09 Chapter 4

CHAPTER: 4
FAMINES AND RELIEF MEASURES IN UNITED

PROVINCE OF AGRA AND AWADH: 1858-1947
The word ‘famine’ has been derived from the Latin word fames, meaning
hunger. It has been defined in ‘A New English Dictionary’ as a condition of extreme
general scarcity of food’ or ‘want of food, hunger & starvation in a certain area or part
of a country.1 However, famine means a state of extreme hunger suffered by the
population of a region as a result of the failure of the accustomed food supply.2 The
explanation of the calamity is authentic only under primitive and medieval conditions
of economic life. Due to lack of means of transport and absence of well established
channels of trade man under those conditions had to remain alive on food raised either
by himself or by others in his immediate neighborhood. Therefore, famine under these
conditions, means absolute demand of food in the distressed region and the rich or
poor all suffer alike from its desolate, when it occurred. But, modern developments in
industry, trade & transport have created a radical change both in the meaning and
nature of the famine. Instead of absolute demand, famine under modern conditions
has come to signify an abrupt and sharp rise in food prices. In a modern famine, food
may be available in market at all times but prices are extremely high that the poor
people cannot buy it.
This transformation in the nature of famine was created in India by the

construction of railway lines and development of trade after 1860. At the same time
there were other forces at work leading to steady bankruptcy of certain class, so
creating a class of potential victims of poverty and scarcities. Thus, the ground was
prepared, not only for the change in the nature of famine but also for increase in its
frequency.
The Report of Indian Famine Commissions of 1880, 1898 & 1901, tells a sad
story of Indian famines. In a period of 90 years, from 1765-1858,3 the country
experienced twelve famines and four “sever scarcities. From 1860 to 1906, famines
1 A New English Dictionary on Historical Principle, ed. Sir James A.H. Murrey, published by
Oxford University in 40 volumes, p.
2 Southard, “Famine”, Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol. VI, p. 85 [(Article) Journals].
3 In 1765 the British East India Company took over the Diwani (Right to Collect Revenue) of
Bengal.
74
and scarcities widespread in one part of the country or the other”, which are twenty in
number within the period of 49 years.4 India has suffered from famines since ancient
times. Yet, a complete record of all the famines, that occurred in pre-British rule of
Indian history is missing, the available record suggest that in the earlier times a major
famine appeared once in every 50 years.5 From the starting of the 11th century, to the
end of the 17th century, there were 14 famines, almost all of which were confined to
regions very much limited in area.
FAMINE BEFORE 1858:
Under British rule frequency of famine was increased and several famines
occurred in North Western Provinces and Oudh, as mentioned in Famine Commission
Report and UP District Gazetteer. The earliest famine of the century occurred in
1802-04. It intensely affected the Bombay presidency, Hyderabad & NWP and
partially northern district of Madras. Besides the failure of rains, the district of Oudh,
deteriorated greatly due to exorbitant increase of the land revenue.6 It was again felt in
1805-06 due to absence of rainfall till the middle of August. The most severe famine
of the first half of the 19th century was occurred in 1837-38, which extended to a great
part of doab region and upper part of India. It affected the whole country between
Allahabad and Delhi, the adjoining states of Rajputana as far West as Jaipur.7 The
area came under famine was about 11,300 square miles and 56,000 square miles of
which came under the British territory 28,600,000 population was distressed, while
mortality due to famine was about 8,00,000 as estimated by colonel Baird Smith. It
can also be estimated by the statement of Mr. Jhon Lawrence. Who wrote that “I have
never in my life seen such utter desolation at that which is now spread over the
parganas of Hodar & Palwal”. In many places i.e., Kanpur, Fatehpur, Agra etc. dead
bodies were lying on the road side, tire these were not taken by the wild animals.,.8 It
was caused by the total failure of rains in 1837 after a series of bad seasons, but was
worsened by an exorbitant revenue demand. Baird Smith correctly observed that “the
native society had to face the 1837 famine debilitated by a fiscal system that was
4 Uttar Pradesh District Gazetteer, edt. Balwant Singh, Allahabad, 1987, pp. 88-89; Report of the
Indian Famine Commission (hereafter IFC): 1901, p. 1.
5 Loveday, History & Economics of Indian Faminies, New Delhi, 1985, p. 25.
6 Girdle stone’s Report, op.cit., p. 13.
7 IFC Report: 1880-85, Agricole Publication Academy, New Delhi, 1989, para 47.
8 R.C. Dutt, Land Revenue & Famine in India, Delhi, 1985, pp. 6-7.
75
oppressive and depressing in its influence and the agrarian class was very restless.9
The famine continued tire the rainy season of 1838. Government provided relief in the
form of work on low wages but sufficient funds were not available. In the rainy
season, work was stopped and thousands were out of work.10 Gratuitous relief was left
to public charity. A relief society was also formed at Agra in February 1838 and an
asylum enclose by brick wall, was started. Entrances were by tickets and cooked food
was distributed to the poor people.11
FAMINE OF 1860-61: It was again felt in 1860-61 and occurred mostly in those
areas where the revolt of 1857 had taken place. Because of the revolt most of the land
remained uncultivated. Irregular and poor season of 1858-59 and scanty monsoon of
1860 caused for the great loss of autumn harvest.12 The rain did not start till the 13th
of the July and even after this, it rained few days. Because of it the soil was not wet
enough to germinate the seeds and to reach its maturity. The famine was intense only
between Agra and Delhi, which was habited by 5½ million of people and the whole
area distressed by it was 48,000 square miles. 13 Conditions deteriorated in Meerut
Division, when people were forced to use mango stones as food.14 Reports received
from adjacent of Agra, Allahabad & Fatehpur were similarly in poor condition.
RELIEF MEASURES 1860-61: The policy for relief was laid down by government
at a very initial stage of the famine.15 It consisted of giving work to able-bodied and
gratuitous distribution of food to the very aged, very young and the infirm, who were
actually not able to work. The Government advised the officers of irrigation and
public work departments of the district officers, to receive into their labouring gangs
as many people as they can furnish with suitable employment. 16 In case this proved
deficient, special works of real utility and benefit were to be selected by the
commissioners with the help of district officers in each district. The amount of wages
was to be kept at the lowest possible scale and was not to be higher than, what would
9 Col. Baird Smith’s Report on the NW Provinces Famine of 1860-61, dated 14th Aug. 1861, Para 32
& 38.
10 C.E.R. Girdlestone’s Report on the Past Famines in the NW Provinces, Allahabad, Govt. Press
(Provincial), 1868, Para 104.
11 IFC Report 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. I, Para 47.
12 Ibid, para 49.
13 IFC Report 1880-85, op.cit.,Pt. I, para 19.
14 Progs. Govt. of India, Home Dept., Public, No. 103 of Oct. 22, 1860.
15 Progs. Gov.t of India, Home (Public), No. 62, Sept. 28, 1860 & No. 18, June 1861.
16 Girdlestone, op.cit., para 121.
76
enable the people to buy sufficient food to keep them alive for labour.17 However, the
policies of relief were same as had been adopted in 1837. Relief works were started
by the Commissioner after consulting with the District Magistrates. Ten large relief
works were opened in NWP, which were carried either by public work department or
by Road & Ferry Fun Committees, as the expenditure incurred on such works was
debited to the famine account and not to the PWD.18 Relief measures of the Govt.
were limited, works were provided at low rate of daily wages,19 a fixed task of work
being demanded in return. The works included earth works, cutting of roads through
hills and excavating side channels to existing canals.20
Besides the above, minor works such as tank; embankments and small
irrigation were opened specially for those people, who were unable to travel far from
their homes. In such cases, the wages were provided in the form of cooked food, not
in cash and works were controlled by local relief committees.21 Altogether, about 12½
lakh rupees were expanded and about 35,000 persons were employed daily for a
period of 10 months on these works. The local works were confined to the districts of
Agra, Etawah and the Meerut Division. The relief works were not popular because of
the extremely low rate of wages, which meant extreme distress, when the price of
food grain was rose to seven seers a rupee.
Gratuitous relief was left on charitable relief fund, aided by contributions from
others part of India and from England. Orders for the formation of local relief
committees in each district and for inviting private contributions were issued from Lt.
Governor of NWP to the District Magistrates as early as 19th Dec. 1860. The function
of central relief committee, which was formed at Agra in January 1861, was to correct
subscriptions from the public, distribute aid to the affected districts, coordinate the
work of local committees, and organize relief to the poor and disabled. All local
committees were ordered to inform the conditions of the people, local requirements,
the state of the local fund and the state of the distress, to the central committee. 22 As
soon as subscriptions started coming in, the money were allotted in proportion to the
17 Progs. Govt. of India, Home (Public), No. 47, Dec. 29, 1860, letter from G. Couper, Scry to Govt.
of NWP to the Commissioner of Meerut Division, No. 1375A, dated Agra, the 14th Dec. 1860.
18 Progs. Govt. of NWP, General Dept., May 1861, Index No. 115, p. 158.
19 In NWP uncooked flour was given once, Baird Smith’s Report, 25th May 1861, para 23.
20 Progs. Govt. of India, Home (Public), No. 24, May 29, 1862(A).
22 Progs. Govt. of NWP. General Dept., No. 51-52, February 23, 1861.
77
distress localities.23 It was generally provided in the form of cooked food to these
persons who lived in an enclosed poor house. This system was first started in
Moradabad by Sir James Strachey, who was at that time collector; it was generally
adopted throughout the NWP. For the first time, famine formed the subject of a
special inquiry, colonel Baird Smith was appointed to examine into and report on the
causes, area and intensity of the famine and the best measures for its relief. 24 The food
distributed was normally cooked by Brahman, so that it might not be objected by
upper cast of Hindus.25
It was realized during the course of relief that many women of respectable
Muslim families refused to go to the public kitchen. Such women were provided work
i.e., cotton for spinning at their homes in return, they were paid in cash to enable them
to maintain themselves.26 Only in the districts of Meerut and Moradabad, relief to
purdanashin women was given to an appreciable extent, though such relief was also
provided in Agra and a few other parts of NWP. The system was cost effective and
worked successfully.27
The central relief committee further, supported the agriculturist class in

