A Review of the 2012 Reynosa Gas

Plant Explosion

An ioMosaic White Paper

Neil Prophet, Senior Partner

[email protected]

Alejandro Barrera, Consultant

[email protected]

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Introduction

On September 18, 2012, a major fire and explosion ripped through a gas plant in Reynosa,
Mexico resulting in 31 fatalities and many injuries. The incident was caught on Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV) and has been viewed millions of times on social media sites such as
YouTube. The video clip is particularly useful to process safety practitioners as it demonstrates
the various hazardous outcomes that can result from one individual loss of containment event.
In the case of this incident, it is possible to see the initial pressure wave, followed by turbulent
momentum jet dispersion, then a flash fire and jet fire, as well as shrapnel projectiles.

This paper reviews the potential causes leading to the incident, as well as summarizing the
lessons that can be learned from the video clip. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for a
complete and thorough Process Safety Management program.

One motivating factor in writing this paper is the apparent lack of publicly available information
and reports addressing this incident. Further research still confirmed the lack of readily
available information, from either English or Spanish language sources. This paper therefore
presents the opinions of the authors, based on the limited information and conclusions we were
able to derive.

Incident Description

The major fire and explosion occurred at a gas plant near the city of Reynosa, Tamaulipas,
which is located very near the US-Mexico border. The incident is regarded as one of the worst
industrial accidents in Mexico’s history, and left catastrophic damages and thirty-one fatalities.

Figure 1 – Still Footage From The Video Clip

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Facility Description

The incident occurred in a natural gas processing unit section of the Central de Medicion KM-
19 (Central Metering Station KM-19), located in the Reynosa suburb of Providencias. Natural
gas metering stations are typically designed for simultaneous, continuous analysis of the
quality and quantity of natural gas being transferred through a pipeline, by measuring
properties such as upper calorific value, concentration of sulfur compounds, hydrocarbon dew
point, and water dew point. Additionally, the processing unit typically separates natural gas
from impurities, condensate, non-condensable fluids, acid gases and water while controlling the
delivery pressure.

The unit, which distributed extracted natural gas from the Burgos Basin, handled about 900 MM
ft^3 of natural gas per day. The processed natural gas from this plant is the main supply for
many states in Mexico. The treatment process interstage pressure of a natural gas compressor
such as may be found in this facility normally operates in the range of 300 psig - 400 psig.

Figure 2 shows the facility main entrance, while Figure 3 shows an aerial view of the affected
area, including the locations of the cameras which recorded the incident (labelled here as
Camera 1 and Camera 2).

Figure 2 – Facility Entrance

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Figure 3 – Aerial View of Affected Area, with Location and Direction of Cameras
Which Recorded the Incident.

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Incident Description

The incident was caused by a pipeline rupture that turned into a flash fire and jet fire. As shown
in the video, the incident escalated extremely rapidly leaving no chance for those caught in the
vapor cloud and subsequent flash fire, which extended approximately 500 feet (150 meters).

Pipeline ruptures are typically attributed due to factors such as physical damage, age,
condensation, temperature-related stress, and material failure.

Incident Investigation

A large majority of the victims were not direct employees of the operating company and were
working for contractor companies. Immediately after the incident, this raised questions of
whether the personnel were truly qualified to perform the technical duties required for the
facility.

Shortly after the explosion, Carlos Morales Gil, the then General Director of the refinery,
expressed that there were two major concerns regarding the explosion. The first concern was
the possibility of a “sabotage or a botched attempt at fuel theft.” The second concern was the
potential pipe rupture as cause of the explosion. Carlos Morales Gil later determined that “The
primary cause is the rupture of a duct [pipeline] that carries gas from our site. This is where we
measure the fuel before turning it over to our clients.”

During the investigation, questions arose regarding the integrity of the tanks and instruments.
However, these issues weren’t directly addressed by refinery representatives and they
redirected any instrumentation or safeguard questions to the rupture of the duct [pipeline].

The investigation was solely being conducted by the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR).
Additionally, the Secretary of Energy (SENER), Secretary of Labor and Social Security (STPS),
the Secretary of Public Function (SFP) and the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection
(PROFEPA) could conduct inspection visits to review the degree of compliance with the
applicable regulations on the affected installations.

