different from each other, since we would
not possess one thing which apprehends them, as he said in On the
Soul.174 For that which perceives things also judges their differentia-
tions. For just as, if one person were hearing and another person
seeing, the person seeing would be unable to judge the <perceptibles>
of the person hearing, so too in our case the capacities would have
20 been detached from each other.) This state does not exist when we
see. (It is also confirmed from what results that the visual soul is not
in the extreme part of the eye and that what is <inside> as far as that
capacity, through the illumination of which seeing comes about, is
transparent. For, he says, when people have been wounded ‘in war
around the temple in such a way that the passages from the eye have
been cut off ’ (438b12-14), passages containing that which is trans-
25 parent, it seemed to them that darkness suddenly came about as if
‘a lamp had been extinguished’ (438b14-15). This is because the pupil
has been cut off from the transparent behind it, the pupil being as it
37,1 were a lantern which illuminates, and through which that which is
inside, everything as far as the visual capacity, received illumination
from the light outside, and the injury, having interrupted the conti-
nuity of <that which is inside> and having prevented it from being
illuminated, has as it were extinguished the light in it.) If we do not
see with the extreme part of the eye, for this reason also that which
 Translation 45
is inside as far as the perceptive soul must be transparent. But fire 5
is not transparent, as the eye is.

438b16 Therefore, if it results in the case of these things as we

were saying, <it is evident that, if one must in this way assign
and attach each of the sense-organs to one of the elements, one
must suppose that the visual <part> of the eye <consists> of
water, that which is perceptive of sounds <consists> of air, and
smell of fire> (438b17-21)
Having shown that the eye consists of water he says that, if this is so
in the case of the eye and if for this reason each sense-organ is
attributed to a single one of the elements, as certain people were
striving for,175 one must postulate that sight consists of water, hearing
of air (this is what is able to hear sounds), and smell of fire. 10
He says176 how it is possible to confirm and demonstrate that smell
<consists of> fire: ‘For that which is able to smell is potentially what
smell is in actuality’. He thus demonstrates by means of this that
<smell> <consists> of fire (for, as he will show elsewhere,177 the
actuality and the potentiality are opposites, and the actuality is
concerned with smell but not with that which is able to smell),
although in the case of sight he <simply> says that ‘the visual’ 15
consists of ‘water’ and in the case of hearing that ‘that which is
perceptive of sounds’ consists of ‘air’. What he is saying is ‘that which
is able to smell is potentially what smell is in actuality.’ Sight before
it sees is potentially the visibles, and hearing before it hears is
potentially the audibles, and so smell before it smells is potentially
the smellables. For smell in actuality is the smellable, just as sight 20
in actuality is the visible, at any rate if perceiving <comes about> by
the taking in of the forms of the perceptibles,178 and it would be true179 38,1
as he says that ‘that which is able to smell is potentially what smell
is in actuality’. Smell in actuality is the same as what is smellable in
actuality. For what is smellable and smell in actuality are the same
thing. But in fact the smellable, and the smell which smelling appre- 5
hends, is a dry and ‘smoky vapour’. A vapour of this sort is fiery and
‘<consists> of fire’ (this is clear from things which are being burnt –
for then in particular they make a smell – and flowers make more
smell in hotter air, as if a vapour is being generated from them). For
the change into fire <comes about> by means of a vapour of this sort.
He will discuss as he proceeds the question of what the smellable is.180 10
For smell in actuality is of this sort.
He is confirming how someone who wanted to attribute each
sense-organ to one each of the elements would say that smell consists
of fire. (For he is not expressing his own doctrines. For he said in On
the Soul181 that no sense-organ could consist of fire or earth alone, 15
 46 Translation
and in that work he attributed smell to either air or water). He says182
that it can also be shown that smell consists of fire by reference to the
fact that the sense-organ of smell is near the brain. For the matter183
of the hot must be cold, and the brain is colder in its own nature.184
Therefore what is potentially smell and what is potentially able to
20 smell is of this sort. But if that which is potentially something is the
matter of the thing which it potentially is, and smell which is poten-
tially the smellable would be the matter of the smellable, and the cold
is the matter of the hot, and that which is able to smell is cold because
it exists from and near the brain, then the smellable is hot. But if this
is so, smell in actuality is hot and is generated because of the presence
39,1 of what is hot, and in this way the person who says that smell consists
of fire would seem to be speaking well. ‘For the matter of the cold is
potentially hot’ means ‘the <matter> out of the cold <is potentially
hot>’. And so he is not demonstrating that the sense-organ <consists>
of fire, because he does not think that this is at all possible, but that
the smellable and smell in actuality <consist of fire>.
5 He says185 that the coming-to-be of the eye possesses the same
character. For it has its constitution from the brain,186 which ‘is
moistest and coldest of the parts in the body.’ Water, through which
sight <comes about> is like this. But since the eye,187 which has its
coming-to-be from the brain, consists188 not of fire but of water, clearly
smell would not consist of fire either, at any rate if <it has its
10 coming-to-be> from <the brain>. However he says as he proceeds189
that smell and this sense-organ are near the brain for this reason,
namely in order that the place near the brain may be brought into a
due proportion of perception. For smellables and smell are hot. For
the smoky vapour is like this. But if someone were to follow what has
been said, he would say that sight is of <the> hot and fire in the same
15 way that smell is, if at any rate the cold is matter of the visibles and
sight in actuality is the same as <the visibles> just as smell <is the
same as> the smellables. But clearly he says these things because he
is arguing to no purpose, and not because he is satisfied with them.
Alternatively, whilst both are near the brain which is cold, the <part>
20 able to smell is able to smell in so far as it is cold (this is also why it
is, in so far as it is <cold>, potentially perceptive and hot) but the
<part> able to see is able to see not in so far as it is cold but in so far
as it is moist and transparent. For <the> actuality of <the> transpar-
ent is light and colour.
Touch must be attributed, he says,190 to earth, and in the same way
also the organ capable of taste, since taste is a species of touch, so
that <the five senses> consist of the four bodies, two, touch and taste,
25 of earth, sight of water, hearing of air, and smell of fire. It is obvious
that he is making postulates in the course of making plausible
arguments without being satisfied with this opinion. For he demon-
 Translation 47
strated191 that no sense-organ can consist of earth by means of the
fact that those <parts> in us which have a greater amount of earth,
like hair, nails, and bones, are without perception. But also he
demonstrated192 that taste comes about in and through moisture.
Alternatively he is not now saying that the sense-organs consist of
earth, but that their actualities come to be like this, in the way he 40,1
showed in the case of smell.
He is continuing to make plausible arguments showing how some-
one would argue for the view that each sense consists of one each of
the elements and <showing> which <element each sense consists of>
when he adds: ‘And because of this their sense-organ, that of taste 5
and touch, is adjacent to the heart. This is opposed to the brain, and
it is the hottest of the parts’ (439a1-4). For having said that smell
consists of fire and that for this reason the sense-organ peculiar to
smell is near the brain (for the cold is matter for the hot, since
generally opposites are matter to each other. Smell is hot since it 10
<consists of> a smoky vapour), he says that in turn for this reason
the organs of touch and of taste are near the heart, since these
sense-organs are hot by their own nature (for flesh is not like this),
but their actuality comes about to a greater degree around cold things,
since touch particularly apprehends earth and earthy things having
resistance. But not even this will seem to be a sound statement. For 15
touch <does> not <consist> of earth (just as a little before he was
speaking about smell when he said ‘and smell <consists> of fire’), but
he said ‘that which is able to touch <consists> of earth’, meaning by
this that the sense-organ <consists> of earth. But earth is not hot.
And so he is certainly not saying that it is because the senses are
similar and near the heart in accordance with the same reason in
accordance with which smell and sight are near the brain, but rather 20
that it is because, just as smell and sight are near <the brain> which
is the coldest of the parts in the body, so in the same way touch and
taste are near the heart which is the hottest of the parts. For the heart
is hot and is opposite to the brain in accordance with this. For this
reason <the brain> is matter for the hot whilst the heart <is matter>
for the cold. In saying that certain sense-organs are near the brain 25
he is not also saying that the perceptive soul which <comes about>
by means of these <sense-organs> is there. For it was because of this
that when he said, ‘This is why <the sense-organ of smell is peculiar
to the place> near the brain’, he added ‘to the place’. For he says that
the perceptive soul is one in number, and he says that it is in the
heart. For this reason the perceptive organs adjacent to the brain do 41,1
not have their starting-point from <the brain> but begin from the
heart, and their route is through this first. For three passages extend
from the heart to the brain, and then from the brain one of them
reaches the sight, another the hearing, and the third the smell. The 5
 48 Translation
<passages> of touch and taste extend directly in a straight line to the
heart and not by way of the route to the brain.

<CHAPTER 3>
Having said this about the sense-organs he will next go on to the
account of the perceptibles in respect of each sense-organ (for he is
not now discussing the common perceptibles). He says (439a6-9) that
10 he has discussed generally what the function193 of each of them is in
On the Soul (and he adds what are the general accounts of them). For
he has already stated with reference to these <perceptibles> that
<they are> the disposition in some way of the sense and the sense-or-
gan, and that ‘<they are> the activity in respect of each of the
sense-organs’ (439a9) and that <they are> the admitting of the form
of the perceptibles apart from the matter which underlies them, and
that the sense in actuality and the perceptible are the same things.194
15 But now he says what each of the things perceptible by each sense is
such that it comes to be perceptible by the sense proper <to it>, and
he adds the nature of each of them, showing what it is, since for them
their being is not the same thing as their being perceptible. And so
that which is perceptible, which has been discussed,195 is common (for
<the perceptible is> that which is apprehensible by a sense), but
20 peculiar to each is its proper nature and being. It is by being different
by virtue of <this nature> that <the perceptibles> are different from
each other and not all perceptible by the same sense. He said, ‘in the
same way we must consider about touch’ (439a11-12) meaning ‘<we
must consider> about the tangible’. For this is the perceptible
whereas touch is the sense. And firstly he proposes to discuss colours,
which are perceptible by sight.

439a12 Each is said in two ways, the one in actuality, the other
potentially.
42,1 This division has been discussed in On the Soul.196 He says197 that he
has stated in On the Soul how that which is perceptible in actuality
is the same as the sense in actuality and how it is different. He has
stated that that which is perceptible in actuality and the sense in
actuality are one in number but different in account. Being sense in
actuality and being perceptible in actuality are different things in
5 account. But instead of saying this he says, ‘how that which is colour
in actuality, and sound, are the same as, or different to, the senses in
actuality’. For colour in actuality is not the same thing as sight in
actuality and nor is sound in actuality the same as hearing. For
<colours> can exist without being seen but it is not possible for them
10 to exist as perceptible in actuality apart from perception. And so what
 Translation 49
is meant is: ‘It has been stated in On the Soul how colour and sound
which are perceptible in actuality are the same as sight in actuality
and hearing in actuality, and in what respects they are different’. He
made this clear by saying ‘the senses in actuality’. For things percep-
tible in actuality correspond to these. <He is saying198 ‘let us discuss> 15
what each of them is such that it is potentially perceptible, colour and
sound and each of the <perceptibles> in respect of the other senses’.
(For he indicated that which is potentially perceptible by saying ‘it
will cause perception and activity’.) This was one of the two meanings
of perceptible he had distinguished and it is that which is perceptible
in this way of which he is saying ‘let us discuss’, i.e. the potentially 20
<perceptible>.

439a18 As therefore it has been said concerning light in that

work that it is accidentally <the> colour of the transparent
He reminds us of what was said about light in On the Soul,199 namely
‘that it is accidentally <the> colour of the transparent’. For it was
shown in that work that light is <the> actuality of the transparent, 25
qua transparent, and as it were <the> colour of the transparent, not
without qualification but accidentally, because the transparent does
not take on light in a way that involves its being affected.200 Rather
it is illuminated at some times but not at others depending upon the
sort of relation to it of that which illuminates by nature. For this 43,1
reason light is not a colour that is proper to <the transparent> in the
way that <the colours of> the other <bodies>, those that are coloured,
are proper to them. For in them their colour remains, because it is
proper <to them>, but this is not the case with light. Aristotle201 added
in explanation, ‘for when there is something fiery in <the> transpar- 5
ent’. That which is accidentally the colour <of the transparent> is like
this. He added an explanation of how <light> is generated in <the>
transparent depending upon <the> relation <to the transparent> of
something fiery (for the presence of something like this in <the>
transparent is light, and the absence is darkness), reminding <us> of
how light is accidentally the colour of the transparent. Nothing seems
to correspond grammatically to the clause ‘as therefore it has been
said concerning light in that work that it is accidentally <the> colour
of the transparent.’ It would be answered by introducing ‘let this be 10
laid down and remain’ before ‘what we mean by transparent is not
peculiar to air or water’ (439a21-2). Before discussing colours it is
reasonable to remind us that light is a colour and is visible in the
highest degree and pre-eminently,202 since it is through <light> that
the perception of the other colours is generated, and it is not gener-
ated in anything other than <the> transparent. By means of this he 15
 50 Translation
shows and establishes that a nature of this sort is able to admit
colours.
Having taken it as agreed that light is generated as a colour in
<the> transparent he next203 shows what the nature of the transpar-
ent is which is able to admit the colours, what <bodies> it is in, and
how the bodies which possess transparency differ from each other.
20 After that he will show how coloured <bodies> differ from illuminated
ones, and that it is reasonable that whereas <coloured bodies> have
as their colour one that is proper <to them> and have this colour on
their boundary, <illuminated bodies> do not have colours like this
and do not have them on their boundary. For he says, ‘what we mean
by transparent is not peculiar to air or water’ and light is generated
as accidentally the colour of <air and water>. Having said that the
25 transparent is not peculiar to air or water he added that it is not
44,1 peculiar to any ‘other of the bodies that are so described.’ For certain
stones are described as transparent. Transparency is not peculiar to
any of these stones. It is rather ‘a common nature and potentiality’
which is not separable and is not able to exist on its own, any more
than any other potentiality is able to. But it is in those <bodies> which
we describe as transparent (I mean air and water) and of which we
5 predicate the transparent, and in all ‘the other bodies to a greater or
lesser degree’ because all bodies possess something of the potentiality
in themselves.
Having taken it as agreed that transparency is a nature and
potentiality in all bodies to a greater or lesser degree, he takes it as
further agreed and says that ‘it is necessary that there is some
10 ultimate <part>’ (439a25-6) and boundary of bodies, in so far as they
are bodies, since no body is without a boundary, as has been shown,204
and this is <its> surface, and that in the same way it is necessary
that there is some such ultimate <part> of the transparency also. This
boundary of the transparency is a boundary of the body not because
it is separated from the surface but because it is in <the surface> and
15 with <the surface>. For what is true of the relationship between the
transparent and the body is also true of the relationship between their
respective boundaries. With regard to the former it is not the case
that the body is one thing and the transparent something else
separated from it. It is rather the case that the body itself is trans-
parent and able to admit colours by virtue of a potentiality of this sort.
The boundary of <the body> is a coloured surface such that the surface
20 of <the body>, in so far as <the body> is a body, is its boundary, but
in so far as <the body> is of a certain sort and transparent, it is the
colour. The colour205 is a quality in the surface <such that the surface
is> a surface, in so far as <the body> is a body, but the surface is white
in so far as the body is of a certain sort. For there is a nature in bodies
able to admit colours, namely transparency. Different bodies are able
 Translation 51
to partake of heat or cold, moistness or dryness, and rarity or density
to a greater or lesser degree, these being potentialities that are not 25
separable <from the bodies>. The same is the case with transparency.
For all <qualities> which are by nature generated and exist in
something else there is something underlying which possesses a
suitability for being given a form in respect of <those qualities>,206
and it is their matter. (For some matter underlies heavy and light, 45,1
large and small, hot and cold, and the other <qualities> that are
analogous to these.) In the same way <there is something underly-
ing> colours too, and the opposition in respect of them. (For <colours>
are included in the <qualities> which by nature are generated in
something else.) And this is the transparency in bodies.207 Bodies, in 5
so far as they are transparent, both possess and admit colour. For
every body is admitting of colour by virtue of a potentiality of this
sort.
But this nature is not equal in all bodies but is present in different
<bodies> to a greater or lesser degree. Some <bodies> are indetermi-
nate and others are determinate. The differentiation of colours in
<bodies> is in accordance with these differentiations. All bodies have 10
a share in this nature which is transparency but to varying degrees.
Only bodies through which things are seen are peculiarly transpar-
ent, as they are customarily described, from the fact that they bring
<things> to light (phainein). That which is apprehensible to sight
when it is in the light (phaos) (and phaos is light) is described in the
proper sense as coming-to-light (phainomenon).208 <Bodies> whose
colour is <light> are peculiarly transparent. For <bodies> which
admit light (phaos or phôs), through which all visible bodies are seen,
are generally described as transparent for both reasons, because they 15
admit light (phôs), i.e. phaos, and because they are responsible for
the fact that all the other <bodies> come to light (phainesthai) and
are seen. For colours are seen through this <i.e. a transparent body>
and cause movement in this. Those transparent <bodies> which are
indeterminate admit light because they do not possess a colour proper
<to them>. For indeterminate <bodies>, just as they derive their
boundary from another body because they do not have one that is
determinate and proper <to themselves>, so too they derive their 20
colours <from other bodies>. We call the body through which (di’ hou)
<colours> appear (phainetai) peculiarly transparent (diaphanês).
For, as has been said, not all the <bodies> which possess transparency
are similarly transparent. Rather they partake of it to a greater or
lesser degree. Bodies which are indeterminate, because they possess
no share of earth and what is solid within themselves, are both
transparent to a greater degree and <transparent> in their depths.
The other <bodies> are <transparent> to a lesser degree because they 25
partake of earth within themselves and earth is minimally transparent.
 52 Translation
For that which is to a greater or lesser degree depends upon a mixture
46,1 of that which is opposite. For the body which is visible and transpar-
ent to the greatest degree is that which is both visible and transparent
itself, and also that which comes to be responsible for the other
<bodies’> being seen. That which naturally illuminates, like the
divine <body> and fire, is a body of this sort.209
Each of the other <bodies> has a share in transparency in accord-
ance with a proportion dependent upon its proximity to and affinity
5 with this <body>, air to a greater degree (this is why it fills up with
light very quickly), secondly water, and lastly earth. It is for this
reason that <earth> is minimally transparent. For one would discover
that all those <bodies> which are transparent and which seem to be
<constituted> out of earth, are <constituted> of water to a greater
degree than they are of earth. It is because of the mixture of <water>
that those bodies which are transparent to a lesser degree are as
transparent as they are. For while air is in a way akin to fire (this is
10 why it is filled up with light quickly), water seems to be nourishment
for fire. For in <bodies> which are burning as a whole it is the
moisture which is burning in them, and the <body> burns to the
extent that it possesses <moisture>. Smoke is like this. Earth is the
furthest removed from <fire> (this is why it is least transparent).
Therefore it is reasonable that it occupies the place of the privation
15 of light somehow: it does not admit light within itself, and it blocks
whatever other <body> it is mixed with and prevents it from being
illuminated through its whole <body>, as we see in the case of air in
which there is smoke. For that which is earthy is abundant in smoke.
Not even flame is transparent: because it too possesses something
earthy mixed <into it>, since flame is burning smoke. For the same
reason air no longer remains transparent when there is a dust-cloud
20 in the air. Horn and tortoise-shell come to be transparent when they
have been worked at in a certain way because there is a great
abundance of water in them. This is clear from the fact that they can
be softened. Those bodies which are transparent to the highest degree
47,1 admit that <colour> which is the most visible of colours, i.e. light, and
do so throughout the whole of themselves because they do not possess
that which blocks it and because they are indeterminate. It is because
of this that each of the other colours is visible. It is because <bodies
which are transparent to the highest degree> are fluid and indeter-
minate and unable to keep in what they admit that they are not
endowed with colour in a way that involves their being affected. This
5 is why they do not always possess this colour but come to be in
privation of it when that which naturally illuminates departs. For if
they could keep the colour in, there would always be light in them.
But they admit the other colours similarly as well. For they are moved
by them because of an affinity. All bodies that are solid and possess
 Translation 53
a greater abundance of earth are neither transparent, because they
are not similarly transparent, nor do they admit light. For light is not 10
the proper colour of bodies of this sort. But they do possess a proper
colour. For, being solid and able to keep in that which they admitted
originally and possessed from the particular mixture of the transpar-
ent <ingredients> in themselves, they are seen through the light,
which is visible principally and to the greatest degree, but they do not
admit the light itself as a colour. So far as they partake of transpar-
ency, to this degree are they endowed with colour. For all the <bodies> 15
which are transparent to a greater degree possess a colour having the
form of light, possessing that which is responsible for a colour of this
sort mixed within themselves. <Bodies> close to these <possess the
colour> white.210 For the <bodies> which possess a colour visible to a
greater degree are also transparent to a greater degree. Black <bod-
ies> are so because of a privation of transparency, since darkness <is
generated> by an absence of that which naturally illuminates. Such
is the nature of colour and of transparency in bodies. 20

439a25 Therefore just as in the case of bodies it is necessary

that there is some ultimate <part>.
He has assumed that colour is in the transparent. (For light is in <the
transparent> and belongs to <the transparent>211 being colour acci-
dentally – for <the transparent> is able to admit the nature of colours
– and colour belongs to this, I mean to the transparent, attaching to 25
it as an accident since it underlies colour.)212 He now says213 that just
as the body, in so far as it is a body, necessarily has some ultimate 48,1
<part> and boundary (for no body is without a boundary and the
surface is the ultimate <part> of every body), so too it is necessary
that the transparency in bodies, and bodies in so far as they are
transparent, have some boundary. This is the same numerically as
the boundary of the body, because <the transparent and the body> of 5
which these are boundaries are one numerically, but not the same in
account, because a body’s being and the transparent’s being is not the
same. For bodies are not bodies to a greater or lesser degree whereas
what is transparent is transparent to a greater or lesser degree. The
boundary of the body as a body is the surface. <The boundary> of the
transparent, as transparent, is colour. This is why surface and colour
are in a way the same and also not the same. The boundary of the 10
transparent is colour. Coloured <bodies> are seen by virtue of their
boundary so that their colour is their boundary. For it is in so far as
<bodies> are seen that they possess colour. And they are seen by
virtue of their boundary. Therefore it is by virtue of this that they
possess colour and this is their boundary considered as transparent
<bodies>. Bodies that are transparent in this way are not also
 54 Translation
<transparent> throughout their depths. For it is the transparency of
15 indeterminate transparent <bodies> which <extends> throughout
their depths.

439a26 Therefore the nature of light is in the indeterminate

transparent.214
<The> indeterminate transparent is that which is fluid and does not
possess a limit proper <to itself>; by this he distinguishes the solid
body from <the fluid>. He describes <solid body> as body without
qualification because solidity is clear in the body. <But he means only
20 one type of body> since even the indeterminate body is nonetheless
body. This is how he shows the differentiation between light and
colour, and between the transparent <bodies> in which these <are
present>. For light is in the transparent <body> which is indetermi-
nate and does not possess an end proper <to itself>. For just as bodies
49,1 of this sort, in so far as they are bodies, do not possess a boundary
proper <to themselves> but are always being defined and bounded by
another <body>, so too they do not possess a colour proper to them-
selves. This is because the colour of the body is its boundary, in so far
as <the body> is transparent and able to admit colour and visible,
whereas <indeterminate bodies> do not possess a boundary proper
5 <to themselves>. But since transparency is in solid <bodies> too and
these possess a boundary which is proper <to themselves> and
determinate, there is necessarily some ultimate <part> of the trans-
parent in solid bodies and this too is determinate, just as <solid
bodies> were <determinate> in so far as they were bodies. For the
boundary <of the body> as a body and the boundary <of the body> as
transparent go together in that which underlies.215
In addition he confirms216 that colour is this on the basis of its
10 attributes. For colour is either in the boundary of the body or it is
<the> boundary of the body. He adduces in support of the claim that
this is so the opinion of the Pythagoreans,217 because they used to say
that colour (khroa) was the surface, which is <the> boundary of the
body. He adduces their opinion and corrects it by saying that colour
(khrôma) is not the boundary of the body but it is in the boundary of
15 the body, which is the surface. And <it is clear that colour is not the
boundary of the body> as body.218 For colour is a quality whereas
surface is a quantity, since it is magnitude extended in two dimen-
sions. Also, every body has a surface but not every body is coloured.219
Also, if there is numerically one surface, there is not necessarily
numerically one colour (for even opposite colours are able to exist in
20 what is numerically one surface).220 Nor is it true that, if there is
numerically one colour, there is necessarily numerically one surface.
Aristotle shows in the next passage that colour is <the> boundary not
 Translation 55
of the body in so far as it is body but of the transparent, and also that
the transparent is that in bodies which is able to admit colours.

439a33 But it is necessary to suppose that the same nature

<which is coloured outside is also coloured inside. And air and
water are clearly coloured. For their sheen is like this.>
(439a34-b2)
In proposing to show that colour is not the boundary of the body but 25
is in the boundary of the body, being a boundary not <of the body> as
body, but of the transparent in so far as it is transparent, he shows
first that the transparent in solid bodies is what is able to admit
colour. For, he says, it is necessary to suppose that the nature which 50,1
is able to admit colour in solid and compound bodies is the same as
that which is seen as coloured even when it is outside solid bodies.
Air and water are of this nature. He shows by means of this that the
transparent is able to admit colour. He said that these <bodies> are
coloured outside because they are illuminated and coloured by some- 5
thing from outside, not possessing <a colour> proper <to themselves>.
(For he describes the <bodies> which possess colour from themselves
and <possess> one proper <to themselves> as coloured inside because
they possess as something proper <to themselves> and within them-
selves their colour and that which is responsible for their colour.) For
sheen and light are what are generated in the indeterminate trans-
parent <bodies> such as air and water. But also the process <brought
about> by the colours is responsible for these <bodies> being col-
oured.221 For a sheen is generated in them, in both air and water, by 10
certain brilliancies so that they seem to be coloured.222 Alternatively
he meant by sheen the light which is generated in them, being in a
way their colour. Therefore in the solid <bodies> too the nature which
admits colours is the same.
Next223 he adds in what respect there is a differentiation between
the indeterminate transparent <bodies> – which he described as 15
being coloured outside <because they do not possess a colour proper224
to themselves> – and the determinate ones. For with regard to the
former, because they are indeterminate and they take on colours in
a way that does not involve their being affected, their colour does not
appear the same and neither does the sheen <appear> the same when
people approach close as when they are removed further away (for
depending on the sort of relation and position of the <bodies> seen
through them to the <bodies>225 seeing and the degree of distance
<between> the colour in them appears different and changing be- 20
cause they do not take on the colour that is seen. But, being moved
by <the bodies seen>, they come to be responsible for their being seen
by the <bodies> seeing). But in bodies (and again he describes solids
 56 Translation
as bodies) the <body> seen remains the same when people <come>
close as when they go further away provided that the distance is
25 moderate. For the colour in these <bodies> does not have its being
dependent upon its being generated.226 It is rather that there is in
them this <colour> through which they themselves are seen without
its being seen through them. But often, even in the case of the
<bodies> that are solid and possess a colour proper <to themselves>
51,1 the surrounding <body> is either too dense or too fine and is illumi-
nated to a greater or lesser degree. Depending on the sort of relation
of the light to the colours and the mixture <of light> with these, <the
surrounding body> makes the <bodies> seen appear different on
different occasions as in the case of the pigeon’s neck.227 For this
reason he added as a precaution the statement that ‘the impression
of the colour is defined unless the surrounding <body> makes it
5 change.’ Alternatively he said ‘unless the surrounding <body> makes
it change’ with reference to bodies, meaning solid <bodies>. For often
the colour of these comes to be different <being affected> by the
surrounding <body’s> being hotter or colder or generally something
like this so that the coloured <body> is affected by it and changes.
10 He has added the differentiation between colours in the indeter-
minate transparent <bodies> and those in the determinate ones and
given the cause. (For it was useful for him so that because of this
people did not think that the indeterminate <bodies> were transpar-
ent whilst the determinate ones were not). He now says228 that it is
clear that the same nature and the same <thing>, both in solid
<bodies> and in those that are indeterminate and endowed with
15 colour from outside, is able to admit colour, and this is <the> trans-
parent. Therefore to the extent that transparency is present in bodies
to that extent they have a share in colour too. We have already
stated229 that this nature being in all <bodies> is present in different
ones to a greater or lesser degree.
Having said this and taken it as agreed that <colour> is in the
20 transparent he now adds230 that it is in the boundary of <the trans-
parent> rather than in the <boundary> of the body, as the Pythagore-
ans thought.231 For he takes it as clear that colour is in a boundary.
Bodies are visible by virtue of their boundary. For that by virtue of
which each of the visible <bodies> is visible is its colour. The deter-
minate <bodies> are transparent at their boundary. Therefore the
boundary of the determinate transparent <body>, in so far as it is
25 transparent, is colour. For the <parts> in the depths of bodies would
be described as possessing colour potentially just as <they would be
described as being potentially> visible too. Visible things possess
colour in the same way that they possess being visible. For every
colour is visible by its own nature, even if a colour’s being does not
52,1 depend upon <being visible>. Light would not be a colour without
 Translation 57
qualification nor would it be covered by the account of colour, because
transparent <bodies> possess and admit it in a way that does not
involve their being affected. In confirmation that the colour is the
boundary he adds that, with regard even to the very bodies that are
transparent,232 if there is a colour proper to any <of them>, this too
is visible by virtue of the boundary. For233 light was not their colour, 5
as it is not a specific property.234
After saying this he next adds the cause of the differentiation of
the colours in bodies, saying ‘that which in air makes light can be in
the transparent’ (439b14-16). The light which is meant is the light
which is generated in the indeterminate transparent <bodies>, being
colour in a way. For it is generated by a presence of light or some 10
nature able to illuminate and colour, at whose departure darkness is
generated in the transparent, being privation of light. Therefore just
as it is with the colour which is generated in the indeterminate
transparent <bodies> by a presence of that which is able to illumi-
nate, so, he says,235 it is with the colour that is proper to each of the
determinate <bodies>. For <the bodies> in which, transparent as they 15
are, there is that by which the transparent is naturally coloured (the
bright and fiery nature is like this), are visible to a greater degree
and are endowed with colour to a greater degree, possessing the
colour which is determinate and remains, because they possess
within themselves that which provides and is responsible for the
colour, and these are <the bodies> possessing the colour white.236 For
snow, because it possesses a great amount of air, and also of water, 20
both of which are transparent, is indeed237 transparent to a very high
degree and white because of the movement and rubbing of the air
which is responsible for the white and foamy colour. For the move-
ment, drawing it together because of the surrounding cold of the
cloud, makes it more dense by heating <it> and establishes it, and
having been overcome in this way by the cold from outside it is frozen.
<Bodies> in which such a nature does not exist, or exists to a lesser 25
degree, are black and in privation of colour in a manner analogous to
the darkness which is in the <indeterminate> transparent bodies
whenever that which is able to illuminate and colour them is not
present. And the intermediate238 colours would clearly be generated 53,1
in accordance with the same proportion of the sort of presence and
mixture of that which <is able to illuminate> in these <bodies of
intermediate colour>, a point which he will investigate next. It seems
reasonable to ascribe the differentiation of the colours not to an
intensification and slackening of the transparent but to the presence
and absence of that which by nature illuminates and colours it.
Otherwise it would be generated out of both. For it is by the trans- 5
parency and the presence of that which by nature colours that there
will be variations in degree, and the transparent239 <will be present>
 58 Translation
in solid <bodies> to a greater or lesser degree depending upon the sort
of mixture of the <bodies> already mentioned.240

10 439b18 One must now distinguish the other colours and say how
they can be generated.
He has said that in the solid bodies the mixture and presence of that
which by nature illuminates in the transparent makes the colour
white whilst its absence <makes> it black in a manner analogous to
the light and darkness being generated in the indeterminate trans-
parent. He next investigates how the colours intermediate between
15 white and black are generated. Since it seems that they are generated
by a mixture of the <two> opposites, i.e. black and white, he sets out
the ways by which the differentiation in respect of colours can be
generated out of the mixture of white and black.
He says: ‘For black and white, being juxtaposed with each other so
that each of them is invisible because of smallness but that which
20 <results> from their being put together comes to be visible, can
produce sight of another colour.’241 For there are certain <bodies>
which escape the sight individually but are seen when put together
with each other. At any rate from a distance one would not see a
wheat-grain that had been laid down. But if a pile of wheat-grains
were to come about it would be seen from the same distance. Just as
25 one of these is visible and the other is not from the same distance, so
certain <bodies> are able because of smallness not to move the <sense
of> sight at all on their own. That which is seen as a result of such a
juxtaposition of the colours mentioned will not be the same as either
54,1 one of the <colours> juxtaposed with each other but it will be a colour
since it is visible. Therefore <it will be> another form of colour.242 More
and different colours will be produced, in accordance with the propor-
tion of the whites and blacks which are invisible because of smallness,
and which are juxtaposed and put together with each other. For one
<colour will be produced> if equal amounts are juxtaposed but an-
5 other in accordance with the predominance of one and the proportion
of the predominance. For <it will> not be similar when the whites are
in the ratio of two to one and one and a half to one or in any other
predominance. The same account <holds> of the predominance of
black. Some of the <colours> present will be in a proportion and
commensurable with each other whilst others <will be> in a predomi-
nance without qualification.243 Of these those that are in a proportion
in their predominance, being commensurable, will be pleasant and
10 soothing, but those that are incommensurable will not be, in a manner
analogous to <sounds> in musical concords.244 For in their case also
the differentiation is in accordance with the proportions of the pre-
dominance in numbers. One, being as two to one, is called and is
 Translation 59
diapasôn.245 Another, that of three to four, diatessarôn.246 When the
sounds possess no proportion to each other, that which is heard is
disharmonious and discordant but is heard nevertheless. The same 15
is true of the colours produced by the juxtaposition of whites and
blacks invisible because of smallness. For example three are juxta-
posed and mixed with two, or four with two or three with four, and
some are in a proportion whilst others are not. The <colours> put
together in a proportion are pleasant, like purple and red and such- 20
like. Those that are startling and unpleasant are not in a proportion.
He says247 that the pleasant <colours> are few for the same cause as
there are few sounds which go together harmoniously, or that all the
colours are generated depending upon certain numbers of the <col-
ours> juxtaposed with each other, but there are ordered juxtaposi-
tions, out of which the pleasant colours <are generated>, and
disordered ones, and the disordered ones are not generated because 25
of the incommensurability of the predominance but because of the
disorder of the juxtaposition.248 For ten can be juxtaposed with five
in various ways, and it is according to these differentiations of
juxtapositions that there will be a differentiation of colours.
He would describe as not pure249 the juxtapositions of <propor- 55,1
tions> that are not similar. For <there would be> a pure <juxtaposi-
tion> if, let us say, one were juxtaposed with two in all the mixture,
and an impure one when some were juxtaposed with two, others with
three, and others with one. This then is one way of the abundance of
colours, there being two colours in respect of what underlies, but 5
many being generated by the proportion and the mixture and the
juxtaposition of a certain sort of these <colours>, the colours having
their abundance dependent upon appearance, not on real existence.
This is how some people say that blendings are generated.

440a7 This is one way of the coming-to-be of the colours, and 10

one <way> is appearing through each other.
Having described the opinion that says that the appearance of the
other colours is generated by the sort of juxtaposition of the white and
black he then sets out a second opinion, according to which it seems
that an appearance can be generated without there being other
colours, only the white and the black being in real existence. This is 15
the <opinion> which ascribes the appearance of the intermediate
colours to the ability of the white and the black to be seen through
each other. He cited250 painters as evidence in showing how the
colours are able to appear through each other and accomplish a
different appearance. For they paint a more lustrous colour under-
neath and then paint over it from outside <a colour> possessing lustre
to a lesser degree, making <the first colour> appear other than it was. 20
 60 Translation
They do this ‘when they want to paint something as if in water or air’.
But also the sun appears white through pure air, but when it is looked
at through mist or smoke it is seen red. For when the superimposed
colour and the underlying one are different neither’s appearance is
25 preserved in its entirety but that which appears is something else
besides either of them. In this way there is an abundance of colours
in accordance with the proportion of the <underlying colours> that
are seen through <the superimposed colours> and the <colours>
through which <the underlying colours> are seen, being white and
black. For if the white underneath were to be predominant over the
56,1 black on top <there would be> the appearance of one colour, but
another if they were equal, and another one if it were the other way
round, <it being> different in accordance with the proportions of the
predominances either of the <colour> underneath or the one on top.
It is clear that this is not the same opinion as the one before this. For
according to that one there was a juxtaposition of <bodies> invisible
on their own,251 whereas according to this one there is a putting
5 together of visible <bodies> some placed under and others superim-
posed.

440a15 To say as the ancients do that colour is an efflux <and

is seen for this reason is absurd.>
He has set out the two opinions according to which the appearances
of a number of colours are thought252 to be generated by a mixture of
10 the opposites white and black. He <now> opposes an opinion presup-
posed by the ancients concerning seeing, that seeing comes about in
accordance with an efflux from the <bodies> seen. For they held
certain images (eidôla) responsible for seeing, <images> which flow
continuously from the <bodies> that are seen, being similar <to
them> in shape and falling on the sight. Their number included
15 Leucippus and Democritus and their followers, who also made the
appearance of the intermediate colours out of the juxtaposition of
<bodies> invisible because of smallness. But Empedocles also says
that seeing comes about in this way, as <Aristotle> mentioned a little
earlier.253 He reminds us that the opinion is not sound and that it is
not possible that seeing comes about in this way but in the way he
himself showed by showing in general that it is not possible that
seeing comes about by virtue of effluxes from the objects seen. For on
20 this view apprehension by sight will be by means of touch254 since the
<bodies> which flow from <the bodies seen>, being bodies that are
responsible for seeing because they fall in the eyes, touch the eyes.255
But he did not add the absurdity which follows. If <apprehension
by sight> were by means of touch it would be necessary256 that <sight>
itself apprehends cold and hot, fluid and dry, and the tangible oppo-
 Translation 61
sitions. But it is not able to apprehend any of these. Moreover if there 57,1
is a continuous efflux from the <bodies> being seen how is it that
<these bodies> are not quickly consumed when there is so much
bodily separating off coming about from them? If other <bodies> are
added to them in exchange firstly why does this fail to come about in
their case all the time, so that they remain equal? Also what is the
cause of their growing in a determinate way and diminishing back in 5
a determinate way? Secondly how do they remain similar in shape?
For the <bodies> flowing from <them> are similar in shape <to them>
(at any rate this is why <on this view> sight apprehends colours). But
why is this true of the <bodies> being added <to them>? Also if the
efflux from each <body that is seen> is continuous and corresponds
to all of <its> parts, how is it that the <bodies> being separated off
will not impede those that are travelling <towards the body that is
seen> so that they may not be added <to it>? Or <how is it that> those
ones <will not impede> these so that they may not travel <away>? 10
And how, being fine, will they not be scattered when there are winds?
For we see even if there is an intervening wind.
Moreover how does apprehension of distance come about if the eye
sees the <bodies> which fall on <it>? How will we not see with our
eyes shut if the <bodies> which travel are fine? For they will be able
to pass inside through the passages when the eyes are shut. And why
will we not see when the <body> being seen is superimposed on the
eyes? For even then <on that view> the images will flow from <the 15
body being seen> and the eye will admit them. Or why does there
come to be a necessity for light to see if the eye admits the <body>
seen?
Moreover either the <bodies> flowing from <the body being seen>
are juxtaposed with the eye, at the time when it attends (epistrephein)
to them, or they are travelling. If they are juxtaposed, there will be
no apprehension of distance at all. But if they are travelling at that
time, firstly it will take more time for us to see bodies that are more 20
removed <from us>, something which we do not see coming about.
Moreover, if the distance in respect of <bodies removed from us>
will be seen because of the quantity of air which flows out and falls
on the sight before the image does (for <the air> too itself falls on the
sight), firstly how will the sight admit so large a quantity of air? (For
in regard to each movement of an image <the sight> will admit as
much air as is intermediate between it and the body seen). Secondly, 25
will the images which flow from <the body seen> possess a certain
strength so as to be able to push this <air> forward? Then again how
will this <body of air> be preserved when there is wind? For the wind
is seen sweeping away the intervening air. If the images slip through
the force of the winds, being too fine, how will they not slip through
the air? What will it be which measures the air entering sight? How 58,1
 62 Translation
will sight judge the magnitude and the shape of the <body> being
seen, when because of the magnitude of the pupil it admits a part
from the travelling image? For if it admits many <parts> on many
occasions how and why will it admit different parts of the image on
5 different occasions and not always the same one even from distances?
And if it always <admits> the <part> juxtaposed <to it> what putting
together of these <parts is there> in sight so that it seems to have
seen a theatre or a temple by means of parts that are so small falling
on <it> from the image travelling from them? How is it that certain
<parts> from certain other images falling on sight in the meanwhile
will not tear asunder the continuity of sight of the first <body seen>,
10 if it is necessary for images to travel from some <body seen> towards
it, so many of them and so often that, although it is taking a different
part from a different image, admitting <parts> from them in accord-
ance with the magnitude of the pupil, it will always admit something
whole? How does it take the images from smooth <bodies> as having
been shaped when <the bodies> do not possess protrusions? Or how
<does it take images> from mirrors? Or how do the protrusions from
15 which <images> are able to travel remain in the sight, if images are
so fine and weak and are not blurred? Why is it that when the <body>
being seen departs for a short while257 these <images> do not remain
either outside or in258 sight?
<To say> that sight is stimulated by the images travelling to <it>
and is determined <by them> and is prepared for seeing <by them>
<is the statement of> those who do not preserve <the claim that>
seeing comes about through the images. For it is clear that sight,
20 when it has been stimulated by the image, will see something else
and not the image.259 Why then are these <other things seen> and
how <are they seen>? It is possible to make these comments and
comments like them against the people who say that something flows
from visible <bodies> and that this is how the <bodies> seen are seen.
But Aristotle himself, having merely given a reminder that it is
not reasonable that seeing comes about in this way, and having shown
25 in the previous chapter260 that it is not possible to say that something
flows from the sight and that this is how we see, puts his own opinion
forward, which he argued for in the treatise On the Soul,261 saying ‘so
that it is immediately better to say that perception comes about
because that which is intermediate between the sense <and the
59,1 perceptible> is moved by the perceptible rather than by touch and
efflux’.262 For it seems to him that sight perceives by being affected
by the visibles, just as each of the other senses <perceives>, rather
than by making anything and sending it out, and being affected not
by admitting any <bodies> flowing from perceptibles, but because the
5 transparent which is intermediate between sight and the <body>
seen is moved by the visibles, when it is <transparent> in actuality
 Translation 63
(and it is <transparent in actuality> when it is illuminated), the
visibles being the colours (for colour causes movement of that which
is transparent in actuality). That which is transparent in actuality is
moved by the colours in the same way in which the potentially
<transparent> is moved by the presence of that which naturally
illuminates when it admits light and is illuminated. For the trans- 10
parent in actuality, being moved in a way and disposed by the visibles,
transmits their form to the pupil, in the same way as it took it, the
pupil also being transparent. It is reasonable that seeing comes about
not because of effluxes from the visibles but in this way by means of
the <pupil> admitting the form of the <visible> seen through the
intermediate transparent and transmitting it as far as the primary
perceptive part, because the intermediate passage is full of a body of
this sort. He describes next the absurdity which follows for those who 15
at the same time hold the efflux responsible for seeing and say that
the mixture of the colours besides white and black comes about
because of the juxtaposition of bodies invisible because of small-
ness.263

440a20 And so in the case of the <bodies> juxtaposed with each

other it is necessary to take as agreed both an invisible magni- 20
tude and an imperceptible time.
What he means is that, for those people who ascribe to this juxtapo-
sition the visible mixture and nature of the colours, and who say
furthermore that seeing comes about by the efflux from the <bodies>
being seen, it follows that, just as they take as agreed some body and
magnitude invisible by its own nature,264 so they are saying that there
exists an imperceptible time.265 For all process is in time. For this 25
reason the efflux from the <bodies> seen, arriving at the eyes by
means of a process, would clearly arrive in a time. He juxtaposes the
cause of its being necessary for them to say that this time is imper-
ceptible.

440a22 So that the processes may escape detection as they 60,1

arrive and there may seem one because of the fact of appearing
at the same time.
For since, according to those who say that seeing <comes about> in
this way, <an impact> comes about for a short time (for the pupil sees,
in respect of each impact, so much of the image as it can admit), and 5
since <the pupil> seems to see the <body> seen as at one time and
with one impact and as one, it must be that the impacts of so many
<bodies> escape detection by coming about in imperceptible times, so
that <the pupil> seems to see <the body seen> itself all together
 64 Translation
instead of in small <bits>. And so there is a necessity for impercepti-
ble times for all those who say that seeing comes about like this. But
for those who attribute the differentiation of the colours to the
10 juxtaposition of the imperceptible bodies, if they also say that seeing
comes about because of the efflux from the <bodies> being seen, the
absurdity is doubled. For it is necessary for them to say not only that
magnitudes are imperceptible but also times. He could also have said
that the need to say that there are imperceptible times follows in a
particular way for those who attribute the differentiation of the
15 colours to the juxtaposition of the bodies in small <bits>. On this view
one will see many objects as one if the efflux from each of them were
to escape detection falling on the eyes by itself, and it seems to come
about as one <impact> at one time and from one <body> seen.266

440a23 But in this case there is no necessity.

By ‘in this case’ he means the opinion that the colours are seen
20 through each other and in this way makes the mixture of the colours.
For the colour on top being moved by the <colour> underlying it will
make the appearance of the <body> seen, and the appearance of the
<body> seen will be different in accordance with the differentiations
61,1 of the underlying <colours>. He showed that this opinion concerning
mixture of colours is better than the one before it by adding, ‘so that
if there cannot exist any invisible magnitude, but every <magnitude>
is visible from some distance’ (440a26-8). For this opinion will be
better than that one just because according to it there is no invisible
body. However he said nothing about there not being imperceptible
5 times according to this <opinion>, because it is necessary for this to
come about according to this <opinion>, if someone were to say that
seeing comes about because of effluxes from the <bodies> being seen.
What is being said can be formulated thus. Having set out the two
opinions according to which more colours can appear, the <opinion>
in accordance with juxtaposition of the <bodies> invisible because of
smallness, which was an opinion of those before him, and the <opin-
10 ion> in accordance with superimposition, he next described how
seeing must come about if the mixture of the colours in accordance
with any of these ways is to be preserved. For <seeing comes about>
not because of the effluxes, as those before him supposed (for on this
view sight will also be touch), but because of the movement by the
visibles of the transparent intermediate between the sight and the
<body> seen. Having said that it is absurd to say that sight comes
15 about because of the efflux and having shown how <it is absurd>, he
adduces and shows the absurd result for those who say that the
mixture of the colours comes about by a juxtaposition of the invisible
<bodies>, if they were to say that seeing comes about by efflux. For
 Translation 65
not only will it be necessary for them to say that some magnitudes
are invisible but also that there is an imperceptible time, and the
absurdity will be duplicated, since there does not exist a magnitude
imperceptible by its own nature, as he will say, nor an imperceptible
time.267 For saying that there exists an imperceptible time follows for 20
all those who hold effluxes responsible <for seeing>. If some were to
say that the mixture of the colours themselves comes about because
of the juxtaposition of the invisible <bodies>, as those before him said,
for these people it will follow that they suppose there to be invisible
magnitudes, which is itself absurd, and at the same time that there
is an imperceptible time, so that ‘and so in the case of the <bodies> 25
in juxtaposition’ (440a20-1) is equal to ‘for in the case of the <bodies>
in juxtaposition, just as it will be necessary to suppose certain
magnitudes to be invisible, so it will be to say that there are also
imperceptible times.’ For on this view the parts which fall on the pupil 62,1
little by little and in accordance with the amount which the pupil can
admit, will be seen as both one and continuous, if the differentiation
of the times at which the seen images fall on the pupil were to escape
detection, and there seems to be one <time> in which it sees the whole
<body seen>. Two absurdities will follow for this sort of opinion:
saying that some magnitudes are invisible, and saying that there are 5
imperceptible times, neither of which are true, as he will show as he
proceeds.
He has described the absurdity which follows for those who attrib-
ute seeing to effluxes from the <bodies> being seen, and has shown
it by way of example <in regard to the claim> that the mixture of
colours comes about from the juxtaposition of invisible <bodies> (for
it follows that they postulate imperceptible times); he now adds that 10
this absurdity does not follow for those who say that seeing comes
about by means of a change in what intervenes, using as an example
for this purpose the opinion that says that it is by the superimposition
of the colours that their mixture comes about. For he says ‘in this case
there is no necessity’ (440a23-4), meaning by ‘this case’ the opinion
which says that seeing comes about by means of the change in what 15
intervenes, the opinion which he himself preferred.268 For there is no
necessity for those who say that seeing comes about in this way to
say that some magnitude is imperceptible or that some time is
imperceptible, and he shows why by reference to the colours that are
painted over each other. For on this view they do not assume that the
coloured <bodies> are imperceptible nor that they will require time
for the effluxes from them to travel to the sight. But the colour on top, 20
being adjacent to the transparent that intervenes between sight and
itself, will arrange the intervening transparent in one way if it is
without qualification and on its own but in another way if there were
something underlying it by which it were being affected. For in the
 66 Translation
latter case it does not dispose the intervening transparent by being
without qualification but by being mixed and being something differ-
25 ent because of the differentiation of the colour painted under it and
the affection generated in it by <that colour>. Having said this and
shown it he adds: ‘so that if there cannot exist any invisible magnitude
63,1 but every <magnitude> is visible from some distance, this too would
be a mixture of colours’ (440a26-9), meaning that if there were no
invisible magnitudes there would not be the mixture of the colours
said to be generated in that way in accordance with the juxtaposition
of the invisible <bodies>, since no magnitude is invisible, but this
second opinion mentioned would itself also become responsible for the
5 mixture of the colours, the opinion in accordance with the painting
over and superimposition of one <colour> by another. He will describe
another <opinion> and this is more authoritative.
Although there are no invisible magnitudes, he nevertheless says
(440a29-31) that nothing prevents a mixture from seeming to be
generated by the juxtaposition of the colours for those seeing from a
greater distance <colours> juxtaposed in this way. As for the view
10 that there is no magnitude invisible by its own nature and that the
mixture of the colours cannot be generated in this way, as if out of the
juxtaposition of invisible wheat-grains, this will be shown later, as he
says.

440a31 If there is mixture of the bodies not only in this way

which some people suppose, by juxtaposition of minimal <bod-
15 ies> yet indistinct to us because of the perception.
With these words he puts forward his own opinion, one which he
consents to more than those already mentioned. For those already
mentioned introduce not a mixture of colours but an appearance of
mixture. For this reason they do not give any real existence to the
other colours. But according to the opinion which he himself now puts
20 forward, there is truly a mixture of colours, and there is real existence,
that which comes about in accordance with a mixture of the bodies.
For suppose there is mixture of the bodies, not merely by juxtaposi-
tion, as those before him supposed, by a juxtaposition of minimal
<bodies> indistinct to us because they are imperceptible, but with
<bodies> being fully interpenetrated, as he has shown when describ-
ing mixture in the treatise On Coming-to-be.269 (For it follows for those
25 who say that mixture is generated by a juxtaposition that they are
saying that only those <bodies> are mixed with each other which can
be divided into their minimal <parts>. These are <the bodies> which
64,1 are similar in form and with reference to which it is possible to take
one numerically which does not divide into similar <parts> any
further. For this reason it is indivisible in this respect. This is true of
 Translation 67
<bodies> that are solid and without similar parts, for example human
beings, horses, dogs, oxen, and seeds. For in each of these there is
something which is numerically one, which is also minimal in com-
parison to those in the same genus because it cannot be divided into 5
similar <parts>. For the human being that is numerically one is not
divided into human beings nor is the horse <into horses> nor is
anything else of this sort. Because everything of this sort is indivisible
in this way it is mixed by juxtaposition. This is how horses are mixed
with dogs and human beings, and barleycorns with wheat-grains and
millet-seeds, by the juxtaposition of the minimals preserved of those
among them, whenever there are many. For when one horse is 10
juxtaposed with one human being it is not said to have been mixed,
and nor is it when one wheat-grain <is juxtaposed> with one barley-
corn. Those <bodies> which are fluid and have similar parts, and of
which the minimal <part> cannot be taken, cannot be said to be mixed
by the juxtaposition of the minimal <parts>, but in these the mixture
is through and through, and they are said to have been mixed in the
strict sense. These are <the bodies> in relation to which we use the
term blending.270 He showed how it271 is possible for something to be 15
mixed by being fully interpenetrated in the treatise On Coming-to-be
and Perishing, when he was discussing mixture. This is why he says
that he has described it in On Mixture. For he said there272 that the
matter of both the <bodies> mixed was the same, and because of this
each of them was both active on the <body> with which it was mixed
and affected by it, when the <bodies> being mixed are equal in regard
to their potentialities, so that neither of them overpowers the other 20
and changes it to its own peculiar form, but each of them at the same
time acting and being affected, removing the predominances, the
presence of which meant that they were different from each other, for
example water and wine, they are established in a mean state, and
one form comes about united273 from both, but not by juxtaposition,
because they are fluid and have flexible limits,274 but by275 being fully 25
interpenetrated. And such mixture is at the same time called blend- 65,1
ing). And so when the bodies are mixed in this way, it is necessary
that the colours in the bodies being mixed are mixed with each other
by being fully interpenetrated.
Therefore just as it is with their other affections so too there is
mixture of the opposite colours, and he says (440b13-15) that this is 5
the cause of there being many colours: for <he says that> neither
superimposition nor juxtaposition make many colours, but merely an
appearance of more <colours>. But with mixture of this sort many
colours are generated in truth. For he showed that the abundance of
colours is not merely apparent but has real existence by saying, ‘For
it is not that one colour appears from far away but not from near by’
(440b16-17). For <colours> which are many and different in appearance 10
 68 Translation
but not in real existence appear different when seen from far away
but the same from near by, as if they are making the mixture of the
other <colours> by virtue of276 the <bodies> that are outside them. He
says (440b18-21) that there will be many differentiations of the
colours <generated> by virtue of mixture of this sort because the
mixture is generated in accordance with their different proportions,
15 some being generated in a particular ratio and proportion, and others
merely because of a predominance, as was also said of the juxtaposi-
tion of invisibles or the superimposition of different <colours> on
different <colours>. For just as it could be said of them that the
abundance of colours is generated by the sort of relation between what
is juxtaposed or superimposed, so too <can it be said> of mixture <that
the abundance is generated> by the sort of relation between what is
20 mixed with each other. For it will be because of this sort of differen-
tiation of what is mixed that the colours will be pleasant to a greater
or lesser degree.
Having said this he says (440b23-5) that consideration will need
to be given later to what sort of cause there is for the fact that the
forms of the colours are defined and not infinite, and similarly with
the other perceptibles, flavours and sounds and smellables and tan-
25 gibles. He will say the cause as he proceeds.277 For of things whose
limits and extremes are defined the intermediates must also be
66,1 defined. Where there is a coming-to-be which is opposite, in these
cases the opposites are boundaries. For opposites are the furthest
extended from each other, and those which are furthest extended are
boundaries, whenever their extension is in the same genus. All
perceptibles possess an opposition with the result that the boundaries
of all perceptibles are defined, and because of this the intermediates
5 are too. He says (440b26-7) that he has described what colour is and
the cause of there being many colours different from each other, as
was proposed.

