Chapter 2: Accidents and Risk Management

2.1 Previous accidents of gas leakage

Heavy gases including natural gas, hydrogen gas, and other associated fuels are widely
transported utilizing long pipe lines and specific transport vehicles [1]. During the
transportation, these mediums of transport are generally vulnerable to corrosion action of
fuels, natural hazards, mechanical equipment failure, materials failure and other external
factors [2]. Overall, it has been observed and concluded that a considerable portion of
transported gases is never utilized and get wasted generally termed as Unaccounted Gas
(UAG) primarily due to the occurrence of accidents [3]. In the past, there has been many
catastrophic gas leakage accidents all over the world specifically in USA, INDIA and other
parts of the world. For instance, in the city of Bhopal India in 1984 a devastating event
occurred when almost 45 metric tons of methyl isocyanate was leaked from Carbide
Manufacturing Plant causing the death of more than 3000 individuals and spread of genetic
disorder in about 300000 inhabitants living in adjacent areas. The causes of such a tragedy
was analysed by gupta [4] where the author concluded that the chief reason was the relaxed
and indifferent attitude of concerned authorities as similar accidents had already happened at
the plant even before the following tragedy. Moreover, no safety measures were actually in
operational mode including gas scrubber, refrigeration system, out of order flare system,
corrosive piping and mafunctiningmalfunctioning flow parameters(temperature, pressure etc).
Similar other accidents also happened in other parts of the world such Piper alpha accidents,
Esso Australia gas explosion and others. An explosion in Esso Australia plant for ags
production occurred in 1998 at Longford causing the death of two individuals and stoppage
of gas supply to the whole state for over a two week period. The investigations revealed that
lean oil system malfunctioned result in brittle heat exchanger pipes consequently causing a
fracture and rapture of pipes and a significant portion of gas was released into the
atmosphere and got ignited leading to the devesatatingdevastating gas explosion [5]..
Another of similar accident occurred in Wisconsin in America when a considerable amount
of lethal propane gas was leaked resulting in explosion killing three persons and leaving
about forty-seven people severely injured. A full closure of the accident concluded that gas
was leaked from backup fuel supply system. The gas leaked from corroded piping system

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connecting propane tanks to propane mixers transforming propane include form to gaseous
form [6]. Heavy As Leakage indicators points to the fact that gas clouds in the atmosphere
occasionally are a contribution form industrial accident. It is important to analyse previous
accidents in order to learn the risks and hazards from the real scenarios. In this chapter, three
typical methods of dispersions of harmful heavy gases in the environment are explored [4].
Based on the investigation of the accidents, risk assessment approach on hazardous zone
concept is reviewed.

References:

[1] Parvini M., and Gharagouzlou E., "Gas Leakage Consequence Modeling for Buried
Gas Pipelines", Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, vol. 37, pp. 110–118,
2015.

[2] Sklavounos S., and Rigas F., "Estimation of Safety Distances in the Vicinity of Fuel
Gas Pipelines", Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 24–
31, 2006.

[3] Costello K. W., "Lost and Unaccounted-for Gas: Challenges for Public Utility
Regulators", Utilities Policy, vol. 29, pp. 17–24, 2014

4. Gupta, J. P. (2002). The Bhopal gas tragedy: could it have happened in a developed
country?. Journal of Loss Prevention in the process Industries, 15(1), 1-4.

5. Hopkins, A. (2000). Lessons from Longford: the Esso gas plant explosion. CCH
Australia limited.

6. Borowski, G. J. (2006). A hint of trouble, then tragedy. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.

2.1.1 Buncefield Explosion and Fire

On 10th December 2005, Buncefield fire explosion took place at the terminal when a
fuel storage tank was being filled with gasoline at Buncefield Tank farm. The terminal was
owned by Total UK Limited and is reported to be the fifth largest storage depot in the UK
with a capacity of 273 Million Litres of fuel. Figure 2.1 shows the smoke containing the
heavy particles rising above the sky from the fire.