purchasing seed grain and plough cattle. The grant for purchasing seed grain was a
free gift but, for purchasing plough cattle was considered as an advance to be
refunded on conditions laid down by collector at his concern. 28 Besides, these
advances, the Govt. also gave advances for digging well, etc., recoverable within five
years.29 The relief measures in the form of employment helped to save the population
of the affected tract from the degree of desolation and devastation that happened in
the famine of 1837-38. In terms of mortality, the famine of 1837-38 was much more
alarming than that of 1860.30 The relieved over a period of 10 months was 25,140 in
NWP. Those getting charitable relief, numbered on an average, 33,800 in NWP. The
total cost of relief to the Govt. of NWP was Rs. 14, 89,617.31

24 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., para 49.
25 Girdlestone, op.cit., para 126 & also Appendix IV, P.XXIII. At Moradabad, two kithens were
maintained. One for genera and another for Hindus.
26 Progs. Govt. of NWPs General Dept. Nos. 109 & 114, April 13, 1861.
27 In Moradabad, for example 43-½% in April & 44-¾% in May was recovered.
28 Girdlestone, op.cit., para 142, the total money spent for seed cattle in NWP was Rs. 340,000.
29 Progs. Govt. of NWP. Rev. Dept. Nos. 1&2, 29th Dec. 1860.
30 Baird Smith’s Report, Sec II, para 171.
31 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, pp. 31 & 38.
78
FAMINE OF 1868: Again in 1868 monsoon proved to be irregular and late, and
failed totally in parts of Rajputana, in NWP, in Punjab, northern part of central
provinces and the whole of Bombay Deccan.32 In NWP, the same area was affected,
as it happened in 1860, but was less sever than earlier, except in Muttra, Agra, Jhansi
and Lalitput districts of NWP. While in other parts of the Province there was some
recovery from the autumn harvest.33 The summer monsoon of 1868 between June &
Sept.34 was not satisfactory, but irrigation was available on a large extent to protect
the crops. In 1867-68 the area under cultivation through canal irrigation was 2,876
square miles. Protection of canal irrigation was available on a large extent than was in
the case of 1861 and the intensity of distress in different parts of the tract was in
reverse proportion to the percentage of the area protected by canal irrigation. Another,
interesting experience of this famine was that the farmers will only take water (from
canal) to save, not to improve coarser grain crops.35
FAMINE RELIEF: The policy adopted by the Govt. in this famine was to provide
work to the capable bodies on relief works of ‘permanent utility’ on ‘just sufficient’
wages to be paid daily and in cash, except in special cases, when food could be
distributed on coupon.36 The local officers were directed to prepare a list of suitable
works which could be started when it required. In NWP, earliest relief works were
started in Sept. 1868.37 Besides the established works, special works under the Public
Work Department38 civil work under civil officers were opened in all the provinces.
In NWP, a special attention was laid on minor works, which were opened in 20
district of the province. Some works were also started by local fund committees &
municipalities, but records of such works are not available. There was no uniformity
in the system of relief works39 even the wages made by the Govt. of India were too
low in certain places.40 The public works started were not well organized. It was
32 Col. J.C. Brooke: Report on the Famine in Rajputana 1869, in the supplement to the Gazetteer of
India Feb. 25, 1871, paras 36-46.
33 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., para 55.
34 Henvey Frederick, Narrative of Famine in NWP & Punjab (1869), Appendix, II; Monsoon was 609
of the usual average of the area.
35 Ibid, Chapter XII.
36 Progs. Home (Public) Famine, Nos. 72 to 74, 26th Sept. 1868 Resolution of the Govt. of India,
P.W.P. Simla, 24th Sept. 1868.
37 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, pp. 97-99.
38 Ibid., pp. 89-103; in NWP 8 special works were opened.
39 Ibid., Pt. I, Para 71; Fredrick Henrey, A Narrative of the Drought & Famine,
Allahabad,1871,pp.165-66 [Printed at the Provincial Govt. Press].
40 Progs. Home (Public) Famine, No. 8, Sept. 25, 1869.
79
found on enquiry that contractors selected only a few weak persons and refused many,
though they were paid extra to assist the expenditure of insufficient labour.41 The
wages paid by them were not sufficient to provide a ‘scanty meal’ to the labourers, 42
while it was reported from Agra that, works were not provided to the poorest people.43
The percentage of work taken was too high and beyond the capability of the distressed
people. A Central Relief Committee was organized at Allahabad for the collection of
funds and distribution of gratuitous relief was organized and local committees were
organized in the distressed areas under the supervision of central relief committee,
which also permitted to utilize the balance of the previous Famine Fund.44 Apart from
that, some money was also collected by Christian Missionaries for poor relief. 45 Relief
was also given in the form of cooked food through poor houses, which were settled on
the model of the Moradabad Poor Houses of 1861. However, raw grain or money in
place of cooked food was given to the orthodox Hindus.46 Who refused to join poor
houses and to take cooked food. Relief to purdanashin women and respectable
persons was given on the same pattern as in 1860-61.47 Revenue to the amount of 15
lakh was suspended in 1868-69 in the NWP & remissions amounting to Rs. 2,
20,000.48
About 65,000 persons were employed daily for 123 months on works and
about 18,000 daily received gratuitous relief; the total cost was about Rs. 46, 000, 00
in NWP.49 Among the able bodied, the main class who depend on to relief works were
field labourers, village artisans, poorer urban population and above all the weavers.50
Henvey pointed out that, the problem with them was not so much of food which they
could buy if they had the capacity to do so; it was a problem of finding work at
acceptable wages. Works were provided by the Government but the wage rates were
inadequately low. In Bijnour, the wages of men coolies were cut down to 1 anna in
April and 9 pies in June 1869, and men started doing work of women i.e., carrying
baskets, and were paid the same rates as women. Infant & children received 3 pies
41 Brooke, op.cit., paras 221 & 222; Progs. Home (Public) Famine, No. 26, Sept. 25, 1869.
42 Ibid., para 131.
43 IFC Reports 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, p. 4.
44 Henvey, op.cit., p. 24.
45 Brooke, op.cit., Paras 163-66.
46 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, p. 100.
47 Report, Famine Relief Fund, 1868-69, p. 30.
49 Ibid, Para 55, Pt. I.
80
after May 1869, those who were unable to works the first example on record of such
an allowance being compensated. The rates of wage were lowered to 1anna, 9 pies
and 6 pies for man, women & child, respectively in Bareilly. Somewhere else, the
rates were 1½annas, 1annas and 9 pies, respectively. It is little shock that, people
preferred suffering from starvation silently at home to searching employment on
Govt. works. The maximum proportion of population engaged on relief works was
3.5% in Lalitput, which was the worst affected district. The monthly average number
of those receiving this type of relief for a period of 12 months when relief works were
at their peak was excluding Ajmer, 43,000,51 which in a native of 30 million in the
famine region, works out to about 1.5 persons per thousand of the native. In spite of
the “saving every life” declaration, under which these reliefs were taken, the province
last blanks of its population who expired of either hunger or the epidemic connected
with malnutrition and consumption of unhealthful food.52
THE FAMINE OF 1873-74: Lord Northbrooke became the Viceroy in 1872 and
next year he had confronted by the famine of 1873-74, which distressed some portion
of North & North Eastern India, parts of Bengal, Bihar and Eastern parts of NWP and
Oudh, covering an area of about 54,200 square miles and a population of 21,400,00
people.53 In NWP, northern portion of the districts of Basti and Gorakhpur, eastern
portion of Ghazipur, Banda, Hamirpur, Jhansi and southern Mirzapur, covering an
area of 11,192 square miles and a population of 29, 21,000 was affected.54 In Oudh,
Gonda, Behraich and some portion of Fyzabad covering an area of 2900 square miles
and a population of 7, 50,000 was distressed.55 The famine was caused mainly
because of irregular rainfall in 1873 and untimely break of it in September. 56 Most of
these were kharif growing regions and the failure of the summer monsoon badly
affected the kharif crops. The condition of the eastern parts of NWP was further
51 IFC Report, 1988-85, op.cit., Pt. III, p. 92.