Additionally, to mitigate the impact on the supply of natural gas to the National Gas Pipeline
System (SNG), a Coordination Commission for the Natural Gas Supply was formed. The
Coordination Commission for Natural Gas Supply consisted of the Secretary of Energy
(SENER), Exploration and Production (PEP), Gas and Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB), the
Corporate Management of the Refinery, the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), the Energy
Regulatory Commission (CRE) and the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH). This

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interinstitutional groups’ main objective was to maintain the conditions of the Natural Gas
Supply, applying actions to maintain the natural gas supply, such as maximizing the use of the
import infrastructure, as well as the increase in natural gas injection by the Exploration and
Production refinery to different parts of the country.

While the initial investigation efforts and thoughts were well-publicized, the conclusions derived
were not so well broadcast. A literature and internet document search has not revealed any
publicly available incident investigation reports and conclusions.

Consequence Analysis

The video footage of the incident in Reynosa dramatically showed how multiple consequences
can arise from one loss of containment scenario.

The video shows how the release transitions through the following consequences:

 Vessel / Pipe Burst (Shrapnel)

 Pressure Wave
 Dispersion Cloud (Turbulent Jet)
 Flash Fire
 Jet Fire

In the case of a flammable gas release such as the one in Reynosa, if immediate ignition does
not occur and the high-pressure releases are not confined, the jet will continue to disperse until
delayed ignition occurs or the release ends. Under these circumstances the lower flammability
limit is usually reached while the jet momentum is still higher than ambient turbulence. When
delayed ignition occurs, and depending on the sensitivity of the fuel and the strength of the
ignition source, a small fireball/explosion may be experienced followed by a flame jet that will
continue until the release ends. The amount of material involved in the fireball/explosion is
limited and typically equivalent to no more than 10 seconds of flow. This can be readily in the
Reynosa incident video clip.

If immediate ignition does not occur and the high-pressure jet is confined and/or obstructed
(such as jets pointing vertically downwards or striking other nearby objects) the jet loses its
momentum and will continue to disperse until delayed ignition occurs or the release ends.
When delayed ignition occurs a flash fire will occur. Depending on the sensitivity of the fuel, the
degree of confinement, and the strength of the ignition source, the flash can accelerate and

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lead to an explosion. The amount of material involved in the flash fire/explosion can be
substantial.

Flash fires typically proceed at flame speeds ranging from 10 to 20 m/s. In general, indoor
populations are expected to survive a flash fire, but outdoor populations are not. In flash fire
exposure, a building is expected to burn from the outside to the inside. This often provides
sufficient time for the occupants to escape.

Jet fires occur because of high pressure gas and/or two-phase releases, such as the case in
Reynosa. Flame jets produce intense heating with flame emissive powers ranging up to 350
kW/m2. Flame jets impinging on nearby structures and/or vessels can lead to catastrophic
failures in less than 10 minutes, such as with the portacabin which happened to be in the path
of the jet fire.

Event tree analysis can be used to determine the probability and transition of each outcome.
An example of an event tree, mapping out a Continuous Gas/Vapor Release is shown below in
Figure 4.

Figure 4 – Continuous Gas/Vapor Release Event Tree

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Using consequence modeling software tools, it is possible to develop a simulation aimed to
recreate the event.

To accurately define such an event, the following consequence modeling inputs would be
required:

 Fluid Conditions (Temperature, Pressure, Phase, Composition, Explosion Reactivity,

Toxicity)
 Release Flowrate or Hole Size
 Release Coordinates
 Equipment Type and Size
 Hole Diameter(s)
 Piping Length (if applicable)
 Release Duration
 Release Geometry (1D, 2D, 2.5D, 3D)
 Degree of confinement
 Meteorological conditions
o Ambient Temperature, Ambient Pressure, Wind Speed, Humidity
o Surface Roughness (Topography)

The more accurate these inputs can be defined, then the more accurate the output
consequence results will be.