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 Figure 2.1: Buncefield fire explosion (Courtesy Wikipedia)

The blast was initiated from Tank no. 912 and led to successive blasts of 20 tanks nearby.
From analysis ,the cause of the blast was identified to be initiated by the level indicator of
the gasoline tank which was stuck at 2/3. As a result of continuous overfilling of the tank,
the temperature increased, causing a huge explosion of the unleaded gasoline, releasing
large amounts of lead and other heavy gases into the atmosphere. Figure 2.2 shows a heavy
gas cloud rising in the atmosphere [5]. These major accidents are the result of continuous
negligence and do not happen instantaneously.

Shown below are two of the main highlighted reasons and solutions that could have
prevented the incident from occurring are:

1) Faulty indicator level in the tank. This accident could have been prevented if a
regular maintenance regime were adhered to for all equipment installed at the site was
set up [6].
2) Increase in temperature of the tank causing ignition of the fuel. A temperature sensor
on site could also have prevented this accident.

A heavy gas is defined as a gas containing heavy elements like chlorine, LNG, LPG, and
other petroleum gases. Heavy gases are said to be incredibly harmful for human health.
Fortunately, the concentration of heavy gases is reduced with the distance. However, the
dispersion of them cause a gas cloud which is very different from a normal vapour cloud.
Normal vapour clouds rise above and form clouds due to the pressure difference. Whereby,
heavy gases move both above the ground and towards the low slope and the concentration of
these gases change as they move with the air.

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 Figure 2.2: Buncefield fire cloud (Courtesy Wikipedia)

The Buncefield fire accident resulted in the vapour cloud covering an area of more than
200,000 m2. The smoke resulted from the burning of structures made of different chemical
compositions, which consequently resulted in high concentrations of harmful materials
within the neighbourhood. Ultimately all residential and commercial areas surrounding the
terminal were immediately evacuated. Figure 2.3 shows the aftermath of Buncefield fire
explosion.

Buncefield fire occurred close to a busy motorway resulting in the disruption of traffic within
the vicinity. All motorway activity was shut down and almost 30 km of the road remained
closed. Thus, disrupting the transport business and causing a huge economical loss to the
nearby industries.

Later , the three-valleyinvestigations concluded in July 2010 and report published announced
that it had detected abnormal amounts of biochemicals and heavy waste products in
underground drinking water. The water underground was polluted to an extent that a criterion
of more than one hectare limit was used to provide information about the environmental
impacts on the atmosphere. Later on, the water was purified to remove PFOS and fuel content
from the drinkable water casing an almost one million pounds expenditure [1].

Table 2.1: Consequences of accident of Buncefield explosion

Consequences and facts
Area affected 200,000 m2
Injuries 43
Smoke cloud altitude 9000 ft (2700 m)

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 Figure 2.3: Aftermath of Buncefield fire (Courtesy Wikipedia)

2.1.2 Caribbean Petroleum Explosion and Fire Bayamon

On 23rd October 2009, a huge explosion hit the Caribbean petroleum Corporation
(CAPECO) facility in Bayamon, Puerto Rico. This incident occurred when gasoline was
being offloaded from the ship tanker, the Cape Bruny, to the CAPECO tank farm onshore.
Figure 2.4 shows the Caribbean Petroleum explosion fire [7].

Heavy gases dispersion is dependent on numerous environmental conditions, for example:

ambient air temperature, air density and air temperature. Nonetheless, the behaviour of
heavy gas dispersion in the following unfortunate accident is also observed to bethe same
identical as other such accidents which can also be verified from the general characteristics of
heavy gases(or their behaviour) when a leak occurs. As shown in figure 2.4, a cloud of heavy
gases resulting from explosion is rising above the ground and expanding with the air. The
concentration of the cloud is at its maximum at the base where it is produced from the fire.
This concentration decreases with the distance.

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 Figure 2.4: Caribbean fire explosion (Courtesy Wikipedia)

It was investigated that the aerosolization of the gasoline spray resulted in the formation of a
huge vapour cloud. This vapour cloud ignited in the wastewater treatment facility area after
reaching an ignition source. The blast also caused the explosion of 17 other storage tanks.