52 Ibid, p. 88; IFCR of 1880 found that it was under-estimated; Henvey estimated total famine
mortality in 1869 at 2,00,000.
53 Papers related to the Famine in Bengal and Bihar 1873-74, pp. 87-88.
55 Letter from G.M. Batten Offg. Secy. To the Govt. of India, Dept. of Rev. Agr. & Commerce, to the
Chief Commissioner of Oudh, No. 73, dated Calcutta 20th Feb. 1875 BB.II, p. 217.
56 Narrative of the Scarcity During 1814 in Eastern District of NWP of India, p. 1.
81
distressed by enormous export of food grains and consequent rise in prices, the
general dearth of the mass and specially that of ‘the labouring classes.’ 57
FAMINE RELIEF: The policy adopted in this famine was disposed by the
Government of India in its resolution of the November 7, 1873 and March 6,
1874.The relief measures of 1874 had been accepted in the same way as in 1868.
Relief on liberal scale was given to those, who were capable to work, and at one time
more than 2, 60,000 men, women and children were employed in NWP & Oudh.58
The spirit behind relief operations was to check scarcity from deepening into famine.
The official narrative says that, “we had not to deal with widespread famine actually
existing; all our efforts were directed to avert it; what concerned us first were the
people; the return we sought was not good bargain wrong out of the labourer but the
preservation of population in such a state of health, morally and physically, as to
enable them at the proper time to resume their ordinary occupation as if the recent
calamitous seasons had not occurred.59
The execution of all relief works in NWP was revised by Public Work
Department in February 1874.60 Public works were managed by civil officers in Oudh
but help and supervision in the arrangement of plans and other technical matter was
available from the Public Work Department’s Officers.61 In Gorakhpur and Basti
district works started in Feb. or March 1874 on low wages. Due to lack of discipline
and light task the number of workers rose to more than 200,000. As a result of it, the
wages was scaled down to the subsistence level, strong discipline, tough task and
strict supervisors were introduced. And labourers were not permitted to go home at
night.62 Wages were not uniformed63 and in the later stages of the famine in NWP,
they varied on a sliding scale with the rise in prices so as to enable the labourers to
57 Letter from the Collector of Gorakhpur to the Secy. to the Govt. of NWP, dated Gorakhpur, 8th
Dec. 1874, No. 77 of para 18; No. 195 from the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Central Famine Committee, NWP to the Secy. to Govt. NWP dated Allahabad, 25 Jan. 1875, para
19.
58 Vide Report on Famine in Collection of papers on Bengal Famine, No. XVI, Progs. No. 3, Feb.
1875.
59 Report of Famine in NWP and Oudh & papers relating to it, No. XVI, Feb. 1875, Progs. No. 3,
Para 37 of Enclosures.
60 Narrative of scarcity during 1874 in Eastern NWP of India, with district reports, Allahabad, NWP
Govt. Press, 1875, p. VII.
61 Letter from H.J. Sparks, Secy. to the Chief Commissioners, Oudh to the Secry. to the Govt. of
India, Dept. of Rev., Agr. & Commerce, No. 5652 dated 16 Oct. 1874.
62 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., p. 15.
63 From G.B. Maconochie, Dy. Commissioner of Gonda to Commissioner, Fyzabad Division, No.
1596 dated Gonda the 11th Sept. 1874.
82
buy a certain minimum quantity of food.64 But people were so destitute that had no
choice except to work on the wages offered or to die of malnutrition. In NWP the
number of women and children on relief work was very high.65
In NWP & Oudh 1, 19,000 and 30,000 people were employed everyday for
four and five months respectively.66 Significant relief works which were completed
during the famine were the construction and repair of two irrigation tanks, a drainage
channel, embankment of a river and road works in Oudh.67
Gratuitous relief was given through the two Central Relief Committees
organized at Allahabad and Calcutta in February 1874 with district and sub-divisional
committees in the distressed region68 on the same principles as in 1868-70. In NWP,
however, the Government fund was not totally utilized.69 Poor houses on the model of
earlier famines were constituted in all the distressed parts and reliefs were provided in
the form of cooked food or partly raw grain and partly cash. 70 Distressed areas in
Oudh were divided into circles and relief was arranged through a respectable person
as supervisor, who later reported to the local committees.71 Advances for the
improvement of land, purchase of seed and bullocks, digging of wells were made in
Bengal and NWP. These advances were authorized to zamindars alone and later it
was also provided to intermediate and inferior landholders.72 Some orphans had also
to be given for and the policy adopted for them was the same as in the last famine.73
The total loss of revenue in 1873-74 due to the famine was estimated at Rs. 2,
83,300.74 In Oudh, the revised estimation was estimated and about 7 lakhs of it was
suspended or remitted.75