A simulation was modeled in SuperChems Expert, based on the following key inputs, with the
aim to recreate the incident:

 Mixture composition: Natural gas (methane, ethane, propane)

 Source pressure and temperature: 400 psig, ambient temperature
 Release size: 24” pipe failure (assumed)
 Meteorological conditions: 30°C, D stability, 5 meters per second wind speed, surface
roughness 1 meter

Additional inputs were also required, but are not listed here.

Based on the release conditions described, this yields the following outputs:

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Figure 5 – Vapor Cloud Dispersion (Side View)

Figure 6 – Thermal Radiation Effects (Side View)

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The results modeled here determined a release rate of approximately 900 kg/s; which resulted
in a jet fire of over 500 feet and lower flammable limit of almost 400 feet. These results are very
consistent with the jet fire results seen in the video clip.

Facility Siting

Given the proximity of the portacabin to the release point, this incident also highlighted the
importance of facility siting considerations as part of a process safety management program.

In December 2009, API issued the Third Edition of the Recommended Practice 752,
“Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Permanent Buildings,”
which incorporated much of what has been learned from catastrophic incidents since their
Second Edition was published in 2003. In addition, API RP 753, “Management of Hazards
Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings,” was developed and issued in
June 2007.

API’s Recommended Practice 753 (Management of Hazards Associated with Location of

Process Plant Portable Buildings) is relatively prescriptive in terms of requirements and
methodologies when compared to API RP 752. A three-zone method is applied for locating
portable buildings. Each zone is based on the size of the congested process area and the
distance from the edge of this congested area to the portable building. These zones are shown
in Figure 7, which comes directly from API 753.

Figure 7 – Portable Buildings Location Guidance (from API RP 753)

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Congested volumes, regardless of the material handled, should be considered as potential
explosion sources, as a released vapor cloud may drift from adjacent facilities. Additionally, the
operating status of a process unit does not exempt it from assessment. As before, a vapor
cloud may drift into an offline unit.

For the three zones identified in Figure 7, light wood trailers intended for occupancy should not
be located in zone 1. Other portable buildings require a detailed analysis before being placed in
zone 1. All portable buildings within zone 2 require a detailed analysis. Finally, any portable
buildings may be located in zone 3 without a detailed analysis. A detailed analysis may either
be a consequence analysis or quantitative risk analysis.

If a Facility Siting study were conducted for this facility, it is unlikely that that portacabin would
be located in its present location.

Storage Tanks Venting Due to Fire Flux

In the video clip (and shown in Figure 8), it is possible to see vapors venting from the storage
tanks which are being impinged upon by the major jet fire. Atmospheric storage tanks are
protected for overpressure and underpressure scenarios as described in API Standard 2000.

Figure 8 – Venting See Coming From Storage Tanks

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API Standard 2000 covers the normal and emergency vapor venting requirements for
aboveground liquid petroleum or petroleum products storage tanks and aboveground and
underground refrigerated storage tanks designed for operation at pressures from full vacuum
through 103.4 kPa (ga) (15 psig). It also includes the causes of overpressure and vacuum;
determination of venting requirements; means of venting; selection and installation of venting
devices; and testing and marking of relief devices.

While the conservation vents protecting these tanks are seen to be venting, they would not be
intended to protect against such a severe event as jet fire impingement, therefore the tanks
would eventually be expected to fail as the tank metal wall temperatures increased.

The Importance of Flame Retardant Clothing

In the video clip, a person can be seen in the foreground having had his clothes burned off after
being exposed to the flash fire. This is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9 – Affected Person

Flame Retardant Clothing (FRC) is a well-known passive safeguard, commonly used in many
facilities, and stipulated by organizations such as API, OSHA and NFPA. FRC is personal
protective equipment (PPE), which is the last line of defense after engineering controls and
administrative controls have failed. FRC are designed to protect against a flash fire that only

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lasts three to five seconds. It is not protective beyond that point except for the fact that it is self-
extinguishing.

API RP 500, Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at
Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division I and Division 2, identifies areas that present
a fire hazard to employees and, therefore, require PPE. These areas include work in Class I,
Division I areas and work where a process is opened to increase the likelihood of flammable
gases or vapors to 10% of the lower flammable limit (LFL). If work is performed in a Class I
Division I area or where a process that contains flammable vapors, then API RP 500 identifies
the need for FRC. Many companies apply a sitewide FRC requirement, rather than designating
specific areas.