The key reasons of the accident noted by the investigation team are as follow:

1) the investigation report claimed that aerosolization of the gasoline spray resulted
in the explosion.
Aerosolization is the phenomenon in which the molecules of the liquid are carried
away with the wind.
2) The explosion could have been prevented if there was no contact of the air with
the fuel.
There was no check at the site available to ensure this.
3) The ignition source was the a nearby waste-water management.
This incident could also have been prevented if the temperature of the wastewater
were checked and controlled frequently.

The fire from the explosion lasted approximately 60 hours with continuous smoke cloud
rising above and mixing in the atmosphere. It affected approximately 45000 residents living
nearby and around 300 houses were damaged from this explosion. Contamination of the
atmosphere from the fire with the heavy metals resulted in many health complications of the
people in that area.

Table 2.2: Consequences of accident of Carribean petroleum explosion and fire

Consequences and facts
Homes affected 300

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 Petroleum released 30 million gallons
Fatal injuries 3
People affected 45000

According to the figures, nearly 30 million gallons of petroleum was released on site and off
site through the storm water channels. 100,000 and seventy-one thousand million gallons of
oil, fire suspension foam and twenty-two million gallons of contact water contaminated the
environment as a result of the accident. Figure 2.5 shows the aerial view of the Caribbean
Fire explosion and figure 2.6 shows the minute stamps view of the explosion, finally figure
2.7 shows the Aftermath of Caribbean explosion.

Figure 2.5: Aerial view of Caribbean fire explosion (Courtesy Wikipedia)

Figure 2.6: Minute timestamps view of the explosion (Courtesy Wikipedia)

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 Figure 2.7: Aftermath of Caribbean explosion (Courtesy Wikipedia)

2.1.3 LNG Peak Shaving Plant, Plymouth

On 31st March 2014 at 8:19 am, (LNG) peak shaving plant operated by Williams
company at Plymouth, Washington faced a disastrous failure and explosion in LNG-1
regeneration system and purification facility area. This occurred during the annual
liquefaction start-up operation. Figure 2.8 shows the aerial view of LNG peak shaving plant
[8].

Key reasons of explosion noted by investigation team are:

1) The explosion was caused by the operator error. The temperature of the air-gas
mixture increased in the pipe and resulted in the ignition of the mixture. There must
have been some temperature sensor present on the line to protect the equipment.
2) Purging the pipes containing combustible vapours must be carried out at regular
intervals to prevent the accumulation of these gases.

Figure 2.1: Aerial view of LNG Peak shaving plant (Courtesy google earth)

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The reason of the explosion was the salt bath heater located at the piping of the tank as shown
in figure 2.9. A gas-air mixture that was flammable remained for a long time in the system
and entered the salt bath heater. This mixture auto ignited after the start up. Figure 2.10
shows the aftermath of the explosion.

Table 2.3: Consequences and facts of LNG Peak shaving plant explosion
Consequences and facts
Cost occurred $ 50,000,000
Fatal injuries 5
People affected 30,000

Figure 2.9: Tank explosion in LNG plant (Courtesy Wikipedia)

Figure 2.10: Aftermath of explosion fire (Courtesy Wikipedia)