65 Correspondence relating to the Famine in Bengal and Bihar from Oct. 1873 to May 31, 1874, p.
304.
66 Ibid, Pt. I, Para 71, Pt. III, p. 154; Works in NWP started in Jan. 1874 & ended by Aug. 1874.
67 Ibid, Pt. III, p. 154.
68 Narrative of scarcity in Eastern NWP, 1874, op.cit., pp. 159-60.
69 Ibid, p. 60; IFC Report: 1880-85, Pt. III, p. 153.
71 Papers Relating to Famine in Bengal and Bihar 1873-74, op.cit., p. 169.
72 Narratives of Scarcity of Eastern NWP 1874, op.cit., p. ii & iii.
73 IFC Report, Pt. III, p. 125; Temple’s Minute of 31st Oct. 1874.
74 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. I, Para 71, Pt. III, p. 150; Rs. 75,000 in NWP & Rs. 179,200 in
Oudh were remitted.
75 Ibid, Pt. III, p. 155.
83
In NWP, the greatest sufferer were the artisans, day labourers, poor
cultivators, ploughmen and lower castes, such as chamar, dhunias etc.76 The relief
measures adopted were, however, still defective in various aspects. The organization
of relief committees were delayed too long and were guided completely by
Government Officers. The conditions for paying advances also meant very tough to
the people. Sir George Campbell rightly emphasized in March 1874 that more trust
should be placed on Indians but nothing was done to change policy. Concessions in
railway freights on food grain gave a great motivation to trade but the Government
did not ban the exports of food grains inspite of requests from all divisions. The result
was that at many places, while the Government was importing grains, merchants were
exporting it.77 This created a peculiar irregularity and partly nullified the benefits of
importation. Whatever may be said from administrative and financial point of view,
Sir Richard Temple must be given credit for saving human lives and believing human
distress apart from other considerations. His policy was liberal and carrying and was a
complete advance on the policy adopted during earlier famines. It was the first famine
in which all unnecessary loss of life was controlled by successful measures of relief
by the Government action.78
Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy and Sir Richard Temple may have over-rated
the severity of the famine and may consequently have been too lavish in the
expenditure incurred in combating it, but these were generous errors and their action
indisputably deserves the high praise of history.79
FAMINE OF 1877: The great famine of 1876 in the South was followed by
widespread scarcity and famine in 1877 in the NWP, Oudh & Kashmir. Over the
entire NWP and Oudh was decreased to 12.04 inches as against the average of 36.85
inches between June and September 1877. The kharif crops was absolutely failed in
the Agra, Meerut, Sitapur, Jhansi, Lucknow division, Bundelkhand, district of
Allahabad and Rai Bareli. In other region casualty was slighter than here. The total
loss of food grains in the provinces were approximated about 3.42 million tons.80 Rabi
76 Letter from C.J. Lyall, Under Secy. to the Govt. of India, Dept. of Rev., Agr. & Commerce to
Secy. to the Govt. of Bengal, No. 1768, dated 19th May, 1874.
77 Letter from A.O. Hume Secy. to the Govt. of India, Dept. of Rev., Agr. And Commerce, dated
Dec. 16, 1875 (Confidential to Bengal Govt.).
78 R.C. Dutt, Famines & Land Assessments in India, op.cit., p. 9.
79 G.W. Forrest. The Famine in India, op.cit., p. 8.
84
crops were also poor, prices were high and various cases of decoties and robberies
prevailed in most of the affected districts.81 The measures accepted were ‘judicious’,
but the Governor ‘too hastily inferred that October rains had changed the whole
situation for the better.’82
FAMINE RELIEF: The relief policy of the Government of India was frequently
declared to be ‘to avert death from starvation by the employment of all means
practically open to the resources of the states and to the exertions of its officers’. 83 It
also declared that ‘whatever relief is given by state should be as far as possible in
return of some kind of labour’.84 Relief works were open late and when initiated, were
“not ample and far-reaching enough to meet the case.85
The works were not very popular, especially in the NWP, where they were
badly criticized. Officers did not treat the famine stricken people very responsively.
Public works in the NWP were ‘harshly and badly managed’, and were not started till
it was not clear that distress would extended into a famine. 86 The people denied to join
to them owing to the ‘severity of task imposed’ and ‘scantiness of the remuneration’87
or, as the Secretary of State for India wrote, due to the ‘cruel in human character of
those works and not any aversion to labour.’88
Gratuitous relief included relief in poor houses, village relief, relief to travellers,
relief to women and children of workers etc. Poor houses were not popular and people
liked to die on the road side than to live in them.89 There was extreme disbelief in
their mind about the British Government; and they feared that by joining the poor
houses, they would either convert into Christianity or sent beyond the seas.90
81 Letter No. 2329 A, dated Nainital, the 4th October 1877, from C. Robertson Offg. Secy. to Govt.
NWP and Oudh to the Addl. Secy. to Govt. of India.
82 Famine Progs. No. 1, April 1882.
83 Famine Progs. No. 96, August 1877; Viceroy’s Minute of 12th Aug. 1877.
84 Letter No. 13, from Secy. of State for India to the Governor or General of India in Council, India
Office, London, 31st Jan. 1877.
85 Scott’s Letter to the Statements dated 11th May 1878.
87 Report on the Scarcity & Relief Operations in NWP & Oudh during 1877-78-79, Allahabad, 1880,
pp. 13 & 175.
88 Sir George Couper, ‘Sir George Couper and the Famine in NWP,’ being a revised reprint of certain
letters & Articles on the subject in the ‘Statesman and Friend of India, Calcutta, 1878, p. 33.
89 William Digby, Prosperous British India, London, 1911, Vol. I, p. 454.
90 Report on the Scarcity & Relief in NWP & Oudh, op.cit., pp. 244-45.
85
Many of them were badly handled and over congested.91 Thus the poor houses
did not afford as much of relief as they were advised to do. The wages paid to workers
on relief works were not constant and contradicted during the various periods of the
famine in different provinces. However, it was divided, in the course of famine that a
‘subsistence’ wage should be paid and if paid in cash, it was to be fixed in accordance
with the prevailing price of the grain. The standard wage of one pound of ration daily
was abandoned as insufficient and at the same time NWP was advised to be too
liberal.92
It was realized during the course of the famine that, over crowded in poor
houses resulted in wandering, mortality and distress. Therefore, order was delivered
for the relief of the destitute people in their own villages. 93 The system of village
relief was never on large scale and the Govt. of India advised that, it should be
discouraged as far as possible. A list was prepared with the help the village officers
and respectable resident of the region, relief of those fit for village relief like the bed
ridden, the helpless, very old & purdanashin women. The relief was given in the form
of a grain doles as cash doles were not allowed by the Government. Village Officers
were also ordered to relieve the hungry and helpless travellers and then, to send them
to work or poor houses as their condition improved.94 Private Charity distributed by
individuals, relief committees and through various bodies and organizations was
active during the period of famine. The amount of individual charity cannot be
confirmed, but there were examples, where two thousand people were provided food
daily by single individuals.95 The Government of India was firmed about the
remissions of revenue and declared that instead of remissions, revenue should be
suspended for some time. The Government of NWP pointed out that ‘the village
payers will simply be ruined’ if revenue were collected as usual.96 But the
Government of India remained strict and allowed one remissions only towards the end
of the famine and it too only in special cases. No common suspensions were
91 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, pp. 250-55; Note on the causes of unpopulately of the poor
houses in NWP & Oudh in the Famine of 1878 by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.
92 Resolution Revenue Dept. dated Nainital, the 24th August 1878.
93 Report on the Scarcity and Relief Operations in NWP and Oudh during 1877-78-79, op.cit., pp.
262-63.
95 Digby, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 13 & 27.
96 Letter No. 792 A, dated Oct. 11, 1877 from the Secy. to Govt. NWP and Oudh, to the Secy. Govt.
of India (PWD) Famine.
86
allowed.97 Because of the strict order of the Government of India, remissions were
irrelevant and collection of revenue was completed in harsh manner. In many cases,
even the suspended claim was collected in the same season.98 Reviewing the famine
in the province, the Government of India themselves later realized that, the revenue
collection ‘intensified the distress’.99 D.G. Pitchers recorded in his report on the
mortality in the Rohilkhand Division of the NWP, dated 28th February, 1879, that he
found examples where mortality appeared clearly traceable to the rigour, with which
revenue had been collected.100
Advances for the improvement of land were not too beneficial for poor
cultivators. Before 1876, advanced were provided to the cultivators according to rules
declared by the land Improvement Loans Act (Act 26 of 1871). This act was not
literal and only rich landlords could benefit by it. The Act was amended by Act 12 of
1876, which allowed land owners or tenant to get advances with the consent of the
landlords. Advances for land improvement, purchase of seeds, plough or bullock were
made in this famine according to the amended act. In NWP, seeds advances were
given without interest, repayable within a month after the crop was mature, while, the
advances for bullocks were to be repaid within two years. 101 The local government
requested the supreme government to exempt the stamp duty from these advances, but
the order came too late and not useful too much.102 Government also adopted the
policy for the preservation of cattle,103 included opening of forest reserves under the
supervision of the forest conservators. But the measures adopted to save the cattle
were late and scanty, and resulted in extreme cattle mortality. Hundreds of cattle died
or were sold to butchers104 in NWP. In Bombay cattle mortality was too high that
agricultural areas were left uncultivated due to shortage of plough cattle.105
SCARCITY IN NWP 1880: The summer monsoon of 1880 was insufficient in

Bombay, central provinces and NWP. But in September, there was a heavy rainfall in
97 Letter No. 481 from A.O. Hume, Secy. to Govt. of India, Dept. of Rev., Agri. & Commerce, to the
Secy. NWP Govt. 6th Aug. 1878, Simla, No. 481.
98 Report on Scarcity and Relief, NWP, op.cit., pp. 382 & 417.
99 Progs. Rev. and Agri. Dept. No. 1, April 1882.
100 Report on the Scarcity & Relief, NWP, op.cit., p. 323.
101 Ibid, pp. 294-96.
102 Ibid, pp. 295-96.
104 Letter No. 792 from Secy. to Govt. NWP & Oudh to Secy. to Govt. of India, Financial Dept. dated
11th Oct. 1877.
105 Temple’s Minute, dated 24th Dec. 1877.
87
first two provinces. Distress, however, continued to be felt in some districts of NWP
and in October 1880 the local government fearing that famine was inevitable, issued
detailed instructions106 to the Divisional Commissioners on the issue of organizing a
system of village inspection and relief. The Lieutenant Governor, Sir George Couper
also requested to the Government of India to authorize him to arrange cash advances
to small landholders, who in his opinion, decided to die rather to coming to the relief
works.107 If a man of this sort loses a plough bullock,” wrote the local Government,
“an advance may be given to him to enable him to buy another; Sir George coupe
does not see why the same principle should not be followed when human instead of
bovine life is in question.”108 The approval for providing such advances was given by
the Government of India on the suggestion of Famine Commission.109 But no relief
works were opened and nor any gratuitous relief was provided, though the need for it
in some districts was badly felt.110
SCARCITY IN KUMAON & GARHWAL 1890: In the hilly districts of Kumaon

and Garhwal the crops were completely failed in 1889-90 and resulted in the shortage
of food supply in the self-sufficient and isolated region. The distress was further
deepened due to lack of good communications and absence of distributing
commercial agency for import and distribution of grain.111
RELIEF: The relief measures in the case were, only to import of food grains and
their disposal to the people at average rates. 112 The Government made arrangements
for the import and distribution, through specially organized depots, of 36,000 mounds
of food grains for Garhwal. A sum of Rs. 15,000 was approved to be placed at the
disposal of district authorities for import of food grain for Kumaon. Relief works were
opened for those who were unable to purchase grain or get advances on security. No
gratuitous relief was provided and the scarcity came to an end with good monsoon in
April and May followed by a good harvest in September 1890. The arrangements
made by the officials proved beneficial as there was no extraordinary increase in
106 Circular No. 65 of 1880 (Special), dated 18 Oct. 1880.

107 Letter No. 1485, dated 28 Aug. 1880 from NWP to India.
108 Ibid.
109 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, Para. 170.
110 From Commissioner Rai Bareli No. 1775, dated 16th Oct. 1880; Asking for permission to start
relief works.
111 Famine Progs. No. 1, Rev. Dept., May 1890.
112 Famine Progs. No. 8, Dec. 1890.
88
mortality due to scarcity. While, prices charged by the Government for the food
grains were “sufficiently high to enforce economy on the purchasers.”113
DISTRESS IN GARHWAL AND ALMORA-1892: The failure of monsoon in

