Wpiea2023074 Print PDF
Wpiea2023074 Print PDF
Wpiea2023074 Print PDF
WP/23/74
2023
MAR
© 2023 International Monetary Fund WP/23/74
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit
comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
ABSTRACT: The surge in energy and food prices, which was amplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has
prompted a flurry of policy responses by countries during 2022. The aim of these policy responses was to
mitigate social and economic impact of higher prices. In this paper we document announcements of policy
measures based on the Database of Energy and Food Price Actions (DEFPA), which was developed based on
two rounds of survey responses of IMF country teams conducted in March/April and June/July of 2022. The
paper also provides discussion on policy trade-offs when considering appropriate policy responses both for
countries with strong and weak social safety nets. Key policy message is that providing targeted support to
households in the form of cash transfers is the most cost-effective way of alleviating the burden on vulnerable
households and have to be preferred over broad-based mechanisms that prevent international prices to pass
through to domestic consumers.
RECOMMENDED CITATION: Amaglobeli, D., M. Gu, E. Hanedar, G. Hong, C. Thévenot, 2023, “Policy
Responses to High Energy and Food Prices”, IMF Working Paper 23/74.
1
The author(s) would like to thank Apostolos Apostolou, Anil Ari, Alberto Behar, Christian Bogmans, Lahcen Bounader, Maureen
Burke, Wala’a El-Barasse, Enrique Flores, Jean-Jacques Hallaert, Salma Khalid, Asao Kohei, Christina Kolerus, Lucy Qian Liu,
Thornton Matheson, Jeta Menkulasi, Nicola Pierri, Rumit Pancholi, Magali Pinat, Alexander Pitt, Ervin Prifti, Natalia Salazar,
Giovanni Ugazio, Nate Vernon, James P. Walsh, Jean-Francois Wen, Reza Yousefi, and many other IMF country teams and
several IMF executive director offices and their authorities for their inputs and helpful comments.
IMF WORKING PAPERS Policy Responses to High Energy and Food Prices
Contents
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3
Annex II. List of Measures Announced in Response to higher Energy and Food Prices (January – June
2022) ................................................................................................................................................................... 29
References ......................................................................................................................................................... 66
FIGURES
1. International Price Developments ..................................................................................................................... 5
2. Share of Food in Consumer Basket and GDP per Capita ................................................................................. 6
3. Share of Various Budget Components in Overall Household Expenditure ....................................................... 8
4. Estimates of Pass-Through of Prices for Fuel, by region .................................................................................. 9
5. Correlation between Domestic and International Food Prices ........................................................................ 10
6. Policy Responses ............................................................................................................................................ 11
7. Announced Measures by Income Group ......................................................................................................... 12
8. Distribution of Announced Policy Measures by Product ................................................................................. 13
9. Targeting of Policy Measures .......................................................................................................................... 13
10. Size and Number of Announced Policies, by Income Group ........................................................................ 14
TABLE
1. Measures Announced by Country and by Type of Measures ......................................................................... 17
I. Introduction
The surge in international prices on energy and food, which were amplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,
triggered a cost-of-living crisis, and constituted significant terms-of-trade shock for many countries. Despite
some moderation in prices at the turn of 2023, global prices on main products such as energy and food, which
account for significant shares of household consumption baskets, remain elevated. These developments have
a disproportionate impact on low-income households. During 2022, the shock triggered swift policy actions by
governments with the aim to mitigate the impact on households and firms. Governments with existing broad-
based price subsidies on energy and food continued maintaining these policies, without necessarily
announcing new discretionary actions, leading to higher fiscal costs.
In this paper we document policy actions announced by governments in the first half of 2022 to mitigate the
impact from high energy and food prices on households and firms, with a special attention to fiscal measures.
Analysis is based on a survey of 174 IMF country teams conducted in two rounds in April and June/July of
2022. Over 700 policy announcements are recorded in the Database of Energy and Food Price Actions
(DEFPA). The announced measures included those that are related to revenue (e.g., reduction in excise tax
rate) and expenditure (e.g., cash transfers), below-the-line measures (e.g., loans or guarantees to state-owned
energy companies) and non-fiscal measures (e.g., export bans). The database also records the existing
subsidies for energy and food. To our knowledge, this database has one of the most extensive coverages of
the measures announced at the global scale related to energy and food price surges in 2022, encompassing all
aspects of fiscal and non-fiscal measures.
The database reveals that most countries announced measures aimed at reducing the pass-through of the
increase in international prices to domestic prices. This outcome was often achieved by a reduction in
consumption taxes such as VAT/sales tax and excises or outright announcement of price freezes. The
measures recorded in DEFPA to limit price pass-through are confirmed by an analysis using actual price data,
showing that in many countries the rise in retail prices was less than what would be implied by the rise in
international prices. Moreover, the price pass-through appears to have declined in 2022 compared to the
previous year for all country income groups. While most of the announced measures were untargeted,
advanced economies, especially in Europe, implemented a significant number of cash transfers aimed at
supporting households. Importantly, there was a divergence in terms of the type of shocks that measures
focused on by income group and region. That is, most measures taken by advanced economies tended to
focus on addressing the impact from higher energy prices while the measures taken in other regions and
income groups, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Asia (MENA) and Caucasus and
Central Asia (CCA), mainly focused on responses to higher food prices.
The most appropriate policy is to protect the price signal, while providing targeted support to those who are
most affected. From this perspective, the measures that have been taken to dampen the price pass-through
are suboptimal (Amaglobeli and others, 2022). Allowing domestic prices to rise in line with international prices
sends a signal to both consumers and producers and helps induce demand and supply responses. Policies that
limit the pass-through result in broad-based subsidies, which are costly and provide relief to everyone,
including to those who do not need it. More targeted support to vulnerable households is preferred, especially
in countries with strong social safety nets. Countries with weaker social safety nets can consider alternative
targeting approaches relying, for example, on digital solutions and big data to provide targeted support. It is
also important that policies adopted to tackle the cost-of-living crisis are consistent with other macroeconomic
policies. In current context, excessive fiscal support does not align with the governments’ efforts to achieve
price stability. These are general considerations and country-specific context will determine the most
appropriate policy response for that country.
This paper is organized as follows: in section II we review recent trends in energy and food prices. Section III
discusses the impact that high energy and food prices had on societies across countries, in section IV we
document announcements of policy measures based on DEFPA, and in section V we provide general guidance
to policymakers on how to mitigate the impact on households using fiscal policy.
International food prices started to rise after mid-2020, driven by a surge in cereal prices and have heightened
concerns over food insecurity in many countries (Figure 1c). The cereals take up a considerable part of
households’ diets and their consumption spending in many developing countries. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
accelerated the rise in cereal and thereby food prices, as both countries account for significant shares in the
global trade of wheat and maize, and some other food items.1 Since the peak after the war started, food prices,
a prime driver of global inflation in 2022, eased slightly during the last quarter of 2022, in part thanks to the UN-
brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, an agreement that allowed resumption of Ukrainian grain exports.
Nonetheless, despite the recent decline, which has been relatively slow, food prices remain significantly
elevated compared to their long-term average (Figure 1d). Upside risks to prices over the medium term,
1
Russia and Ukraine account for one-quarter of global wheat, one-seventh of corn, and three-quarters of sunflower oils exports.
including those stemming from climate change, are also significant. Moreover, the elevated levels of prices on
fertilizer, whose production process is heavily energy-dependent, contributes to higher prices (Figures 1e and
1f). The rise in natural gas prices, a major input for the production of some fertilizers, and the disruption in trade
flows, have contributed to higher fertilizer prices. Russia and Belarus account for one-fifth of global fertilizer
exports (one-third of global trade of potassic fertilizers).