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2.2 Hazardous zones concept

Heavy Gas Leakage from various eqipmentsequipment’s, processes and its contact with
inflammable fluids may cause explosion in the adjacent environment leading to severe
dames. Therefore, a new concept was introduced whereby identification of potential ignition
sources coupled with reducing possibilities for the various heavy gas clouds to combine
together. This concept was known as Hazardous Area/Zone Classification. In the literature,
there has been serval methodologies presented to identity and design hazardous zones with
the aim to reduce accidents. However, these techniques are limited by inaccurate
identification of such areas due to the fact that combined effects of multiple leak sources and
weather conditions are not included in the process. Thus a new approach was presented by H.
Zohdirad et al [1] where an optimization methodology is adopted to define better hazardous
zone while considering varying weather conditions and number of leak sources. The results
show that better hazardous are definition and classification is possible since this method
incorporated the wind direction, leak sources and their combined influence on the process.
AdditionalyAdditionally, a similar research activity focused on construction industry was
conducted by Xu Shen et al [2] where authors keeping in view that construction sites are
usually flexible and have unique requirements as per the application and widely entangled
interaction between workers and heavy construction equipment is bound to cause fatalities if
no safety precautions area adopted, presented a novel six step methodology to design reliable
hazardous zones for any construction site and for any piece of heavy equipment. The first
step involves clearly describing potential equipment location and orientation in the vicinity of
construction site. The second step is inclusion of well defined and established safety areas
followed by the complete manual of safe operation of equipment. The next stage involves
considering and incorporating reaction times of operators in safety policies design also
specifying the braking distance for heavy machinery. Finally, based on above information
map generated, hazardous zones are described. Another study on similar topic was presented
by Howard G. W. et al [3] where the authors provided a numerical modelling approach to
accurately define hazardous zones in facilities dealing with hydrogen gas production, storage
and transportation. More specifically, the CFD model was built to analyse the effects of
compressed hydrogen gas release into the atmosphere under the influence of variety of
conditions in order to primarily identify the flammable limit for hydrogen air mixture. The
study was conducted by virtually recreating the environment of typical hydrogen energy
station. A novel approach was presented for specifying safe electrical distance from various

10
equipment’s based on hydrogen gas pressure and storage containers volume and other related
factors. The authors concluded that more research is needed on deciding the optimal distances
definitions which is acceptable to all the stakeholders involved. Based on investigations into
previous accidents, hazardous zone concepts were introduced [9] with which relevant risk
management approaches were developed and are applied in industrial practice.

2.2.1 Definition

Any place or area where a potential of explosion is possible resulting from

accumulation of heavy gases is termed as ‘Hazardous area’.

For any explosion to take place, the three conditions that must be satisfied are:

(1) Fuel,

(2) Ignition sources

(3) Oxygen

For each of these conditions, explained below is a short description of the conditions that
must be fulfilled for an explosion to occur:

Fuel: Fuel must be present in large concentration for an explosion to occur. For example, if
a gas burner is left on for a period of time and then ignited with a lighter nearby, a small
explosion will occur.

The ignition source is required to burn the fuel within the air.

Oxygen is required to carry out the chemical reaction. This chemical reaction will
consequently produce heat and light.

Hazardous areas are divided into three categories based on the percentage of risk: Zone 0,
Zone 1, and Zone 2,

These zones refer to continuous, secondary, and primary grades of release respectively.
Furthermore, this is also defined as term Vz, a volume within, which flammable gas based on
the mean concentration increases because of the release.

2.2.1.1 Zone 0

Zone 0 is the place where the explosive fuel is present frequently for long periods. Zone
0 is the area where precautionary measures taken by the plant team are most strict and has no

11
chance of leverage is provided to any member of the workers regardless of the position or
state of the employee. The risk management protocols remain the same for all persons.

This zoning concept must be kept in mind by the risk management team in order to account
for safety measures.

2.2.1.2 Zone 1

Zone 1 has still high probability of explosion but is less than zone 0. In this zone, the
explosive materials are present while working on the equipment, which contain those
materials. Zone 1 is an area where some leverage can be provided in some cases, but the risk
is still considered to be high. In this zone all precautionary measures must be adopted to
avoid any accident at Zone 1

2.2.1.3 Zone 2

Zone 2 has the lowest probability of explosion even if the explosion occurs, it is short
and small scaled. Zone 2 has the lowest probability of any accident hence the safety is also
not so strict but still some measures are taken to ensure the safety of the workers.

2.2.2 Example applying hazardous zone approach

A hazardous area is defined as the place where there is a presence of any flammable
substance that has ability to cause an explosion. However, these hazardous places contain
different concentrations of flammable substances and based on such factors, these areas are
divided into different zones i.e. Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2. [10] Thus, for any explosion to
occur, three components should be present: Any flammable substance, Ignition source or
heat, and Air or oxygen.

