THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136843. September 28, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO ABUNGAN

alias "Pedring," RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO RAGONTON
Jr., accused.

PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Atty. Simplicio M. Sevilleja for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

In an information, Pedro Abungan, together with Randy Pascua and

Ernesto Ragonton, Jr. were charged with murder. Only Abungan, the
appellant herein, was arrested and the other two remained at large.
Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After trial on the merits, the
court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant, through counsel, filed a
Notice of Appeal before he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in
Muntinlupa. The case was submitted for resolution. However, the Assistant
Director of the Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that the appellant
died at the NBP Hospital. The only issue before the Court is the effect of the
appellant's death on the case and on the appeal.
The Supreme Court ruled that the death of the appellant during the
pendency of his appeal extinguished his criminal liability as well as his civil
liability, based solely on delict. In this case, since the appellant died during
the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against
him, the rule should apply. However, it must be added that his civil liability
may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the
victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules. The criminal case against the
appellant was dismissed and the appealed decision was set aside.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; EXTINCTION BY DEATH;

CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. — The consequences of appellant's death are
provided for in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads as
follows: "Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; . . . " Applying this provision, the Court in People vs. Bayotas
made the following pronouncements: "1. Death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
'the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.' 2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
(the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) . . . e) Quasi-
delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription." IDCcEa

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The death of
appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished
his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex
delicto). The death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover,
because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of
the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict
(civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though,
that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict.
For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Moreover, the Court held
that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the
criminal case against him. Necessarily, the lower court's Decision — finding
him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased — becomes ineffectual.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of
conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict
or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be
dismissed.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision 1
of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, 2 in Criminal
Case No. V-0447, which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased.
In an Information 3 dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R.
Bautista charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto
Ragonton, Jr. (both at large), with murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay
Capulaan, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation and superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo,
[Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of
his body . . . injuries [which] directly cause this death, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code." 4
With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not
guilty upon his arraignment on April 30, 1993. 5 After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered the assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, the [Appellant] Pedro Abungan is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and such
penalties accessory thereto as may be provided for by law.
The . . . [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Camilo Dirilo, Sr. in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) and to pay the costs." 6
Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September
14, 1998. On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison
(NBP) in Muntinlupa. On October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant's Brief 7
before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
submitted the Appellee's Brief 8 on February 4, 2000. The case was deemed
submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received the
Manifestation of appellant stating that he would not file a reply brief.
In a letter dated August 7, 2000, 9 however, Joselito A. Fajardo,
assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that
Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached
to the letter was Abungan's Death Certificate. THEcAS

Issue
 The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on
the case and on the appeal.
This Court's Ruling
The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his
appeal extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on
delict (civil liability ex delicto).
Main Issue:
Effect of Appellant's Death
During Appeal
The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows:
"Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx"

Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas, 10 made the

following pronouncements:
"1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.'
"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

a)Â Law

b)Â Contracts

c)Â Quasi-contracts

d)Â . . .

e)Â Quasi-delicts

"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2

above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the
 executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior
to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription."
In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in
Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover,
because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of
the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict
(civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though,
that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict.
For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. ESacHC

Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in

the dismissal of the criminal case against him. 11 Necessarily, the lower
court's Decision — finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased — becomes ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis,
Pangasinan) against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Â
Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 15-36.

2. Penned by Judge Rosario C. Cruz.

3. Rollo , p. 9.

4. Ibid.

5. RTC Records, p. 304.

6. Rollo , p. 36.

7. The Appellant's Brief was signed by Atty. Simplicio M. Sevilleja.

8. This was signed by Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez, Asst. Sol. Ben
Magdangal M. De Leon and Sol. Nyriam Susan O. Sedillo-Hernandez.
9. Received by the Court on August 8, 2000.

10. 236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994, per Romero, J. See also Villegas v. CA ,
271 SCRA 148, April 11, 1997; People v. Sambulan , 289 SCRA 500, April 24,
1998; People v. Romero , 306 SCRA 90, April 21, 1999; People v. Enoja , GR
No. 102596, December 17, 1999.

11. While we agree with the doctrinal ruling in Bayotas, we believe that the
disposition therein dismissing the appeal might have resulted from an
oversight. In doing so, the Court was effectively affirming the trial court's
Decision, which had found Bayotas criminally and civilly liable. Such
disposition is clearly contrary to the discussion in the body of the Bayotas
Decision quoted earlier in this Resolution that his death extinguished his
criminal as well as civil liabilities based on delict. Indeed, the only logical
consequence of the extinguishment of his criminal and civil liabilities was the
dismissal of the case itself, not of the appeal.