100
70
120
60 80
100
Peak=100
USD per Barrel
80
40
60
40
30
40
20
20
20
10
0
0 0
Jan-2000 Jan-2002 Jan-2004 Jan-2006 Jan-2008 Jan-2010 Jan-2012 Jan-2014 Jan-2016 Jan-2018 Jan-2020 Jan-2022 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Months before/after peak begins
c. International Food Prices d. International Food Prices during the Last Three Peaks
(Index, 2014 – 16 = 100; January 2000 – October 2022)
Food Price Index Previous Peak (Food) Cereals Price Index Previous Peak (Cereals)
2007/8 Peak 20010/12 Peak Current peak
2007-08 World Food 2010-12 World Food Current food 100
Price Crisis Price Crisis price shock
170
150 80
130
60
2014-2016=100
Peak=100
110
40
90
20
70
0
50
Jan-2000 Jan-2002 Jan-2004 Jan-2006 Jan-2008 Jan-2010 Jan-2012 Jan-2014 Jan-2016 Jan-2018 Jan-2020 Jan-2022 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Months before/after peak begins
e. International Fertilizer Price Index f. International Fertilizer Prices during the Last Three
(Index, 2010 = 100; January 2000 – October 2022) Peaks
2007/8 Peak 2010-2012 Peak Current Peak
300
2007-08 World 2010-12 World Current food
100
Food Price Crisis Food Price price shock
Crisis
250 256 255
80
200
2014-2016=100
60
Peak=100
150
40
100
20
50
0
0 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Jan-2000 Jan-2002 Jan-2004 Jan-2006 Jan-2008 Jan-2010 Jan-2012 Jan-2014 Jan-2016 Jan-2018 Jan-2020 Jan-2022
Months before/after peak begins
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
500 5000 50000
GDP per Capita, constant US$ (2017)
Within countries, food takes up a considerably higher share of household budget for the poorest households
than for those with higher incomes (Figure 3). On average, in emerging and developing countries, households
in the lowest income group spends about three-fifth of its total expenditure on food, compared with about one-
fifth for households in the highest income group. 2 This pattern also holds in advanced economies. In the
European Union, for example, households in the lowest income quintile spend 16 percent of their budget on
food, compared with 12 percent for those in the highest income quintile.3 In the United States, households in
the lowest income quintile spend 27 percent of their budget on food compared with 7 percent among the richest
income quintiles.4 Higher food prices could have more long-run implications. In the absence of policy support,
poor households switch to lower quality staple food, reduce overall food consumption, change intra-household
allocation of resources, disinvest in their children, and cut expenditure on health and education (Ruel and
others, 2010).
The share of energy (electricity, gas, and domestic fuel) tends to decrease in household consumption with the
increase in income (Figure 3). The composition of the energy basket differs by product and across regions
(Coady and others 2015). In low-income developing countries, the share of electricity, natural gas, and fuel for
transport in consumption increases with income levels, reflecting the gaps in access to energy utilities and car
ownership. By contrast, the share of domestic fuel in domestic consumption decreases with income, as this is
the most widespread source of energy for these households. In advanced economies, the pattern is slightly
different. For example, in European countries, the share of spending on electricity and natural gas among
poorer households is on average higher than among richer households while the share of spending on
transport fuels is relatively flat across consumption quintiles (Ari and others, 2022).
2
Four levels of consumption are used to segment the market in each country: lowest, low, middle, and higher. They are based on
global income distribution data, which rank the global population by income per capita. The lowest consumption segment
corresponds to the bottom half of the global distribution, or the 50th percentile and below; the low consumption segment to the 51th–
75th percentiles; the middle consumption segment to the 76th–90th percentiles; and the higher consumption segment to the 91st
percentile and above. A low-income household spends less than $2.97 per capita a day; a high-income household spends more
than $23.03 per capita a day (source: World Bank, Global Consumption Database) (source: World Bank, Global Consumption
Database).
3
Source: Eurostat.
4
USDA, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
EME
EME
EME
EME
EME
EME
EME
LIDC
LIDC
LIDC
LIDC
LIDC
LIDC
LIDC
LIDC
EME
LIDC
EME
LIDC
EME
LIDC
EME
LIDC
Lowest Low Middle Higher Lowest Low Middle Higher Lowest Low Middle Higher
Pass-through of international oil prices to domestic retail prices decreased for all income groups in 2021, with
some heterogeneity observed across countries (Figure 4).5 In the left chart of Figure 4 (Figure 4a), we plot the
pass-through of international oil prices to domestic retail prices from January to April 2022, compared to the
annual pass-through from December 2020 to December 2021. In the right chart of Figure 4 (Figure 4b), we
compare the previous year’s pass-through with the pass-through from January to July 2022. Looking at the
pass-through from December 2020 to December 2021, the pass-through for main fuel products (such as diesel)
has been the highest in advanced economies and the lowest in emerging and developing economies. The
lower pass-through in emerging and developing economies is explained by the prevalence of price subsidies,
especially in the MENA and the SSA.
5
Pass-through of fuel prices is defined, as in Abdallah and others (2020), as the change in retail fuel prices divided by the change in
international fuel prices over the same period with a monthly lag, both expressed in US dollars per liter. Domestic retail prices are
obtained from the Global Petrol Prices Database. Supply cost is obtained from the International Energy Agency. There are three
different international oil prices used depending on the region of the country. A transportation cost of $0.10 per liter is added for all
countries and an additional margin of $0.10 per liter is added to oil-importing countries.
In the first four months of 2022, the pass-through on diesel has been lower, on average, for all country income
groups compared with last year when international prices were also increasing (Figure 4a). Even advanced
economies with liberalized prices have not increased retail prices to the same extent as they did last year.
While the SSA, Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA), MENA and Emerging and Developing Asia (EDA) had
limited pass-through in the first months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, these countries have increased their
pass-through in the later survey (up to July) to the level broadly the same as last year (Figure 4b). Given the
prevalence of price subsidies and limited fiscal space, in particular in oil-importing countries, this could indicate
governments’ desire to ease pressures from subsidies. In contrast, advanced economies have had limited
pass-through even further throughout the year compared to the first four months of 2022 and the last year.
Pass-through from international food prices to domestic food prices is typically lower for food than for other
commodities (fuel in particular). In all regions, the domestic food price index was more strongly correlated with
international FAO food price index in 2021 than in 2022 (Figure 5). In 2022, for some groups of countries, such
as advanced economies, SSA and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) the correlation of domestic food price
index with the international food price index was even negative. The negative correlation may suggest that
policies and/or other country-specific factors (e.g., a good agriculture harvest) may have driven domestic food
prices lower while international prices were on the rise.
AE AE
LAC LAC
EDA EDA
EDE EDE
SSA SSA
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Source: IMF staff calculations based on the global petrol price database and International Energy Agency. Note: AE =
advanced economy; CCA = Caucasus and Central Asia; EDA = Emerging and Developing Asia; EDE = Emerging
and Developing Europe; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENAP = the Middle East, North Africa,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
AE
CCA
EDA
EDE
LAC
MENAP
SSA
2022 2021
The desk survey of IMF country teams has been conducted to report discretionary policy measures in response
to high energy and food prices announced since January 2022 (see Annex I).6 The survey also asked whether
or not there were existing energy and food price subsidies. The survey served as the basis for creating the
Database on Energy and Food Price Actions (DEFPA), which covers 174 countries representing 88 percent of
the IMF membership. The country coverage is the highest among advanced and emerging market economies
(90 percent) followed by low-income developing countries (80 percent). In total, the survey includes nearly 750
announced measures for all countries. The survey shows that the largest number of measures in response to
the rise in energy and food prices was announced in advanced economies. From a regional perspective the
coverage is the highest among European and CCA countries and the lowest in EDA.7
The number of measures should also be assessed considering existing price subsidies (Figure 6). For
example, the number of measures in SSA countries is low but at the same time the percentage of countries in
SSA with existing energy or food subsidies is high. Therefore, even if there are no discretionary measures
taken, existing subsidies in place prevent or limit the pass-through from international prices to domestic prices
whereby there is no or less impact of higher international prices on households and companies. However,
maintaining these price subsidies will become more costly. As will be discussed in section IV, this is not the
6
The survey was conducted in two rounds, in March/April 2022 and June/July 2022. A more recent survey was conducted at the
time of publication of this paper.
7
Please see Annex I for the list of countries within each region.
appropriate policy response. In addition to existing subsidies, the ability of a country to implement measures
and fiscal space are also key in implementing measures.
The survey indicates that about half of the measures were aimed at reducing the pass-through of international
prices to domestic prices. In advanced economies the most announced measures are vouchers and discounts
followed by reduction in consumption taxes such as VAT/sales tax and excises, followed by cash transfers and
price subsidies (Figure 7a). In emerging market economies, the most common measures are direct price
subsidies to energy and food companies followed by a reduction in consumption taxes and cash transfers
(Figure 7b). Reducing customs duties or price freezes are also not uncommon. Except for cash transfers these
are all measures that reduce the pass-through of international prices. The picture is broadly similar for low-
income developing countries with most of the measures focused on announcing (price) subsidies and reducing
consumption taxes and custom duties (Figure 7c). One clear exception with other income groups is that cash
transfers are rarely announced. This is likely related to a lower coverage of social safety nets and capacity
constraints in scaling up cash transfers for the desired groups.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
% % %
Source: IMF DEFPA country desk survey. X-axis shows the percent of the count of each measure type by total
number of measures by each income group.
