REGISTRATION under Sec 14(1)

A.) Requirements

Malabanan vs Republic (Resolution)

Facts:
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Cavite.
Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that
the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title. To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) dated March 15, 1982. After trial, on
December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA
promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of
Malabanan.

Issue:
Whether or not Malabanan acquired the land through judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
by prescription?

Ruling:
The Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:
No. Malabanan never acquired the land through judicial confirmation nor by prescription.
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and are inalienable.
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through
any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion
and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.

In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Espiritu vs. Republic

GR. 219070 June 21, 2017

Facts:

On March 1, 2010, the petitioners filed before the RTC an Application for Registration of Title to
Land covering a parcel of land located at Parafiaque City, Metro Manila, and identified as Lot 4178,
Cad. 299 of the Paranaque Cadastre Case 3 (subject land). Attached to the petitioners' application
were copies of the following documents: (1) Special Powers of Attorney respectively executed by
petitioners Oscar Espiritu (Oscar)  and Alfredo Espiritu (Alfredo )  in favor of petitioner Conrado
5 6

Espiritu, Jr. (Conrado, Jr.), to represent them in the proceedings relating to the application.

The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents, Conrado Espiritu, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) and
Felicidad Rodriguez-Espiritu (Felicidad), were the owners of the subject land; that they inherited the
subject land after their parents passed away; and that they, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, public, and continuous possession of the subject land
in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. Marrieta, one of the children claimed that the
subject land was agricultural in nature because it was being used as salt land during summer and as
fishpond during rainy season; and that there were no adverse claimants over the subject land.
Conrado, Jr. testified that they utilized the subject land in their salt-making business, which they
inherited from their parents. Conrado, Jr. testified that he commissioned the survey of the subject
land; that he requested and received from (DENRNCR), a Certification, stating that the subject land
was part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Conrado, Jr. admitted that their
salt-making business ceased operation in 2004, and that the subject land had become idle.

the RTC granted the application for registration. The trial court opined that the petitioners were able
to establish possession and occupation over the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Aggrieved, the Republic, through the OSG, elevated an appeal to the
CA.

The CA reversed and set aside the July 30, 2012 RTC decision. In reversing the trial court, the
appellate court reiterated the prevailing doctrine that to successfully register a parcel of land, the
application must be accompanied by: (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification stating the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners acquired the land under Section 14(1) of PD1529?

Ruling: The petition is DENIED

Ratio Decidendi:

No, they never acquired the land under Section 14(11) of PD 1529. Registration under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the
land was susceptible to private ownership at that time.  Thus, for registration under Section 14(1) to
prosper, the applicant for original registration of title to land must establish the following: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the
applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and (3) that the possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In this case, the petitioners presented several tax declarations in their names, the earliest of which
dates back only to 1970.  This period of possession and occupation is clearly insufficient to give the
1âwphi1

petitioners the right to register the subject land in their names because the law requires that
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

To prove the alienable and disposable character of the subject land, the petitioners
presented the DENR-NCR certification stating that the subject land was verified to be within the
alienable and disposable part of the public domain. This piece of evidence is insufficient to overcome
the presumption of State ownership. As already discussed, the present rule requires the
presentation, not only of the certification from the CENRO/PENRO, but also the submission of a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records.

Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529
For registration under this provision to prosper, the applicant must establish the following requisites:
(a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years,
in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c)
the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the
beginning of the said 10- year or 30-year period of possession
Here, the petitioners failed to present any competent evidence which could show that the
subject land had been declared as part of the patrimonial property of the State. The DENR-NCR
certification presented by the petitioners only certified that the subject land was not needed for forest
purposes. This is insufficient because the law mandates that to be subjected to acquisitive
prescription, there must be a declaration by the State that the land applied for is no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil
Code. Clearly, the petitioners failed to prove that they acquired the subject land through acquisitive
prescription. Thus, the same could not be registered under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
 AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM [AFP-RSBS] vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.180086               July 2, 2014

FACTS:

On July 10, 1997, the Armed Forcesof the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS) filed an application for original registration of parcels of land consisting of
48,151 square meters in Silang, Cavite. These were allegedly acquired from Narciso Ambrad,
Alberto Tibayan, and Restituto Tibayan on March 13, 1997It was also alleged that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the properties since June 12, 1945.