1891 affected Ajmer-Marwara, parts of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, Madras,
Bombay and hilly divisions of Kumaon and Dehradoon in the NWP.114 Besides these,
Mysore and Hyderabad also experienced some difficulties.
In the hilly tracts of the NWP, the agricultural seasons proved unfortunate and
the people deteriorated from want of food grains till the meeting of autumn harvest in
1892. The kharif of 1891 was bad and the rabi of 1892 still worse in Garhwal, Almora
in Kumaon hills and the hilly parganas of Jaunser Bhawai in Dehradun. A population
of 118,000 in the pargana, part of Almora and 293,000 in Garhwal was distressed.115
In both case the cause of distress was the same. The kharif or autumn crop of 1891-92
has been a poor one because of the late monsoon and partial loss of the crops by
locusts, due to the failure of the usual winter rains the spring crops too proved worse.
During the months of March dry west winds and a high temperature predominated,
which prevented the crops to germinate. However, there was shortage of sufficient
grain in store to carry the people on till the meeting of autumn harvest of 1892-93.116
Food supply was short for 2 to 2½ months. The Government organized for the
import and distribution of wheat, barley etc. as did in earlier famine. A total of 45,524
mounds of food grains, costing the Government a little over 1½ lakh of rupees, was
purchased and distributed among the people. In Jaunsar & Bawar, a local market was
connecting with the sources of supply through the medium of cart road. So, the
Government did not felt it necessary to arrange grains in this area, on its own account.
Here relief was given in the shape of advances for seed and food for the destitute, the
total sum of advances was Rs. 23,400. Road construction was started as a relief work,
on Mussoorie-Chakarta road but it did not attract more than 150 labourers at any
113 IFC Report: 1898, p. 33. It may be pointed out that the Govt. actually made profit of Rs. 13,080
on the sale of grain.
114 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Paras.
115 Letter from NWP to India, No. 9485 of 1892, dated 25th April 1892.
116 IFC Report: 1898, op.cit., para 34.
89
time.117 No gratuitous relief was arranged, but liberal suspensions of land revenue and
to the repayment of loans, was granted by Government.118
FAMINE OF 1896-97: The famine of 1896-97 was more widespread and severe than
any the country had faced earlier. Besides the four districts of Banda, Hamirpur,
Jhansi and Jalaun of Bundelkhand and adjoining parts of Allahabad, where famine
conditions had already prevailed since 1895 and suffering from a succession of bad
crops119 from 1893, so the famine of 1896-97 affected more or less, every part of
India. Among the provinces affected were Bihar, Bengal, Bombay, Deccan, and
districts of Madras presidency, the NWP & Oudh, Central Provinces, Punjab and
Burma. Distress was most severe in the Central Provinces, NWP, Hisar district of
Punjab and the Deccan districts of Bombay.
The immediate cause of the famine was the failure of autumn rains of the
country. Over a large area there was no rainfall between August to November – a
period during which India gets normally about one-third of her annual rainfall.120 The
autumn food crops were badly damaged (millets, pulses and rice). The produce on
unirrigated lands varied from almost nothing to one-half. In the central provinces the
crop produce for the year was estimated at 45% of the generals in NWP and Oudh
60%, in Bengal 67%.121 The total loss of the crops in the year was estimated at one-
third of the average annual production or “18 or 19 million tons”.122 In the NWP and
Central Provinces, the famine had been leaded short crops in the previous one or two
years and in the former province by a famine of considerable distress in Allahabad
Division. Food stocks in these areas were naturally low at the time, when the famine
came.
The first anxiety of famine came to Government from NWP at the end of
September 1896123 and took a sever turn next month. These were a grain riots in
Delhi, Agra, Muzaffarnagar and Mauw. There was growing demand for imposing a
117 Report of Garhwal Famine, Resolution of NWP Govt., No. 3193-S/1-24 of 1892, dated 26 Nov.
1892.
118 IFC Report: 1898, op.cit., para
119 Famine Progs. No. 3, Feb. 1896; No. 115 of 1896, dated Allahabad the 11th Jan., 1896, from the
Govt. of India, Rev. & Agr. Dept.
120 Famine Progs. No. 139, May 1897.
121 Holderness, Narrative of the Famine in India in 1896-97, vide Govt. of India, Rev. & Agri. Dept.,
Famine Progs. Dec. 1897, Para 27.
122 IFC Report: 1898, para 585.
123 NWP to India Rev., dated 30th Sept. 1895.
90
restriction on exports of food and for encouraging imports of food outside on
Government fund. The Government of India, however, denied to change its food
policy124 and firmly clung to the view so far held that, “even in the worst conceivable
emergency so long as trade is free to follow its normal course, we should do far more
harm than good by attempting to interfere.”125 In the NWP, the death-rate during the
famine was very high. The figures show the ratio of mortality for 1896-97 for the
province as a whole at 36.30 per miles as against the normal ratio of 33.04 and for the
famine districts 39.54 per miles against the normal of 32.8, but these figures were
considered as underestimated.126 The high mortality caused by such epidemics as
cholera dysentery, malaria fever and small pox as a result of insufficiency of food
consumption at prevailing high prices, which weakened the people and reduced their
resistance power against diseases. The excess of mortality during 1896 and 97 over
the normal death-ratio for the country as a whole was 4.5 million.127
RELIEF MEASURES: The earlier relief works were opened in the NWP in
September 1896 and at the close of the December, relief works were running in
almost all the affected parts. They were in operation at full scale till the end of
October 1897 and a few lasted till the early months of 1898. The work taken up
consisted mostly of construction or repair of roads, earth work and metal collection.
Other works undertaken included improvement of irrigation works such as tanks,
canals, wells and miscellaneous works like guarding reserve forests, removal of
prickly pear, village improvement and a few railway projects. 128
Public works in NWP were handled by the Public Work Department, small or
village works on the other hand, were generally controlled by the village officers or
the civil officers of the district. In NWP, some village works were also started by
village landlords under the system of advances from public funds, the landlord being
under commitment to be employing village labour on respective wages.129 The piece
work system been under famine codes, but during the famine a new system of piece
work, called the ‘intermediate system’ was introduced in the NWP.
124 India to Bengal dated 4th Jan. 1897.

125 Resolution of Govt. of India, No. 33 of 1897, dated 18th May 1897.
126 Vide Pamphlet entitled “A relief account of the Famine” issued by the authorities of St. Jhon
Mission College at Agra & Signed the Rev. J. Haytharntwaite., Quoted in IFCR 1898, p. 148.
127 Digby, op.cit., p. 129.
128 IFC Report: 1898, op.cit., para 391-402.
129 Ibid, para 103.
91
There was no uniformity in the payment of wages in various provinces, but in
NWP the wages were low (due to the introduction of the new wage scale) 130 and
caused immense distress to the people. Along with low wages, a modified system of
relief works which was described131 as “intermediate between works carried out on
the ordinary and on the famine code system”132 was introduced in December 1896.
The lowering of wages resulted in saving of consumption by labourers employed on
relief works and there was a common complaint that the daily wage paid to them was
not decent to “allow them to satisfy their hunger.”133 The result was that, except in the
Banda district, “there is same reason to fear that many people must have been
severely pinched” and that in June and July, “a considerable number of incapable
people failed to get the relief that was desirable.”134
Gratuitous relief was started in many provinces in the starting of 1896, but its
planning was completed in the beginning of 1897. It was remarkably reduced after
October 1898, but continued in some extent throughout the famine. Poor houses were
started in all the provinces except Madras, where in their place; various free kitchens
were opened in the distressed parts. In NWP, poor houses were largely set up, while
they were not popular in all parts of the country and people feared that, either they
would lost their cast or converted into Christianity. 135 There was no regularity in the
food given in the poor houses.136 The inmates of the poor houses were not well cared
for and even in extreme cold no measures was made to provide them woolen clothes.
The organization of village relief was largely used in this famine. In Jan. 1897, it was
started in NWP,137 villages were arranged into circles and a list of those eligible for
village relief was made with the help of village officers, and other officers, as needed
by the codes.138 Allowances were given in the form of weekly and fortnightly cash or
grain doles. Doles were also given by the municipalities but were irregular and varied
130 Resolution No. 753/S-73, dated 16th March 1897, Scarcity Dept., NWP and Oudh.
131 From NIWP to India, No. 417, dated 14th Dec., 1896, para 3.
133 Ibid, para 246.
134 Report of the Central Executive Committee, Indian Famine Charitable Relief Fund, 1897,
Calcutta 1898, Vol. I, pp. 31-32..
137 Resolution on the administration of Famine Relief in the NWP & Oudh, during 1896-97,
Allahabad, 1897 Appendix, Vol. III, pp. 195-97.
138 Circulation No. 7-32-2F, dated Calcutta 18th Jan. 1897, from T.W. Holderness, Secy. To Govt. of
India, Rev. Agri. Dept. to the Secy. to Govt. of Local Govt. for organization of Home relief.
92
from province to province.139 The highest amount of the Indian Famine Charitable
Relief Fund was used in the NWP, 50% of the money available was used on
distribution of cloth purchased from weavers, who were also indirectly relieved. 140 A
large number of purdanashin women were relieved in Bengal and NWP through
works like spinning, corn grinding, embroidery, sewing and paddy-husking etc.141 At
some other places, measures were formed to sell food grains at low rates through
merchants who were paid the difference between the market rate and the selling
price.142 Weavers were also provided loans to buy implements, and cultivators to buy
ploughs, fodder, seed grains or for maintenance during the sowing and weeding
seasons. Grants were also provided to buy and hire cattle. 143 Last donation, money for
building houses and charitable advances were also provided.144 The policy of
remissions and suspensions of land revenue was liberal in NWP and Madras but was
very harsh in Bombay. The Famine Commission of 1898 defined it as ‘the most
questionable feature of the scheme relief adopted’ in the province. The total
remissions and suspensions were about three and quoted crore rupees. 145 Most of the
suspended amount was later collected.
CAUSES OF FAMINES
EXPORT OF FOODGRAINS AND PRICE RISE: The economy of Indian began to

disintegrate with the onset of the colonial rule. The classical nationalist writings
argued that British rule in India was primarily responsible for the problem of poverty
and consequent famines. They explained that the problem in terms of two variables:
one was the drain of wealth or the direct transfer of national resources through
plunder and extraction of agrarian surplus by imposing heavy land revenue demand;
and the other was the destruction of traditional handicrafts industry leading to the
progressive ruralization of the country, and this was achieved by introduction of
machine-made goods from Manchester and Lancashire. It was surprising to Dadabhai
Naoroji that the British rule which produced industrial revolution and created
prosperity in Britain led to the problem of economic backwardness and created