Measures in advanced economies were mainly focused on addressing higher energy prices while measures in
SSA, MENAP and CCA measures were mainly focused on higher food prices (Figure 8). More than 60 percent
of the measures in advanced economies was focused on the increase in energy prices, one third was related to
a general increase in inflation or both energy and food prices and only 5 percent of the measures was food
related only. This is likely due to the fact that food spending accounts for a smaller percentage of household
expenditure in advanced economies. In emerging market economies, LAC, and EDA about half of the
measures related to energy. By contrast, in SSA countries, which account for the large part of low-income
developing countries, more than 50 percent of the measures are related to food price increases, reflecting the
fact that food expenditure amounts to large percentage of household incomes in these countries. In MENA
countries also half of the measures focused on food. One reason why there is less focus on energy in these
countries is the high prevalence of existing energy price subsidies in these countries which limits increases in
international oil price in the first place to domestic prices.
Most measures were untargeted but advanced economies implemented a significant number of cash transfers
targeted to households. Almost 40 percent of all measures are untargeted to any group such as households or
companies. This is explained by the large number of measures that aim to reduce the pass-through from
international prices to domestic prices. All groups in the economy from households to companies benefit from a
limited pass-through of international prices to domestic prices either as a final consumer or by using the good
or service in the production of other goods and services. However, there is some diversity in targeting
depending on income level. For instance, almost half of the measures announced in advanced economies are
targeted towards households either through cash transfers, vouchers and to a less extent through changes in
pensions or the personal income tax. About one third of the measures are untargeted. Whereas in low income
and developing countries almost 50 percent of the measures are untargeted and related to reducing the pass-
through. Measures targeted to households is less than 20 percent of total measures.
LIDC 33 51 16
AE 63 5 32
EME 47 30 23
ED-Europe 52 21 27
AE 63 5 32
LAC 57 26 17
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
LIDC 2.5
ED-Asia 47 36 16
EME 3.5
MENAP 27 50 23
AE 6.6 CCA 14 71 14
LIDC
EME
AE
These newly announced measures put an additional pressure on government budgets. In more than half of the
countries, the announced measures cost more than 0.2 percent of GDP on average (excluding existing
subsidies). Energy-related measures are the costliest, in all income groups (Figure 10). More than one-fifth of
countries have announced policy packages in response to energy prices that are above 1 percent of their GDP.
More than half of advanced economies have announced at least three measures aiming at responding to high
energy prices. In emerging market and low-income economies, the median number of announced measures in
response to energy prices is two. Food-related measures have the highest relative cost in low-income
developing countries. They reach more than 0.75 percent of GDP for some of these countries.
1.2
Amount of GDP (%)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Both Energy Food Both Energy Food Both Energy Food Both Energy Food All
Advanced economies Emerging Market Low income Developping All countries Total
(32) Economies (50) Countries (28) (110)
While the price shock was global it manifested itself in different ways in different parts of the world. For
example, in Europe the size of energy price shock was unprecedented in size given the decline in Russian
natural gas supplies to about 15 percent of their 2019 levels, corresponding to around one-third of Europe’s
total natural gas consumption. As prices of natural gas and wholesale electricity skyrocketed governments
responded with a combination of limiting the pass-through to consumer prices, and support to households and
firms (see, for example, Annex IV with the discussion of comprehensive policy packages introduced in the
United Kingdom and France). In SSA, the main concern has been with food insecurity due to a sharp rise in
food prices, making food less affordable for the poorer households and disruptions in trade as many SSA
countries depend on imported basic staples, which resulted in the deterioration of access. Various measures
announced in different regions of the world are summarized below:
Europe8
▪ Pricing policies. These included cuts to excise duties and to lesser extent in VAT rates on energy
products (e.g., Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania). General
retail price caps of energy products (France, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain) were also
common.
▪ Support to households. These included cash transfers (Austria, Cyprus, Czech Rep, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, U.K.), vouchers (Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden), and other
forms of subsidies such as energy efficiency grants/subsidies (Lithuania, Luxembourg, Sweden)
exclusively for vulnerable households or more broadly covering all households.
▪ Support to firms. The most common include grants/subsidies/loans to firms in specific industries
(Austria) or all categories (Bulgaria, Greece). Others include liquidity support to energy companies
(Denmark, Switzerland), energy efficiency grants and subsidies (Norway), tax credits for electricity,
gas, and gasoline for selected firms (Italy), and temporary unemployment benefits (Belgium, France,
Germany). Some countries have set up company lists for energy rationing in case of severe shortages
in natural gas supply (Netherlands, Romania).
▪ Windfall taxes. Italy introduced a special contribution on extra profits realized by energy companies’
windfall tax on the extraordinary profits of energy companies. Spain introduced a mechanism in which
large energy companies pay back an amount proportional to the increase in income due to rising
prices.
▪ Pricing policies. Measures to reduce pass-through from international prices to domestic prices were
mostly focused on food products. Price freezes and price subsidies are announced in Burkina Faso,
Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Senegal, and Togo, while Benin, Malawi, Togo,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe reduced custom duties and consumption taxes. Benin, Cote
d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Namibia, Togo, South Africa, and Zimbabwe announced also pricing policies
regarding energy.
▪ Support to households. Cash transfers are announced in Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal,
Seychelles, and Tanzania. Some countries also increased the public wage bill (DR Congo,
Madagascar, and South Sudan) or lowered the personal income tax (DR Congo and Mauritius).
▪ Support to firms. Most announced measures were in the form of fertilizer subsidies to the agricultural
sector (Benin, The Gambia, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania).
▪ Pricing policies. Measure to reduce pass-through of international prices was both focused on energy
(Jordan, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Tajikistan, West Bank and Gaza) as food products (Azerbaijan,
Algeria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco, Oman, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, West Bank and
Gaza).
8
Europe in this section includes advanced and developing European countries.
▪ Support to households. Cash, semi-cash or in-kind - transfers while less in number - were announced
in Djibouti, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan).
▪ Support to firms. Support for firms were announced in a handful of countries (Iran, Kyrgyz Republic,
Sudan, Tajikistan).
LAC
▪ Pricing policies. Most measures were focused on reducing the pass-through of international prices
mainly on energy products (Argentina, Brazil, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, EL Salvador, Suriname, Sint Vincent, and the
Grenadines). Pricing policies focused on food were announced in (The Bahamas, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Sint Vincent, and the Grenadines).
▪ Support to households. Cash transfers are announced in Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru, and Suriname. Argentina, Brazil, and Dominican Republic also announced
semi-cash measures as well as Peru and St. Vincent and Grenadines.
▪ Support to firms. Measures are mainly focused on support for fertilizers and agricultural inputs
(Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Sint Vincent and the Grenadines).
ED-Asia
▪ Pricing policies. Pricing policies were announced in China, Fiji, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Mongolia,
Nepal, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vietnam.
▪ Support to households. Support to households were announced in China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, and Tonga.
▪ Support to firms. Some support measures to firms were announced in China, India, and Nepal.
to food companies
Other subsidies to
Non-tax revenues
Other/unspecified
Other/unspecified
Export restriction
(Price) Subsidies
(Price) Subsidies
In-kind transfers
incomplete pass
Cash transfers
Custom duties
VAT/Sales Tax
(import tariffs)
all companies
Price Freeze /
Property tax
(vouchers &
companies
discounts)
Semi-cash
Revenues
Other_onf
Spending
to energy
Pensions
Other_btl
Wage bill
Excises
through
PIT
CIT
AE AND X X X X X
AUS X X X X
AUT X X X X X X X X X
BEL X X X X
CAN X X X
CHE X X
CUW X X
CYP X X
CZE X X X X X
DEU X X X X X X X X
DNK X
ESP X X X X X X X X
EST X X X X X
FIN X X X
FRA X X X X X X X X X X
GBR X X X X X
GRC X X X X
ISL X
ISR X X X X
ITA X X X X X X
JPN X X X X X
KOR X X X
LTU X X X X X X X
LUX X X X X X X X X
LVA X X X X
MLT X X X
NLD X X X
NOR X X X X
NZL X X X
PRT X X X X X X X X
SGP X
SMR X X X
SVK X X X X
SVN X X X X X X X
SWE X X X X X
SXM X X
CCA AZE X X X
GEO X X
KAZ X X
KGZ X X X X X X
TJK X X X X
UZB X
ED-Asia CHN X X X X
FJI X
IDN X X X X X X X
IND X X X X
LKA X X X X
MNG X X X X X
MYS X
NPL X X X X X X X X X X X
NRU X X
PHL X X X
PLW X
SLB X X
THA X X X X X X
TLS X
TON X
VNM X
ED-
ALB X X X X
Europe
BGR X X X X X
BIH X X X X X X X X X
HRV X X X X X X X X
HUN X X X
KSV X X X X X
MDA X X X
MKD X X X X X X X X X X X
MNE X X X X
POL X X
ROU X X X X X X X X X
SRB X X X X X X
TUR X X X X X X X X X X X
UKR X X X
LAC ARG X X X X X X
ATG X
BHS X
BOL X
BRA X X X X X X X X X
BRB X X
CHL X X
COL X
CRI X X
DOM X X X X X X X X
ECU X X X X X
GTM X X
GUY X
HND X X X X X
JAM X X X X
MEX X X X X X
NIC X X X
PER X X X X X X
PRY X X
SLV X X X X
SUR X X
VCT X X X X X X
MENAP ARE X X
DJI X
DZA X X X X X X
EGY X X
IRN X X X
IRQ X X X X X X X X
JOR X X
LBN X X
MAR X X
OMN X X
PAK X X X X X
SDN X
WBG X X X
SSA AGO X
BEN X X X X X
BFA X X X
CIV X X X X X
CMR X X
COD X X X
COM X
GAB X X
GHA X
GIN X
GMB X X
GNB X X
GNQ X X
KEN X X
LBR X
LSO X
MDG X X X X X
MOZ X X
MUS X X X X
MWI X X
NAM X
NER X X X
SEN X X X X X X
SLE X
SSD X
STP X X
SYC X
TCD X
TGO X X X X X
TZA X X X X X
ZAF X
ZMB X X X
ZWE X X X
V. Policy Discussion
This section lays out the key principles in designing policies in the face of the surge in food and energy prices.