In a decision dated July 28, 2001, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court approved AFP-RSBS’s
application for original registration. The Republic of the Philippines moved for the reconsideration of
the decision However, the motion was denied in an order dated February 19, 2003. 8

On March 14, 2003, the Republic appealed the decision and order of the trial court, alleging
improper identification of the properties, noncompliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 7-96
dated July 15, 1996 requiring that copies of a list of lots applied for be furnished to the Bureau of
Lands,non-submission of a tracing cloth plan, and lack of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources certification showing that the properties were already declared alienable and
disposable at the time of possession by the predecessors-in-interest. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and dismissed AFP-RSBS’s application.

Issue: Whether the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and
disposable agricultural land should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession for
purposes of original registration?

Ruling:
The petition was GRANTED.

Ratio Decidendi: No, it should not be excluded. Section 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in
Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually
declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fideclaim of ownership
long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto.
Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. Upon satisfaction of
this requirement, the computation of the period may include the period of adverse possession prior
to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable.
Petitioner’s right to the original registration of title over the property is, therefore, dependent on the
existence of: a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time ofthe application
for registration and b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or
through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier. In this case, there is no dispute
that the properties were already declared alienable and disposable land on March 15, 1982. Hence,
the property was already alienable and disposable at the time of petitioner’s application for
registration on July 10, 1997. As to the required period of possession, petitioner was able to show
that it, through itself or its predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession before 1945 through testimonies and documents. Based on the testimonies,
we can already deduce that petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest had possessed the properties in the
concept of an owner even earlier than 1945.Petitioner was, therefore, able to prove all the requisites
for the grant of an original registration of title under our registration laws.

B.) Land must already be A and D at the time of filing of application

Facts:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit,
filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land
situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s
imperfect title over the aforesaid land. On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing
the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico
Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an
order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government. After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the
government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative
of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,
1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation
of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied. RTC and
CA denied the subsequent motions of the Republic.

Issue: Whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that
the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start?

Ruling: The decision of CA was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: No. The property need not be classified as A and D at the time of possession; it
must be such before the application, regardless of its kind at the time of possession.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old
trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in
1945.

(Relate this to Naguit doctrine!! No need land to be alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945.
As long as (1) the possession was from June 12, 1945, and (2) the land was classified as
alienable and disposable before registration, the Sec 14(1) may apply.)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs.  MATEO LAO

Facts:
Mateo Lao (Lao) filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Liloan-Compostela,
Cebu an Application for Original Registration of Title of two parcels of land situated in Cebu. The
subjects of the Application are Lot Nos. 206 and 208 covered by Compostela Subdivision AP-
072218-001228 containing a total area of 8,800 square meters. Lao alleged in his Application that he
acquired the subject properties by purchase and that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same in
the concept of owners prior to June 12, 1945. Lao attached in his application the following
documents: (1) tracing cloth plan; (2) white print of plan; (3) technical description of the subject
properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; and (5) Certificate of Assessment. The MCTC
rendered a Decision granting Lao's application. The case was later re-opened after the MCTC
received the Opposition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner). Consequently, however,
the MCTC rendered a Decision dated November 28, 2002, granting Lao's application. The CA
rendered the herein assailed Decision, affirming the MCTC ruling.

Issue: Whether Lao's application for original registration of the subject properties should be
granted?