<CHAPTER 4>

440b27 Concerning sound, he says, there has been discussion

previously in On the Soul.
His proposal was to discuss perceptibles. He has discussed colours,
10 which are visibles. But he says that sound and voice have been
discussed sufficiently in On the Soul. He has said in that work that
sound is the actuality of that which is able to sound,278 that air is <that
which is> able to sound,279 and that the actuality comes about <of air>
considered as an underlying <body> able to sound, in such a way that
<it is actualised> by a blow of such a nature and <generated> by such
things as to prevent it from being dispersed as it travels.280 This comes
 Translation 69
about whenever the movement from the blow comes about in <the 15
air> more quickly than the dispersal which is proper <to the air>.281
Voice is a striking of the air which is exhaled, <produced> by the soul
in these parts, against what is called the wind-pipe in conjunction
with a certain imagination.282

440b28 One must discuss smell and flavour. For it is almost the
same affection, but they are not both in the same things.
His proposal is to discuss smell and flavour, one of which is percepti- 20
ble by smell and the other by taste. He gave the explanation for
mentioning them at the same time when he said, ‘For it is almost the
same affection but <they are> not <both> in the same things.’ <It is
almost> the same affection because it seems to him that flavour and
smell come about when that which is dry in flavours is washed off
and as it were wiped off in that which is moist, and <they are> not 25
<both> in the same thing because flavour <comes about> in water
whereas smell comes about particularly in air, but also in water. But
he will show this as he proceeds. Having said that it is almost the 67,1
same affection, i.e. that both these qualities come about by means of
a similar affection, he adds the explanation of the fact that flavour is
more obvious to us than smell even though they are similar <affec-
tions> and come about in a similar way, namely that ‘We have a worse 5
sense of smell than the other animals have and it is the worst of all
the senses in us whereas <our> sense of touch is more accurate than
our other senses and more accurate than <the sense of touch> of the
other animals’ (440b31-441a2). (At any rate this is why we cannot
bear the excesses of the winter and summer in the same way as the
other <animals>.) Taste <is a species> of touch. He has discussed
these points in On the Soul.283

441a3 And so the nature of water tends to be without flavour. 10

Firstly he begins the discussion concerning flavours, and on the one
hand he takes it as evident that water is without flavour in itself and
not perceptible by taste (for waters which are particularly clear and
pure are like this), and on the other hand no other of the simple bodies
has flavour in itself, as he will explain.284 But since flavour seems to
be in watery things and taste seems to come about by means of what 15
is moist like this (for taste cannot come about without moisture like
this, as has been explained in On the Soul,285 but it exists side by side
with the changes of moist things), and he is investigating how it comes
about in <what is moist>, firstly he sets out the opinions that have
been laid down beforehand concerning these matters, which he ar-
gues against by setting out his own opinion. For on one alternative,
 70 Translation
as it seems to Empedocles,286 water necessarily possesses within itself
all the kinds of all ‘the flavours’, i.e. all the species of flavours, mixed
in but ‘imperceptible because of smallness’, i.e. escaping perception
because of smallness, and clearly they must be dispersed and have
68,1 little that has flavour mixed in with them, but whenever they are
drawn in and collected by plants, or generally by those things which
seem to possess a flavour, and more things similar to each other come
together, at that time different imperceptible things which have been
drawn in from the water come themselves to be perceptible in these
<plants>.
5 Either flavours must always come about like this, or <it must be>
that water does not possess the flavours already in actuality, but is
itself matter of the flavours.287 In saying ‘a sort of seed-aggregate of
flavours’ he meant that <water> possesses within itself things able
to produce all the flavours but is not able to receive <different
flavours> by virtue of the same part.288 For those who say that all
things have been mixed in all things, like Anaxagoras,289 produce all
10 things out of all things by separation, but not different things from
the same part. For he says that from the same mixture bone is
generated by the separation of bones and their combination with each
other, and sinew is generated <by the separation and combination>
of sinews, but sinew is not generated <by the separation and combi-
nation> of bones. It is in the same way that he says water is matter
of the flavours, not so that from any chance <water> any chance
15 flavour is generated, but so that this <flavour is generated> out of
this <water> in accordance with the suitability of the water which is
taken for each of the flavours, so that all <flavours> are generated
out of water, a different one from a different part, and a difference in
flavours <is generated> in accordance with the concoctions and con-
stitutions of different waters, because there exist in the water bodies
able to produce all the flavours, not the same <bodies> in all <parts>,
20 but in this <part> the <bodies able to produce> these <flavours>, and
in this <part> the <bodies able to produce> a different <flavour>, and
in this way all the flavours are generated out of water as out of matter
so that the flavours are generated out of those <bodies> which the
water consists of, but any chance flavour <is> not <generated> out of
any chance water because not every part of water possesses within
itself bodies that are able to produce all the flavours. By means of
25 these points he would be mentioning the opinion of Democritus and
his followers, who postulated atoms as elements of all things. It is
clear that this opinion is different to that of Empedocles. For accord-
ing to the opinion of Empedocles the flavours are present beforehand
in actuality in the water, but according to this <opinion> they are
generated in accordance with the suitability towards them of the
parts of the water.
 Translation 71
He adds a third opinion290 to those already mentioned, one which 69,1
says that water itself possesses no differentiation within itself, so that
from this part of it this flavour is generated, and a different one from
another <part>, but it is matter nevertheless for every flavour, but
that which is able to produce the flavours which are generated in
water comes to be responsible itself for the differentiation of the 5
flavours which are generated in it, for example if someone were to say
that the sun or generally that which is hot is able to produce flavours.
For they attribute the differentiation of the flavours in the water to
the fact that <the sun> heats to a greater or lesser degree, and to the
differentiation in the heat and in the concoction which comes about
from the heat.
Having described291 the opinions mentioned he firstly raises objec- 10
tions to that of Empedocles and demonstrates it <to be> false and
superficial.292 For if the flavours <are> in the water and both the
flavours in fruits and the other <flavours are generated> because the
plants draw them in, and the differentiations of them <are> depend-
ent upon the water that is drawn in and <originate> from this
<water>, it would be necessary that, when the plants are not drawing
the water in, change no longer comes about in the flavours in the 15
fruits, and instead <the flavours> remain as they were when they
were taken and drawn in from the water. But as it is we see that,
after the fruits have been removed from the plants and placed in the
sun, and when the pods which protect <the fruits> have been removed
from them, as in the case of nuts, <the fruits> undergo a very great
change in being heated. ‘But changing in the pod itself ’ would be 20
equal to ‘But irrespective of whether the pod remains or is removed
<we see that the fruits> are altered and change in this <heating> and
come to be as they are.’ A sign of this is the fact that when <the pods>
have been removed <the fruits>293 can change in respect of flavours.
But by ‘when the pods are removed’ he means ‘when the fruits are 25
removed from the plants’, since they are removed by removing the
<pods> containing them. There are certain unripe and bitter contents
in pods. When these have been removed and have remained for some
time they ripen and come to be edible, because what is moist in them
changes in respect of flavours and not because flavours are being
drawn out of the water outside. But also when juices294 have been
separated and removed from fruits, like wine from bunches of grapes
and olive oil from olives, they possess many differentiations and 70,1
changes in respect of flavours. It is clear from these facts that
<flavours> do not possess their being because they are present in
<water> in actuality and are generated in <plants> from the water.
It is rather that flavours of every kind are generated by being boiled.
And yet they are no longer being drawn from the water. Thus, when 5
 72 Translation
wine and other <fluids> are boiled, they possess in the boiling fla-
vours of every kind.
Having said these things against the opinion of Empedocles he says
(441a18-20) that in a way similar to this it is also impossible for ‘water
to be matter for a seed-aggregate’, by a different flavour’s being
generated from a different part of it. For we see that from the same
water different flavours are generated, just as different bodies are
10 from the same nourishment. For sinew, bone, flesh, and vein are. For
indeed it is not295 only that <plants> taking in water differ from each
other, like plants which are close to each other, if one were a vine,
another a fig-tree, a third an olive, and the fourth something else. But
it is also clear that in each plant there is one flavour of the leaf,
another of the pod, and there is one <flavour> of the <fruit> itself
15 when it is unripe and another when it is ripened. But generally the
opinion is fictitious and implausible.
Having demonstrated that this opinion is also absurd he turns to
the third one, which said that water itself is without differentiation,
and that what is able to change <water> and produce all <flavours>
is responsible, and this was that which is hot, to which <the third
20 opinion> attributes the cause of the coming-to-be and differentiation
of flavours. He attacks this opinion for saying that flavours are
generated in water by the hot alone. For fire and the hot work in
co-operation in the coming-to-be of flavours in water, just as earth
does, as he himself says,296 and it cannot be <the hot> alone which is
able to produce flavours. In demonstrating this he assumes that
71,1 water is ‘the finest of all the things which are moist like this’, (441a23)
i.e. of the <bodies> which are able to fill things up. For this reason it
does not become dense when it is heated on its own (441a27-8). If it
does not become dense, it does not take in any flavour either when it
is heated and boiled on its own. For all ‘flavours possess density’
(441a28-9). Having said that water is the finest of all moist things of
5 this sort he says297 that olive oil floats on the surface of water not
because of its fine nature but because of ‘stickiness’, and it is in this
sense that ‘it is spread over a larger surface’, and it is more able to
fill things up than water because of the same cause. Water is unco-
hesive and easily dispersed. For this reason it is not easily confined298
and not able to fill things up similarly. Having taken it as agreed that
10 water is very fine, he confirms this by reference to the fact that, when
heated by itself, it takes no consistency.299 Because of its fine nature
it does not become dense when boiled and heated, whereas all flavours
are dependent upon a certain consistency, so that if water is not given
a consistency by itself by that which is hot, that which is hot would
not be the sole cause of the flavours which are generated in it, but
would be a ‘contributory cause’.
15 Having said this and shown that that which is hot is a contributory
 Translation 73
cause, but not the cause, of the coming-to-be of flavours in water, he
next adds his own opinion, saying: ‘All the flavours which are in pods
are clearly present in the earth too’ (441a30-b1). By means of these
words he takes it as agreed that all the qualities of flavours exist in
the earth also. By means of this he confirms that water on its own is 20
not sufficient for the constitution and coming-to-be of flavours but
comes to be such by taking in something from the earth. He uses as
testimony for this the opinion of the majority of the ancient natural
scientists. They say that ‘water is of such a nature as the earth
through which it passes’ (441b2-3), since the water takes in the
flavour from the earth, but <he> also <makes use of> what is obvious.
For salt waters are such because they pass through earth of this 25
nature (441b3-4) (for salt is a species of earth, passing through which
water becomes salty), and generally, whatever the quality of the earth
is, the flavour of what flows through it is seen to become of this nature,
bituminous <if it flows through> bituminous <earth>, and bitter <if
it flows through> bitter <earth>. At any rate <waters> ‘passing
through ashes’ (441b4-5) come to be bitter. For it is for this reason 72,1
also that there are many differentiations of streams and springs. For
some springs are ‘bitter’, and others are ‘sharp’ (441b5-6) side by side
with the differentiations of the earth through which they flow. Such
questions have been examined by Theophrastus in On Water.300 And
so he says that it is reasonable because of this that flavours are 5
particularly generated in ‘things which grow’ (441b7-8) out of the
earth, i.e. in plants, and in things which are nourished in this way
with moisture. For they draw and take in water which has absorbed
the nature of the earth, in which and through which it is flowing when
the plants themselves admit it. He would not be saying that it is
because earth has flavour by virtue of its own nature (for none of the
simple bodies seems to have flavour by its own nature), but because
<earth> is first in being affected and in admitting these charac- 10
teristics by virtue of its being mixed by heat with a certain moisture.
For he is not saying that <plants> take in water from earth which
already possesses all the flavours in actuality. For <in that case> he
would no longer have a general account of the coming-to-be of fla-
vours, but <only> of the <flavours> in water. He offered as evidence 15
for the fact that the coming-to-be of flavours in what is moist comes
about from what is dry in the earth the fact that, when the earth
already possesses certain qualities or flavours, the water which
passes through it absorbs its nature, because it is naturally affected
by it. That which in earth has admitted flavour would also be a certain
moisture.
Having said this he also says in what respect it is reasonable for
water to be affected in some way by earth. ‘For what is moist is
naturally affected by what is opposite to it’ (441b8-9), just as the 20
 74 Translation
other opposites are by what is opposite to them. That which is dry is
opposite to that which is moist. Earth is particularly dry. Fire is also
dry, and for this reason what is moist is also affected by it. But fire
has been given form particularly by virtue of what is hot, even though
it is as dry as possible, whereas earth <has been given form> by virtue
of what is dry, even if it is cold. His statement that <what is moist>
25 is also affected by fire (441b10) was not made fruitlessly. For what is
hot, and not earth alone, also contributes to the coming-to-be of the
flavours which are generated in <what is moist>. He says that this
has been discussed in the work concerning elements (441b12), mean-
ing On Coming-to-be and Perishing.301 For in that work particularly
he has discussed the nature and being of the four bodies, which are
also called elements. He has also explained in that work which feature
30 is dominant in giving each of the simple bodies its form, saying that
73,1 earth <is given form> more by what is dry than by what is cold, water
more by what is cold than by what is moist, air more by what is moist
than by what is hot, and fire more by what is hot than by what is dry.
Having said that opposites are affected by their opposites, and that
5 this is why what is moist <is affected> by what is dry and vice versa
(for that which is dominant is able to act), and that fire is also dry,
but earth is particularly so, he adds to these points the statement302
that in so far as one of the elements is fire, and one is water, and one
is earth, and one is air, they do not by nature act in any way and nor
are they affected in any way. For they are substance, and substance
is not opposite to substance,303 and acting and being affected are
10 dependent upon opposites. For this reason he added, ‘And nothing
else either’. For no body, in so far as it is a body, acts or is affected,
because there is not an opposition in them. But in so far as an
opposition is present in them, to this extent they are able to act on
each other and they are able to be affected (441b14-15). There is an
opposition in water in relation to earth by virtue of moisture (for earth
is particularly dry), and in relation to fire by virtue of both <its
15 qualities> (for <it is opposite> by virtue of both dryness and heat; for
water is moist and cold), but to a greater degree by virtue of cold, since
the cold is more proper to <water>, but the hot is particularly proper
to fire.
Someone might learn from these comments Aristotle’s opinion
concerning things which act and which are affected. For bodies do not
20 seem to him either to act or to be affected, as is the doctrine of the
Stoics, and neither do things without a body, as it seemed to Plato
and his followers,304 but <it seemed to him> that <bodies act and are
affected> by virtue of the oppositions in them which are without body.
And so, if water’s being water is dependent upon moisture and cold,
and fire’s <being fire> is dependent upon heat and dryness, how is it
that water is not opposite to fire both in so far as water <is water>
 Translation 75
and fire <is fire>? Is it that, even though each of these is given form
as much as possible by virtue of these <qualities>, nevertheless these 25
<qualities> are not fire and water. For <fire and water> are not
merely forms, but there is also something underlying <the forms>
which possesses these qualities, in conjunction with which one is
water and the other is fire. At any rate the inclination in them is not
primarily opposite. For water is not the heaviest in the way that fire
is the lightest. But their being is in conjunction with matter, which
is the same in them all. 30
Having said that it is reasonable that what is moist is affected by
what is dry (the one was in water and the other in earth), he describes 74,1
how what is moist in water is affected by what is dry in earth in the
coming-to-be of flavours. For just as those who wash off things that
are coloured in what is moist colour the water also with the colour of
the thing which is being washed, and the same goes for those who
<wash off> things that possess flavours (for the water absorbs the
nature of the flavours of the things which are washed off in it), so too 5
does he say that this comes about by nature.305 For <nature> washes
off what is dry and earthy in the moist and passes what is moist
through <what is dry and earthy>, using what is hot and by means
of this changing <what is moist> and producing flavour in it. In the
phrase, ‘So too nature what is dry and earthy’, he would be leaving
the phrase, ‘ washes off  in what is moist’, to be supplied. The
explanation of the phrase ‘and passing through what is dry and
earthy’ would be ‘washing <it> off in <what is moist> and using what 10
is hot in the passing through and changing it, i.e. altering it and giving
consistency to it and ripening it, it produces a quality. For <it comes
to be> having flavour.’ He attributes the coming-to-be of flavours to
the passing through of the moist in the dry which is in the earth, when
the hot moves it and changes it and gives it consistency. For the
coming-to-be of flavour is dependent upon the passing <of the moist> 15
through <the dry> and upon the ripening and consistency which is
generated in <the moist> by the hot, and it is not because the earth
possesses flavour in itself, as he seemed to be saying a little before306
when he wanted to establish that the moist in water absorbs the
nature of the dryness in the earth by being passed through it. For if
there were earth which possesses flavours in actuality and the water
were being wiped off from it, it would be necessary that <the flavours> 20
are not altered side by side with the differentiation of the plants which
admit water of this sort, but that the same <water> produces the very
same flavours in <the different plants>. For he made this accusation
against those who say that water is a seed-aggregate of the flavours
and matter in this way.307 But if the coming-to-be of flavours is
dependent upon water’s passing through that which is earthy and dry
in the earth <and is> because of the change <made> by the heat, there 25
 76 Translation
would also be flavours in the earth generated in it in this way by a
mixing in of something watery and moist and of heat of a certain sort.
Earth possesses within itself both heat and moisture mixed in.
75,1 Having described how flavour comes about, he defines it. For he
says that flavour is ‘the affection’ generated ‘in what is moist by what
is dry in earth <and> able to alter taste in potentiality into actuality’
(441b19-21). By taking it as agreed <that flavour> is an affection he
5 includes in his account the hot by which the affection is generated in
the moist by the dry. The phrase, ‘able to alter taste in potentiality
into actuality’ signifies the very thing which so changes and alters
the taste that it brings it from potentiality to actuality. For flavour is
able to produce taste in actuality.
It is clear from what he adds that flavour comes to be able to change
the perceptive potentiality which is present beforehand into actuality
10 without itself being responsible for the potentiality capable of taste.
For he says, ‘perceiving is not analogous to learning but to contem-
plating’ (441b22-3). This is equal to ‘For the perceptive potentiality
is not generated in the perceiving just as knowledge <is not gener-
ated> in those who are learning, but it is active by being present
beforehand and being in potentiality, just like the person who pos-
15 sesses knowledge beforehand and is then active in respect of it’. He
has explained in On the Soul308 what potential and actual perception
are. The phrase, ‘For it brings what is perceptive, being present
beforehand potentially, into this’ (441b21-2), is equal to ‘For what is
perceptive is brought by the perceptible into actuality, being like this
potentially before this.’ To this he added the comments that come
20 next309 which make it clear what sort of actuality it is brought into
and from what sort of potentiality. Since it is not only the affection in
respect of flavour which is generated in the moist by the dry (for if
colour is washed off in it the water is coloured in the same way), but
smells also are generated in it in the same way, it was reasonable
because of this that he added what is peculiar to the affection as
flavour, namely that310 it is an affection ‘able to alter taste in poten-
tiality into actuality.’
25 That dryness in the earth is responsible for the coming-to-be of
flavours is also clear from the differentiation of waters that are
boiled,311 which is generated side by side with the mixing in of earthy
76,1 dryness. At any rate the sweetest of rain waters is that of winter, less
sweet that of summer, and least sweet that of autumn. Also what falls
down in rain when there are northerly winds is more pleasant to
drink, and when there are southerly winds it is more brackish, and
it is sweet when there are heavy showers and brackish when there
are droughts. For in winter, because the surface of the earth is moist,
5 the vapours which are raised up are unmixed with earthy dryness
whereas in summer, when the surface is less moist, something of
 Translation 77
what is earthy is drawn in along with the vapour and raised up along
with it. Furthermore more of what is earthy is drawn up to a greater
extent in the autumn because then in particular everything has been
dried up by the summer heat. Also, when there are northerly winds,
because they blow from damp <places>, what is pleasant to drink is
plentiful whereas when there are southerly winds, because <they
blow> from dry and parched <places>, what is earthy is plentiful. It 10
is like this also in droughts. For in these what is largely earthy and
brackish is raised up whereas the opposite <comes about> in heavy
showers. And so in this way it is reasonable that all the flavours are
generated by the mixing in of earthy dryness and by the ripening of
them which the hot generates by means of a moderate heat. At any
rate flavours are often destroyed, whenever their ripenings are re- 15
solved and saturated with moisture by the cold, just as if the dryness
which has been mixed in with the moist is being dispersed. For after
the freezing which is generated by the cold the things in them, being
resolved, are saturated with moisture and made into air. For the
moist is present in flavours. For flavours <are> not <generated> by
a separation of the moist from the dry generated by what is hot, but
by a ripening and condensation. For it is clear that the moist is 20
present in things that are ripening from the fact that they are
moistened when the ripening is resolved. Many fruits in cold places
do not become ripe at all and do not take their peculiar flavour,
because it is the hot which comes to be able to produce their ripening
and the flavours in them.

441b23 That flavours are either an affection or a privation not 25

of every dry thing but of the nourishing must be taken as
established from the fact that [neither the dry without the moist
nor the moist without the dry. For nourishment is not one thing
alone for animals.] (441b25-7)
Having said that flavour is the affection generated by means of heat
in water by what is dry in earth, <and> able to alter taste in
potentiality into actuality, he now demonstrates that it was reason-
able for him to add to the account the phrase ‘able to alter taste in
potentiality into actuality’ (441b20-1). For not every affection gener- 77,1
ated in the moist by the dry is flavour. For smell is generated in the
moist by dryness, as he will show as he proceeds,312 but this is not
flavour. Furthermore nourishment is also tangible but it nourishes 5
not in so far as it is tangible but by virtue of the tasteable affection.
This is what he wanted to make clear when he said ‘but of the
nourishing’, using the expression ‘the nourishing’ to mean the taste-
able.
Having said that flavours are an affection of the nourishing he
 78 Translation
added ‘or privation’, meaning the privation of the nourishing, i.e. of
10 the sweet. For this is the nourishing, as he will show. For it seems to
him that the sweet flavour is nourishing whereas the bitter and salt
is privation of this, but both are tasteable. For just as in the case of
colours the opposite to what is particularly visible (and this is white),
which is black being itself also visible, <is privation of white>, so too
in the case of flavours the opposite to what is particularly tasteable
15 (and what is most nourishing is particularly tasteable, and the sweet
is of this nature) is privation of it. For it seems to him that generally
with opposites the one in the worse column313 is a privation. Therefore
since both the sweet and its opposite, the bitter, are tasteable and
flavours, and all the other flavours from a certain sort of mixture of
these, just as the colours from the white and the black, he indicated
the tasteable generally by referring to the opposites among flavours,
20 from which all flavours <come about>. And these are the sweet and
the bitter. For, since the sweet is nourishing, he said that flavour is
the affection of the nourishing dry in the moist or of the privation of
this, meaning the bitter. For it is the opposite of this. And what is
opposite to the sweet is also its privation. For he takes it as under-
stood that neither the dry itself on its own nor the moist nourishes.
25 For nourishment is dependent upon a certain sort of mixture of these.
He leaves ‘<are> flavour and nourishment’ to be supplied in the
sentence ‘Neither the dry without the moist nor the moist without the
dry’. For this is followed by ‘For nourishment is not one thing alone.’
He next demonstrates that not every affection which comes about
78,1 from the mixture of such things is flavour. For the nourishment which
is assimilated by animals is also tangible. It is at any rate for this
reason that he describes taste as being a species of touch,314 because
it too is able to apprehend tangible oppositions. But nourishment is
not nourishment in so far as it is tangible. For it does not nourish in
so far as it is hot or cold or soft or it possesses any other tangible
5 opposition. But it is responsible for growth and wasting away in
things which are being nourished in so far as it is tangible (441b27-9).
For in so far as that which nourishes is hot or cold, it is either
assimilated or rejected. For the hot and the cold are responsible for
digestion and indigestion, and of these digestion is responsible for
assimilation and growth whereas indigestion is responsible for wast-
ing away and malnutrition. The heat and coldness of the things being
assimilated work in co-operation with the nutritive soul in relation
10 to the connate heat315 in animals through which digestions <come
about> (for this potentiality316 uses this as an organ for the purpose
of digestion). The consequence is that flavours do not exist by virtue
of this tangible affection317 which is also itself generated by the dry
in the moist (for nourishment which consists of these is also tangible).
15 For nourishment can, in so far as it is tangible, be described as
 Translation 79
responsible for growth, because the body is tangible. For resistance
is a tangible, and being for the body depends on it. But also the things
from which the first bodies are given form, things on which the being
for <those bodies> depends, are also tangible. It is by virtue of the
addition and absence of body that growths and diminutions <come
about>. Consequently nourishment, in so far as it is a body, will cause
growth, as he stated in On Coming-to-be318 (for it is a quantity in so 20
far as it is a body), but in so far as it is sweet it nourishes and it is by
virtue of this that it is also able to change taste in potentiality into
actuality.

441b29 For, whether it is hot or cold, what is responsible for

these things [is that which is assimilated (for these things
produce both growth and wasting away), and that which is
assimilated nourishes qua tasteable (for all things are nour-
ished by the sweet whether it is <by the sweet> without quali-
fication or <by the sweet> mixed).] (441b29-442a2)
He is saying that nourishment is responsible for these things, i.e.
growth and wasting away, whether it is319 hot or cold or altogether
tangible. ‘For’, he says, ‘these things produce both growth and wasting 25
away’, either meaning the tangibles without qualification or the hot
and the cold among tangibles. And so flavour <comes about> by virtue
of this very affection by virtue of whose generation in the moist by
the dry both tasting and being nourished <come about> for animals. 79,1
Therefore by virtue of what does <flavour> nourish? Clearly in so far
as it is tasteable but not in so far as it is tangible.
And so he added what is simply demonstrative of this, namely the
fact that everything which is nourished is nourished either by sweet
flavour ‘without qualification or <by sweet flavour> mixed’, things
which are tasteable but not tangible. For nourishment cannot exist 5
without what is sweet. Mixed <nourishment> would consist of both
sweet <nourishment> and its opposite, bitter, like oils. For, as he will
explain as he proceeds,320 it is because what is sweet and nourishing
tends to float to the surface that flavour of this nature needs a
mixture. What is sweet tends to float to the surface because it is light
and travels upwards. For it is for this reason that it is also nourishing. 10
He says that the <account> concerning what things nourish us and
cause growth in us, and how they do so, is proper to the accounts
concerning coming-to-be (442a3). He has discussed growth specifi-
cally in On Coming-to-be and Perishing, and nourishment in On the
Coming-to-be of Animals.321 This is why he leaves the accurate ac-
count of <growth and nourishment> to those works as being inquiries 15
that are more appropriate, ‘but now’ he says that he must mention
them ‘as far as is necessary’ (442a3-4) for the demonstration of what
 80 Translation
is proposed. He says that the hot comes to be responsible for growth
in bodies by means of the digestion of nourishment and of the creation
and the coming-to-be of nourishment. For <the hot> is able to produce
20 <nourishment> because it can naturally ‘draw in what is light’ and
sweet from the moist which already has flavour whilst at the same
time ‘leaving behind what is salt and bitter because of its heaviness’
(442a4-6). For it raises up what is lighter along with itself as it is
naturally moved to the place that is upward, and it leaves what is
heavy.
He takes this as understood from the case of vapours. For this is
80,1 how vapours come about. And so he says that what the hot is seen to
produce in outside bodies it also produces in the nature of animals
and plants (442a6-7), <saying that> what is hot inside draws in from
the nourishment that has been eaten322 what is light and sweet and
assimilates it, and leaves what is heavy because it is bitter and salt,
5 and this is the excretion. For, if these things which are heavy and
bitter remain behind, it is clear that what is light and opposite to them
is sweet. This would also be an explanation of the fact that things
which are nourished are nourished by sweet things (442a8). It is also
clear from the case of vapours that what travels upwards and is
assimilated323 by what is hot is sweet and not simply light but is that
10 which is light and sweet. For all rain is sweet, even though most of it
is vaporised from the sea which is salt. This has been discussed in the
Meteorologica.324
Primarily it is sweet flavour which is nourishing. The other fla-
vours are mixed together into the nourishment, which we assimilate
from outside, for the sake of seasoning, he says, (442a8-10) like the
salt and the sharp, not because they are nourishing in themselves.
15 For just as we see that these flavours, when mixed with the sweet
<flavours> for the sake of seasoning, abate the excess of sweetness in
respect of each taste, so too <we may assume> that the other flavours
also are mixed together with the sweet <flavours> for the sake of this
necessity, holding back that which tends to float to the surface,
(442a10-12) and <they are> not <mixed with the sweet flavours>
because they are nourishing in themselves. It is clear from this that
20 what is hot inside nourishes by means of sweet <flavours> in the way
he has described.

442a12 But just as the colours consist of a mixture of white and

black [so the flavours <consist> of sweet and bitter.] (442a13)
Having said that sweet flavour is nourishing and that bitter flavour
is the opposite and in accordance with a privation of this, he shows
that all flavours <arise> from a certain sort of mixture of these
25 opposites, just as colours <are generated> from white and black, and
 Translation 81
that the differentiation of the intermediate <flavours> comes about
in accordance with the proportion in the mixture of the opposite
flavours with each other, just as in the case of colours (442a13-14),
whether all the flavours come about in accordance with certain 81,1
defined numbers and proportions out of the mixture of the opposites
(442a14-15), or those that produce pleasure <come about> like this
and the others in a chance way (442a15-17).
Next (442a17-19) he sets out the species of flavours and he says
which of them one must classify with the extremes and opposites and 5
which one must describe as coming about from the mixture of oppo-
sites. He says that the oily flavour is the same as the sweet (for it is
nourishing), and the salt <is the same as> the bitter, whereas the
pungent, the harsh, the sour, and the sharp are in the middle, being
generated from a certain sort of mixture of the extremes.
Having said that the intermediate flavours are generated out of 10
the mixture of the opposites, the sweet and the bitter, in the same
way as the colours are when white and black are mixed, he now
demonstrates the similarity between <flavours and colours> in re-
spect of number. ‘For’, <he says>, ‘there are seven species of both’
(442a20-1), in the case of the flavours, the ones which he has enumer-
ated. For <he assumes> that the salt is a different species and not
altogether the same as the bitter.325 But just as he joined the oily 15
together with the sweet, so too he says in the case of colours one must
enumerate yellow in the white, (442a22-3) and the grey must some-
how be in the black, (442a21-2) just as in the case of the flavours also
the salt was in the bitter. Just as in the case of <the flavours> the
salt was somehow in the bitter, but was a different species, and for
this reason there were seven species of flavours, so too in the case of
the colours <he says> that there will be a species of colour in respect 20
of grey.326 For, if this is what he is saying, the fact that there are seven
species of colours would be preserved. For red, purple, green, and
blue, which he says are between those three, the white, the black, and
the grey,327 will produce seven species of colours. And so if someone
were to preserve the yellow among the colours and join the grey and 25
the black together, and among the flavours distinguish the oily and
the sweet but put together the328 bitter and the salt, there will be
seven species of each of them, as he has said. For, if someone were 82,1
either to put together both <the yellow and the white and the bitter
and the salt> or to distinguish both the second <i.e. the black/grey
and the bitter/salt> and the first <i.e. the white/yellow and the
oily/sweet>,329 there will in this way too be equal species of both
flavours and of colours, not however seven, but either six or eight.
But since certain colours are generated not only by virtue of the
mixture of white and black, but also when the intermediate <colours>
are again mixed with each other (for this reason the colours seem to 5
 82 Translation
be in a way infinite), he says that the other <colours> are generated
out of the mixture of these, the primary colours being the number he
has said.
After saying that the mixture of colours and of flavours comes
about in the same way he shows that their species are equal in respect
10 of another similarity (for just as black being opposite to white is ‘a
privation of white in the diaphanês’, so the salt and the bitter are a
privation of the sweet in the nourishing moist) (442a25-7). At the
same time by means of this he explains to us what he meant by the
text a little earlier to the effect ‘that flavours are either an affection
or a privation not of every dry thing but of the nourishing’ (441b23-4).
For he is saying that the privation of the sweet, which he has also
15 shown to be nourishing, is the bitter and salt. It is from these that
the coming-to-be of all the others <comes about>. Those who wrote a
commentary on the book330 did not think of this and explained this
text in another way. He offered as a sign of the fact that the bitter is
privation of the sweet the fact that ashes of things that are burnt are
also bitter. For <the ashes> come to be like this because all that is
20 sweet and pleasant is evaporated by what is hot.

442a29 Democritus and most of the natural scientists who

discuss perception produce a great absurdity.
Having shown that nourishment, although it is tangible, is not
nourishment in so far as it is tangible, he accuses by means of this
25 both Democritus and most of the natural scientists because they
made all the senses senses of touch and said that all perceptibles are
tangibles and become known by means of the sense of touch. He
83,1 explains how they made all the senses senses of touch. For because
they made all perceptibles tangibles (442b1) and because the sense
<perceptive> of tangibles is the sense of touch, the sense of touch
would perceive all perceptibles and all the senses would come to be
senses of touch. They made all perceptibles tangibles because they
said that apprehension comes about by means of the efflux from the
5 perceptibles and the falling in of these <effluxes> into the sense-
organs,331 the sense-organs being moved by them in accordance with
the differentiations of the shapes in them and the magnitudes,
smoothnesses, and roughnesses. Furthermore Democritus and his
followers say that the white, the sweet, the fragrant, and each of the
other perceptibles differ from each other in nothing other than their
10 shapes, magnitudes, smoothnesses, and roughnesses. For these
things332 appear as they appear to those who perceive them, side by
side with their affecting and disposing in this way, as they fall on it,
the sense of touch in respect of each sense.
Having said that all the senses come to be senses of touch according
 Translation 83
to those who speak like this, he says, ‘But it is not difficult to see that
this is impossible’ (442b3). He would be saying this because, if all <the 15
senses were> senses of touch, they would have to apprehend the
tangible oppositions, things which we observe that people apprehend
by touch. These are hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold,
moist and dry things, and all things that are tangible. But in fact if
anyone perceives these things by touching, he apprehends nothing
sharp-smelling and sweet and bitter and white and black. Further-
more if sight were a sense of touch it would have to apprehend visibles 20
that were placed on it, and smell would have to smell and hearing
hear in the same way. But in fact they do not perceive unless <they
do so> from a distance and through a medium. Furthermore if every
perceptible were to impinge on the sense of touch, if it chances <to be
bitter or black or foul-smelling> it would have to seem not bitter to
the taste or black to the sight or foul-smelling to the sense of smell,
but smooth to all these <senses> too or at least in every way such as 25
would be congruent with the smooth, and in the same way everything
that is smooth would always have to be either bitter or sweet, rather
than that one of the smooth things is bitter and another sweet or one
white and another black. For it is clear from this sort of differentiation 84,1
that these senses are able to apprehend in connection with the things
which underlie natures which are different and not the same. Fur-
thermore if all <the senses> were senses of touch, why would there
be a need for several senses? For it would be sufficient that one
existed.

442b4 Furthermore they treat <perceptibles> which are com-

mon to all the senses as if they were peculiar <to one sense>. 5
For magnitude and shape and the rough and the smooth [and
the sharp and the blunt in bulks are common to the senses, if
not to all, at least to sight and touch.] (442b6-7)
He says that Democritus and his followers are mistaken in their
account of the senses in that they make the perceptibles that are
common to the senses peculiar. He has already stated in On the
Soul333 what the common perceptibles are, and what the peculiar ones
are, and that each of the senses speaks the truth in regard to the
perceptibles peculiar <to it>, but is deceived in regard to the common 10
ones. He now mentions some of the common ones, in showing that
they make the common perceptibles peculiar. For magnitude and
shape are common perceptibles, which he now mentions, as are
movement and number and rest and distance. He here adds to
magnitude and shape, as also being common perceptibles, ‘the rough
and the smooth and the sharp and the blunt’ in bulks, since they are 15
not shapes because they do not likewise fall under the definition of
 84 Translation
shape. He added ‘in bulks’ since the rough and the smooth and sharp
are also in sound, and the sharp is also in flavour. Of these the former
are perceptibles peculiar to hearing, and the latter to taste.
He says that the <perceptibles> ‘in bulks’, just as the others
20 mentioned, are common to both touch and sight, even if not to all <the
senses>. For just as sight is able to apprehend shapes, so too <can it
apprehend> the rough, smooth, sharp, and blunt in bulks. He added
as a sign of their being common the comment that <the senses> are
deceived about them but are not deceived as to the peculiar <percep-
tibles> (442b8-10). For sight, which is not deceived about colours
which are peculiar <perceptibles>, is deceived about these.
25 Although the peculiar perceptibles possess so great a differentia-
tion in relation to the common ones, <Democritus and his followers>
join the peculiar to the common. He next explains how they do this.
For Democritus (442b11-12) connects the colours, white and black,
85,1 which are peculiar to sight, to the smooth and the rough, saying that
the white is smooth, and the black rough, these being common to the
sight and the sense of touch, with the result that for him it comes
about that the common perceptible is the same as the <perceptible>
peculiar to sight. Again flavours are the perceptibles peculiar to taste.
But Democritus and his followers (442b12) attribute flavours to
5 shapes. For they say that the differentiation of flavours comes about
side by side with the differentiation of these, saying that sharp
flavours are those that are put together out of shapes of this sort, and
sweet <flavours> are those <put together> out of smooth and round
ones. For the atoms produce flavours in the things which are gener-
ated from their combination, flavours which differ in accordance with
the differentiations in the shapes they possess. And so again accord-
10 ing to <Democritus and his followers> shapes, which are common
<perceptibles>, come to be perceptibles peculiar to taste.
Having shown that shapes, which are common perceptibles, come
to be <perceptibles> peculiar to taste according to them <i.e. Democri-
tus and his followers>, he adds that the common <perceptibles>
would be peculiar ‘either to no <sense> or to sight rather <than
touch>’ (442b13). (One would ask why sight would be more able to
15 judge shapes than touch is. Alternatively the common <perceptibles>
would be more <peculiar> to <sight> because sight is able to appre-
hend all the common <perceptibles>. For touch cannot apprehend
number and distance.) If one were to say that taste is more able to
apprehend the common <perceptibles> (442b14) (for the sense which
is the most accurate in regard to something apprehends the smallest
<differentiations> in respect of it and distinguishes them. And they
20 say that taste apprehends the smallest shapes. For according to
<Democritus and his followers> taste perceives the bulks which no
<other> sense apprehends as being sharp or smooth, if indeed flavours
 Translation 85
<are generated> from shapes), it would be necessary that it also
‘perceived the other common <perceptibles> particularly’ (442b16-
17). And so if <taste can perceive> the shapes which exist not only in
flavours but also in all the other things, and it can perceive those that
are the smallest and the most difficult to perceive, it will also perceive 25
the others easily. But in fact taste cannot apprehend the other shapes. 86,1
For how is taste, in so far as it is taste, able to judge a cube? Of the
two texts that are offered334 the following preserves to a greater
degree the thought of what is being said: ‘At any rate it is <charac-
teristic> of the most accurate sense to distinguish the smallest things
in relation to each genus. Consequently it was necessary that taste 5
perceive the other common <perceptibles> also’ (442b14-16).

442b17 Furthermore all perceptibles possess an opposition.

By means of this attack he shows that shapes are not visibles or
tasteables or peculiar perceptibles generally. For all the peculiar
perceptibles possess an opposition: those of sight white and black,
those of taste sweet and bitter, those of hearing sharp and blunt, those 10
of touch hot and cold, moist and dry and all the oppositions which
touch <is perceptive> of. But there is opposition also among smel-
lables. ‘But a shape’ is ‘not opposite to a shape’ (442b19-20). Conse-
quently if there is an opposition among tasteables but not among
shapes, shapes would not be tasteables, and on this argument they
would also not be generally things perceptible as peculiar to a sense. 15
But since the <idea> that what is round is opposite to what possesses
angles exercises the imagination to the full he showed that there is
not any opposition in them by saying, ‘For which of the polygonal
shapes is it that is opposite to what is round?’ (442b20-1). For one
thing must be opposite to one thing. But what sort of polygonal shape
will be opposite to the circle? For this one is not opposite to a greater
degree than some other one. For they are not <both> opposite, since
they are not the same as each other.335 Furthermore it has been 20
generally demonstrated at length in On Heaven336 that nothing is
opposite to the circle, for which reason there is not <any movement
opposite> to movement in a circle either. Consequently if the peculiar
perceptibles possess an opposition and shapes do not possess an
opposition, shapes would not be peculiar perceptibles. Furthermore,
‘as shapes are infinite it is necessary that <flavours> too be infinite’
(442b21-2), if flavours are shapes. But there are infinite shapes that 25
differ from each other according to Democritus. Therefore there 87,1
should be infinite differentiations of flavours. Then again since it was
possible for someone to avoid the absurd <conclusion> by saying that
there are infinite differentiations of flavours but not all are perceptible,
 86 Translation
he replied to the point: ‘Why will one flavour produce a perception but
not another?’ (442b22-3). For this needs explanation.

5 442b23 Flavour and the tasteable have been discussed. The

other affections of the flavours [are considered in the Natural
History of Plants] (442b25-6).
He tells us that concerning flavour, which is the tasteable, there has
been discussion of what it is and what the tasting of it is, a discussion
which was proper to the proposed inquiry. For he says that ‘the other
affections of the flavours’, both what the differentiations are between
10 them and what comings-to-be are proper and appropriate to each
flavour, are subjects proper to the Natural History of Plants. There
is also an inquiry On Plants written by Theophrastus.337 For Aris-
totle’s does not survive.

88,1 <The Commentary> of Alexander of Aphrodisias on

<Aristotle’s> On Perception and Perceptibles
Book 2
<CHAPTER 5>

5 442b27 One must think of smells in the same way. For what the
moist produces in the dry338 the moist with flavour produces in
another genus, [in air and water in the same way] (442b29).
He has passed from flavours to the account of smellables. He now
clarifies the brief remarks he made earlier, when he gave his account
of flavours. What he said earlier was: ‘There must be discussion
10 concerning smell and flavour. For it is almost the same affection, but
they are not both in the same things’ (440b28-30). He now shows what
he meant at the time by saying this. He says one must think of smell
being generated in the same way in which flavour also was shown to
be generated. For just as the dry, which is mixed with earth, produced
flavour when it was somehow washed off in water and worked on in
15 co-operation by heat,339 so he says that the moist which already
possesses flavour, and this is what has been mixed with the dry in
the way described, produces smell when it is somehow washed off in
air and water.
He said ‘in another genus’. For smell does not come about in <air
and water> in so far as they are moist or transparent or able to admit
89,1 flavour, but in so far as they have a share in another nature, one which
is able to admit smells, which one would analogously name trans-
odorant.340 For in so far as water and air are transparent they are able
 Translation 87
to admit colours. Water admits flavours by virtue of its moisture of
bodily form, by virtue of which it is able to be affected by what is dry,
and <it admits> smells by virtue of another common potentiality 5
besides these, which he called another genus. Alternatively by ‘in
another genus’ he meant ‘<in> the smellable’. For the tasteable and
the smellable are not the same genus.
In saying that smell is generated in air and water by dryness which
has flavour, since the transparent also is common to them, he made
it clear by means of what he adds that they do not admit smells by 10
virtue of their being transparent. For he says that, although the
transparent is a predicate which they have in common, they do not
admit smells in so far as they are transparent, but in so far as they
are able to wash and cleanse the dryness with flavour341 which is
somehow washed off in them, since flavour came about when the
earthy dryness was washed off in water. Having already said that it
was a moisture with flavour which produces smells in air and water 15
(442b28-9) he now in turn gave this very same name, ‘with flavour’,
to dryness, because it was shown that flavour <came about> from
both, from watery moisture and earthy dryness.342 The dry though
not yet containing flavour within itself, was producing flavours, when
mixed and washed off in water by being ripened by heat. Smells are
produced not by the dry without flavour but by <the dry> which has 20
already been mixed with water and possesses flavour. For he too will
show that smells are generated by moisture or dryness with flavour
(for how it would be described makes no difference). But it is also clear
from the fact that all the things that are smellable also possess a
flavour. At any rate it is often by our sense of smell first that we
recognise certain flavours of things that are rotting, burning, coming 25
to be sharp, and changing from one flavour to another because of
boiling, when the change which has come about in those things is not
yet evident to taste, since the smell has its coming-to-be out of the
flavours and comes to be different by virtue of the change in them and 90,1
itself changes in conjunction with that <change>.

443a2 For that which belongs to smell is not only in air but also
in water.
Having already said, ‘For what the dry produces in the moist the 5
moist with flavour produces in another genus, in air and water in the
same way’, he now shows that <it is produced> in both. For he showed
that smellables <are> not only in air, as seemed to some people
because for most <animals> the sense of smell comes about by means
of the respiration of air, but also in water, referring to ‘fish and the
hard-shelled’343 (443a3-4), which exercise their sense of smell when 10
they are in water and often come for nourishment from far away by
 88 Translation
following their sense of smell, ‘without there being air in the water’
(443a4-5), (for it does not remain in the depths of the water, but floats
to the surface. For air and breath, even if they are generated in the
depths, rise quickly. This is also made clear by wine-skins which have
15 been blown up, if they are brought to the depths and released).344 But
<the fish and the hard-shelled> are not ‘respiring’ (443a5-6) at all
either. For he has shown elsewhere345 that animals which do not
possess lungs do not breathe. But in case anyone were to say that not
only water is moist but also air (for <air> is also itself moist),346 he
says, ‘smell would be the nature of the dry with flavour in the moist’
(443a7), i.e. the smellable would be the affection which is generated
20 in the moist by the dry with flavour, in so far as it is such.
Next he shows that smell is generated not simply from dryness, as
flavour was generated, but from dryness with flavour by means of the
fact that all things which possess smell also possess flavour and all
things which are without flavour are also without smell.347 For simple
bodies are without smell because they are also without flavour. For
25 neither earth on its own nor fire on its own possesses any flavour,
even though they are dry, and despite their being moist, neither water
nor air, possesses any flavour on their own (443a9-11). For all those
<bodies> which seem to possess a flavour, are not simple but have
91,1 already been mixed (443a11-12). For the sea, while being moist,
possesses a salt flavour, because it has been mixed with a dryness
(for this reason also it possesses smell) (443a12-13), but salt, though
appearing <entirely> to consist of earth, possesses both smell and
flavour. For it does not exist without possessing dryness mixed with
the moist. He says that salt possesses both flavour and smell to a
greater degree than sodium carbonate (443a13), because it has been
5 mixed with the moist to a greater degree. For sodium carbonate
consists of earth to a greater degree whereas salt possesses more
moisture, as is made clear by the oil which is exuded from it348
(443a13-14). He used the fact that oil is exuded as a sign either that
salt possesses moisture or that it possesses flavour. For the oil which
is exuded from <salt> seems to be bitter. But stones also are without
10 smell because they are also without flavour (443a15). Pieces of wood
prove to have a share in both smell and flavour, and those that are
more moist have less flavour and smell (443a15-16).
But in the case of things got by mining also he shows that smell
goes together with flavour. For <he shows> that in their case also
things without flavour are without smell like gold whereas bronze
and iron partake of smell because they also partake of flavour
15 (443a16-18). It is clear that gold possesses less water from the fact
that it does not rot. For rust is a rot which comes about because of an
undigested change in the moist. The <verdigris> on bronze and the
rust on iron are foul-smelling because it possesses more of the moist.
 Translation 89
Gold is smoother and more readily beaten out because it has been
finely blended and mixed. Perception bears witness that gold is
without smell and flavour. It is for this that he now uses it as an 20
example. Also the fact that the slags (skôriai) of things that are got
by mining come to be to a greater degree without smell (443a18-19)
because the moist and the flavour in them is burnt up, is a sign that
smell is dependent upon moist flavour. He says that silver and tin
have less smell than some things, but more smell than other things
(443a19-20), and have more smell than gold, but less smell than
bronze and iron because there is more water in them (443a20-1) and 25
the moist has not been blended with the dry in them in the same way
as in iron and bronze. And so349 how, if flavour and smell exist at the
same time, would the smell which is generated by the dry which has 92,1
flavour still exist? Alternatively he is not saying that flavour exists
first and then when it is generated in these things it produces smell,
but that the dryness which has flavour, and not dryness without
qualification, is responsible for the affection which is generated in air
and water, which is smell, so that both <flavour and smell> exist at
the same time, and that the moisture which has flavour350 comes to 5
be the cause of smell, if flavour is able to produce smell. For air while
being without flavour becomes capable of admitting smell, so that
dryness with flavour, being in another <body> would be able to
produce the smell that is in <air>. In the same way also water, which
is itself without flavour on its own, becomes <receptive to smell> from
the dryness with flavour, <coming to be in this way smellable>351
without at the same time coming to be tasteable as well.352 If smell
<is> in these <bodies> which are without flavour, the smell which is 10
in them would exist being generated by the dryness with flavour as
by a cause able to produce <smell>. For just as colour disposes the
transparent, so too flavour <disposes> the moist <bodies> just men-
tioned.353 And just as sight would not come about apart from the
transparent, so too smell <would not arise> apart from these <moist
bodies>. Flavour exists in those <bodies> which possess it whereas
smell does not exist in those <bodies> which possess flavour although 15
it is generated in these <bodies without flavour> by the <bodies>
which possess <flavour>. For every sense of smell and every smell <is
generated> by these means.

443a21 Smell seems to some people to be a smoky vapour which

is common to earth and air, and all are led to this opinion
concerning smell.
He says that some natural philosophers have come to be of the opinion 20
that smell consists of air and earth and is a smoky vapour. <He says
that> (443a23-4) Heraclitus also is of their number when he says: ‘If
 90 Translation
all the things that exist were smoke, noses would discriminate’ and
recognise them, clearly by perceiving them, since smoke is the per-
ceptible peculiar to noses. Having said that some natural philoso-
25 phers say that smell is a smoky vapour he says that all natural
philosophers either suppose that smell is steam or that it is vapour
or that it is both (443a24-6). He explains next what each of them is
and what the differentiation between them is. For steam is some kind
93,1 of moist vapour (443a26-7) (for <it consists> of air and water) which
changes into water (443a28). But what they call a vapour is ‘a smoky
vapour’, which likewise has something of air as well as of earth
(443a27-8), out of which he says that a ‘species of earth’ is condensed
(443a28-9). For both sooty smoke and soot are generated out of it.
Having explained what each of them is he adds: ‘But obviously neither
5 of them’ appears to be smell (443a29), as they thought, and he shows
why neither of them can be smell: ‘For on the one hand steam consists
of water’ (443a29-30), so that there would not be smell in air if steam
were smell (and water on its own is without smell). On the other hand
smoky vapour cannot be generated in water (443a30-1). But smell is
generated in <water> (443a31). For <animals> under water exercise
their sense of smell in <water>.

10 443b1 Furthermore vapour is spoken of in the same way as

effluxes.
He shows that it is not vapour from the fact that the vapour is an
efflux from whatever it is generated from. And so just as those who
say that effluxes exist and who hold them responsible as causes of
seeing were not speaking well (for it would be necessary, if such a
15 bodily efflux were being generated from the visibles, that the <bod-
ies> being seen are not preserved even for a little but are dispersed),354
so if a vapour and efflux comes about from the smellables, it would
be necessary for them to be rapidly dispersed and not to remain even
for a short time. But as it is we see that things which are small remain
for as long a time as possible preserving their fragrance or smell
20 completely. For just as things in whose case the vapour is evident are
rapidly consumed, like things which are being burnt, so would it also
be necessary for the other things. As this does not come about, smell
would not come about by means of the vapour and efflux from
<smellables>. Furthermore the sense <perceptive> of perceptibles
would come to be a sense of touch, as has already been said. It has
already been said that this is not sound.355 And so the account of
vapours, being similar to <the account> of effluxes, would be demon-
strated to be absurd in a similar way to that.
 Translation 91

443b3 It is quite clear that the moist, both that in breath and 25
that in water, can absorb the nature of and be affected in some
way by the dryness which has flavour.
Having shown that neither steam nor smoky vapour is smell by
means of the fact that smell comes about both in air and in water 94,1
whereas neither of these come about in both (for steam <does> not in
air and the smoky vapour <does> not in water) (443a29-31), he
reminds us that smell was shown to be generated in both <air and
water> by the dryness which has flavour by means of the fact that
there are <animals> which exercise the sense of smell in air and in 5
water (443a31). For not only <is> air and the moisture in it <affected
by the dry with flavour>, but the <moisture> in water also has a share
of this affection. Having said that the moisture in the breath, meaning
the <moisture> in the air, is <affected in some way by the dryness
which has flavour>356 (443b3-5), he reminds us of what has been said
in other works concerning air, namely that it too is ‘moist by nature’
(443b5-6). This has been discussed in other works but primarily in 10
On Coming-to-be and Perishing.357
Having said this he adds that, if the dry produces smells in moist
things, by being in some way washed off in them, in the same way as
<it produces> flavours in water (443b6-7) (for in water flavour was a
certain sort of washing off and passing through of the dry, and again
in moist things, in air and in water, smell was again a washing off 15
and passing through of the dry with flavour), if then the dry in the
moist is able to produce both flavour and smell, and the dry in flavours
is able to produce smell, ‘evidently smells must be something analo-
gous to flavours’ (443b7-8). Alternatively what he is saying is that, if
the dry with flavour, when it is washed off, produces smells in the
same way in both water and air, clearly smells will be something
analogous to the flavours by which they are generated. For the 20
differentiations in smells will be in accordance with the differentia-
tions in flavours, if at any rate they are generated by them, so that,
if this were the case, <a given smell> follows that <flavour> which is
attached to it. Furthermore he shows that this is the case when he
says: ‘But this has resulted in the case of some’ (443b8-9), and he says
how: ‘For smells are pungent and sweet and harsh and sour and oily’ 25
(443b9-10), just as flavours are, each smell preserving a correspon-
dence to each of these flavours. But also the smells of things that have
putrefied would be something analogous to those flavours which are
bitter (443b10-11). And showing the correspondence between them
he said: just as bitter flavours are difficult to imbibe, so too putrid 95,1
smells are difficult to breathe in (443b11-12). Taking it that these
things are evidently like this, he uses them to confirm what has been
said already, namely that what ‘flavour’ is ‘in water’, being generated
 92 Translation
by that which is dry and earthy, ‘smell <is> in air and water’
5 (443b12-14), being generated by the dryness which has flavour. He
demonstrates that heat is the cause of each of them (for it was shown
to be able to produce the flavours by which smell is generated), from
the fact that the cold and freezing blunt and obscure flavours and
smells in the same way (443b14-15). For the hot, which is able to
produce flavours, is obscured and destroyed by freezing and the cold
10 which prevent358 the mixture and ripening in <the moist bodies>
which is generated by means of <the hot>. It is reasonable that when
this <mixture> is destroyed firstly the flavours and secondly the
smells too which are generated by them are destroyed in the moist.
He added, ‘in the case of some’ (443b8-9), because he showed that
certain smells possessed what was pleasant and painful not because
they followed the flavours but in themselves.

15 443b16 There are two species of the smellable. For it is not, as

some people say, that there are not species of the smellable.
There were some people who said that species of the smellable did
not exist in themselves, as species existed of visibles but also of
audibles and tangibles and flavours. For they were saying that
species of smellables did not exist in this way. <They said that> the
20 differentiations between them which seemed <to exist> in themselves
did not exist in themselves but were transferred from the flavours.
For <they said that> sweet and harsh and sour smell and differentia-
tions in <smells> of this sort are so described in accordance with the
differentiation from the tasteables, as he too demonstrated came
about in some cases. In showing this to be a falsehood he says that
there are two species and two differentiations of smellables. For <he
25 says that> one differentiation of the smellables corresponds to the
96,1 flavours, the one which possesses the pleasant and painful not by
virtue of its own nature but accidentally (443b19-21). In the same way
also it possesses the species which are applied to it by virtue of the
transfer from the flavours by which it is generated, and <it possesses
them> not in itself. This is the species of smellables which follows the
5 nourishing and nutritive flavour, being generated by it. For it is
postulated that smell is generated by the dry with flavour. <Smell>
which is generated by nourishing flavour possesses the pleasant and
the painful accidentally. For it is by reference to the nourishment by
which it is generated that it too comes to be pleasant or unpleasant.359
When people desire nourishment the smells from it360 are pleasant
whereas these same <smells> are unpleasant when people have been
10 satiated (443b22-3). And people for whom a certain type of nourish-
ment is pleasant find the smell from it pleasant whereas those for
whom it is satiating find the smell from it unpleasant (443b23-4). All
 Translation 93
smells of this nature possess the pleasant and the painful acciden-
tally, as we have said and as those people say who deny that there
are species of the smellable in themselves (for there would not be
<species in themselves> if all smellables followed the differentiations
of the flavours and possessed the pleasant and the painful acciden- 15
tally without being <pleasant and painful> in themselves. The result
would be two different species of things smellable in this way). Smells
of this sort, he says, are those smellable in the case of nourishing
flavours and common to all animals (443b26). For all <animals> are
nourished and all have perception of the smell arising from nourish-
ment.
He says that there is another species of smells, in which the 20
pleasant <exists>, not accidentally and not from the nourishing
flavour, but in itself. This is the <pleasant> which is not generated
in the case of nourishments nor from flavour of this sort and which
does not invite us to nourishments (443b26-8). The smells from
flowers are like this, smells which make no contribution to the desire
for nourishment, but are unpleasant in the same way as <smells from 25
nourishment> are for people who have been satiated with <nourish-
ment> (443b28-30). In order to prove that smells of this sort make no 97,1
contribution to nourishment, but instead make flavours unappetiz-
ing, he mentioned the comic poet, Strattis.361 He ridiculed Euripides
for the infelicity of his verses by saying that one should not, when
boiling one’s lentil soup, pour perfume over it (443b30-1), since
perfumes do not in any way contribute anything to nourishing flavour
but on the contrary make it devoid of nourishment. He says (443b31- 5
444a3) that some people are forced by fondness for pleasure and their
enthusiasm for perfumes to mix perfume with their drinks, making
what is undrinkable to us362 pleasant to drink for themselves out of
habitual use and forcing themselves to take pleasures from two
senses, one coming about from taste and one from smell. He says that 10
this smellable is not common to all animals as the one <generated>
from nourishing flavours is, but is peculiar to the human being
(444a3-5).
He says that ‘the species’ of the former smells ‘are divided in
accordance with the flavours because of possessing the pleasant
accidentally’, whereas the species of the latter type of smell are not
divided by reference to the flavours (for the pleasant and the painful 15
<are> not in them accidentally) (444a5-8). On one view he is saying
that species of the former type of smell exist because <species exist>
of the flavours from which they are generated, <species> in conjunc-
tion with which <the species of the former type of smell> are divided
whereas species of the type of smell which is pleasant in itself do not
exist because they do not have <species> in conjunction with which
they are divided (for he said earlier ‘one must determine how’ species
 94 Translation
of smells ‘exist and how they do not’ (443b18-19)). A preferable
20 alternative is that he is saying that species of the former <type of
smell> do not exist in themselves but accidentally (for the pleasant
generally and the painful, which are the primary and the most
important differentiations, exist in it accidentally but not in them-
selves) whereas <the species> of the latter <type of smell>, which
possesses the pleasant and the painful in itself, would exist, and
would do so qua <species> in themselves, the pleasant and the painful
being primary (for they are present in <smells> by virtue of their
25 peculiar nature) whereas the other <species> are secondary, being
differentiations within the pleasant and the painful. And there are
98,1 many <differentiations> even if they have not been named in them-
selves. For there are many differentiations of smells in accordance
with the differentiations of flowers and the <differentiations arising>
from perfumes, both natural and artificial. And so he says that there
are two species of the smellable, one ordered in accordance with the
flavours, which possesses both the pleasant and the painful because
5 of its correspondence to <the flavours> (for this reason too <it exists>
accidentally. For the pleasant <exists> not in so far as <there are>
smells but in so far as <there are smells> able to reveal flavours of
this sort, and some people thinking that this is the only species among
smells, the one which possesses a correspondence to flavours, denied
that more species of the smellable existed). The other species of
smellables is that on which what is pleasant and painful generally
10 among smells depends, not accidentally and not by reference to the
flavours. Consequently there are two species of smell and not, as some
people thought, only one.
Having said that the smells from such things <as perfumes> are
peculiar to the human being (444a3-4) he next adds the explanation
for this. For <it is> because the brain, which is largest in the human
being in comparison with the other animals, is cold (444a10), and
15 because of this the parts around <the human being’s> brain are
colder. For the blood around <the brain>, being in narrow veins, is
fine and pure, in order that we may be able to perceive well, and is
easy to cool because of its fine and feeble nature (444a10-12). For this
reason <he says that> it needs some assistance from outside towards
the cold of these parts (444a14-15). For <he says that> for this reason
20 flowings from the head are generated in human beings, when the
vapour which travels upwards to these parts is cooled and condensed
and flows in the <parts> inside (444a12-13). <He says that> nature
devised such a species of smell for the sake of the heat of the parts in
that place for the help of health (444a14-15). For there is no function
for smell of this sort other than to heat and be dispersed through the
25 places around the brain which are too cold and to bring them to what
is proportionate (444a15). For smells of this sort are by their own
 Translation 95
nature fragrant and pleasant (444a17-19). For <they are> dry and 99,1
distinguished by the hot which is soft and pleasant, and the more they
have been overpowered by the hot the more fragrant <they are>. For
generally <there is> fragrance in them because of the ripening of the
moist in them by the hot. It is at any rate for this reason that things
in hot and dry places are more fragrant, and land which is hot and 5
dry is fragrant when it first admits rain because of the heat which is
present in it. For at that time the flavours from it are fine and dry.
Smells which are unpleasant and troublesome are generated because
of the cold and unripeness of the moist which is present in that from
which363 <they are generated>. That nature provides364 human beings
with smells from <fragrant> things for the sake of health and for no 10
other purpose he demonstrated by means of the fact that pleasant
smells <arising> from flavours, which he described as <a species of
smell existing> accidentally, are often unwholesome (for the smells
of certain drinks and foods satiate the heads) (444a16-17). But the
pleasant smell from <fragrant> things is almost always healthy and
‘beneficial to people in whatever condition’ (444a18-19). For during
pestilential <diseases> the smell from these things has been trusted 15
to preserve <people> in better health.
Having said that the apprehending of these smells is peculiar to
the human being he made clear in what way it was peculiar. For it is
not that only <human beings apprehend them> but that <they do so>
pre-eminently, since he says that certain of the things supplied with
blood also have perception of this sort of smell, like quadrupeds and
things which breathe (for these would be what he describes as
partaking of ‘the nature of air to a greater extent’) (444a19-22). ‘For 20
when the smells travel upwards’ by means of respiration ‘towards the
brain’, these parts are disposed more healthily because of the heat
and lightness coming from them (444a22-4). For the fragrant smell,
as we have said,365 is ‘hot by nature’ (444a24-5). For their coming-to-be
is like this. Just as in certain other cases nature uses the same thing
for several purposes (at any rate it is evidently apparent as using the
tongue both for the distinguishing of flavours and the pronunciation 25
of utterance and speech), so too he says (444a25-7) that it uses
respiration for two purposes, ‘as a main function’ and primarily366 for 100,1
the preservation in the highest degree of the things that breathe,
<using it> as a contributor to the cooling in the chest, which is
generated by the air which is breathed in, ‘and as a subordinate
function’ and secondly ‘for the purpose of smell.’ For when <animals>
breathe, the breath, which, being as it were in a passage, moves and
opens the things through which smell comes about, comes to be 5
responsible for smelling (444a27-8).
He says (444a28-b2) that such a species and genus of smells is
particularly peculiar to human beings, and that the human being
 96 Translation
particularly delights in smells from <fragrant> things ‘because’ the
human being ‘possesses the largest brain’ in proportion to the other
animals and because of this the parts around <the brain> are colder
10 and particularly needing assistance from outside. As for those other
animals, which breathe because they possess lungs, and need the
cooling which <is generated> by means of the air which is breathed,
and exercise the sense of smell as they breathe without perceiving367
any other smells than those which <arise> from nourishing flavours,
to these also, since <nature> generally <assigned> respiring to them,
15 ‘nature assigned the perception of smell, so as not to make two
sense-organs’, one through which respiration <comes about> and the
other through which smell <comes about> (444b2-b7). He described
the respiratory organ as a sense-organ also. For just as for human
beings there are two sorts of species of smells perceptible by means
of respiration, so for those <animals> the second of them <is percep-
tible>, that <arising> from the nourishing flavour, this being the only
species which <their> smell perceives.
20 It is clear that ‘those animals which do not breathe’ exercise the
sense of smell (for when nourishment is far away both the genus of
fishes and insects come to it). But it is not clear what it is through
which <they do so> (444b7-15).

444b5 For <it> is sufficient, since they also in this way (hôs)
breathe.
Since the <animals> which perceive the second species of smells
101,1 breathe, respiration was sufficient for them for the apprehension also
of the smellables which they smell. As for the <text> ‘<since they>
also entirely (holôs) <breathe>’, <the words> ‘just like <the sense-
organ perceptive> of both sorts of smellable <belonging> to human
beings, the sense-organ perceptive of the second sort only which
belongs to these <animals>’ (444b5-7), are connected with <the
5 phrase> ‘is sufficient’. In certain copies the text is preserved without
‘also entirely’ and this text is more congruent and possesses a more
evident meaning.

444b15 For this reason one would also raise a difficulty as to

with what they perceive smell.
Having shown (444b7-15) that some of the animals which do not
breathe perceive the smell arising from nourishment (for they come
10 to it from far away coming to be guided by the smell), he raises a
difficulty whether after all they possess some other sense besides
smell. For smell comes about when <animals> breathe (444b16-17)
but these <animals> do not breathe. And so it might seem that they
 Translation 97
do not possess this sense of smell but some other ‘besides the five
senses’ (444b19-20), with which they perceive the smellables. Having
raised this difficulty he adds <to it> by saying (444b20) that it is
impossible for them to possess another sense beside the five, and he 15
adds the cause of this: ‘for the sense of the smellable’ is ‘smell’
(444b20) and not any other. Consequently these <animals> also
perceive <smellables> by smelling368 them. Smell would not perceive
in the same way for all <animals> but for those which breathe <it
does so> by means of air which, as it is being breathed, removes what
is ‘as it were a lid placed on’ (444b22-3) the passage which is able to
smell and either keeps <the passage>369 uncovered or awakens and 20
dilates it. For this reason <he says that> (444b23) those animals able
to breathe could not apprehend smells in another way if they were
not respiring.
For smells are not in that place where the breath which is breathed
travels, but when it is in the passage the breath drawn in makes this
part suitable for the activity which is proper <to it>. For it is clear 102,1
that smellings are not in that place where the breath drawn in travels
from the fact that we also breathe through the mouth, and this
<breath> which is breathed through the mouth travels where the
<breath drawn in> through the nose <travels>, and nobody exercises
their sense of smell by respiring through the mouth, because it is the
respiration through the nose which comes about along those passages
which are able to smell. <Animals> which breathe, having this part 5
covered, need that which will uncover it, which is done by the breath
which is breathed through the nose in animals able to breathe. In
<animals> which do not breathe this <part> would be unprotected
and opened and not needing breath which will open it. For there is
nothing absurd in the fact that animals which exercise the sense of 10
smell have the sort of differentiation concerning the organ of smell
which they are seen to have concerning the eye.370 For ‘some’ of them
‘possess eye-lids’ (444b25), and cannot see unless these are kept
raised whereas others, like the hard-eyed, possess no covering. For
this reason they do not need anything which will keep <their eye-lids>
raised, but they see things visible to them without this help (444b26-
8).