Appropriate policy response to the surge in international prices will be country specific but general principles
apply to all. These policy objectives should be to (i) induce demand and supply responses; (ii) reduce burden
on poor and vulnerable households; and (iii) ensure consistency with other policies, including the need for
macroeconomic stability. The section ends with a discussion on political economy considerations when
designing policy responses. When examining options for government responses, policymakers would need to
be aware of potential policy trade-offs. The strength of social safety net, availability of fiscal space, the nature
of existing domestic price setting mechanisms, institutional capacity, threats of food and energy scarcity, and
potential spillovers on international markets are some of key considerations.
Allowing the pass-through of international prices to domestic prices is a crucial market instrument to
send signals to both consumers and producers. Higher international prices reflect shortage of supply on the
market relative to existing demand. As supply is relatively inelastic in the short run, the bulk of adjustment
would need to come from the demand side. Price signals are the most effective way to encourage consumers
to reduce consumption. If prices are not allowed to adjust, governments that face rigid supply may need to
resort to costly rationing or face unmitigated supply shortages and an increase in informal (black) market
activity. Empirical evidence suggests that demand response can be sizable. For example, in the case of
energy, cross-country short-term price elasticity of demand has been estimated at -0.21, with the highest
elasticity for gasoline (-0.29) followed by natural gas (-0.18) and diesel (-0.15) (Labandeira and others, 2017).
Long-term price elasticities of energy demand are even greater and are significantly higher in developing
countries Price elasticities of demand for food depends on income and the type of food (Cornelsen and others,
2015, Green and others, 2013). It is larger in low-income countries. For example, price elasticities are the
highest for meat (-0.78) and the lowest for cereals (-0.43) (Green and others, 2013). Demand from poorer
households is more responsive to price changes than higher income households. This is another indication that
higher food prices could have a disproportionately large effect on lower income households. Poor households
respond to higher prices by reducing quantity and quality of their food consumption and cutting health and
education costs (Ruel and others 2010, Green and others 2013).
In the energy sector, the success of demand response will be higher if governments also provide
instruments to consumers that allow them to reduce consumption. In this context, providing incentives to
consumers to become more energy efficient through programs that support retrofitting of buildings and
purchases of energy efficient appliances can be helpful. Moreover, by harnessing digital technologies
governments can increase consumer awareness of own energy use such as through deployment of smart
meters that allow consumers get real-time energy consumption information and incentivize them to save.
Encouraging more competition in the energy market and providing consumers with information that they can
use to make decisions and easily switch suppliers will also be useful.
Countries with no existing price subsidies should allow domestic prices to move in line with
international prices. Introducing generalized prices subsidies that aim to limit the price pass-through to
domestic consumers are not advisable. Measures that prevent domestic prices to adjust (e.g., through price
caps) are fiscally costly because they come either in the form of higher budgetary outlays or foregone revenues
(due to tax cuts or lower profit transfers from state-owned enterprises). A general price subsidy on products
with low differentiation, such as fuel, implies providing relief to all including the most affluent households and
giving up precious budgetary resources at the time when they are most needed. 9 These subsidies crowd out
productive spending such as on social assistance, health, education, and public investments. Price subsidies
could also impose a risk to energy and food security as incomplete compensation of suppliers is often
associated with supply shortages and the accumulation of payment arrears, especially in countries where fiscal
space is more limited, and the institutional capacity is weaker. They can generate negative spillovers to other
countries by inflating international prices. But most importantly, price subsidies counter the main policy
objective of inducing demand and supply response as they encourage overconsumption at the time of
heightened shortages and reduce producer incentives. However, for food, while overconsumption or poorly
targeted subsidies have to be avoided, reducing demand can have adverse consequences on the most
vulnerable (see section III.). In countries with weak social safety nets where the expansion of existing programs
does not provide sufficient protection and where food security concerns are particularly acute, governments
can consider temporary reductions in taxes with clear sunset clauses for staple foods. Import tariff cuts on
necessities, which are less distortionary, would then be preferable. For energy, temporary smoothing of
domestic prices is only warranted if price increases are very high, and governments are not able to mitigate the
impact on the vulnerable through other means.
Governments with existing subsidies can allow a gradual pace of adjustment in domestic prices.
Political economy and social policy considerations may prevent governments in these countries to immediately
let retail prices fully adjust in line with international prices despite a significant rise in fiscal costs. Therefore,
these governments can limit but should not avoid retail price increases. They should also take this opportunity
to remind the public about the costly, distortive, and unsustainable nature of uniform price subsidies and
develop and announce concrete plans to eliminate them over medium term. The pace of elimination of price
subsidies should be higher where fiscal space is more limited, the gap between domestic and international
prices is large and the ability to put in place effective measures to mitigate the impact on vulnerable households
is stronger. Moreover, countries with fuel subsidies could consider differentiating adjustment paths of domestic
prices by type of fuel based on their relative weights in the consumption of different income groups. For
9
Food price subsidy differ from energy subsidy as they often pertain to products that are more extensively consumed by poorer
households due to quality differentiation – such as staple food or types of bread. Therefore, they are effectively more targeted
towards the bottom of the income distribution than energy subsidies. Nevertheless, the deadweight loss of food price subsidies
is expected to be larger than the one for targeted cash transfers that would have a similar policy objective.
example, in some countries, LPG and kerosene are more important for low-income households, which they use
for cooking or heating, and hence could have a slower adjustment path than prices for gasoline and diesel.
Once the domestic price is increased in line with the international price, countries could adopt an automatic
energy pricing mechanism with smoothing that prevents sharp adjustments in fuel prices as a transition to
liberalized pricing (Coady and others, 2012).
Where the magnitude of mismatch between supply and demand is so large that it would imply an
extraordinary increase in prices, some rationing could complement price adjustment. Combining
quantitative controls with price mechanisms can be effective in delivering the needed reduction in demand. For
example, building on past experiences with energy shortages (e.g., Brazil in early 2000s and Japan in early
2011) governments can impose consumption quotes for households and firms (based on previous period
consumption volumes). An upward breach of these quotas could be penalized through fines, while downward
breach could be incentivized through bonuses (see, for example, Maurer and others 2005; and Kimura and
Nishio 2016). Crude measures, such as blackouts, are economically costly and should be used only as a last
resort instrument. As a last resort option, if food security is a concern, food rationing can be implemented
through ration shops (e.g., public distribution system in India, see Gadenne 2018), vouchers or direct food
distribution. However, this may give rise to governance concerns.
Export restrictions, particularly when they are introduced by large exporters, disrupt international trade
and contribute to even higher global prices. Although an export restriction can temporarily increase supply
on the domestic market and limit domestic price surges, it can reduce incentives for domestic production,
create negative spillovers to other countries, and trigger retaliatory actions by trading partners. Export
restrictions on food when they are introduced by countries that have a sizable share of the global food market
can have significant adverse impact on other, particularly low income and food insecurity vulnerable countries.