Figure 2 Fire triangle (Courtesy: raytecled.com)

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2.2.3 Importance of Zones

2.2.3.1 Locating the dangerous areas

These zones are important in understanding the severity of the danger. Many safety
standards are existent which help to identify such zones. Colour coding is used to help locate
these areas. For example, in some industries, red coloured fittings and piping are used to
identify Zone 0, yellow-coloured fittings and piping are used to identify Zone 1, and grey
colour are used to identify Zone 2.

2.2.3.2 Providing safety measures

If in any area, there is a chance that these three components can be present, fire safety
measures must be provided. Zone 0 is the most hazardous area that is directly exposed to the
flammable gases if there is any leakage. Hence, Zone 0 will contain maximum safety
measures to prevent any loss. Moreover, further safety measures will also be provided that
includes restrictions for specified personnel only and not allowing ignition sources inside the
zone 0. Similarly, Zone 2 is least dangerous so there will be less safety measures.

2.2.3.3 Conserving the resources

The concept of zones help save the resources that are spent on safety measures and also
help to identify the most affected areas in case of any leakage [10]. For example, Zone 0 is
the most dangerous area and must contain maximum safety measures.

To understand the concept of zones, consider a gasoline filling station as shown in figure
2.11. A petrol yard (where the petrol is directly filled into the vehicles) is declared as Zone 0,
as this place is exposed to hazardous and explosive material directly and frequently. The
maintenance workshop located behind petrol station is also declared as Zone 1, as this
involves maintenance activities sometimes which involve release of hazardous gases. The
area surrounding the filling station can be declared as Zone 2 as it has less probability of
explosion.

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 Figure 2.3: Petrol station example (Courtesy leansixsigma.com)

2.3 Other consequences and hazards

To understand the effects of industrial release of harmful gases into the atmosphere, the
hazards of these gases must be known in case they are released in the environment beyond
safe limits. For instance, consider CO2 emissions during its transport can cause health
problems such as respiratory problems and other related medical issues. Moreover, it was
found the higher the concentration of heavy gas released into the atmosphere and the soil
cause reduction of ph level of soil thus soil slowly lose its fertility. The additional
environmental implications include degradation in groundwater quality also causing some
irreversible effects on microbial species[1,2]

2.3.1 Consequences of Pre-mixed combustible mixture

The energy from liquids and gaseous fuels is produced by mixing together with a
combustible oxidizer, which in this case is air containing oxygen. Pre-mixed combustible
mixtures result due to the prior mixing of fuel and the oxidizer to the passage of the burning
zone. A good example of pre-mixed flame is the flame burning on the common household
burner. Any atmosphere with the deficiency of the oxygen is due to the accumulation of the
LP gas vapours. This type of atmosphere causes the formation of a cloud that sometimes
seems to be either bigger or smaller than the actual cloud, which mainly depends on air
humidity. To enter such a zone with clouds an explosimeter must be utilised, otherwise
entering for anyone could be an introduction of an ignition source in such a fatal and
hazardous zone.

2.3.2 Consequences of fast flame

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 Upon the complete LP gas combustion mainly water and the carbon dioxide are
released, both of which are not extremely hazardous when burned completely and taken care
of the residue. However, with LP leakages, the flame takes ignition from the lowest possible
area because of the gases are heavier. The flame can ignite from the source and move up to
the leakage rapidly causing an overpressure zone and a very fatly burning flame. In lieu of
safety, correct and adequate ventilation system and a proper vent for the combustion as well
as for the formation of products from the combustion to eradicate the chances of fire catching
by the LP must be present.

2.3.3 Consequences of explosion

Principally, the potential hazard of LP gas is fire and explosion. It can be concluded
that this is due to the inherited quality of the discussed product including high flammability
and combination of gases in extreme conditions. Such gases can lead to a phenomenon called
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion). BLEVE occurs only when the vessel
containing the pressurised gas is ruptured due to the high temperatures and pressure. All
explosions as mentioned above are proved to be extremely dangerous.

The pressure is the main aspect and circle of discussion when discussing explosions or
combustions. Being inherited with a very high volumetric expansion LP gas tanks must never
be filled. The explosion causes a release of a large amounts of flammable gas and vapours
which cause an area of lesser vacancy to the production of larger cloud causing the pressure
to be over-excited during the explosion. In these cases, the significant flame has a fast-
moving flame front from about 1OO to several hundred.