Ruling: the petition is GRANTED

Ratio Decidendi:

No, it should not be granted. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, it is imperative for an applicant
for registration of title over a parcel of land to establish the following: (1) possession of the parcel of
land under a bona fide claim of ownership, by himself and/or through his predecessors-in-interest
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (2) that the property sought to be registered is already declared
alienable and disposable at the time of the application.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim and cannot just offer general statements, which are mere conclusions of law rather than
factual evidence of possession."Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property." Lao's claim of
ownership of the subject properties based on the tax declarations he presented will not prosper. It is
only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that
they may become the basis of a claim of ownership. As already stated, Lao failed to prove that he
and his predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the subject properties since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by (PENRO) and (CENRO). These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Lao failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had
indeed approved a land classification and approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. Lao merely presented a tracing cloth plan, supposedly approved by the Land
Management Bureau of the DENR, which allegedly showed that the subject properties indeed form
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.

Facts:
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007
hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. When the trial court called the case
for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order of General
Default against the whole world except as against petitioner. The testimonies of respondent's
witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and
continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio
executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga
(Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961,
Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio's
children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to Respondent.

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent on the
basis of possession since June 12, 1945. So, Republic appealed to CA. In its 21 August 2002
Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.

Issue:
 Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or
earlier?
Ruling: The court SET ASIDE the decision of CA.

Ratio Decidendi:

No. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of
land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. 
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area
of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the
CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. 
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications submitted here-in
do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the
DENR Secretary. The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a
single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated
testimony insufficient to prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondent
did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955
considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The
payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed
ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

C.) NAGUIT DOCTRINE The case is discussed above! No need land to be alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945. As long as (1) the possession was from June 12, 1945, and (2)
the land was classified as alienable and disposable before registration, the Sec 14(1) may apply

E.) REQUISITE CHARACTER AND PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA

Facts:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an
application5 for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of 5,220 square
meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their application, they stated, among other
things, that they are the sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones
Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had
been in possession of the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and
father on 19 February 1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the property among
themselves and subdivided it into five lots, namely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and
2111-E. Since then they have been in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners
and in a public and peaceful manner. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application.
The MTC found that the respondents have sufficiently established their family's actual, continuous,
adverse, and notorious possession of the subject property for more than fifty-seven years,
commencing from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such
possession was in an adverse and public manner.

Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether the respondents had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier?

Ruling:
The petition is granted and the CA decision is reversed and set aside.

Ratio Decidendi:
No, they do not have such possession.
Under SEC. 14. Persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land,: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property. Here, no evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz
Melendez cultivated, had control over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land
for agricultural purposes. Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no evidence as
to how big was the portion occupied by the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the
Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation purposes or paid its taxes. While tax
receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least,
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership

The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land upon the death of
their parents who died on May 1976 and February 1967, respectively, and that they had been
religiously paying the taxes thereon. If that were so, why had they not themselves introduced any
improvement on the land? We even find unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a
tenant on the land. They did not present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one tenant could
have cultivated such a vast tract of land with an area of 2.6 hectares.

The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation purposes by the
respondents only for the year 1994. We cannot trust the assertion of the respondents that they
immediately took possession of the property in the concept of an owner after the death of their
parents. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate
the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT

Facts:
The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an
area of 9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the subject property
consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B)
from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition
with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondent’s predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property
since June 12, 1945.
After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the
respondent’s petition for registration of the land in question
On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTC’s August 27, 2004 Decision

Issue:
Whether the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA and P.D. No.
1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles?

Ruling: The petition was granted.

Ratio Decidendi:
No, the respondent did not prove itself as entitled.
It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an
imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious" in character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, this Court explained that the
23 

intent behind the use of "possession" in conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the need for
actual and not just constructive or fictional possession. On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as
to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for purposes
of prescription must be "in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted".

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11) Tax Declarations
covering Area B for a claimed possession of more than forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not
qualify as competent evidence of actual possession and occupation.

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A were four years old at the
time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as evidence that her possession
commenced prior to June 12, 1945, in the absence of evidence that she planted and cultivated them.

Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it was the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual cultivation or harvesting was made does
not constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession and occupation.

Fourth, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were
performed by the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a
general claim that they came into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law
and not factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice

Finally, that the respondent’s application was filed after only four years from the time the subject
property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DAR’s October 26, 1990 Order shows lack
of possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period.
 1âwphi1

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