140 Report of Charitable Relief Fund 1897, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 10.
141 Ibid, Vol. I, p. 97; Vol. II, pp. 267-70.
142 Report of Charitable Relief Fund 1897, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 44.
143 Ibid, Vol. II, p. 216.
144 Ibid, Vol. II, p. 275.
145 IFC Report: 1898, op.cit., Statement A, p. 235.
93
poverty and misery in India. The continuous drain of wealth from India to Britain was
responsible for the constant problem of poverty. The drain occurred through
numerous channels. The first was dividend to East India Company’s shareholders and
interest on foreign debts on account of wars of conquests in India or public work such
as railways, irrigation or infrastructure. The public debt of East India Company was
pound 70 million before 1857; by 1900 it had touched pound 224 million. The
Second World War expenses incurred in Burma Afghanistan, China, and Ethiopia
credited to Indian accounts. The army expenditure also included the salaries of perks
conveyance and pensions for British soldiers stationed in India. The third channel was
interest paid on foreign capital investments in railways, reads, shipyards on which
guaranteed interest was paid. The state also paid for public and army purchases made
in Britain. The fourth channel was in the form of Home charges including salaries and
pension to British officials, establishment charges for India office in London,
diplomats or commercial emissaries in China, Egypt or elsewhere. 146 William Digby
estimated that the amount of wealth transferred from India to Britain between Plassey
and Waterloo was about 100 million pound. About 19 millions of Indians died of
starvation and about one million from plagues during the last decade of 19 th century.
He also noted that the continual tendency of events since the British occupation of the
country had been to turn the people more and more towards, agriculture and less and
less towards manufactures.147 The drain of capital and resources from India to Britain
had a crippling effect on the Indian economy and consequently led to intense famines.
In a letter to N.F. Danielson Marx had observed.
“…. In India serious complications if not a general outbreak are in store for
British government, what the English take from them annually in the form of rents,
dividends for railways useless to the Hindus; pensions for similarity and civil
serviceman, for Afghanistan and other wars, etc. etc. – what they take from them
without any equivalent and quite apart from what they appropriate to themselves
annually within India – speaking only of the value of the commodities the Indians
have gratuitously and annually to send over to England – it amount to more than the
total sum of income of the 60 millions of agricultural and industrial labourers of
146 Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and un-British Rule in India, London, 1901 [Reprint 1969, New
Delhi].
147 William Digby, Prosperous British India, London, 1901, pp. 33 and 64.
94
India! This is a bleeding process with a vengeance! The famine years are pressing
each other and in dimensions till now not yet suspected in Europe.”148
The integration of India into world market during the 19th century under
colonial rule by lifting of internal trade barriers such as transit and town duties,
improvement of the means of communications especially roads and railways.
Unification of weights and measures and establishment of a uniform trade and tariff
policy149 etc., led to sharp rise in the export of foodgrains like wheat and rice and non-
food crops like cotton, oilseeds, sugar and tobacco to Europe. Also due to the opening
of Suez Canal which reduced the time and cost of transport to Europe by at least one-
third, the demand was increased, for instance, the export of wheat increased from Rs.
0.18 million during 1841-50 to Rs. 90 million during 1901-12.150 The scarcity of
foodgrains owing to their substitution by non-food crops and exports to international
market was responsible for the sharp rise in the prices of foodgrains in the internal
market of India. This increase in the prices placed the foodgrains beyond the reach of
the poor strata of society and famine followed. K.L. Dutta emphasized that during
modern famine food was always available in the market but its prices reached so high
that poorer strata could not purchase its succumbed to starvation. So according to K.L.
Dutta’s ‘price syndrome theory’, it was the rising price spiral which caused frequent
famine.151
B.M. Bhatia made a very significant contribution on the question of famine

during colonial period. He has also raised very significant issue by attributing famines
during this period to the evolving colonial social structure in which the problem of
poverty was natural and central to the entire problem. According to him, famine in
colonial India resulted from the fundamental socio-economic and political change
taking place during that period. The emerging agrarian relations affected both
production and distribution. The land was passing into the hands of money lenders
and other propertied class. A large share of agricultural production was appropriated
by landlords and moneylenders in the form of rack-renting and exorbitant interest
charges which impoverished the cultivators. Prices, including those of foodgrains and
other essential commodities vary sharply while wages for most part remained
148 K. Marx, F. Engels, On colonialism, Moscow 1976, p. 340.

149 T.S. Banerjee, Internal Market of India, 1834-1900, Calcutta, 1966.
150 George Keatinige, Rural Economy of the Bombay Deccan, Bombay, 1912, p. 149.
151 K.L. Dutta, Report on the Enquiry into Rise of Prices in India, 1914.
95
stationary. The commercial revolution made the foodgrains the largest single item in
India’s export trade during the late 19th and early 28th centuries. The domestic
reserves of grain, which cultivators used to keep in the past, disappeared. The export
of grain continued even during the famine years. Railways extended the scarcities of
foodgrain over larger area of the country. Also, there was a rampant boarding and
speculation of grain by merchants, moneylenders and wealthy cultivators which added
to the scarcity of grain and further accentuated food crisis.152
Foodgrains became after 1833 the largest single item in India’s export trade
and remained so till about 1914. There was nothing else to take their place if their
exports were prohibited. The possibility of any reduction in the total value of exports
was unacceptable both to the Government and to the British economists. In the words
of Atkinson to accept any measure that would tend to reduce exports would adversely
affect the gold standard (after 1893) and the rate of exchange, and might cause a
reversion of the silver standard, with the accompanying heavy home charges caused
by a fall in exchange.” “In addition”, Mr. Atkinson continued “if the food supply from
India ceased, unless the gaps could at once be filled from elsewhere, food prices
outside India would rise, and this owing to the existence of unions and their methods
of enforcing their wishes by means of strikes, and in opposition to economic laws on
the subject might affected wages outside India and thus indirectly all prices.153
Obviously imperial considerations were of far greater importance to the Government
of the day than the interests of the people of India. Thus although the exports of food
grains and a rise in their prices brought prosperity to certain sections of the population
in the absence of a commensurate rise in wages, high prices were a source of constant
hardship for the labouring classes.
For instance the drought of 1860-61 was not wide pleaded and confined to the
upper part of the North Western Provinces. In the Doab the irrigated tracts had fairly
thriving crops but the people in the area starved because of high prices. 154 The famine
tracts itself produced, according to Baird Smith 44½ million mounds, which with the
population of 11 million, was sufficient to provide 4 mounds per head for the year,
without much loss of life. But the mortality in the famine was “a minimum of 2 lakh
152 B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India, 1860-1945, Bombay, 1963, Chapter 1.