Ban on exports by one country can also trigger a chain reaction of retaliatory measures further limiting the
global supply. The impact of export bans introduced by a number of countries since the beginning of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine has led to an increase in prices higher than 5 percent for several international traded food
items (Espitia, Rocha and Ruta, 2022). Previous food price peaks (such as in 1973 and 2008) indicate that
trade barriers are ineffective on average in stabilizing domestic prices, but they do contribute to further
increases in world prices.10 In the long run, export bans may also hurt countries imposing restrictions as they
reduce production incentives and encourage smuggling to countries with higher prices.
Providing targeted support through cash transfers, especially in countries where social safety nets are
strong, can effectively alleviate the impact on households most affected by higher energy and food
10
See, for instance, Martin and Anderson 2011.
prices. Countries that are able to systematically identify most-affected households and have in place an
efficient mechanism to deliver social assistance are considered to have strong social safety nets. The strength
of social safety nets stems from the availability of comprehensive information systems, which include universal
and robust identification that is effectively linked to databases with socio-economic information (household
characteristics, employment, and income), and from adequate implementation capacity to deliver benefits to
the intended beneficiaries in a reliable and timely manner. The strength of the social safety net is also
determined by the existence of strong medium-term fiscal frameworks that ensure flexible and sustainable
financing for social assistance programs. Cash transfers are a preferred policy instrument because they are
independent of the consumption of energy or food, do not distort relative prices and are not fiscally costly.
Social protection spending is an effective tool in containing deterioration of food security from rising domestic
food inflation (Bogmans and others 2021). However, tax systems can also be used to provide relief to
vulnerable households, for example, through refundable tax credits.
Countries where social safety nets are not well developed can expand existing programs, use
alternative targeting approaches, and employ digital solutions and big data to provide targeted
support. The existing programs, such as school feeding programs, can be expanded by increasing benefit
levels and coverage as needed to provide some relief to low-income and vulnerable households. In the
absence of sufficient (financial) information about households to perform (proxy) means tested targeting,
governments can employ alternative approaches to targeting, such as demographical/categorical targeting
(age, civil status, gender), geographic targeting, self-selection targeting, community targeting, or proxy-means
testing. There is no single targeting method that is superior, and the choice of targeting mechanism depends on
policy objectives and the institutional capacity of a country (Grosh and others, 2022). Digital tools can be
leveraged to identify eligible beneficiaries, verify their socio-economic information and deliver benefits in the
absence of a delivery infrastructure. For instance, in countries where financial inclusion is relatively low,
benefits can be delivered through Government-To-Person (G2P) mobile payment platforms to mobile accounts.
Digital tools can also speed up beneficiary intake and registration through online applications which could be
complemented with information on individuals’ situation from non-standard sources, such as telecom metadata.
During the Covid many countries enabled digital solutions to quickly scale up their social safety nets. For
example, Nigeria used a new targeting method based on census data and high-resolution satellite imagery to
map the poorest urban areas and target benefits. Brazil implemented a new online registration process, verified
their eligibility through a newly developed analytical database that leveraged existing administrative databases
and provided cash transfers to beneficiaries’ bank accounts including to newly created, free digital savings
accounts. In Togo, the government was able to quickly identify and enroll the vulnerable with the help of
biometric voter IDs and satellite and phone record data and deliver cash transfers through digital G2P platform.
However, these technology-based approaches can lead to exclusion of low-income households that may not
have access to digital tools and/or may be hard to reach through digital mechanisms. Governments could also
consider reducing education, health, or public transport fees if they help in reaching the targeted groups and
can be effectively implemented. All these imply that countries with weaker social safety nets have to rely on a
combination of measures to reach the desired target groups.
Cash transfers provide a cost-effective way of alleviating the burden on vulnerable households and can
be financed from higher tax revenues. For example, IMF staff estimates of fiscal cost to compensate all poor
households for the increase in food prices in food insecurity vulnerable countries point to an average annual
cost of 0.15-0.30 percent of GDP (Rother and others 2022).11 Digital payments can improve the efficiency of
cash transfers even further. These additional outlays can be financed from increased tax revenues resulting
from a combination of higher prices, a relatively lower price elasticity of demand on food and energy products
and the prevalence of ad valorem taxes, such as VAT and ad valorem excise in flexible pricing regimes.
Moreover, where feasible, one-time solidarity tax on high-income households and businesses could be
considered to raise additional revenue. Such solidarity taxes are preferred over ex post windfall corporate taxes
as the latter could increase policy uncertainty and discourage future investments. Governments can also
consider permanent excess profits taxes—economic rents more than the return required by investors (Hebous
and others, 2022).
While cash transfers are strongly preferred to other forms of support to households could also be
considered. When existing social safety programs cannot be scaled up immediately, in the case of energy
prices, other temporary measures that rely on utility service providers could be deployed. For example,
governments can provide uniform lump sum discounts on utility bills to all households below a certain income
threshold. Such lump-sum benefits are more progressive and less distortive than benefits that are proportional
to utility bills. In addition, smoothing of energy bills throughout the year can help households avoid falling into
arrears during the months when more energy is needed for heating or cooling. Lifeline tariffs can help cushion
the impact of high prices on low-income households, but such tariffs are generally inferior to alternative
measures. This is because the consumption level of poor households is not always lower (Komives and others
2005), and the measure reduces the average tariff for the utilities and distorts prices. When food security is a
concern and cash transfers cannot be delivered, governments can consider providing price subsidies or
lowering consumption/import taxes with clear sunset clauses for basic food staples.
11
The calculations assume compensating households living on less than US$1.90 per capita per day for food price increases
between end-December 2021 and the most recent food inflation data available in 2022. The estimates assume temporary (six-
month) compensation, unchanged consumption budget shares allocated to food, and perfect targeting of compensation.
Because inflation varies significantly across countries, even within the same region and across peer countries, the analysis is
based on a lower bound value (10th percentile) and a higher bound value (90th percentile) to estimate a range of fiscal costs
rather than imputing central tendency values.
C. Ensure consistency with other policies, including the need for macroeconomic
stability
Measures introduced to fight the current cost-of-living crisis should not undermine broader policy
objectives and maintaining macroeconomic stability is key among those objectives. Against the
background of elevated inflation worldwide, it is crucial to ensure that monetary and fiscal policies stay aligned
on the path to sustained disinflation. In this context, although broad-based price subsidies could reduce current
readings of inflation they also lead to higher budgetary spending/lower revenues implying a more expansionary
fiscal stance at the time when monetary policy is tightening. Targeted and temporary measures, on the other
hand, are less costly and hence can be accommodated within the existing fiscal envelope delivering a tighter
fiscal stance.12 Moreover, maintenance of costly broad-based support measures reduces fiscal space for more
productive developmental spending.
Crises measures should not compromise climate-related objectives. The crisis is a reminder of the
importance of diversifying energy supplies away from fossil fuels, which can help accelerate the transition to
green economy and strengthen energy security. While in the short run alternative supply sources of
nonrenewable energy, including, for example, enhancing markets for Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and
expanding production of shale oil and gas may be needed, to ease supply shortages, this should be done in a
way that is consistent with climate change goals. The crisis should also be used as an opportunity to
encourage investments in the production of renewables, to promote energy efficiency and facilitate expansion
of climate-resilient agricultural production.
D. Political considerations may explain the policy responses to limit the pass-
through
Results of the survey presented in this paper reveal that a relatively high number of measures aimed at
reducing the pass-through of international energy and food prices to domestic prices. This is true even
in countries with strong social safety nets. Political economy considerations may explain, in part, such policy
choices. Social unrest over price increases for energy and basic goods is not new (Morrisson 1996), and
protests over (planned) fuel price increases have occurred often, including in the recent past (for example,
Ecuador, France, Haiti, Iran, and Kazakhstan). Such protests have the potential to spark widespread discontent
with government policies. Some conditions, such as high poverty, inequality, and the electoral cycle, may
increase the risk of social unrest (Alesina and others 2019). A high perception of corruption may lead to
resistance to removing price subsidies because they are viewed as one of the few tangible benefits provided by
the government and there is a lack of confidence in governments reallocating the resulting budgetary savings
12
It is true that the pass-through of higher international prices to domestic prices would lead to higher inflation in short run through
direct and indirect channels. However, coordinated monetary and fiscal policies would help anchor inflation expectations and put
inflation on a downward path.
to benefit the population (Strand 2013). Finally, the existence of strong and well-organized interest groups—not
necessarily the most vulnerable—benefiting from lower prices or the status quo, can fuel social unrest.
Whereas these political considerations and the challenges in scaling up SSNs may prompt measures that limit
the pass-through, such interventions are costly and regressive, and cannot be a sustainable response to a
persistent shock. Therefore, it is crucial to let various measures that have been adopted recently to limit the
pass-through (for example, tax cuts) expire so that they do not get entrenched. A comprehensive
communication strategy is crucial to address underlying resistance.