API summarizes RP 500 as follows: this recommended practice provides guidelines for
determining the degree and extent of Class I, Division 1 and Class I, Division 2 locations at
petroleum facilities for the selection and installation of electrical equipment. Basic definitions
provided in the National Electric Code (NEC) have been followed in developing this document,
which applies to the classification of locations for both temporarily and permanently installed
electrical equipment. RP 500 is intended to be applied where there may be a risk of ignition due
to the presence of flammable gas or vapor, mixed with air under normal atmospheric
conditions.

Wearing FRC is intended to reduce the potential for burns to personnel, and hence reduce the
amount of skin surface area burned. This is especially important when considering that there is
a direct relationship between age, percentage of burned area, and mortality. This relationship is
shown in the Green Book (CPR-16E - Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage), and
shown below in Figure 10.

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Figure 10 – The Relationship Between Age, Percentage of Burned Area and Mortality
(From The Lancet, 20 November 1971)

When considering this information, the wearing of FRC is common sense in any facility
handling flammable materials, even when the operating company does not mandate it. An
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure!

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Emergency Planning

Considering the speed at which the incident developed, those people caught in the path of the
jet fire would have little chance of escape. However, a well-developed emergency plan could
prevent further escalation, and minimize further injuries and damage.

Operating companies, at a minimum, should have an emergency action plan that will facilitate
the prompt evacuation of employees (and contractors) when there is an unwanted release of a
highly hazardous chemical. The operating company's plan would be activated by an alarm
system to alert employees when to evacuate, and should allow for employees who are
physically impaired to ensure that they have the necessary support and assistance to get them
to a safe zone.

The intent of the emergency plan would be to alert and move employees quickly to a safe zone.
Delaying alarms or confusing alarms should be avoided. The use of process control centers or
buildings as safe areas is discouraged, if these buildings are not known to be blast-resistant.
Experience has shown that that lives can be lost in these structures because of their location
and because they are not necessarily designed to withstand overpressures from shock waves
resulting from explosions in the process area.

If there are unwanted incidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals in the process area,
the operating company should inform employees of the actions/procedures to take. If the
operating company wants employees to evacuate the area, then the emergency action plan will
be activated. For outdoor processes, where wind direction is important for selecting the safe
route to a refuge area, the employers should place a wind direction indicator, such as a wind
sock or pennant, at the highest point visible throughout the process area. Employees can move
upwind of the release to gain safe access to a refuge area by knowing the wind direction.

If the operating company wants specific employees in the release area to control or stop the
minor emergency or incidental release, these actions must be planned in advance and
procedures developed and implemented. Handling incidental releases for minor emergencies in
the process area must include pre-planning, providing appropriate equipment for the hazards,
and conducting training for those employees who will perform the emergency work before they
respond to handle an actual release.

Preplanning for more serious releases is an important element in the operating company’s line
of defense. When a serious release of a highly hazardous chemical occurs, the employer,
through preplanning, will have determined in advance what actions employees are to take. The

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evacuation of the immediate release area and other areas, as necessary, would be
accomplished under the emergency action plan.

Drills, training exercises, or simulations with the local community emergency response planners
and responder organizations help to ensure better preparedness.

An effective way for medium to large facilities to enhance coordination and communication
during emergencies within the plant and with local community organizations is by establishing
and equipping an emergency control center. The emergency control center should be located
in a safe zone so that it could be occupied throughout the duration of an emergency.

Lessons Learned

After an accident, some of the first thoughts that come to mind are safety-related. What does a
company have to do to prevent this from happening again? What measures are needed to be
safe in a preferably long extended term? How does a company train new employees and
contractors?

Many of the victims were subcontractors during the accident, so the company began to ensure
proper training of their contractors after the incident, including emergency preparedness drills.