153 Atkinson, “Rupee price in India, 1870-1908” Journal of Statistical Society, September 1909, pp.
496-574.
154 Baird Smith, Report on the Effect Famine on Manchester Trade, 1861, Para 20.
96
deaths”.155 The reason, as was pointed out by column in his account of the irrigated
tracts of Muzaffarnagar district, lay in the extra ordinary rise in prices. He stated that
“where there is canal irrigation in Parganah Muzaffar Nagar, the crops are fairly
thriving, but the people are starving on high prices.”156 There was a sharp rise in the
prices of food-grains not only in the affected tract but also in the neighbouring
districts. In Kanpur, for example, the district which lay outside the affected tract,
wheat was sold at 15 seers to a rupee (Rs. 2-10-9 per mound) from December 1860 to
February 1861 as against 25 seers to a rupee (Rs. 1-9-6 per mound) in May 1860. In
Saharanpur the price of wheat rose to Rs. 5 per mound in February 1861 as against
Rs. 1-8 per mound in May 1860. In Meerut, Aligarh, Mathura, and Agra wheat sold
during the famine at about double its normal price.157
The total loss of food-grain in the kharif and rabi crops in 1868 and 1869
amounted to 39.8 million mound valued at Rs. 6.47 crore. 158 But even after this loss,
the famine tract produced a total of 80 million mounds of food-grains from the two
harvests, which would have been sufficient to maintain the affected population for a
year on an average ration of 5 pounds per head. But the product was “drained away by
a sharper demand elsewhere”159 with the result that an acute shortage of food was
experienced by the people, and prices rose very high. The average price of wheat at
seven principal centers in the most affected part of the province rose from Rs. 1-12
per mound in July 1868 to Rs. 3-8 per mound in December that year. After the arrival
of the new crop which was “a fair average” is fell to Rs. 2-13 in April 1869 but an
account of “the continued drain to the west” which carried off surplus supplied, price
rose to Rs. 3-14-6 per mound again in September. For same time in August and
September stocks in Rohilkhand had run so low that there was panic in the area. No
action was taken to control export or regulate prices but the railway freight on
carriage of food grain was reduced for two months from middle of January to the
middle of March 1869. Grains was also exempted from payment of Octroi (import
tax) and toll at octroi barriers and faries respectively, the Government undertaking to
155 C.E.R. Girdlestone, Report on the Past Famine in the North Western Provinces, Allahabad, Govt.
Press, 1868, p. 87.
156 Vide Home (Public) Progs. No. 47, December, 1860.
157 Baird Smith, Report on Manchester Trade, op.cit., Para 20.
159 Ibid.
97
compensate the loss, thus suffered by the toll collectors, which came to Rs. 25, 086.160
Mr. Henvey in his report on the famine of 1868 drew pointed attention to the
fundamental factor in the situation that distinguished the modern famines from those
of the old days. There were the steep rise in the prices of food grains caused by
exports resulting from the development of railways and the recent emergence of a
class of labour subsisting on money wages, which during a famine suffered from the
effects of high prices of food on the one hand, and the loss of employment and
income, on the other. “It will be commonly understood; he wrote, “that when wheat is
selling at 8 seers a rupee, a man who earn a rupee once a fortnight must be hard
pushed for a living. Nor is this all, when prices raise to famine heights the employees
of labour contract their expenditure and discharge work people whom they can no
longer afford. Not only is the broad dear but there is no money to buy bread.” 161 On
the utility of railways, he said that “while rail-roads and other means of easy
communication lessen the danger of local famine, they widen the area within which
high would otherwise be happily situated.”162 The great famine of 1876 in the South
(Madras and Bombay) was followed by widespread drought and famine in 1877 in
NWP, Awadh and Kashmir. There was complete failure of the kharif crops in NWP
and Awadh. The total loss of food grains in these provinces was estimated at the high
figure of 3.42 million tons. The rain had been good and crops had been plentiful in the
three preceding years in these provinces. Wheat at this time, however, became usually
dear in England and a large export trade in wheat came to be organized in this region
both.
Internally, the famine in Bombay and Madras was a great drain on the local
stocks of grain and millet in this region. This region had been, therefore, drained of its
surplus of both wheat and the commoner types of grains. The trade had been so active
that the rails were unable to carry off quantities of grain brought for exports, so that
much of it had been forced to travel by river.163 Sir Richard Temple noted that, “the
extra ordinary activity of private trade, supplying fully with grain markets in large
160 Ibid, p. 89.

161 Henvey Frederick, A Narative of Famine in N.W.P. and Punjab, Allahabad, 1871, Chapter I
“Causes of Famines” [Printed at Govt. Press].
162 Ibid, Chapter XIII, ‘conclusion’.
163 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit. Pt. III, p. 191.
98
districts which had suffered a total loss of whole year’s harvest.” 164 The local stocks
were thus low when drought afflicted these provinces. In 1873 the Secretary of State
himself admitted that “repeated experience has sufficiently proved that when scarcity
and danger of famines arise in India, the ordinary operations of commerce and the
ordinary processes of supply and demand cannot be relied on for any adequate supply
of food to the affected districts” and that “without the active intervention of
Government, the worse consequences are likely to ensure.”165 These ideas were,
however never, translated into action. The Government of India persistently refused to
control or interferes with prices.166 And it went to the other extreme of giving an
absolutely free hand to the traders and discouraged local administration and its
officers from interference in his activities.167 It was repeatedly pointed out to the local
administrations that “absolute non-interference with operations of private commercial
enterprise must be the foundation of our present famine policy. 168 The Provincial
Government and the local officers were told that it was the Government’s policy that
“the dealings of grain traders and operation of the grain market should be left inter
free and unrestricted,”169 that any restriction on trade would be a fatal blow to the
prosperity of the exporting areas, that stoppage of export would “excite confidence
unduly and lower prices, consumption will be stimulated instead of being reduced,
which is the natural effect of rise of prices and the greatest safeguard against
famines.”170 That “any measures that would dimension the export trade in common
rice from Bengal would weaken the power of the country to meet any future period of
scarcity”.171 While the more fundamental considerations that led the Government of
India to adopt the policy were those “connected with trade and finance.” 172 In the
absence of any other major item of export, the Government of India was anxious not
only to maintain the export trade in agricultural produce, but even to increase it so as
to provide funds for meeting the foreign financial obligations and financing the import
164 Richard Temple’s Minute No. III, dated 12 January 1877, Vide Famine Progs. No. 24, January
1877.
165 Dispatch to Viceroy dated 1 December, 1873.
166 “The operations of Laisse Fair Principle in Times of Famines”, Calcutta Review, Vol. XCI
(1868), p. 106.
167 Vide Govt. of India Letter No. 1998, dated 15 September 1860.
168 Lord Lytton’s Minute dated 12 August, 1877.
169 Letter No. 1084-A, dated 1 October 1864, Para 4 (Containing orders to Commissioner Agra
Division on the question of banning exports of grain from his division during famine).
170 Viceroy’s Minute, dated 30 January 1874.
171 Viceroy’s Minute, dated 30 January 1874.
172 Lord Northbrook’s Minute, dated 30 January, 1874.
99
trade of the country in foreign manufactures. To stop exports of food was, in a way, to
curtail imports of foreign cloth and default on payment of “home charges” which the
British Parliament and its subordinate Government in India could never permit. The
colonial status of the country and the imperial obligations that states involved were
thus directly the essence of the food and famine problem of the country. The
Government food policy, dictated by extraneous considerations, not only vitiated the
famine relief measures, making them much more expensive than they need have
been,173 but also helped to aggravate distress and cause much greater mortality than
need haven been the case if food wanted by the people had not been allowed to go
out, and if the activities of traders had been controlled and regulated to check the
speculative rise in prices.
ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
Change in the vegetational composition result in complex ecological change.

Vegetational composition of any region shows a complex ecological balance of that
region. Flora, fauna, soil, moisture, atmosphere temperature, hydraulic cycle are
interconnected. Change in any component of this complex set up leads to a chain
reaction in the whole ecosystem. Recent ecological studies show that replacing the
vegetation of any area affects hydrolical cycle, moisture, temperature, atmosphere, the
nutrient cycle of the soil, and surrounding flora and fauna of that area.174
The complex ecological implications of vegetational changes could not be

established without proper research under colonial rule only the impact of
deforestation was initially discussed broadly. Gibson, an acting conservator of
Bombay Presidency Forest, was among the first to write, way back in 1846, that
deforestation was leading to reducing fertility of the surrounding soil and an increase
in the temperature and aridity of climate. He based some of his arguments on the
incident of the people of the south konkan who noticed drying up of water sources,
dry season and a decline in the fertility of the soil due to deforestation in that region.
The court of Directors, responding to Gibson letter, sent a dispatch on 7 July 1847 to
the GOI asking it to ascertain the effect of trees on the climate and the productively of
173 George Campbell, Memoirs of my Indian career, Vol. II, p. 336.

174 See D.J. Mabberley, Tropical Rain Forest Ecology, New York, 1983 (2nd ed. 1992); Charles J.
Krebs, Ecology: The Experimental Analysis of Distribution and Abundance, New York, 1917 (2nd
ed. 1978).
100
the country and other consequences of the clearance of forests. It did not remind a
good response except from the Madras Presidency, which concurred with the finding
of Gibson.175 The awareness of this problem was rising, the British Association
appointed a committee in 1851 to consider the impact of deforestation. The committee
urged the GOI to take up forest conservancy and planting operations. 176 Sir Richard
Temple’s Report on the Madras Famine of 1877 again highlighted the information
that forests were being denuded resulting in the drying up of water sources and erratic
seasonal changes, unpredictable droughts and famines.177 The first famine
commission (1880-85) again underlined this connection in 1878.178 J.A. Voelcker, a
distinguished chemist, in his report on the improvement of Indian agriculture in 1893
stressed the need for conservancy and recommended the creation of fuel and fodder
reserves.179 This issue was frequently brought up before the GOI but no genuine steps
were taken.180
More and more people emphasized the need to protect forests, underlined their
value in the conservation of water and soil and in prevention of flood, famine and
drought. A writer in the Indian Forester wondered weather such a scientific observer
like D. Brandis did not believe that forest conservancy protected against the
recurrence of seasons of excessive drought.181 The significant fact was that forests
were linked to agriculture: the role of forests was seen as crucial in retaining the
humidity of soil, in bringing rain and in preventing soil erosion. It was argued that an
area covered with good forests could not suffer scarcity.182 The Himalayan
deforestation, it was said rendered futile and unproductive the ravine land of the
Yamuna and Chambal rivers covering 200 sq. miles. Every year another 250 acres
was added to this area.183 Similarly, the Hoshiyarpur chos in Punjab were torrent beds
175 J. Nisbet, ‘Indian Famines and Indian Forests’ Indian Forester, November 1908, pp. 633-52,
reproduced from Nineteenth Century and After.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid, J.A. Voelcker, op.cit.
180 J. Nisbet, Indian Famines and Indian Forests, op.cit., He carefully reviews the govt. efforts.
181 Anon., Forests of India and Their Products, Indian Forester, March 1892, pp. 118-21.
182 Ram Swarup, The Influence of Forest on Cultivation in the Hills, Indian Forester, July 1902, pp.
253-55.
183 Anon, Farmers and Foresters, in the Indian Farming, Vol. II, No. 10, Oct. 19451, Extracts
Published in IF Feb. 1942, pp. 94-8.
101
had overrun nearly 5000 acres of land between 1854, and 1897 was connected to the
Himalayan deforestation. Similar harm was noticed below the Siwalik hills.184
Thus the significance of forests was realized and deforestation was seen as an
ecological danger. But what extent this awareness influenced government policy is
difficult to say as deforestation continued throughout the colonial period on a large
scale. As I have discussed in third chapter that how the large scale devastation of
accessible forests in the colonial rule of railway expansion led to the rapid creation of
a forest department,185 set up with the help of German experts in 1864. The first task
to the department was to discover the sources of supply of strong and durable timbers
such as sal, and deedar, which could be used as railway sleepers with sal and teak
bring much worked out, search parties were sent to explore the deodars forests of the
Sutlej-Yamuna Valley.186 One can imagine the scale of the onslaught by the data
mentioned by Irfan Habib, that nearly 1,100 wooden sleepers were required for each
kilometer of tract, needing some 250 trees to be felled in the average. Even the sleeper
of good sal timber could not last for over eight or ten years so that after each decade
or so an equal amount of timber would be needed again. Since 13,639 km. of railway
track had been laid by 1879, one can imagine that for the initial track-lying alone 3.4
million trees must have been cut, with another 2 million cut for replacement of
sleepers on track laid out earlier. In addition, much firewood was also needed to
provide fuel to the locomotives, it was estimated that, despite rather low level of
traffic, 50 tons of firewood were burn up annually each kilometer of track. It was only
1860s that the steam engines began to feed with imported and later, locally mined
coal, but there were sections of railway where as late as the 1890s, firewood served as
fuel for railway engines. However, the forests suffered from both those which had
wealth of better timber and those that had inferior woods.187
Changing vegetational composition: A changing composition of forests also