2.3.4 Consequences of ignition of other materials

Any sort of uncontrolled release or usage of LNG/LPG would always result in a

hazardous outcome. Whenever LPG is released in the air by any means then a 2OO times
expansion in the original liquid is seen. The vapours being heavier than the LPG always
move closer to the ground and any ignition source would therefore be risk takingly ready to
ignite a fire, which would rapidly cross the safe limits by combusting the nearby ignitable
material and leading to anstart in limits but catch any material in their way to introduce itself
again as uncontrolled explosion.

The LP gas pipeline failures often lead to a scenario which is different for the fire which may
include pool fires and explosions commonly and commonly vary by the mode of ignition to
the LP gas.

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2.4 Pollution to the environment

LPG industry plays an important role in the economic and social development of
society. Containing LPG as a mixture of Propane and Butane and is produced by which are
derivatives of the distillation of crude oil as discussed earlier gives anand generate an
extensive amount of CO2 as a by-product of the LPG productionir combustion. And CO2A is
a major pollutant to the atmospheric environment, no doubt has lesser content contribution to
environmental degradation but put its part to the cause as well.still plays a part in damaging
the environment.

2.5 Impact on human health

LPG has direct effects on human health despite making a difference indirectly through
environmental pollution. LPG vapourises rapidly and causes cold burns to the skin.
Furthermore, eyes must be protected at all times by wearing safety goggles from types of
products. (T)hisLPG at a very high concentration if mixed with the air with diluting the
available oxygen becomes an anaesthetic substitute..

Statistics data from a questionnaire interview along with the haematological and biochemical
analysis on venous blood samples were collected from approximately 30 workers from the
filling and the distribution stations. All the LP workers were diagnosed with high red blood
cell count, corpuscular haemoglobin, and platelets count. Furthermore, it was also determined
that these workers had significantly high values of kidney and liver function tests. It is clearly
evident that LP has a direct effect not only on the workers but also on people present within
the LP surrounded areas resulting from leakages or from the presence of such
chemicals/gases.

2.6 Risk Assessment and Management for the Hazardous zones

In the modern world, a comprehensive statistical analysis of protection against

explosions is usually based on analysing the influence of all the related factors such as
materials, possible ignition sources, related process of the system and interrelated interaction
of different factors. To such an effort, usually first of all the risk assessment studies are
carried out based on various factors such probable undesirable event, the frequency f their
occurrence and potential results of damage that may occur. I this regard, a basic formation of
risk was given based on triplet concept by Kaplan et al [1]. Where risk R is defined as a
function of all possible scenarios for an undesirable accident. After that the next step would
be proper identification of hazards considering as to why and how and what may cause an
16
unforeseen accident followed by a risk intensity estimation (frequency of potential
occurrence of event). The next step is important as it requires the comparison between
estimated risk potential with some standards in the field. Finally, the risk management
policies as defined by world standards are to be adopted and implemented in hope to prevent
possible catastrophe [2]. Moreover,While describing the risk management step involves we
can say in simple words that the management of consequences and the probability of any sort
of incidence happen.potential accident. Additionally, all of the described process primarily
depends upon the accurate and reliable risk assessment Considering the risk assessment
targets, it is evident that………. we can say theirand it is evident from the literature job that a
perfect risk assessment is toshould properly identify the potential accidents, causes of the
incident as well as they prescribe ways to reduce the risk as shown in figure 2.12 [5].

Figure 2.4: Risk management (Courtesy riskmanagement.org)

This risk assessment can be classified into qualitative and quantitative methods.
Consequently, proper Prevention, Protection, and the Emergency responses would be brought
into light as a result of conducting a risk assessment study.(per the discussions) [5].

2.6.1 Prevention

Prevention is taking any measures to avoid any accident. This is a leading indicator to
identify the causes of any accident before its occurrence.

The above-mentioned accidents[Bhopal Gas leaks, Bleve accident etc] could have been
prevented if the precautionary measures were taken by the plant teams such as Eevery storage
tank or equipment must come under the designation tag of Hazardous Substances and Highly
Flammable [6].

