Learned Hand
Learned Hand
Learned Hand
Billings Learned Hand (/ˈlɜːrnɪd/; January 27, 1872 – August 18, 1961) was an American judge and judicial
philosopher. He served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and later the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Hand has been quoted more often by legal scholars and by
the Supreme Court of the United States than any other lower-court judge.[1]
Born and raised in Albany, New York, Hand majored in philosophy at Harvard College and graduated with honors
from Harvard Law School. After a short career as a lawyer in Albany and New York City, he was appointed at the
age of 37 as a Federal District Judge in Manhattan in 1909. The profession suited his detached and open-minded
temperament, and his decisions soon won him a reputation for craftsmanship and authority. Between 1909 and
1914, under the influence of Herbert Croly's social theories, Hand supported New Nationalism. He ran
unsuccessfully as the Progressive Party's candidate for Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals in 1913, but
withdrew from active politics shortly afterwards. In 1924, President Calvin Coolidge promoted Hand to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which he went on to lead as the Senior Circuit Judge (later retitled Chief Judge) from
1939 until his semi-retirement in 1951. Scholars have recognized the Second Circuit under Hand as one of the
finest appeals courts in the country's history. Friends and admirers often lobbied for Hand's promotion to the
Supreme Court, but circumstances and his political past conspired against his appointment.
Hand possessed a gift for the English language, and his writings are admired as legal literature.[2] He rose to fame
outside the legal profession in 1944 during World War II after giving a short address in Central Park that struck a
popular chord in its appeal for tolerance. During a period when a hysterical fear of subversion divided the nation,
Hand was viewed as a liberal defender of civil liberties. A collection of Hand's papers and addresses, published in
1952 as The Spirit of Liberty, sold well and won him new admirers. Even after he criticized the civil-rights activism of
the 1950s Warren Court, Hand retained his popularity.
Hand is also remembered as a pioneer of modern approaches to statutory interpretation. His decisions in specialist
fields, such as patents, torts, admiralty law, and antitrust law, set lasting standards for craftsmanship and clarity. On
constitutional matters, he was both a political progressive and an advocate of judicial restraint. He believed in the
protection of free speech and in bold legislation to address social and economic problems. He argued, however, that
the United States Constitution does not empower courts to overrule the legislation of elected bodies, except in
extreme circumstances. Instead, he advocated the "combination of toleration and imagination that to me is the
epitome of all good government".[3]
Early life[edit]
Billings Learned Hand was born on January 27, 1872, in Albany, New York, the second and last child of Samuel
Hand (1833–86) and Lydia Hand (née Learned). His mother's family traditionally used surnames as given names;
and Hand was named for a maternal uncle and a grandfather, both named Billings Peck Learned.[4] The Hands were
a prominent family with a tradition of activism in the Democratic Party. Hand grew up in comfortable circumstances.
The family had an "almost hereditary" attachment to the legal profession[5] and has been described as "the most
distinguished legal family in northern New York".[6]
Samuel Hand was an appellate lawyer,[7] who had risen rapidly through the ranks of an Albany-based law firm in the
1860s and, by age 32, was the firm's leading lawyer. In 1878, he became the leader of the appellate bar and argued
cases before the New York Court of Appeals in "greater number and importance than those argued by any other
lawyer in New York during the same period".[8] Samuel Hand was a distant, intimidating figure to his son; Learned
Hand later described his relations with his father as "not really intimate".[9] Samuel Hand died from cancer when
Learned was 14.[10] Learned's mother thereafter promoted an idealized memory of her husband's professional
success, intellectual abilities, and parental perfection, placing considerable pressure on her son.[11]
Lydia Hand was an involved and protective mother, who had been influenced by a Calvinist aunt as a child; and she
passed on a strong sense of duty and guilt to her only son.[12] Learned Hand eventually came to understand the
influences of his parents as formative.[13] After his father's death, he looked to religion to help him cope, writing to his
cousin Augustus Noble Hand: "If you could imagine one half the comfort my religion has given to me in this terrible
loss, you would see that Christ never forsakes those who cling to him." The depth of Hand's early religious
convictions was in sharp contrast to his later agnosticism.[14]
Hand was beset by anxieties and self-doubt throughout his life, including night terrors as a child. He later admitted
he was "very undecided, always have been—a very insecure person, very fearful; morbidly fearful".[15] Especially
after his father's death, he grew up surrounded by doting women—his mother, his aunt, and his sister Lydia (Lily),
eight years his elder.[16] Hand struggled with his name during his childhood and adulthood, worried that "Billings" and
"Learned" were not sufficiently masculine. While working as a lawyer in 1899, he ceased using the name "Billings"—
calling it "pompous"—and ultimately took on the nickname "B".[7][17]
Hand spent two years at a small primary school before transferring at the age of seven to The Albany Academy,
which he attended for the next 10 years. He never enjoyed the Academy's uninspired teaching or its narrow
curriculum, which focused on Ancient Greek and Latin, with few courses in English, history, science, or modern
languages. Socially, he considered himself an outsider, rarely enjoying recesses or the school's military drills.