disturbs the ecology. This aspect was not well accepted by the colonial government.
Scientific research on forest ecology started very late in India but on the basis of
evaluation some generalizations were made in the early years of 20th century. B.O.
184 Ibid.
185 Grove, op.cit., He fails to show whether conservationalist propaganda was able to prevent
deforestation or not.
186 G.F. Pearson, Sub-Himalayan Forests of Kumaun and Garhwal, in Selections from the Records
of the Govt. of the NWP, 2 series, Vol. 2, Allahabad, 2869,p. 132.
187 Irfan Habib, Man and Environment, op.cit., p. 132.
102
Coventry, the conservator of Punjab Forest, argued that vegetation and soil has a close
connection and soil is affected by the accumulation of debris from fallen woods and
leaves, and the varying degrees of heat, moisture and aeration to which the soil is
subjected at different stages of forest growth.
He recognized the significance of natural vegetation with all its diversity. He

wrote “It seems probable that growing mixed forests rather than pure forests would
result in maintaining the fertility of the soil for a longer period than would otherwise
be the case. Therefore, there appear to be the indications that certain species get
mutually towards one another by imparting certain beneficial qualities to the soil
investigations may possibly show that many of our so called inferior species which
are found associated with more valuable species and which are generally removed in
clearings and thinning exert some influence on the soil which is beneficial if not
necessary for the growth of the valuable species, and whose removal will result in the
disappearance of the valuable species.”188
The importance of natural vegetation was recognized, though very late. The
third Silviculture conference held at Dehradun in March 1929 passed a resolution for
the preservation of natural flora.189 When the information was so needed on natural
forests it was found that only the United Province and Bihar had some blocks. In the
United Provinces there were 9 acres of virgin first class mature sal forest in the
Haldwani Forest Division constituted as an experimental plot to be preserved in
perpetuity. A similar reserve also existed for deodar in Chakrata in Dehradun
district.190 This shows that no forests were left untouched.
Thus it was slowly accepted that any change in forest vegetation affected soils
and their fertility.191 The Indian Forester in its editorial wrote in December, 1932, that
there was a need to recognize the ecology of vegetation. It argued that species which
are introduced also have to be correlated with the native communities in which they
could be expected to grow best. It emphasized the need for the right choice of species
for plantation.192
188 B.O. Conventry, ‘Alteration (Rotation) of Forest Crop’, Indian Forest, June 1908, pp. 327-39.
189 A Letter to the editor of the Indian Forester,
190 Ibid.
191 E.A. Garland, ‘Forest Soils’ Indian Forester, March, 1933, pp. 171-75.
192 Indian Forester, Dec. 1932, pp. 659-61.
103
Most of the research on forest ecology being done abroad till the 1920s and
1930s193 and its findings were slowly getting acknowledgment in India. R.S. Troup, a
renowned silviculturist stressed that the advantages of mixed vegetation and natural
regeneration were being acknowledged in Europe and America. About forest ecology
he wrote:
“It is no longer considered sufficient to possess knowledge of

individual trees and their requirements: the forest has to be
considered as a whole and the mutual reaction of various trees
on each other, on the undergrowth and on the soil, has to be
studied.”194
Scientific research on forest ecology was, however, not started on a large scale
in India before independence. The consequent research has recognized that different
plant species affect nutrient cycles of the soil, hydrological cycle, temperature,
moisture, climate, soil erosion etc. differently. These aspects were overlooked under
colonial forestry when plantation was carried on to spread commercially viable
species. Every species either adds to soil productivity or reduces it. For instance
Eucalyptus, very popular among the colonial foresters for its fast growth, consumes
huge nutrients and returns only in little amounts. The huge difference between
nutrients intake and nutrient return depletes nutrients in the soil. 195 However, exotic,
fast growing trees tend to expose the soil surface to erosive and desiccative forces like
leterization more than does the native vegetation cover. Similarly other fast growing
trees of timber revenue, such as safeda and popular that are preferred in forestry
operations,196 also cause reduced soil productivity and low water table in adjoining
areas.
Conclusively, the frequency of famine was increased in the 19th and early 20th
centuries. British government adopted various relief policies in the form of gratuitous
relief, private charity, relief of purdanashin women and suspension of revenue etc.,
but these were only accepted on paper in spite of in practice. The famines in colonial
rule were result of both British economic and administrative policies and poor
193 W.C. Lowdermilk, ‘The Role of Vegetation in Erosion Control and Water Conservation, Indian
Forester, Feb., 1935, pp. 123-31.
194 Ibid.
195 R.P. Singh, ‘Nutrient Cycle in Eucalyptus tereticoinis Smith Plantations’ Indian Forester, Vol.
110, No. 1, 1984, pp. 76-85.
196 Social Forestry in India: Problems and Prospects, Birla Institute of Scientific Research, Economic
Research Division, Radient Publishers, 1986.
104
monsoon. Colonial policies directly or indirectly, focused on free trade practices,
levies for war, the expansion of agricultural export and the neglect of agricultural
investment. The export of agricultural products led to food crises or famines. The
introduction of railway infrastructure in India proved to be catalyst in the occurrence
of famine. Members of the British administrative machinery also exposed that the
large market created by railway transport encouraged poor peasants to sell off their
reserve stocks of grain. The immediate cause of famine was invariably drought and
unseasonal rains. Deforestation alone was seen as an ecological danger, as its
consequences were more apparent and it was linked to famines and drought. There
was little understanding of the ecological impact of the changing vegetational
composition. Until research work on forest ecology was done in Europe and America
and the knowledge travelled to India in the 1920s and 30s. Subsequently researchers
have shown that replacing a species from its natural habitat by another species
disturbs eco-systems and have serious ecological consequences.
105

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CHAPTER: 4

FAMINES AND RELIEF MEASURES IN UNITED

This transformation in the nature of famine was created in India by the

FAMINE BEFORE 1858:

The central relief committee further, supported the agriculturist class in

23 Girdlestone, op.cit., para 126.

51 IFC Report, 1988-85, op.cit., Pt. III, p. 92.

64 IFC Report: 1880-85, op.cit., Pt. III, p. 151.

SCARCITY IN NWP 1880: The summer monsoon of 1880 was insufficient in

SCARCITY IN KUMAON & GARHWAL 1890: In the hilly districts of Kumaon

106 Circular No. 65 of 1880 (Special), dated 18 Oct. 1880.

DISTRESS IN GARHWAL AND ALMORA-1892: The failure of monsoon in

124 India to Bengal dated 4th Jan. 1897.

EXPORT OF FOODGRAINS AND PRICE RISE: The economy of Indian began to

139 IFC Report: 1898, op.cit., para 368.

B.M. Bhatia made a very significant contribution on the question of famine

148 K. Marx, F. Engels, On colonialism, Moscow 1976, p. 340.

152 B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India, 1860-1945, Bombay, 1963, Chapter 1.

160 Ibid, p. 89.

Change in the vegetational composition result in complex ecological change.

The complex ecological implications of vegetational changes could not be

173 George Campbell, Memoirs of my Indian career, Vol. II, p. 336.

Changing vegetational composition: A changing composition of forests also

He recognized the significance of natural vegetation with all its diversity. He

“It is no longer considered sufficient to possess knowledge of

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