444b28 In the same way none of the other animals is disgusted 15

at any of the things that are foul-smelling in themselves.
Having distinguished smellables into two species and having said
that one species <of smellables> accompany nourishing flavour he
showed that in their case pleasant and painful smell existed acciden-
tally (for <they do so> by reference to the nourishment), <these being
smellables> which all animals which possess smell perceive. He 20
 98 Translation
showed that the other species <of smellables> possessed the pleasant
and the painful in themselves, <these being smellables> which <he
said that> only the human being apprehends, because of the fact that
<the human being> particularly needs the fragrance from such things
since it is hot by nature and provides assistance against the cold
around the brain which is greater in human beings because <the
human being> possesses a brain which is, in proportion to the
magnitude of the body, both greater and more moist than that of the
25 other animals. He said that the other animals do not perceive the
smells that are pleasant in themselves, which <are generated> from
flowers, unless they were also to be nourishing for them. He now adds
that none of the other animals perceives the foul-smelling <smells>
which are opposite to the smells which are pleasant without qualifi-
103,1 cation, which are themselves unpleasant in themselves just as <the
pleasant ones> are pleasant <in themselves>. For they do not have
perception either of <smells> that are pleasant in themselves or of
those that are unpleasant unless, he says371 (444b30), there were to
be certain of the <smells> which are unpleasant and foul-smelling in
themselves which are capable of destroying them. For just as they
5 perceive smells which are nourishing and preservative and pleasant
accidentally, so too <they perceive> those which are capable of de-
stroying them, which are in turn unpleasant to them accidentally,
because they destroy them.
Next he explains how it is possible for <animals> to be destroyed
by certain smells. For just as human beings who are smelling charcoal
‘are made drowsy and are destroyed’ (444b30-b31), not by the smell
itself but by the ‘fume’ which travels from <the charcoal> by means
10 of respiration, so too <the other animals> ‘are destroyed by the’
exhalation ‘of brimstone’ and the power in it and by <the exhalation
of> bituminous things (444b32-445a1). For this reason they also seem
to avoid the smell from <these things>. Serpents also <seem to avoid
the smell> when fruit of the carob tree is burnt (the plant which they
call hulwort is also like this), avoiding the smell from <the carob
15 fruit> not in so far as it is foul-smelling but in so far as it is able to
destroy them. It was reasonable for him to discuss <other animals>.
For since some animals seem to avoid certain foul smells, which are
<unpleasant> not <because they are generated> from <unpleasant>
nourishment but in themselves, and since it would be a consequence
for the <animal> which avoids <smells> which are unpleasant in
themselves that it also pursues and perceives those <smells> which
are pleasant in themselves, he showed that <such animals> avoid
these smells not qua <smells that are> unpleasant without qualifica-
20 tion but qua <smells that are> capable of destroying them. Conse-
quently they would also pursue some <smells> because they would
 Translation 99
pursue <smells that are> nourishing and pleasant because of their
nourishment.
He presented (445a1-4) as a sign of the fact that <animals> do not 104,1
avoid smells that are foul-smelling in themselves the fact that some
<animals> do not avoid many <smells> of plants which are foul-
smelling and others even feed on <such plants> measuring what is
pleasant and painful in the smells merely by reference to what is
nourishing and what is capable of destroying <them>. For the only
smellables pleasant to them are those which contribute something 5
generally to taste or nourishment.
One would reasonably raise a difficulty, starting out from these
remarks, as to what he meant when he said in the second <book> On
the Soul372 with reference to smell that this was the worst sense which
a human being possesses, and <what he meant> when he said a little
earlier, being about to discuss flavours and giving <the> explanation
for the fact that flavours are more obvious to us than the smellables: 10
‘The cause of this is that we have a worse sense of smell than the
other373 animals and it is the worst of the senses in us ourselves’
(440b31-441a2). For how <do we have> a worse <sense of smell> than
the other animals if we perceive all the pleasant <smells> among the
smellables whereas the other animals only <perceive> those that
follow nourishing flavour? <It is> because we perceive very badly
those smells which the other animals smell, which he described as 15
possessing the pleasant and the unpleasant accidentally. For <we
perceive them> neither from an equal distance nor in a similarly
striking way. For if those <other animals> perceived the other
<smells> they would outdo the human being there too. But the other
<animals> do not perceive those <smells>, because they do not need
them.

445a4 Since the senses are an odd number it seems reasonable 20

that the sense of smell <is in between>.
By means of this he shows that smell is in some way intermediate
between ‘the senses able to touch’ (445a6-7), which are touch and
taste, ‘and those which come about through some other medium’, such
as sight and hearing (445a7-8). He argued very subtly for the conclu-
sion that it was in between. For since every odd number has some- 25
thing in between, and the number of senses is odd, for this reason it
is reasonable that among the senses also, because they are odd, there
is some sense in between, and this374 is smell. He explains how it is
in between by partaking in a way in both <pairs of senses>. For to 105,1
the extent that the smellable is an affection of nutritive375 flavours
which are tasteable and therefore tangible it would have a share in
the senses which <come about> by means of touch because in a way
 100 Translation
we perceive tasteables themselves also by means of touch. For nutri-
5 tive things are ‘in the tangible genus’. For taste was shown in On the
Soul to be a sort of touch.376 On the other hand it partakes of, and has
a share in, the senses which come about through certain media, which
include sight and hearing, because <smell> also comes about through
air and water, through which their apprehension also <comes about>.
After saying ‘the audible’ (445a12), instead of adding ‘and the visible’,
he said ‘the transparent’. For sight <comes about> through the
transparent in actuality.
10 Having said this he adds that it is after all reasonable that we have
said that smells are generated out of such things and in this way.377
For the account embraces both the tangibles and the media through
which the other senses <come about>. For it has been laid down by
us that smell is generated by the dryness which has flavour (for this
must be understood with dryness) in the moist, being ‘a sort of
15 plunging and washing’. It was reasonable of him to say that <the
smellable> has been ‘described by analogy’ because of the dipping and
washing. For it is not this outright but the moist in the case of that
which is being washed off in378 <something else> has been transferred
from the case of people who dip <things> in the course of washing
<them>. For washing, when it is spoken of strictly, does not come
about in air. It could be that the terms fluid and moist are being used
interchangeably. For both water and air are both moist and fluid.
20 Alternatively it could be that he is describing water as moist and air
as fluid, since air <is generated> from a vapour which <is generated>
when the things from which the change into <air> comes about are
flowing. For water flows to a greater extent when it is changing into
air because air is more loose-textured and finer. For this reason too
<air is> in greater bulk. For the air <generated> from an equal
106,1 amount of water is greater in bulk. And so to the extent that the
coming-to-be <of smell is generated> by dryness and this is tangible,
<smell> would possess something tangible. But to the extent that it
is generated in moist things, <media> through which sight and
hearing <come about>, it would be possessing that which is the same
as the perceptibles which are generated through a medium which is
outside.

5 445a14 Let this much be said on how one should, and how one
should not, speak of species of the smellable.
This is what he proposed. What has been said is, on one alternative,
that <smell> would have those species of the smellables whose
existence is from the nourishing flavours. (For there are as many
<species> of the smellables <arising> from <nourishing flavours> as
there are species of those flavours, but <they are> not <species>
 Translation 101
without qualification but <species> accidentally. For we say that 10
smells too differ by virtue of their reference to flavours.) But those
things that are smellable without qualification and pleasant or pain-
ful in themselves are not divided into species. On the more preferable
alternative <what has been said is> that there are not species in
themselves in those smellables <arising from nourishing flavours>,
because the pleasant and the painful do not exist at all in them in
themselves (for this is also what certain <other> people were say-
ing),379 but in <the smellables> in which the pleasant and the painful 15
<do exist> in themselves, which he said only the human being
perceives, species of smellables would exist in themselves. At any rate
the pleasant and the painful in them has been distinguished by virtue
of the nature of the smellables and they differ from each other in
species. For in cases where the same thing is now pleasant and then
again painful these do not differ from each other in species (for it is
impossible for something to differ itself from itself in species). But in 20
cases where these things have been divided by their proper nature
they necessarily differ from each other in species. Consequently if
someone were to take the smells that are common to animals (and
these are the ones which are generated from nourishing flavours)
there would not be species of smells. But if someone were to take the
smells which belong to human beings as being peculiar <to them>,
species380 of smells would come about.

445a16 But what some of the Pythagoreans say is not reason- 107,1
able.
He says (445a17) that the opinion that certain smellables nourish in
so far as they are smellable belongs to the Pythagoreans. But already
certain doctors came to be of this opinion also. He shows that it is not 5
reasonable that smell nourishes by means of the comment (445a17)
that nourishment must be compound (for things that are nourished
in the strict sense are like this). For no simple body nourishes and no
body nourishes in a simple way, as he said in On the Soul also.381 For
plants are not nourished by water alone. He offered excretions which
are both dry and moist as a sign of the fact that nourishment is not 10
simple. In the case of animals these excretions are clearly secreted
like this when they come about inside whereas in the case of plants
he says (445a20) that the excretions come about outside. The excre-
tion in their case would either be the sap which flows from them or
the ash-like and earthy formation which is discovered adjacent to
their roots. The change of their leaves into an earthy formation, which
comes about outside, is also excretive. But the bark on them is also 15
of this nature. The ripening of their fruits also comes about on their
outside and not inside as in animals. The separatings off which come
 102 Translation
about when their fruits ripen would be coming about on their outside
also.
If then nourishment is not a simple body but water and air, through
which smelling comes about, are simple, there would not be any
20 <animals> nourished by smellables. For it is only simple air which
they admit while breathing in and using their sense of smell. He adds
to this the comment (445a20-2) that not even water (and water ‘which
is alone unmixed with any other things’ is simple) comes to be
nourishment because nourishment must undergo a sort of condensa-
tion in the nourishing process and the digestion but water itself on
its own cannot be condensed. For that which will be condensed and
changed by digestion must have a certain density of bodily form. For
108,1 this reason farmers when watering plants mix dung in and in this
way stir up <the water>. For in no other way would trunk or root or
bark or fruit come about. But if water on its own cannot nourish, still
less would air nourish. For <air> is finer (445a22-a23) and admits
5 condensation of bodies to a smaller degree. And most of the <ani-
mals> that exercise a sense of smell do so through <air>. The argu-
ment would be in terms of what is to a greater and lesser extent.382

445a23 In addition to this [it is clear] that there is in all animals

a place able to receive nourishment.

By means of this argument he shows that no animals are nourished

10 by smell. For there is in all animals a place separated off in the body
into which they receive their nourishment. This is the stomach. For
this receives the primary nourishment out of which, by virtue of a
change, the whole body has its supplies, the heart being the first <to
act> digesting the blood in a pure fashion and supplying it to the other
15 parts. If then the stomach <is> able to receive nourishment (for from
this <there arise> supplies and the change of, and distribution of,
nourishment to the <parts> being nourished), and the breath and the
smell do not come into the stomach, <smell> would not be one of the
things that nourishes. He showed that smell <does> not <come> into
the stomach and <does> not <go> where nourishment does from the
fact that the sense-organ of smell is in the head and smell comes about
20 in conjunction with breath and vapour of this sort (445a25-7). The
breath which is drawn in does not travel into the stomach, and does
not travel where nourishment does, but travels into the lung. Conse-
quently whether it were to travel into the head where the sense-organ
of smell is or into the lung where the breath drawn in <travels>,
<smell> would not be one of the things that nourishes. If some
animals are on some occasions revived by certain smells when they
 Translation 103
faint, this would not be a sign of the fact that they are being nourished. 25
For it is not only nourishment which revives, and not only smell, but
also a bracing splash of cold water, and if someone strikes <them,
they are revived>. Nobody would say that these are things that
nourish.
But he says (445a27-9) that it is clear that the smellable, in so far 109,1
as it is smellable, does not nourish. He added, ‘qua smellable’ since
the smellable can nourish accidentally. For being smellable attaches
to nourishment as an accident, as has already been said.383 However
he says (445a29-30) that it is understood by means of perception that
smellables that are so without qualification and by their own nature 5
‘contribute to health’ for human beings. For people who make for
themselves a way of life among smells of this sort pass healthier lives
and succumb to a lesser extent to certain affections, as comes to be
understood particularly in conditions of pestilence. But this is also
clear ‘from what has been said.’384 For the fragrance of such <smells>
is temperate because of their heat, because of which and by which the 10
ripening which <comes about> in them <is generated>, and the place
around the head, being cold particularly in human beings because of
the moisture of the brain <is> in need of assistance of this sort. He
says (445a30-b1) that in an analogous way just as flavour is in
relation to the nutritive and to things that are nourished, filling up
their deficiency in this respect by assimilation, so the smellable is in
relation to health. For this in its turn contributes to health by filling 15
up with the heat proper <to itself> the excessive coldness around the
head.

<CHAPTER 6>

445b3 Someone might raise the difficulty as to whether, if every

body is divided to infinity, the perceptible affections are too.
Having described the sense-organs and the perceptibles that underlie
each sense, saying what it is by being which they are perceptible (for 20
he has described the tangible perceptible in the treatise On the
Soul,385 saying that it comes about in combination with a touching;386
this is why he omitted discussion of it here), he raises a difficulty
connected with perceptibles. For he enquires whether, just as bodies
are divided to infinity, so too are the perceptible affections in them.
The perceptible affections of bodies are colours, flavours, smells, 25
sounds, heavy <affections>, light affections, hot affections, cold affec- 110,1
tions, moist affections, dry affections, soft affections, hard affections,
and all the other tangible oppositions, since all these, being percep-
tible, are affections of bodies. For they are attached to them as
accidents.387 He raises a difficulty as to whether these <affections>
 104 Translation
are divided in conjunction with bodies and are divisible to infinity or
whether the division of these <affections> is brought to a standstill
5 and bodies are divided into certain <parts> which do not possess these
affections, which are and are said to be perceptible. He raises a
difficulty about this because an absurdity seems to follow on either
supposition. For suppose that the affections are divided in conjunc-
tion with the bodies: because each of these affections causes move-
ment of the sense (each of them is at the same time that which it is,
10 for example white or black or hot or cold or sweet or bitter or any of
the others, and also perceptible. It is perceptible because it is able to
move the sense, i.e. a perception of it is able to be generated in
actuality. Now, not every perceptible is perceptible in actuality nor is
there perception of it the moment it is perceptible in actuality.
However, at the same time as it is perceptible it does possess a
15 potentiality for moving the sense; for if it did not possess this, it would
not even be perceptible), if then the affections are divided in conjunc-
tion with the bodies to infinity, the potentiality by virtue of which
they cause movement of the senses and the perception of them in
actuality will also be divided to infinity. For all <the affections> will
be a magnitude, i.e. a perceptible body. But if every body is percepti-
20 ble, every magnitude is visible and perceptible. And any part what-
soever of the body is visible. Everything which is seen is seen with
magnitude. Therefore every magnitude will be visible and percepti-
ble. For it is not possible to see something white but not its quantity.
Consequently there is colour visible in a magnitude however small,
and the magnitude would itself be visible and perceptible. In this way
there would be no body imperceptible because of smallness. And yet
25 some magnitudes and parts of bodies seem to escape perception. If
this is true, not every part of the body would involve perceptible
affection. For the fact that its magnitude was perceptible followed
from the fact that it possessed an affection.
Having brought the first supposition, the supposition that affec-
111,1 tions are divided in conjunction with bodies to infinity, to this absurd-
ity, namely that, if every part of a body is divided to infinity, every
magnitude will be perceptible and visible, he pursues the supposition
opposed to it, the one that takes it as agreed that affections are not
divided in conjunction with bodies to infinity, and he says, ‘For if this
5 were not true, a body could <exist> without possessing any colour or
heaviness or any other affection of this sort’ (445b11-12). For what he
means is: clearly if the affections themselves were not divided in
conjunction with the bodies to infinity, certain parts of the body being
divided would themselves also be bodies without possessing any
colour or heaviness or any other affection of this sort. But if this is
10 true, the rest of the whole magnitude will be put together out of
 Translation 105
<magnitudes> which are not perceptible and do not possess <any>
affection.388
Having said this he adds, ‘but <it is> necessary; for <it is> not
<composed> out of mathematical <bodies>’ (445b14-15). For the
physical and perceptible body must be divided into physical parts.
But every physical body <is> in conjunction with affections and is put
together out of <bodies> of this sort. For if it were not put together
out of <bodies> of this sort and divided into <bodies> of this sort,
physical bodies would be put together out of mathematical bodies. For 15
mathematical <bodies> are without affection. But it is impossible to
say that bodies that are physical and perceptible are put together out
of <objects> of this sort, because these, and I mean mathematical
bodies, do not exist in real existence on their own but are assumed by
being separated in thought from their affections.389

445b15 Moreover with what will we judge or understand these? 20

With intellect? But <they are> not intelligible.
By ‘these’ he means bodies that are without affection and impercep-
tible. If there were <bodies> of this sort into which perceptible bodies
are divided, with what will we judge and understand them? For all
those things that we understand, being either intelligible or percep-
tible, we understand either through thinking of them or through 25
perceiving them. For nature has given us these two criteria for the
understanding of existents, because existents are distinguished by
these differentiations. But those parts of bodies which are impercep- 112,1
tible and without affection will fall under neither of these. For <they
will not fall under> the intellect. For they are not intelligible in their
own right. For the intellect thinks of none of the <subjects> which
underlie in their own right, and exist outside, apart from perception.
For there are some things which, though outside, do not exist in their
own right by nature, being indivisible substances (for the forms of 5
these <subjects> and the universals do not exist outside and do not
exist in their own right. For existence for universals is dependent
upon being thought of, with the result that their real existence as
such is within the intellect and not outside). If the intellect thinks of
none of the things that are existent in this way apart from perception,
and if these are not perceptible, then neither the intellect nor percep-
tion would judge them. The intellect thinks of perceptibles along with 10
perception, because when perception of them comes about the intel-
lect can contemplate their differentiation from each other and the
essence of each of them and how such <perceptibles> are related to
the universal, and because it distinguishes in all cases by reason that
which attaches to them as an accident and the form which underlies
<them>.
 106 Translation

445b17 But if this is so, it seems likely to bear witness in favour

15 of those who postulate indivisibles.
He applies this absurdity to the opinion which divides perceptible
bodies into <parts> without affection, namely that what is being said
will be concordant with those making the supposition of indivisible
magnitudes. For the account which <the atomists> use must also be
20 used by those who say this, in resolving the difficulties raised against
them. Those who make the supposition that there are atoms say that
indivisible bodies are without affection and depending upon how they
are put together and related to each other they produce affections and
qualities of this sort. These people also will be compelled to say the
same. This is because for these people too the affections that are in
25 bodies will be produced depending upon how the parts without
affection are put together.
113,1 Having said this he objects, ‘but they are impossible’, just as the
other claims made by those people are impossible.390 They too would
say this in order to resolve the difficulties raised. For they too will say
impossible things by saying the same as them. He says that the point
has been made concerning those who make the supposition that there
are indivisible bodies that they are saying impossible things in the
5 discussion Concerning movement, meaning by Concerning movement
the last <parts> of the Physics, in which he has shown that there
cannot be an indivisible magnitude.391

445b20 Concerning the resolution of these <difficulties> it will

be clear at the same time also why the species are limited [of
colour, flavour, sounds and the other perceptibles]. (445b21-2)
The difficulties raised were that if affections are divided in con-
10 junction with bodies which are being divided to infinity there will
be, he says, the absurdity that every body and magnitude turns out
to be perceptible, and if they are not divided in conjunction <there
will be the absurdity> that bodies are put together out of infinite
<parts> and <parts> without affection. We will, he says, at the
same time resolve the difficulties raised and by means of the
resolution of them make it clear why the species of the perceptibles
in respect of each sense are limited, for example colours, flavours,
15 sounds, smells, and all the tangibles. For he noted this earlier392 as
itself also needing enquiry, and now he connects the resolution of the
difficulties raised and the demonstration of this as being akin. For if
there is infinite division of affections, is it the case that the affections
in themselves are divisible to infinity and in the same way the species
of <the perceptibles> are infinite and divisible in themselves? Or <are
20 they> not <divisible> in themselves and is the division of them to
 Translation 107
infinity and generally into magnitudes not in species but accidentally,
because they are divided in conjunction with the <bodies> in which
they are, as they are divided? Firstly393 he says why the species of
perceptibles must be limited. Next394 he will connect this with the
resolution of the difficulty before him and show how useful the one is
to the other.395
The demonstration is as follows: where there are extremes, that is 25
where the limits are defined, in those cases the intermediates be-
tween the extremes and limits must also be defined. In every genus 114,1
the opposites are extremes. The opposites are limited since opposites
are the furthest distance from each other, and that which is the
furthest <distance> is a limit. Consequently where there are oppo-
sites there the extremes are limited. There is opposition in all the
perceptibles, and he shows this for each perceptible by selecting it in
turn. Therefore all perceptibles are limited in respect of species. For 5
if, where the extremes are limited, the intermediates are also limited,
and if the extremes are limited where there are opposites, it follows
that where there is opposition there are limits. And there is opposition
in all perceptibles. Therefore all perceptibles are limited. The claim
that ‘where all the extremes are limited, the intermediates must also 10
be limited’ he takes here as understood, but he demonstrated it in the
first book of the Posterior Analytics.396 For if they were not limited
but <were divided> to infinity, the extremes would not be limited
either, because we could never proceed to the limit because there
would be an infinite number of intermediates. By arguing in this way
it can be shown that the perceptibles are not divided into infinitely
many species. For if the species are infinite and every species is 15
predicated of an infinite number of indivisibles, there will be an
infinite number of things an infinite number of times. But if <it is
predicated> of a limited number <of species> many will at the same
time be infinite in number. This is impossible. For the juxtaposition
of some things with others would limit them and an infinity would be
both greater and smaller than an infinity.

445b27 That which is continuous is divided into an infinite 20

number of unequal <parts> but a limited number of equal
<parts>, while that which is not in itself continuous <is divided>
into a limited number of species.
With these words he stated that he would at the same time resolve
the difficulty and show that the species of perceptibles are limited.
For he will resolve the difficulty by showing how affections can be 25
divided in conjunction with the infinite division of continua, and how 115,1
all parts of perceptibles are both perceptible and not perceptible.397
The species of perceptibles will not be infinite, even if <perceptible
 108 Translation
affections> were to be divided to infinity in conjunction <with the
infinite division of continua>, because of what has been said before,
since where there are opposites, the species intermediate between the
opposites must be limited too. They are not divided like this in
5 themselves, but accidentally, being divided in conjunction with those
<bodies> whose affections they are. For it would be absurd to say that
certain species of perceptibles were not perceptible, which would be
the result in the case of the infinite division of bodies, on the grounds
that perceptibles are divided into different species by being divided
in conjunction <with bodies>. Therefore he shows how the division of
10 continua differs from the division of non-continua such as the affec-
tions in bodies. He says that continua are divided into limited
<parts>, if divided into equal <parts>, whereas there comes about an
infinite division of them in the case of division into unequal <parts>,
as he showed in the Physics,398 and that <they are> the two divisions
of continua as such mentioned, whereas where it concerns things that
15 are not continuous, for example perceptibles and affections generally,
they are divided in themselves into a limited number of species. For
the division of non-continua is into species not into magnitudes. And
the species of these are limited because there is opposition in them.
And so it is clear that every continuum, if divided into equal
<parts>, will be divided into a limited number <of such parts>. For
every continuum is limited (for it has been shown that there is nothing
20 infinite in actuality). Everything which is limited is measured by
every part of it. For if the last <part> that measures it were not to be
brought to an end together with it but were to surpass it, it would
have measured it nonetheless. If it did measure it, clearly there would
be a limited number of <parts> in it that were the same size as the
<part> which measured it. And so for this reason every continuum is
25 divided into a limited number of equal <parts>. But the infinite
division of continua always comes about in respect of unequal divi-
116,1 sions. For if, when <a part> has been removed, so much were to be
removed <from that part> as corresponded in quantity to the <part>
from which it was removed, <then> since the proportion according to
which the whole had already been divided is the proportion according
to which the part of it is also divided, and the part of <the part> is in
turn <divided> in the same way, there will be a division to infinity.
The division of the continuous is like this. But the divisions of what
5 is not in itself continuous, for example the perceptible qualities, are
a limited number of species, if they were to be divided in themselves,
as has been shown.
The difficulty raised was whether, just as bodies are divided to
infinity, so too are their affections. In showing this he says that the
division of affections in themselves is a limited number of species. For
10 these affections of the bodies are the perceptible species, and they are
 Translation 109
not magnitudes and nor are they continuous in themselves. This is
why the division of them comes about into a limited number <of
species>. Because they are affections of continua and are present in
continua and have their being dependent upon them, they would be
divided in conjunction with them accidentally, and clearly they will
be divided in conjunction with <the continua> in whatever way those
<continua> are divided. Therefore since that which is continuous is 15
divisible to infinity potentially, its affections would also be divisible
to infinity potentially in the same way as it <but> accidentally.
Therefore it is necessary, he says, in the case of perceptibles which
exist in a continuity to take it as agreed that ‘the potential and the
actual are different’399 (for being actually perceptible is one thing and
being potentially <perceptible> is something else), and just as the
parts of the continuum are in the whole potentially so too the affec-
tions of the parts which are perceptible are potentially perceptible, 20
the parts being in the whole. And so the millet-seed as a whole is
perceptible on its own (for it also exists on its own), but the ten
thousandth part of the millet-seed is <only> potentially perceptible
because it does not exist on its own, but <only> in the millet-seed
which is continuous. For sight encounters even this <ten thousandth
part> when it looks at the millet-seed. But it does not see it on its
own. <It sees it> because it exists in the whole. The same is true of 25
the sound in ‘the quarter-tone’. Hearing hears the whole melody on 117,1
its own, it being a continuum of which the sound in the quarter-tone
is a part, but <it hears> the <sound> in the quarter-tone potentially
because it is a part of that <continuum>. After saying ‘hearing hears
the whole melody, it being a continuum’, he says that this interval of
the quarter-tone, being a part of the melody and being intermediate 5
between the extremes, that is <being a part> of the whole interval of
the melody (for this is the <interval> of that which is intermediate
between the extremes) escapes detection (for that which is inter-
mediate between the sounds at the extremes is a part of the whole
melody which is heard) because it exists in the whole, not being
actually at that time perceptible itself by itself, because it does not
even exist by itself.
Having said with reference to the visible and the audible that the 10
parts in the wholes escape detection because they are not actually
perceptible and not <perceptible> on their own, when they are in the
wholes, but <perceptible> potentially, he says that the same is true
of the other perceptibles.400 For the small parts which are in percep-
tibles are perceptible potentially but not actually because in the first
place they have not been separated and nor do they exist by them-
selves. For the foot-length exists not actually but potentially in the 15
two-foot-length, it being a continuum. The foot-length comes to be
 110 Translation
actually at the time when it is separated and, having been separated
from its continuity with the other <foot-length>, is taken by itself.401
Having said that the parts which are in the wholes are potentially
perceptible because they exist potentially in the continuity of the
20 wholes, he next enquires whether they can all come to be perceptible
on their own when separated from the continuity, or if this <is> not
<possible> how they could be said to exist, being potentially in the
whole; and he says that when the division comes to be into sufficiently
small <parts>, it is possible that the parts that are sufficiently small
no longer remain in the nature that is proper <to them>, so that the
ten-thousandth part of the millet-seed when it has been removed no
longer remains a part of a millet-seed and the affection which it
25 possessed when it was in the millet-seed <no longer remains> but is
resolved and changed into the surrounding air, so that by changing
it comes to be in turn a part continuous with that <air>. For just as
118,1 the ladle of wine, when it has been poured in to the sea, does not
preserve its nature, but changes into the substance of the sea, so too
it is reasonable that the parts of perceptibles that are sufficiently
small, when they are separated, are resolved into that which sur-
rounds <them>, the whole being divided into such small <parts>.
5 Consequently not even thus would they exist on their own, but <would
be> parts of those <bodies> into which they were resolved.
Nevertheless, even if <the ten-thousandth part of the millet-seed>
were not destroyed but remained, not even thus would it be actually
perceptible, but even at that time <it would be> potentially <percep-
tible>. For all the parts which are in wholes, so long as they are in
wholes, are potentially but not actually perceptible. For this is how
the parts of the whole possess their being (to einai). On this view those
10 parts that are sufficiently small to escape perception because of
smallness, even when they have been separated from the wholes,
preserve their potentially <being perceptible>, being perceptible and
possessing the affection as far as their own nature is concerned (for
they were perceptible in the whole; at any rate sight will encounter402
<them> even if <it does not see them> on their own), but escaping
perception because of smallness. What is responsible for this is the
fact that the excess of the perception is not perceptible on its own,
15 that is not every part of the perceptible is perceptible on its own. For
he would be saying excess of perception in the sense of that which is
actually <perceptible>. An excess of the perceptible would be a part
such that what is left at its removal still remains actually perceptible.
And so if this part which is removed from the perceptible is not
perceptible as a whole on its own, when it has been isolated and
20 separated from the whole, but <is perceptible> potentially, it would
at that time be potentially but not actually perceptible. For when it
 Translation 111
was in the actually perceptible as a whole it was not perceptible on
its own. But it was not for this reason not perceptible potentially.403
Alternatively what is being said is as follows: for just as the more
accurate perception predominates over the less accurate by a certain
perceptive potentiality (for the excess of the more accurate perception 25
is not by virtue of anything other than a perceptive potentiality),
whereas the excess itself, when it comes about, is not in itself a
perception (he said ‘perceptible’ (aisthêtê) in the sense of ‘perceptive’
(aisthêtikê); for if <there is> some <sense> possessing a potentiality
as great as is the perceptive excess in the more accurate perception
it would not already be able to perceive. However it will increase the 119,1
perception by the addition. For the excess is present potentially in
the more accurate perception, and it is a perception potentially, but
not so as to be a perception on its own if separated), so too some of
the parts in perceptibles are like this, being in the whole, potentially
perceptible, so that when they are in the whole they make some 5
contribution to it for its being perceptible but when they are separated
and come to be on their own they are not perceptible, because of an
excess. For he would describe as an excess of a perception the
<excess> which comes about in the more accurate <perception> in
contrast with the less accurate one. For the more accurate perception
sees something to a greater extent, not in such a way that, by
surpassing in accuracy, it fails to see it in the same way, but <merely 10
seeing it> more accurately.404
He showed what he set out to show very effectively by using the
excess of the perception and showing the similarity between them.
For just as the excess of the more accurate perception contributes to
the perception for the person who possesses it and is not a perception
when separated and on its own, so the sufficiently small part of the
perceptible will not be perceptible on its own when separated, but will 15
be perceptible in the same way as it was when it was in the whole.
For at that time it was potentially <perceptible>. In the same way
the excess of the more accurate perception when taken on its own is
<only> potentially a perception because it comes to be a perception
when some other potentiality is added. However, it will not be
imperceptible and without affection just because it is not perceptible
when separated and on its own. But it will be potentially perceptible
when existing on its own. For it possesses perceptible affections but 20
because of its smallness it has failed in its ability to move the sense
on its own. But it will be actually perceptible when added to other
similar <perceptibles>. For when these are collected (<perceptibles>
which when they existed individually and separated were only poten-
tially perceptible, being unable actually to move the sense because of
weakness) and when there comes to be out of them <a perceptible> 25
sufficiently large to be able to move <the sense>, perception in
 112 Translation
120,1 actuality comes about by means of their being united.405 It depends
not upon a quality in isolation but also upon the quantity of the
potentiality whether the movement <generated> by the perceptible
comes to be actually perceptible, not because either of <the percep-
tibles> is perceptible individually but because being put together
they contribute to the whole that is <put together> out of them
5 towards its being able to move the sense in actuality. And being in
this way in the whole <they are> potentially perceptible, not
because they are actually able ever to become <perceptible> on their
own, but because they are parts. For they were parts of that which is
perceptible on its own, and the potentiality of theirs in relation to
perception, which they actually possess when separated, would be
less important406 than the potentiality in virtue of which they were
said to be potentially perceptible parts when they were in the whole.
10 At that time the sense apprehends them in a way and is active
concerning them, even if they would not be <perceptible> on their own
if separated.
Having shown this he adds: ‘And so it has been stated that some
magnitudes and affections escape detection and for what cause and
how they are perceptible and how they are not’, adding ‘and affections’
after ‘magnitudes’ (446a15-16). For it is not by being without affection
15 that some magnitudes escape detection by the sense, but affections
also as well as magnitudes escape detection. <He adds> ‘and for what
cause’ since it is not because of their being without affection and apart
from any perceptible differentiation that they escape detection by the
sense. (For this is how the difficulty comes about that has been raised
to the effect that affections and perceptibles come to be out of imper-
ceptibles and <bodies> without affection, as it seemed to those who
suppose atomic principles.) But <they escape detection> because
20 although they possess <affections> they are too small to be able to
move the sense when they are on their own. This is why it is neither
the case that all <bodies> are perceptible, if division goes on to
infinity, nor that there are certain parts of perceptibles that are
imperceptible and without affection by their nature. And so when
these <bodies> that on their own escape detection of the sense ‘are
present’ (446a17) in something and at the same time are ‘so many’
(446a17) that already that which <is put together> out of them is able
121,1 to move the sense, and when those <bodies> which <are put together>
out of them are not only potentially perceptible, so too when <the first
bodies> are still in the whole they make some contribution to the
whole with regard to the perception of it, but <they are> not poten-
tially perceptible in the whole in such a way that they are able to be
perceptible on their own if separated.
5 When the parts of a continuous and perceptible magnitude are
sufficiently large, so that not only do they contribute to the percepti-
 Translation 113
bility of the whole being themselves potentially perceptible in it but
also they are ‘actually perceptible’ when separated, it is necessary
that these magnitudes be ‘limited’ in number in the magnitude
(446a16-20). For it is not possible for that which is limited to be
divided into an infinite number of <parts> that are as large as this.
For divisions into <parts> like this are the same as divisions into 10
equal <parts>. For the man dividing in this way does not keep on
dividing into smaller <parts>. For there are two sorts of the poten-
tially perceptible, one because it is in the whole and has not yet been
separated, being able to be perceptible on its own even when sepa-
rated from <the whole>, the other because it contributes to the
perceptibility of the whole, not ever actually being perceptible on its
own. The <parts> which are potentially perceptible in the whole such 15
that they can be perceptible on their own are limited, just as the
division of them into equal <parts> was <limited>. For it is not
possible for that which is continuous to be divided into an infinite
number of actually perceptible <parts>, just as it is not <possible for
it to be divided> into <an infinite number of> equal <parts>. There-
fore just as there are potentially infinite parts in the continuum but
not actually, so too the perceptibles that are divided in accordance 20
with division to infinity will be potentially perceptible but never
actually come to be perceptible on their own. Just as the parts of the
continuum that are sufficiently large are limited in number, so too
the perceptible affections that are in them possess the infinite and 25
the limited in whatever way <magnitudes> do, but accidentally. (This
is because this division of these <perceptible affections> comes about
accidentally, being a division in conjunction with magnitudes, and is
not a division of them in respect of species.) Therefore he showed that
not every part of the perceptible is actually perceptible and that this
is not because perceptibles and affections <are put together> out of
imperceptible <parts> and <parts> without affection, and he heeded 122,1
the point that every part of the perceptible is perceptible by its own
nature.
Even if there is some magnitude imperceptible on its own it does
not follow that there is a largest imperceptible and a smallest percep-
tible. For the division of the magnitude is to infinity, as has been 5
shown, and the part of the magnitude is a magnitude. Because of this
every <part> that is removed from that <magnitude> which has been
taken as the smallest perceptible so that the <magnitude> after the
removal is the largest imperceptible, will be divisible. When <such a
part> is divided and added in respect of each of its parts to that
<magnitude> which came to be imperceptible after its removal, if 10
<the magnitude> remained imperceptible still when these <parts>
were added, it was not the largest imperceptible after the removal.
But if it became perceptible in respect of each addition, the smallest
 114 Translation
perceptible <will be> that <magnitude> the removal from which of
this <part> will, when it is divided and added, make the impercepti-
ble. For when a part of that407 <part> which was removed is added to
15 it it makes it perceptible. Consequently the <magnitude> with the
<part> that had been removed as a whole was not the smallest
perceptible. This can be shown for every removal. Hence, even if there
is something imperceptible, there is no largest imperceptible just as
there is no smallest perceptible either even if there is something
imperceptible. Moreover if every magnitude is potentially perceptible
(for the imperceptible is not such by its nature but because of the
20 weakness of the perception), there would not be any magnitude
imperceptible by its own nature. Consequently there would not be a
largest <imperceptible>. But if there is no <magnitude> which is by
its own nature the smallest perceptible nor any which is the largest
imperceptible there would not be any magnitude which was by its
own nature the smallest, as Diodorus thinks he shows.408

123,1 446a20 Someone might raise the difficulty as to whether the

perceptibles or the movements from the perceptibles arrive.
The difficulty now is whether all perceptibles before impinging on the
sense come about first at the half way point of the distance between
5 <the perceptible> and the sense. For this is obvious in the case of
certain perceptibles, such as sounds and smells. For hearing <is> not
immediate upon the generation of the sound (for instance men who
are far away hear more slowly then those who are near by, because
the perceptible travels to them in a longer time because it travels a
greater distance). The same thing also comes about in the case of
10 smells. For the smelling is not immediate upon the presentation of
that which is fragrant, and the men close to it and the men far away
do not perceive it in respect of the same thing. And so in the case of
these <perceptibles> it is understood. But it is worth enquiring
whether, if in the case of sight also <it is> like this, something must
travel from the visible and this is in time because what travels is
moved over every distance in time.
15 This is the difficulty. He said ‘whether the perceptibles or the
movements from the perceptibles arrive’ because some people409
thought that certain effluxes travel from the perceptibles to the
senses and perception is of these (according to these people the
perceptibles themselves arrive at the senses), whereas others think
20 that nothing flows from the perceptibles or travels but that which is
between the perceptible and the sense is somehow moved and dis-
posed by <the perceptible> because it is of this nature, as he himself
showed410 <in showing how> perceiving came about. Therefore since
opinion concerning perceiving is divided, and it is not his present
 Translation 115
concern to say how perceiving comes about he frames the difficulty
neutrally. For whether it comes about in this way or in that someone 25
might raise the difficulty as to whether the perceptible or the move-
ment from the perceptible comes first in the medium. He next estab- 124,1
lishes (446a23-5) as a first point that it is reasonable that it is like
this with all the <senses> because it is like this with hearing and
smelling.
He says (446a25-446b2) that he is investigating whether it comes
about like this in the case of sight too, as it seems to Empedocles. For
<Empedocles> says that the light from the sun comes about first in 5
that which is between the sun and the earth and then in this way on
the earth. Democritus is of the same opinion and all those according
to whom something flowing from the visibles travels to the eye. He
says that it will seem to be reasonable that the visible comes about
first in that which is between. For the movement generated is either
of the <body> seen itself or of something else <moved> by it. All
movement is ‘from somewhere to somewhere’ (446a29) and in time. 10
And all time is divisible. And so at the half-way-point of the time in
which the <body> seen or the affection <generated> by it travelled
the movement towards the eye that came to be in the medium would
be at the half-way-point or at some between-point of the distance
which it was travelling and through which it was being moved. And
<it would> not yet <be> at the eye. Therefore while it was travelling
towards <the eye> it would not yet be being seen. Consequently the 15
ray from the sun is seen in the way that Empedocles says, not
immediately upon the sun’s rising and not at the same time by all the
people on whom it has risen, but in time and in a longer time for those
further away. <Aristotle> assumed that it was reasonable <for see-
ing> to come about like this if it came about by means of a movement,
showing that if seeing were not to come about like this it will not be
accompanied by movement.

446b2 And if everything at the same time hears and has heard 20
and generally perceives and has perceived, [and there is no
coming to be of them but they exist without coming to be, <there
is> even so none the less <an interval> just, as when the blow
has been generated, the sound <is> not yet at the hearing]
(446b3-6).
Having said that it seems to be reasonable that the perceptible comes
about first in that which is between as it travels to the senses before
we perceive it, and that this is so with visibles as with the other
senses, he adds that it makes no difference411 that there is no coming 125,1
to be of perceiving with regard to the point that no time comes about
in which the perceptibles are travelling to the senses. For of the things
 116 Translation
that are not always existent all those which proceed to being by means
of coming to be are not coming to be and being at the same time, but
5 their coming to be is present before their being. For this reason
something of them exists, when they are coming to be so long as they
are coming to be. The things that come to be by nature come to be in
this way. (For example a horse is not coming to be and being at the
same time, but while it is coming to be a horse does not yet exist but
something of it does exist.) But so too do the things <that come to be>
by art, since a house <comes to be> like this and a cloak and a shoe.
10 These things, which are said to come to be, exist so long as they cease
from coming to be. But so long as they are coming to be, something of
them exists but they themselves do not.
But there are certain things which do not proceed to being from
not being by means of coming to be and it cannot be said of them that
a part exists but they have not been completed and they do not exist
as a whole because they are still coming to be and in need of some
15 time for their completion. For the coming to be of everything comes
to be in time. Touch is like this. There is no coming to be of touch. It
is not the case that touch comes to be in one time but exists in another,
but rather touch exists immediately and at the same time as it began,
and it cannot be said that something of touch exists but touch does
not yet exist and is still coming to be. Things like this include the
20 activity in accordance with the senses. For there is no coming to be of
them but hearing at the same time hears and has heard, and it cannot
be said that something of hearing exists but hearing is coming to be
and does not yet exist. But just as every part of touch is touch and it
cannot be said that this is something of touch but not yet touch, the
25 same goes for pleasure and this is also true of hearing. For ‘at the
same time it hears and has heard’. For all the activity of it is hearing
and so is every part. This is why that which hears has heard imme-
diately upon hearing. The same goes for the other activities in
accordance with the senses. Their activities and apprehensions are
126,1 all together and do not need time for <their> completion. For it
requires time to hear or see or taste so many things but not to see or
hear or taste without qualification. But even if this is true of the
senses nothing prevents perceptibles from being somewhere in that
5 which is between before being at the senses with the result that the
senses are not moved by them at the same time as their movement.
For just as in the case of touch things that are going to touch are,
when they are travelling towards each other, not yet touching and
there is not something of touch at that time, so too in the case of the
other senses it is possible that this is so, and in some cases at least it
is obvious. For the sound is not already at the hearing immediately
10 upon its coming to be somewhere, but rather hearing apprehends it
after its coming to be when it travels to it. This at any rate is why
 Translation 117
men who are <hearing> from a smaller distance and men who are
<hearing> from a greater distance do not hear it in the same respect:
for those <hearing it> from a greater <distance> hear it later. He adds
(446b6-9) as a sign of the fact that the blow is not at the same time
coming to be and being heard the fact that the men who are further
removed from people who are talking hear the sound of the voice but 15
do not hear what was said, because the shapes which are generated
by the blow in the air out of the letters, and out of the words that are
put together out of them, are changed in the medium, and the sounds
which arrive at the hearing do not have the shapes which the people
talking gave to them.412 Whether in fact it is because their shape is
changed in their locomotion or because the tension of the blow is 20
relaxed, as Strato says,413 (for he says that the generation of the
different sounds depends not on the air’s somehow being shaped but
on the inequality of the blow), nevertheless, in whichever way it
comes to be that the being heard and the coming to be414 of the
locomotion do not correspond, this comes to be because in the distance
in between through which it travels one <portion> of air takes the
blow over from another <portion> in succession.
Having said this about sound, he raises no difficulty about the 25
other perceptibles since they come to be actually perceptible in the 127,1
same way as sounds, but he raises a difficulty about sight and
<bodies> that are seen and he says, ‘And so is this true of colour and
light? For it is not that the one sees and the other is seen because
there is a relation, as is the case with equal things. For there would
be no need for each of the two to be somewhere’ (446b9-11). By means 5
of this he establishes plausibly the claim that seeing does not come
about by virtue of a relation between those seeing and the <bodies>
being seen. For since those things that come to be this or that by virtue
of their relation to each other need neither movement nor time he
argued plausibly that it is impossible to say that seeing comes about
in this way by reference to relatives and by virtue of a relation
between each other such as the things that do not need a particular
position in relation to each other in order to be as they are. For it is 10
not the case that things are equal when lying in this way or here but
not equal <when lying> in another way or somewhere else. This is
not so with seeing which needs a particular position.
As I said, he argued plausibly. For not all the things which either
exist or come to be by virtue of their relation with each other exist in
the same way. For that which is on the right has its relation depend-
ent upon a particular position. In showing that seeing does not exist
by virtue of a relation he says that things that are equal have the 15
same relation to each other wherever they are. It is not the case that
the equal things are equal here but not equal when transferred, but
rather whether they are in the same place or separated equal things
 118 Translation
are equal. Likewise with things that are similar. But also things that
are unequal are like that. He says that it is not true of perception in
20 accordance with sight that the position of the <bodies> seen and their
distance from that which sees makes no difference. For it does not see
all visibles nor does it see them wherever they are nor however <they
are positioned>. In saying this he is advocating as plausible the view
that visibles travel to the sight just as the other <perceptibles do>,
and not because seeing is not one of the things that are in relation to
something415 (for not all relatives are like things that are equal to each
other. That which is on the right, as I said, is in relation to something
25 and requires a certain position, and the same is true of that which is
in front and behind and upward and downward), but because sight
cannot be one of these relatives which have no need of position and
128,1 distance, since seeing seems to him to be dependent upon the particu-
lar relation between that which sees and the <body> being seen.416
Alternatively seeing needs a relation but seeing does not consist in
the relation (that which is on the right consists in the relation). There
also <needs> to be a potentiality that is able to apprehend the
5 <bodies> seen. For without this the relation is no use for seeing. For
this reason <being seen> consists in being transparent and is by
virtue of a relation, but seeing is not by virtue of a relation.
Having raised this difficulty he says: ‘Alternatively, regarding
sound and smell it is reasonable for this to result. For just as air and
water are continuous <so are sound and smell> but nevertheless the
10 movement of these417 has been divided into parts. For this reason in
one way the first and second man hear and smell the same thing, and
in another way they do not’ (446b13-17). He wants by means of this
to show a differentiation of sight from the other senses, and <show>
that it is true of them that before being at the sense the perceptibles
travel towards it and a time comes about in the middle of their
15 locomotion, but this is not so with visibles. He says: air and water,
the media of hearing and smell, through which hearing and smelling
come about when <the media> are affected and moved by the percep-
tibles, are continuous in the same way as each other, water clearly
<being continuous> with water and air with air (for <they are> bodies,
20 and just as air is continuous with itself so water is too), but the
movements which come about in them come about in a manner
involving division into parts and part by part, the first part being
disposed by the perceptibles first, then with a transmission in respect
of the movement coming about in this way, the next part being
affected by the first part affected and the affection and the movement
being transmitted in this way as far as the sense organs. Moreover
25 one man hears the same sound first and another second, the one being
129,1 first by virtue of the first part to be moved either of the air or of the
water and the other being second by virtue of the second <part>. At
 Translation 119
the same time he adds his comment that several people perceive the
same things, some first, others second, as a sign of the fact that the
affection of both air and water, through which smelling and hearing
come about, and their movements <which are generated> from the
audibles and the smellables are divided and are generated in several
parts. For this reason in one way they hear and smell the same thing 5
and in another way they do not.
There is also a reading thus: ‘for just as air and water are continu-
ous, but418 the movement of both has been divided into parts, <so is
it with sound and smell>.’ And on this view he would be saying <that
it is reasonable for this to result regarding sound and smell>.419 For 10
they are just like water and air, and he adds the reference to water
because smell <travels> through water. And so in the case of the
transmissions of things perceptible <by smell and hearing> the
coming about of the movement of the air and water a part at a time420
is the same (for this reason both these senses apprehend perceptibles
in time). But there is a differentiation between the movement in the
case of sounds and the movement in the case of smellables because
in the case of smellables the first part to be moved by the smell 15
preserves the affection in itself when it transmits it to the next part
(for this reason even though those near the smell smelt it first, they
still remain smelling it when those far away apprehend the smell),
whereas this is not so with sound. In contrast the movement does not
remain in the first part that has been moved when it is transmitted
by the first part to the next <part>. This is why different people hear
<the same sound> at different times. For of the <two, hearing> 20
resembles locomotion more and <smelling> alteration.
Having said ‘In one way the first and second man hear and smell
the same thing and in another way they do not’, and before saying 130,1
how it is in the case of sight and <saying> that it is not the same in
the case of these <other senses>, he examines a difficulty concerning
the senses, the resolution of which he will show to be the already
mentioned statement that ‘in one way the first and second man hear
and smell the same thing and in another way they do not’. He will 5
use this as a resolution of the difficulty raised. The difficulty seems
<to be> this: he says (446b17-19) that it is impossible for one man to
hear, see, or smell the same thing as another. For if those people who
have been separated from each other were apprehending and perceiv-
ing numerically one and the same thing at the same time that which
they perceive would be ‘itself apart from itself ’ (446b20-1), if it were
in different places at the same time. He adds the resolution of this 10
difficulty when he says (446b21-3) that everyone perceives numeri-
cally the same first mover of the medium, whether it be water or air.
For if it were a bell that were ringing <he says that> this is one <bell>
that everyone hears, and if <it were> frankincense that were being
 120 Translation
burnt this is what everyone smells, and if it were a fire that was
15 heating or being seen this is the same thing that they all perceive,
those heated by it by means of touch or those seeing it. But <he says>
(446b23-5) that the <medium> through which the apprehension of
those things <comes about> is not numerically the same for all but
for each person the proximate and peculiar part of the air or water,
<which act> as a medium through which the apprehension of those
things <comes about>, is different. For this is the same only in form.
For these <media> are affected by the sound or smell or hot thing
20 which is the same in form and announce and transmit these things
to the senses, in respect of a different part of <the medium> for a
different sense.421 Because the apprehension of the perceptibles
comes about in this way, it is not absurd that at the same time the
same people see the same thing and smell and hear the same thing,
and the already mentioned statement that ‘in one way he perceives422
the same thing and in another way he does not’ is sound.
25 For this reason, he says, ‘these are not bodies’ (446b25), talking
about the perceptibles, the sound, the smell, the colour, the heat, but
they are affections and movements, but nor are they apart from a
body (446b25-6). For <they are> affections of body and in body. For
this reason when the intermediate body is affected and disposed in
some way by the perceptibles the apprehensions of the senses <come
131,1 about>. For if the things which we perceive were bodies, it would not
be possible for several people to perceive at the same time numerically
one and the same thing (for the perceptible would be ‘itself apart from
itself ’, if whilst being a body it came about at the same time in several
different <places>), and if <they were> without body apprehension of
5 them could not come about. For the movement by means of which the
apprehension <comes about is a movement> of a body. But also the
division, by virtue of which the affections are divided in conjunction
with the body when several people perceive the same things, is a
division of magnitude. For it is because the perceptibles that come
about in a body are affections and movements that several people
perceive them at the same time, the bodies being affected by the
10 things that cause the affections at the same time in different parts.

446b27 There is a different account concerning light. For light

exists because something is <in something>, but <light> is not
a movement. Generally [it is not the same as alteration and
locomotion] (446b28-9).
He has said concerning sound and smell that it was a reasonable
result that these <perceptibles> came about in the medium before
moving the sense because the apprehension and the perception of
15 them comes about when a movement and a locomotion and a trans-
 Translation 121
mission of the perceptible comes about through the continuous body
that is in between. (This is why the perception of these <is> in time.)
He now says that light does not come about in the same way in the
transparent and the body between that from which the light <comes>
and the eye. And there is the same account concerning colour.

446b27 For light exists because something is in <something>, 20

but <light> is not a movement.
He says that what occurs in the case of sound and smell, namely that
the intervening body is moved by transmission of the affection, a
different part of it being affected at different times, and that this
motion is the cause of the perception, does not occur in the case of 132,1
light and the visibles. For the air and the transparent is illuminated
not by means of a movement, but immediately from being potentially
transparent it becomes actually transparent and illuminated, becom-
ing that which possesses it from that which had not possessed it, not
because it takes it and is moved. For it is by the relation and the 5
presence of that which illuminates to that which is by nature illumi-
nated that light <is generated>, as has been stated in the treatise On
the Soul.423 For this is what is described there as the ‘presence of fire
or that which naturally illuminates in the transparent’, the presence
which he indicated by the expression ‘is in’. For that which is on the
right of something comes to be on the right not by means of a
movement or a coming to be424 but rather not being on the right before
it comes to be on the right all together by virtue of some kind of 10
relation to it of that which it is on the right of. So too that which is
potentially transparent comes to be actually such, changing all to-
gether by virtue of some kind of relation to it of that which naturally
illuminates. For everything which can come to be actually transpar-
ent and illuminated because of such a relation with that which
illuminates is illuminated all together, not beginning first from the 15
<part> near that which illuminates and proceeding by means of
transmission and movement in time to the parts that are farther
away, as was the case with sound and smell.
What he first stated as a possible way of talking about seeing, he
himself now argues for, since it is necessary425 to justify in a few words
on what has been said by means of certain other points that this is
not impossible. For, he says, it is not the same with all movement.426
For these are not the same, alteration and locomotion, that is move- 20
ment in respect of place, which427 comes about when what travels
comes to be first in what is between. The movement which comes
about in the case of sound resembles locomotion, and the same is true
of the <movement> in respect of smell. Therefore it is reasonable that
the apprehensions of these are in time. For there is not yet an
 122 Translation
apprehension after the sound has come to be, and when the smellable
25 is where it can be smelt the apprehension of it does not yet exist, but
133,1 needs time. For this reason he says that movement in respect of
alteration does not come about in all cases in the same way as
locomotion: ‘for it is possible for something to begin alteration all
together’ as a whole, ‘and not the half ’ of it (447a1-2) and not the first
part, so that it comes about in time. For even if it began the alteration
5 and the freezing all together, it is not the case that it has completed
the freezing which it is undergoing already and immediately upon
beginning it, but rather it needs time.
Having said that alteration does not come about in all cases by the
transmission of the parts (for <he is saying> that there is some
magnitude beginning all together), he adds that ‘in these cases also
however, if that which was being altered, for example heated or
10 frozen, were large, it does not begin as a whole at the same time, but
rather the <part> which adjoins is affected and altered by the part
adjoining, and not every <part is affected> from the <part> which
first caused the alteration, but a part did begin the alteration from
that <part> all together’ (447a3-6). He added this image, not saying
that being illuminated is alteration (for it does not seem to him to be
so), but wanting to take it as agreed that certain things can change
15 all together, and that it is not in every case necessary, if something
is divided into parts, that it begins to change from one part. And so
if in the case of alteration which is a movement and which comes
about in time there is nevertheless nothing preventing a part from
beginning its change all together,428 there is nothing paradoxical in
saying that what is illuminated admits light as a whole all together,
20 the being illuminated not coming about by means of movement. For
he himself gave a sign that he was not mentioning alteration because
being illuminated was an alteration: ‘nevertheless if that which is
being heated or frozen is large, that which adjoins is affected by what
adjoins.’ But if that which is being illuminated is large, this <adjoin-
ing part> is not <affected> first by that which illuminates, but rather
all that, being able to be illuminated, is in some kind of relation
25 between itself and that which illuminates is illuminated by it as a
whole at the same time, and there is not a part which has not been
illuminated now but <is illuminated> after a short <time> if the same
illuminator remains in the same <place>.
134,1 The feature of the example which he made use of is the fact that a
part of what is altered is changed all together by that which alters, a
point which429 he expressed as follows: ‘But the first <part> is changed
by the very thing which alters, and it is necessary for it to be altered
at the same time and all together.’ For this was useful to him in regard
5 to what was proposed, since the smelling comes about when the
medium is altered. Perhaps it is not true that the whole begins the
 Translation 123
alteration all together. For it is sound that some part of the whole
begins all together but it would not seem <sound> for the whole <to
do so>, since it is necessary as he has said in the Physics,430 that for
everything that is moved some part is in the point from which it is
moving and the other in the point towards which it is moving. For it
is by means of this that everything that is moved was shown as being 10
divisible.
That light depends on a relation but not on an alteration is clear
from the fact that, whereas things which are altered have not ceased
from the affection that is generated in them by that which alters
<them> immediately upon its departure (for when that which heats
departs that which is heated by it does not immediately cease from
the heat that is generated in it by <that which heats>), things that 15
are such by virtue of their relation to something cease to be in the
relation to that thing in conjunction with its departure. For the father
has ceased being a father when the son has died, and when that which
is on the left has departed that which is on the right is on the right
no longer. The same is true of light. For it departs all together in
conjunction with the departure of that which naturally illuminates.
Having said this in a few words he says: ‘Tasting would be like 20
smell if we existed in the fluid’ (447a6-7). What he is saying is this:
just as in the case of smell, when that which possesses the smell is
far away, we perceive it because the intermediate air and water is
affected by it and transmits the affection to the sense, so too, he says,
would it be in the case of tasting if we existed in the fluid, that is in
water, and we made our apprehension of flavours through that 25
<medium>. For the water, admitting the quality from the flavours, 135,1
would provide us with a perception of the tasteables by means of
tasting before we came upon them, just as it acts in the case of the
smellable. But, as it is, this does not come about. For the air, in which
we exist, is able to admit smell but not flavours, and is not naturally
affected by every fluid,431 since air is fluid. ‘It is reasonable’, he says, 5
because of what has been said, that where there is apprehension of
perceptibles through some medium, these media ‘are not all affected
at the same time’, and apprehensions and perceptions through them
do not always come about at the same time, but rather <they come
about> in time, except for light and visibles. Why is it reasonable?
Because the former perceptibles are generated in <a medium> by
means of a movement and an affection, the medium itself being 10
altered and affected, for which reason the affection which is generated
in <the medium> is transmitted, from that which causes the move-
ment, in time. Light and colours <are not generated> by means of a
movement (for light depends upon some kind of relation between
illuminator and illuminated), for which reason the transparent is
illuminated as a whole at the same time. Since light is generated
 124 Translation
instantaneously in this way it is reasonable that what is seen im-
15 pinges on the eye instantaneously, so that not only is seeing generated
instantaneously (for this was shown as present to all the senses), but
also the perceptible impinges on the eye all together and apart from
time. For the movements from the colours come about in that which
is transparent in actuality in the same way as light <comes about>
in the transparent, a point which432 he made clear himself when he
said: ‘For the same reason <the same is true> in regard to seeing. For
20 light causes seeing.’ For if that does not come about in the transparent
in time or by means of a movement, seeing would not come about in
time either. For this reason as soon as we look we simultaneously see
<bodies> both near and far.

<CHAPTER 7>

447a12 There is also another difficulty concerning the senses as

follows, whether it is possible to perceive two <things> together
25 in the same indivisible time (atomôi khronôi).
The difficulty which he raises is clear. For he is investigating whether
136,1 it is possible or not to perceive several things together, so that there
comes about an apprehension of several perceptibles in the same
time. He said ‘indivisible time’ not meaning an indivisible one (for
there is no indivisible time), but because he meant perceiving several
things in the same time rather than perceiving different things in
5 different parts of the time in which we perceive. He intends firstly to
argue on the basis of received opinions (endoxôs) that it is impossi-
ble.433 He takes certain things as agreed and postulates them as being
obvious, and by means of these <postulates> he will argue in favour
of the view that, when there are several perceptibles, they impede
each other.
The first <postulate> is that the greater movement always drives
out the lesser (447a14-15), as proof of which he added the comment
that certain people often do not perceive things placed or travelling
before their eyes, when ‘they happen to be thinking of something
intently within themselves or to be afraid or to be hearing’ (447a16)
10 a loud sound (for intense activity of the soul over other things prevents
lesser apprehensions from coming about in it). His second postulate
is that what is unmixed and unblended and existing on its own ‘can
be perceived to a greater degree’ than what has been mixed and
blended with something else (447a17-18). Again, he showed this to
15 be obvious by reference to the examples of ‘unblended wine and wine
blended with water’, similarly of ‘honey’, of white unblended and
<white> mixed with another colour, and of the lowest note taken on
its own and mixed with the highest note or with some other note or
 Translation 125
with the musical concord of the diapasôn434 (447a18-20). For in all
these cases and cases like them the perception of the perceptibles
which is taken is purer and more accurate if they are without 20
qualification than if they have been put together and blended with
each other.
He added the cause of this: for each <set of perceptibles> come to
be more obscure in their mixture with each other ‘because they
obscure each other’ (447a20). Having said that each <set of percep-
tibles> obscure each other in their mixture, he made clear what things
they are in which the mixture comes about and what things they are
which obscure each other in the mixture because what has been mixed 137,1
is established in some middle point and each of the things in the
mixture loses the purity. For he added: ‘This is caused by things from
which some one thing comes to be’ (447a20-1). It is those things from
which, when they are mixed, some one thing can come to be, which
are mixed with each other and obscure each other in the mixture. For 5
not everything is mixable with everything, but flavours <are> with
flavours, sounds with sounds, colours with colours, hot and cold
affections with each other, dry and moist affections with each other,
and similarly with the other oppositions. For a sound is not mixed
with a colour and nor is a flavour with a sound. For some one thing
cannot come to be out of the putting together of such things. For
universally the perceptibles of the different senses are unmixable
because they are different in genus. For mixture is of, and dependent 10
upon, things that are the same in genus, as it is of opposites and their
intermediates. He has then laid down that perceptibles impede each
other, those that differ <in genus> because435 no perception comes
about of <perceptibles> that are wholly different in genus,436 and
those that are the same in genus and mixed because things that have
been mixed with each other are perceptible in the mixture to a lesser
degree than things that are unmixed. Using these <postulates> he
tries to show that it is not possible for a perception to come about of 15
two things together.
He adds that even when the lesser <movement> is obscured
because it is driven out by the more violent one, the apprehension of
the greater one which comes about is not pure (447a21-3). For given
that the greater movement drives out the lesser by blocking it (this
is why we do not see when we are very afraid), but also that the
apprehension in the case of mixture with each other is not the same,
then it is necessary that if there is a perception of certain things 20
coming about together (one able to cause movement to a greater
degree and the other to a lesser degree), the <perception> of that
which is perceptible to a greater degree in its association with some
other perceptible, even one less <perceptible> than it, comes about to
a lesser degree than if what came about was the perception of it on
 126 Translation
its own. For something is removed from it in its mixture with the
25 lesser (447a23-4). For it has been postulated that all things which are
without qualification and unmixable are perceptible to a greater
degree.437
Again438 he assumes [i.e. what perhaps follows his initial assump-
tions] in fact follows from them,439 namely the conclusion that, if
138,1 certain perceptions are equal, that is <if they are perceptions> of
perceptibles which are equal but different and belonging to different
senses, there will be perception of neither of them (447a25). For if the
lesser removed something440 of the greater perception and obscured
it by coming to be one with it, and if they are both equal being
5 <perceptions> of different perceptibles, they will obscure each other
in the same way (447a26-7). There would not be a perception without
qualification441 arising out of both coming about together. For the
simple perception without qualification is of a simple perceptible
without qualification. It therefore remains either that no perception
comes about at all or one mixable from both (447a27-8). But this
comes about in relation to things able to be mixed with each other,
such as things that are blended442 (447a28-9). For such perception
10 <comes about> in the case of things that are mixed. For ‘something
comes about’ out of the mixture of certain perceptibles, ‘but from some
<perceptibles> nothing comes about’ (447a29-30), because they are
not even mixable to begin with, as we have said above.443 For such are
the <perceptibles> belonging to the different senses. The mixable
<perceptibles> are those of the same genus and those that are before
the same sense. Such are the <perceptibles> whose ‘extremes are
opposite’ each other (447a30-b1). In each case the things most distant
15 from each other are extremes, and the things most distant from each
other among things of the same genus are opposites, and these are
mixed with each other. For when white and black are mixed some one
thing comes about together, as it does when the intermediates of these
<opposites> are mixed with each other and with these <opposites>.
But some one thing cannot come about out of white and high ‘other
than accidentally’ (447b2) (<that is> unless the high note were black
or appearing some other colour in virtue of which it will be mixed with
20 white). Alternatively the white and the high would be accidentally
mixed and both some one thing, if together both were attached to
something as an accident, the white and the high, so that what was
white was high and what was high was white. But these are not one
in the way that ‘the musical concord of the high and the low’ is
(447b2-3). For these are mixable in themselves. For they are the same
in genus and fall under (hupo) one sense.
139,1 After saying this he adds <the conclusion> (447b3-4) since the
impossibility of perceiving different perceptibles together has been
shown from the <postulates> laid down. For either the movements
 Translation 127
from them will be equal or one will predominate. But if they are equal,
‘they will obscure each other’ (447b4-5). For clearly they will obscure
each other when they are equal if it is impossible to perceive the
greater in a pure way when it comes about in conjunction with 5
another lesser <movement>. For they will not make some one per-
ceptible when mixed. But if one of the two were to predominate, there
will be an apprehension of this alone (447b5-6). For it is laid down
that the greater movement obscures the lesser.