Coverage of the 174 countries in the survey were broadly balanced among income groups and regions (see
Annex Table A1). Most countries (142) announced at least one measure (36 out of 38 advanced economies, 67
out of 97 emerging market economies and 39 out of 59 low income developing countries. In total, the DEFPA
includes about 750 measures announced as a response to higher energy and food prices. The detailed,
country-by-country, which are organized by region, are described in the Annex II. Measures announced as a
response to higher energy and food prices but resulted in an increase in prices (for instance, removal of a
subsidy) are not included in DEFPA, as the focus is on measures aiming at mitigating the impact of higher
prices. These entail 23 measures, in 14 countries and are described in Table A2.
▪ Classification of Measures. The classification of measures in the DEFPA are in line with the
Government Financial Statistics Manual 2014. Measures are organized in the following categories:
spending, revenue, and transactions in financial assets and liabilities. DEFPA also includes non-fiscal
measures. In each category, the detailed breakdowns of the type of revenue and spending measures
follow are also in accordance with the classification in the GFSM 2014. Given the analytical relevance,
each measure that relates to reducing or preventing the pass-through of international prices to
domestic prices is categorized as well in line with the GFSM 2014. For instance, if the pass-through of
international prices to domestic prices is reduced by lowering excises, this measure is recorded under
excises. However, if the pass-through is reduced by providing subsidies through expenses or through
transactions in financial assets and liabilities, these measures are recorded accordingly. Measures that
prevent the pass-through but are not financed through fiscal operations are recording under Non-Fiscal
Measures. Examples are when governments impose a price cap on goods and public/private
companies pay for this (often through lower profit margins).
Other/unspecified Pensions
Revenues
Other/unspecified Spending
⚫ Discretionary measures. Discretionary measures refer to measures that would be actively taken by
governments. This means that automatic stabilizers or measures under the baseline are not
included. For instance, if indexation of benefits is prescribed under the law this will not be included
in the DEFPA.
⚫ Existing price subsidies. To complement the information on newly announced measures, the
DEFPA gathers information on existing food and energy consumer price subsidies prevailing in
the country. Subsidies for a set of food and energy products are gathered in the database for
years 2022, 2021 and 2022, measured in percentage of GDP. The detail of subsidies identified in
the DEFPA is reported in Annex III.
▪ Implementation stage. The focus of DEFPA is on announced policy measures, rather than the
measures implemented. It provides an overview of actions taken by countries, and make it possible to
deliver rapid, evidence-based policy advice (see FM April 2021, IMF Note, June 2022, September
2023 and Fiscal Monitor, October 2023 + REO if relevant). It also raises several issues from a
methodological point of view.
▪ Size of measures. Each measure has the same weight in the DEFPA regardless of size. However,
some measures are of a very small size in terms of GDP, other are more significant.
Korea Spending Other subsidies to all companies Subsidy for diesel fuel
Revenue Excises Extension of the fuel tax cut
Custom duties (import tariffs) Removal of import tariff on food
items
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of import tariff on jet
fuels
Annex Table 2.2 - Announced Responses to Higher Food and Energy Prices - Caucasus and Central
Asia
Country Detailed Type of Measure Type of Measure Subcategory Measure Description
Azerbaijan Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Interest subsidies to SME food
companies producers (agriculture
processing)
Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
imported foods and a number of
intermediate products used in
domestic
VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT on wheat and
bread
Georgia Spending Semi-cash Vouchers to farmers in fertilizer
purchase
Cash transfers Increase in cash transfers
Kazakhstan Other (non-fiscal) Export restriction Export ban of gasoline and fuel
Export restriction Export restrictions on wheat and
wheat flour
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price ceiling on LPG (liquified
through petroleum gas), diesel fuel and
gasoline
Export restriction Export ban on sugar
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price cap on basic food products
through
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price freeze on utilities
through
Kyrgyz Republic Spending Other/unspecified Spending Fiscal provision for food reserve
Wage bill Public wage and pension
increase
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT rates on
imported agricultural goods
Custom duties (import tariffs) Tax reduction to facilitate basic
food products imports
Below the line Other (btl) Concessional lending to SMEs
(e.g., farms) through capital
increases in bank sector
Other (non-fiscal) Export restriction Export ban on selected cereals
Annex Table 2.3 - Announced Responses to Higher Food and Energy Prices - Emerging and Developing
Asia
Country Detailed Type of Measure Type of Measure Subcategory Measure Description
China Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Support grain producers through
companies purchasing and stockpiling
(Price) Subsidies to food Subsidies for full-cost insurance
companies and income insurance for grain
producers
Cash transfers Food price subsidies to
unemployed
Other (non-fiscal) Other (non-fiscal) Lifting wheat import restrictions
from all Russian regions
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price cap on coal prices
through
Other (non-fiscal) Support for fossil fuels to ensure
energy security
Other (non-fiscal) Incentives to increase coal mining
activities
Fiji Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Suspension of VAT Tax on
essential consumer products
India Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Increase subsidy for fertilizers
companies
In-kind transfers Extend food rations
Semi-cash Subsidy for LPG
Revenue Excises Reduction of excise tax for
gasoline and diesel
VAT Reduction in VAT on fuels by
some states
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction in import duties on
some food items
Other (Non-fiscal) Export restrictions Export restrictions/ban on food
products
Easing import restrictions
Other (non-fiscal)
Indonesia Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Increased energy subsidy in the
companies budget
Semi-cash Cash transfers on cooking oil
Cash transfers Increased social protection in the
budget
(Price) Subsidies to energy Fuel subsidy
companies
Revenue Other/unspecified Revenues Export duties adjustment of crude
palm oil on its threshold and levy
rate
Other (non-fiscal) Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price ceilings on bulk cooking oil
through
Export restriction Export restrictions for crude palm
oil
Other (non-fiscal) Incentive on price difference
(CPO fund)
Annex Table 2.4 - Announced Responses to Higher Food and Energy Prices - Emerging and Developing
Europe
Country Detailed Type of Measure Type of Measure Subcategory Measure Description
Albania Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Subsidies for farmers and
companies fishermen
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidies for the transport
companies industry
Pensions Increased pension payments
Cash transfers Temporary cash transfers to
vulnerable households
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidies to energy companies
companies
Bosnia and Herzegovina Spending Cash transfers Social assistance program to
vulnerable households
Other/unspecified Spending Reconstruction of oil terminals
Pensions Increase in public wages and
pensions
Other/unspecified Spending Increase in commodity reserves
In-kind transfers Free fuel for agricultural
producers
Cash transfers One-off cash assistance to
pensioners and young people
(KM 100)
Revenue Excises Reduction of excises and VAT on
fuel products
VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of excise on fuel and
VAT rates on necessity goods
Other (non-fiscal) Export restriction Export ban for heating wood
Other (non-fiscal) Extension of usage of thermal
power plants
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Increase for the electricity price is
through limited up to 20 percent compared
to 2021
Bulgaria Spending Other/unspecified Spending Government purchase of wheat,
corn, and sunflower supplies
Semi-cash Compensation for corporate and
household consumption of
electricity
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT for bread,
district heating and natural gas
Other (non-fiscal) Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price freeze on basic food
through products
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Ceiling on trade margins
through
Poland Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidies for coal
companies
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidies for gas
companies
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT for fertilizers
VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT for fuels
VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT for food and
beverages
Romania Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidies for fuel
companies
Semi-cash Vouchers for students from
vulnerable households
Cash transfers Cash transfer for pensioners
Other subsidies to all companies Subsidy for SMEs
Cash transfers Extension of voucher for energy
to vulnerable households
(Price) Subsidies to energy Extension of energy cap
companies
Cash transfers Wage subsidy for unemployment
Semi-cash Voucher for food products
(Price) Subsidies to energy Energy cap
companies
Other/unspecified Spending Increased investments for
National Program for Local
Development
Other subsidies to all companies Subsidy for transporters
(Price) Subsidies to food Subsidy for food processing
companies industries
In-kind transfers Double hospitals food allowance
Cash transfers Voucher for electricity bill for
pensioners
Cash transfers Voucher for energy to vulnerable
households
Other subsidies to all companies Subsidy for major investments
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Introduction of reduced VAT rate
for heating
Non-tax revenues CO2 certificates
Annex Table 2.5 - Announced Responses to Higher Food and Energy Prices - Latin America
Country Detailed Type of Measure Type of Measure Subcategory Measure Description
Antigua and Barbuda Spending Other subsidies to all companies Fuel voucher programs
Other subsidies to all companies Revised fuel voucher programs
Bahamas, the Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
selected food imports
Barbados Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT on diesel and
gasoline
Custom duties (import tariffs) Freight costs cap
Colombia Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties for
agricultural products
Costa Rica Revenue Excises Smaller increase in excises on
fuel
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
shipping products?