17
. The risk management department take care of such activities at the plants and provide
recommendations of the measures to reduce the hazards.

The risk assessment must be in lieu to keep working of their own must also have an eye on
the hidden causes of the occurrence of the incidence. So, they can be prevented by
precautionary measures including the identification of LP gas cylinders, their storages, and
their pipelines as well. Employees can/should be educated upon starting employment in order
to prevent accidents. Hence, such measures can be taken by ensuring the display markings,
warning signs, and precautionary instructions are clearly vigilant and adhered to. All import/
export products could be separate avoiding any sort of mixing and thus improve the degree
of purity.

Every storage tank or equipment must come under the designation tag of Hazardous
Substances and Highly Flammable [6].

2.6.2 Protection

Protection is a lagging indicator because it is useful in the case of an occurrence of an

accident which has already occured. In the absence of the national regulation tags, the
minimum safety information, the name of the supplier, the quantity filled, and all necessary
symbols must be present on the cylinder. Furthermore, the tanks and storage compartments
must also be explosion-proof.

Additionally, it is noticed n that a language barrier is also present occasionally in industry

due to the varying range of backgrounds of workers. Hence, these measures must also be
taken not only in the local language but also in an international language. Upon complia font
size must be easily readable, and in a noticeable colour contrasting with the rest of the
cylinder.

2.6.3 Emergency response

Although it is ideal to have an existing safety systematic approach in case of any sort of
emergencies, a backup option is necessary to control and limit the rate of danger or accidents
caused. Hence, an option is to have an increase number of LP gas detectors in working areas
along with controlled valves present in the vaporizing section which can be operated should
an emergency arise. Heat intensities from storages often reach approximately 4KW/m2 at
roughly 550 meters due to the catastrophic failures. For this, a solution could be to have
separate rooms which have ability to remain insulated from explosions to keep situations
under control in times of emergency. The shock waves can also reach at about 0.2 bars for
18
the facilities nearby. Major accidents are also caused resulting from employees smoking, and
this should be limited to restricted smoking zones only, which help prevention of further
accidents.

Research shows numerous software are devised to model certain wind stability and contour
of different concentration levels. The point of release has about 38 m and the falling flame
can go as far as to approximately 143 m in the downwind direction which needs to be coped
in emergency situations. Based on LFL distance level methodologies utilizing various
electrical safety equipment’s, a decision is devised to as which of above two sources of gas
leaks are can be safeguarded against coming in contact with an ignition source causing an
explosion Thus, for this purpose electrical equipment based on the LFL distance level, is
used to decide on which ignition sources can be avoided [11].

2.7 Protection requirements

2.7.1 Detection system installed

Identification of any type of hazard is one of the crucial steps to consider when carrying
out a risk assessment. To identify the hazards in an LPG system, the temperature detection
of operations, pressure range of working modules, conditions of storage, and he composition
of the inventories must be identified. Site visits must be carried on daily basis in order to have
a verification and overview with flow diagrams, discussions with the plant manager
and/operator to ensure suitable changes for the detection of any sort of hazardous after
affecting activity can be made. Working in such environments always demand a highly
qualified system. Hence, knowing the behaviour of LP gas, it is possible to predict the
behaviour in advance using a technological approach. For accurate and reliable detection
systems, a coupled approach involving an informed decision making by safety experts,
manufactures and supplier based on data received from state of the art safety devices should
be adopted.there must be good expertise and technicality to be found in the supply, all
vendors, and the manufacturing area. Based on the nature of the hazards and all consequences
the QRA must be identified and studied to learn the significant sfactors that may potentially
cause an accident.cenarios. Thus, the selected hazards are consequently taken out on a new
platform for modelling and future restrictions that may occur.

2.7.2 Protection setup

The primary policy in any operation must be to minimize the risks involved.
Management of LP Gas operators must be given guidelines to operate, work and manipulate

19
the operational equipment, which should all be included within the protection of the
individual in such a modernized industrialized society [12].