447b6 Moreover the soul would perceive two things together

with the one perception to a greater extent <being things> of 10
which there is one sense.
By means of this <counter> argument he shows that it is impossible
to perceive several perceptibles together, if they are perceptible to
different senses. He makes his argument in accordance with what is
to a greater and lesser extent.444 For he says that the soul would
perceive several perceptibles together to a greater extent if they were
<perceptible> by virtue of the same sense than if they were <percep- 15
tible> by different senses. He said, ‘with the one perception’ instead
of ‘with an activity which is one and coming about together’. ‘Of which
there is one sense’ must be joined together with ‘the soul would
perceive two things together’. For ‘of which there is one sense’ follows
this. He argues for this by saying: ‘For the movement of the one <is>
itself of itself to a greater extent than that of the two such as sight
and hearing’ (447b8-9), <which> is equal to ‘for the movement of the 20
one sense is together and one to a greater extent than the <move-
ments> of the two senses’. What he is saying is that the activity of
the one sense is able to be one and the same to a greater extent than
the <activity> of several <senses>. Consequently those <activities>
which are able to a greater extent to be one because of similarity
would come about together to a greater extent than those which are
more separated from each other.
After bringing the argument to this point he next shows that it is 140,1
impossible for the one sense to perceive several things together. From
this it will follow that it is impossible to perceive together in respect
of different senses either. For he says that it is impossible to have
perceived two things together with the same sense if they are sepa-
rated and remain two. For it is possible if they are mixed because 5
things that have been mixed are no longer several and the mixed
things are perceived as one (447b9-10). As a demonstration of the
impossibility of perceiving unmixables together he puts forward the
point that of numerically one thing there is numerically one percep-
tion. For this is what is signified by ‘and the one is together with itself’
(447b11). For the one activity of the sense comes about in the same 10
 128 Translation
time and together. ‘The sense necessarily perceives mixed things
together’ (447b12) because they are one, and the activity of the sense
that applies to a perceptible that is numerically one is itself numeri-
cally one. For the perception of numerically one thing is one in
actuality (447b13-14). In contrast the perception of those things
which possess unity not in respect of number but in respect of species
15 or genus, like the white and the black (for these are the same in
species),445 is one, not in actuality, but potentially and in respect of
capacity (447b14). For all the activities of sight are potentially to-
gether with each other at the time when sight is able to be active in
respect of them. For there is perception which is one in respect of
actuality, and perception which is one in respect of capacity. And so
the soul perceives perceptibles which are the same in genus with the
<perception> which is one in capacity.
20 Having taken it as agreed that, of a numerically one perceptible,
the perception is one in actuality, he converts the point and says that
the perception which is one in actuality will be of a numerically one
perceptible. Therefore the one activity would perceive several percep-
tibles as one and mixed because they are no longer several,446 if it
perceived them together (447b14-16). If they were not mixed, ‘two
25 perceptions’ and apprehensions of them would come about, as many
141,1 as the perceptibles of the same genus that had not been mixed with
each other (447b16-17). But the actuality from numerically one cap-
acity coming about in an indivisible time is necessarily one (447b17-
19). For of numerically one capacity there is numerically one actuality
and ‘use’ coming about ‘once and for all’, that is an apprehension of
one thing (447b19-20). The perception that is one in actuality will not
therefore apprehend both <perceptibles> together in the same time
5 (447b20-1). For the apprehensions of two <are> two whereas the one
actuality <is> able to apprehend one. Having argued for the impossi-
bility of apprehending several <perceptibles> together with one
sense, he adds what follows from the postulate, namely that it will be
more impossible for the soul to perceive things perceptible <only> by
several senses together (447b21-4).

10 447b24 For the soul appears to describe one thing as numeri-

cally one for no other reason than the fact <of perceiving>
together, and another thing as one in species because of the
sense which judges and the way.
To prove the claim that one actuality of the sense is able to apprehend
that which is numerically one thing he adds that <the sense> judges
15 that which is numerically one for no other reason than the time. For
it judges it numerically one because it apprehends it together and as
being indivisible in time. Consequently all the things which the sense
 Translation 129
understands in an indivisible time it understands as being numeri-
cally one. But he says that it judges things which are one and the
same in species, and similarly things <that are one and the same> in
genus (for by ‘species’ in regard to perceptibles he also means genus)
‘with the sense which judges’ and ‘the way’ of the apprehension, those 20
that are the same in genus because of the sense which judges, and
those <that are the same> in species because of the way of the
apprehension. For things that are judged by the same sense, be it
sight or hearing, are the same in genus as each other, and the same
goes for the other <senses>. And so in this way <the perceiver>
defines things that are the same in genus by the sense which judges, 142,1
and it distinguishes things that are the same in species from those
that are the same in genus by the way of apprehending them. For the
same <sense> apprehends them, but not in the same way. For each
sense is able to judge those things that are opposites in respect of
itself. Sight <is able to judge> white and black, tasting sweet and
bitter, hearing high and low, and the other <senses> similarly. For it 5
judges that the black and the white are the same in genus because
one sense is perceiving <them>. But it judges that they are different
from each other in species because it perceives them in a different
way and in respect of a different affection. Clearly, because the time
is different, differentiation in respect of time has been included in the
way of apprehending. Things that are the same in species would be 10
judged <to be such> if the judging sense were the same and only the
time were different.
Things opposite to each other are the same in genus, but not the
same in species. For things opposite to each other are different in
species. <The sense> judges the differentiations of these by the way
of apprehending. For sight does not apprehend white and black in the
same way,447 but rather <it apprehends> the one as state, the other 15
as privation. For in all things that are opposites one is as state and
the other is as privation of this.448 For the same sense judges the white
and the black to be different from each other in species. For sight
<does so> because of the differentiation in the apprehension and the
way <of apprehension>. In the same way tasting judges the sweet
and the bitter to be different in species. Consequently the fact that 20
things are perceptible by the same sense is not sufficient for their
being the same in species. Things that are the same in species are
judged <to be such> by the sense proper <to them> because of the
way of apprehending. For of things under <the reach of> the same
sense those which <the sense> apprehends as states are the same in
species as each other, and those <it apprehends> as privations are
the same in species as each other. Judgement of such things comes 25
about only by virtue of the differentiation of the time. Of the inter-
mediates some would be allocated to these and others to those, the
 130 Translation
allocation coming about by virtue of the mixture of that which is in
them in greater amount.
He says that the senses perceive in the same way as each other
things that are correspondent with each other (447b29-30). For it is
not the case that sight apprehends state and privation of the opposites
143,1 in one way whilst hearing <apprehends> its opposites in a different
way, and taste and each of the other <senses> in yet a different way.
It is rather the case that they all <apprehend> the opposites before
them in the same way as each other and analogously. For the
apprehensions and perceptions of things correspondent with each
5 other also correspond. For what the white is among colours the sweet
is among flavours. Hence taste apprehends sweet in the same way as
sight <apprehends> white. Again, what the black is among colours,
the bitter is among flavours. For they are both privations. And the
senses proper <to them> apprehend them in this way. Consequently
sight <apprehends> black and taste bitter in the same way.

448a1 Moreover if the movements of the opposites are opposite

[and the opposites cannot be present together in the same
indivisible <time> and opposites are under the one sense, e.g.
sweet and bitter, <that sense> could not perceive them together]
(448a2-5).
10 By means of this argument also he shows that it is impossible for the
same sense to perceive several things together. For if perceptions are
by means of a movement and are movements, and if the movements
<generated> by the opposites are opposite, and if it is impossible for
the opposites to exist together and in the same time, it would be
15 impossible for a sense to perceive the opposites in the same time. For
it would be being moved with opposite movements together. Just as
it is impossible for the same sense to perceive opposites together, so
too <it is impossible for it to perceive> ‘things that are not opposite’
<together> (448a5-6). These are the things intermediate between the
opposites. For of these <intermediates> some are of this opposite and
others are of the other, as we said earlier.449 The intermediates <are
generated> by mixture of the opposites and are classified with which-
20 ever of the opposites they possess more of. Consequently the sense
will not apprehend together several things that are mixed and inter-
mediate, grey for example, and red, or the diapasôn and the dia-
pente450 (448a8-9). There are oppositions in these <perceptibles>
which are mixable, since the note of the diapente is as odd to even (for
it is as three to two) whereas the diapasôn is the inverse, as even to
25 odd. For it is as two to one.451 And it is not possible to perceive the
ratios of odd to even and of even to odd together.
Having said that a perception does not come about together of
 Translation 131
several mixed and intermediate things he added, ‘unless it perceives 144,1
them as one; in this case but not in any other the proportion of the
extremes comes to be one’ (448a10-11). What he is saying is that in
this case it perceives several things together because they have been
blended and mixed with each other. For it perceives the grey as one
even though it is put together out of opposites. But in a mixture like 5
this one proportion, one nature, and one thing comes about out of the
mixture of the extremes and the opposites. Consequently, since what
has come about out of the mixture is one singular thing, it perceives
what has been mixed in this way together. For <it perceives it> as
one. However it does not apprehend together as separated either <the
opposites> out of which the grey has been mixed or <colours> which
have been already mixed with each other, as is the case with the grey
and the red. He said, ‘the <ratio> of much to little or of odd to even, 10
and of little to much or of even to odd will be together’ (448a11-13) in
relation to perceptibles of this sort, which are intermediate. For each
of them will be mixed, but not so that they all possess one proportion.
For one of them will possess <a proportion> such that it possesses
much of the white and little of the black like the red whilst another 15
will be the reverse like the grey. Again, in the case of notes one will
be <a proportion> of odd to even like the diapente, whilst another will
be <a proportion> of even to odd like the diapasôn, proportions which
are different to each other and opposite. But the grey does not possess
one proportion, even though it is compound, in the same way as the
note of the diapente.

448a13 Therefore if the things which are described as corre- 20

spondent [but are in a different genus] are still further distant
and different from each other <than those in the same genus
they would be still less able to be perceived together than those
that are the same in genus> (448a14-15,17-18).
Having taken it as agreed that, where each sense apprehends a
perceptible proper <to it>, one sense is able to a greater extent to
apprehend together several perceptibles proper <to it>, and having
shown that, where each sense apprehends a perceptible proper <to
it>, it is not possible either for the one <sense> together to apprehend
several <perceptibles> or for several perceptions to come about to- 25
gether, he adds to the points laid down the point which follows, 145,1
namely that the things which are less able to come about together
cannot come about together either. For if things not of the same genus
differ from each other more than things of the same genus, and if it
is impossible to perceive several things of the same genus together,
it would be still less possible to apprehend together several things
correspondent <with each other but> of different genera and before
 132 Translation
different senses, and still less if they did not correspond in addition
to being of different genera. (Sameness and similarity in respect of
genus are present to some things whilst other things are deprived of
5 this. Of things not of the same genus, some correspond to each other
in respect of each sense whilst others are similar to each other without
being correspondent. Of things perceptible by different senses states
<correspond with> states and privations <correspond with> each
other, but those things perceptible by one sense which are states do
not correspond with <any one> of those things before another sense
which is a privation. He himself made this clear when he said, ‘I call
10 the sweet and the white correspondent but different in genus’
(448a15-16). For opposites are of the same genus. For <they are>
under the same genus and one sense. For there is a greater distance
between the sweet and the white than between the white and the
black, and a still greater <distance> between the sweet and the black
than between <the sweet> and the white. For the white and the black
are of the same genus whereas the sweet and the white are of different
15 genera but correspondent, and the sweet and the black are neither of
the same genus nor correspondent.)

20 448a16 The sweet differs in species still more from the black
than the white does (ê to leukon).
The text would be more congruent and clearer if ê tou leukou had been
written, in order that it might be, ‘for the sweet differs in species still
more from the black than from the white’ and this452 is the point that
the white corresponds <with the sweet> (for both of them are in their
proper genus as a state) whereas the black, being a privation is not
25 even correspondent with the sweet.

146,1 448a19 As for what certain of those who <talk> about musical
concords say, namely that sounds do not arrive together but they
appear to, [and they escape detection when the time is imper-
ceptible, is it said correctly or not?] (448a20-1)
Having shored up the points by which he had argued for the view that
a perception cannot come about of several things together, which is
used by certain people who try to show that a perception of several
5 things does not come about together but appears to, he postulates this
view and shows it to be a falsehood, demonstrating that people using
this solution cannot show that we do not perceive several things
together. What was being said was that perceptibles which seem to
move the sense together do not move it together but in different times,
and seem to <the sense> to come about together because the inter-
10 mediate times are imperceptible. He shows that this is a falsehood by
 Translation 133
showing that there is not even one time imperceptible by its own
nature. Showing this would also be useful in relation to what has
already been said about sight, namely that neither light nor any other
of the visibles is seen with time.453 For at the same time as we look
we see both the things that are close and the things that are far away.
This view would be destroyed if it were laid down that imperceptible
times exist. For it would be said that we do not see together, but seem 15
to because of imperceptible times. Firstly he postulates the opinion
and mentions the musical theorists and those who <talk> about
musical concords,454 because they use this opinion and say that the
sounds from musical instruments that have been harmonized and
struck to produce a musical concord do not arrive at the hearing 20
together, but in different times, and appear to come about together
and one ringing <appears to be generated> out of all <the sounds>
and the hearing <does> not <appear> to be interrupted, but <it
appears> to hear the sound as continuous because the intermediate
times of the sounds travelling to <the hearing> are imperceptible.
Those who say that seeing comes about by virtue of images (eidôla)
falling on <the eye> also use imperceptible times. Therefore, he says,
one must investigate whether ‘it is said correctly or not’. And he added 25
the cause of the need to investigate it at this stage.

448a22 For perhaps someone would now say alongside this that
<one> seems to see and hear together because the intermediate
times escape detection. [Or is this not true, and it is not possible
for any time to be imperceptible or to escape detection, but every
<time> is perceptible? For if, when someone himself perceives
himself or something else in a continuous time, it is not possible
at that time for it to escape his notice that he exists, and there
is in the continuous time a time so small as to be totally
imperceptible, clearly at that time it would escape his notice
whether he is himself existing, and whether he is seeing and
perceiving.]455 (448a24-30)456
For if this were the case, there would be a solution of the difficulties
which could be raised against what he has argued for just now,
showing that it is not possible to perceive several things together. For 147,1
a difficulty could be raised of how we seem to perceive several things
together if this is not possible. There would be a solution dependent
upon the imperceptibility of the intermediate times, if there were
some imperceptible time. But if no time is like this, some other
<solution> will have to be used, but not this one. Therefore he shows
that no time can be imperceptible.457 We must presuppose that time 5
is not a perceptible in itself. For time is not some underlying nature
which we perceive, but rather time is perceptible because we perceive
 134 Translation
the things that come about and exist in it.458 An imperceptible time
would be the <time> in which it is not possible for a perception of any
of the things which come about in it to come about.459 If there were no
10 <time> like this, but in every part of time a perception of something
of the things that come about in it were discovered to exist, there
would be no imperceptible time. For if some of the things which come
about in time are imperceptible, the time in which these things come
about is not imperceptible for this cause. But if in the same time in
which the imperceptibles exist and come about it is impossible gen-
15 erally to perceive anything, this time would be imperceptible. But if
we were to perceive some other things in the same time, they would
not be imperceptible because of the time and nor would the time be
said to be imperceptible because of them. For certain imperceptible
<bodies> can be moved in a whole year, and it is not possible to have
perceived their movement, for example if there were certain bodies
20 that failed to be perceived because of smallness. A time as long as this
would not be imperceptible because of this, but perceptible, since we
perceive certain other things in it. If he shows that we possess a
perception of something in every time, he would have destroyed the
view that an imperceptible time exists.
That ‘every’ time ‘is perceptible’ (448a25-6), that is <that we can>
25 perceive something in every time he shows as follows: if, when
someone perceives himself perceiving and <does so> in time, it is
impossible for it at that time to escape detection by him that he exists
and perceives, then it is impossible for an imperceptible time to exist.
148,1 He argues for this from the consideration that, if there were an
imperceptible time, it would exist in this continuous time in which
someone perceives himself perceiving, and if this <were so>, in this
<time> the man perceiving will not perceive any of the things which
he does perceive and nor <will he perceive> himself perceiving and
5 existing. For if there were such a thing, clearly in that time a man
will escape detection by himself in regard to both the fact that he
perceives and the fact that he exists, and he will not perceive himself
existing. Consequently, in the time in which someone perceives
himself perceiving, he will also not perceive himself existing or
perceiving. This is impossible. For every man, when he perceives,
perceives in conjunction with <himself> that he exists and per-
10 ceives.460 In the same way as in the case related to himself, if someone
perceives ‘another man’ perceiving, it is impossible, if that man is
perceiving when someone perceives, for him not to perceive both that
he exists and that he perceives, <and it is impossible that> instead
some time is interrupted and he does not perceive <the man> existing.
But if there is no time in which, while we are active and perceiving,
we escape detection by ourselves in regard to the fact that we exist,
15 there would be no time imperceptible by its own nature. For if, when
 Translation 135
we are asleep, we escape detection by ourselves in regard to the fact
that we exist, this is not an imperceptible time. For other people
perceive in that time, and so do we if we are awake. For a time, or
generally anything, is not judged imperceptible by those who are not
perceiving. For all things are imperceptible to them, colours and
sounds and smells and flavours and tangibles. 20

448a30 Moreover, there would not be a time in which, nor any

thing which, he perceives except in the sense that <he sees> in
a <part> of this <time> or he sees a <part> of this <thing>, if
there is an imperceptible magnitude of a time and of a thing
[which is wholly imperceptible because of smallness. For if he
sees the whole (tên holên) and perceives for the same continuous
time in this way, because <he perceives> in a <part> of this
<time>, let CB be removed, in which he was not perceiving. And
so <he perceives> in a <part> of this (tautês) or <he perceives>
a <part> of this (tautês) just as he sees the earth as a whole
because <he sees> this <part> of it, and he walks in the year
because <he walks> in this part of it. But in fact he perceives
nothing in the <part> BC. Therefore he is said to perceive the
whole because he perceives in a <part> of this whole AB. The
same argument applies to the <part> AC. For always <he
perceives> in a <part> and <perceives> a <part> and he cannot
perceive a whole] (448a30-b12).
By means of this argument he shows the same thing, namely that no 25
time is imperceptible. He demonstrates in conjunction with that the 149,1
point that no magnitude and part of a perceptible can be impercepti-
ble by its nature. For these points follow each other. For according to
the people for whom there exist certain bodies imperceptible and
partless by their own nature, there also exist imperceptible move-
ments and times.461 The demonstration has been expressed unclearly, 5
but if one extracted the thought it would be as follows:462 if there is
any imperceptible part of the time or of the magnitude, there will not
be any time in which we perceive nor any magnitude which we
perceive without qualification and strictly. But in every time in which
we say that we are perceiving we will be perceiving in this way: not
because <we perceive> in this <time> but because <we perceive in>
one of the <parts> of this <time>. And we will perceive every magni- 10
tude not because we perceive this <magnitude> (for we will not
perceive anything as a whole), but because <we perceive> one of the
<parts> of this <magnitude>. But in all cases where we describe
ourselves as perceiving in a time in the sense that we are perceiving
in a part of it, or <as perceiving> magnitudes in the sense that we do
not perceive them as a whole but only certain parts of them, we speak
 136 Translation
the truth for this reason, namely because there is a first time of the
15 <time> in which as a whole we perceive, and in the case of the
magnitude, because there is a part of this <magnitude> which we
perceive first and as a whole. For it is possible to take in everything
that is true in respect of something and in respect of a part, at that
time when it is possible to take in a part of that <something>, which
is the first to be such. For <something> is truly463 white in respect of
a part at that time when one can take in some part of it which one
can take in as white not in respect of one and another part, but
20 pre-eminently and without qualification. And <something> is truly
described as being moved in respect of a part at that time when one
can take in some part of it which is moved as a whole rather than in
respect of a part of it. For that which is predicated as being present
in things in respect of a part will not truly be predicated of those
things unless there is a part in them of which one will predicate as a
whole and pre-eminently that which is predicated of the whole as
25 being present in respect of a part of it. And so it will be with what is
proposed as it is with the rest. For if there were nothing of this sort
either in a time or in a perceptible, in which we will perceive first or
which <we will perceive> first, then there would not be true perceiv-
ing in respect of a part of the time or <perceiving> of a part of the
magnitude. For if that which <is> pre-eminently <perceived> is
destroyed so too is that which <is perceived> in some other respect.
But in fact that which <is perceived> pre-eminently is destroyed if
150,1 some time or magnitude were imperceptible. For every time which is
taken in will possess some imperceptible parts within itself with the
consequence that in no <time> will we perceive in such a way as to
perceive pre-eminently in <that time>, but rather <we will perceive
in it> because it possesses within itself parts in which we perceive.
In the same way every magnitude will possess some imperceptible
5 parts, with the consequence that we will not perceive any magnitude
because of perceiving the whole but because it possesses certain parts
of itself which are perceptible. Therefore we will not perceive in any
first time nor will we possess a perception of anything pre-eminently.
And if nothing exists which <is perceived> pre-eminently, then none
of the things in which the pre-eminently <perceived> does not exist
<is perceived> in another respect. Therefore we will not perceive in
a time nor <will we perceive> any magnitude.464 He himself shows in
10 the following way that, if there is a time or magnitude imperceptible
by its nature, then we will not perceive in any first time nor will we
perceive any magnitude pre-eminently.

448b4 For if he sees the whole (tên holên) and perceives for the
same continuous time in this way, because <he perceives> in a
 Translation 137
<part> of this <time>,465 let CB be removed, in which he was not
perceiving.
By means of this he shows what has been proposed by reference to 15
letters, namely that there will be no time pre-eminently in which one
will perceive nor any perceptible which is perceptible not because one
of its <parts> is perceptible but <because it is perceptible> in itself.
He makes his demonstration in a very abridged manner. What he is
saying is as follows: if there is some imperceptible time, clearly there
will also be an imperceptible time in this <time> in which we perceive 20
something continuously. This will be the <time> AB. In the same way
if there is anything imperceptible, it will be a part of the perceptible,
and in this <perceptible> which we perceive in the time AB there will
be certain imperceptible parts. The magnitude of this <perceptible>
which we perceive in the time AB, <will be> the magnitude AB. For 151,1
he uses the same letters in reference both to the time and to the
perceptible. He refers in the feminine466 to the perceptible magnitude
which he takes, saying ‘in a <part> of this (tautês) or a <part> of this
(tautês)’ (448b6), making his demonstration with lines, both the time
and the magnitude similarly being a line, to which AB <applies> in
the first place. Having said, ‘for if he sees the whole (tên holên)’ with 5
reference to the magnitude which is seen, he said the same with
reference to the time as follows: ‘and he perceives the same continu-
ous time’, <saying> ‘perceive’ in place of see and ‘the same continuous
time’ in place of the whole. For this is equal to some time as a whole.
Having taken these points as agreed he removes the <part> CB from
the time AB. The phrase, ‘in a <part> of this (tautês)’ <he uses> in
reference to the time and the line in respect of <the time>, and he 10
says ‘a <part> of this (tautês)’ in reference to the <line> in respect of
the magnitude which is seen.
He showed how that which is seen is seen in respect of a part by
reference to the earth, just as <he did the same for> the time by
reference to the year: For someone ‘sees the earth  because he sees
this’ part ‘of it, and he walks in the year because <he walks> in this
part of it’ (448b7-8). The phrase, ‘and so in a <part> of this <tautês> 15
or a <part> of this <tautês>’ is explanatory of how the phrase ‘in a
<part> of this’, is said, as if he were saying: and so the phrase, ‘in a
<part> of this <tautês> and a <part> of this <tautês>’ is the sort of
thing which is the case when we say of the earth that it is seen without
qualification. For the earth is said to be seen because a part of it is
seen. In the same way the Olympic games are said <to be> in the year
because <they are> in this part of it. And so if someone perceives the 20
whole AB in the time AB continuously, and the time possesses within
itself some imperceptible parts (for this is indicated by the text which
says, ‘in this way because  in a <part> of this <time>’ (448b5)), if
 138 Translation
the time AB, in which he is postulated to perceive something continu-
ously, possesses within itself some imperceptible <parts>, let these
152,1 be removed. And let this be the part CB of the time AB. When it is
removed it is clear that in the <part> AC which is left he will perceive
the same thing. For in this part which is imperceptible he was
perceiving nothing, and the <part> CB contributes nothing if joined
together to the time if in467 the <time> he was perceiving he perceives
5 something because he perceives ‘in a <part> of it’. For the <time> AC,
in which he perceives, is a part of the time AB. For468 it was postulated
that he was not perceiving in the time CB.469 He himself made the
text unclear by shaping the time in the feminine and together involv-
ing the seen earth, since the same <word> which applies to the thing
seen was shown <to apply> to the time in which the thing seen which
possessed within itself imperceptible <parts> was postulated to be
10 seen. Therefore when these have been removed (again let them be
CB) what is left will be seen in the same way and as the same thing,
because the imperceptible parts did not, when they were with the
whole, contribute anything to the perception of it which comes about.
Therefore the whole AB was seen not in itself but because a <part>
of it was seen.
This is what is being shown. And he himself has described it as
15 follows: ‘And so <he perceives> in a <part> of this (tautês) or <he
perceives> a <part> of this (tautês)’, saying ‘<in> a <part> of this
(tautês)’ extension and continuity in respect of time, and ‘a <part> of
this (tautês)’ in respect of the extension of the thing seen. For the
conclusion of what is shown is that what sees does so not in the
extension in respect of time AB as a whole but <does so> in it because
<it sees> in a <part> of it, and that the extension of the thing seen
20 AB is not seen as a whole but because a <part> of it <is seen>. For
when the extension CB, which was imperceptible, was removed from
each of the two extensions, the extension which was left was not
diminished, neither the <extension> in time in respect of which
<what sees> was seeing nor the <extension> in the visible which was
seen.
Having made this concise statement he reminds us how something
is said to be seen in another respect and not pre-eminently nor in a
first time, but because <one sees in> one of the <parts> of <the time>,
showing that what results in the case of what has been shown is
153,1 similar to these <examples>. For he says, ‘just as he sees the earth
as a whole, because <he sees> this <part> of it, and he walks in the
year, because <he walks> in this part of it.’ For as is the case with
these, so too does it come about in the case of every time in which
someone perceives, and in the case of every magnitude which some-
one perceives. By means of the phrase, ‘and so in a <part> of this
(tautês) or a <part> of this (tautês)’, he included these points among
 Translation 139
the conclusions which he has taken as established. He gives the cause 5
when he says, ‘but in fact he perceives nothing in the <part> BC’. And
so because he perceives ‘in a <part> of this’ time ‘AB’ he does not
perceive in the part BC. Therefore he would perceive in the time AB
by perceiving in this way, because he is said to perceive the whole in
a part of the time, not because he perceives a part of the perceptible 10
in a part of the time, but because <he perceives> the whole <percep-
tible> in the part <of the time>. Having shown this he says what
follows also in the case of the time AC. This was a part of the time by
perceiving in which he seemed to be perceiving the whole in the
<time> as a whole. (For again, since there exist in this <time AC>
certain imperceptible parts, when they have been removed he will be
perceiving in the part of it that is left, with the consequence that <he
did> not <perceive> pre-eminently in the whole <time AC>.) He made 15
it clear that this will be the case with all times and things seen by
saying, ‘for always <he perceives> in a <part> and <perceives> a
<part> and he cannot perceive a whole’ (448b11-12). This would be
demonstrative of the point that there will be no time in which we will
perceive anything pre-eminently, and no perceptible which we will
perceive pre-eminently and whole. But if that which <is perceived>
pre-eminently does not exist that which <is perceived> in another
respect would not exist either. For that which is true in another 20
respect <is so> because there exists something which is such pre-emi-
nently and in itself.
Alternatively it is on account of the fact that the time possesses
within itself certain perceptible parts that it is true that the percep-
tion of something comes about in <a time> because of perceiving ‘in
a <part> of this <time>’ (448b2). And if this is true it will be possible
to be always removing something of <the time> and investigating how
he perceives in it pre-eminently, not separating the imperceptible
<parts> of the time, because this is not possible, but removing some 25
other part from it, since where it is true that <a thing> is something
in respect of a part it is true that a part also <can be> removed in
respect of which the whole is such. For it is not the case that, just as
someone can470 remove the <time> CB from the whole time AB, in 154,1
which it was postulated that someone was perceiving, because he was
perceiving in a part of it, so too <one can remove> the part of it in
which he was not perceiving. For this cannot be separated off and
kept apart. But since he is assumed to perceive in the whole because
of <perceiving> in one of its <parts>, <Aristotle> takes the part of it
CB and sees whether he can perceive in this <part> pre-eminently.
Next he says that it is impossible to perceive anything in the <part> 5
CB in this way, i.e. in this <part> pre-eminently. For if some times
are imperceptible they will also exist in the <time> CB, with the
consequence that in this <time> also will they perceive in the way in
 140 Translation
which perceiving was said <to come about> in the <time> AB, <by
perceiving> in one of its parts. And just as is the case with the part
10 CB of the time AB, so too is it the case with its part AC. For he will
not perceive in that <part> as a whole or pre-eminently, but rather
<he will perceive> because of <perceiving> in a part of it, and this <is
so> with each of the parts that are taken. For no time will be
discovered in which someone will perceive pre-eminently. For the
divisions of the time always into smaller <parts> <are generated>
with the purpose that the <part> in which the perceiver will perceive
pre-eminently does not escape detection and <to detect> what differ-
entiates it471 from imperceptible times, if indeed there are any such.
15 The point that there cannot be imperceptible times would also be
demonstrated by means of the point that time is not <a collection> of
<parts> that persist but of those which have their being dependent
upon their coming to be.472 For if the first does not persist <waiting
for> the second with the consequence that some <time> is collected
out of them, but rather the passage of <time> <comes about> by virtue
of some imperceptible part, all time would be imperceptible. For in
20 the case of magnitude, if there is added to some persisting <part>,
imperceptible because of its smallness, another <part> similarly
imperceptible it can make the whole perceptible. But in the case of
time this is not possible because as the second <part> is passing by
the <part> before it is destroyed.
‘Let CB be removed, in which he was perceiving’ (448b5-6), i.e. from
the time in which he was perceiving. By removing this he will again
show with reference to the <part> CB which has been removed from
25 the <part> AB that with reference to this also it will be true that
<perceiving in it> is perceiving in a <part> of it, and that in the same
way as in the case of magnitude <perceiving something is> perceiving
155,1 a <part> of it. For, having described by means of a parenthesis how
<someone> is said to see something whole, because <he does so> from
a part, and <is said to see> in a time, because <he does so> in a part,
and having made these points understood by means of examples, he
added, ‘but in fact he perceives nothing in the <part> BC’, saying the
cause why he said a little before of the <time> CB, ‘and so in a <part>
of this (tautês) or a <part> of this (tautês)’. For because he perceives
5 nothing pre-eminently in the <time> CB which has been removed, for
this reason it will be said of it, ‘in a <part> of this’, just as was said
with reference to the <time> AB as a whole. Therefore it is because
he perceives the magnitude AB in a part of the time CB that he will
be said to perceive in the <part> CB of the whole time and <to
perceive> the whole (tên holên), i.e. the magnitude and the line.
10 Having shown this, he says that the same account will be given with
reference to the <part> AC also, which was the other part of the whole
time AB. For he will not perceive the <line> AB in this <time>
 Translation 141
pre-eminently but <in> one of its parts. For always, whatever part of
the time or of the magnitude we take in, we will be perceiving in a
time and <perceiving> some magnitude, but <we will> never <per-
ceive> in a time as a whole or any magnitude as a whole. For he made
this clear with reference to all the things seen when he said, ‘for 15
always <he perceives> in a <part> and <perceives> a <part> and he
cannot perceive a whole’ (448b11-12). This would be demonstrative
of the point that there will not be any time in which we will perceive
anything pre-eminently, nor a perceptible which we will perceive
pre-eminently and as a whole. But if that which <is perceived>
pre-eminently does not exist, neither would that which <is perceived>
in another respect. For what is true in another respect <is true>
because there is <a part> of it which is such pre-eminently and in
itself.

448b12 And so they are all perceptible, but it is not apparent 20

[of what size they are].
Having shown that no part of the perceptible is imperceptible by its
nature, which he also showed in the earlier passage473 (for he men-
tioned that no part of a perceptible is imperceptible and without
affection by its own nature. For a ten thousandth part of the millet-
seed is perceptible, and sight sees it when it sees the millet-seed, but 25
<it does> not <see it> by itself nor how small it is), he reminds us here
also of this same point, saying that all the parts of the perceptible are
perceptible, but it is not apparent how small they are to begin with 156,1
when they are by themselves. For <as proof> that there is no necessity
that, for all things which are seen, their size is also seen immediately
he mentions the sun and the four cubit magnitude. Sight sees these
and does not also see their sizes, but sometimes from a greater
distance the things seen appear to it <to be> indivisible (448b13-15). 5
However it saw nothing indivisible. And sight sees the colours which
exist in bodies. He says that the cause concerning this has been given
earlier (448b15-16), not meaning <the cause> concerning the fact that
the sun is seen without its size being seen, and not <meaning the
cause concerning> the fact that things seen from a greater distance
sometimes appear indivisible (for he used this point as being obvious
for the purpose of a demonstration that there is no necessity that, for
the things seen, their size is also seen immediately). But he is saying 10
that the cause has been given of the fact that, when things are seen
as wholes, the parts that are in the wholes are seen but not their size.
This is the <cause> which he gave earlier,474 <saying> that sight sees
none of them on their own in the whole, but, as I said,475 it encounters
each of them, impinging on it as it sees the whole, but it does not see
each of them on their own nor their size, because something so small 15
 142 Translation
is not even visible on its own. Alternatively, he reminds us of what
he said above476 concerning the fact that all the things seen are seen
with magnitude. For he said that it was impossible to see a white
<body> and not the quantity. But if every <body> seen has a quantity,
nothing indivisible would be seen. He demonstrates in conjunction
20 with the point that an imperceptible time does not exist the point that
no part of the perceptible is imperceptible, a point which he had
already shown, and he summarises what has been shown when he
says, ‘it is obvious from these points that no time is imperceptible’
(448b16-17).
Having said and shown this he returns to what had been proposed
and the difficulties already raised, for the sake of which he mentioned
25 these things in the meanwhile. What was being investigated was
whether it is possible to perceive several things together either with
157,1 the same sense or with different ones. Investigating this, he argued
for the view that it was impossible by means of reputable <opinions>.
Now he will turn to saying how it is the case and how it is possible
for the perception of several things to come about together. For this
seems to be obvious. Having said, ‘whether or not it is possible to
5 perceive several things together’ (448b18-19), he says, in explanation
of how he means ‘together’, ‘by together I mean in one indivisible time
in relation to each other’ (448b19-20). He added, ‘in relation to each
other’, in order that no one should suppose him to mean an indivisible
time,477 but rather indivisible in such a way that <the time> is
indivisible in relation to478 the things of which the perception <is>479
and it is not divided in relation to the things which we perceive so
10 that we perceive this thing in this part of it and that thing in that
<part of it> rather than <perceiving> several things in every <part>
in the same way.

448b20 And so firstly is it possible in this way: perceiving

together but with a different <part> of the soul? [And in a <time>
indivisible in the sense (kan houtôs atomôi) that it is continuous
as a whole] (448b21-2).
He is investigating how it is possible to say that we perceive several
things together, since it seems to be obvious that this comes about.
15 Firstly he postulates the idea whether it is possible to say that we
perceive several things together in this way, because <we perceive>
them all together and in the same time, but with different <parts> of
the soul, since we are perceiving in respect of the same thing different
things with different capacities. He again said in explanation how he
meant indivisible:480 ‘and indivisible in the sense that it is continuous
as a whole.’ For having said, ‘by “together” I mean in one indivisible
20 time’, and mentioning, ‘together’ again by saying, ‘firstly is it possible
 Translation 143
in this way: <perceiving> together but with a different <part> of the
soul’, since ‘together’ was postulated to be equal to ‘in an indivisible
time’, he added how he meant ‘together’ and ‘in an indivisible time’.
For <it is> in the time as a whole in which <someone> perceives
different things with different capacities, <the time> being taken as
one and continuous, rather than a perception coming about of this
thing in one <part> of it, and of that thing in another. It is also 25
written: ‘not with the indivisible’ (ou tôi atomôi). If this text is 158,1
correct,481 he is saying,482 with reference to that which we perceive,
that we do not perceive several things together with some one <part>
in such a way that they are indivisible by their nature but rather that
<we perceive> them all in the same way with one whole. For we do
not perceive everything with one indivisible part of the soul, but
rather with this with which we perceive as a whole, it being one and
continuous, consisting of different parts. 5
He shows next that it is impossible to perceive several things
together in this way483 by means of the point that, if the perception of
several things were to come about in such a way that the apprehen-
sion of several things came about with different parts of the soul,
when we perceive together several things that are the same in species,
there will be several perceptive parts the same in species as each
other (448b22-5). For example, if the things seen were several, the 10
visual parts would be several and these would be the same in species
as each other. For if the perceptibles were the same in species, the
parts with which we perceive them would also be the same in species.
For if someone were seeing several things together, and he were
perceiving a different thing with a different <part>, there will be
several parts of sight, i.e. there will be several senses and several
sights the same in species as each other because the perceptibles also
are the same in genus as each other. For they are all visible. For, 15
where things are in the same genus, the perception <of them is> the
same in species.
Having raised the difficulty and having indicated by means of the
things perceptible by the same sense organ the absurdity which
remains, if someone were to say that we perceive several things,
different things with different parts of the soul and different capaci-
ties, he next tackles the difficulty that had been raised that there will 20
be several sights the same in species, if someone were to see several
different things together, saying: ‘but if <it is said> that <as there
are> two eyes, one would say, nothing prevents <its being> like this
in the case of the soul’ (448b26-7). What he means by this is as follows:
if someone were to say, he says, that as in the case of sight we see by
means of several sense-organs that are the same in species (for we 25
see by means of two eyes), so too the soul is not prevented from
possessing several capacities the same in species, with which it
 144 Translation
perceives things the same in species together. Having postulated this
as a possible response to the difficulty raised, he refutes it by showing
that what has been compared is not similar, saying, ‘<the answer is>
that perhaps some one thing is generated out of these things’
159,1 (448b27), meaning the eyes, and ‘the activity of them’ both ‘is one’
(448b27-8) (for the apprehension by means of both is of numerically
one thing and together. He added, ‘perhaps’, because nothing has yet
been determined about this), ‘but in that case, if that which <is
generated> out of both is one, that which perceives will be that <one
thing>, but if <both remain> apart, it will not be the same <as it is
5 with the soul>’ (448b28-9). He shows that what <comes about> in the
case of the eyes’ being two is not the same as what <comes about> in
the case of the soul and its several capacities. For in the case of the
eyes, even if there are two eyes, nevertheless that which is generated
10 is one thing. For the sense is one and the activity which comes about
by means of both eyes is one. For this reason <it is the activity> of
one capacity. But in the case of the capacities of the soul, if that which
is active by means of several capacities is one and the activity of both
<capacities> is concerned with one thing and is one, that will be that
which perceives, that which is active by means of both <capacities>
in respect of one activity (and this is nothing absurd. For one capacity
turns out to perceive one thing by means of several <things>, as also
in the case of the eyes). But if this were not said (for what was being
investigated was how one <sense> perceives several things) and it
15 were said instead that each of the senses perceives something pecu-
liar <to itself>, that which is being compared will not be similar. For
the activity and sense of the eyes is one though they are more than
one, but the senses of the several capacities of the soul are several.
For each of them will be of something peculiar <to itself>. The passage
has become unclear because he joins to what would have been said
by those people484 his demonstration that the comparison which they
all use is not similar.485

20 448b29 Moreover there will be several senses of one thing, that

are the same <as each other>, as if one were to say <that there
were> different knowledges.
Having shown in a parenthesis that it is impossible to say that one
perceives several things together such that the soul apprehends by
means of several capacities and sense organs, as in the case of the
25 eyes, he again discusses the difficulty and shows the absurdity which
follows, which he mentioned before. For if the soul were perceiving
together, in respect of several capacities, several perceptibles that
were the same in genus, we will possess several senses and capacities
able to apprehend, for example visibles, just as if someone were to
 Translation 145
say that we possessed several knowledges of the same thing. For a
knowledge of the same thing is one, and so too is a sense. He added
why we will possess several senses of the same things: ‘for there will 160,1
not be the activity without the capacity in respect of it, and nor will
there be a perception without this <activity>’ (449a1-2). For if we
were seeing several things together, clearly we would be active in
respect of several activities. For it is impossible for a perception to
come about apart from an activity. He said this by means of ‘and nor 5
will there be a perception without this’. But it is impossible for an
activity to come about apart from the capacity proper <to it>. Conse-
quently, when we see several things, we will be active in respect of
several activities together. But if <we are active in respect of> several
activities, we will also possess several capacities together, from which
the different and distinguished activities <will come about>. There-
fore we will possess several visual capacities. The same will be the 10
case with each sense. Therefore we will possess several senses of the
same things.
He has expressed himself like this not because he is saying by
means of ‘moreover there will be several senses of one thing that are
the same’ the same thing as the first point that ‘firstly with reference
to a single sense’ (448b22-3). (For, having said, ‘is it the case firstly’,
he has said secondly, adding to this, ‘moreover there will be several
senses of one thing that are the same’). But by means of the first point 15
he showed that the soul will possess several parts and several
capacities the same in species, and by means of the point added
second <he showed> that some activities will be multiple. For if we
are going to perceive several visibles together, there will be several
activities of the same thing together. For if there are several capaci-
ties able to apprehend visibles and they apprehend the perceptible
by means of the activity proper <to them> (for a perception does not 20
come about apart from an activity), there would be several activities
of one thing coming about together, by means of which the apprehen-
sion of the visible <comes about>. But the several <activities>
would486 destroy each other. And so firstly he took it as an absurdity
following from the opinion487 that the soul will possess several parts
and several capacities and senses the same in species, for example
several visual <senses> and several auditory ones. But now he added
the demonstration of how, and that, we will have several senses of 25
the same things, and at the same time he showed the absurdity of the
opinion by the juxtaposition of the knowledges. For it is impossible
for there to be several knowledges of the same thing in relation to the
same thing, so that together we are active in respect of several 161,1
activities in relation to the same object of contemplation, but one
<knowledge being knowledge> that the isosceles triangle possesses
three angles equal to two right <angles>, and a different <knowledge
 146 Translation
being knowledge> that the scalene and the equilateral <possess three
angles equal to two right angles>.
‘But if <the soul> perceives this (touto) in one indivisible <time>’488
5 (449a2-3) means something like the following: if the soul in one
indivisible time perceives together several different perceptibles with
different parts and capacities of the soul, clearly it would be perceiv-
ing together several things the same in species. For it is more
reasonable that it perceives several things the same in species to-
gether, as was said above489 concerning things of different genera.
This being postulated there followed the absurdity that <the soul>
10 possesses several capacities the same <as each other>. It is also
written as follows: ‘But if <the soul> perceives these (toutôn) in one
indivisible <time>’, and this is the text which has more clarity. ‘These
(toutôn)’ would mean things of different genera, perceptible by differ-
ent senses. And so having first shown that it is not possible to perceive
several things of the same genus, he was also destroying <the view
that it was possible to perceive several> things of different genera by
arguing from what is more <reasonable>. But now he converted it
15 and showed it <by arguing> from what was less <reasonable>. For if
<the soul> perceives together those things which it is less possible to
perceive several of together, a point which was postulated by the view
that <the soul> is able to be active together in respect of several senses
and is able to perceive several things together, it would also perceive
together several things which it is more possible <to perceive several
of together>. He showed that it followed from this that we will possess
several senses and capacities of the same perceptibles, which is
20 impossible. Therefore it would be impossible to perceive together
several things of different genera.
The text would be clearer if it were as follows: ‘if it perceives those
in one indivisible time, clearly <it perceives> these also’, or as follows:
‘but if it perceives this490 with the one indivisible <time>’, i.e. ‘if this
is so and the perceptive <part> perceives in one indivisible time
25 things different in genus with different parts and capacities’ (for
having discussed in parenthesis perceptibles of different genera he
will return to what has been proposed) ‘clearly, if <it perceives> those
things <together>, it will also perceive things of the same species
162,1 together. For it had been agreed491 that it would be more able to
perceive several things that were the same in species together than
things that differed in genus.’ He did not add the absurdity which
followed. It would be that, as he said before,492 we will possess several
senses the same in species, several sights whenever we apprehend
5 several visibles, and several hearings and for each <sense> in the
same way. For with these also the capacities will be divided in
conjunction with the activities and they will be equal in number to
them. It seemed to me when I examined the text that it was incorrect
 Translation 147
and what should have been written was, ‘if they perceive those
things in one indivisible <time>, clearly <they perceive> this also’.
It is also possible that what should have been written was some-
thing like, ‘but if someone does not even perceive them (tôn) in one 10
indivisible <time>, clearly <he does not perceive> the others’. What
was being said would then be clear and would follow what had been
said before.

449a5 But if the soul perceives the sweet with one part and the
white with another, either there is some one thing out of these
or there is not.
Having postulated that the soul perceives things different in genus
with different capacities and in addition to this <different things> 15
with different parts,493 he has turned to the solution of the difficulties
raised, and he shows that the perceptive capacity which apprehends
all perceptibles is one, and how it is possible for it, being one, to
perceive several different perceptibles together, reminding us of what
was said about this in On the Soul. And so since the soul perceives 20
the sweet and the white with different parts and organs and the other
different perceptibles with different <parts>, and it is clear <that it
does so> by virtue of each of its different capacities, he investigates
whether there is some one thing which underlies the capacities and
uses them, and was something whole <put together> out of these
parts, or whether each capacity exists individually and they do not
possess reference to some one thing. For ‘either there is some one 163,1
thing out of these or there is not’ indicates this: ‘either there is some
one thing which underlies and uses the different capacities in respect
of the senses, or <there is> not one thing but several.’ To this he adds,
‘but it is necessary.494 For the perceptive part is one’ (449a7), meaning
that it is necessary that what perceives and uses several capacities
is one. He added the cause of this, saying: ‘for the perceptive <part> 5
is one part of the soul’, and not many. And it has been shown by him
in On the Soul495 that, if the perceptive <part>, with which we perceive
all perceptibles, were not one but instead different <parts> perceived
different perceptibles, we would be unable to discriminate how the
perceptibles were differentiated from each other, but our position 10
with regard to perceptibles would be as if someone perceived this
perceptible and someone else <perceived> that one. For different
perceivers do not possess a joint perception of things perceptible to
each other. So too we would not perceive several things if we perceived
them with different <parts> and not one <part>. For that which
judges the differentiations of perceptibles is that which perceives 15
them. And one thing judges the differentiations of perceptibles.
Therefore one thing also perceives them. And it is necessary that the
 148 Translation
apprehension of them comes about together with the perception,
when <the perceiver> perceives them as different.
Having taken it as agreed that the perceptive part of the soul is
<perceptive> of one thing he investigates what that one thing is. ‘For
there is no one thing out of these things’ (449a8). Having said that
20 the perceptive <part> is one he raised the difficulty of what one thing
it is perceptive of and able to apprehend. For no one thing is generated
out of the things which we perceive with the different parts of the
soul, such as the sweet and the fragrant and each of the other
perceptibles of different genera. For these are unmixable with each
other. And he says, if it is necessary for the one thing to possess
together with each other496 the capacities which perceive and the
perceptibles which it perceives, if the several capacities <come about>
25 from one, the perceptibles also must be some one thing and under one
164,1 nature, just as the things seen were under one nature, and similarly
audibles and the other <perceptibles>. Having raised this difficulty
he adds, ‘therefore it is necessary that there is some one <part> of the
soul’ (449a8-9), with which it perceives everything, meaning by this
that it is necessary that there is some one part with which it perceives
all the perceptibles, different genera of perceptibles by means of
different organs.
5 Next he explains in another way of what one underlying thing this
perceptive <part consists> of, and of what body there is a perceptive
capacity. For the sense-organs by means of which the apprehension
<comes about> are different, and nothing is generated out of them.
In saying this he does not explain ‘of what one thing’ (449a8), but he
says concerning the capacity that there is some one part of the soul
10 with which we perceive everything, it being indivisible, ‘as’, he says,
‘has been said before’(449a9-10), either referring us to On the Soul497
(for he showed there that there is some one thing, which apprehends
all the perceptibles and because of this judges them in relation to each
other, and he showed498 what sort of thing it is and that it is one in
the way that the limit and the sign are, and in the way that the limit499
15 of several lines is. For this is both one and not one, one because that
with which we perceive one thing is indivisible, but to the extent that
<we perceive> more than one thing to this extent <it is perceptive>
of different things together. For it is a limit of several things together).
Either he refers us to this passage, or to what was said before,500 to
the effect that there must be one thing that perceives in us. For
absurdities would follow if it were postulated that perceptions of
different things came about by different things.
And so he takes it as agreed for this reason that what perceives
20 must be numerically one (but it perceives different things by means
of different parts of the body and different organs), using what has
been shown in On the Soul, saying, ‘Is it therefore the case that qua
 Translation 149
being indivisible in actuality the <part> perceptive of sweet and white 165,1
is one?’ (449a10-12). For by means of this he shows how, being one,
it will perceive several different things together. For in so far as it is
itself taken and thought of in itself as being an indivisible limit of all
the sense-organs, it will be in actuality and by its own nature an 5
indivisible one, and this <will be> able to apprehend, and perceptive
of, all perceptibles. ‘But when it comes to be divisible in actuality’
(449a12), i.e. when it is divided by the activities in respect of the
sense-organ, it will be more than one. In this way, in so far as it is
one thing in respect of that which underlies, that which perceives all
the perceptibles and judges them will be the same thing, but in so far
as it is divided by the activities in respect of the sense-organs, coming 10
to be many in a way, it will perceive several different things together.
He has discussed this view in On the Soul.501 It is taken as divisible
because it is taken <as> a limit of several things. For being a limit of
all the sense-organs in the same way, when the activity in respect of
several sense-organs comes about, it is taken as divided and as more
than one. To the extent that it comes to be a boundary of several 15
things together, the same <limit> in the activities in respect of several
sense-organs, to this extent one thing would perceive several things
of different genera together. For the same thing is both one and many,
just like the centre in the circle. This, being one in respect of what
underlies, comes to be many in a way, when it is taken as a limit of
the <lines> drawn from the circumference to the centre. 20
Having used the aforementioned as a first solution of the difficulty,
<a solution> which he showed as being like this in On the Soul, he
next uses another, which he also laid out in On the Soul.502 For he
says: ‘Alternatively as it can be with things themselves, so too it is
with the soul’ (449a13-14). What he is saying is: just as in the case of 25
bodies and things which underlie the senses it is possible that
something, being numerically the same, possesses several affections
within itself (for the apple, being numerically one, is at the same time
sweet, yellow or white, and at the same time fragrant, and the 166,1
affections differ from one another and are perceptible to different
senses), so too can it be like this with the soul, such that the perceptive
<soul>, being one, is able to apprehend and judge several different
things at the same time because it possesses several capacities.
Having shown that what underlies is one thing possessing several 5
different affections together, he says: ‘For that which is the same and
numerically one is white and sweet and many other things. For if the
affections <are> not separable from each other, nevertheless the
being for each is different’ (449a14-16), meaning and showing by this
comment that these affections which are concerned with that which
is numerically one, although they are not such that each of them
either exists or can be taken individually, are not for that reason the 10
 150 Translation
same as each other. For although they are not apart <from each
other> nevertheless the being of each of them and the account is
different. Things for which the being is different are different from
each other. For things that are different are judged <to be so> not
only by their being separated but also by the fact that <each>
possesses a different essence.503 In this way the affections are differ-
ent from each other and from that which underlies.
15 He says504 that it is necessary to say ‘in the same way with
reference to the’ perceptive ‘soul’, that it, being ‘numerically one and
the same’ in respect of what underlies because it is the actuality of
one thing, is able to apprehend all the perceptibles, but that it is
different in respect of the account and the capacity and the essence,
possessing different capacities in accordance with the differentiation
20 of the perceptibles, some <capacities> different in genus, others in
species, just as perceptibles are in relation to each other. For the
differentiation of colours is a difference in species but the <differen-
tiation> of colours from sounds is a difference in genus. In this way
the soul would be one when it perceives everything in accordance with
167,1 that which underlies, often admitting also several together, i.e. judg-
ing them, but not <perceiving> with the same thing in respect of the
account and the essence. For it will apprehend colour by virtue of one
account and one capacity, and sound or flavour by virtue of another.
For <being> different in respect of the account and the capacity <it
will be> able to apprehend different things. This would not mean that
5 the same thing comes to be at one moment auditory and at the next
visual in accordance with its relation to the different perceptibles,
just as the Stoics say that the commanding faculty by being in a certain
state comes to be at one moment this and the next that.505 For if this
were the case it would no longer be able to perceive several things
together. What it means is rather that, being one in respect of that which
underlies, it possesses several capacities different from each other, in
respect of which it is possible to be active at the same time.
10 But even if the perceptive <part>, being numerically one is able in
the highest degree to be at the same time more than one in respect of
the account and the capacities, nevertheless how will it apprehend
the opposites at the same time? For the things which underlie are
able to admit several affections together but <they are> not for that
reason <able to admit> the opposites too. (For just because the apple
can be sweet and white at the same time it cannot also be white and
15 black at the same time or sweet and bitter.) This will be the case with
perception too. Consequently it is not true that the perception is able
to come about to a greater degree of things that are the same in genus
than of things that are different in genus. For something is able to a
lesser degree to admit at the same time opposites than things which
have nothing in common. But if we will not perceive opposites at the
 Translation 151
same time, we will not judge that they are opposites either since
something cannot perceive the differentiation of things from each
other if it cannot perceive them together. For we said in On the Soul 20
that this was <true> of memory not perception.506 Alternatively
perception, even if it seems to come about by means of an affection,
is nevertheless itself a judgement. (That which is opposite in an
affection is different from that which is <opposite> in a judgement.
For in an affection white <is opposite> to black but in a judgement
the judgement concerning the white <body> that it is white and the
<judgement> of the black <body> that it is black are not opposites.
For these are true together and it is impossible for opposite judge- 25
ments to be true together. But what is opposite to the judgement
concerning the white <body> that it is white is the <judgement> con-
cerning the white <body> that it is black. For this reason these latter
<judgements> are never present together in the judgement in accord- 168,1
ance with perception, but the former ones are. For they are not opposite.)
However when that body is affected in which <is housed> the507 percep-
tive capacity of the soul, and which it is habitual to call the ultimate
sense-organ, <it is affected> not in respect of the same part by both
<opposites> but rather it is generated in different <parts> by different
<opposites> just as508 we see that the opposites are at the same time clear
both in the eyes and in the mirrors.509 The second solution would differ 5
from the first because in the case of the first <solution> it was taken as
agreed that the perceptive soul was one not only in number but also in
capacity whereas in the second <it was> one in number but not in account,
and it is just like things that underlie. Those things were in numerically
one underlying thing being several things different in account. 10
Having shown how it is possible to perceive several perceptibles
together he shows next that no perceptible is partless but every
perceptible is a magnitude and divisible. He has already made use of
this point as being true and agreed when he discussed the division of
the perceptible affections and the magnitude of the sun.510 For he 15
says: ‘It is clear that every perceptible is a magnitude and there is not
an indivisible perceptible’ (449a20-1). The demonstration which he
uses is as follows:511 he takes it as being obvious and understood that
none of the things perceptible through a medium is perceptible from
every distance, but there is a distance from which the thing seen is
seen and the thing heard is heard and the smellable causes smelling. 20
These perceptions come about by means of some medium. Touch and
taste do not perceive any of the perceptibles proper <to them> by
means of any medium which exists outside and nor <do they do so>
from any distance, but rather <they perceive> them by touching. Now
the distance from which we would not perceive the perceptible is
considerable and almost infinite. For <starting> from the <bound-
ary> where we begin not to perceive <it> and increasing this distance 25
 152 Translation
and always coming to be further away from the perceptible, it is even
more the case that we do not perceive it. For by ‘infinite’ (449a22) he
meant that which is considerable and not limited. For it is not possible
to take the greatest distance from which we do not perceive. But the
distance from which we can perceive is limited.
Since then it is obvious and agreed that there is some distance from
which we perceive and from which we do not perceive, it is clear that
169,1 there would be also some ultimate <boundary> of the distance from
which what is seen is seen (for he makes the argument with reference
to visibles; what is shown with reference to these would also fit the
other perceptibles the apprehension of which <comes about> by
means of some medium), but <it is> also <clear that there will be> a
first <boundary> remaining beginning from which we fail to see the
visible. For if there were no first <boundary> from which it is not seen
5 the thing seen would be <seen> through every <distance>.512 But in
fact it is obvious that the thing seen is seen and is not seen from a
certain <boundary> and <it is obviously not the case> that <the thing
seen is visible> from the first <boundary> from which it is seen <and
is invisible> from a different <boundary> from which it is not seen.513
Therefore there exists something which is the first <boundary> of the
distance from which it is not seen and the ultimate <boundary> of the
<distance> from which it is seen. ‘This’ which is between the ultimate
<boundary> from which it is seen and the first <boundary> from
10 which it is not seen ‘must be indivisible’ (449a26). He himself took it
as obvious that in the case of things like this the same thing comes
to be a boundary and an ultimate <boundary> of the one and begin-
ning and first <boundary> of the other. It would be shown as follows:
if it were divisible, the <boundary> taken as both ultimate and first
would not have been soundly taken. For the division of this which is
between and the addition of the parts of it to both the <boundary>
15 taken as first and the <boundary> taken as ultimate shows that
neither of them was soundly taken either as first or ultimate <bound-
ary>. For if, by dividing that which is between and adding <the parts>
to each, we have the one still remaining in the same way such that
what is seen from it is visible, and the other such that what is not
seen from it is invisible, that which had been taken as <ultimate>
20 before the addition was not the ultimate <boundary> from which we
see and <that which had been taken as first was> not the first
<boundary> from which we fail to see. For <the thing seen> is last
visible where there cannot come to be sight and apprehension from a
greater distance, and it is first invisible where the thing seen cannot
be invisible from a smaller distance. This being so, if one could divide
that which is between the first <boundary> from which something
25 fails to be seen and the ultimate <boundary> from which it is seen,
and if the part of the division which is ‘beyond’ (449a26) is added to
 Translation 153
the visible <part> it will keep it visible and will destroy the existence
of the distance mentioned as the ultimate from which the thing seen
was visible. For it will be seen from a greater distance. And again if 170,1
the part of it ‘on this side’ (449a27) is added to the invisible it will still
keep it invisible and again will destroy the distance mentioned’s being
the first invisible one. For there exists some <distance> before it from
which it will not be seen. In the same way too if, when what is added
to one of them keeps it the same as a whole, that which was taken
before the addition as being either the ultimate <part> of the <dis- 5
tance> from which we see or the first <part> of the <distance> from
which we do not see was not soundly taken as such. For if it is added
to the visible it will make greater the distance of that which was taken
as the ultimate visible, and again <if it is added> to the invisible it
will make smaller <the distance> of that which was taken as the first
invisible. Therefore it must be impossible to divide that which is
between the ultimate <distance> from which we see and the first from
which we fail to see.514
After this he uses the demonstration by means of what is impossi- 10
ble and shows that no perceptible is indivisible, using in addition
what has been shown. For if it is possible, let there be something of
this sort. If this <indivisible perceptible> ‘is placed’ (449a28) in the
partless <interval> between the ultimate visible and the first invis-
ible, clearly it will fit onto it, and in fitting onto it it would be ‘together
visible and invisible’ (449a30), the former because it is visible at the 15
boundary of the visible, the latter because it is invisible at the
beginning of the visible. For if someone were to see this partless
visible from the distance from which the thing seen was first visible,
he would both see it and not see it at the same time. He would see it
because it is placed on this side of the ultimate distance from which
the visible could not be seen, and the things on this side of the
ultimate invisible and the first visible distance are visible. On the 20
other hand he will not see it because it is placed beyond the beginning
of the distance, <the beginning> from which the thing seen was
visible,515 and things placed beyond such a beginning were not visible.
For the partless visible will not be seen, because of being placed
beyond the beginning of the visible distance (for nothing was seen
beyond that), and it will be seen, because of being placed on this side 25
of the boundary and extreme of the visible distance. Therefore if it is
impossible for the same thing to be visible and invisible at the same time
in respect of the same thing, it is also impossible for there to be some
indivisible visible. For being divisible and being placed in accordance
with that,516 it will have the one <part> visible (for that which is on this
side of the extreme <will be> altogether visible; for being divided into 171,1
parts it will not fit onto that which is partless), and the other invisible.
For that which is beyond the visible is invisible. For this was what being
 154 Translation
the first invisible and ultimate visible was, namely to have everything
on this side visible and everything beyond invisible. Being partless it
5 would come to be both of these together. This is impossible.517
However he himself used distances in the opposite way.518 For he
described as ultimate the distance beginning from where the visible
is no longer seen. But it does not seem to be possible to take the
ultimate <part> of that from which it is not seen (for this reason he
himself also said with reference to it, ‘for the distance from which <the
visible> would not be seen is infinite’ (449a21-2). <It seems that>
10 what is nearby the eye is the first <distance> of that from which it is
seen, and the ultimate is that after which it would not be seen from
the same distance.
The demonstration seems in other respects to be of a rather verbal
sort. For not every visible is visible from an equal distance, but one
thing is visible from close by but not from far away while something
15 else <is visible> from far away, like the stars. This being so, how could
anyone define either the ultimate <part> of the distance from which
the visibles are not seen or the first <part> from which they are seen?
Alternatively it is the case that, even though it is as true as it can be
that some visibles are seen from a greater distance and others from
a smaller, nevertheless there will be an indivisible boundary of each
of them, after which the visible is no longer seen.
Someone might also investigate how he shows that there is no
20 partless part of the continuum. For what is between the ultimate
visible distance and the first invisible <distance> is something sepa-
rating them 519
Alternatively, one must suppose that he himself is not showing
that there is something partless without qualification but partless
with reference to perception. And he shows that perception perceives
no perceptible as partless.520 For he showed at greater length in
another work521 that no magnitude can be partless. Therefore one
must interpret, ‘that every perceptible is a magnitude and there is
172,1 not an indivisible perceptible’ (449a20-1) as meaning ‘that perception
perceives nothing as partless.’ That which is between would be shown
to be partless with reference to perception because, if it were visible522
to perception as being divided into parts and as a distance, then either
sight would see the <parts> in it or it would not see them. In this way
5 one would destroy the view that what is described as first is a first
<part> of the distance from which something is seen or that what has
been taken as ultimate is an ultimate <part> of the <distance> from
which the things seen are not seen.
Alternatively there is no necessity for there to be a distance
between the <part> from which the visible is seen and the <part>
from which it is not seen. For in the case of things like this there is
necessity for the same thing to be the boundary of one thing and the
 Translation 155
beginning of another. For if there is a continuous distance between
that <part> in which there is the ultimate distance of the ultimate 10
<distance> in which the visible is seen and that <part> which is the
first in which <the visible> beginning not to be seen is seen no longer,
clearly they possess a common limit, one which joins together the
ultimate visible <part> of it and the first invisible <part>, or rather
both are the same thing, the boundary of the one and the beginning
of the other, being the indivisible limit in the middle. For the limit by
virtue of which continua are joined together is such as is the distance 15
through which the things seen are both seen and not seen. Therefore
it will be in both the parts of the distance, the ultimate visible and
the first invisible, being the boundary of the one and the beginning
of the other. In whatever thing the partless perceptible is placed, it
will fit onto it and will be in both, both the visible and the invisible.
Being in both, it would be seen to the extent that it is in the visible, 20
being its boundary, and it would not be seen to the extent that it is
in the invisible being the beginning of it. In this way it would be seen
and not seen at the same time. For it would not be seen since it was
not on this side of the boundary of the visible (for these were visible
things), and it would be seen since it was not beyond the beginning
from which the visibles were not seen, in as much as it was not yet
in the invisible distance. This would not happen to it if it were 25
divisible. For the one <part> of it would be visible, all that was in the
visible, and the other would be invisible, being that which was in the
distance beyond the visible.
It seems by means of this that he himself was the first to use and
enquire into the account concerning things without parts, which was
enquired into either by Diodorus or by someone else.523 But he 30
discovered it and used it soundly whereas those who were presump-
tuous in relation to it took it from him and failed to use it in the way 173,1
they should. For he showed by means of it that what comes about as
partless in relation to perception is not impossible, but is <impossi-
ble> in nature and in things, because there is no partless perceptible
because there cannot even be a distance which is partless between
the ultimate perceptible and the first imperceptible. For this is the 5
limit which holds together continua. And a part of a body whether
perceptible or imperceptible cannot be partless. With reference to this
the <argument> was used by those who reason falsely, since the part
of a body is a body. For this reason there cannot be in their case either
<a body> that is the largest imperceptible or the smallest perceptible
one by its own nature, because this magnitude524 has to be partless
but every magnitude is divisible to infinity. Having shown this he 10
summarises briefly what has been said in the book525 and he mentions
that after this book On Memory and Sleep526 is the next in order.
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 Notes