Dominican Republic Spending Other subsidies to all companies Subsidy for fuel subsidy for public
transport
Cash transfers Cash transfers (expansion) for
food and fuel
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy for retail fuel price
companies
Other subsidies to all companies Cash transfers for mototaxi
sectors
In-kind transfers Food assistance (in-kind and
subsidized)
(Price) Subsidies to food Subsidy for basic food
companies imports/production
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of excises on fuel
Ecuador Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Subsidize fertilizers for small and
companies medium farmers
Cash transfers Cash transfers to poor
households (mothers with
children up to age 2)
(Price) Subsidies to energy Fuel subsidies for gasoline and
companies diesel
Other/unspecified Spending Higher budgetary allocation for
intercultural and ethnic education
spending
Cash transfers Increased benefits for social
assistance to US$55 from US$50
Other (non-fiscal) Other (non-fiscal) Credit lines for small and medium
firms by public bank
Other (non-fiscal) Lower interest rates and credit
forgiveness of public banks
El Salvador Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidies for LPG
companies
(Price) Subsidies to energy Price freeze for gasoline and
companies diesel
Revenue Excises Temporary suspension of excise
taxes on fuels
VAT/Sales Tax Suspension of VAT on gasoline
and diesel
Other (non-fiscal) Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Incomplete pass-through of
through electricity price increases
Guatemala Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Price subsidy for diesel
companies consumption
(Price) Subsidies to energy Price subsidy for diesel
companies consumption
(Price) Subsidies to energy Price energy subsidy on gas for
companies low-income countries
(Price) Subsidies to food Subsidy for agriculture inputs for
companies farmers
(Price) Subsidies to energy Price subsidy for electricity
companies consumption for low-consumption
households
Guyana Revenue Excises Reduction on excise tax rate
Honduras Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Price freeze/subsidy for regular
companies gasoline price users (households,
producers, public service
transport)
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy to eliminate electricity
companies tariffs for poor consumers who
consume less than 150 kilowatts
per
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy on transportation (bus)
companies tariff
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy to electricity tariffs
companies
(Price) Subsidies to energy Price freeze on LPG gas prices
companies for domestic use
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Tax reduction for gasoline and
diesel of $ 0.4140 per gallon (10
lempiras)
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of freight costs by 75
percent
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Spending In-kind transfers In kind food support for vulnerable
households
(Price) Subsidies to food Subsidy for fertilizers
companies
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT for residential
electricity for lower consumption
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
cooking gas
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
flour
Other/unspecified Revenues Reduction of excises on electricity
bills
Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties for
fuel for electricity generation
Excises Temporary reduction of excises
on diesel and gasoline
Suriname Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy for electricity products
companies
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy for fuel products
companies
Cash transfers Cash transfer targeted to
vulnerable households
Annex Table 2.6 - Announced Responses to Higher Food and Energy Prices - Middle East North Africa
Pakistan
Country Detailed Type of Measure Type of Measure Subcategory Measure Description
Algeria Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Subsidies of wheat sold to
companies agribusinesses
Cash transfers Unemployment benefit (new) for
young, first-time job seekers
Revenue Corporate income tax Suspension of increase in taxes
on sugar
VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT and custom
duties on edible oil
Custom duties (import tariffs) Suspension of custom duties on
sugar
Other (non-fiscal) Export restriction Restriction of exports of imported
goods
Djibouti Spending Cash transfers Cash and in-kind food transfers to
vulnerable households
Egypt Other (non-fiscal) Other (non-fiscal) Diversification of wheat imports
Export restriction Export ban on staple foods
Other (non-fiscal) Increased wheat import (change
in categorization of imported
wheat)
Other (non-fiscal) Increased procurement of wheat
from domestic producers
Iran Spending Semi-cash Coupons/vouchers for subsidized
bread
Wage bill Increased wages for public
servants
Cash transfers Temporary cash transfers to
targeted households
Iraq Spending Cash transfers Increased cash transfers
(Price) Subsidies to food Increased allocation to Ministry of
companies Agriculture to purchase
agriculture-related products
Semi-cash Increased in-kind food transfers
(ration cards)
Morocco Spending Other subsidies to all companies Subsidy for transportation sector
workers
Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Removal of custom duties on
wheat
Oman Spending (Price) Subsidies to energy Increased subsidy for electricity
companies
Revenue VAT/Sales Tax Increase the list of VAT
exemption for food products
Pakistan Spending Cash transfers Increased cash transfers of 7.7
percent for low-income population
Semi-cash Price subsidy on some food items
in state-owned supermarkets
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy to mitigate the fuel prices
companies (Price Differential Claim, PDC)
(Price) Subsidies to energy Subsidy to reduce the electricity
companies price for all residential and
commercial users
Cash transfers Cash transfer of PRs
2000/household for middle
income quintile and below who
are not eligible to the main cash
transfer program
Semi-cash Price subsidy on some food items
in state-owned supermarkets
Cash transfers Additional cash transfer of PRs
2000/household to the recipients
of existing Social Safety Net
Revenue Excises Reduction of petroleum
development levy for both
gasoline and diesel
VAT/Sales Tax Removal of sale tax for fuels
Annex Table 2.7 - Announced Responses to Higher Food and Energy Prices - Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Detailed Type of Measure Type of Measure Subcategory Measure Description
Angola Spending Other/unspecified Spending Introduction of the food reserve
Benin Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Fertilizer subsidy
companies
Revenue Corporate income tax Rebate on freight costs
VAT/Sales Tax Subsidies for basic food products
(rice, flour, vegetable oil)
Custom duties (import tariffs) Freeze of fuel prices
Other (non-fiscal) Export restriction Export ban selected agricultural
products
Burkina Faso Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Support bakeries through the
companies payment of their water and
electricity bills for a maximum
CFAF 150,000
Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
food imports
Below the line Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Maintaining bread price at CFAF
through 150.
Cameroon Revenue Corporate income tax Suspension of the income tax
installment
Other (non-fiscal) Export restriction Export bans on products facing
supply shortages
Chad Spending Other/unspecified Spending Increasing food security stocks
Comoros Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Subsidy to bakeries
companies
Côte d'Ivoire Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of custom duties on
wheat
Excises Reduction of excises on
petroleum and subsidies to
refineries (two measures)
Other (non-fiscal) Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Food price cap for selected food
through items
Export restriction Food export permits requirement
Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Food price cap for selected food
through items
Other (non-fiscal) Allowing wheat and other cheaper
and local cereals for bread
production
Other (non-fiscal) Reinforcing consumer protection,
including by enforcing price
posting on markets
DR Congo Spending Wage bill Increase in base wages for
certain civil servants
Revenue Personal income tax Reduction in individual income tax
VAT/Sales Tax Reduction of VAT on some
imported goods
Equatorial Guinea Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Suspension of fees at customs
Other (non-fiscal) Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price freeze/reduction on selected
through food items
Gabon Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Deferral of customs duties and
taxes on specific products
Below the line Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Price ceiling by freezing the
through automatic adjustment mechanism
for retail gas price
Gambia, the Spending (Price) Subsidies to food Subsidy for fertilizer purchases for
companies groundnut producers
Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Reduction of revenues from fuel
products
Ghana Other (non-fiscal) Price Freeze / incomplete pass- Reduced levies on petroleum
through products to reduce price build-up
margins
Guinea Revenue Custom duties (import tariffs) Removal of customs duties on
some food products
Guinea-Bissau Spending In-kind transfers In-kind transfers for vulnerable
households
Revenue Other/unspecified Revenues Capping price of essential
products
Other/unspecified Revenues Capping prices on fuel
Annex Table 3.2 - Subsidies for Food and Energy Products - Caucasus and Central Asia
Size Size Size
Type of 2020 2021 2022
Country Type of Product
Subsidy (% of (% of (% of
GDP) GDP) GDP)
Azerbaijan energy (Natural) gas 2.1 1.6 .
Diesel 0.64 0.27 .
Electricity 1.8 1.5 .
Gasoline . 0 .