The protection setups include all the equipment, plant storages, LP gas storages, and effective
implementation of the precautionary measures. Illegal working should also be prevented
which may include transferring products by the incompetent person or by unapproved
connections such as . under the table transactions and other such ways.For such types of
setups, the software can be aided with PHAST 6.5, which is a prime example of obtaining
results in a graphical form, making it easier for detection and termination of potential gas leak
sources. ………?. The main hazards, which can be associated are: the production of toxic
gases with a fair chance of thermal radiation emissions. Thus, for such cases, the sudden
release of the LP gas in substantial amounts into the atmosphere may result in explosions
similar to the BLEVE incident as discussed earlier in section 2.3 .

2.7.3 Emergency rescue planned

Emergency rescue planning is an incredibly important task to deal with as shown in

figure 2.13. Key responsibilities may include the determination of the exact scenarios,
resulting in calculating the exact amount of damaged caused to a property and the exact
amount of accidental leakages in the tanks and all the leading failures in a system due to the
malfunction of any sort of component within the system.

There is a vital need to have a fire protection system in place in order to avoid any sort of
emergency. It would be ( Generally, the typical fire prevention system requiring requires a
200 mm water supply hose along with sets of fire extinguishers.)

1) Deluge sprays cover the heat sensor or fragile bulbs in the area.
2) Activation of emergency stop buttons (ESD) placed around the terminal as shown on
the site plan

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 Figure 2.13: Emergency rescue planning (Courtesy industrial safety planning)

During normal working hours, trained personnel with brief knowledge regarding first aid
must be present on site. These personnel can be traced by notice board signs placed in
common communal areas, for example in the front or nearby to a first aid kits, canteens, or
even at entrances /reception. Inclusive on such boards should be all techniques that would be
able to help device ways to find the probability of failures. Several examples of powerful
tools that help in the prediction of the failure rates have been seen.

2.9 Summary

Overall it concluded that majority of such actions generally resulted from human error
and adoption of indifferent attitude. For instance, in Gas leak accident in Wisconsin USA the
corrosion of pipe could have been prevented with periodic maintenance and adoption of
safety precaution in the operation of heat Anexchanger. Similar human negligence was also
evident in the Bhopal Gas Leak accident where the preventive devices were malfunction for
over a year and no action was taken. All such accidents caused a lot of havoc and devastating
damage to the environment and inhabitants of adjacent areas. Towards the prevention of such
future accidents, the concepts of hazardous zones was presented and is widely implemented
all across the globe. imperative characteristic feature of a heavy gas cloud is that it is visible
to the human eye. There are still many gases in this heavy cloud that are dispersed within the
environment without being detected. An additional known factor is the concentration of the
concentration of the heavy gases is maximum at the point where it is generated and is called
zone zero. Zone zero is reduced with distance, until the point where the concentration is
within the safe limits.

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 As explained previously in section 2.2 : Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2 are continuous,
secondary, and primary grades of release respectively. to theWhile the term Vz is the
volume within which flammable gas mean concentration arising from the release will be 25%
(primary release) and 50% (secondary release) of the Lowest Explosive Limit.

If Vz < 0.3 m3, the ventilation will be high. Thus, if ignition occurs, small thermal
effects and overpressure will be produced that can easily be considered insignificant.
Moreover, the catastrophic consequences of such accidents are evident in the literature in
form of genetic diseases, worsening weather conditions and respiratory problems.

In this chapter, explained in detail is the equipment that can be used to protect the
environment from dispersion of heavy gases. This equipment is widely used in industry to
prevent explosions and fire hazards particularly in areas which are continuously exposed to
fuel release i.e., areas that are declared zone 0.

This chapter also explained the impact of dispersion of heavy gases into the environment,
which cause global warming. These gases may also cover the vegetation i.e., leaves pores and
prevent the release of oxygen into the environment that may further adverse the conditions.

References:

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[8] G. Atkinson. “Buncefield: Lessons learned on emergency preparedness.,” Loss Prev.
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[11] J. Hebrard and J. Lacome. “Evaluation of two-phase flow models for accidental release
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