1. ‘Perception’ translates aisthêsis and refers either to the general faculty of

sense-perception whereby an animal sees, hears, etc. or to the activity of that
faculty on a particular occasion. Alexander also uses the term aisthêsis to refer to
individual senses such as hearing or vision as well as to the sense-organs through
which these are exercised. See Greek-English index for citations. At 2,5-6 Alexan-
der suggests that aisthêsis here may refer to the sense-organs rather than to the
faculty of perception.
2. ‘Perceptible’ translates aisthêton. Perceptibles, which include all possible
objects of sense-perception, are divided by Aristotle (DA 2.6, 418a6-25) into three
groups: (i) those peculiar to a particular sense, the idia aisthêta, e.g. colours,
sounds, smells, flavours; (ii) those common to more than one sense, the koina
aisthêta, e.g. movement, rest, number, shape, magnitude (see 11,12-19, 84,4-18,
and n. 73); (iii) persons or things that are perceptible ‘accidentally’ (kata sumbe-
bêkos, for which expression see n. 76) because a property in group (i) happens to
belong to them, e.g. the son of Diares (418a20-3), or foam (Alexander, de Anima
41,7-8), is seen because a white thing is seen.
3. On the Soul introduces the series of treatises on life functions known
collectively as the Parva Naturalia, of which the subject of the present commen-
tary is the first in order. Aristotle’s general discussion of soul (psukhê) occupies
1.1-5 (a survey of earlier views which highlights problems in defining the soul) and
2.1-3 (the exposition of Aristotle’s own general definition of the psukhê as the first
actuality of a natural body which has organs (412b5-6) with a warning (414b25-
415a13) that the soul is better understood by considering its powers individually.
See Alexander at 3,10-15). The powers of the soul listed at 414a31-2 are discussed
in what follows: nutrition (2.4), perception (2.5-12, 3.1-2, 12-13), imagination (3.3),
the intellect (3.4-8), movement in respect of place, and appetition (3.9-11). All of
these except the intellect require bodily organs for their exercise.
4. Alexander’s summarising account (de Anima 38,21-39,2) of the perceptive
power as the power ‘by virtue of which its possessor is able, in becoming similar,
by means of an alteration, to the perceptibles to be received, to judge them through
its activity towards them’ suggests that he may have the following passages
particularly in mind: 416b34-5 (perception seems to be a sort of alteration, later
qualified at 417b6-7: the change involved in perception is a special kind of
alteration), 418a5-6 (the perceptive part becomes similar to the perceptible), 424
a5-6 (the sense judges perceptibles), 424a17-19 (the sense can receive perceptible
forms without the matter), 425b26-426a26 (how the activity of the sense is related
to the activity of the perceptible).
5. A reference to Aristotle’s argument (DA 3.1, 424b22-425a13) that there are
only five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Alexander argues for the
same conclusion at de Anima 65,21-66,8. Aristotle’s reference at 425a27 to a
‘common sense’ (koinê aisthêsis), by virtue of which the koina aisthêta (see n. 2) are
perceived, does not introduce a sixth sense but, on the traditional view, is con-
nected with his account of a unified faculty of apperception, the ‘common sense’.
158 Notes to pages 17-19
See Hamlyn 1968a, 195-200 for a criticism and Modrak 1981, 405-23 for a defence
of this view. Alexander endorses the traditional view (see de Anima 65,10-21).
6. ‘Actuality’ translates energeia and ‘potentiality’ dunamis, the distinction
between the two being used for a variety of philosophical purposes by Aristotle and
Alexander who elsewhere use them in a less technical sense, energeia to mean
activity and dunamis to mean power. See Greek-English index for citations
(‘actuality’ also translates entelekheia). On the use of energeia in physiological
contexts to refer to the functioning of organs of the human body as a Hellenistic
development see Sambursky 1962, 110. Aristotle has discussed each individual
sense at 2.7 (sight), 2.8 (hearing), 2.9 (smell), 2.10 (taste), 2.11 (touch) but not in
the schematic way Alexander suggests.
7. Sens. 2. The discussion of the eye predominates. See 14,6 to 41,23.
8. The exception is the intellect. Cf. Aristotle DA 3.4, 429a24-6, Alexander de
Anima 84,10-12, de Intellectu 107,11-19.
9. For colour cf. Sens. 3, flavour Sens. 4, and smell Sens. 5. For the omission of
sound see 66,7-17 (commenting on Sens. 4, 440b27-8). For the omission of touch
see 109,20-2. Sens. 6-7 discusses problems that arise in relation to perceptibles
generally.
10. This distinction is elaborated at 41,9-21.
11. Alexander argues at 3,6-8 that animal activities are not without body
because they come about by means of perception which is common to soul and body.
This suggests that the phrase ‘common to soul and body’ merely characterises an
activity of the soul as requiring a body and not as requiring a specific bodily activity
correlated with that activity of the soul. A similar argument at 7,15-8,12 supports
this interpretation.
12. Reading aisthêseôs for aisthêseôn at 2,5 (Usener).
13. ‘Species’ translates eidos. The term does not indicate a biological species
but an object of definition arrived at by deciding which general kind or ‘genus’
(genos) the definiendum falls under and then specifying its ‘differentiation’ (dia-
phora). Alexander sometimes uses the terms genus and species interchangeably
(cf. 5,13-15).
14. ‘Principle’ translates arkhê. Alexander may have in mind Aristotle’s state-
ment at DA 2.4, 415b8 that the soul is a cause and principle of the living body.
15. Aristotle’s definition of soul at DA 2.1, 412b5-6 (see n. 3) except that
Alexander omits ‘first’.
16. Sens. 1, 436b6-8: ‘It is obvious both by means of argument and apart from
argument that perception comes about for the soul by means of the body’. See
8,9-13.
17. By ‘perception’ here Alexander means the faculty or potentiality whose
actualisation is the occurrence of a perception (referred to as ‘the activity in respect
of it’). For the sense in which the occurrent perception is common to soul and body
see de Anima 38,21-39,2 (cf. n. 4 above): the activity of judging the perceptible is
by means of (dia) an alteration in the body. Elsewhere Alexander identifies
perceiving with the activity of judging the perceptible rather than with the bodily
alteration required (de Anima 84,4-6, de Intellectu 107,11.13-14)
18. The argument here that activities of the soul require a body because they
involve perception is amplified and refined at 7,15-8,13. See n. 39.
19. See n. 3 above for DA references.
20. DA 2.2, 413b2-4. The point is repeated at 9,1-2.
21. i.e. actions peculiar to one species.
22. ‘Action’ translates praxis which Aristotle and Alexander normally reserve
for human actions that are the outcome of rational and deliberate choice (EN 6.2,
 Notes to pages 19-21 159
1139a18-20,31, EE 2.8, 1224a25-30, Phys. 2.6, 197b1-8; cf. Alexander, de Anima
80,3-5). For examples of the looser usage see DA 2.4, 415a18-20, Cael. 2.12,
292a21,b7.
23. ‘Form’ translates eidos. In arriving at his general definition of soul (see n.
3) Aristotle had suggested first that soul is the form of a natural body which has
life potentially (DA 2.1, 412a19-21). Form stands to ‘matter’ (hulê) as actuality
does to potentiality. Alexander’s comment that soul is both form and potentiality
needs to be understood in the light of Aristotle’s distinction (DA 2.1, 412a9-11)
between knowledge (a state of possessing the capacity to engage in contemplation)
and the active engaging in contemplation. These represent a first and second
actuality, the first being a potentiality for the second (cf. 75,9-16).
24. The ‘examination’ of animals refers to the Historia Animalium and ‘divi-
sion’ (diairesis) refers to Aristotle’s method of definition by differentiation within
genus (see n. 13), the grasping of such differentiations forming an important part
of the search for scientific explanation in that work (see HA 1.6, 491a5-10).
25. ‘For’: what follows is an explanation not of the preceding sentence but of
the statement (two sentences before) that Aristotle will begin with discussion of
common activities.
26. The more complete definition of soul (see n. 3, and 3,10-15) specifies the
different powers of the soul which are manifested in the activities common to
animals and other animate things.
27. DA 1.1, 403a5-8, 16-19, 2.2, 413b24-7. See also n. 8.
28. For perception and appetition (orexis) see n. 3. Spiritedness (thumos) and
desire (epithumia) are mentioned as irrational forms of appetition at DA 3.9,
432b3-7 and desire again at 3.10, 433a25-6. Pleasure and pain are associated with
perception and desire at 2.2, 413b23-4 and with desire at 3.11, 434a2-3.
29. Memory is the subject of the De Memoria et Reminiscientia, the next
treatise in order in the Parva Naturalia. Appetition and desire are discussed in
relation to animal movement in MA 700b4-701b1.
30. Wendland suspects a lacuna in 5,29 since the te in 5,28 cannot be connected
to anything in the next line. I have translated it as if êrtêtai from 5,27 had been
repeated, and have commenced a new sentence at peri.
31. De Mem. 1, 449b28-9: only animals which perceive time remember.
32. See n. 27.
33. Reading hekaterôn for hekaterou in 6,3 (Thurot).
34. On Sleep and Waking follows the De Mem. in the Parva Naturalia. The
other three treatises mentioned are also in that collection.
35. There is no evidence that a treatise on this subject was ever in the Parva
Naturalia. ‘On Respiration’, the last surviving treatise in the Parva Naturalia,
concludes (Respir. 21, 480b20ff.) with a short discussion of health and disease
reminiscent of the comments at 436a17-b1, described at 6,26-7,6.
36. A reference to HA 4.10, 536b25ff., which concludes that all fish sleep.
37. ‘Harmonikê’, the study of musical melody, was treated as a branch of
mathematics by Plato (Republic 7, 530C5-531E1). For optics see n. 127.
38. Aristotle at 436a13-15 had described the most important as being four
pairs (the four listed by Alexander at 6,16-20) but Alexander includes health and
disease because Aristotle had introduced them at 436a17.
39. The argument here introduced that certain activities of the soul are
common to body and soul, which occupies 7,15-8,13, is an expansion of the
argument at 3,6-8 (see n. 18) but with the substitution of ‘with’ (meta) for ‘by means
of ’ (dia) as the principal designator of the relation between perception and other
activities of the soul.
160 Notes to pages 22-23
40. ‘Sense-organs’ translates aisthêseis and ‘being in a certain state’ translates
pôs ekhein. Alexander must mean that a certain state of the sense-organs is a
necessary condition of either youth or old age only in animals. For he points out at
8,6-7 that these terms also apply to plants (which lack perception).
41. In what follows Alexander is explaining 436b4-6: ‘some <functions> hap-
pen to be affections of <perception>, others are states, others are guardings and
preservations, and others are destructions and privations.’ ‘Affection’ translates
pathos which is simply the internal object of paskhein (‘to be affected’). On the
temporary nature of affections see Cat. 8, 9b19-33. On their application to the soul
see Cat. 8, 9b33-10a10.
42. i.e. the heart, which is for Aristotle the central sense-organ. Compare
G.R.T. Ross, 1906, 128.
43. ‘State’ translates hexis, a noun cognate with the verb, ekhein, ‘to possess’,
hence Alexander’s conjecture. Since Aristotle alludes to states of perception Alex-
ander’s interpretation is unlikely although he is correct in categorising perception
as a state (analogous to the state of having knowledge which Aristotle distin-
guishes from the activity of engaging in contemplation at DA 2.1, 412a9-11 (see n.
23), in which respect it can be distinguished from the activity of perception).
44. ‘Account’ translates logos, meaning an account in the sense of a definition.
The definition given here does not appear either in Aristotle or elsewhere in
Alexander. Alexander’s own general account of perception (de Anima 38,21-39,2,
see n. 4) refers to the perceiver’s ‘becoming similar by means of an alteration to the
perceptibles to be received’ but does not refer directly to the sense-organs, although
these are mentioned in his account of the process of alteration (de Anima 39,18-19:
‘this affection comes about in the first body which possesses the perceptive soul
(i.e. the heart) by means of certain organs ’).
45. See n. 3 and n. 4 for DA references.
46. Sense-organs generally at 418a3-6, 419a25-31, 424a17-28, 425b23-5,
426a2-6, the organ of hearing at 420a3-19, the organ of smell at 421b26-422a7, the
organ of taste at 422b15-16, the organ of touch at 422b34-423b26, perceptibles
generally at 418a6-25 (see n. 2), visibles at 418a26-418b3, sounds at 419b4-420b4,
smells at 421a7-421b26, tasteables at 422a8ff, touchables at 422b17-33 and
423b27-424a16.
47. See n. 20.
48. The reference to DA and the significance of the point are unclear unless
Alexander is using the term ‘tangible’ (haptos) in an unusual sense to denote a
capacity for touching rather than being touched, in which case the point is the
same as that made at 9,3-5.
49. DA 3.13, 435a11-b3. Aristotle argues that because an animal has the sense
of touch its body must be composed of more than one of the four primary elements,
earth, air, fire, and water. Plants do not perceive because they are composed of just
earth (435b1).
50. This is elaborated at 9,9-11. ‘The things which underlie’ translates hupo-
keimena, a term used by Aristotle to indicate the matter which persists through a
change in form (Phys. 1.7, 190a13-16). Here it means the four elements (see n. 49).
In fact Aristotle says at 435a21-2 that touch is a mean state (mesotês) of the
tangibles (the hot, the cold etc.) and the identification of this with a due proportion
(summetria) of the elements is Alexander’s interpretation.
51. This has not been shown in the DA. When Aristotle says at 435b17 that ‘it
has been shown that without touch it is impossible for an animal to exist’ he is
referring back to the claim at 413b2-4 that animals have perception by definition
 Notes to pages 23-25 161
(see 3,19-20). Since touch can exist apart from the other senses (413b6-7) an
animal by definition must at least have touch.
52. This is misleading: strictly speaking the discussion in DA 3.13 refers back
to a demonstration that an animal would not be an animal without touch (see n.
51) and on this basis but without further proof declares that an animal deprived
of touch dies (435b4-5).
53. My translation reflects the fact that grammatically the ‘that’ clause at
9,11-13 (‘that taste  being nourished’) needs to be taken with ‘it was shown’ at
9,8. But in fact the proof that taste is necessary for animals is absent from the DA
and Alexander must be referring to Sens. 1, 436b15-18.
54. ‘The taste’ means the sense faculty or power (see n. 3). The word ‘part’
(morion) is often used by Alexander to mean a faculty of the soul. For flavour as
an affection cf. 75,1-78,21.
55. Alexander does not confuse the nutritive faculty with the faculty of taste
as 9,27-9 makes clear. He means either that taste enables the animal to distin-
guish what is nourishing from what is not (see 9,21-4) or that nourishment
nourishes by virtue of the tasteable affection, sweet flavour (see 77,5-6) or both.
56. The word ‘part’ is implied by the partitive genitive ‘of us’ and refers to a
part of the body, the sense-organ of taste, although Alexander seems to have the
faculty equally in mind. For a similar ambiguity with the word aisthêsis cf. n. 1.
57. Alexander makes it clear that his statement at 9,14-15 that taste both
apprehends and is affected by flavour is his interpretation of 436b15-18. The
significance of taste’s being affected by flavour is perhaps to point to a contrast
with sight’s perception of colour where no affection is involved (see 19,5-6; 42,26-7;
47,3-4; 50,16-17; 52,1-2).
58. The pleasant coincides with the nourishing. Cf. 80,12-20.
59. Nevertheless Alexander states at 78,20-1 that nourishment nourishes in
so far as it is sweet and it is by virtue of this that it is also able to change taste in
potentiality into actuality.
60. An Aristotelian of the early second century AD whose commentary on part
of EN has survived. His pupil Herminus was Alexander’s teacher. See Sharples
1987, 1176-243, 1178, and Sorabji 1990, 1-30, 16.
61. G.R.T. Ross, 129, takes this to be the nutritive object. But Alexander has
just characterised the faculty of taste as the part by means of which we are
nourished (see 9,14-15) and this is the more probable meaning here.
62. If taste is differentiated in this way the affection of nutritive taste ought
to be sweet flavour rather than flavour generally as Alexander implies. Cf. n. 59
and Alexander’s comments at 80,12-20.
63. DA 3.12, 434b24-6: hearing, vision, and smell are necessary only in ani-
mals capable of travel.
64. Delete hôsper at 10,15.
65. DA 3.12, 434b24.
66. Delete tôn in 10,20 and read phthartikôn sêmantikoi, ha for phthartikoi,
hous (Wendland).
67. Reading euporei for euporian in 10,23 (Wendland).
68. Reading diakrinei tin’ for diakrinousi in 10,24 (Wendland).
69. ‘Wisdom’ translates phronêsis, which is properly the capacity to deliberate
about human goods (see EN 6.7, 1141b9) but can be used more widely to refer to
an animal’s ability to learn to perform actions (see Alexander in Metaph. 3,19-4,5).
By ‘those able to receive wisdom’ Alexander has human beings primarily in mind.
70. ‘Conception’ translates ennoia, a term employed in the Stoic account of how
perception gives rise to the formation of concepts in infancy (cf. Long/ Sedley, I,
162 Notes to pages 25-26
238-41). Alexander in contrast uses the term to describe a stage in the acquisition
of scientific knowledge (see also 11,10 and 11,20) and the term is absent from his
own account of concept-formation in de Anima 83,2-13.
71. Alexander holds that the eternal and continuous movements of the ‘divine
body’ (mentioned at 46,3) are the cause of the succession of night and day. Cf.
Alexander, Fat. 195,10-13. The divine body is the system of eight heavenly spheres
which include the moon and the sun (cf. Alexander, Quaest. 1.25, 40,24ff.).
72. Plato, Timaeus 39B2-C1. Alexander’s emphasis at 11,10-21 on the impor-
tance of sight in leading to the study of the stars is similarly indebted to Timaeus
47B5-C4 (cf. Alexander, in Metaph. 1,18-20). For further remarks on the thought
of number cf. 12,25-7.
73. For the distinction between peculiar and common perceptibles see n. 2. The
statement that sight apprehends the common perceptibles is qualified at de Anima
65,10-21 which allocates to the common sense the function of judging the common
perceptibles and to sight merely the role (shared with the other special senses) of
transmitting onwards to the common sense seated in the heart (cf. de Anima
97,13-14) the movements generated by the common perceptibles. To the list of
common perceptibles given at 11,14-15, 84,11-13 adds rest and distance (cf. also de
Anima 65,13-14). Distance (which was not included in Aristotle’s list at either DA
2.6, 418a17-18 or DA 3.1, 425a16) is apprehended by sight, sound, or smell (de
Anima 50,18-51,6) but not by touch (85,16).
74. ‘The first cause’ is God (cf. Alexander, in Metaph. 18,10).
75. For ‘actions’ see n. 22.
76. 437a3-5: ‘Of these sight in itself <kath’ hautên> is superior with regard to
things that are necessary and hearing <is> accidentally <kata sumbebêkos> <so>
with regard to intellect <nous>.’ Aristotle elsewhere uses ‘accidentally’ to mark off
causes which lack explanatory power (see Phys. 2.3, 195a32-b2: ‘<the cause> of a
statue is in one way Polyclitus and in another way the statue-maker, because being
a statue-maker attaches to Polyclitus as an accident’) and the distinction (see n. 2)
between objects perceptible accidentally and objects perceptible in themselves can
be seen as similarly demarcating causes of perception (the son of Diares is
accidentally perceptible whilst white is perceptible in itself in the sense that the
son of Diares is perceived not because he is the son of Diares but because he is
white). Alexander’s interpretation here seems to read the contrast between ‘sight
in itself ’ and ‘hearing accidentally’ in terms of this distinction (cf. 12,19-20 and
13,9-11). But see n. 78.
77. The things which sight is able to apprehend in itself are the things which
are perceptible to sight in themselves, i.e. colours (cf. 12,19-20). The expression ‘in
itself ’ ‘in themselves’ indicates that there is a relationship of definitional depend-
ency (see Aristotle, An. Post. 1.4, 73a34-b1; cf. Sorabji 1980, 188) such that sight
by definition apprehends colours and colours by definition are what sight appre-
hends (cf. Hamlyn 1968a, 105; Sorabji 1971, 55).
78. ‘On their own’ translates kath’hauta marking a different sense of the
expression to that described in n. 76 and n. 77. See Greek-English index for
citations. Alexander means that the perception of colours is accompanied by the
perception of the common perceptibles (cf. 12,22-4). These are perceptible in
themselves by the common sense (see n. 5) but (in Aristotle’s view at least)
perceptible accidentally by sight (see DA 3.1, 425a14-16) so that they do not fit
neatly into the contrast between things perceptible to sight in themselves and
things perceptible to hearing accidentally suggested in n. 76.
79. ‘Voice’ (phônê, translated as ‘utterance’ at 13,14 and 13,25) is for Aristotle
a sound made by something animate (DA 2.8, 420b5-6) in conjunction with an act
 Notes to pages 26-28 163
of imagination (cf. 66,15-17), and having significance (420b31-33). Alexander
defines it as a sound generated by an animal as an animal, being generated in
accordance with an impulse (hormê, a Stoic term for something which charac-
terises animals but not plants) as well as an act of imagination (de Anima 49,3-5),
thus by implication extending the production of voice to non-rational beings even
though its recognition is here limited to rational beings.
80. 437a12-15: ‘For speech is responsible for learning by being audible, not in
itself but accidentally. For it is composed of names and each of the names is a
symbol.’ ‘Name’ translates onoma, elsewhere rendered as ‘word’, which would be a
more suitable rendition at 13,14 were it not that at 13,15-16 the term is clearly a
congener of ‘verb’ (rhêma). Aristotle defines a name as an ‘utterance significant by
convention without time, no separate part of which is significant’ (Int. 2, 16a19-21)
and a verb as ‘that which additionally signifies time no part of it being significant
separately’ (Int. 3, 16b6-7), and stipulates that all speech capable of being true or
false needs a verb (Int. 5, 17a9-10).
81. 437a15-17: ‘For this reason of those who have been deprived of either of the
two senses from birth the blind are more intelligent than the dumb <eneôn> and
the deaf <kôphôn>.’ The text of 14,1-2 is difficult to make sense of and I have
followed Thurot’s conjectures (see nn. 82-4) without any great conviction.
82. Reading kôphous for enneous in 14,1 (Thurot).
83. Deleting kôphous and reading kai enneous before tous and mête for mêde
in 14,2 (Thurot).
84. Reading tois kôphois ek genetês to kai for kôphois te kai in 14,3 (Thurot).
85. At 436b1-6. See 7,7-8,8.
86. See n. 3 and n. 4 for references.
87. 437a19-22: ‘But of the body in which as sense-organs <the senses> are
naturally generated some people seek <it> by reference to the elements of bodies;
but not finding a way to correlate with four <elements> <the senses> which are
five they are striving concerning the fifth.’ The four elements are fire, water, earth,
and air.
88. Timaeus 66D8-67E2. It is odd that Alexander who elsewhere treats this
dialogue as giving Plato’s own view (see for example 20,24-21,18) here treats it as
recording the view of the Pythagoreans, presumably on the grounds that Plato’s
mouthpiece, Timaeus, is described as being an Italian and a philosopher (20a1-5).
Elsewhere Alexander follows Aristotle in regarding Empedocles as the first to
treat the elements as material principles (in Metaph. 34,7-10).
89. Just as the word for sense, aisthêsis, can refer to the sense-organ (see n. 1)
so the words for the different senses may, as here, mean their respective sense-
organs.
90. 437a22-3: ‘But they all <pantes> make the eye out of fire because of being
ignorant of the explanation for an affection.’ Alexander is puzzled as to why
Aristotle should now attribute to all a view about the eye which he has just
attributed only to those who correlate the elements with the sense-organs.
91. See 438a5-7 and 24,10-27,19. The Democritean theory that vision is caused
when an imprint made in the air by effluxes from the eye and the thing seen is
reflected in the pupil (Theophrastus, De Sensibus 50) assumes that the eyes are
moist in order to admit the reflection. Alexander may have this theory in mind
here and at 24,10-17. But it should be noted that he attributes a quite different
theory of vision to Democritus at 24,18-22 and at 56,10-15.
92. Reading in the lacuna at 15,8 eis ta stoikheia anagontes (Wendland).
93. Deleting the second pantes in 15,9.
94. The view that the flashing phenomenon shows that the inner part of the
164 Notes to pages 28-29
eye is made of fire is attributed to Alcmaeon of Croton by Theophrastus (De
Sensibus 26, cf. Stratton 1917, 88).
95. ‘ and the middle of the eye  is smooth’ (437a32-b1). Cf. 17,3-11.
96. 437a23-4: Alexander omits gar kai kinoumenou at 437a23-4 and substi-
tutes phainesthai for phainetai at 436b24.
97. Alexander refers to 437a26-9 (‘This involves a further difficulty: for, if it is
impossible to escape detection whilst perceiving and seeing, the eye must see itself.
And so why does this not result when <the eye> is at rest?’). 16,5-9 (‘since  is
compressed’) is Alexander’s explanation not of what the further difficulty is (which
he explains at 16,9-16) but of what the first difficulty is.
98. ‘His’ translates hauton which is Alexander’s addition and probably refers
to the eye (contrast Sens. 7, 448a26-30, 148,1-20). 437a27-8, the phrase which
Alexander quotes, does not state the difficulty but an assumption without which
the difficulty would not arise: if the eye could see something without being aware
of it there would be no difficulty in supposing the eye to be permanently seeing
itself but only aware of itself when the flashing phenomenon occurs (for Alexan-
der’s commitment to the assumption that all perception requires awareness that
one is perceiving cf. 148,9-10). Alexander adds (at 16,11) that the consequence of
this assumption here is the impossible result (see n. 102) that the eye sees nothing
when it sees the flashing. This is the only alternative for Alexander to the
supposition that the eye sees itself (cf. 16,12-13). The suggestion of W.D. Ross
(1955, 188-9) that 16,11 gives Alexander’s interpretation of 437a27-8 is unneces-
sary and cannot in any case be reconciled with Aristotle’s text.
99. Delete kai tês aporias kai tês dia ti thlibomenê hê opsis hautên horâi,
êremousa de ou at 17,1-2 (Thurot).
100. DA 2.7, 419a1-6. This answers the first difficulty (see also 20,2-5).
101. ‘Pupil’ has been chosen as the translation of the Greek korê on grounds of
tradition even though this is in some cases misleading. As used by Alexander the
word refers to two distinct parts of the eye: (i) the inner part of the eye which in
human beings is covered by a skin which renders it invisible to the outside world
(see 18,9-16; cf. Sorabji 1992, 195-225, 210), and (ii) the part of the eye’s surface in
which the reflection of bodies can be observed (see 24,16-17) and whose small size
would limit the size of particles that could enter the eye (see 58,1-12). It is the
latter usage which corresponds to our notion of the pupil.
102. ‘The things in relation to something’ translates tôn pros ti this being the
term used for the category of relatives in Cat. 4, 1b26. Relatives are pairs of things
between which a relational state exists. With some pairs each member of the pair
implies the other’s existence (e.g. double/half, master/slave) (see Cat. 7, 7b15-22)
but in a pair like perception/perceptible the implication is only in one direction (if
there is a perception there must be a perceptible but not vice versa) (7b35-8a12).
Aristotle’s denial that visual perception can be explained as a relational state
(Sens. 6, 446b10-13) is brought into line with this passage by Alexander’s stipula-
tion at 127,5-14 that the relational state is position-dependent (cf. 18,6-8 and n.
106). Given a relational analysis of perception there must always be two things for
there to be a perception. Alexander’s first answer to the second difficulty (at
17,12-18,8) is that the eye achieves the feat of being two things by rapid movement
out of and back to its natural position. His second and preferred answer (at
18,17-20,5) is that the eye remains one thing but its parts are two.
103. A sense-organ is in its natural position when lying in a straight line with
the passages which transmit perceptions to the heart (the central sense-organ) (cf.
19,17-20).
 Notes to pages 29-32 165
104. Reading in the lacuna in 18,2 alla kai touto ou khalepon luein, ei tis legoi
hoti mê (Thurot).
105. Glittering requires a medium through which to be seen but, unlike
colours, not an illuminated one (see 17,3-7). ‘Transparent’ and ‘transparency’
translate diaphanês and diaphaneia even though Alexander attributes dia-
phaneia to opaque objects also (cf. Sharples 1992, 20 n. 29). At 47,8-20 Alexander
explains that diaphaneia is the property of bodies such as air, water, and glass
(bodies that are diopta, which I translate as ‘see-through’), being the property
whereby they can be illuminated and thus act as a medium through which colours
can be seen, as well as being the property of bodies that cannot be seen through in
this way, these latter bodies nevertheless being endowed with colour to the extent
that they partake of diaphaneia.
106. ‘Points’ translates sêmeia, a term which Alexander uses for mathematical
points and which here indicates a differentiation of position (cf. DA 1.4, 409a19-21,
in Metaph. 112,10-13). If Alexander means here that the eye comes to be in two
different positions at the same time he corrects this at 18,19-19,2.
107. Reading kai for kan in 18,20 (Thurot).
108. Diels’ reconstruction at 18,21-2 offers the best sense (reading, after
genomenê, kat’allo ti morion apo tês korês, hês en tini allôi genomenês estai to
diaphanes). The ‘elsewhere’ is the place where the eye glittered when away from
its natural position, the explanation being that the eye leaves behind in that place
an after-effect of its glitter which it can then see when back in its natural position.
This place would need to be a transparent medium since glitters need to act on a
transparent medium in order to act on the eye (see n. 105).
109. ‘In a way that involves its being affected’ translates pathêtikôs, the
medium’s failure to undergo an affection being characteristic both of its transmis-
sion of colours to the eye (cf. 47,3-4, 50,16-17, Quaest. 1.2 6,9-10, 6,25-6) and of its
being illuminated (cf. 42,24-43,1, 52,1-2). For affections see n. 41. Alexander links
the medium’s failure to undergo an affection with its undergoing a relational
change (cf. 42, 26-43,1, 47,3-8, de Anima 42,19-43,8, Quaest. 1.2, 6,10-15) which is
in turn linked with the denial that the medium receives light or colour by being
matter (de Anima 42,21-2).
110. ‘Sense-organ’ here translates aisthêsis (cf. n. 1). The ‘primary sense-
organ’ is the heart, the seat of the common sense (cf. n. 73) and the place where
the other senses end (cf. de Anima 97,11).
111. Conversion in Aristotelian logic is the replacement of one proposition by
another which is equivalent to it, the predicate of the first becoming the subject of
the second. The correct conversion of the universal affirmative ‘all fires are things
that glitter’ is the particular affirmative ‘some things that glitter are fires’ (cf. An.
Pr. 25a7-9).
112. See the verses quoted at 437b26-438a3 (translation at n. 121) and para-
phrased at 23,8-24,2. For Empedocles’ other theory of vision see 24,2-9, 56,12-16.
113. Plato, Timaeus 45B4-D7 (= 21,3-18). See also 67E4-68B1.
114. ‘Gentle’ translates hêmeros which Plato associates with hêmera (day).
115. Alexander omits on at 45B6.
116. Alexander reads exôthen sunêntêsen for Plato’s exô sunepesen (‘ of the
things outside which it fell upon’) at 45C6.
117. Alexander reads toutou for Plato’s toutôn (‘ movements of them’) at
45D1.
118. Alexander reads hên for Plato’s hêi (‘ sense by which we say that we
see’) at 45D3.
119. i.e. water. Each primary element (see n. 49) exists as a conjunction of
166 Notes to pages 32-35
prime matter and one each of two pairs of opposite qualities (cold/hot and
moist/dry) which constitute its form and by virtue of which it can act on, and
transform, the other elements (see 73,18-30).
120. The uncertainty arises because of 437b16-19: ‘For the hot and dry (such
as the fire in charcoal and flame seem to be) is extinguished by either moist or cold,
neither of which is apparent as being present in light’. To what pair does ‘neither
of which’ refer? Alexander puts forward two possibilities ((i) hot and dry (21,23-4),
(ii) cold and moist (22,1-2)), and then proposes rewriting the sentence to read ‘For
the hot and dry is extinguished by either moist or cold. The flame in light <seems
to be> such  is extinguished’ (22,2-5).
121. 437b26-438a3: ‘And as when someone, thinking to go out, gets ready a
lamp, a glow of fire which blazes through the stormy night, fitting lanterns
amourgous of all winds, which scatter the breath of the blowing winds, fire, which
was tanaôteron, leaping across outside shone over the threshold <kata bêlon> with
unyielding rays; just so, when primeval light <was> enclosed in membranes and
poured the round-eyed pupil in fine linens which had been pierced through with
tremendous funnels, they protected the depth of surrounding water but let the fire
which was tanaôteron through to the outside.’ I here follow the text of W.D. Ross,
1955, amending it where necessary to correspond with Alexander’s comments, i.e.
reading d’hopot’ for de tot’ and phôs for pur at 437b33 (cf. 36,15-16), and reading
leptêisi de for leptêisin te and othonêisin ekheuato for othonêisi lokheusato at 438a1
(cf. 23,23-4).
122. Homer, Iliad 15, 23. Zeus is describing how he throws his opponents off
Olympus. Alexander reads riptesken for ripteskon (‘I threw’).
123. Meno 76D4-5. Alexander reads sômatôn for either skhêmatôn (‘ an efflux
of shapes ’) (MSS BTWF) or khrômatôn (‘ an efflux of colours ’) (MS T).
124. See n. 91.
125. The eidôla theory which Alexander describes here and at 56,10-15, and
criticises at 56,17-58,22, is consistent with what we know of Epicurus’ theory (see
Long/Sedley, I, 72-3, cf. Avotins 1980, 429-54, Asmis 1984, 131-5) but the sugges-
tion that it represents accurately the views of Democritus and Leucippus is
implausible.
126. When one looks in another’s eye one sees oneself reflected in the pupil just
as in a mirror (cf. Plato, Alcibiades 132E7-133A3).
127. ‘Appearance’ (emphasis) refers to the phenomenon of something’s appear-
ing in a smooth surface like a mirror as a result of reflection (anaklasis, literally
‘a bending back’, a technical term from optics). Optics, as expounded in Euclid’s
Optica, developed laws of the reflection of light by combining the principles of
geometry (cf. 7,4-5) with the assumption that the eye emits light rays which are
reflected (anaklasthai) from smooth surfaces. Aristotle himself used optical theory
to explain rainbows (Meteor. 3.2, 372a29-b11) even though, as Alexander argues at
27,20-28,15, Aristotle’s own views rule out the possibility of anaklasis. According
to Alexander’s first explanation (25,4-7) the ‘it’ at 438a7 is ‘seeing’ and Aristotle
argues that since the appearance of the image in the eye (the emphasis) is merely
an example of anaklasis it does not explain seeing.
128. By ‘this’ Alexander means the fact that the appearance is in the eye.
Alexander’s second explanation (25,7-18) takes the ‘it’ at 438a7 as referring firstly
to seeing and secondly to the appearance and takes Aristotle to leave unargued the
claim that the appearance does not explain seeing, arguing instead that since the
appearance is reflection and since reflection occurs in smooth things which possess
a certain constitution like the eye the appearance is in the eye.
129. Since Aristotle himself used optical theory (see n. 127) it is at least
 Notes to pages 35-38 167
possible that he uses anaklasis in the sense given to it by that theory. But this
would imply that the eye emits light rays, which would be inconsistent with
Aristotle’s own account of light. Hence Alexander insists that emphasis and
anaklasis have the same meaning, even though this sits ill with his own explana-
tions of 438a7 (see n. 127 and n. 128). Alexander provides a non-Euclidean
explanation of reflection at 25,20-6.
130. The mathematicians are the exponents of geometrical optics, the most
prominent being Euclid (fl. 300 BC), Archimedes (287-212 BC), Hero of Alexandria
(fl. AD 62), and Ptolemy (fl. AD 127-148).
131. The primary meaning of diakonia (25,21) is the service provided by
servants or attendants, but a diakonos is often a messenger (cf. Aeschylus,
Prometheus 942, Sophocles, Philoctetes 497) and the idea of passing on a message
to the primary sense-organ seems to be behind Alexander’s description of the
sense-organs as diakonêtika of perceptibles at de Anima 59,14.
132. DA 2.7, 419a13-15.
133. ‘Attaches  as an accident’ translates sumbainein. Aristotle distin-
guishes the properties of a thing into its essential properties, attributes which
make it the thing which it is, and its accidental properties (sumbebêkota), attrib-
utes it could acquire or lose without ceasing to be the same thing. It is water’s
accidental property of transparency, not its essential properties of moistness and
coldness which explain why the eye sees.
134. ‘Appearance-making’ translates emphanês, the adjective associated with
the noun emphasis (‘appearance’, discussed at n. 127).
135. DA 2.11, 424a2-10. Alexander is here going further than Aristotle who
restricts the principle to the perception of the peculiar perceptibles (cf. n. 2),
requiring for example that the eye be neither white nor black in actuality.
136. Reading dêla for dêlon in 27,10 (Thurot).
137. The opinion of Empedocles and Plato that the eye is fire and sees by
emission of light (437b10-14) is discussed at 20,14-24,9.
138. Earlier (15,5-14) Alexander had noted that Aristotle either attributes the
view that the eye is fire to all or to all who correlate the elements with the
sense-organs, and not merely to Empedocles and Plato. It is unclear whether
Alexander intends the phrase ‘those who made the eye consist of fire’ at 27,22 to
have this wider extension and also what logical connection he sees between the
claim that the eye is fire and the claim that the eye sees by emission of light strong
enough to ensure that the defeat of the latter guarantees the defeat of the former.
139. A reference either to one of the two theories held by Democritus (cf. n. 91)
or to the theory of ‘the mathematicians’, i.e. Euclid and Hero and their followers
(cf. n. 130). In what follows (28,16-31,19) Alexander concentrates his attack on the
mathematicians possibly because it is very similar to the Stoic theory which he
also disapproved of, cf. SVF II. 864 (= Alex. Mant. 130,14 Bruns), 866 (= Aetius
Plac. IV 15.3), and 869 (= Aetius IV 15.2).
140. Reading ho for hou at 28,21 (MSS MT).
141. ‘Mica’ translates speklon. Mica is any one of a group of naturally occurring
compounds of silicate of aluminium which can be separated into thin transparent
laminae (micae). ‘Selenite’ translates phengitês, a variant for selênites, a form of
gypsum occurring in transparent crystals and so-called because the crystals are
thought to form when the moon, selênê, is waxing. Selenite can be split into thin
transparent plates and these were used by the Greeks for glass.
142. ‘Reciprocal replacement’ translates antiperistasis, a process postulated
by Empedocles (cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias,
976b22-9) in order to explain locomotion without accepting the atomists’ hypo-
168 Notes to pages 39-42
thesis that void exists. On this theory an object moves through a plenum of air by
occupying the place vacated by the air in front of it, which fills the place vacated
by the air behind it, which fills the place vacated by the object, all three movements
occurring simultaneously. Alexander assumes that the mathematicians will follow
Aristotle in denying that there is void (cf. 29,13) but then further assumes that,
unlike Aristotle, they will in consequence need to postulate antiperistasis to avoid
admitting that bodies pass through bodies (29,13-15).
143. ‘Process’ translates kinêsis. Aristotle has two general terms for change,
kinêsis and metabolê (cf. W.D. Ross 1936, 7-8, 45-7). The distinction has been
explained by the suggestion that, whereas metabolê individuates a change as
strictly just the emergence of a new state of affairs, kinêsis counts the conditions
that causally lead up to the new state of affairs as part of the change (see Waterlow
1982, 95-6). On this view ‘the very meaning of kinêsis implies a process taking time’
(Waterlow, op. cit., 97). For the possibility of a kinêsis without time-lapse cf. Sens.
6, 446b28-447a6 and below 132,17-134,10.
144. Alexander here assumes that there is no imperceptible time-lapse. For
Aristotle’s arguments against imperceptible times see Sens. 7, 448a19-b17 and
below 146,1-156,22.
145. cf. 131,20-132,16.
146. cf. Alexander, Mant. 127,27-130,12 (against those who say that seeing
comes about through rays), 134,28-136,28 (against those who say that seeing
comes about through the impact of images), 136,29-138,2 (against those who say
that seeing is through an efflux from both the person seeing and the body seen).
Alexander criticises the view that seeing comes about through an efflux from the
body being seen at 56,6-58,22.
147. Alexander reads elegon for legousi (‘ as some people say ’) at 438a27.
148. The target is followers of Plato whose theory of vision (see 21,3-18)
Alexander takes to imply the fusion (sumphusis) of light from the eye with external
light. Alexander bases this on Plato’s use of the word xumphues at Timaeus 45D5
(= 21,17). For the meaning of fusion see n. 152.
149. ‘Enclose’ translates perilambanein. The term was used (see 28,4-7) in
describing the mathematicians’ theory that the eye emits a cone of rays which
enclose the visible object. But Alexander has explained (cf. n. 148) that the target
of Aristotle’s criticisms here is the Platonic theory that emitted light is fused with
external light. On this theory (Timaeus 45C2-D3 quoted at 21,8-15) the emitted
light fuses with the external light to form a body extended in a straight line from
the eye to the visible object which it lays hold of (ephaptêtai) and whose movements
it transmits to the eye. Alexander either confuses the two theories or considers the
terminology interchangeable. Alexander’s first argument (32,13-22) is in fact an
attempt to apply Ockham’s razor to both theories: since, on his own theory (cf. de
Anima 43,18-44,2), the transmission of the form of the visible body to the eye is
carried out by the light already outside the eye, there is no need to postulate the
emission of light from the eye (whether to enclose or lay hold of the visible body).
150. i.e. the followers of Plato (cf. 21,15-18; 33,3-6), Alexander’s second argu-
ment (32,22-6) unlike the first (cf. n. 149) being aimed specifically at Plato’s theory.
151. Reading ou for oude at 33,9 (Wendland).
152. cf. 438a30-438b1: ‘Or how is <fusion> able to belong (for chance things are
not fused with each other)?’ Alexander appears (cf. 34,12-13) to equate fusion with
mixture (mixis) and his insistence that only bodies can be fused (33,10-11) is
probably based on GC 1.10, 327b20-1 where Aristotle states that not everything can
be mixed with everything, only things that are separable, i.e. bodies. Alexander
has been criticised (see G.R.T. Ross, 1906, 140-1) for wrongly reading Aristotelian
 Notes to pages 42-43 169
mixis into the Timaeus but from an Aristotelian viewpoint this would be the most
charitable way of reading the text, given Aristotle’s charge that its theory of
elements is misconceived (cf. GC 2.1, 329a17-21). Alexander does in any case
supplement his argument with appeals to observation (33,14-25).
153. Elsewhere I have rendered opsis as ‘eye’ or ‘sight’ as the sense requires.
In this sentence Alexander uses omma as well as opsis to refer to the eye. To
distinguish the two terms I have rendered opsis as ‘faculty of sight’ in this and the
next sentence.
154. i.e. the light from the lamp. Alexander is asking why the light from the
lamp is necessary at all.
155. Reading to for tên and idion for idiôn at 33,25 (Wendland).
156. 438b1-2: ‘And how <is the light> inside <fused> with the <light> outside?
For the membrane is in between.’
157. A paraphrase of 438b8-10 (= 36,5-6) which substitutes tôi eskhatôi for tou
eskhatou and oude for ê tês psukhês.
158. Wendland takes this to refer to DA 2.11, 423b20-6 where the fact that we
do not see what is placed on the eye (the sense-organ of vision) whereas we do feel
what is placed on the flesh is taken to show that the flesh cannot be the sense-
organ of touch. But Alexander is referring to a proof that the faculty of perception
has a central location (the ‘perceptive starting-point’ at 34,7; cf. 19,17-20, de Anima
97,8-11) and is not dispersed between the sense-organs of the five senses and it is
more likely that he has in mind DA 3.2, 426b8-23 (cf. 36,11-19).
159. Reading in the lacuna at 34,9 ei de asômatôn, oud’ holôs dunêsetai
sumphuesthai to phôs (Wendland).
160. 437b32 (see n. 121). Since Alexander regards the membrane as prevent-
ing any contact (cf. hapsasthai at 34,20) between the pupil and the outside world
he presumably disregards Empedocles’ stipulation that the ‘fine linens  had been
pierced through with tremendous funnels  which let the fire through to the
outside’.
161. Reading korêi for khôrâi in 34,17.
162. A reference to DA 2.7, 418a29-30: ‘For the visible is colour and this is what
overlies that which is visible in itself.’ Aristotle explains (418a30-1) that by ‘visible
in itself ’ he is not alluding to his doctrine of definitional dependency (see n. 77)
but to the fact that a coloured body is one which ‘possesses in itself the cause of its
being visible’. For Alexander’s account of the internal material composition of
coloured bodies cf. 52,6-53,8.
163. A reference to DA 2.7, 418a31-b4: ‘And every colour causes movement in
what is transparent in actuality, and this is its nature. This is why it is not visible
without light, but every colour of each <body> is seen in light.’ Cf. also DA. 2.7,
419a7-11.
164. A reference to Aristotle’s theory of transparency (see n. 105) which is
introduced as a postulate at DA 2.7, 418b4-10: ‘There is something transparent. I
mean by transparent what is visible, but not what is visible in itself to speak in an
unqualified way, but <what is visible> because of something else’s colour. Air,
water, and many solid <bodies> are of this sort. For <water> is not transparent
qua water and <air> is not transparent qua air, but because there is a nature
which is the same present in both of them and in the eternal body above <i.e. the
aether or fifth element>. Light is the actuality of this, the transparent qua
transparent’.
165. cf. 438b3-5: ‘But whether that which is between the <body> seen and the
eye is light or air the movement through this is what produces seeing.’
166. This cannot be a reference to DA 2.7, 418b9-10, as Wendland suggests,
170 Notes to pages 43-46
since the theory of transparency has been introduced at 418b4 as a postulate (see
n. 164). The demonstration Alexander has in mind may be Aristotle’s argument at
DA 2.7, 418b20-6 against the alternative theory that light is a fast-moving body.
167. 438b 5-8: ‘And it is reasonable that what is inside consists of water. For
water is transparent and just as <the body seen> is not seen outside without light
so too <is it the case> with what is inside. Therefore <what is inside> must be
transparent. Therefore it must be water since it is not air.’
168. ‘Sense-organ’ translates aisthêsis and refers to the central sense-organ
located at the heart (cf. n. 110 above).
169. Sens. 2, 438a12-16. See 26,8-13.
170. ‘Easily confined’ translates euphulaktos, a translation which accurately
conveys Aristotle’s meaning at 438a15. But the word can also have an active
meaning (‘good at guarding’, cf. Euripides, Hercules Furens 201) which Alexander
exploits here.
171. See n. 134.
172. Alexander takes ‘soul’ at 438b8 to mean the visual potentiality and
interprets Aristotle not as meaning that the visual potentiality is in the inner part
of the eye but as meaning that it is in the heart.
173. cf. 438b10-11: ‘But clearly <it is> inside. This is why what is inside the
eye must be transparent and able to admit light.’
174. DA 3.2, 426b17-23. Alexander identifies the ‘one thing which apprehends’
the objects of the different senses with the common sense seated in the heart (cf.
de Anima 63,6-64,11 and see nn. 5, 73, 158).
175. See 14,18-15,4.
176. 438b21-5: ‘For that which is able to smell is potentially what smell is in
actuality. For the perceptible causes the sense to be active so that <the sense> is
necessarily present potentially beforehand. Smell is a smoky vapour and the
vapour that is smoky <consists> of fire.’
177. Wendland suggests a reference to either Sens. 6, 445b30 or 7, 449a1,
neither of which passages demonstrates that the actuality and the potentiality are
opposites. Alexander may have in mind Aristotle’s treatment of change in general:
the emergent property in any change must come to be from an opposite or
intermediate in the same range of properties (Phys. 1.5, 188b21-6) and change
itself is defined as the ‘actuality of what potentially is as such’ (Phys. 3.1, 201a10-
11). The sense-organ of smell, when acted upon by something smellable, acquires
the smellable’s heat (‘the change into fire’ at 38,9) and, to do this, it must start off
cold (cf. DA 2.5, 418a3-6). As Alexander points out (39,2-3), this is not a demon-
stration that the sense-organ of smell is fire (in the way that the sense-organ of
vision has been shown to be water).
178. cf. DA 2.12, 424a17-24.
179. Adding alêthes after an (Wendland).
180. See Sens. 5 passim and 88,4-109,16. At Sens. 5, 443a21-b2 Aristotle
rejects the view that smell is a smoky vapour (cf. 92,17-93,24).
181. DA 3.1, 425a3-7. The sense-organ of smell is stated to be either air or
water at 425a5.
182. 438b25-7: ‘For this reason also the sense-organ of smell is peculiar to the
place around the brain. For the matter of the cold is potentially hot.’
183. Aristotle analyses change (cf. n. 177) in terms of form and matter (cf. n.
23), any change being a case of some underlying thing (the matter) acquiring a new
property (the form) (cf. Phys. 1.7, 190b10-17). The ‘matter of the hot’ is that which
underlies the change of something cold into something hot (cf. Phys. 4.9, 217a20-6).
184. cf. PA 2.7, 652a27-8.
 Notes to pages 46-51 171
185. 438b27-30: ‘The coming-to-be of the eye possesses the same character. For
it has been given its constitution from the brain. For <the brain> is moistest and
coldest of the parts in the body.
186. cf. GA 2.6, 744a5-10.
187. There is a lacuna at 39,8. I have supplied a full stop after opsis and added
alla mên epei hê opsis.
188. Reading esti for eisi in 39,9.
189. Sens. 5, 444a28-444b2 (cf. 98,12-99,15).
190. 438b30-439a1: ‘That which is able to touch <consists> of earth and that
which is able to taste is a form of touch.’
191. DA 1.5, 410a30-b2.
192. DA 2.10, 422a17-19.
193. ‘Function’ translates ergon, a noun cognate with, and close in meaning to,
to energein translated as ‘activity’ at 41,12. 194. See n. 4 above for the DA passages
referred to here.
195. See n. 2 above.
196. A reference to Aristotle’s doctrine, expounded at DA 3.2, 426a15-26, that
the activity of the perceptible and the activity of the sense are different descrip-
tions of a single event Alexander here corrects an imprecision in Aristotle’s text: it
is not simply actual colour (which may or may not be being seen) but actual colour,
when it is perceptible in actuality, that is one in number with sight in actuality.
197. 439a13-16: ‘How that which is colour in actuality, and sound, are the
same as, or different to, the senses in actuality, for example sight and hearing, has
been discussed in On the Soul.’
198. 439a16-17: ‘Let us discuss what each of them is such that it will cause
perception and activity.’
199. DA 2.7, 418b11-13: ‘Light is a sort of colour of the transparent whenever
it is transparent in actuality by the agency of fire or something like the body above’.
The ‘body above’ is the fifth element, the aether, out of which the heavenly spheres
(see n. 71) are made.
200. For the failure of the transparent to be affected see n. 109. This explana-
tion offers a different sense of ‘accidentally’ to those identified at n. 76 and n. 133.
201. 439a19-21: ‘for when there is something fiery in <the> transparent, its
presence is light and its privation is darkness.’
202. cf. 46,21-47,1, 47,13, de Anima 44,13-15, 89,1-2, in Metaph. 142,13-16,
Mant. 148,23, 149,33-44. The property of being visible to the highest degree is
nevertheless given to the divine body and fire at 45,26-46,3 (cf. de Anima 46,2-3).
The inconsistency is discussed in Accattino/ Donini 1996, 186, 191.
203. 439a21-5: ‘What we mean by transparent is not peculiar to air or water
and not to any other of the bodies that are so described, but there is a common
nature and potentiality, which is not separable, but is in <air and water>, and it
is present in the other bodies to a greater or lesser degree.’
204. See Phys. 3.5, 204b10-206a8.
205. Adding at 44,20 to dê khrôma before the square-bracketed text (44,21-2
del. Usener) the contents of which are not to be deleted.
206. Reading auta for auto in 44,27 (Wendland).
207. For matter (hulê) see n. 183. For the view that transparency is the matter
of colour cf. Quaest. 1.2, 5,32-6,1, de Anima 44,21-2, Mant. 147,30ff. and 148,29ff.
208. Reading phainein in the lacuna in 45,12 and reading gar for men (Diels).
Alexander connects the words phainesthai (‘appear’) and phôs (‘light’), pointing out
that the latter word is in fact a contracted form of phaos. Here, and in what follows,
172 Notes to pages 52-56
I have included the Greek word after its translation where Alexander’s point
depends upon the etymological connection.
209. For the divine body see n. 71. At Quaest. 2.17 Alexander distinguishes the
elemental heavenly fire from the terrestrial fire which contains an admixture of
the matter which provides its fuel (cf. Sharples 1994, 14 and 114). Since the fire
referred to here is unmixed with the other elements it is presumably the heavenly
fire whereas the flame referred to at 46,17-18 is terrestrial fire.
210. For the connection adumbrated here between the colour white and the
colour ‘having the form of light’ (phôtoeidês) see also de Anima 45,15 (where the
two are apparently identified) and Mant. 150,7 ff. (where the two are distin-
guished, as here, by reference to the degree of transparency in the body concerned).
211. Reading, for the first touto in 47,23, toutou with Thurot’s MSS BC.
212. For ‘attaching  as an accident’ see n. 133. ‘Underlies’ translates hu-
pokeisthai and refers to the relation between a subject (to hupokeimenon) and the
things that are either ‘said of ’ it (species and genera in the case of individuals) or
are ‘in’ it (qualities, quantities and other properties) (for the ‘said of ’/‘in’ termino-
logy see Aristotle, Cat. 2, 1a20-1b9). The transparent means any body that is
transparent: any such body possesses the property of being coloured although, in
the case of indeterminate bodies the colour possessed is light (see 46,21-47,3).
213. Reading phêsin in the lacuna in 47,25 (Thurot).
214. Adding en before aoristôi and tôi before diaphanei with the other Aristo-
telian MSS.
215. ‘That which underlies’ (see n. 212) is the subject to which the property of
being coloured belongs, i.e. any transparent body.
216. 439a27-33: ‘It is clear that the ultimate <part> of the transparent in
bodies would be something, and that this is colour is evident from what results.
For colour is either in the boundary or <is the> boundary (this is also why the
Pythagoreans called the surface colour). For it is in the boundary of the body but
<it is> not the boundary of the body.’
217. According to W.D. Ross, 197, the term khroa was used by the Pythagore-
ans to mean surface and not colour and they were not identifying surface with
colour.
218. Adding dêlon hoti ou tou sômatos in the lacuna in 49,15 (Wendland).
219. This apparently contradicts 45,5-6 unless Alexander is now discounting
light as a colour.
220. cf. de Anima 46,14-17.
221. Reading toutois aitia esti tou khrômatizesthai for toutôn esti khrômatizes-
thai at 50,9 (Wendland dubitanter).
222. The phenomenon of air which appears to take on colour is described at de
Anima 42,11-19. Cf. also Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 4.72-83.
223. 439b3-6: ‘But in that case because of the fact that <the colour is> in an
indeterminate <body> neither the air nor the sea possess the same colour from
close by and to those who approach as from far away. But in bodies the impression
of the colour is defined unless the surrounding <body> makes it change.’
224. Supplying khrôma oikeion ouk ekhonta in the lacuna in 50,15 (Wendland).
225. Alexander uses the neuter plural ending of the participle translated as
‘seeing’ leaving it unclear whether he means perceivers or their sense-organs. My
translation here and at 50,22 is intended to preserve the ambiguity.
226. ‘Being generated’ translates to ginesthai (50,25), elsewhere translated as
‘coming about’ or ‘coming to be’. Confusingly at 132,8-9 Alexander suggests that it
is light, the accidental colour of the indeterminate bodies, which exists without
being generated. His reason there is that a transparent medium comes to be
 Notes to pages 56-58 173
illuminated by undergoing a relational change (see n. 109). The apparent inconsis-
tency can be resolved if we suppose Alexander to mean here not that the colour of
a solid body has never been generated but merely that, unlike the colours taken
on by the sea and the air, it does not require to be generated afresh on each
occasion in accordance with the relation and the position of the perceiver.
227. A commonplace of the Sceptics, who advocated suspension of judgment as
the way to liberate the mind from disturbance: ‘the necks of pigeons seem differ-
ently coloured depending on the angle of inclination’ (Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh.
Hyp., 1.118-120; cf. also Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.802-5).
228. 439b6-10: ‘Therefore it is clear that the same thing both in that case and
in this case is able to admit colour. And so the transparent, to the extent that it is
present in bodies (and it is present in all to a greater or lesser degree), causes them
to partake of colour.’
229. See 45,21-47,20.
230. 439b10-14: ‘Since colour is in <the> boundary it would be in <the>
boundary of <the transparent>. Consequently colour would be the boundary of the
transparent in a determinate body. And with regard to the very <bodies> that are
transparent, for example water and anything else like this, and all those <bodies>
to which a peculiar colour appears to belong, it belongs to them all in the same way
by virtue of the extreme <part>.’
231. See 49,11-15.
232. Alexander neglects to explain that Aristotle’s expression ‘the very bodies
that are transparent’ means only those bodies that can be seen through.
233. The statement that light is not the colour of indeterminate bodies is
offered in explanation not of the claim that their colour is visible by virtue of the
boundary but of Alexander’s doubts that these bodies have a colour at all.
234. ‘specific property’ translates idion. Aristotle (Top. 1.5, 102a17-30) uses
this term to mean a predicate which is unique to a species of subject without being
part of its definition (which describes its essence), e.g. the capacity to learn
grammar, which is found only and necessarily in human beings but is not part of
the definition of a human being. For Alexander light is not a specific property of
indeterminate bodies (since they can be unilluminated) whereas colour is a prop-
erty of determinate bodies (since they cannot lack colour).
235. 439b14-18: ‘That which in air makes light can be in the transparent, but
it can fail to <be> and <the transparent can be> deprived <of it>. And so just as in
that case on the one hand light <is generated> and on the other hand darkness
<is>, so in bodies white and black are generated.’
236. The suggestion that the presence of something bright in a body accounts
for its white colour would appear plausible in Greek where the ideas of whiteness
and brightness, combined in leukos (white), were not generally distinguished.
237. Reading dê for the second de in 52,20 (Wendland).
238. Aristotle, following unidentified predecessors (cf. Theophrastus, De Sen-
sibus 59) assumes that black and white are the two fundamental colours, different
combinations of which will yield all the other ‘intermediate’ colours (cf. Sens. 3,
439b25-440a6, 440a12-15, 440b21-3; for a discussion of the theory see Sorabji
1972, 293-308).
239. Reading diaphanes with MSS TANa for diaphanesi at 53,7.
240. cf. de Anima 45,5-17 where the two explanations of colour-difference in
bodies (variation in the degree of transparency and variation in the amount of
white body in the mixture) are similarly combined (see Accattino/Donini 1996,
187-90).
241. Alexander’s version of 439b19-22 which in fact reads: ‘For black and
174 Notes to pages 58-60
white can come to be juxtaposed with each other so that each of them is invisible
because of smallness but that which <results> from both is visible.’
242. Alexander’s paraphrase of 439b22-5: ‘For this <sc. what results> can
appear neither white nor black. But since it must possess some colour and neither
of these is possible, there must be something mixed and another form of colour.’
243. Alexander’s paraphrase of 439b25-30: ‘And so it is possible to suppose
that there are more colours besides white and black and <that they are> several
because of the proportion (for <black and white parts> can be juxtaposed with each
other in the ratio three to two, and three to four, and in respect of other numbers,
and they <can be juxtaposed> generally in accordance with no proportion but in
accordance with an incommensurable predominance and deficiency (elleipsis))’.
244. Alexander’s paraphrase of 439b30-440a3: ‘<and it is possible to suppose
that> these <colours> possess the same character as musical concords. For colours
dependent upon simple numbers, just like the musical concords, <are supposed>
to be the colours which seem most pleasant, for example purple and red and a few
others like this (<few> for the same cause as the musical concords are few), and
the other colours are those not dependent upon numbers.’ ‘Musical concord’ trans-
lates sumphônia and means (cf. Aristotle, An. Post. 2.1, 90a18-21) a musical sound
consisting of a high and a low note where the numbers representing the rate of
vibration of the string producing each note can be expressed as a ratio of whole
numbers. For a good account of the ancient musical theory assumed here see
Guthrie, HGPh I, 222-6.
245. The musical concord made up of the two notes which span an octave and
which are sounded by the outer two strings of the seven-stringed lyre. Pythagoras
is credited with the discovery that this concord depends upon the ratio 1:2 (cf.
Guthrie, op. cit., 222-3).
246. The musical concord made up of the two notes which span a fourth and
which are sounded by the middle and the lowest string on the lyre.
247. 440a1-2. See n. 244.
248. Alexander’s paraphrase of 440a3-6: ‘Alternatively <it can be supposed
that> all the colours are dependent upon numbers, some <colours> being ordered
and others disordered, and that the latter come to be so when they are not pure
because of the fact that they are not pure in their numbers.’
249. At 440a5. See n. 248.
250. 440a7-15: ‘ and one <way> is appearing through each other such as the
effect painters sometimes produce, painting one colour over another more lustrous
one, as when they want to paint something as if in water or air, and as the sun
appears white on its own but red through mist and smoke. There will be many
colours on this view also in the same way as for the account just given. For there
would be a proportion of <colours> on top to <colours> underneath, and the others
generally would not be in a proportion.’
251. Reading kath’hauta for kat’auta at 56,4.
252. Reading dokousin, enantioutai doxêi prokatabeblêmenêi for dokei en hê en
doxa prokatabeblêmenê in 56,10 (Wendland).
253. For Empedocles see Sens. 2, 437b23-438a5 and 24,4-9. Alexander’s at-
tempt here to identify the theories of Democritus, Leucippus, and Empedocles
glosses over the fact that at 24,4-9 the shape of the Empedoclean efflux determines
the colour seen whereas at 56,12 the shape of the Democritean efflux, or image,
determines the shape seen.
254. cf. 440a16-20 (‘For it is in any case necessary for them to make perception
by means of touch so that it is immediately better to say that perception comes
 Notes to pages 60-68 175
about because that which is intermediate between the sense <and the perceptible>
is moved by the perceptible rather than by touch and efflux.’)
255. Reading tois ophthalmois aitia tou horan tôn ophthalmôn haptetai. all’
for ê horatheisôn and the subsequent lacuna in 56,21 (Thurot).
256. Reading deon for dein in 56,22 (Diels).
257. Reading oukhi kan ep’ for kan in 58,15 (Wendland).
258. Reading ê exô ê en for ê ex hôn en in 58,16 (Diels).
259. Reading kai for ei at 58,20 (Diels). The theory that the job of the images
is merely to get the sight ready for seeing leaves the actual seeing unexplained.
260. See Sens. 2, 438a25-7 and 27,20-31,29.
261. DA 2.7, 419a15-21.
262. Note that Alexander in his quotation of 440a19-20 reads ê haphêi kai
aporrhoiâi rather than the generally accepted reading, haphêi kai mê tais apor-
rhoiais. This is consistent with the fact that he takes what ‘it is immediately better
to say’ as being Aristotle’s own theory. The generally accepted reading (‘it is
immediately better to say that perception comes about because that which is
intermediate between the sense <and the perceptible> is moved by the perceptible
by touch and not by means of effluxes’) suggests that Aristotle is not presenting
his own view but merely pointing out that, since the efflux theory regards touch as
the mechanism for vision, it would be more economical to dispense with effluxes
all together by having the perceptible act on the eye by touching the air in between.
Alexander’s reading may have been the only reading in the text of Aristotle
available to him. Alternatively he chose a reading that suited his own interpreta-
tion.
263. Reading sômatôn for khrômatôn in 59,17 (Thurot).
264. For Aristotle’s argument against imperceptible magnitudes see Sens. 7,
448a30-b12 and 148,21-156,22. By a ‘magnitude invisible by its own nature’
Alexander means one that lacks colour (cf. 61,19, 111,4-10). He has apparently
forgotten that at 53,18-21 he described the juxtaposition theory of colour as
presupposing black and white magnitudes invisible only because of their small
size. Colourless magnitudes are a presupposition rather of the image theory (see
n. 125) as expounded by Epicurus (cf. Quaest. I 13).
265. See n. 144.
266. Reading aph’henos for aphenes in 60,17 (Wendland).
267. See n. 144. Aristotle’s argument at 448a30-b12 is in fact aimed at magni-
tudes imperceptible because of their small size (cf. 448b3-4) rather than by their
own nature.
268. Aristotle thinks it better but does not accept superimposition, because
that does not involve the real mixture through and through which he requires at
440b3.
269. GC 1.10. ‘Being fully interpenetrated’ translates holôn di’holôn tre-
pomenôn (cf. Mixt. 216,29, Todd 1976, 116-7).
270. For blending see Todd 1976, 26 ff., 73 ff., 236 and SVF 2.479.
271. Deleting touto in 64,15.
272. GC 1.10, 328a19-31.
273. Reading hênômenon for hênômena in 64,24 (Wendland).
274. cf. Alex. Mixt. 228,36.
275. Reading tôi de for to te in 64,25 (Wendland).
276. Reading kata for kai in 65,12 (Diels).
277. See Sens. 6, 445b20-9, 446a16-20.
278. A reference not to DA 2.8 (Aristotle’s account of hearing) but to DA 3.2,
426a6-7: ‘the actuality of that which is able to sound is sound or sounding
176 Notes to pages 68-71
(psophêsis)’. The context is the exposition of the doctrine that the activity of the
perceptible and of the sense is a single event (see n. 196).
279. In Aristotle’s account ‘that which is able to sound’ (to psophêtikon) refers
not to air but that which sets air in motion (cf. DA 2.8, 420a3-4), i.e. solid objects
like bells which make sounds when struck (cf. DA 2.8, 419b6-9). Alexander’s
identification of to psophêtikon with air reflects the greater prominence he gives to
air in his own account of hearing: he builds on Aristotle’s suggestion that air makes
a sound if struck rapidly and violently by solid objects which strike each other (cf.
DA 2.8, 419b19-22) and his vague statement that the air inside the ear is moved
when the air outside is moved (cf. 420a3-5) to develop a theory that the air struck
by the solid objects acquires a shape which is transmitted to the air in the ear (see
de Anima 50,11-18).
280. See n. 279. The ‘underlying body’ of air is the air adjacent to the solid
bodies which acquires a shape when they strike each other. Alexander’s suggestion
that this body ‘travels’ should not be taken literally. Aristotle says that sound
seems to be a movement of something travelling (Sens. 6, 446b30-447a1) but
Alexander, whose theory treats the transmission of sound as an alteration, says
(132,22) that it resembles locomotion, implying that the movement is not locomo-
tion.
281. cf. DA 2.8, 419b22-5, de Anima 47,14-16.
282. See n. 79.
283. DA 2.9, 421a7-26. For the claim that taste is a species of touch see 78,2-3.
284. Sens. 5, 443a9-12. Cf. also 72,7-11.
285. DA 2.10, 422a17-19.
286. 441a4-6: ‘But it is necessary that either water possesses within itself the
kinds of the flavours imperceptible because of smallness, as Empedocles says ’.
According to Theophrastus, De Sensibus 9, Empedocles’ account of taste was
confined to the claim that perception occurs because effluxes fit in the passages (as
with vision: cf. 24,5-6) but Claudius Aelianus, de Natura Animalium 9.64, attrib-
utes to him the view that fish in the sea are nourished by sweet water which is
imperceptible to human taste.
287. cf. 441a6-8 ( or <water> is matter of such a nature as to be a sort of
seed-aggregate of flavours, and all <kinds of flavour> come to be out of water but
different <kinds> from different parts ).
288. i.e. different parts have the potential to take on different flavours.
289. G.R.T. Ross 1906, 163, suggests (citing Aristotle, GC 1.1, 314a25-31) that
‘seed-aggregate’ (panspermia) is a coinage of Anaxagoras (but Aristotle also uses
the word in reference to Democritus at Phys. 3.4, 203a21, Cael. 3.2, 303a16, DA
1.2, 404a4). Alexander, though mentioning Anaxagoras here, attributes the seed-
aggregate theory of flavour to Democritus at 68,24-5.
290. 441a8-10 ( or water possesses no differentiation and that which pro-
duces <the differentiation> is responsible, as for example if one were to say that
the hot and the sun <did so>). G.R.T. Ross (1906, 164) follows Simon in regarding
this as the theory of Anaxagoras whilst W.D. Ross (1955) regards it as Aristotle’s
own (but see 70,17-71,16).
291. Reading eipôn for eis in 69,10 (Diels).
292. 441a10-17: ‘In regard to these <opinions> the falsehood of what Empedo-
cles says is very easily seen. For we see that the flavours are changed by the hot
when the pods are removed into the sun and warmed, because they come to be such
not by drawing in <flavour> from the water but changing in the pod itself, and <we
see> that, when <the juices> are exuded and left to lie, because of the time, they
 Notes to pages 71-78 177
come to be harsh, from being sweet, and bitter and of every kind, and when they
are boiled they change into almost all the kinds of the flavours’.
293. Reading autous for auta in in 69,23.
294. Reading khuloi for khumoi in 69,30 (Thurot).
295. Reading ou gar tôi for ê gar tôi in 70,10 and diapherei monon for dia-
pherein in 70,11 (Wendland).
296. See Sens. 4, 441b15-21.
297. 441a23-6: ‘For water is the finest of all the things which are moist like
this, <finer> than olive oil itself (but olive oil is extended to a greater extent than
water because of stickiness; water is uncohesive, which is why it is more difficult
to preserve water in the hand than olive oil)’.
298. It is however more easily confined than air in Alexander’s view (cf.
36,1-4).
299. 441a27-9: ‘Since water itself alone when being heated is not apparent as
becoming dense, it is clear that there would be some other cause. For all flavours
possess density to a greater extent. But the hot is a contributory cause.’
300. The treatise is not extant. For the title cf. Diogenes Laertius, 5.45. It is
elsewhere referred to as ‘On Waters’ (cf. FHSG I, p. 282). The same principle of
flavour passing through earth is found in Theophrastus, CP 6.1. For the differ-
ences noted in springs and wells cf. Alex. in Meteor. 88,24 ff.
301. GC 2.3, 331a3-6. Cf. also Alex. Quaest. 1.6.
302. 441b12-13: ‘Nothing by nature acts and is affected qua fire and qua earth,
and nothing else either.’
303. cf. Cat. 5, 3b24-5.
304. This account of the Stoics and the Platonists reflects the Stoics’ own view
that Plato was committed to a belief in the causal efficacy of incorporeals which
they themselves rejected (Long/Sedley, I, 272-3). Alexander gives the same ac-
count of the Aristotelian position at de Anima 7,9-14.
305. 441b15-19: ‘And so just as those who wash colours and flavours off in the
moist cause the water to possess <colour or flavour> of this sort, so too nature
<does with> what is dry and earthy, and passing <the moist> through what is dry
and earthy and moving <it> with the hot it produces in the moist a certain quality.’
306. At 441b7-10 (cf. 72,7-11).
307. At 441a18-20 (cf. 70,6-16).
308. DA 2.5, 417a2-14. See also n. 23.
309. 441b22-3: ‘For perceiving is not analogous to learning but to contemplat-
ing.’
310. Reading pathous hôs in the lacuna in 75,23 (Wendland).
311. Alexander is here referring to the process by which rain is formed: the
action of the sun causes the moisture on the earth to evaporate (the ‘waters that
are boiled’) and rise up as vapour which becomes water when cooled and falls as
rain (cf. Meteor. 1.9, 346b20-35). For the remarks on different types of rain see in
Meteor. 84,4 ff.
312. Sens. 5, 442b28-9.
313. A reference to the Pythagorean method which arranged opposing princi-
ples in parallel columns (e.g. limit-unlimited, light-darkness etc.). Cf. Aristotle,
Metaph. 1.5, 986a22-7.
314. Sens. 4, 441a3. See 67,1-9.
315. The connate heat or breath is a vital principle in animals, based in the
heart, that holds them together and gives them strength (see MA 10, 703a9-24).
For its relation to Aristotle’s psychology see Nussbaum 1978, 143-64, Freudenthal
1996.
178 Notes to pages 78-86
316. The nutritive soul (cf. n. 3) uses the connate heat to digest food (DA 2.4,
416b28-9).
317. Alexander does not mean the connate heat here. He means merely that
the heat in any nourishment (one of its tangible affections) is something other than
its flavour (its tasteable affection).
318. GC 1.5, 322a25-8.
319. Reading êi for esti in 78,24 (Thurot).
320. Sens. 4, 441b10-12.
321. GC 1.5. There is no chapter in the GA which provides the specific discus-
sion referred to here.
322. Reading entetheisês for enetheisês in 80,3 (Thurot).
323. Reading proskrinomenon for trephon in 80,8 (Wendland).
324. Meteor. 2.3. Cf. in Meteor. 81,17-87,23.
325. Sens. 4, 442a17-18: ‘the salt and the bitter are almost the same’.
326. Alexander’s uncertain and improbable interpretation of 442a21-2 (‘if one
postulates, as is reasonable, that grey is a black’). The problem is that, having
listed eight colours and eight flavours, Aristotle has apparently merged grey with
black whilst denying (see n. 325) the identity of salt and bitter.
327. A reference to 442a20-5 (‘For there are seven species of both if one
postulates, as is reasonable, that grey is a black. For it remains that yellow is
<part> of white just as the oily is of the sweet, and red and purple and green and
blue are between white and black, and the others are mixed out of these.’)
328. Reading in the lacuna in 81,26 men liparon kai to gluku diairoiê, sun-
titheiê de to (Wendland, but with gluku for hêdu).
329. Reading, for mête in 82,1, ê amphotera and adding kai ta deutera before
kai (Wendland).
330. Alexander has already (at 10,1-2) referred to the (lost) commentary on the
De Sensu by Aspasius (see n. 60). Another Aristotelian commentator, contempo-
rary with Aspasius, was Adrastus of Aphrodisias (see H.P.F. Mercken 1990,
404-43, esp. 421).
331. For the charge that the efflux theory reduces vision to touch see also
56,6-23.
332. The effluxes from the white, sweet, fragrant etc. perceptibles.
333. DA 2.6, 418a6-25. For the peculiar/common distinction see n. 2. Aristotle’s
claim at 418a11-16 that the perception of peculiar perceptibles is veridical is
making the point that a sense cannot confuse its object with that of another sense
(cf. Hamlyn 1968b, 106). The claim that perception does not err in e.g. perceiving
that something is white is made at DA 3.3, 427b11-12, 428b18-22, 3.6, 430b29-30
(subject to the qualification at 428b18-22 that such error occurs to the least
possible extent).
334. The variation to which Alexander refers is not known. The manuscripts
show one consistent text (cf. Wendland, ad loc.).
335. Reading in the lacuna at 86,19 ou gar enantia tauta, hoti (Thurot).
336. Wendland (ad loc.) detects a reference to Cael. 1.4. But the arguments
presented at 270b32-271a33 against the possibility of a movement opposite to
circular movement do not amount to a demonstration (cf. L. Elders 1966, 98 and
S. Leggatt 1995, 185) and do not in any case yield the conclusion which Alexander
here describes.
337. For Theophrastus’ Historia Plantarum see Sharples 1988, 60 n. 81. The
flavour of plant juices is dealt with in book IX. Aristotle’s lost treatise On Plants
is referred to at HA 5.2, 539a20-1 and GA 1.23, 731a29-30.
 Notes to pages 86-92 179
338. Most manuscripts of Aristotle read ‘what the dry produces in the moist’
as does Alexander at 90,5.
339. See 73,31-74,27.
340. ‘Transodorant’ translates diosmos, a word formed by analogy with dia-
phanês (transparent) (see n. 105). Whether this coinage originates with Alexander
is uncertain. But note that Philoponus (in DA 354,12 ff.) attributes the usage to
Theophrastus and that Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeus attributes a parallel term
diêkhes (‘transsonic’) to Aristotle.
341. 442b29-443a2: ‘We give to these the common term, the transparent, but
[the smellable] is smellable not qua what is transparent but qua what is able to
wash and cleanse dryness which has flavour’ , i.e. in so far as it is transodorant (cf.
de Anima 51,19-20 and 53,14-15).
342. In defending Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency in attributing
smell to both moisture with flavour and dryness with flavour Alexander exagger-
ates their equivalence. For the moist in water acquires flavour permanently by
absorbing the nature of the dry in earth (cf. 74,17-18) whereas the dry in earth has
no flavour other than the flavour temporarily imparted to it by the admixture of
moisture with flavour (cf. 74,14-27).
343. The hard-shelled include sea-anemones, limpets, the purple murex, and
sea-turtles (cf. HA 8.2, 590a19-b9). The purple murex is mentioned amongst
animals that perceive food by its smell at Sens. 5, 444b13.
344. Reading luthôsi for lutheien in 90,14 (Usener).
345. PA 3.7, 670a129-30.
346. The word hugros can mean fluid or moist (see Greek-English Index for
citations). Air is clearly fluid rather than moist but I have preferred the latter here
in order to be consistent with the rest of the passage.
347. 443a8-9: ‘It is clear from the things that possess smell and the things that
do not that the affection is from what has flavour.’
348. Both salt (sodium chloride) and washing soda (sodium carbonate) are
found in natural deposits. Alexander implies (cf. 91,7-8) that exudation arises
naturally in salt but later commentators (e.g. W.D. Ross 1955, 213-14; G.R.T. Ross
1906, 181) take Aristotle to mean an artificial process.
349. The argument at 443a8-21, introduced by Alexander as showing that
smell is generated from (and therefore follows after) flavour (cf. 90,21-3), has in
fact emphasised that smell and flavour co-exist. This problem is solved by stipu-
lating (cf. 92,1-9) that smell and flavour exist at the same time but in different
bodies.
350. This is the same thing as dryness with flavour (cf. 89,21-2).
351. Reading in the lacuna at 92,9 osmês dektikon, osphranton houtô gino-
menon (Wendland).
352. Alexander means that air and water as media for the perception of smell
do not themselves possess flavour.
353. The ‘moist bodies’ are air (cf. n. 346) and water, bodies which were
described as transodorant by analogy with transparent bodies at 88,18-89,5.
354. cf. 57,1-2.
355. cf. 82,21-87,4 (commenting on Sens. 4, 442a29-b26).
356. Reading hupo tês enkhumou xêrotêtos paskhein ti in the lacuna in 94,7
(Wendland).
357. GC 2.3, 330b4, 331a5.
358. Reading kôluonta for duo onta in 95,9 (Wendland).
359. The smell is accidentally pleasant because it is only indirectly the cause
of pleasure, the direct cause being the nourishment (cf. n. 76).
180 Notes to pages 92-107
360. Reading autês for autôn in 96,9 (Wendland).
361. A comic poet contemporary with Euripides whose work parodied tragic
drama generally and included travesties of Euripides’ Medea and Phoenissae (cf.
Webster, 19).
362. Reading to apoton hêmin for ton apo tôn khumôn in 97,7 (Thurot) and
placing a comma after rather than before muron.
363. Reading tôi aph’hou for tôn aph’hôn in 99,8 (Wendland).
364. Reading parekhontai for dekhontai in 99,9 (Diels).
365. cf. 98,25-99,9.
366. Placing te in 100,1 after ergôi in 99,27 and omitting kai in 100,1 (Thurot).
367. Reading aisthanetai for aisthanontai in 100,12.13 (Wendland).
368. Reading osphrêsamena for osphrêsan in 101,16 (Wendland).
369. Reading auton for auta in 101,19 (Wendland).
370. Transposing kai peri tên opsin to follow horatai in 102,10.11 (Wendland).
371. Omitting ti in 103,3 (Thurot).
372. DA 2.9, 421a9-10.
373. Adding allôn after tôn in 104,10 (Wendland).
374. Reading hautê for autôn in 104,27 (Thurot).
375. Reading threptikôn for geustikôn in 105,1 (Thurot).
376. DA 2.10, 422a8.
377. 445a13-a14: ‘Because of this it is reasonable that it has been described by
analogy as a sort of dipping and washing of dryness in the moist and fluid.’
378. Reading enapoplunomenôi for plunonti in 105,17 (Wendland).
379. cf. 95,17-23.
380. Reading an eidê for anankê in 106,24 (Thurot).
381. Given that the sense of touch involves more than one of the four elements
(see n. 49) the statement at DA 3.12, 434b19 that nourishment is a tangible might
be taken to imply that no one element can be nourishment. The point is explicit at
GC 2.8, 335a10-14.
382. An argument a fortiori: if water does not nourish then a fortiori air does
not nourish.
383. cf. Sens. 5, 443b20-b21, 95,17-96,8, and n. 359.
384. cf. Sens. 5, 444a8-15, and 98,12-99,15.
385. DA 2.11 deals with tangibles but does not describe them as coming about
in combination with a touching, the conjectured reading of 109,21 (see n. 384),
which may rather be a reference to the doctrine of DA 3.2, 426a15-26 (cf. n. 196).
386. Reading ginetai sunkrimati tês hapseôs for gar sunkrima toutou opsesi in
109,21 (Diels).
387. See n. 133.
388. The construction of coloured from colourless magnitudes is associated by
Alexander with the Epicurean school (cf. 112,20-3, Quaest. I 13, n. 264).
389. The view that mathematical objects (i.e. triangles etc. in abstraction)
have real rather than thought-dependent existence is Platonic (cf. Metaph. 1.6,
987b14-18, in Metaph. 52,10-25).
390. Reading hôs for hôn and adunata for dunata in 113,1 (Diels).
391. Phys. 6.1, 231a21-232a22.
392. Sens. 3, 440b23-25 (65,22-66,6), Sens. 4, 442b21-22 (86,23-87,4).
393. 445b23-29 (discussed at 113,24-116,6).
394. 445b29-446a4 (discussed at 116,7-117,9).
395. It is not clear what usefulness Alexander has in mind here since, as he
himself points out (cf. 114,20-115,17), the question of whether there are an infinite
variety of perceptible affections is connected with the quite distinct question of
 Notes to pages 107-111 181
whether perceptible affections can be divided to infinity only by confusing the
division of continua (magnitudes and, derivatively, the perceptible affections of
magnitudes) with the division of non-continua (perceptible species).
396. An. Post. 1.19-22.
397. On Alexander’s account it is the second demonstration that resolves the
difficulty, by distinguishing what is potentially perceptible from what is actually
perceptible. See nn. 399, 400, 401, 403, 404.
398. Phys. 8.8, 263a4-b9.
399. 445b29-446a4: ‘And so, since affections must be spoken of as species, and
continuity is present always in these [affections], one should take it as agreed that
the potentially and the actually are different. And because of this the ten thou-
sandth part of the millet-seed that is being seen escapes detection even though
sight has encountered it, and the sound in the quarter-tone escapes detection even
though [hearing] hears the whole melody, it being a continuum. But the interval
of that which is intermediate to the extremes escapes detection.’
400. 446a4-15: ‘Similarly the small [parts] in the other perceptibles [escape
detection] altogether. For [they are] potentially visible, but not actually [visible]
when they are not apart. For the foot-length is present potentially in the two-foot-
length but [is present] actually when already removed. But it is reasonable that,
when separated, sufficiently small excesses would be dissolved into the [bodies]
that surround [them], just as a tiny flavour [is] when poured into the sea. But,
since the excess of the sense is not perceptible [aisthêtê] by itself, nor separable (for
the excess is potentially present in the more accurate [sense]), so it will not be
possible to perceive the equally small perceptible when [it is] actually separable.
Nevertheless it will be perceptible. For it is already potentially [so] and will be
actually [so] when added.’
401. The foot-length and the two-foot-length should be thought of as bodies
respectively one foot and two feet in length (with their width and breadth ignored).
A two-foot-body (2F) could be divided into two new one-foot-bodies (two 1Fs).
Before such a division is made the two 1Fs do not exist actually by themselves but
have a potential existence in the sense that the possibility of their actual existence
is already present in the 2F. To conclude, as Alexander does, that the two 1Fs prior
to division are not actually perceptible one must assume that the actual percepti-
bility of something requires that it exists by itself as a separate body. Such an
assumption appears questionable and it is not surprising that Alexander offers
another version (at 118,23-119,10) of the distinction between what is actually
perceptible and what is potentially perceptible.
402. Reading epeisi goun for epei oun in 188,12.13 (Wendland).
403. Reading oude dunamei for ouden in 118,22 (Wendland). The suggestion
here that Aristotle is arguing that the excess will preserve the potential percepti-
bility it enjoyed when part of a millet seed but without being actually perceptible
since it is too small sits awkwardly with the account of the actually perceptible/
potentially perceptible distinction we have just been given (cf. 111,9-10). For it is
difficult to see why the part of the millet seed which becomes detached preserves
its potential perceptibility if that perceptibility is to be construed as a potentiality
that is derived from the fact that, as a part, it had only a potential existence within
the whole. For if it has ex hypothesi survived separation off from the whole it must
be presumed to have undergone a promotion from potential to actual existence
with a corresponding elevation of its perceptibility from potential to actual.
404. Alexander’s second account of the actually perceptible/potentially percep-
tible distinction relies on drawing an analogy between perceptions and percep-
tibles: a slight increase in the accuracy of a perception involves the addition of a
182 Notes to pages 112-119
perceptive potentiality but not a further actual perception and similarly a corre-
sponding increase in the perceptibility of a body does not involve the addition of
anything that would be actually perceptible on its own. The excess which contrib-
utes to the perceptibility of the whole body of which it is part is not actually
perceptible on its own but is potentially perceptible in the sense that it makes the
aforesaid contribution.
405. Reading di’ hênômenôn for di’ hôn in 119,25 (Wendland).
406. Reading presbutera hê for hê hustera in 120,8 (Wendland).
407. Reading meros tou for meros autou in 122,13 (Wendland).
408. Diodorus Cronus, who was active around 300 BC, was an influential
defender of atomism. Sorabji (1983, 345-7), takes the reference to him here,
together with 172,28-173,1, as evidence of an argument in favour of postulating
atomic differences in magnitude.
409. For the adherents of efflux theories see 24,16-21 and 56,6-16.
410. DA 2.7, 419a22-35.
411. I have not tried to complete the lacuna in 125,1 and I have left hoti and
gar in the same line untranslated.
412. The idea that sounds are transmitted because of the generation of shapes
(skhêmata) in the air, which Aristotle alludes to at Sens. 6, 446b6, is not present
in Aristotle’s account of hearing in DA 2.8 (cf. Accattino-Donini 1996, 201). The
theory was probably a later development in the Peripatetic school as it is men-
tioned in the ps.Aristotelian treatise peri akoustôn (perhaps by Theophrastus or
one of his pupils, see Gottschalk 1968). The use of the terminology in Alexander’s
own account of hearing at de Anima 48,7-21 and 50,12-18 has been seen as
modifying the Aristotelian account (cf. J.A. Towey 1991, 13-16; Sorabji 1991).
413. Strato of Lampsacus, head of the Aristotelian school from c. 287 to 269 BC.
This reference is fragment 114 Werhli. For Alexander’s rejection of tension as an
explanation of difference of colour see 53,2-5. His own use of tension in his account
of hearing (de Anima 50,18-24) (explaining how the primary sense-organ measures
the distance of the sound) may explain why his attitude here to Strato’s tension
theory of sound is more open-minded. The details of Strato’s theory are unclear.
But Repici (1988, 24 and 45, n. 110) goes too far in equating the inequality of the
blow with the relaxation of the tension.
414. Reading ginetai for gineta in 126,23.
415. Reading kai oukh hôs tou horan ouk ontos tôn pros ti in the lacuna in
127,23 (Thurot).
416. Aristotle at 446b9-13 apparently rejects the view that seeing can be
explained as a relational state. Since Alexander regards both the propagation of
light and the visual process itself as relational changes (see n. 109) his preferred
explanation is that Aristotle is only ruling out relational states not dependent
upon position. Cf. also n. 102.
417. In reading toutôn (‘of these’) for amphoterôn (‘of both’) at 447b15 Alexan-
der departs from the version given in the manuscripts (cf. Wendland, ad loc.)
whereas what he describes as an alternative reading at 129,8-9 conforms in this
respect with the manuscript tradition.
418. The significance of the alternatives for Alexander does not lie in the
replacement of amphoterôn by toutôn (see n. 417) since, as 129,2 makes clear, these
alternatives have the same reference, i.e. air and water. The point is rather that,
whilst both alternatives say the same thing, on the first alternative Aristotle’s all’
homôs (‘but nevertheless’) gives an emphasis, which is absent from the second
alternative, to the fact that the movement involved in sounding and smelling
involves time-lapse (in contrast to the change involved in the visual process).
 Notes to pages 119-126 183
419. The contents of the brackets are my suggestion for what is missing in the
lacuna in 129,9. I have not translated tôi in that line.
420. Reading kata for ta and tên for kata in 129,11 (Wendland).
421. Alexander means that they announce the same sound, smell etc. to
different perceivers in respect of different parts of the medium.
422. Reading aisthanetai for aisthanesthai in 130,24 (Wendland).
423. DA 2.7, 418b18-20. For the relational nature of light cf. 31,11-18, 52,10-
12, de Anima 42,19-43,4, Mant. 141,29-147,25.
424. Coming to be other than ‘by means of a coming to be’ is best understood
by distinguishing coming to be generally (which applies to anything coming into
existence) from the full-blooded coming to be which is marked by a stage in time
at which what is coming into existence exists in part only (cf. 125,12-15). For
example, although it takes time for me to assume a position to the left of a line of
people, the property of being on the right of me takes no time to spread from one
member of the line to the others. The line’s coming to be on the right lacks the
interruptibility characteristic of full-blooded coming to be. For Alexander’s denial
of imperceptible times see 146,1-156,22.
425. Reading hôs deon for eis de in 132,18 (Diels).
426. 446b29-447a1: ‘For locomotions reasonably arrive first in the medium
(and sound seems to be a movement of something travelling) but it is not the same
with things that undergo alteration.’
427. Adding hêtis after kinêsis in 132,21 (Wendland).
428. For Alexander’s use of this idea in relation to hearing see J.A. Towey, op.
cit., 13-16.
429. Reading ho kai for ê in 134,2 (Wendland).
430. Phys. 6.4, 234b10-20.
431. Reading esmen, all’ou khumôn oude pephuke paskhein hupo pantos
hugrou in the lacuna in 135,4 (Thurot).
432. Adding ho before edêlôsen in 135,18 (Wendland).
433. It should be noted that the whole of the commentary from 135,23 to
145,25, which explicates Aristotle’s argument at 447a12-448a19, is defending a
position, the impossibility of two simultaneous perceptions, which is ultimately
rejected (cf. 146,3-7, 157,1-3).
434. See n. 245.
435. Reading tôi for hôs in 137,12 (Thurot).
436. Reading holôs allogenôn for holôn elattonôn in 137,12 (Wendland).
437. cf. 136,12-14.
438. There is a lacuna in 137,26 which I have not attempted to fill. See next
note.
439. Reading toutois for touto in 137,26 (Wendland). The lacuna (cf. n. 438) and
the awkward syntax give cause for suspicion: there is a possibility that a marginal
note explaining touto was inserted into the text, perhaps after the lemma dropped
out. palin 137,1 is puzzling. (Ed.)
440. Reading ti hê elattôn for tên elattô in 138,3 (Wendland).
441. Reading haplê men gar aisthêsis ouk an eiê for hapla men gar ex isou kan
eien in 138,5 (Wendland).
442. According to 64,11-15 blending (krasis) is mixture in the strict sense
(total fusion as distinct from juxtaposition) and applies only to fluids. Alexander
does not accept the Stoic distinction between blending and fusion whereby blended
constituents retain their original properties and can be separated out again (cf.
Mixt. 216,14-217,2).
443. See 137,7-10.
184 Notes to pages 127-133
444. cf. 108,5-6 and n. 382.
445. Elsewhere (cf. 113,25-114,10, 142,12, 166,21-22) Alexander regards the
perceptibles peculiar to one sense modality as forming a single genus (e.g. colour)
made up of a limited number of different species (white, black etc.) But Aristotle
uses ‘species’ to mean genus at 447b25 (cf. 141,10-12) and Alexander is presumably
following this loose usage (cf. 141,18-19).
446. Reading tôi mêketi einai for aei in 140,23 (Wendland).
447. cf. 447b29 (‘But [a sense judges] each of the things that are opposite in a
different way.’)
448. Alexander seems to mean that one of the pair of opposites is a state of
possessing whiteness (cf. n. 43) and the other is a state of being deprived of
whiteness. Black has no whiteness at all unlike the intermediate colours (cf.
142,25-7).
449. See 142,25-7.
450. The musical concord made up of the two notes which span a fifth and
which are sounded by the middle and the highest string on the seven-stringed
lyre.
451. See n. 245.
452. Reading touto for to in 145,23 (Thurot).
453. See 131,21-132,16.
454. The musical theorists have been identified with Archytas of Tarentum
(active in the early fourth century BC) (cf. Timpanaro Cardini, II 330). Archytas’
theory that notes of different pitch are produced by movements of different speed
might be taken to imply that a musical concord is heard by hearing different notes
with an imperceptible time-lapse although this does not appear to be true of Plato’s
version of the theory (cf. Timaeus 79D10-80B8). More compelling is the suggestion
(Isnardi Parente 1982, 317) that the target is Xenocrates (head of the Academy
339-314 BC). For Xenocrates in the passage referred to illustrates the existence of
imperceptible times in hearing by a visual example (a cone with a black spot which
is seen as a black line when the cone spins) and this builds up the perception of a
line from successive perceptions of the black spot in the same way in which on the
images theory (cf. 146,23-4) perception of the image is built up from image
fragments (cf. 60,1-7). Against this identification is the fact that Xenocrates’ theory
addresses sounds generally and is not specifically about musical concords.
455. I follow the suggestion of W.D. Ross (1955) 231, that kai ei aisthanetai in
448a30 should be excised as a dittography.
456. This passage is the first of two arguments which Aristotle deploys against
imperceptible times, the second (at 448a30-b12) being an argument also against
imperceptible magnitudes.
457. cf. 62,5-6. It is debatable whether Aristotle is as committed to the rejec-
tion of imperceptible times as Alexander suggests. The view that there are imper-
ceptible times is relevant as explaining apparently simultaneous perceptions on
the assumption that simultaneous perceptions are impossible. But Aristotle’s view
is that simultaneous perceptions are possible (cf. n. 433) and this implies that in
the present context imperceptible times are unnecessary but not impossible.
Aristotle’s doctrine at Phys. 6.6, 237a26-28, that any process of change takes place
during an infinitely divisible period of time and incorporates within its duration
an infinity of distinct lesser processes suggests, given his acceptance at 446a4-15
that if magnitudes are infinitely divisible there will be imperceptible magnitudes
(cf. 117,10-120,11), that Aristotle accepts that there are imperceptibly small
processes and imperceptibly small periods of time in which those processes occur.
Cf. also Phys. 4.13, 222b14-15.
 Notes to pages 134-141 185
458. Elsewhere (cf. Sorabji 1983, 28) Alexander distinguishes time in itself,
which is unitary, from time as it exists in our thoughts, which is divisible into a
plurality of times. No weight is placed on this distinction here.
459. This account of what an imperceptible time is loses sight of what, on
Alexander’s analysis, Aristotle’s argument is meant to show if 62,5-6 is taken as
referring forward to 448a24-b12. On Alexander’s analysis Aristotle will disprove
the existence of the imperceptible times required by the efflux theory of vision
described at 60,1-17. But that theory requires imperceptible times in which a
perception does come about (cf. 60,4-5,15-17) even if the perceiver is not conscious
of it as a distinct perception.
460. This makes explicit the assumption implicit in Aristotle’s argument that
all perception is conscious perception. Since the imperceptible times required by
the efflux theory house unconscious perceptions (see previous note) Alexander
appears to be begging the question.
461. Alexander has in mind the defenders of the efflux theory of vision (cf.
59,21-8). The sense in which the doctrine of imperceptible times and the doctrine
of imperceptible magnitudes ‘follow’ each other is unclear.
462. Alexander’s own summary of the second argument continues to 150,9 at
which point he reverts to commentary.
463. Reading alêthôs for alêthes in 149,18 (Wendland).
464. As summarised here by Alexander the second argument shows the ab-
surd consequence of postulating times or magnitudes that make no contribution
to the perception of the whole of which they are parts. It is therefore no more
effective against the efflux theory than the first argument (cf. n. 313). Cf. Inwood
1991, 160: ‘Both arguments seem to ignore the fact that two or more imperceptible
times might together constitute a perceptible time.’ This objection does not apply
to Alexander’s own argument at 154,19-22. Cf. n. 472.
465. Punctuating with a comma after tini in 150,13.
466. Alexander is explaining why Aristotle uses the feminine gender (tên holên,
tautês) in reference to a magnitude and a time, the Greek nouns for which are neuter
(megethos) and masculine (khronos) respectively. The explanation here appears to rely
on the fact that the Greek noun for line (grammê) is feminine in gender whereas at
152,14-23 it relies on the fact that the Greek noun for extension (diastasis) is feminine.
467. Reading to GB suntelei ti sunêmmenon tôi khronôi ei en for to sunêm-
menon tôi khronôi en in 152,3 (Wendland). The MSS have suneilêmmenon.
468. Reading ou gar for ouk in 152,5 (Wendland).
469. Reading GB for B in 152,5 (Wendland).
470. Reading ou gar hôs in the lacuna in 153,27 and adding tis after dunatai
in the same line (Wendland).
471. Reading kai tis diaphora in the lacuna in 154,13 (Wendland).
472. Alexander adds his own argument against imperceptible times. This
relies on the idea that two imperceptible times cannot be present at the same time
and consequently rules out the possibility of their contributing to the perceptibility
of some larger whole in the manner envisaged for magnitudes at 119,1-7 (cf. n.
404). This feature makes it more relevant to the efflux theory than the first
argument (cf. n. 459 and n. 464).
473. Sens. 6, 445b31-446a15. Cf. 116,7-121,4. A part of a perceptible magni-
tude which is imperceptible by its nature is a part which makes no contribution to
the perception of the whole magnitude (cf. n. 464).
474. Alexander seems to refer back to Sens. 6, 445b31-446a3 even though, as
interpreted by Alexander, this makes the separate point that sight sees the ten
thousandth part of the millet-seed because it sees the whole seed.
186 Notes to pages 141-150
475. cf. 116,23-117,9 and 118,12-13.
476. Sens. 6, 445b10-11. Cf. 110,20-21.
477. Cf. 136,2-6.
478. Omitting allêla in 157,7.
479. Alexander assumes (cf. 147,5-9) that a time is perceptible because a
perception comes about in it. The question is whether two or more perceptions can
come about in one perceptible time.
480. Reading atomôi for atomôs in 157,17 (Wendland).
481. Ross (1955, 232) regards ou tôi atomôi as ‘no doubt a dittograph of houtôs
atomôi’.
482. Reading alêthês, legei for, legôn in 158,1 (Wendland/Thurot).
483. By ‘in this way’ Alexander means the perception of several things each
with a different part of the soul. If the things perceived were all visibles (‘several
things that are the same in species’) there would have to be for each item seen a
distinct visual faculty of the soul (‘several sights the same in species as each
other’). For the use of the term ‘species’ to refer to the genus of visibles see n. 445.
484. The suggestion that the soul is like two eyes (448b26-7).
485. The point that the two eyes are a single capacity (448b27-8) whereas the
soul which perceives several things with different parts ex hypothesi comprises
several capacities (448b28-9).
486. Adding an before anêiroun in 160,22 (Wendland).
487. The opinion that the soul perceives different things with different parts.
488. 449a2-5: ‘449a2 But if [the soul] perceives this (touto) in one indivisible
[time] clearly [it perceives] the others also. For it would be able [to perceive]
several of these at the same time to a greater degree than [several] things different
in genus.’
489. Sens. 7, 448a13-18. Cf. 144,22-4.
490. Reading touto in the lacuna in 161,22 (Wendland).
491. See n. 489.
492. Sens. 7, 448b23-5. Cf. 158,6-16.
493. I have not tried to fill the first lacuna in 162,15. I have omitted ei gar and
read allou, allôi de in the second lacuna and read allou for allôs in the same line.
494. W.D. Ross reads all’ anankê hen at 449a7: ‘But it is necessarily one’.
495. DA 3.2, 426b17-23. Cf. de Anima 60,19-61,3.
496. Reading legei de, ei anankê hama allêlois in the lacuna in 163,23 (Wend-
land).
497. See n. 495.
498. DA 3.2, 427a9-16.
499. As 165,17-20 makes clear Alexander here means the centre of a circle
where many radii converge. He is thus building on Aristotle’s idea of a point
dividing one line (cf. Sharples, 1994, 135-6 who compares this passage with de
Anima 63,8-13 and Quaest. 3.9, 96,14-18).
500. Sens. 7, 449a7. Cf. 163,3-5.
501. See n. 495.
502. DA 3.2, 426b8-17. For the example of the apple cf. de Anima 30,26-31,6
(arguing for the unity of the soul as a whole).
503. The essence (to ti ên einai) of a thing consists of its essential properties
(cf. n. 133). At 112,10-14 Alexander ascribed to intellect rather than perception the
role of differentiating the essences of perceptibles.
504. 449a16-20: ‘Therefore one should postulate that in the same way with
reference to the soul that which is perceptive of all [perceptibles] is numerically
one and the same but its being is different in relation to some [objects] in genus
 Notes to pages 150-152 187
and in relation to others in species. Consequently it would perceive at the same
time with what is one and the same thing but not the same in account.’
505. I have replaced pôs with a circumflex accent at 167,6 with pôs without a
circumflex accent. The ‘commanding faculty’ (to hêgemonikon) is the Stoic term for
the centre of consciousness which was located, like Alexander’s common sense (cf.
n. 73), in the heart. The idea criticised here that the commanding faculty cannot
have different perceptions at the same time had already been criticised within the
Stoic school by Chrysippus (280-206 BC) (cf. Sext. Emp., Adv. math. 7. 227-8 = SVF
II.56). Alexander’s point may have more to do with the Stoic theory of tensional
movement (tonikê kinêsis). As applied to the commanding faculty this involved two
movements, one towards the centre which produced the unity of consciousness,
and the other towards the sense-organs producing the differentiation of percep-
tibles (cf. Sambursky, 1959, 30). Alexander’s criticism of this theory (Mant. 130,14
ff.) on the grounds that we are not aware of interruptions in perception suggests
that he understood the tensional movements involved to be successive rather than
simultaneous.
506. If Alexander means by ‘On the Soul’ his own treatise (rather than his lost
commentary on Aristotle’s treatise) it is not clear what passage he has in mind.
There is no explicit statement in that work that memory, unlike perception, can
judge that two perceptibles differ from each other. Wendland (ad loc.) suggests a
reference to de Anima 62,22-63,4 but this passage makes no mention of memory,
a subject which Alexander in fact excludes from detailed discussion (cf. de Anima
69,19-20). Alexander’s description of memory and recollection as activities involv-
ing a residue of a perception (de Anima 69,17-19) might be taken to imply the
distinction between memory and perception to which Alexander here refers.
507. Reading hê dunamis hê aisthêtikê tês psukhês for hêde psukhê in 168,2
(Thurot).
508. Omitting gar in 168,4.
509. For 167,21-168,5 cf. de Anima 64,11-20, Quaest. 3.9, 97,25-35.
510. Sens. 7, 448b13-15. Cf. 155,20-156,5.
511. 449a20-31: ‘It is clear that every perceptible is a magnitude and there is
not an indivisible perceptible. For the distance from which [the visible] would not
be seen is infinite but [the distance] from which it is seen is limited. And the same
also applies to the smellable, the audible, and all the things [perceivers] perceive
without touching them. There is some ultimate [boundary] of the distance from
which it is not seen, and [some] first [boundary] from which it is seen. This, beyond
which, if [a visible] exists, it cannot be perceived and on this side [of which] it must
be perceived, must be indivisible. If there is an indivisible perceptible, when it is
placed on the ultimate [boundary] from which it is last imperceptible and first
perceptible, it will be at the same time visible and invisible. This is impossible.’
512. At 168,16-169,4 Alexander gives his analysis of the first stage [449a21-5]
of Aristotle’s proof that every perceptible is divisible: since there is from a per-
ceiver’s point of view a furthest distance from which a visible object can be seen
and a nearest distance from which it is invisible there must be a furthest boundary
(fb) from which it can be seen and a nearest boundary (nb) from which it cannot be
seen.
513. Adding ouk ap’allou after horômenon kai in 169,6 and adding kai aph’hou
oukh horatai after horatai in the same line (Wendland). While I cannot do better
than this conjectural reconstruction I must point out that it presents a difficulty
in that Alexander appears to treat as obvious at 169,5-7 the point that he will
demonstrate at 169,12-170,9, namely that fb and nb must coincide. He is presum-
ably at this stage simply reflecting the fact that at 449a24-8 Aristotle asserts the
188 Notes to pages 153-155
same point without demonstration. A further difficulty is that Alexander does not
appear to be aware of the dilemma that if fb and nb coincide the object will be both
visible and invisible but if they do not coincide, the object will be neither visible
nor invisible in the gap between fb and nb (cf. Sorabji 1983, 346).
514. At 169,5-170,9 Alexander gives his analysis (and defence) of the second
stage [449a26-8] of Aristotle’s proof: fb and nb coincide and cannot be separated by
a gap.
515. Reading horaton to for to horan oukh in 170,21 (Wendland).
516. Reading ekeino for ekeinou in 170,28 (Wendland).
517. At 170,10-171,5 Alexander gives his analysis of the final stage [449a28-
31] of Aristotle’s proof: if there were an indivisible perceptible it would fit exactly
on the indivisible fb/nb with the impossible consequence that it is simultaneously
visible and invisible. Alexander’s suggestion at 170,27-171,4 that this consequence
will not arise for divisible perceptibles is challenged by R.R.K. Sorabji, op. cit., 416:
‘ the problem which Aristotle has raised will apply not only to an approaching
point but also to  an extended surface  We can ask, as before: what is the
nearest distance at which the surface is still invisible, and what the furthest at
which it is invisible?’
518. For Alexander there is a furthest boundary from which the visible can be
seen whereas Aristotle talks at 449a24 and 449a25 of the ultimate boundary from
which it cannot be seen.
519. I have not tried to fill the lacunae at 171,21-2 and I have not translated
hama an ti eiê hopôs  ameres legein  hoion te ex amerôn sunekhes ti ginesthai
in those lines.
520. This interpretation appears to be at odds with Sens. 7, 448b14 (cf. 156,4-5,
173,2-3).
521. Phys. 6.1 and 2, especially 231b18-232a17, 233b15-31.
522. Reading horaton in the lacuna in 172,2 (Wendland).
523. See n. 408 and cf. 122,21-3. On one view (Mau 1955, 107, Denyer, 1981,
36-7, Sedley 1977, 87) the argument of Diodorus to which Alexander refers both
here and at 122,21-3 is an argument which draws an analogy between perceiving
something and conceiving of it and derives from the possibility of a perceptible
partless in the sense that, though divisible in reality, it cannot be perceived as
having parts (cf. 173,2-3) the possibility of a body partless in the sense that it
cannot be conceived of as having parts. On another view (Sorabji 1983, 345-7) the
reference is to an argument by Diodorus that a smallest visible size and a largest
invisible size differ from each other by an atomic magnitude, this being a solution
to a dilemma concerning sizes adapted by Diodorus from the dilemma concerning
distances raised by Aristotle’s argument (cf. n. 513).
524. Reading touto megethos in the lacuna at 173,9 (Thurot).
525. Sens. 7, 449b1-3: ‘Sense-organs and perceptibles have been discussed,
how they are both in general and in relation to each sense-organ’.
526. This refers to the two treatises de Memoria and de Somno which are the
next in order in the Parva Naturalia.
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 English-Greek Glossary