Annex Table 3.3 - Subsidies for Food and Energy Products - Emerging and Developing Asia
Size Size Size
Type of 2020 2021 2022
Country Type of Product
Subsidy (% of (% of (% of
GDP) GDP) GDP)
India energy LPG 0.19 0.014 0.045
LPG . . 0.23
Other fuel/unspecified . . 0
Annex Table 3.4 - Subsidies for Food and Energy Products - Emerging and Developing Europe
Type of Type of Size 2020 Size 2021 Size 2022
Country
Subsidy Product (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Albania energy Diesel 0.06 0.06 0.09
Electricity . . 1
Hungary energy Gasoline . . 1
Kosovo energy Electricity . 0.52 1
Moldova energy (Natural) gas . 0.83 1.2
Electricity . . 0.33
Poland energy (Natural) gas . . 0.34
Other
fuel/unspecified . . 0.1
- Coal
Serbia energy (Natural) gas . 0.5 0.6
Electricity . . 0.1
Annex Table 3.5 - Subsidies for Food and Energy Products - Latin America
Size 2020 Size 2021 Size 2022
Type of
Country Type of Product (% of (% of (% of
Subsidy
GDP) GDP) GDP)
Antigua
and energy Electricity 0.6 . .
Barbuda
Other energy/unspecified -0.2 0.2 0.6
Argentina energy (Natural) gas . . .
Electricity . . .
Bahamas,
energy Electricity 0.61 0.73 0.77
the
Kerosene 0.16 0.16 0.18
LPG 0.074 0.075 0.082
Other fuel/unspecified 0.85 0.8 0.78
Bolivia energy Energy Subsidies Total 1.7 1.3 3.7
Other (utilities) . . 0.042
Other fuel/unspecified 1.7 1.3 3.7
food Staple foods 0.1 0.1 0.056
Colombia energy Energy Subsidies Total 0.03 0.6 1
Costa Rica energy Diesel 0.0017 0.0018 0.0019
Gasoline 0.0013 0.00095 0.00062
Dominican
energy Electricity 0.42 0.55 0.48
Republic
Gasoline . 0.24 0.65
food Bread/Wheat/Grains/Cereal/Flour . . .
Fertilizer . . .
Suriname energy Electricity 2.3 4.1 4.3
Gasoline . . 0.6
Trinidad
and energy Fuel Subsidies Total 0.3 0.04 0.2
Tobago
Venezuela energy (Natural) gas 0.84 . .
Electricity 8.7 . .
Gasoline 8.3 . .
Annex Table 3.6 - Subsidies for Food and Energy Products - Middle East North Africa Pakistan
Size Size Size
Type of 2020 2021 2022
Country Type of Product
Subsidy (% of (% of (% of
GDP) GDP) GDP)
8E-
food Fertilizer 0.0025 0.0039
04
Staple foods 0.003 0.0015 0.0042
Morocco energy Other energy/unspecified 0.008 1.1 0.017
United
Arab energy Other energy/unspecified 2.7 2.1 .
Emirates
West
Bank and energy Fuel 0.4 0.43 1
Gaza
Yemen energy Electricity 0.007 0.01 0.019
Annex Table 3.7 - Subsidies for Food and Energy Products - Sub-Saharan Africa
Size Size Size
Type of 2020 2021 2022
Country Type of Product
Subsidy (% of (% of (% of
GDP) GDP) GDP)
Other energy/unspecified 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
Other fuel/unspecified 0 0 0
food Bread/Wheat/Grains/Cereal/Flour 0 0 .
Fertilizer 0.059 0.069 0.097
Meat 0 0 0
Oil 0 0 .
Other 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
. . .
Other food/unspecified 0.015 0.015 0.015
Staple foods 0.041 0.043 0.049
Sugar 0 0 .
Madagascar energy Diesel -0.24 . .
Gasoline -0.16 . .
Kerosene 0 . .
Total for Diesel, Gasoline and
-0.41 0.34 1.7
Kerosene
Malawi food Fertilizer 0.89 1.6 0.89
Maize seed 0.18 0.13 0.06
Mauritius energy Diesel . 0.43 .
Gasoline . 0.12 .
LPG 0.44 0.3 .
food Bread/Wheat/Grains/Cereal/Flour 0.46 0.38 .
Nigeria energy Gasoline 0.1 1.1 2.5
Rwanda energy Energy Subsidies Total . . 0.3
Senegal energy (Natural) gas . . .
Diesel 0.043 0.16 0.91
Electricity 0.3 1.1 1.1
Gasoline . . 0.22
LPG . . 0.28
Other fuel/unspecified . . 0.083
Since the beginning of this year, the UK government has introduced several rounds of measures to mitigate the
social impact from the increase in the cost of living, especially in energy prices. The untargeted package to
households benefiting 28 million household had an initial envelope of £350 discount on their energy bill. In late
May, the size of energy bill discount was increased to £650 for all households, with some targeted measures
for pensioners and disabled. In September, in the context of the so-called ‘mini budget’, the UK government
announced a program called ‘Energy Price Guarantee (EPG)’ to shield households and firms against rising
energy costs. For households, EPG will be effective till March 2024, which the Autumn Statement modified to
make less generous, while adding a new round of targeted support to the same vulnerable groups included in
the May package. Some of the previously announced measures, such as the £400 rebate on household energy
bills from October 1, are still effective.
▪ Energy Price Guarantee (EPG). It limits the price that is charged for each unit of energy and hence
under this scheme, the energy bill will still depend on the amount of electricity consumer by
households.9 For households on a standard variable tariff the average unit price will be limited to 34.0
p/kWh for electricity and 10.3 p/kWh for gas, inclusive of VAT, from October 1. For households on a
fixed rate tariff who currently have unit rates above the EPG unit price reductions of up to 17 p/kWh for
electricity and 4.2 p/kWh for gas will apply. For households whose fixed rate tariff is below the EPG
rates, a floor unit price for gas averaging at 10.3 p/kWh and for electricity averaging at 34 p/kWh for
direct debit customers will be introduced.
▪ Temporary removal of green levies on household bills. It saves about £150 per household.11
▪ Support for businesses. A 6-month scheme of energy price cap will be applied for businesses and
other non-domestic energy users (including charities and public sector organizations like schools). For
businesses that do not have fixed contracts, they will benefit from the same energy price cap as
households during this time. After the initial 6-month scheme, the government will provide ongoing
focused support for vulnerable industries.
▪ Measures to increase supply. These include (i) launching a new oil and gas licensing round; (ii)
acceleration of new sources of energy supply, including oil and gas from the North Sea and clean
energy; (iii) undertake fundamental reforms to the structure and regulation of energy market.
▪ Energy bill support scheme (EBSS). It was announced in May 2022 by the previous government.
Key measure of the scheme is a universal discount of £400 on electricity bills for any consumers in the
UK with a domestic electricity connection. The £400 discount will be paid in six monthly instalments
beginning October 1st. In October and November, households will see a £66 discount, which will rise
to £67 a month from December through March 2023.
B. France
Since the onset of the Ukraine war, the French government introduced a wide array of measures to support
households to mitigate the rise in the cost of living. These included price controls (“bouclier tarifaire”), in
particular: (i) a freeze of regulated gas prices at the October 2021 levels, with gas suppliers compensated for
the difference between market and regulated prices; and (ii) a cap on the increase in regulated electricity prices
at 4 percent from February 2022 for the duration of one year. This is done by lowering electricity excise taxes to
the lowest level allowed under EU rules, requiring EDF (state-owned power generation company) to provide an
additional 20TWh of nuclear power to distributors at a below-market price and by compensating suppliers for
the difference between market and regulated prices. Unlike other European countries France is less dependent
on imported energy with three-quarters of the country’s electricity generated from nuclear powers plants.
However, in 2022 nuclear facilities did not function at a full capacity due to maintenance issues causing
outages at these plants.
On September 14, France introduced additional measures to help households cope with rising energy costs, in
particular:
▪ Extensions of controls on regulated gas and electricity prices. This allows for a 15 percent
increase as of January 2023 (gas) and February 2023 (electricity). The cap is estimated to cost 16
billion euros (government estimates). Without the announced extension, these price controls would
have expired by end-2022 (gas) or early 2023 (February, electricity). For households that rely on gas
for heating, the energy bill for this winter will remain at around 25 euros per month (as opposed to 200
euros without the extension). For households that use electricity, the energy bill would be kept at 20
euros per month (as opposed to 180 euros without the extension).
▪ Cash transfers to lower income household. Some 12 million households in the bottom two income
quintiles will receive an additional “cheque energie” in the amount of €100-200, varying with income.
The additional cheque energie that was provided in 2021 targeted the bottom quintile (5.8 million
households), with a fixed amount of €100, so eligibility has widened while generosity has increased.
▪ Extension and expansion of fuel subsidy (“remise carburant”). In March 2022, the government
provided subsidy at the gas stations, which has been €18ct/liter, which was set to expire in October
2022. On September 1, the government extended the subsidy until the end of this year and increased
the subsidy to €30ct/liter.
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