This was the second accident to affect this company in the month of September. Earlier in the
month, four workers were injured after a fire broke out at one of their other refineries in
Tamaulipas. Another fire at the same location occurred less than a month before on August 13.
With a series of incidents in a short time span, Gerardo Reza said that the company
implemented inspections and evaluated their systems before restoring process activities.
Companies included within the investigation were the following; the Energy Agency,
Environmental Protection Agency and the Labor and Social Security. “Prior to the restoration of
activities in the metering center, the company carried out a mechanical integrity inspection and
evaluation program consisting of non-destructive testing, visual inspection, wall thickness
measurement, ultrasound, metallography, hardness, verticality and roundness, which ended on
September 30, 2012.”

The Burgos well administration stated that the investigation of the explosion was completed on
December 2012 and officially sent to the PGR (Mexican government) in January 2013, though
it is unclear if the findings have ever been made publicly available.

As with any incident, there are typically multiple contributing factors which need to line up
before the incident can occur, illustrated with the Swiss Cheese Model (Figure 11). The Swiss

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cheese model of accident causation illustrates that, although many layers of defense lie
between hazards and accidents, there are flaws in each layer that, if aligned, can allow the
accident to occur.

Figure 11 – Swiss Cheese Model

A review of the fourteen elements in OSHA’s PSM Standard (Process Safety Management of
Highly Hazardous Chemicals) shows that most, or all, of these elements could have played a
part in preventing such a catastrophic incident such as the one in Reynosa.

The fourteen elements in OSHA’s PSM standard are:

 Employee Participation
 Process safety information (PSI)
 Process hazard analysis
 Operating procedures
 Training
 Contractors
 Pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
 Mechanical integrity
 Hot work permit
 Management of change
 Incident investigation
 Emergency planning and response
 Compliance Audits
 Trade secrets

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Elements which could have potentially contributed to, or prevented, the Reynosa incident have
been highlighted in bold.

It is worth noting that the facility in Reynosa is located approximately twelve miles from the US
border. Had this plant been located twelve miles to the north, on US soil, the incident
investigation and aftermath would have been significantly different. The follow-up to an event of
this scale in the US would include public enquiries, a public Chemical Safety Board
investigation, industry-wide recommendations, and probable updates of affected standards and
regulations.

This paper concludes with the following thoughts:

1. Operator intervention cannot always be relied upon, as some incidents escalate too
quickly to allow for any immediate response. In which case, an automated, independent
protection system would be much more effective.
2. The lessons learned from any major incident, regardless of location, should be shared
and implemented on an industry-wide, and international basis.

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References

Martinez Conde, Baraquiel Alastriste. "Dictamen Sobre La Causa Raiz Del Incidente."
(http://www.diariomomento.com/en-diciembre-dictamen-sobre-la-causa-raiz-del-incidente-
registrado-en-instalaciones-de-pemex-de-reynosa/)

Diario Momento, N.p., 7 Nov. 2012. Web. 18 July 2017 (http://www.diariomomento.com/en-

diciembre-dictamen-sobre-la-causa-raiz-del-incidente-registrado-en-instalaciones-de-pemex-
de-reynosa/)

Navarro, Carlos, "Fatal Explosion at Natural-Gas Plant in Tamaulipas Exposes Safety, Staffing
Problems for State-Run Company PEMEX"
(https://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/21277/SourceMex.Mexico%20PEMEX%20e
xplosion.9.26.12.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

SourceMex, 26 Sept. 2012. Web. June-July 2017

(http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/la_energy_notien/15/?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

Pemex Refuerza Acciones Preventivas a 3 Años De Explosión En Reynosa." El Universal.

Notimex, 17 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 July 2017
(http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/estados/2015/09/17/pemex-refuerza-acciones-
preventivas-3-anos-de-explosion-en-reynosa)

API Recommended Practice 572, Third Edition, “Management of Hazards Associated with
Location of Process Plant Permanent Buildings” (2009)

API Recommended Practice 573, First Edition, “Management of Hazards Associated with
Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings” (2007)

CCPS, “Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout,” AIChE/CCPS, New York (2003)

API Recommended Practice 500, Third Edition "Recommended Practice for Classification of
Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and
Division 2" (2012)

API Standard 2000, Seventh Edition "Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks"
(2014)

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 CFR 1910.119, Process Safety

Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (1992)

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CCPS, “Layer of Protection Analysis – Simplified Process Risk Assessment,” AIChE/CCPS,
New York (2001)

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