abate: paramutheisthai alter, able to: alloiôtikos

able to receive: dektikos alteration: alloiôsis
absence: apousia analogy, describe by: pareikazein
absorb nature of: apolauein ancients: arkhaioi
absurd: atopos angle: gônia
abundance: plêthos animal: zôion
accidentally: kata sumbebêkos animate: empsukhos
accomplish: apotelein announce: diangellein, eisangellein
accompany: parakolouthein apex: koruphê
accurate: akribês appear: phainesthai
accuse: aitiasthai appear in: emphainesthai
act: poiein appear through: diaphainesthai
act, able to: poiêtikos appearance: phantasia, emphasis
action: praxis appearance making: emphanês
active: poiêtikos appetition: orexis
active, be: energein apprehend: antilambanesthai,
activity: energeia katalambanein
actuality: energeia, entelekheia apprehend, able to: antilêptikos,
add: prostithenai, proskrinein, lêptikos
epipherein apprehensible: antilêptos
adjacent, be: geitnian, ekhesthai apprehension: antilêpsis
admit: dekhesthai appropriate: oikeios, prosekhês
advance: proödos argue against: antilegein, epikheirein
advocate (verb): sunêgorein argue for: kataskeuazein
affected, able to be: pathêtikos argument: logos, epikheirêsis, logos
affected, be: paskhein arithmetic: arithmêtikê
affected, being (adv.): pathêtikôs arouse: diegeirein
affected, easily: eupathês art: tekhnê
affection: pathos, pathêma artificial: skeuastos
affection, similar in: homoiopathês ashes: tephra
affection, without: apathês assimilate: prospherein, proskrinein
affinity: oikeiôsis, oikeiotês assimilation: proskrisis
agree: homologein assistance: epikouria
agree with: sunkatatithesthai assistance against, provide: epikourein
air: aer assign: apodidonai
air, make into: exaeroun association: koinônia
akin: oikeios, sungenês astronomy: astrologia
akin, make: oikeioun atom: atomos
alien: allotrios attack: epiboulê, epikheirêsis
all together: athroos attack (verb): epitithesthai
allocate: prosnemein attribute (verb): anapherein,
allow through: diêthein, diïenai anatithenai, anaptein, agein
alter: alloioun, allassein audible: akoustos
192 Indexes
auditory: akoustikos call: onomazein
avoidance: phugê carnivore: sarkophagos
axiom: axiôma case (outer layer): khitôn
cause (noun): aitia
bark: phloios cause (verb): poiein, kinein
barleycorn: krithê cause, contributory: sunaition
base: basis centre: kentron
beat out: elaunein chance (verb): tunkhanein
begin: arkhesthai, hormasthai chance thing: tukhon, to
beginning: arkhê change (noun): metabolê, kinêsis
behind: opisthen change (verb, intrans.): metaballein,
being (noun): ousia hupallattesthai
bell: kôdôn change (verb, trans.): kinein
belong: huparkhein change shape: metaskhêmatizein
beneficial: ôphelimos change, subject to: metablêtikos
birth: genetê character: tropos
bitter: pikros charcoal: anthrax (noun), anthrakôdês
bituminous: asphaltôdês (adj.)
black: melas circle: kuklos
blend: kerannunai, kirnan circumference: periphereia
blending: krasis classify: suntassein
blind: tuphlos cleanse, able to: rhuptikos
block: antiphrattein, episkotein clear: saphês, katharos (of water)
blood: haima cloak: himation
bloodless: anaimos cold (adj.): psukhros
blow: plêgê (noun), pnein (verb) cold (noun): psukhrotês, psukhos
blow up: phusan collect: athroizein
blue: kuanous collide: sumballein
blunt: amblus (adj.), amblunein (verb) colour (noun): khrôma, khroa
blur: sunkhein colour (verb): khrômatizein,
bodily: sômatikos khronnunai
body: sôma column (of opposites): sustoikhia
boil: hepsein combination: sunkrima, sunkrisis,
boiling: hepsêsis sumplokê
bone: ostoun come about: sumbainein
bound (verb): peratoun come into being after: epiginesthai
boundary: peras coming to be: genesis
boundary, without a: apeiros commanding faculty (soul):
brain: enkephalos hêgemonikon
brace: tonoun commensurable: summetros
brackish: halukos commentary, write a:
breath: pneuma hupomnêmatizesthai
breathe in, difficult to: dusanapneustos common: koinos
bright: lampros compact: xumphagês
brilliancy: anthos compare: paraballein, sunkrinein,
brimstone: theion apeikazein
bring: agein comparison: parabolê, analogia
bronze: khalkos complete (verb): sumpleroun
bulk: onkos complete (adj.): teleios, holoklêros
burn: kaiein, katakaiein, proskaiein completion: teleiôsis
burn (incense): thumian compound: sunthetos
compress: sumpilein
 Indexes 193
compression: thlipsis day (adj.): methêmerinos,
concern oneself with: pragmateuesthai meth’hêmeran
conclusion: sumperasma daylight: phôs, hêmera
concoction: pepsis deaf: kôphos
concord (musical): sumphônia death: thanatos
concordant: sumphônos deceived, be: diapseudesthai,
condensation: sustrophê, sustasis apatasthai
condense: sunistanai deficiency: endeia
condition: katastêma define: horizein
cone: kônos definition: horos
confined, easily: euphulaktos deliberate (verb): bouleuesthai
confirm: pistoun, prosbibazein demonstrate: endeiknusthai,
congruent: katallêlos deiknunai
connate: sumphutos demonstrate in conjunction with:
consequence: akolouthon sunapodeiknunai
consist in: einai en demonstration: apodeixis
consist of: einai ek dense: puknos, pakhus
consistency: sustasis density: puknotês
consistency, give: sunistanai dependent upon, be: artasthai
constitution: sustasis deprive: sterein
consume: analiskein, katanaliskein, depth: bathos
apanaliskein destroy: phtheirein, anairein,
contemplate: theôrein diaphtheirein
contemplation, object of: theôrêma destruction: phthora
continuity: sunekheia detach: apartan
contribute: suntelein, sumballesthai detection, escape: lanthanein,
contributory cause: sunaition dialanthanein
contrive: mêkhanasthai determinate: diôrismenos, hôrismenos
convert: antistrephein determine: diorizein
cool: katapsukhein detestable: misêtos
cool, easy to: eupsuktos devise: epimêkhanasthai
cooling: empsuxis difference, make a: diapherein
co-operation, work in: sunergein different in genus: heterogenês,
co-operation, working in: sunergos anomogenês
copy (of a ms.): antigraphon differentiation: diaphora
correlate: sunagein, anagein differentiation, without: adiaphoros
correspond: akolouthein, antikeisthai; difficult to perceive: dusaisthêtos
(grammatically): antapodidosthai difficulties, raise (preliminary):
correspondence: analogia, akolouthia (pro)aporein
correspondent: sustoikhos difficulty: aporia
cover: epikaluptein digest: pessein
covering: epikalumma digestion: pepsis, katergasia
creation: dêmiourgia dilate: aneurunein
criterion: kritêrion diminish: meioun, meiousthai
cube: kubos diminution: meiôsis
cubit, four: tetrapêkhus directly: euthus
discordant: asumphônos
damp: enugros discover: heuriskein
dark: skotôdês discriminate: diaginoskein
darkness: skotos disease: nosos
day: hêmera disgusted at, be: duskherainein
194 Indexes
disharmonious: anarmostos enclose: katheirgein, perilambanein,
disorder: ataxia sunkleiein, eirgein,
disordered: ataktos emperilambanein
dispersal: thrupsis encounter: peripiptein, eperkhesthai
disperse: diakrinein, thruptein, end: telos
diaspeirein, diaphorein enter: eiserkhesthai
dispersed, easily: euthruptos enthusiasm: spoudê
dispersed through, be: diakhein enumerate: katarithmein
dispose: diatithenai environment: periekhon
dissection: anatomê equal, be: isazein
distance: apostasis, apostêma, equal speed, at: isotakhôs
diastasis, diastêma equal strength, of: isosthenês
distinguish: diairein, dialambanein equilateral: isopleuros
distribution: anadosis escape: ekpheugein, diapheugein,
divert: ektrepein diekpiptein
divide: diairein, temnein, merizein escape detection: lanthanein,
divisible: diairetos dialanthanein
division: tomê, diairesis essence: to ti ên einai
divine: theios establish: sunistanai, kathistanai
doctor: iatros evaporated, be: exikmazesthai
doctrine: areskon even: artios
dominant, be: pleonazein everlastingness: aïdiotês
draw: span everyday speech, be used in:
draw in: helkein kathomilein
drink (noun): poma, poton evidence: tekmêrion, marturion
drink, pleasant to: potimos evident: phaneros
drive out: ekkrouein exalted: semnos
drought: aukhmos examination: historia, exetasis
drowsy, be made: karêbarein examine: historein
dry: xêros example: paradeigma
dry up: anaxêrainein excess: huperbolê, huperokhê
dryness: xêrotês excessive, be: pleonazein
due proportion: summetria exchange places with:
dumb: eneos antiperiïstasthai, antimethistasthai
duplicate: diplasiazein exclude: apeirgein, aperukein
dust-cloud: koniortos excluder: apeirktikos
excretion: perittôma
earth: gê exhale: anapnein
earthy: geôdês exist: huphistasthai, einai
easily affected: eupathês existence, real: hupostasis, huparxis
easily destroyed: euphthartos experience: empeiria
easily dispersed: euthruptos explain: exêgeisthai
easily moved: eukinêtos explanation: aitia, logos
easy to capture: halôsimos explanatory: exêgêtikos
easy to cool: eupsuktos extend: apoteinein, diateinein, teinein,
easy to hold: euüpolêptos epekteinein
edible: edôdimos extended, be: diistasthai
educate: paideuein extension: diastasis
efflux: aporrhoia extinguish: aposbennunai,
embrace: periekhein katasbennunai, sbennunai
embryo: embruon extinguishing: aposbesis
extinguishing, capable of: sbestikos
 Indexes 195
extract: eklambanein frankincense: libanôtos
extreme: eskhatos, akros freeze: pêgnunai
exudation: hidrôs freezing: pêxis
exuded, be: exikmazesthai frost: pagos
eye: ophthalmos, opsis, omma fruit: karpos
eye-lid: blepharon fruitlessly: argôs
eyes, shut the: muein fruit of the carob tree: keratia
fume: atmis
faint: ekluesthai function: ergon
fall under: hupopiptein function, subordinate: parergon
false: pseudês fuse (together): sumphuein,
falsehood: pseudos prosphuein
falsely, reason: paralogizesthai fused: sumphuês
fat (noun): pimelê fusion: sumphusis
feed on: nemesthai future: ta mellonta
feminine: thêlukos
fictitious: plasmatôdês general, in: katholou
fig-tree: sukê generated, be: ginesthai
fiery: purôdês gentle: hêmeros
fill up: anapimplanai, anaplêroun genus: genos
find a way: euporein genus, different in: heterogenês,
fine: kalos, leptos anomogenês
fine nature: leptotês genus, same in: homogenês
fire: pur geometry: geômetria
fit: harmozein glass: huelos
fit in: enarmozein glitter: stilbein (verb), stilbêdôn (noun)
five: pente glittering: stilbos
flame: phlox glow-worm: pugolampis
flash: lampein gold: khrusos
flash out: eklampein go through: dierkhesthai
flavour: khumos go together: sunodeuein
flavour, having: enkhumos green: prasinos
flavour, without: akhumos grey: phaios
flesh: sarx grow: auxanesthai
float on the surface: epipolazein growth: auxêsis
flow: rhein, epirrhein, kheisthai growth, cause: auxanein
flow from: aporrhein guard against, be on one’s:
flowing: rheuma prophulattesthai
fluid: hugros, khutos guarding: phulakê
foamy: aphrôdês
follow: hepesthai, akolouthein habit: ethos
fondness for pleasure: philêdonia habitual use: sunêtheia
foot-length: podiaia hair: thrix, trikhes
foot-length, two: dipous hard: sklêros
force: bia (noun), biazein (verb) hard affection: sklêrotês
form: eidos hard-eyed: sklêrophthalmos
form, give: eidopoiein hard-shelled: ostrakodermos
form, of bodily: sômatôdês hard to accept: dusparadektos
foul-smelling: dusôdês hare: lagôs
four cubit: tetrapêkhus harmful: blaberos
fragrance: euôdia harmonize: harmozein
fragrant: euôdês harsh: austêros
196 Indexes
health: hugieia infelicity: akairia
healthy: hugieinos infinite: apeiros
hear: akouein injury: plêgê
hear, able to: akoustikos inquire into: theôrein
hearing: akoê inquiry: pragmateia, theôria,
heat: thermainein (verb), thermotês, episkepsis, historia
kauma (noun) insects: entoma
heaven: ouranos insensible to cold: arrigos
heavy: barus instantaneous: akhronos
heavy shower: epombria intellect: nous
heed: têrein intelligent: phronimos
help: boêtheia, boêthêsis intelligible: noêtos
high (sound): oxus intense: suntonos
hold: iskhein intensification: epitasis
hold back: antispan interchangeable: parallêlos
hold, easy to: euüpolêptos intermediate: metaxu, hêmigenês
hold of, lay: ephaptesthai interpenetrated, being fully: holôn di’
hold together: sunekhein holôn trepomenôn
honey: meli interpret: akouein
horn: keras interrupt: diairein
hot: thermos interrupted, be: dialeipein
interval: diastêma
ignorant of, be: agnoein introduce: eisagein
illuminate: phôtizein investigate: zêtein
image: eikôn, eidôlon investigation: zêtêsis
imagination: phantasia invisible: aoratos
imaginative: phantastikos invite: parakalein
impact: prosbolê iron: sidêros
impinge: prosballein, prospiptein isolate: monoun
impede: empodizein isolation, in: monos
imperceptibility: anaisthêsia isosceles: isoskelês
imperceptible: anaisthêtos,
anepaisthêtos join together: sunaptein, harmozein
impression: phantasia judge (verb): krinein, epikrinein
inactivity: argia judgement: krisis
inanimate: apsukhos juice: khulos
inclination: rhopê juxtapose: tithenai para, paratithenai
include: perilambanein juxtaposition: parathesis
include in the account:
sumperilambanein keep: têrein
incommensurability: asummetria keep in: stegein
incommensurable: asummetros keep off: kôluein
incomplete: atelês kind: genos
increase: auxanein kind, of every: pantodapos
indemonstrable: anapodeiktos knowledge: epistêmê
indeterminate: aoristos known, become: gnôrizesthai
indigestion: apepsia
indistinct: adêlos laid down, be: keisthai
individually: kat’ idian lamp: lukhnos
indivisible: adiairetos, atomos lampholder: lukhnoukhos
ineffectual: kenos language, speaking the same:
inequality: anisotês homophônos
 Indexes 197
lantern: lamptêr mining, get by: metalleuein
large: megas minimal: elakhistos
last: teleutaios mirror: katoptron
lay down beforehand: prokataballein mist: akhlus
leaf: phullon mistaken, be: hamartanein
leak out: diapneisthai mix: mignunai
learn: manthanein mixable: miktos
learning (noun): mathêsis mixed: miktos
leave: kataleipein mix in: enkatamignunai
letter: gramma, stoikheion mixture: mixis, migma
lid: pôma mix with: paramignunai
life: zôê moderate (adj.): summetros
life, way of: anastrophê moist: hugros
light (noun): phôs moisten: anugrainein
light (adj.): kouphos moisture: hugrotês
light, bring to: phainein moisture, saturate with: exugrainein
light, come to: phainesthai move: kinein
light, having the form of: phôtoeidês moved easily: eukinêtos
lightness: kouphotês movement: kinêsis
limit (noun): horos movement, causing: kinêtikos
limit (verb): perainein, horizein musical concord: sumphônia
line: grammê musical inquiry: harmonikê
linen: othonê musical instrument: organon
liquid: tholos
locomotion: phora nail: onux
locomotion, be in: pheresthai name: onomazein
look: anablepein, apoblepein narrow: stenos
look at: blepein natural: phusikos, autophuês
lose: apoballein natural philosopher: phusikos
loose-textured: araios nature: phusis
low: barus nature, be by: pephukenai
lung: pneumôn navigation: kubernêtikê
lustrous: enargês necessity: anankê, khreia
neck: trakhêlos
magnitude: megethos need: deisthai, prosdeisthai
make: poiein need of, be in: endein
malnutrition: apepsia new born: neognos
mathematical: mathêmatikos night: nux
mathematician(s): mathêmatikos, hoi night, at: nuktôr
apo tôn mathêmatôn northerly winds: boreia
matter: hulê nose: rhis, rhines
mean: legein note (musical): phthongos
measure: anametrein, katametrein, note (musical), lowest: nêtê
parametrein note (musical), highest: hupatê
medical: iatrikos nourish: trephein
medium: metaxu, meson nourishing process: threpsis
melody: melos nourishment: trophê
memory: mnêmê number: arithmos, plêthos
mention: mnêmoneuein, numerically: arithmôi, kat’ arithmon
epimimnêiskesthai
messenger service: diakonia obliged, be: opheilein
mica: speklon obscure (adj.): aphanês
198 Indexes
obscure (verb): aphanizein perceive in conjunction with:
observation: thea sunaisthanesthai
observe: paratêrein perceive well, able to: euaisthêtos
obvious: enargês, enargeia perceptible: aisthêtos
occupy: katekhein perception: aisthêsis
occur: eperkhesthai perception, joint: sunaisthêsis
odd: perittos perception, without: anaisthêtos
oil: liparotês, elaion perceptive: aisthêtikos
oily: liparos perceptive part, primary: prôton
Olympic games: ta Olumpia aisthêtikon
one: heis, mia, hen perfume: muron
opinion: doxa perishing: phthora
oppose: enistasthai persist: hupomenein
opposed, be: antikeisthai persuade: anapeithein
opposite: enantios, hupenantios, pestilential: loimôdês
antikeimenos, antikrus philosopher: philosophos
opposition: enantiôsis, enantiotês physical: phusikos
optics: optikê (sc. theôria) pigeon: peristera
order (verb): tattein pile: sôros
origin: arkhê place (noun): khôra, topos
organ: organon place (verb): tithenai
outdo: pleonektein place, in respect of: topikôs
outstanding, be: diapherein placed, be: keisthai
overcome: kratein plant: phuton, botanê
overpower: katiskhuein, plausible: pithanos, endoxos
katergazesthai plausible arguments, make:
pithanologein
pain: lupê pleasant: hêdus
painful: lupêros pleasure: hêdone
painting over: epaleipsis pleasure, fondness for: philêdonia
paint under: hupaleiphein poetic: poiêtikos
painter: grapheus polygonal: polugônios
pair: suzugia position: thesis
paradoxical: paradoxos possess: ekhein, iskhein
parch: katakaiein possession: hexis
parenthesis: meson postulate: tithenai, tithesthai,
part: morion, meros poiein
partless: amerês potentiality: dunamis
parts, divide into: merizein potentially: dunamei
parts, having similar: homoiomerês pour: khein
parts, without similar: anomoiomerês pour forth: prokhein
partake of: metekhein pour in: enkhein
particulars: kath’ hekasta pour out: ekkhein
pass (verb): khôrein, parerkhesthai, pouring out: ekkhusis
poreuesthai power: dunamis
passage: poros, parodos praise: epainein
passing through: diêthêsis predicate (verb): katêgorein
pass through: diêthein, diêtheisthai predominance: huperokhê
peculiar: idios predominate: huperekhein
perceive: aisthanesthai pre-eminently (adv.): prôtôs
perceive, difficult to: dusaisthêtos prepare: paraskeuazein
perceive in advance: proaisthanesthai presence: parousia
 Indexes 199
present, be: huparkhein, pareinai, quantity: poson, posotês
enuparkhein quarter-tone: diesis
present before, be: proüparkhein
present together, be: sunuparkhein rain: hudôr (noun), ombrios (adj.)
presented, be: parapheresthai rain, fall down in: huesthai
preservation: sôtêria raised, keep: apokaluptein
preservative: phulaktikos, sôstikos raise up: anagein
preserve: sôzein, phulassein rapid: takhus
prevent: kôluein rapidity: takhos
primarily: proêgoumenôs, prôtôs rarity: manotês
primary: prôtos ratio: analogia
primeval: ôgugios rational: logikos
principal: kurios ray: aktis
principle: arkhê reach: kathêkein
privation: sterêsis reason (noun): logos
proceed: proienai, diexienai reason falsely: paralogizesthai
process: kinêsis reasonable: eulogos
process, nourishing: threpsis reasonably: eikotôs
produce: apogennan, gennan, reason, without: alogos
paraskeuazein, poiein reason, beyond: paralogos
produce, able to: gennêtikos, poiêtikos receive: dekhesthai, hupodekhesthai
pronunciation: prophora receive, able to: dektikos
proof: pistis reciprocal replacement: antiperistasis
proper: oikeios recognise: gnôrizein
property: idion red: phoinikous, eruthros
prophecy: mantikê refer: ekpherein, anapherein
proportion: logos, analogia reference: anaphora
proportion, due: summetria reflection: anaklasis
proportionate: summetros refute: elenkhein
propose: protithesthai regularity: homalotês
protect: skepein reject: apokrinein
protrusion: exokhê related to, be: ekhein pôs pros
prove: prosbibazein relation: skhesis
provide: parekhein relax: ekluein
proximate: prosekhês release: luein
proximity: geitniasis remain: menein, diamenein, leipesthai
pungent: drimus remain behind: hupomenein
pupil (of eye): korê, kourê remaining: loipos (adj.), monê (noun)
pure: katharos, eilikrinês remind: hupomimnêiskein
purity: eilikrineia removal: aphairêsis
purple: halourgos remove: apoballein, aphairein,
purpose: prothesis khôrizein, periairein
pursue: diôkein remove in conjunction: sunkhôrizein
push aside: paragein resistance: antitupia
push forward: proôthein resolve: luein, analuein
putrefy: diasêpesthai resolution: lusis
putrid: sapros respiration: anapnoê
putting together: sunthesis respiratory organ: anapneustikon
respire: anapnein
quadruped: tetrapoun respire, able to: anapneustikos
qualification, without: haplôs responsible: aitios
quality: poiotês, poion responsible, hold: aitiasthai
200 Indexes
rest: stasis seem: dokein
rest, be at: hêsukhazein, êremein select (verb): prokheirizesthai
result (verb): sumbainein, apobainein selenite, of: phengitês
result, be the: periginesthai send out: ekpempein
return: epanodos (noun), sense (noun): aisthêsis
epanerkhesthai (verb) sense-organ: aisthêterion, aisthêsis
reveal: mênuein separable: khôristos
reveal, able to: mênutikos separate (verb): khôrizein, diakrinein
ridicule: skôptein separated, be: diïstasthai
right (angle): orthos separate off: apokrinein
right, in their own: kath’ hauta separating off: apokrisis
rightwards: dexios sequence: akolouthon
ring (verb): êkhein serpent: ophis
ringing (noun): êkhos set out: ektithesthai
ripe, become: pepainesthai shameful: aiskhros
ripen: pessein, pessesthai shape (noun): skhêma
ripening: pepsis shape (verb): skhêmatizein
rise: anatellein shape, change: metaskhêmatizein
rise quickly: anatrekhein shape, having similar:
rough: trakhus homoiomorphos, homoioskhêmôn
roughness: trakhutês share: moira
round: kukloterês, peripherês share, have: koinônein, meteinai (with
round-eyed: kuklops dative)
root: rhiza sharp: oxus
rot: sêpesthai (verb), sêpsis (noun) sharp-smelling: oxôdês
route: hodos sheen: augê
rubbing: tripsis show: deiknunai
rust: ios shower, heavy: epombria
shut up, hard to: dusapolêptos
salt: hales (noun), halmuros (adj.) sight: opsis
same in genus: homogenês sign (noun): sêmeion
same in species: homoeidês significant: sêmantikos
sameness: tautotês signify: sêmainein
sap: dakruon silver: arguros
satiate: korennunai, plêroun similar: homoios
satiating: proskorês similar in affection: homoiopathês
satisfied with, be: areskesthai similar shape, having:
saturate with moisture: exugrainein homoiomorphos, homoioskhêmôn
scalene: skalênos similarity: homoiotês
scantiness: oligotês simple: haplous
scatter: skedannunai simple-minded: euêthês
science: epistêmê sinew: neuron
seasoning: hêdusma skin: derma
secrete: ekkrinein skin, thin: humên
separation: ekkrisis slackening: anesis
see: horan slag: skôria
see, able to: horatikos sleep (noun): hupnos
see x through y: dioran sleep (verb): koimasthai
see through (adj.): dioptos slip through: diaduesthai
seed: sperma slow: bradus
seed-aggregate: pansperma small: mikros, brakhus
seek: zêtein smallness: mikrotês
 Indexes 201
smell (noun): osmê, osphrêsis strength: iskhus
smell (verb): osphrainesthai strengthen: bebaioun
smell, able to: osphrantikos stretch: teinein
smell, guided by the: huposmos stretching: tasis
smell, without: aosmos strictly: kuriôs
smellable: osphrantos, osphrêtos strike: krouein, plessein
smelling: osphrêsis striking: plêgê
smoke: kapnos strive: glikhesthai
smoke, sooty: aithalê strong: iskhuros
smoky: kapnôdês substance: ousia
smooth: leios subtle: glaphuros
smoothness: leiotês succession, take over in: diadekhesthai
snow: khiôn succession, in: ana meros
sodium carbonate: nitron succumb: haliskesthai
soft: malakos sufficient: hikanos, autarkês
softened, able to be: malaktos sufficient, be: arkein, exarkein,
solid: stereos apokhrênai
solidity: stereotês suitability: epitêdeiotês
soot: asbolê suitable: epitêdeios
sooty smoke: aithalê summarise: sunkephalaioun,
soothing: prosênês anakephalaiousthai
soul: psukhê superimpose: epitithesthai,
soul, of the: psukhikos epiprostithesthai
sound (noun): phthongos, psophos superimposition: epiprosthesis,
sound (adj.): hugiês epipolasis
sound, able to: psophêtikos supervene on: akolouthein
sour: struphnos supplies: khorêgia
southerly winds: notia supply: khorêgein
species: eidos suppose: hupotithesthai,
specifically: idiôs hupolambanein
speech: logos surface: epiphaneia
speed, at equal: isotakhôs surface, float on the: epipolazein
spiritedness: thumos surpass: huperballein
splash: prosklusis surround: periekhein, perikeisthai
spring (water): krênê sweet: glukus
stand firm: antereidein sweetness: glukutês
stand, make to: histanai sweep away: parasurein
standstill, bring to a: histanai symbol: sumbolon
star: astron
startling: plêktikos take: lambanein, ekdekhesthai
starting-point: arkhê take as agreed: lambanein,
state: hexis prolambanein
state, be in a certain: ekhein pôs take in: lambanein
steam: atmis take on: anadekhesthai
stickiness: gliskhrotês taking in: lêpsis
stimulate: muôpizein talk: lalein
stir up: anatarassein tangible: haptos
stomach: koilia taste (noun): geusis
stone: lithos taste (verb): geuesthai
straight line: eutheia, euthuôria taste, capable of: geustikos
straight line with, in a: kata tastable: geustos
stream: rheuma, pêgê teach: didaskein
202 Indexes
tear asunder: diaspan underlie: hupokeisthai
temperate: eukratos understand: ginôskein, sunienai,
temple (building): naos prosupakouein
temple (side of the head): krotaphos understanding: gnôsis, sunesis
ten thousandth: muriostos understood: gnôrimos
tend: boulesthai undigested: apeptos
tension: tonos unequal: anisos
text: lexis, graphê unfrozen: apêktos
theatre: theatron unite: henoun
thin skin: humên unity: to hen
thing: pragma universal: koinos, katholou
think: oiesthai, noein universe: kosmos
thought: epinoia unmixable: amiktos
time: khronos unmixed: amigês, amiktos
tin: kassiteros unpleasant: aêdês
tongue: glôtta unprotected: askepastos
tortoise-shell: khelônion unreasonable: alogos
touch (noun): haphê unripe: apeptos
touch (verb): haptesthai unripeness: apepsia
touching (noun): hapsis unsettled: rheustos
transfer: metapherein (verb), unstable: euripistos
metaphora (noun) unwholesome: nosôdês
transmit: diadidonai, metadidonai, upwards, travel: anapheresthai
diapempein useful: khrêsimos
transmission: diadosis use (noun): khrêsis
transodorant: diosmos utterance: phônê
transparency: diaphaneia
transparent: diaphanês vapour: anathumiasis
transparent, be: diaphainein vaporise: atmizein
travel (verb): pheresthai various: poikilos
travel together: sunodeuein, vein: phlebion, phleps
summetapheresthai verb: rhêma
travel upwards: anapheresthai verse: epos
triangle: trigônon violent: sphodros, biaios
trouble: enokhlein vine: ampelos
troublesome: mokhthêros visible: horaton
true: alêthês visual: horatikos
trunk: premnon voice: phônê
trust: pisteuein void: kenon
truth: alêtheia
truth, speak the: alêtheuein wake: egeiresthai
turn (verb): trepesthai waking: egrêgorsis
turn away from: apostrephesthai walk: badizein
turned away, be: parapheresthai war: polemos
warm: thalpein (verb)
ultimate: eskhatos wash, able to: plutikos
unappetising: abrôtos wash off: apoplunein
unblended: akratos wash off in: enapoplunein
unclear: asaphês, adêlos washing off: apoplusis
uncohesive: psathuros watch: têrein
uncovered, keep: apokaluptein water: hudôr (noun), hudreuein (verb)
undergo: lambanein watery: hudatôdês
 Indexes 203
way: tropos winter: kheimôn
way, find a: euporein wipe off: apomattein
way of life: anastrophê wisdom: phronêsis
weak: asthenês within: en
weak, be: exasthenein witness, bear: marturein
weakness: astheneia wood, piece of: xulon
weary, grow: kamnein word: logos, onoma
weigh down: barein work at: ergazesthai
well-being: eu, to work in co-operation: sunergein
wheat-grain: puros working in co-operation: sunergos
white: leukos wound: titrôskein
whole: holon, pas write: graphein
whole, the: to pan write a commentary:
widen: platunesthai hupomnêmatizesthai
wind: anemos, pneuma
winds, northerly: boreia year: eniautos
winds, southerly: notia yellow: xanthos
wine: oinos youth: neotês
wine-skin: askos
 Greek-English Index

adiaphoros, without differentiation, akolouthia, correspondence, 98,5.7

70,18 akolouthon, consequence, 14,3;
agnoein, be ignorant of, 15,11.12 103,17; sequence, 13,19
adiairetos, indivisible, 64,2.7; passim akouein, hear, 12,5; passim;
adunatos, impossible, 9,13; passim interpret, 10,1; 171,26
aêdês, unpleasant, 54,21; 96,8.9.11; akoustikos, auditory, 13,12; 160,24;
99,7; 103,1.3.6.18.19; 104,15 167,5; able to hear, 37,10
aêr, air, 15,1.4; passim akoustos, audible, 13,9.20.21; 37,18;
aïdiotês, everlastingness, 11,20 95,18; 105,8; 117,10; 129,4; 164,1
aiskhros, shameful, 12,2.3 akratos, unblended, 136,13.16
aisthanesthai, perceive, 1,8; passim akribeia, accuracy, 119,10
aisthêsis, perception, sense, 1,7; akribês, accurate, 8,29; 67,6; 79,14;
passim 85,17; 86,3; 118,23-5.28;
aisthêtêrion, sense-organ, 1,11; 119,2.8-10.12.16; 136,19
passim; prôton aisthêtikon, akros, extreme, 26,27; 27,1.3; 34,14;
primary perceptive part, 59,13 36,10.20; 37,3; 81,5.9; 144,2.5
aisthêtos, perceptible, 1,10; passim aktis, ray, 28,2.4; 29,2.4.9.18; 30,2;
aithalê, sooty smoke, 93,3 124,15
aitia, cause, 13,13; 14,1; 18,4; 20,16; alêtheia, truth, 11,21; 65,7
24,27; 32,15; 35,11; 51,11; 52,6; alêthês, true, 26,8.10; 62,5; 63,19;
54,22; 57,4; 59,28; 65,5.22.25; 66,5; 134,6; 149,16.18.20.24.28;
70,20; 71,7; 93,13; 95,5; 101,15; 153,20.21.23.25.26; 154,25; 155,19;
120,13.16; 136,22; 146,25; 147,12; 167,16.25.26; 168,14
153,5; 155,3; 156,6.10; 163,5; alêtheuein, speak the truth, 84,9;
explanation, 2,13; 6,8; 9,19; 14,16; 149,14
15,11; 20,24; 26,14; 33,3; 36,8; allassein, alter, 69,21; 74,21
66,21; 67,4; 80,6; 98,13; 104,9 alloiôsis, alteration, 129,21; 132,20;
aitiasthai, hold responsible, 18,13; 133,1.3.5.7.12.13.16.20; 134,6.11
23,7; 56,13; 59,18; 61,20; 93,13; alloiôtikos, able to alter, 75,3.6.24;
accuse, 70,20; 74,22; 82,24 76,28; 77,2
aition, cause, 11,22; 16,9.19; 20,2; alloioun, alter, 21,16; 33,5; 74,11;
71,14; 92,5.11; 104,10 75,7; 133,9.11; 134,2-5.12; 135,10
aitios, responsible, 8,1; passim alogos, unreasonable, 27,20.27; 32,1;
akairia, infelicity, 97,3 33,19; without reason, 4,6
akhronos, instantaneous, 135,14.15 amblunein, render blunt (verb), 95,7
akhumos, without flavour, 67,10.11; amblus, blunt (adj.), 84,14.22; 86,10
89,20; 90,23.24; 91,9.11.13.19; amegethês, without magnitude, 20,1
92,6.8.10 amerês, partless, 149,3; 168,12;
akoê, hearing, 11,3; passim 170,12.17.23; 171,1.4.19.22-5;
akolouthein, follow, 61,20.23; 62,4; 172,1.2.18.28; 173,2.4.5.7.9
63,25; 77,27; 96,4.14; 137,26; 140,2; amigês, unmixed, 136,13; 137,14
145,1; correspond, 95,25; supervene amiktos, unmixable, 137,9.25; 140,7;
on, 102,18; 163,23; unmixed, 76,4; 91,3; 107,22
 Indexes 205
anadekhesthai, take on, 42,27; anatellein, rise, 124,16
50,17.20 anathumiasis, vapour, 7,26;
anagein, raise up, 76,4.11; correlate, 38,5.6.8.9; 39,13; 40,10; 76,4.6;
15,6 79,23; 80,1.9; 92,17.21.25.26.28;
anairein, destroy, 27,24; 28,14; 93,1.2.8.10.11.16.19.21.23.28;
146,14; 147,22; 149,28.29; 160,22; 98,20; 103,11; 105,20; 108,20
161,13; 169,26; 170,1; 172,4 anatithenai, attribute (verb), 37,9;
anaisthêsia, imperceptibility, 147,2 38,13.16; 39,22; 70,20; 74,12; 85,4
anaisthêtos, imperceptible, 59,20; anatomê, dissection, 27,11; 35,27
passim; without perception, 39,27 Anaxagoras, Anaxagoras, 68,9
anakephaloiousthai, summarise, anemos, wind, 57,10.11.26-8; 28,28
173,11 anepaisthêtos, imperceptible,
anaklasis, reflection, 20,7.9; 122,7.9.10.13.16-18.20.22; 146,9;
25,1.6.8.9.11.17.19.20.27.28; 27,27 155,21.23; 173,8
analiskein, consume, 28,18; 57,1; anesis, slackening, 53,3
93,20 aneurunein, dilate, 101,20
analogia, proportion, 53,1; anisotês, inequality, 126,22
54,2.5.18.21; 55,26; 80,26; 81,1; anoignunai, open (verb), 100,4; 102,8
100,8; 102,25; correspondence, anomogenês, of different genera,
94,26.28; ratio, 65,14; 143,25; 145,14.17.18; 161,9.12.14.20.25;
comparison, 98,14 163,22; 165,17; 167,17
analuein, resolve, 28,22; 76,15; anomoiomerês, without similar
117,25; 118,4.5 parts, 64,2
Analutika (hustera), (Aristotle’s) anomoios, dissimilar, 21,2.16; 33,4
Posterior Analytics, 114,11 antapodidosthai, correspond
anametrein, measure (verb), 58,1 grammatically, 43,10
anamignunai, mix together, 80,13.18 anthos, flower, 38,7; 96,23; 98,1;
anamnêsis, recollection, 8,4 102,26; brilliancy, 50,11
anankê, necessity, necessary, 9,1; anthrax, charcoal (noun), 21,22;
passim 22,14; 103,8
anapherein, refer, 10,1; attribute anthrôpos, human being, 64,3.6.8.10;
(verb), 14,23 97,11; 98,12.14.19; 99,10.16;
anapheresthai, travel upwards, 100,6-8.17; 101,2; 102,21.24; 103,8;
80,8; 98,20; 99,20 104,8.17; 106,15.24; 109,5.11
anaphora, reference, 96,7; 97,14; antidiairein, distinguish from, 48,18
98,10; 102,19; 106,10; 162,24 antigraphon, copy (noun), 101,4
anapnein, respire, 29,19; 90,15.16; antilambanesthai, apprehend, 8,12;
99,19.27; 100,1-3.11.12.14.20.23.24; passim
101,8.11.18.21.22.23; 102,1-3.5-7; antikeimenos, opposite, 22,21; 40,23;
107,20; 108,20.23; exhale, 66,16 102,28
anapneustikon, to respiratory antikeisthai, correspond, 40,6
organ, 100,16 antikrus, opposite, 30,13; outright,
anapnoê, respiration, 6,24; 29,29; 105,16
90,8; 99,20; 100,16.17; 101,1; 102,4; antilegein, argue against, 20,18;
103,9; peri anapnoês, (Aristotle’s) 24,12.23; 28,12; 35,3; 67,19
On Respiration, 6,18 antilêpsis, apprehension, 10,19;
anapodeiktos, indemonstrable, 4,20 passim
anaptein, attribute (verb), 69,9 antilêptikos, able to apprehend,
anarmostos, disharmonious, 54,14 10,4; passim
anaspan, draw up, 76,7 antilêptos, apprehendible, 41,19;
anastrophê, way of life, 109,7 45,12
anatarassein, stir up, 108,1
206 Indexes
antimethistasthai, exchange places apodeixis, demonstration, 4,21; 140,7
with, 29,17 apokaluptein, keep raised,
antiperiïstasthai, exchange places 102,11.13; keep uncovered, 101,19
with, 29,20.22.25.26 apokhrênai, be sufficient, 100,23
antiperistasis, reciprocal apokrinein, separate off, 57,9;
replacement, 29,15.16.20.24 108,10; 154,2; reject, 78,7
antiphrattein, block (verb), 46,15; apokrisis, separating off, 57,2; 107,17
47,2 apolauein, absorb nature of, 72,6.16;
antiproskrinesthai, be added to in 74,4.17; 93,25
exchange, 57,2 apomattein, wipe off, 66,24; 74,19
antispan, hold back, 80,18 apoplunein, wash off, 74,3; 88,16;
antistrephein, convert (verb), 89,13
140,21; 161,15 apoplusis, washing off, 94,13.15
antistrophê, conversion, 20,4 aporein, raise a difficulty, 16,8;
antitupia, resistance, 40,14; 78,16 passim
anugrainein, moisten, 76,21 aporia, difficulty, 16,5.7.10; 109,22;
aoratos, invisible, 53,19; passim 113,23; 114,23.25; 123,3.15.24;
aoristos, indeterminate, 45,8.18.23; 130,2.5.10; 135,23.26; 159,24;
47,2.3; 48,14.16.17.19.21; 50,8.16; 165,21
51,10.12.15; 52,9.12; 53,13 aporrhein, flow from, 24,4.19; 29,9;
aosmos, without smell, 90,23.24; 30,22; 31,21.22; 56,12.20;
91,9.11.13.19.21.23.25; 93,7 57,6.15.17.21.25; 58,21.25;
apanaliskein, consume, 28,25 59,4.18.23; 107,13; 123,19; 124,7
apantan, meet, 30,19 aporrho(i)a, efflux, 23,7; passim
apartan, detach, 36,19 aposbennunai, extinguish,
apatasthai, be deceived, 84,23.24 21,2.19.21.24; 22,11.12.15.17.24;
apathês, without affection, 111,16.22; 31,7; 36,25
112,1.17.21.24; 113,12; 119,19; apostasis, distance, 50,19
120,14.17.18.23; 122,1; 155,23 apostêma, distance, 61,2; 62,27;
apeikazein, compare, 23,10 83,22; 168,30; 171,6.7.10; 172,10
apeirgein, exclude, 23,13.16 apostrephesthai, turn away from,
aperukein, exclude, 23,18.20 12,21
apeiros, infinite, 65,23; passim; apoteinein, extend, 28,2.3.24; 32,2.4.6
without a boundary, 44,11; 48,1 apotelein, accomplish, 55,18; exercise
apepsia, indigestion, 78,8.9; to the full, 86,15
unripeness, 99,8 apotemnein, cut off, 21,16; 33,4;
apeptos, unripe, 69,26; 70,14; 36,23.25
undigested, 91,16 apousia, absence, 43,7; 47,19; 53,5;
aphairein, remove, 69,17; passim 78,18
aphairesis, removal, 69,21; apsukhos, inanimate, 26,6
122,7.9.11.16 araios, loose-textured, 105,22
aphanizein, obscure (verb), 95,7.8; areskesthai, be satisfied with,
136,22-4; 137,4.17; 138,3.5; 39,17.25
139,3.5.8 areskon, doctrine, 38,14
aphikneisthai, arrive, 59,26.27; 60,1; argia, inactivity, 7,21
123,1.15.18; 126,18; 146,2.19 argôs, fruitlessly, 72,25
aphistasthai, be removed, 28,19; arguros, silver, 91,2.3
46,13; 50,18; 57,20; 126,14 aristeros, on the left, 134,18
aphrôdês, foamy, 52,22 Aristotelês, Aristotle, 32,1; 73,18;
apienai, depart, 21,15; 33,3; 47,5; 87,11
52,11; 58,16; 134,12.13.16.18 arithmos, number, numerically, 11,9;
apoballein, remove, 64,22; lose, 137,2 passim
 Indexes 207
arkein, be sufficient, 26,23; 101,1 autarkês, sufficient, 36,10; 66,10;
arkhaios, ancient, 56,6.10; 71,22 71,20
arkhê, beginning, 7,2; 14,4; 169,12; autophuês, natural, 98,3
170,15.21-3; 172,8.13.17.21.23; auxanein, cause growth, 78,19;
principle, 2,10; 4,18.19.23.24; 79,12; increase, 119,1; 168,24
6,10.11.26; 7,4; 120,19; auxêsis, growth, 78,6.9.15.18.23.25;
starting-point, 25,24; 32,8.12; 34,7; 79,12.17
41,1; origin, 11,3 axiôma, axiom, 4,20
arkhesthai, begin, 41,1; 67,11;
125,17; 132,14; baphê, dipping, 105,14.15
133,3-5.8.10.12.16.17; 135,6.7; baptein, dip, 105,17
168,24; 169,3; 171,7 barein, weigh down, 7,28
artasthai, be dependent on, 5,27 baros, heaviness, 79,21; 111,5.8
artêria, wind-pipe, 66,17 bebaioun, strengthen, 12,2
artios, even, 143,23-6; 144,11.16.17 bêlos, threshold, kata – 23,22.23
asaphês, unclear, 25,3 (quoting Empedocles)
asbolê, soot, 93,3 bia, force (noun), 31,1; 57,28
asômatos, without (a) body, 28,17; biaios, violent, 28,28
31,10; 33,9.13; 34,10; 73,20.21 biazein, force (verb), 97,6.9
Aspasios, Aspasius, 10,2 biblion, book, 6,17; 82,16; 173,11.12
asphaltôdês, bituminous, 71,28.29; blaberos, harmful, 11,27.28; 13,2
103,11 blepein, look at, 29,18; 55,23; 116,24
astheneia, weakness, 119,24; 122,20 blepharon, eye-lid, 15,18; 17,11; 18,3;
asthenês, weak, 58,15 29,1.3.8; 102,11
astrologia, astronomy, 7,5 boreia, the northerly winds, 76,2.8
astron, star, 11,12; 32,2.4.6; 171,14 botanê, plant, 103,13; 104,2
assumetria, incommensurability, boulesthai, want, 38,13; 74,17; 77,6;
54,25 tend, 67,10
assumetros, incommensurable, 54,10 bouleuesthai, deliberate (verb), 12,1
asumphônos, discordant, 54,15
ataxia, disorder, 54,26 dakruon, sap, 107,13
atelês, incomplete, 3,13 deiknunai, show, demonstrate, 3,4;
athroos, all together, 7,26; 31,25; passim
60,7; 125,27; 132,3.10.14; deiktikos, demonstrative, 25,9; 79,3;
133,2.4.8.12.14.17.18; 153,17; 155,16
134,1.4.6.7.19; 135,16 deisthai, need (verb), 10,17; 79,8;
athroizein, collect, 68,2; 119,23; 87,4; 98,18; 100,10.11; 102,6.8.22;
154,17 104,18; 109,12; 125,14.27; 127,7.10;
atmis, steam, 92,26.28; 93,6.7.28; 128,1.2; 133,1.6
fume, 103,9 deixis, demonstration, 79,16;
atmizein, vaporise, 80,10 113,17.24; 149,5; 150,18; 151,3;
atomos, atom, atomic, indivisible, 156,9; 159,19; 160,25; 168,16;
68,25; 85,7; 112,5.16.18.21; 113,4.6; 170,10; 171,12
114,15; 120,19; 135,24; 136,2; dekhesthai, admit, 19,6; passim;
141,2; 157,5.7.8.17-19.21.22.25; receive, 108,11
158,2.3; 161,4.5.10.22-4; 162,8.10 dektikos, admitting of, able to admit,
atopos, absurd, 9,27; passim 43,16.18; 44,18.22; 45,6; 47,24;
atrophia, malnutrition, 78,9 49,3.23.28; 50,2.4; 51,15; 88,19;
atrophos, devoid of nourishment, 97,5 89,3; 92,6; 135,3; 167,13.17; able to
augê, sheen, 50,8.10.11.17 receive, 10,27; 12,7; 26,2; 68,8;
aukhmos, drought, 76,3.10 108,8.14
austêros, harsh, 81,8; 94,25; 95,21 dêmiourgia, creation, 79,18
208 Indexes
Dêmokritos, Democritus, 15,7; diapempein, transmit, 19,18
24,10.15.23; 25,28; 26,10; 27,21; diapente (musical term), 143,21.22;
56,14; 68,25; 82,21.24; 83,9; 144,16.19
84,7.27; 85,4; 86,25; 124,6 diaphainesthai, appear through,
derma, skin, 18,14; 29,7 55,17
diadekhesthai, take over in diaphainein, be transparent, 128,6
succession, 126,24 diaphaneia, transparency, 26,26;
diadidonai, transmit, 21,14; passim
25,22.24; 32,19.20; 59,11.13; diaphanês, transparent, 18,5; passim
128,24; 129,15; 130,20; 134,23; diapheugein, escape, 67,22; 118,10.13
135,11 diapherein, differ, be different,
diadosis, transmission, 25,15; 128,2; 41,20; passim; make a difference,
129,12; 131,15.22; 132,15; 133,7 89,21; 125,1; 127,19; 130,10;
diaduesthai, slip through, 57,28 131,4.9; be outstanding, 98,2; 102,9
diagein, pass one’s life, 109,6 diaphora, differentiation, 10,8;
diagi(g)nôskein, discriminate, 13,5; passim
92,22; 163,9 diaphorein, disperse, 93,15.17
diairein, divide, 30,11; 63,26; diaphoros, diapheros, different,
64,1.5.6; 97,13.14; 106,12.20; 30,7; passim
109,17; 110,18; 111,13.15.23.27; diaphtheirein, destroy, 27,8
112,17; 113,10.21; 115,5.8.18.19; diapneisthai, leak out, 26,18
116,2.6.7.14; 118,3; diaporein, raise a difficulty, 127,1;
121,10.11.18.20; 122,8; 129,4; 128,7
157,8; 165,7.10.14; 169,16.17; diapseudesthai, be deceived, 84,10
distinguish, 53,9; 111,27; 142,1; diasêpesthai, putrefy, 94,27
160,8; 82,1; 102,17; interrupt, 37,2 diaspan, tear asunder, 58,9
diairesis, division, 4,2; 33,25; 41,26; diaspeirein, disperse, 67,23
114,25; 115,7.9.10 etc.; diastasis, extension, 66,2; 152,16-21;
116,3.4.9.11; 117,22; 120,22; distance, 145,12
121,17.23.24; 122,5; 131,6; 154,12; diastêma, distance, 28,21.23; 30,4;
168,14; 169,14.25 31,24; 50,24; 53,22-4; 57,11.19.23;
diairetos, divisible, 110,4; 113,19; 58,5; 63,9; 84,12; 85,16; 104,16;
116,15.16; 122,7; 124,10; 134,10; 123,4.9.14; 124,13; 126,12.23;
165,6.12; 168,13; 169,12.24; 170,27; 127,20; 128,1; 156,4.8;
173,10 168,18.21.23.25.27-9;
diakhein, be dispersed through, 98,24 169,7.21.22.27.28;
diakonia, messenger service, 25,21 170,6.16.18.20.21.23.25;
diakrinein, distinguish, 171,11.13.15.17.20; 172,3.4.6.9.27;
9,16.18.21.24; 10,24; 85,19; 86,4; 173,5; interval, 117,4.5
99,1; 106,17; disperse, 7,20; 76,15; diastrophos, distorted, 20,13
separate, 69,29 diateinein, extend, 41,3
dialanthanein, escape detection, diatessarôn, 54,13
60,7; 120,23 diatithenai, dispose, 34,7; 41,11;
dialeipein, be interrupted, 146,21; 59,10; 62,21.23; 83,12; 92,12; 99,21;
148,12 123,20; 128,21; 130,28
diamartanein, fail utterly, 20,4 didaskein, teach, 8,31
diamenein, remain, 22,23; 27,14; diegeirein, arouse, 7,20
57,4.5; 93,17 diekpiptein, escape, 23,21
diangellein, announce, 28,10; 130,20 dierkhesthai, go through, 29,6
dianoia, thought, 86,3; 149,5 diesis, quarter-tone, 116,25; 117,2.4
diapasôn (musical term), 54,12; diêthein, pass through (trans.),
136,18; 143,21.24; 144,17 74,6.9; allow through, 21,8
 Indexes 209
diêtheisthai, pass through (intrans.), (Aristotle’s) On Waking and Sleep,
71,25.26.29; 74,18 6,18
diêthêsis, passing through, eidôlon, image, 24,19.22; 26,4; 56,12;
74,10.13.15.24; 94,13.15 57,15.22.24.25.27;
diïenai, allow through, 23,14.17 58,3.4.7.8.10.11.13.15.17.19.20;
diïstasthai, be distant, 27,4; 114,2; 60,4; 62,3; 146,23
138,14.15; be extended, 49,16; 66,2; eidopoiein, give form, 44,27;
be separated, 33,16 72,23.30; 73,24; 78,16
Diodôros, Diodorus, 122,23; 172,29 eidos, species, 2,10; passim; form, 4,9;
dioptos, see through (adj.), 45,12; 24,16; 26,25; 32,20; 35,14; 36,3;
46,17; 47,9 37,21; 41,13; 54,1; 59,11.13;
dioran, see through (verb), 55,26.26 64,21.24; 65,22; 73,25; 112,5.13;
diorizein, determine, 3,1.9; 45,8; 130,18-20
58,17; 97,18; 159,3 eikôn, image, likeness, 133,13
diosmos, transodorant, 89,2 eikotôs, reasonably, 27,6; 46,13;
diplasios, in the ratio of two to one, 103,15
54,6 eilikrinês, pure, 21,6; 67,13; 136,19;
diplasiazein, duplicate (verb), 60,11; 137,17; 139,4
61,18 eilikrineia, purity, 137,1
doxa, opinion, 11,27; passim einai, exist, 1,5; passim
drimus, pungent, 81,7; 94,24 einai (ek), consist of, 14,22;
dunamis, capacity, potentiality, 1,8; 15,7.10.12.16; 16,6.8; 20,17-19;
passim; power, 1,4.6; 3,2.10.14; 24,13; 26,8.1.15.18; 27,7.25; 35,17;
9,25-7; 10,1; 14,6.15; 22,10; 103,11; 37,7.9; 38,12.15.17; 39,9.23.27;
dunamei, potentially, 37,12.17-19; 40,1.4.8; 68,21; 78,14; 79,5; 80,22;
38,2.19-21; 39,1.19; 42,16.18.20; 91,2.5; 92,4.21
51,25; 59,9; 116,14.16-20.22; einai, to, being (noun), 48,6; 50,25;
117,2.12.13.15.18.19.21; 51,27; 73,22.29; 78,16.17; 116,12;
118,7.8.11.20.25; 118,9; 125,4.12
119,1.3.5.16.20.23; 120,5.9; eirgein, enclose, 34,16
132,3.11; 140,16.17 eoikenai, seem reasonable, 53,2;
dunasthai, be able, 10,3; 19,10; 44,3; 93,4; 104,19
47,11; 49,18; 52,11; 53,25; 55,15; eirêsthai, have been said, 42,21.23;
57,13.26; 58,14; 110,11; be possible, 45,21
19,23 eisagein, introduce, 63,18
dusaisthêtos, difficult to perceive, eisangellein, announce, 11,1; 12,18
85,24 eiserkhesthai, enter, 34,11; 58,1
dusanapneustos, difficult to breathe ekdekhesthai, take, 97,9
in, 95,1 ekhein, possess, 8,3; passim; ekhein
duskatapotos, difficult to imbibe, en, have x dependent upon y, 50,25;
95,1 55,7; 116,13; 127,14; 154,16; ekhein
duskherainein, be disgusted at, (pôs) pros, be related to (in some
102,15 way), 112,12; 127,3; 166,20; 167,6;
dusôdês, foul-smelling, 83,24; 91,16; ekhein (pôs), be in a (certain) state,
102,16.28; 103,3.14; 104,2 7,23; 36,19; ekhesthai, be adjacent,
dusôdia, foul smell, 103,16 133,10.22
dusparadektos, hard to accept, 18,18 êkhein, ring (verb), 130,12
êkhos, ringing, 146,20
edôdimos, edible, 69,27 ekkaiein, burn up (trans.), 91,21
egeiresthai, wake, 148,17 ekkhein, pour out, 29,11
egrêgorsis, waking, 5,6; 6,20; 7,19.21; ekkhusis, pouring out, 30,2
peri egrêgorseôs kai hupnou, ekkrisis, separation, 68,10.11; 76,18
210 Indexes
ekkrouein, drive out, 136,8; 137,17.18 enantiôsis, opposition, 45,3; 56,23;
eklambanein, extract (verb), 149,5 66,3; 73,21; 78,5; 83,15;
eklampein, flash out, 15,13; 16,4.9 86,6.9.11-13.22.23; 110,2; 114,4.8;
ekluein, relax, 126,20 115,17; 137,7; 143,22
ekluesthai, faint (verb), 108,24 enantiotês, opposition, 73,11.12;
ekpempein, send out, 20,20.23; 78,3; 86,17
22,16.18.21.24; 23,6.9.10; enapoplunein, wash off in (trans.),
28,7.17.18.20; 29,9.12; 30,11.25; 66,23; 74,1.3.5.8.10; 75,21; 88,14;
31,4.8.10.11.16.17.18.22; 89,14.18; 94,12.18; 105,17
32,5.7.10.11.16-18.22; 33,20; 34,16; enargeia, the obvious, 71,24
59,3 enargês, obvious, 2,19; 8,10; 33,13;
ekpheugein, escape (verb), 53,21; 67,3.12; 104,9; 136,6.14; 156,9;
110,25 157,3.14; 168,17; 169,5.10;
ekpiptein, be deprived of, 119,21; lustrous, 55,19.20
147,19; fall out, 21,2.9 endeia, deficiency, 109,14
ekpnoê, expiration, 6,24 endeiknusthai, demonstrate, 32,4;
ekrhein, flow out, 27,8 146,6
ektithesthai, set out, 67,18.19; 81,4 endoxos, plausible, (reputable) 136,5;
elakhistos, smallest, 85,18.19.24; 157,2
86,3; 122,4.6.12.15.17.21.22; energeia, actuality, 1,9; passim;
minimal, 45,25; 46,6; 63,14.22.26; activity, 2,9.12.13.17.18.21.24;
64,4.9.12.13 3,5.6; 5,2.14.18.23; 7,21; 8,24.28;
elaunein, beat out (of gold), 91,18 14,8.13; 42,17; 101,24; 125,19.25-7;
elenkhein, refute, 158,26 136,11; 139,16.22; 140,9.12.17.22;
embruon, embryo, 27,9 159,1.8.10.11.16;
Empedoklês, Empedocles, 20,14.18; 160,1.4.5.7.8.17-21; 162,6;
23,5; 24,7; 34,15; 56,16; 67,19; 165,7.10.14.16
68,26; 69,10; 70,6; 124,4.15 energein, be active, 8,1; 14,14; 41,12;
empeiria, experience, 11,25 75,14.15; 120,10; 140,17; 148,14;
emperilambanein, enclose, 35,27 159,10.11; 160,3.7; 161,17; 167,9
emphainesthai, appear in, 24,16; enginesthai, be generated in, 19,1;
25,13; be clear in, 48,18; 168,4 70,2; 72,6; 74,25; 75,4.12.21; 78,26;
emphanês, appearance-making, 90,19; 134,13.14; 135,9.11; come to
26,22.24; 36,2 be in, 124,12
emphasis, appearance, 20,10.11; eniautos, year, 147,18; 151,13.14.19;
24,11.15-17.22.24.25-7; 153,2
25,5.6.8.9.11.15.17.19.26-8; enistasthai, oppose, 27,23; raise
26,2.6.7.25 objections to, 69,11
empiplanai, fill up completely, 46,10 enkatamignunai, mix in, 67,21;
empiptein, fall on, 24,20; 31,28; 74,27; 76,16
56,13.21; 57,11.21.22; 58,7.8; 60,16; enkatamixis, mixing in (noun),
62,1.3; 83,12 74,26; 75,26; 76,13
empodizein, impede, 8,1; 57,8; 136,7; enkephalos, brain, 7,27; 38,18.19.23;
137,11 39,6.11.12.18; 40,6.8.20.23.25.27;
emprosthen, in front, 127,25 41,1.3.4.6; 98,24; 99,20; 100,8;
empsukhos, animate (adj.), 2,8.16; 102,23.25; 109,11
3,21; 4,12.16; 8,8 enkhumos, having flavour, 67,14.23;
empsuxis, cooling (noun), 100,2.12 72,8.9; 74,12; 88,6;
emptôsis, falling on (noun), 60,5.6; 89,8.12.14.16.21; 90,6.18.19.22;
83,4; 146,23 92,1.3.5.7.9.10; 93,26; 94,4.14.18;
enaimos, supplied with blood, 95,5; 96,5; 105,13; 135,4
27,13.15; 99,18 ennoein, think of, 136,10
 Indexes 211
ennoia, conception, 11,5.10.20; 12,2 epiprosthêsis, superimposition, 61,9;
entelekheia, actuality, 2,15; 35,15; 62,12; 63,5
42,25; 166,17 epiprostithenai, superimpose, 65,18
entoma, insects, 100,21 epirhein, flow (verb), 98,21
enuparkhein, be present, 70,2; episkepsis, inquiry, 3,18
73,12; 76,18.20; 99,6.8; 119,2; 120,4 episkotein, block (verb), 18,14; 137,18
epagôgos, inducer, 21,18 epistêmê, knowledge, 12,11; 13,11;
epainein, praise (verb), 24,13 75,13.15; 159,21.28.29; 160,26.27;
epaleiphein, paint over, 55,19; 62,18 science, 12,5
epegeirein, awaken, 101,20 epistrephein, attend to, 57,18
epekeina, on the far side, 29,6; epitasis, intensification, 53,3
beyond, 169,26 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 44,26;
eperkhesthai, encounter, 116,23; 68,15.28
118,12; 156,13; occur to, 26,3 epitetmêmenôs, in an abridged
epharmozein, fit onto, 170,13.14; manner, 150,18
171,1; 172,18 epithumein, desire (verb), 96,8
epiboulê, attack (noun), 10,21 epithumia, desire (noun), 5,21.26;
epiginesthai, come into being after, 7,11; 96,24
11,2 epitithenai, place on, 83,20; 101,19
epikaluptein, draw down, 15,18; epitithesthai, superimpose, 55,18;
17,11; cover, 102,5 56,5; 57,14; 65,16; attack, 10,25
epikeisthai, 18,14.16 epos, verse, 23,8.10; 24,3; 97,3
epikhein, pour over, 97,3 êremein, be at rest, 16,14.19; 17,12.13
epikheirein, argue, 39,16; 40,3; ergon, function, 5,20.23; 8,17.18;
104,24; 114,14; 127,8.12; 136,5; 14,10.11; 41,9; 98,23; main
146,3; 157,1; 161,14 function, 99,27
epikheirêsis, attack, 86,7; argument, erkhesthai, come, 90,11; 100,20;
108,6.9; 139,11.13; 143,10; 148,25 101,9; 108,17; 124,1
epikourein, provide assistance eruthros, red, 143,21; 144,9.15
against, 102,23 eskhatos, ultimate, 44,10.12; 47,21;
epikouria, assistance, 98,18; 100,10; 48,1.2; 49,6; 168,3.30;
109,12 169,8.9.11.13.15.16.19.20.25.27;
Epikouros, Epicurus, 24,19 170,5.7.9.13.18.19; 171,6.8.15.20;
epikrinein, judge (verb), 141,14.19; 172,5.6.9.10.12.16; 173,4; extreme,
142,13 34,4; 36,5; 65,25; 113,25.26;
epimêkhanasthai, devise, 98,22 114,1.3.6.7.9.12; 117,5-7; 138,13.14;
epimimnêiskesthai, mention, 79,16 170,25.28
epimuein, shut the eyes, 17,14; ethos, habit, 4,19; 168,2
18,2.6; 28,23; 29,1.3 euêthês, simple-minded, 31,8;
epinoia, thought, 11,9; 12,26; 111,18 32,9.27; 33,8
epiphaneia, surface, 44,11.13.19.21; eukinêtos, easily moved, 30,26
48,2.8.9; 49,12.14.16-20 eukratos, temperate, 109,10
epipherein, add, 22,5; 25,9; 61,1; eulogos, reasonable, 2,12.19; 9,21;
62,11.26; 101,13; 139,1; 141,8; 18,17; 22,23; 23,2; 30,24; 31,3.21;
145,1; 155,2; 162,3; 163,3.5; 164,2; 35,17; 43,12.21; 58,2.3; 59,15;
epipheresthai, be led to (an 72,4.18; 73,31; 75,23; 76,12; 77,1;
opinion), 92,18 95,10; 104,6.26; 105,10.15; 107,2.5;
epipolaios, superficial, 69,11 118,3; 124,1.7.17.23; 128,8; 131,13;
epipolasis, superimposition, 65,6 132,23; 135,5.8.14; 161,8
epipolazein, float on (or to) the euôdês, fragrant, 83,8; 99,1.3.5.6.22;
surface, 71,5; 90,12 123,10; 163,22; 165,27
212 Indexes
euôdia, fragrance, 93,18; 99,3; 161,24; 162,2.14; 164,4; 166,20.22;
102,22; 109,9 kind, 67,20
euoristos, with flexible limits, 64,25 geôdês, earthy, 40,14; 46,17;
eupathês, easily affected, 22,11; 74,5.8.9.24; 75,27; 76,5-7.10.11.13;
28,27; 31,28 89,13.17; 95,3; 107,14.15
euphthartos, easily destroyed, 28,26 geômetria, geometry, 7,5
euphulaktos, easily confined, 26,16; geuesthai, taste (trans.), 9,16.17;
36,1.2; 71,8 79,1; 126,2; 134,20; 135,1
euporein, find a way, 14,20 geusis, taste, tasting (noun),
eupsuktos, easy to cool, 98,17 9,8.11.14.21; 10,4.12; 15,4;
Euripidês, Euripides, 97,3 39,23.24.28; 40,5.11.22; 41,5; 66,21;
euthruptos, easily dispersed, 71,8 67,8.12.15.16; 75,3.5.7.8.24; 76,28;
eutheia, straight line, 19,17; 25,23; 77,1; 78,2.21; 80,16; 83,24; 84,18;
28,28; 30,14.15; 41,6 85,3.10.12.17.19.21; 86,1.5.10; 87,8;
euthu(s), immediately, 34,17; 110,13; 89,27; 97,8; 104,5.22; 105,4; 134,24;
123,6.10; 124,15; 125,17.25; 126,9; 142,4.19; 143,2.5.8; 168,21
133,5; 134,12.14; 135,21; 156,2.10; geustikos, capable of taste,
directly, 41,6 9,13.20.22.24; 10,5.7-10; 39,22;
euthuôria, straight line, 21,11 75,10
euüpolêptos, easy to hold, 26,20; 36,1 geustos, tasteable, 9,23;
exaeroun, make into air, 76,18 77,6.7.11.14.17.19; 79,2.4;
exarkein, be sufficient, 84,3 86,8.13.14; 87,5.7; 89,6; 92,9; 95,22;
exasthenein, be weak, 23,2 105,2.4; 135,2
exêgeisthai, explain, 43,4; 82,12.17; ginôskein, understand, 111,20.24.25;
157,5.17 141,17
exêgêtikos, explanatory, 74,10; 151,15 glaphuros, subtle, 104,23
exerkhesthai, come out, 20,26; glikhesthai, strive, 15,3; 37,8
21,16.19; 27,20.23.26.27; 28,1.3.12; gliskhrotês, stickiness, 71,6
32,1.3.23; 33,2.5.7; 35,3 glôtta, tongue, 9,16; 99,24
exetasis, examination, 11,21 glukus, sweet, 76,1.3; passim
exikmazesthai, be exuded, 91,6-8; be glukutês, sweetness, 80,16
evaporated, 82,19 gnôrimos, understood, 8,6.10; 77,24;
exokhê, protrusion, 58,13.14 79,23; 109,6.8; 114,10; 123,5.12;
exugrainein, saturate with moisture, 155,2; 168,17
76,15.17 gnôrizein, recognise, 89,24; 92,23
gnôrizesthai, become known, 82,26
genesis, coming to be, 39,5.8; 55,9; gnôsis, understanding, 111,26
65,26; 70,20.22; 71,16.20; gônia, angle, 86,16; 161,3
72,13.14.25; 74,1.12.16.23; 75,25; gramma, letter, 126,16
79,12.14.18; 82,15; 87,10; 89,27; grammê, line, 151,3.4.10; 155,9;
99,23; 106,1; 125,1.3.5.12 etc.; 164,14
132,9; peri geneseôs, (Aristotle’s) graphê, text, 9,29; 10,4.11; 22,2; 86,2;
On Coming to be, 63,23; 64,16; 101,5.6; 161,11; 162,7
72,27; 78,19; 79,13; 94,9 graphein, write, 9,24; 10,5.6; 20,15;
gennan, produce (verb), 68,10; 74,7; 87,11; 129,8; 145,21; 157,25;
112,25 161,10; 162,7
genos, genus, 5,14; 6,21; 10,8; 14,24; grapheus, painter, 55,18
64,4; 66,3; 86,4; 88,5.18; 89,5.6;
90,6; 100,6.21; 105,4; 114,1; haima, blood, 98,16; 108,13
140,14.19; 141,18.19.21.24; 142,5; haireisthai, choose, 12,11.20
145,3.10.11.24; 158,15; 159,26; hales, salt (noun), 71,26; 91,2.4.5.7
halmuros, salty (adj.), 71,25.26;
 Indexes 213
77,11; 79,20; 80,4.11.14; henoun, unite, 64,24; 119,25
81,7.14.18.26; 82,11.15; 91,1 hepesthai, follow, 5,29; 8,19; 27,25;
halourgos, purple, 54,20; 81,22 31,22.23; 39,13; 56,21; 59,16.23;
halukos, brackish, 76,2.3.11 62,7.9.10; 90,11; 94,22; 95,13;
hamartanein, be mistaken, 84,6 104,13; 110,7.26; 137,26; 139,17;
hapax, at one time, 60,5.17 149,2; 153,11; 159,25; 160,22;
haplôs, haplous, without 161,9.18; 162,2; 164,19
qualification, 15,7; 42,26; 48,18; hepsein, boil, 70,3.4; 71,3.11; 75,26;
52,1; 54,9; 62,22.23; 78,25; 79,4; 97,3
92,3; 102,28; 103,19; 106,9.11; hepsêsis, boiling (noun), 70,5; 89,26
109,4; 126,2; 136,20; 137,25; Hêrakleitos, Heraclitus, 92,22
138,5.6; 149,7.19; 151,18; 171,23; heterogenês, different in genus,
simple, 9,2; 67,13; 72,9.30; 79,3; 137,10
80,8; 90,21.24.27; 107,7.9.18-21 heuriskein, discover, 14,5; 46,7;
haphê, (sense of) touch, 9,8; passim 107,13; 147,10; 154,11; 172,30
hapsis, touching (noun), 109,21 hexis, state, 8,2; 142,15.16.23.29;
haptesthai, touch (verb), 9,4.5; 34,20; 145,8.7.24
56,21; 83,16.18.23; 126,6.7; 168,22 hidrôs, exudation, 29,3
haptikos, able to touch, 40,17; 104,21 himation, cloak, 125,9
haptos, tangible, 9,2; 41,22; 56,23; histanai, make to stand, 30,13; bring
65,24; 77,5; 78,2-5.13-17.24.25; to a standstill, 110,4
79,2.5; 82,23.26; 83,1.2.3.15.18; historia, examination, 4,14; inquiry,
95,18; 105,2.4.12; 106,1.2; 109,20; 12,12; hê peri zôiôn historia,
110,2; 113,15; 148,20 (Aristotle’s) Examination of
harmonikê, musical inquiry, 7,5 Animals, 6,21
harmonikos, musical theorist, 146,17 holoklêros, complete, 19,13.22; in its
harmozein, harmonize, 54,22; entirety, 55,24
146,18; join together, 29,4; fit, 169,3 holon, whole, 3,9; passim; holôn
hêdonê, pleasure, 5,22.26.29; 7,11.22; di’holôn trepomenôn, being fully
81,2; 97,8; 125,23 interpenetrated, 63,23; 64,15.25;
hêdus, pleasant, 9,16.18.21.23; 65,3
54,9.19.21.24; 65,20; 95,13.25; homalotês, regularity, 11,19
96,6.8-10.12.21.25; Homêros, Homer, 23,22
97,13.15.17.20.22.23.25; 98,4.6; homoeidês, same in species,
99,1.11.13; 102,18.21.26.28; 142,12.22.24; 158,8-11.14.20.23.25;
103,1.2.5.18.21; 104,3.4.12.15; 161,7.26; 162,1; having similar
106,12.13.15.17.19 form, 64,1
hêdusma, seasoning, 80,13.15 homogenês, same in genus,
hêgemonikon, commanding-faculty 137,10.13; 138,12.15.24; 140,25;
(soul-function), 167,6 141,22; 142,1.12; 145,3.5.10.14-16;
(to) hen, unity, 140,14 158,15; 161,13; 167,16
hêlios, sun, 55,22; 69,6.17; homoiomerês, having similar parts,
124,4.5.15.16; 156,3.7; 168,15 64,11
helkein, draw in, 68,1.3; 69,12-14.16; homoiomorphos, having similar
79,20; 80,3 shape, 57,5
hêmera, day, 11,6.8; 21,4; daylight, homoiopathês, similar in affection,
22,24; 23,2 21,12
hêmeros, gentle, 21,4 homoioskhêmôn, having similar
hêmiolios, in the ratio of one and a shape, 57,5
half to one, 54,6 homoiotês, similarity, 21,12; 81,12;
hêmisu, half way point, 123,4; 82,9; 139,23; 145,4
124,10.12; half, 133,3 homologein, agree, 162,1; 168,13
214 Indexes
horan, see, 6,10; passim; observe, 149,22.24; belong, 1,16; 5,8; 6,8;
83,16 101,3; 106,24
horatikos, visual, 25,6; 36,9.20; huparxis, real existence, 63,20
37,1.15; 158,10; 160,9.24; 167,5; hupatê, the highest note, 136,18
able to see, 39,19.20 huperballein, surpass, 27,10; 115,22;
horaton, visible, 11,5; passim 119,9
hôrismenos, determinate, 26,27; huperbolê, excess, 9,5; 27,2; 67,7;
45,19; 49,5.6; 50,15; 51,11.13.23.24; 80,16
52,14.17; 57,4.5 huperekhein, predominate, 55,28;
horizein, horizesthai, define, 118,24; 139,3.7
3,12.13.19; 24,8; 49,1; 51,4; huperokhê, excess, 26,26;
65,22.25.26; 66,4; 75,1; 81,1; 118,14.16.25.26.28;
113,25.26; 141,24; 171,16; limit, 119,2.7.11.12.16; predominance,
113,22; 114,1-3; 115,4; 168,26.28 54,5.7.9.10.12.25; 56,2; 64,22; 65,15
hormasthai, begin, 11,7; 15,9; 104,6 huphistasthai, exist, 44,3; 112,4.6;
horos, limit, 48,17; 164,13; lie in wait, 10,22
172,11.13.14; 173,6; definition, hupnos, sleep, 5,6; 6,21; 7,25.26; 8,2;
84,16 21,18; 173,12
hudatôdês, watery, 67,14; 74,26; hupodekhesthai, receive, 108,12
89,17 hupokeisthai, underlie, 9,3; 41,13;
hudôr, water (noun), 15,1; passim; 44,26; 45,2; 47,24; 49,7; 55,5.24;
rain, 22,12; 99,5; peri hudatos, 60,21.22; 62,23; 66,13; 73,26; 84,1;
(Theophrastus’) On Water, 72,4 109,20; 122,2.14; 147,6; 162,23;
hudreuein, water (verb), 108,1 163,2; 164,5; 165,8.18.25;
huelos, glass, 26,28 166,14.16.22; 167,8.12; 168,8.9; be
huesthai, fall down in rain, 76,2 supposed, 5,10
hugieia, health, 6,10.11.14.19.26; hupolambanein, suppose, 15,10;
7,22; 98,22; 99,9; 109,5.15 19,12; 20,3; 92,26; 171,23
hugieinos, healthy, 99,14.15.21; 109,6 hupomenein, persist, 18,20; 31,17;
hugiês, sound (adj.), 40,15; 56,17; 154,16.17.20; remain behind, 80,5
93,23; 130,23; 134,7; 169,13.16; hupomimnêiskein, remind,
170,4; 172,30 8,22.25.30; 14,16; 42,23; 43,8.13;
hugros, moist, 6,12; passim; fluid, 58,23; 94,3.7; 152,24; 155,26;
47,3; 48,17; 56,22; 64,11.25; 156,16; 162,19
134,21.24; 135,4.5 hupomnêmatizesthai, write a
hugrotês, moisture, 8,1; 22,13; commentary on, 82,16
39,28.29; 44,23; 46,11; 67,16; hupopiptein, fall under, 84,15; 112,1
72,6.10.17; 73,13.22; 74,27; huposmos, guided by the smell, 101,9
89,3.15.17.21; 91,6.7; moist hupostasis, real existence, 55,7.14;
affection, 92,5; 94,7; 109,12; 110,1; 63,18; 65,9.11; 111,18; 112,7
137,7 hupothesis, supposition, 4,19.20.24;
hulê, matter, 38,18.20.22; 39,2.15; 110,28; 111,3
40,9.10.24; 41,13; 44,27; 45,2; hupotithesthai, suppose, 4,21;
64,17; 68,6.13.21; 69,4; 70,7; 73,29; 61,23.26; 110,7; 112,18.21; 113,4;
74,23 120,19
humên, thin skin, 18,14.16; 23,15;
24,1.2 iatros, doctor, 7,1; 107,4
hupaleiphein, paint under, 55,18; idios, peculiar, 2,9.11.14; 3,6.24;
62,24 4,1.2.11.13.14; 5,12.14; 7,9; 11,16;
huparkhein, be present, 10,26; 26,28; 33,25; 40,8; 41,19; 43,12.24;
21,23; 22,1.4.7-9; 51,16.17; 54,8; 44,1; 45,11.13.20; 60,13; 64,21;
71,18; 97,24; 116,12; 135,16; 145,4; 75,23; 76,22; 84,5.7.9.11.18.23-7;
 Indexes 215
85,3.10.11.13; 86,8.9.15.22.23; katêgorein, predicate (verb), 44,4;
92,24; 97,11.24; 98,12; 99,16.17; 64,14; 89,11; 114,15; 149,22-4
100,6; 106,24; 130,17; 159,15.17; katekhein, occupy, 29,13.25; 30,1
kat’idian, individually, 53,21; katergasia, digestion, 107,23
119,23; 120,3; 162,24; 166,9; idiâi, katergazesthai, overpower, 99,2
individually, 1,4; separately, katharos, pure, 21,8; 55,1.3.22;
3,9.10; idion, specific property, 98,16; 108,13; clear (of water), 67,13
52,5; idiôs, specifically, 79,13 katheirgein, enclose, 23,15
ikhthus, fish, 6,21; 18,11; 90,9; 100,21 kathêkein, reach, 41,5
ios, rust, 91,16.17 kath’ hauto, kath’ hauta, in itself,
iskhein, hold, 45,19; possess, 70,1.5 in themselves, 3,1.8.15; 5,15;
iskhuros, strong, 22,12 12,8.9.16; 13,5.20.21; 28,17; 35,7;
isazein, isazesthai, be equal, 56,1; 67,12.14; 80,14.19; 95,13.17.19.20;
64,19; 69,20; 75,12.17; 82,2.9; 96,3.13.16.21; 97,17.20.22.23; 98,1;
104,16; 105,23 102,16.20.26; 103,1-3.17.18; 104,1;
isopleuros, equilateral, 161,3 106,11.13-16; 113,18.19; 114,21;
115,4.13.15; 116,4.6.8.10; 118,26;
kaiein, burn, 21,4; 33,16; 46,11.12.18 138,24; 147,5; 150,17; 152,13;
kalos, fine, 12,2.3; 24,10.11.26.27; 153,20; 155,19; 165,3; on its own,
91,18 on their own, 12,19; 44,3; 53,25;
kamnein, grow weary, 31,27 56,4; 60,16; 62,22; 71,2.3.10.13;
kapnôdês, smoky, 38,5; 39,13; 40,10; 77,24; 90,24-6; 92,8; 93,8; 107,24;
92,17.21.25; 93,1.8.28 111,18; 116,21.23.24;
kapnos, smoke, 46,12.16-18; 55,23; 117,2.8.9.11.14.16.20;
92,22.23 118,4.13-15.19.21;
kardia, heart, 40,5.12.19.22-4.28; 119,3.6.13.14.17.19.21;
41,2.3.6; 108,13 120,6.7.11.19.23; 121,4.7.14.15.21;
karêbarein, be made drowsy, 103,9 122,3; 136,13.17; 155,25;
karpos, fruit, 69,12.15.17.24.29; 156,1.13.15.16; in their own right,
76,21; 107,16.17; 108,2 112,2-4.6
kassiteros, tin, 91,23 kath’ hekasta, particulars, 11,24
katalambanein, apprehend, 17,20; kathistanai, establish, 64,23; 137,1
19,1.9 katholou, universal(ly), 1,4; 3,9.11;
kataleipein, leave, 10,13; 19,16; 20,1; 11,27; 112,12; 137,9; in general,
33,18; 79,20.22; 80,4; 118,17; 56,18
152,1.10.21; 153,14 kathomilein, be used in everyday
katapsukhein, cool (verb), 7,27 speech, 25,19
katarithmein, enumerate, 6,6; katiskhuein, overpower, 64,20
81,14.16 katoptron, mirror, 20,9.11; 58,13;
katasbennunai, extinguish, 21,16; 168,5
33,5 kauma, heat, 76,8
kataskeuazein, argue for, 58,26; keisthai, be laid down, 4,18; 18,2;
132,18; 136,6; 139,18; 141,6; 43,10; 53,22; 105,12; 127,11;
146,3.29; 148,1 137,11; 139,1.7; 145,1; 146,14; be
katastêma, condition, 109,8 placed, 25,23; 30,14.15;
kata sumbebêkos, accidentally, 170,18.21-3.25
12,11.13.14.17; 13,9; 16,20; kenkhros, millet-seed, 64,8; 116,21-4;
42,22.24.26; 43,5.8.24; 47,23; 117,24.25; 155,24
96,1.7.12.15.20; 97,12.15.20.21; kenos, (empty), ineffectual, 20,25;
98,5.10; 99,11; 102,18; 103,5.6; 21,18; (to) kenon, void, 29,13
104,14; 106,10; 109,2; 113,21; kentron, centre, 165,18.20
115,5; 116,13.15; 121,23.26; 138,20
216 Indexes
kephalê, head, 18,11; 98,19; 99,12; kinêtikos, causing movement, 10,17;
108,19.22; 109,11.16 35,7.11; 45,17; 59,7; 110,8.16; able
kerannunai, blend, 64,14; 91,18.26; to change (trans.), 70,19; 75,10;
136,14.15.20; 144,3 78,21
khalkos, bronze, 91,14.17.24.27 kôdôn, bell, 130,12
khein, pour, 23,24; kheisthai, flow, koilia, stomach, 108,11.14.16.17.21
105,20.21 koimasthai, sleep (verb), 148,15
khelônion, tortoise-shell, 46,19 koinônein, have a share (in), 4,6;
khitôn, case, outer layer, 27,12.18; 45,10; 46,4; 89,1; 91,10; 94,6;
34,15 105,2.5
khôra, place, 17,20; 18,1.22; koinônia, association, 137,22
19,10.15.17; 20,12; 46,14 koinos, common, 2,4; passim; koinôs,
khorêgein, supply, 108,14 in general, 1,3; 3,9
khorêgia, supplies, 108,13.15 kôluein, prevent, 34,9; 37,2; 46,15;
khôrein, pass, 24,6; 29,14.28; 30,17; 66,14; 136,12; keep off, 23,13
57,14 kômikos, comic poet, 97,2 (Strattis)
khôrizein, separate (verb), 9,2; 12,26; koniortos, dust-cloud, 46,18
44,13.17; 111,18; 117,14.16.19; kônos, cone, 28,4-6; 29,12.21-5.27.28;
118,3.10.19; 119,3.6.13.14.19.23; 30,1.7.10.16.19
120,8.11; 121,3.7.13; 127,17; 130,7; kôphos, deaf, 13,24; 14,1.3
139,24; 140,4; 144,8; 153,24; 154,3; korê, kourê, pupil, 17,8; 18,14.21;
166,13; 171,21; remove, 33,17; 69,30 19,8; 23,17.24; 24,1.16.21; 27,7.12;
khreia, necessity, 18,3; 57,16; 60,8; 29,17; 30,24; 31,4.26;
80,17; 127,24 32,12.18.21.22.26; 33,27; 34,3.14;
khrêsimos, useful, 1,10; 4,14; 35,17; 36,25.26; 58,2.10; 59,11;
12,4.8.10.16; 13,1.6; 15,16; 16,2; 60,4; 62,1.3
32,25; 134,5; 146,11 korennunai, satiate, 96,9
khrêsis, use (noun), 141,3 koruphê, apex, 28,4
khro(i)a, colour (noun), 49,12; kosmos, universe, 11,7
51,5.21; 54,1.23; 55,19; 56,7; 65,5.10 kouphos, light (adj.), 45,1; 73,28;
khrôma, colour (noun), 12,18; passim 79,9.19.20; 80,3.6.8.9
khrômatizein, colour (verb), kouphotês, lightness, 99,21; light
50,2.4.9.15; 51,14; 74,2 affection, 109,25
khrônnunai, colour (verb), 11,16; krasis, blending, 55,7; 65,1
12,22; 43,2.20; 44,19; 47,4.15; kratein, overcome, 52,24
48,11; 49,17; 50,5.6.11; 51,8.26; krênê, spring, 72,1.2
52,10.15.27; 53,4.6; 62,18; 74,2; krinein, judge (verb), 36,15.17.18;
75,22 58,2; 111,20.23; 112,9;
khronos, time, 30,4; passim; en 141,11.16.19.20.22.24;
khronôi, in time, 30,2.3; 59,25.26; 142,5.7.10.16.20.22; 148,18;
123,8.13.14; 124,10.17; 125,15; 163,14.15; 164,13; 165,9; 166,13;
129,13; 132,15.23; 133,4.17; 167,1.19
135,8.10.20.21; 147,12 krisis, judgement, 142,24;
khulos, juice (conjectural); 69,30 167,22-4.26; 168,1
khumos, flavour, 9,13; passim kritêrion, criterion, 111,26
khutos, fluid, 105,18-20 krithê, barleycorn, 64,8.11
kinein, move (trans.), 15,13; passim; kritikos, able to judge, 9,11; 85,14;
change (trans.), 74,7.11; 75,6; 86,2; 142,3; 166,3
cause, 168,20 krotaphos, temple (side of the head),
kinêsis, movement, 11,11; passim; 36,23
process, 30,1; 50,9; 59,25.26; 60,1; kuanous, blue, 81,22
change, 62,14-15; 74,25 kubernêtikê, navigation, 7,5
 Indexes 217
kubos, cube, 86,1 logos, account, 8,9.10.11.25.27; 14,8.9;
kuriôs, strictly, 4,5; 12,25; 45,12; 41,8.11; 42,3.4; 48,5; 52,2; 54,7;
64,14; 105,18; 107,6; 149,8; kurios, 72,13; 77,1; 79,12.14; 84,6; 88,7.8;
principal, 47,13; authoritative, 63,6 93,24; 105,11; 112,19; 131,11.19;
155,10; 166,11.18; 167,1.2.3.11;
lambanein, take as (agreed), 4,21; 168,8.10; 172,28; proportion, 46,3;
passim; assume, 111,19; take in, 54,8.10.12.14; 55,5; 56,2; 65,14.15;
11,27; 70,11; 71,3.21.24; 72,6.12; 116,1; 144,2.5.13.18; speech,
149,16-18.21; 150,1; 155,12; take as 13,6.8.10.12.13.15.17-19.21; 99,25;
established, 76,26; 153,4; undergo, argument, 22,11; 113,5; 140,1;
69,19; 107,23 169,1; word, 12,14; 126,17; reason,
lampein, flash (verb), 15,17; 16,3; 40,19; 112,13; explanation, 87,4
17,4; 18,9 loimôdês, pestilential, 99,14; 109,8
lampros, bright, 11,11; 52,16 luein, resolve, 17,3; 76,17.21; 112,20;
lamprotês, brightness, 27,10 113,2.12.24; 114,23.25; 147,2;
lamptêr, lantern, 20,20; 23,12.13.18; 162,16; release, 90,14; break up,
36,26 30,10
lanthanein, escape detection, 16,10; lusis, resolution, 16,17; 113,7.9.13.17;
22,7.9; 60,1.16; 62,2; 117,6.11; 130,3.10; solution, 146,6.28; 165,21;
120,15-17; 146,27; 147,26; 168,6
148,6.14.15; 154,13 lukhnos, lamp, 23,12; 33,16; 36,25
legein, describe, 43,25; 44,4; 45,12.15; lukhnoukhos, lamp-holder, 23,11
48,18; 50,6; 51,25; 55,1; 59,16; lupê, pain, 5,22.29; 7,11.22
61,10; 141,11; 144,21; 149,12.20; lupêros, painful, 9,18.21.23; 95,13.25;
say, 49,12.13; 58,25; 59,18.23.24; 96,6.12.15; 97,15.21.23-5; 98,4.9;
61,7; 126,15; 147,17; 149,8; 154,8; 102,19.21; 104,3;
mean, 43,11; 44,4; 47,25; 52,8; 106,12.13.15.17.19
59,21; 60,19; 157,5
leiotês, smoothness, 17,8; 83,7.10 malakos, soft, 78,4; 83,17; 99,1
leios, smooth, 16,2; 17,4.8.9; 18,17; manotês, rarity, 44,23
21,6; 24,24; 25,11.12.16.22; 26,1; manthanein, learn, 12,5; 73,18;
58,12; 83,25.26; 84,5.14.17.21; 75,11.13
85,1.7.21; 91,18 mantikê, prophecy, 5,6
leipesthai, remain, 138,7; 158,17 mathêsis, (act of) learning, 12,13;
lêptikos, able to apprehend, 9,12 13,8.12.20; 14,5
leptotês, fine nature, 23,21; 26,22; marturein, bear witness, 91,19;
28,20; 71,5.9.11; 98,17 112,15
leptos, fine, 22,10; 23,14.15.17.23.24; marturia, testimony, 71,21
28,22.24.26.28; 29,2.5; 30,23.26; marturion, evidence, 72,15
31,2; 50,27; 57,10.13.27; 58,15; mathêmatikos, mathematical,
70,24; 71,4; 98,16; 99,6; 105,22; 111,12.15-17; mathematician,
108,4 28,2.12; hoi apo tôn mathêmatôn,
lêthê, forgetting (noun), 8,4 the mathematicians, 25,20
Leukippos, Leucippus, 24,18; 56,14 megethos, magnitude, 11,12; passim
leukos, white, 27,13; passim meiôsis, diminution, 78,18
lexis, text, passage 10,2; 21,3; meioun, meiousthai, diminish, 57,5;
82,13.17; 145,21; 151,22; 152,6; 152,22
158,22; 159,18; 161,21; argument, mêkhanasthai, contrive, 21,5
13,19 melas, black, 17,7; passim
libanôtos, frankincense, 130,13 mellonta, ta, the future, 12,1
liparotês, oil, 79,6 melos, melody, 117,1.3.5.6.8
logikos, rational, 4,5; 13,2.6; 171,12
218 Indexes
mêninx, membrane, 23,15; 53,19; 54,3.16; 56,14; 59,17; 61,9;
34,8.14.16.19 67,22.23; 110,24; 118,13; 119,21;
Menôn, (Plato’s) Meno, 24,7 147,19; 154,20
mênuein, reveal, 12,29 miktos, mixable, 15,1; 137,5;
mênutikos, able to reveal, 98,6 138,7.11.12.24; 143,22; mixed, 79,5
meristos, divided into parts, 133,15; mixis, mixture, 45,26; passim
171,1; 172,2 mnêmê, memory, 5,21.27.28; 7,11;
merizein, divide into parts, 128,9.20; 8,3; 167,20; peri mnêmês,
129,9 (Aristotle’s) On Memory, 173,12
meros, part, 19,20; passim; ana mnêmoneuein, mention, 24,7; 66,21;
meros, in turn, 11,8 68,24; 84,12; 97,2; 146,17; 155,22;
meson, middle, 17,7; 18,9; 21,7; 30,16; 157,19; 173,11
81,8; 128,14; 137,1; 153,4; 172,13; monê, a state of rest, remaining
medium, 83,22; 105,6; 106,3; (noun), 69,21
168,17; 169,2; parenthesis, 155,1; monoun, isolate, 118,19
159,22; 161,25; mean state, 27,1.2; muein, shut the eyes, 57,12.13
64,23 muôpizein, stimulate, 58,17.19
mesotês, mean state, 9,10 muriostos, ten thousandth, 116,22;
metaballein, change (verb), 7,21; 117,24; 155,23
15,1; 50,20; 51,5.8; 64,21; muron, perfume, 97,3.6.7; 98,2
69,20.22.23.28; 74,14; 89,26;
105,22; 107,25; 117,25.26; 118,2; naos, temple, 58,6
132,12; 133,15.16; 134,1.3 nemesthai, feed on, 104,3
metablêtikos, subject to change, neognos, new born, 27,9
10,17 neotês, youth, 6,22.23; 7,23; 8,7; peri
metabolê, change (noun), 38,9; 67,17; neotêtos kai gêrôs, (Aristotle’s) On
69,14.19; 70,1; 89,26; 90,1; 91,16; Youth and Old Age, 6,18
93,1; 105,21; 107,14; 108,12.15; nephos, cloud, 52,23
133,18 nêtê, the lowest note, 136,17
metadidonai, transmit, 129,19 neuron, sinew, 68,12.13; 70,10
metalleuein, get by mining, 91,12.21 nitron, sodium carbonate, 91,4.5
metapherein, transfer (verb), 95,21; noein, think of, 82,16; 88,4.12;
105,16; 127,16 111,25; 112,3.6.8.9; 165,4
metaphora, transfer (noun), 96,2 noêtos, intelligible, 11,1; 111,21.24;
metaskhêmatizein, change shape, 112,2
126,15 nomê, allocation; 142,26
meteinai, have a share, 51,17 nosos, disease, 6,10.12.14.19.26; 7,22
metekhein, partake of, 5,31; 6,22; notia, southerly winds, 76,2.9
44,24; 45,22.25; 47,14; 91,14; 99,19; nous, intellect, 12,17; 111,20;
104,27; 105,5 112,1.4.7-11
Meteôrologika, (Aristotle’s) nuktôr, at night, 31,8
Meteorologica, 80,11 nux, night, 11,6.8; 18,10; 21,15;
meth’ hêmeran, (during the) day, 23,2.3.12; 31,5.6; 33,4
22,11; 23,4; 31,5
methêmerinos, of day, day- (adj.), ôgugios, primeval, 34,16
21,9 oiesthai, opine, think, 93,5
migma, mixture, 68,11 oikeios, proper, 1,16; 4,21; 6,13;
mignunai, mix, 21,1; passim 11,11; 18,22; 19,10.15.17; 21,4;
mikros, small, 45,1; 58,7; 60,7.14; 41,16.19; 43,2.3.21; 45,18.19; 47,10;
117,13; 118,3; kata mikron, little by 48,17.22; 49,1.2.4.5; 50,5-7.26;
little, 61,27 52,4.14; 66,15; 73,16; 79,12;
mikrotês/smikrotês, smallness, 87,8.10; 101,24; 106,21; 109,16;
 Indexes 219
117,23; 142,22; 143,7; 144,22.23.25; 84,14.17.22; 85,6.21; 86,10; 89,25;
145,24; 160,6.19; 168,22; akin, high, 138,18.21-3; 142,4
12,20; 46,9; 113,17; appropriate,
79,15 pagos, frost, 22,13.14
oikeiôsis, affinity, appropriation, 46,4 pakhos, density, 71,4
oikeiotês, affinity, 33,11; 47,8 pakhunesthai, become dense, 71,2.11
oikeioun, make akin, 21,10 pakhutês, density, 31,7; 107,24
Olumpia, Olympic games, 151,19 panspermia, seed-aggregate, 68,7;
omma, eye, 21,6.7.11; 24,24; 27,13; 70,7; 74,22
32,8.13; 33,20; 34,4; 35,18; 36,5.24; paraballein, compare, 158,27; 159,15
39,5; 158,21 parabolê, comparison, 159,19
onkos, bulk, 84,15.16.19.21; 85,20; paradeigma, example, 62,8.12;
105,23 91,20; 134,1; 136,15; 155,2
onoma, word, 4,4; 24,1; 25,19; 26,20; paradoxos, paradoxical, 133,18
noun, 13,13-15 paragôgê, pushing aside (noun),
onomazein, name, 89,2.16; 98,1; call, 17,15.16.21; 18,19.21; 20,1
89,5 parakolouthein, accompany, 12,24
ophis, serpent, 103,13 parallêlos, interchangeable, 105,18
ophthalmos, eye, 15,13; passim paralogizesthai, reason falsely,
opsis, sight, eye, 10,17; passim 173,7
optikê (sc. theôria), optics, 7,4 paralogos, beyond reason, 32,5
orexis, appetition, 5,22.29 paramignunai, mix with, 80,15;
organikos, having organs, 2,16 97,7; 108,1
organon, organ, 8,11; 39,23; 40,11; paramutheisthai, abate, 80,16
41,1; 78,11; 102,10; 162,20; parapheresthai, be turned away,
164,4.21; musical instrument, 19,3; 31,18; be presented, 123,10
146,19 paraskeuazein, prepare, 58,18;
osmê, smell, 14,24; passim produce, 74,12
osphrainesthai, (exercise sense of) paratithenai, tithenai para,
smell, 37,20; 83,21; 90,10; 93,9; juxtapose, (quote) 53,18.27;
94,4; 100,12.20; 101,1.16; 102,3.10; 54,2.4.18.23.27; 55,2; 57,17.18;
103,8; 104,14.19; 107,20; 108,5; 58,5; 59,19.28; 61,15.25.26;
128,11.16; 129,7.17.18; 63,9.14.22; 64,10; 65,18
130,1.4.7.14.22; 132,25 pareikazein, describe by analogy,
osphrantikos, able to smell, 105,15
37,12.15.17; 38,2.20.23; 39,18; parergon, subordinate function, 100,3
101,18; 102,4 parerkhesthai, pass by, 154,22
osphrantos, smellable, 37,19; passim parodos, passage, 100,4; 101,23;
osphrêsis, smell, smelling, 10,18; 154,18
passim parousia, presence, 38,25; 43,7;
osphrêtos, smellable, 86,12; 129,14 52,10.13; 53,2.4.6.11; 59,9; 132,5.7.8
ostoun, bone, 39,28; 68,11-13; 70,10 (to) pan, (the) whole, 21,12; 37,1;
ostrakodermos, hard-shelled, 90,8 62,4; 118,19; 133,3.10.18.25;
othonê, linen, 23,24; 24,2 134,6.7; 149,14.15.21; 155,11;
ouranos, heaven, 23,22; 28,19; peri 157,18.22; 158,3.4
ouranou, (Aristotle’s) On (the) paskhein, be affected, 7,25; passim
heaven, 86,21 pathêma, affection, 109,18
ousia, substance, 31,16; 73,8; 112,5; pathêtikos, involving affection, 19,5;
118,2; being, 41,19; 70,3; 72,28; 42,27; 47,4; 50,16; 52,2; 64,19; able
125,5 to be affected, 73,12; 89,4
oxôdês, sharp-smelling, 83,19 pathos, affection, 7,25; passim
oxus, sharp, 29,10; 72,2; 80,14; 81,8;
220 Indexes
pauesthai, cease, 9,9; 17,22; 19,4; 155,20; 156,1.5.9; come to light,
21,18; 125,10; 134,12.15.17 45,12.16
pêgnunai, freeze, 27,16; 52,24; phaios, grey, 81,17.20.23.25; 143,21;
133,5.10.22 144,4.8.9.15.18
pepsis, ripening, 74,15; phakê, lentil soup, 97,3
76,13.15.20.21.23; 95,10; 99,3; phaneros, evident, 2,23; 5,22; 7,13;
107,16; 109,10; digestion, 14,10; 20,3; 28,25; 89,26; 93,19;
78,8.10.11; 79,17; 107,25; 94,17; 95,2; 99,26; 101,6
concoction, 68,17; 69,7 phantasia, appearance,
perainein, limit (verb), 113,8.13; 55,6.12.14.16.17.24; 56,1.9.15;
114,5-10.12.16.18.21.24; 60,21.23; 63,17; 65,7.10;
115,11.15.17-20.23.24; 116,5.9.11; imagination, 66,17; 86,15;
121,8.16.22.25 impression, 51,4
peras, boundary, 26,28; 28,9; 43,21; pheresthai, travel, 29,21; 30,7.9;
44,10.13-15.18.20; 45,19; 31,3; 57,9.10.13.18.19;
48,1.4.5.8.10-12; 58,3.7.10.14.17; 62,20; 66,14; 79,9;
49,1.2.4.5.8.10.12.13.15.25.26; 101,22.24; 102,2; 103,9; 108,21.22;
51,20-4; 52,3.4; 66,1.2.4; 169,11; 123,8.9.13.17.19; 124,7.11.13.14.23;
170,15.25; 171,18; 125,3; 126,6.10; 127,22; 128,13;
172,8.13.17.20.22; limit, 65,25; 132,21; 136,9; 146,22
113,25.26; 114,13; 164,14.17; philêdonia, fondness for pleasure,
165,4.12.13.15.19 97,6
periekhein, surround, 23,15.19; philosophos, philosopher, 6,27
27,12; 34,14; 50,27; 51,4.7; 52,23; phlebion, vein, 19,18; 98,16
117,25; 118,4; embrace, 105,11 phleps, vein, 70,10
periekhon, environment, 21,2 phloios, bark, 107,15; 108,2
perikarpion, pod, 69,18.20.21.24.26; phlox, flame, 21,23; 22,3.12.14; 29,10;
70,14; 71,17 46,17.18
perikeisthai, surround, 27,18 phoinikous, red, 54,20; 55,23; 81,22
perilambanein, enclose, 24,1; 28,5.6; phônê, voice, 13,8; 66,10.15; 126,14;
30,9; 32,14; include, 142,9 utterance, 13,14.25
periphereia, circumference, 165,19 phora, locomotion, 11,23; 57,24;
peripiptein, encounter, 10,18 126,19.23; 128,14; 129,21; 131,15;
peristera, pigeon, 51,3 132,21.22; 133,2
perittôma, excretion, 80,5; phôs, light, 11,6; passim; daylight,
107,9.10.12.15 20,26
perittos, odd, 143,23-6; phôtizein, illuminate, 11,10; 19,7;
144,11.12.16.17; 104,19.24-6 23,2; 31,5.11.12-14.16.18; 32,21;
pessein, ripen (trans.), 74,12; 89,19; 33,15; 35,8.10.20.21.23.24;
digest, 108,13 36,21.26; 37,1.2; 43,1.20.22;
pessesthai, ripen (intrans.), 69,27; 46,2.15; 47,5.19; 50,5; 51,1;
70,15; 76,20; 107,17 52,10.13; 53,4.11; 59,6.9.10;
pêxis, freezing (noun), 76,17; 95,7.9; 132,3-7.12-15; 133,13.19.20.23-7;
133,5.6 134,19; 135,12.13
phainein, bring to light, 45,12 phôtoeidês, having the form of light,
phainesthai, appear, be clearly, 47,15
5,11.14; 11,12; 15,13; 16,4; 22,4; phronêsis, wisdom, 10,27; 11,25;
27,8; 28,27; 35,27; 45,20; 50,17.20; 12,6.7.17; 13,22; 14,1
51,2; 55,10.20.21.22.25; 60,2; 61,8; phronimos, intelligent, 13,24
65,8.10.11; 71,17; 83,11; 91,10; phthartikos, capable of destroying,
99,26; 138,19; 141,10; 146,2.5.20; 9,4; 10,18.20; 23,1; 103,4.5.15.19;
104,4
 Indexes 221
phtheirein, destroy, 9,5; 76,14; Platôn, Plato, 11,9; 20,19.24; 23,5;
95,9.10.12; 103,6.7.10.12; 118,6; 24,7; 28,11; 33,1; 73,21
154,22 plêgê, blow, 66,13.15;
phthisis, wasting away, 78,6.9.23.25 126,13.17.20.22.24; injury, 35,27;
phthongos, note, 136,18; 143,23; 37,2; striking, 66,16
144,16.19; sound, 54,14; 113,15; plêktikos, startling, 54,20; 104,16
117,1.2.7 pleonazein, be dominant, 73,5; be
phthora, destruction, perishing, 8,4; excessive, 109,16
passim pleonektein, outdo, 104,17
phugê, avoidance, 13,1 plêroun, satiate, 96,25; 99,12
phulakê, guarding (noun), 8,3 plêssein, strike, 108,27
phulaktikos, preservative, 26,19 plêthos, abundance, 55,4.6.26;
phulassein, preserve, 9,4; 65,8.17; great extent, 28,20;
10,17.20.21; 24,17; 36,4; 81,24; number, 85,16
93,19; 99,15; 118,1.11; 129,15 plusis, washing, 105,14-17
phullon, leaf, 70,13; 107,14 pnein, blow, 76,9
phusan, blow up, 90,14 pneuma, breath, 90,13; 93,26; 94,6;
phusikos, physical, 7,1.3.4; 100,4; 101,22.23; 102,1.7.9;
111,12.13.15.17; natural 108,16.20.23; wind, 23,13.19.20
philosopher, 6,10.27; 7,2; pneumôn, lung, 6,25; 90,15; 100,11;
92,20.24.25; natural, 2,16; hê 108,21
phusikê akroasis, (Aristotle’s podiaia, foot-length, 117,15.16
[lectures on]) Physics, 113,5; poiein, make, 15,4; passim; produce,
115,13; 134,8; hê phusikê 74,21; 78,24; 80,2; 81,2.24; 82,22;
pragmateia, the treatise on nature 85,9; 86,4; 88,5.13.16; 89,15.19.20;
(i.e. Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia), 90,5; 92,2; 94,12.19; cause, 17,21;
6,17 21,6; 42,17; 131,9; 135,20; 137,3;
phusiologos, natural scientist, 71,22; act, 64,21; 73,9.10.18.19; 135,3; do,
82,21.24; hê peri phutôn 84,26; 102,6; paint, 55,21;
phusiologia, (Aristotle’s) Natural postulate, 112,16
Science of Plants (lost work), 87,10 poiêtikos, able to produce, 69,4.6;
phusis, nature, 1,16; passim 70,18.24; 76,23; 79,18; 92,5.7.11;
phuton, plant, 3,22; 6,23; 8,6; 68,1; 94,15.17; 95,5.8; able to act,
69,12.14.17.25; 70,11.13; 72,5.7; 73,5.12; able to cause, 11,7.8;
74,21; 80,2; 87,10.11; 107,8.11; poetic, 24,2; active, 64,18
108,2 poion, quality, 74,12
pikros, bitter, 69,26; 71,29; 72,1.2; poiotês, quality, 44,20; 49,16; 67,2;
77,11.17.20.22; 79,6.20; 80,4.5; 71,19.27; 72,15; 73,26; 112,22;
81,7.11.15.18.19.26; 82,11.15.18; 120,1; 135,1
83,19.23.26.27; 86,10; 91,8; 94,27; polemos, war, 36,23
95,1; 110,10; 142,4.19; 143,6.8; polion, hulwort, 103,13
167,15 polugônios, polygonal, 86,16.18
pimelê, fat (noun), 27,17 poreuesthai, pass, 71,23
pisteuein, trust (verb), 99,15 poros, passage, 24,5; 29,1; 36,24; 41,3;
pistis, proof, 2,16; 136,8; 141,13 57,13.14; 101,19; 102,4
pistoun, confirm, 36,22; 71,9.19; 95,2 porrô(then), far away, 27,4; 30,6;
pithanologein, use plausible 31,13; 32,22; 90,10; 100,21; 101,9;
arguments, 39,26; 40,3 123,7.11; 124,17; 126,14; 129,17;
pithanos, plausible, 18,22; 70,16; 132,16; 134,22; 135,22; 146,14;
127,5.8.12.22 171,14
plasmatôdês, fictitious, 70,15 poson, quantity, 49,16; 57,22; 78,20;
110,22; 156,18
222 Indexes
posotês, quantity, 120,1 proskrisis, assimilation, 78,8; 109,14
potimos, pleasant (to drink), 76,2.9; prospherein, assimilate, 78,1.12;
82,19; 97,7 80,13
poton, drink, 99,12 prospiptein, impinge, 21,11; 23,16;
pragma, thing, 144,6; 148,21.23; 24,5; 28,10; 31,21; 33,21.22; 83,23;
165,23; 168,8; 173,3 135,17
pragmateia, inquiry, 2,2; 3,3.24; 5,7; prosthêkê, addition, 78,18; 119,1;
6,17; 79,15; 87,8.11 122,12; 169,14.20; 170,4
pragmateuesthai, concern oneself prostithenai, add, 15,15; 16,10;
with, 6,17 43,4.6; 50,14; 51,3.10; 56,21;
praktos, of action, 11,2 119,17; 122,8.10.13.14; 144,1;
prasinos, green, 81,22 159,2; 169,17.25.28; 170,6
praxis, action, 4,1.4.5; 11,4.23.24; 12,4 prosupakouein, understand, 105,13
premnon, trunk, 108,2 prothesis, purpose, 2,1; 6,2
presbus, important, 120,8 protithenai, protithesthai, propose,
proaisthanesthai, perceive in 4,3; 14,18; 15,15; 28,15; 49,25; 66,6;
advance, 10,19.22 79,16; 87,8; 106,7; 119,11; 134,4;
proaporein, raise preliminary 149,25; 150,15; 161,26
difficulties, 16,17 prôtos, first, 3,12; passim; primary,
proêgoumenôs, primarily, 12,13; 82,6; 97,21.23; 108,12; prôtôs
28,14; 80,12; 94,10; 100,1 (adv.), pre-eminently, 12,25; 43,13;
proienai, proceed, 28,8; 30,20; 149,19.23.28.29; 150,3.7.11.16;
125,4.12 152,25; 153,15.18.19.20.23;
prokataballein, lay down 154,4.6.10.12.13; 155,5.11.17-19;
beforehand, 56,10; 67,18 primarily, 73,27; prôton
prokhein, pour forth, 23,9; 28,24.25; aisthêtikon, primary perceptive
29,1.5.8; 30,28; 31,11 part, 59,13; prôtê aisthêsis, primary
prokheirizesthai, select, 114,4 sense-organ, 19,19
prolambanein, take as agreed proüparkhein, be present before,
beforehand, 147,5 68,27; 75,9.14.17; 125,4
proödos, advance, 29,10 psathuros, uncohesive, 71,8
proôthein, push forward, 57,26 pseudês, false, 69,11
prophora, pronunciation, 99,25 pseudos, falsehood, 95,23; 146,5.10
prophulattesthai, be on one’s guard psophêtikos, able to sound, 66,11.12
against, 12,10 psophos, sound, 10,19; passim
prosaporein, raise a further psukhê, soul, 1,3; passim; peri
difficulty, 33,26 psukhês, (Aristotle’s) On the Soul,
prosballein, impinge, 123,3; 135,14; 1,3; 3,11.20; 5,19.25.30;
156,14 8,16.23.29.31; 9,8; 10,14.16; 14,15;
prosbibazein, confirm, 37,11; 38,12; 17,5; 25,25; 27,5; 34,5; 35,6; 36,16;
49,9; 96,25 38,14; 41,10.26; 42,2.13; 58,26;
prosbolê, impact, 60,5 66,7.10; 67,9.16; 75,16; 84,8; 104,7;
prosdeisthai, need, 8,21 105,5; 107,8; 109,21; 132,6; 162,19;
prosekhês, appropriate, 87,10; 163,7; 164,10.22; 165,12.22.23;
proximate, 130,17 (Alexander’s) On the Soul, 167,21
prosênês, soothing, 54,9 psukhikos, of the soul, 5,18
prosginesthai, be added, 119,22; psukhein, cool (verb), 98,20
154,20; 170,3 psukhos, cold (noun), 76,15.17
prosklusis, splash, 108,26 psukhros, cold (adj.), 6,13; 21,22.24;
proskorês, satiating, 96,11 22,2.5.19; 38,18.19.22;
proskrinein, add, 57,7.9; assimilate, 39,1.2.6.15.18.20; 40,9.13.21.24;
78,7; 80,4.8 45,1; 51,7; 52,24; 56,22; 72,24;
 Indexes 223
73,1.15.16; 76,22; 78,4.7.8.22.24.26; sklêrophthalmos, hard-eyed, 27,17;
83,17; 86,11; 95,7.9; 98,13.15.24; 102,13
100,9; 108,26; 109,11; 110,10 sklêros, hard, 83,17
psukhrotês, cold (noun), 22,13; 27,10; sklêrotês, hard affection, 110,1
44,23; 52,23; 73,16.22; 78,12; 98,18; skôptein, ridicule (verb), 97,2
99,8; 102,23; 109,16; cold affection, skôria, slag, 91,20
110,1; 137,6 skotôdês, dark, 31,8
pugolampis, glow-worm, 18,13 skotos, darkness, 11,6; 15,17; 16,1.3;
puknos, dense, 21,6; 23,20.22; 50,27 17,4.5.9-11; 20,22.25; 21,2.19;
puknotês, density, 23,20; 44,23 22,4.8.14.16.19; 23,1; 32,22-4; 33,3;
pur, fire, 15,3; passim 36,24; 43,7; 47,18; 52,11.26; 53,14
purôdês, fiery, 38,6; 43,4.6; 52,16 sôma, body, 1,13; passim
puros, wheat-grain, 53,22.23; 63,11; sômatikos, bodily, 8,11; 11,14.15;
64,8.11 14,19; 57,2
Puthagoreios, Pythagorean, 14,23; sômatôdês, of bodily form, 89,3;
51,20; 107,1.4 107,25
sôros, pile, 53,23
rhâidios, easy, 26,18; 85,25 sôstikos, preservative, 103,4
rhein, flow, 21,6.28; 72,3.7 sôtêria, preservation, 8,3;
rhêma, verb, 13,15 10,15.19.26; 12,9; 100,1
rheuma, stream, 21,9; 29,2; flowing, sôzein, preserve, 6,19; 9,13; 20,26;
98,19 25,12.22; 26,17.24; 55,24; 57,26;
rhis, rhines, nose, 92,22.24; 102,3.4.6 61,10; 64,9; 81,21; 86,2; 93,15; 94,26
rhiza, root, 107,13; 108,2 span, draw, 69,29; 70,4; 72,6
rhopê, inclination, 73,27 speklon, mica, 29,7
rhuptikos, able to cleanse, 89,12 sperma, seed, 64,3
spoudê, enthusiasm, 97,6
sêmainein, signify, 10,23; 13,8; 33,9; stasis, rest, 84,12
75,6; 140,9 sterein, deprive, 6,14; 9,9; 13,23; 145,4
sêmantikos, significant, 13,14; 26,20 stereos, solid, 26,27; 29,5; 45,23;
sêmeion, sign, 13,14.23; 69,22; 82,17; 47,8.11; 48,18; 49,4.5;
84,22; 91,7.22; 104,1; 107,9; 108,25; 50,1.2.12.23.27; 51,6.14; 53,7.11;
126,12; 129,5; 133,21; 164,14; 64,2
point, 18,7 sterêsis, privation, 8,4; 46,14; 47,5.18;
sêpia, cuttle-fish, 18,12 52,11.25; 76,26;
sêpsis, rot (noun), 91,16 77,8.9.11.15.16.22.23; 80,24;
sidêros, iron, 91,14.17.25.26 82,10.11.14.17; 142,15.16.24.29;
skepein, protect, 23,19; 27,19; 69,18 143,7; 145,7.24
skeuastos, artificial, 98,3 stilbêdôn, glitter (noun), 17,21;
skhêma, shape (noun), 11,15; 18,2.16.20; 19,4.11.19
12,24.28; 58,2; 83,6.9; stilbein, glitter (verb), 17,6.9.17;
84,5.11.13.15.16.20; 18,1.4.8.14; 19,2.4; 20,3.4
85,4.6.8.9.11.14.19.22.23; stilbos, glittering (noun), 17,8; 18,1;
86,1.7.12-14.18.22-5; 126,17.19 19,3.9; 20,3
skhêmatizein, shape (verb), 58,12; Stoas, hoi apo tês, the Stoics, 73,20;
126,18.21; 152,7 167,6
skhesis, relation, 31,11.15.16; 42,27; stoikheion, element, 14,19.20; 15,5;
43,6; 50,18; 51,1; 65,18.19; 112,22; 37,9; 38,13; 40,4; 68,25; 72,27.29;
127,5.6.9.13-16; 128,1.3-6; 73,7; letter, 150,15; 151,1
132,5.10.12.13; 133,24; Stratis, Strattis, 97,2
134,11.15-17; 135,12; 167,5 Stratôn, Strato, 126,20
struphnos, sour, 81,8; 94,25; 95,21
224 Indexes
sumbainein, come about, 7,19; 8,15; 8,27; 14,10; 81,15.25; 84,26; 139,17;
result, 11,26; 15,18; 17,1.10.12; 159,18; 172,1.14
24,23; 26,9; 37,6; 49,9; 61,15; 94,24; sundiairein, divide in conjunction
115,7; 128,8; 131,13; 152,26; attach with, 97,17.18; 110,4.7.15.28;
to something as an accident, 13,10; 111,3.6; 113,9.11.21; 114,25;
26,12; 47,24; 109,3; 110,3; 112,13; 115,2.5.8; 116,13.14; 121,24; 131,6;
138,21; apply to, 152,8 162,6
sumballein, collide, 29,23; 30,16 sunekheia, continuity, 30,11; 37,2;
sumballesthai, contribute, 14,4; 58,9; 116,17; 117,17.19.20; 152,16
96,24; 97,1; 104,5; 109,5 sunekhein, hold together, 173,6
sumbolon, symbol, 13,14 sunekhês, continuous, continuum,
summetaballein, change in 31,28; 56,12; 57,1.7; 62,2;
conjunction with, 90,2 114,20.21.25;
summetapheresthai, travel together 115,9.11.14.16.18.19.25.26;
with, 19,9 116,4.10.12.15.19; 117,1.3.15.26;
summetria, due proportion, 6,12; 121,5.18.19.22; 128,9.17.19; 129,8;
9,3.10; 39,11 131,15; 146,21; 148,2; 150,13.20;
summetros, commensurable, 24,6.9; 151,7.8.21.23; 157,18.24; 158,4;
54,8.10; moderate, 50,24; 76,14; 171,19.22; 172,9.14; 173,6
proportionate, 98,25 sunergein, work (on) in co-operation,
sumparalambanein, include in the 78,9; 88,14
account, 75,4 sunergos, working in co-operation,
sumpauesthai, cease in conjunction, 70,22
19,7; 134,16 sunesis, understanding (noun), 13,7
sumperasma, conclusion, 152,17; sunêtheia, habitual use, 97,7
153,4 sunienai, understand, 13,18
sumphônia, musical concord, 54,11; sunistanai, establish, 6,27; 21,10;
136,18; 138,23; 146,1.17 28,9; 43,15; 52,23; 74,17; 124,2;
sumphônos, concordant, 54,22; 127,6; give consistency, 26,19;
112,18; 146,19 71,13; 74,11.14; condense, 93,3;
sumphuein, fuse (together), 28,9.13; 98,21; 107,24.25
32,3.7.8.10-12.26; sunkatatithesthai, agree with, 63,16
33,1.7-12.21.26.27; 34,1.2.8.10.18.21 sunkephalaioun, summarise, 156,21
sumphuês, xumphuês, fused, 21,17; sunkhein, blur, 58,15
32,23; 33,5 sunkrisis, combination, 68,12
sumphusis, fusion, 33,1.13.15.23.24; suntassein, classify, 81,5; 143,19
34,9.19 suntelein, contribute, 2,4;
sumpilein, compress, 21,7 10,15.20.27; 12,7.12; 13,22; 26,25;
sumplêroun, complete (verb), 125,13 32,17; 72,26; 97,4; 100,1; 109,15;
sumplokê, combination, 85,9 119,5.12; 120,4; 121,2.6.14; 152,12
sunagein, draw together, 52,22; sunthesis, putting together, 13,16;
correlate, 14,20 53,20; 56,4; 112,22.24; 120,3; 137,8
sunaisthanesthai, perceive in suntithenai, put together, 13,13;
conjunction with, 148,10 53,21; 54,2.19; 58,6; 82,1; 85,6;
sunaisthêsis, joint perception, 36,12; 111,10.14.15.17; 113,12; 126,16;
163,12 136,20; 144,4; 158,5
sunaition, contributory cause, suntonos, intense, 136,11
71,14.15 sunuparkhein, be present together,
sunapodeiknunai, demonstrate in 168,1
conjunction, 149,1; 156,19 sustasis, constitution, 25,12; 39,6;
sunaptein, join together, 4,16; 7,3; 68,17; 71,20; consistency, 26,21;
 Indexes 225
71,10.12; 74,16; condensation, thlibesthai, be compressed, 15,12;
107,23; 108,4; formation, 107,14.15 16,3.14.18; 17,14
sustoikhia, column, 77,16 thlipsis, compression, 16,9; 20,8.16
sustoikhos, correspondent, 142,28; threptikos, nutritive, 3,14.20;
143,3; 144,20; 9,24.25.27.28; 10,1.5.7-9; 78,10;
145,5-8.10.14.15.17.18.23.25 96,4; 105,4; 109,13
sustrophê, condensation, 76,20 threpsis, nourishing process, 107,23
suzugia, pair, 6,5.16; 7,13; 8,5 thrupsis, dispersal, 66,15
thumian, burn, 38,6; 93,20; 103,13;
takhos, rapidity, 17,20.22; 18,7.19; 130,13
19,8.11 thumos, spiritedness, 5,21.26; 7,11
tattein, order (verb), 36,13; 54,24; thurathen, from outside, 100,10
98,4; 173,12 Timaios, (Plato’s) Timaeus, 14,22.23;
taxis, ordering, 11,23; 28,28 20,15; 21,3; 22,18; Timaeus
tekhnê, art, 125,8 (persona in the dialogue), 14,4
tekmêrion, evidence, 24,21 tithenai, tithesthai, postulate, 35,8;
teleiôsis, completion, 125,15.27 37,9; 39,26; 62,10; 68,25; 96,5;
telos, end, 48,22 136,6.12; 141,8; 146,5.16; 151,23;
temnein, divide, 30,10.17; 109,23; 152,6; 154,1.3; 157,14.21; 158,26;
110,5; 111,2.7; 114,14.20; 161,9.16; 162,14; 164,19; 165,23;
115,11.25; 122,12 place, 69,17; 170,12; 172,17
tephra, ashes, 71,29; 82,18 tomê, division, 110,5; 113,18.20;
tephrôdês, ash-like, 107,14 115,12; 121,20
têrein, keep, 169,26; 170,1.4; watch, tonos, tension, 126,20
58,18; heed, 122,1 topos, place, 10,17; 19,21; 22,21;
tetrapêkhus, four cubit, 156,3 26,19; 29,13.14.26; 30,1.7; 39,12;
tetrapoun, quadruped, 99,18 40,27; 76,22; 79,22; 98,25; 99,5;
thalpein, warm (verb), 27,14 108,7.10; 109,11; 130,10; 132,21
theion, brimstone, 103,10 to ti ên einai, essence, 112,11;
thêlukos, feminine, 151,1; 152,6 166,13.18; 167,1
Theophrastos, Theophrastus, 72,3; trakhêlos, neck, 51,3
87,11 trakhus, rough, 83,17; 84,5.14.16.21;
theôrein, contemplate, 75,12; 112,11; 85,1
inquire into, 5,3 trakhutês, roughness, 83,7.10
theôrêma, object of contemplation, treis, three, 41,3; 54,13.17.18; 55,3;
161,1 143,23; 161,2
theôrêtikos, pertaining to inquiry, trepesthai, turn, 63,23
12,7 trephein, nourish, 9,12.14; 10,2.3;
theôria, inquiry, 2,4.8; 5,1.16; 6,2.7; 72,5; 77,5.24; 78,5-7; 79,1-4.8.11;
7,1.2; 11,4.7; 12,4; 13,11; 14,4.9 80,7.20; 96,18; 107,4.5.7.8.20;
thermainein, heat (verb), 52,23; 108,3.4.9.16.17.23.25.27; 109,1.3.13
69,7.19; 71,2.3.10.11; 98,24; trigônon, triangle, 161,2
130,14.15; 133,9.21; 134,13.14 tripsis, rubbing (noun), 52,21
thermos, hot, 6,12; passim trophê, nourishment, 7,20.26;
thermotês, heat, 44,23; 69,7.8; 72,10; 9,11.19.22; 10,19.23; 46,10; 70,9;
73,15.23; 74,24.26.27; 76,14.28; 77,5.25-7; 78,1.3.14.15.19.23;
78,10.12; 88,14; 89,19; 95,5; 98,22; 79,5.13.17.18; 80,3.13; 82,23; 90,11;
99,6.21; 109,10.16; 130,26; 134,15; 96,7.8.10.11.19.22-4; 97,1; 100,21;
hot affection, 109,25; 137,6 101,8; 102,19; 103,17.21; 104,5;
thesis, position, 50,19; 107,6.9.18.22.23;
127,9.12.14.20.24; 128,1 108,8.11.12.15.16.18.21.25; 109,3
trophimos, nourishing, 9,23; 76,25;
226 Indexes
77,6.8-10.14.21; 79,7.10; xanthos, yellow, 81,16.24; 165,27
80,12.14.19.23; 81,7; 82,11.13.15; xêros, dry, 6,12; passim
96,4.6.18.21; 97,4.11; 100,13.18; xêrotês, dryness, dry affection, 44,23;
102,17.27; 103,4.20; 104,3.13; passim
106,8.23
tropos, way, 18,7; 24,14; 33,24; zêlôtos, worthy of emulation, 12,3
55,4.9.26; 59,8; 61,11; 63,9.13; zêtein, investigate, 117; 29,20; 67,18;
68,13; 74,26; 80,20; 88,4.12.16; seek, 14,19.21
101,17; 141,12.20.21; zêtêsis, investigation, 11,22; 14,4
142,1.6.9.14.18.21; character, 39,5 zôê, life, 2,13; 3,19.22.24; 4,9; 5,5.8.31;
tunkhanein, chance (verb), 81,3; 6,15.22.24; 7,12; 8,7; peri zôês kai
83,24 thanatou, (Aristotle’s) On Life and
tuphlos, blind, 13,24 Death, 6,19
tukhon, to, chance, 28,26; 33,10; zôion, animal, 2,8; passim; peri zôiôn
68,14.22 geneseôs, (Aristotle’s) On the
Coming-To-Be of Animals, 79,14
 Subject Index

accident, light is colour accidentally: and Stoics: 73,4-30; mathematical

42,21-43,16; some smells possess bodies: 111,11-19; proper colour
pleasure accidentally: 95,15-99,15 distinction: 49,24-51,9; solid/fluid
activity, activities of animals involve distinction: 48,16-49,23
perception: 3,7; activities of brain, and eye: 39,5-21; and heart:
animals not without body: 3,6-7; 40,3-41,23; naturally cold:
5,13-19; 5,20-30; 5,31-6,15; 38,12-39,4; 98,12-99,15
7,15-8,13 (see also ‘animals’);
activity distinguished from action: capacities, several of sight impossible:
4,3-6; and division of animals: 158,17-162,11
4,14-15; and soul: 4,15-16; 14,8-10 cause, first cause: 11,21-2
actuality, actualities of perception and colour, analogy with flavour:
perceptible are the same: 76,25-77,27; 80,21-81,3;
37,6-38,11; 41,24-42,20; opposite to 81,10-82,20; 142,12-143,8; analogy
potentiality: 37,6-38,11 with sound: 53,9-55,8; and
air, and sound: 66,7-17; and smell: boundary: 48,16-49,23; and
90,3-20 transparency: 44,8-47,20; and light:
animals, activities not without body: 42,21-43,16; 48,16-49,23; and
3,6-7; 5,13-19; 5,20-30; 5,31-6,15; visibility: 51,19-52,5; Aristotelian
7,15-8,13; and life: 3,22-3; and theory: 63,13-65,21; bodies
perception: 2,22-4; 3,7; 3,19-20; coloured from outside: 49,24-50,13;
9,1-2; 14,10-11; and soul: 2,7-24; colour-difference explained:
3,3-6; and taste: 9,7-17; and touch: 52,6-56,5; juxtaposition theory:
9,2-11; 66,18-67,9; preservation 53,9-55,8; 59,19-60,17; 61,7-62,6;
aided by senses: 10,15-12,5; sense 63,7-65,3; Pythagorean theory:
of smell: 66,18-67,9; 98,12-104,18; 48,16-49,23; superimposition
106,5-109,16 theory: 55,9-56,5; 60,18-61,6;
atomism, (for ‘atomic’ times: see time) 62,7-63,6
atoms are without perceptible coming-to-be, and perception:
affections: 112,15-113,6 124,20-126,24; and time:
awareness, of perception: 16,9-16 124,20-126,24

black, and transparency: 44,8-47,20 deliberation: 11,23-12.1

body, and animal activities: 3,6-7; demonstration, and psychology:
5,1-6,15; 7,15-8,13; and senses: 4,18-25
14,17-22; and soul: 3,16; boundary dry, and flavour: 73,30-74,27;
distinguished from boundary of 75,25-76,24; and flavour/smell:
transparency: 47,21-49,23; 66,18-67,9; 88,4-90,2; and smell:
boundary is surface: 44,8-47,20; 93,25-95,14
determinate/indeterminate
distinction: 44,8-47,20; divisibility earth, acts on water: 72,18-73,3; and
of: 109,17-122,23; interaction of transparency: 44,8-47,20; and
bodies according to Aristotle, Plato,
228 Indexes
flavour: 71,15-72,17; 73,30-74,27; light, and body: 33,1-25; and colour:
and touch: 39,22-40,2 42,21-47,20; 48,16-49,23;
eye, material composition: 15,3-27,19; 51,19-52,5; and transparency:
27,20-28,15; 33,26-34,21; 44,8-47,20; and fire: 42,21-43,16;
35,17-36,4; 36,5-37,5; 39,5-21 and relational state: 31,15-18;
42,21-43,16; 131,11-132,16;
fire, and transparency: 44,8-47,20; 134,11-19; 134,20-135,22; fusion of:
and light: 42,21-43,16; 44,8-47,20; 27,20-28,15; 32,1-26; 33,1-25;
and sight: 27,20-28,15; and smell: 33,26-34,21; time taken to travel:
37,6-38,11; 38,12-39,4; 39,5-21 124,3-19; 132,17-134,19
flashing phenomenon: 15,5-20,13
flavour, analogy with colour: magnitude, invisible magnitudes:
76,25-77,27; 80,21-81,3; 59,19-28; 60,18-63,12;
81,10-82,20; 142,12-143,8; and 109,17-122,23; 148,21-155,19; no
density: 70,17-71,14; and dryness: largest imperceptible or smallest
66,18-67,9; 71,15-72,17; 73,30-75,8; perceptible magnitude: 122,3-23;
75,25-77,27; 88,4-89,7; and 168,11-173,12; no smallest
elements: 67,10-68,4; 90,21-91,11; magnitude: 122,21-3; perception of:
and earth: 73,30-75,8; and heat: 155,20-156,22
70,17-72,17; 75,1-8; 93,25-95,14; matter, and elements: 73,4-30; and
and moist: 73,30-75,8; 75,25-77,27; potentiality: 38,12-39,4; of
88,4-89,7; and nourishment: perceptibles: 41,24-42,20;
76,25-77,27; and smell: 66,18-67,9; something underlying: 44,8-47,20
88,4-90,2; 90,21-92,16; 93,25-95,14; mixture, true mixture distinguished
and water: 73,30-74,27; from juxtaposition: 63,13-65,3
Aristotelian theory: 71,15-72,17; moist, and flavour: 73,30-74,27;
73,30-75,8; 76,25-77,27; 88,4-90,2; and smell: 88,4-90,2
Democritean theory: 68,5-28; movement, and hearing: 123,1-14;
82,21-83,12; efflux theory: 128,7-129,27; 132,17-133,27; and
82,21-87,4; Empedoclean theory: perception: 143,9-26; and smell:
67,10-68,28; 69,10-70,5; species of: 123,14; 128,7-129,27;
81,4-9; 87,5-12 132,17-133,27; change all together:
form, and soul: 4,9-10; of elements: 133,7-134,10; divisibility of:
72,18-73,3; of perceptible admitted 124,3-19; greater drives out lesser:
in perception: 41,24-42,20; 135,23-139,8; opposite movements
58,23-59,18; forms of perceptibles impossible at same time:
not infinite: 65,22-66,6 143,9-143,26

God, first cause: 11,21-2 nutrition, and digestion: 77,28-78,21;

and flavour: 76,25-77,27;
hearing, and movement: 123,1-14; and 78,22-80,20; and growth:
vision: 12,6-14,5; 128,7-129,27; 77,28-79,22; and perception: 3,20-1;
musical theorists’ theory: and plants: 3,21-2; and smell:
146,1-155,19; Stratonian theory: 107,1-109,16; and taste: 9,7-10,11;
126,19-24; time taken: 123,1-14; 77,28-78,21; and touch: 77,28-78,21
124,20-126,24; 128,7-129,27;
132,17-133,27; value: 12,3-5 perceptibles, and movement: 123,1-14;
heart, and brain: 40,3-41,23; and and predication: 149,16-150,11;
perceptive soul: 40,3-41,23; and and treatise: 1,15-18; coexistence
senses: 40,3-41,23; naturally hot: of: 165,21-166,4; common
40,3-41,23 perceptibles: 11,12-19; 12,22-9;
heat, and nutrition: 79,11-80,20 divisibility of: 109,17-122,23;
 Indexes 229
168,11-173,12; forms of 82,21-83,12; on smell: 92,17-93,9;
perceptibles not infinite: on water: 71,15-72,17
65,22-66,6; function in perception: sense-organ, and animal activities:
41,24-42,20; 75,9-24; intellection of: 5,1-19; and elements: 14,18-22;
111,20-112,14; mixture of: 37,6-38,11; 38,12-39,4; 39,22-41,23;
135,23-139,8; 143,27-144,19; and perception: 1,12-13; 8,9-13;
perceptible distinguished from and treatise: 1,11-14; 2,1-5; 3,17
being: 41,24-42,20; 51,19-52,5; senses, and perception: 1,5-7; 1,8; and
potentially and actually perceptible preservation of animals:
distinguished: 41,24-42,20; same 10,15-12,5; touch distinction:
perceptible perceived by several 104,19-105,9
people: 128,24-131,10; species of: shame, 12,1-5
113,7-116,6; 142,12-143,8; smell, accuracy of: 66,18-67,9; and
144,20-145,25; 157,11-158,16; time transparency: 89,7-90,2; and dry:
taken to reach sense-organ: 66,18-67,9; 93,25-95,14; and
123,1-14; 124,20-126,24; elements: 15,2-3; and fire:
128,7-129,27; unity of: 139,9-142,11 37,6-38,11; 38,12-39,4; 39,5-21; and
perception, and animals: 2,22-4; 3,7; flavour: 66,18-67,9; 88,4-90,2;
3,19-20; 7,15-8,13; 8,20-1; and 90,21-92,16; 93,25-95,14;
body/soul: 2,4-5; 3,8; and 95,15-99,15; and nutrition:
coming-to-be: 124,20-126,24; and 107,1-109,16; and pleasure:
heart: 40,3-41,23; and judgement: 95,15-99,15; and taste:
167,10-168,10; and movement: 134,20-135,22; and vision:
143,9-26; and potentiality: 1,8; and 128,7-129,27; and water: 90,3-20;
sense-organ: 1,12-13; 8,9-13; 134,20-135,22; Heraclitean theory:
33,26-34,21; 36,5-37,5; and senses: 92,17-93,24; intermediate status:
1,5-7; and time: 150,12-155,19; 104,19-106,4; movement: 123,1-14;
self-consciousness of: 148,91-10; Platonic theory: 14,22-15,2;
simultaneous perceptions: Pythagorean theory: 14,22-15,2;
135,23-168,10; unity of: 36,5-37,5; 107,1-109,16; species of:
40,3-41,23; 139,9-142,11; 95,15-104,18; 106,5-24; time taken:
143,27-144,19; 157,11-158,16; 123,1-14; 128,7-129,27;
162,12-168,10 132,17-133,27; vapour theory:
potentiality, and health: 6,9-13; and 92,17-93,24
matter: 38,12-39,4; and perception: soul, and body: 3,16; and
1,8; 41,24-42,20; 75,9-24; and soul: form/potentiality: 4,9-10; and
4,9-10; divisibility of: plants: 3,18-22; definition: 2,15-16;
109,17-122,23; not separable: 4,15-16; indivisibility of perceptive
43,17-44,7; opposite to actuality: soul: 157,11-158,16; 162,12-168,10;
37,6-38,11; potentially perceptible: in itself: 3,8-17; powers: 1,3-5
116,7-122,2 sound, analogy with colour: 53,9-55,8;
power, and senses: 1,5-7; of soul: defined: 66,7-17
1,3-5; 3,8-15 substance, not opposite to substance:
73,4-30
relational state, and light: 31,15-18;
42,21-43,16; 131,11-132,16; taste, and animals: 9,7-17; and heat:
134,11-135,22; and perception: 40,3-41,23; and moisture:
17,12-13; and vision: 126,25-128,6; 39,22-40,2; and nutrition:
134,20-135,22 9,7-10,11; 77,28-78,21; and smell:
134,20-135,22; and touch:
scientists: 6,26-7,6; on perception: 77,28-78,21; and water:
230 Indexes
134,20-135,22; sense-organ: hearing: 12,6-14,5; and relational
40,3-41,23 state: 126,25-128,6; 134,20-135,22;
time, indivisible (or ‘atomic’) times: Aristotelian theory: 35,1-16;
135,23-136,5; 156,23-158,5; 58,23-59,18; 62,7-63,6;
161,4-162,11; imperceptible times: Democritean theory: 56,6-58,22;
59,19-63,6; 146,1-155,19; not 82,21-87,4; 123,15-124,19;
perceptible in itself: 147,5-23; time distinguished from hearing and
of perception: 150,12-155,19; time smelling: 128,7-129,27; effect of
taken in perception: 123,1-14; time medium: 50,14-51,9; emission
taken by light to spread: 124,3-19 theory: 27,20-28,15; Empedoclean
touch, accuracy of: 66,18-67,9; and theory: 27,20-28,15; 56,6-58,22;
earth: 39,22-40,2; and heat: 123,15-124,19; Leucippean theory:
40,3-41,23; and perception: 56,6-58,22; mathematicians’
82,21-83,12; and taste: 77,28-78,21; theory: 27,20-28,15; objections to
omitted from treatise: 109,20-2; efflux theory: 31,20-9; 56,6-58,22;
sense-organ: 40,3-41,23; time 59,19-63,6; 82,21-87,4; objections to
taken: 125,12-126,24 emission theory: 28,16-31,18;
transparency, a common nature: 32,1-16; 33,1-25; Platonic theory:
43,17-47,20; 51,10-18; 52,6-53,8; 27,20-28,15; 33,1-25; time taken:
and colour: 42,21-43,16; 44,8-48,15; 124,3-19; 126,25-129,27;
49,24-50,13; and earth: 44,8-47,20; 132,17-133,27; 134,20-135,22;
and light: 42,21-43,16; and matter: value: 11,5-12,3;
44,8-47,20; and smell: 89,7-90,2; a
potentiality: 43,17-47,20; boundary water, and transparency: 44,8-47,20;
of: 44,8-48,15; 51,19-52,5; and earth: 72,18-73,3; and flavour:
indeterminate transparency: 66,18-72,17; 73,30-74,27;
48,16-49,23; 50,14-51,18 75,25-76,24; and smell: 90,3-20;
and vision: 35,17-36,4; 39,5-21
vision, and body: 28,16-31,18; and white, and transparency: 44,8-47,20