[18]
Vacations, spent in Elizabethtown, New York, were happier times. There, Hand developed a life-long friendship
with his cousin and future colleague Augustus Noble Hand, two years his senior.[19] The two were self-confessed
"wild boys", camping and hiking in the woods and hills, where Hand developed a love of nature and the countryside.
[20]
Many years later, when he was in his 70s, Hand recorded several songs for the Library of Congress that he had
learned as a boy from Civil War veterans in Elizabethtown.[21] After his father's death, he felt more pressure from his
mother to excel academically. He finished near the top of his class and was accepted into Harvard College. His
classmates—who opted for schools such as Williams and Yale—thought it a "stuckup, snobbish school".[22]
Harvard[edit]
Hand started at Harvard College in 1889, initially focusing on classical studies and mathematics as advised by his
late father. At the end of his sophomore year, however, he changed direction. He embarked on courses
in philosophy and economics, studying under the eminent and inspirational philosophers William James, Josiah
Royce and George Santayana.[23]
At first, Hand found Harvard a difficult social environment. He was not selected for any of the social clubs that
dominated campus life, and he felt this exclusion keenly. He was equally unsuccessful with the Glee Club and the
football team; for a time he rowed as a substitute for the rowing club. He later described himself as a "serious boy",
a hard worker who did not smoke, drink, or consort with prostitutes.[24] He mixed more in his sophomore and senior
years. He became a member of the Hasty Pudding Club and appeared as a blond-wigged chorus girl in the 1892
student musical. He was also elected president of The Harvard Advocate, a student literary magazine.[25]
Hand's studious ways resulted in his election to Phi Beta Kappa, an elite society of scholarly students.[26] He
graduated with highest honors, was awarded an Artium Magister degree as well as an Artium Baccalaureus degree,
[27]
and was chosen by his classmates to deliver the Class Day oration at the 1893 commencement.[26] Family tradition
and expectation suggested that he would study law after graduation. For a while, he seriously considered post-
graduate work in philosophy, but he received no encouragement from his family or philosophy professors. Doubting
himself, he "drifted" toward law.[28]
Hand's three years at Harvard Law School were intellectually and socially stimulating. In his second year, he moved
into a boarding house with a group of fellow law students who were to become close friends. They studied hard and
enjoyed discussing philosophy and literature and telling bawdy tales. Hand's learned reputation proved less of a
hindrance at law school than it had as an undergraduate. He was elected to the Pow-Wow Club, in which law
students practiced their skills in moot courts. He was also chosen as an editor of the Harvard Law Review, although
he resigned in 1894 because it took too much time from his studies.[29]
During the 1890s, Harvard Law School was pioneering the casebook method of teaching introduced by
Dean Christopher Langdell.[30][31] Apart from Langdell, Hand's professors included Samuel Williston, John Chipman
Gray, and James Barr Ames. Hand preferred those teachers who valued common sense and fairness, and ventured
beyond casebook study into the philosophy of law.[32] His favorite professor was James Bradley Thayer, who taught
him evidence in his second year and constitutional law in his third. A man of broad interests, Thayer became a
major influence on Hand's jurisprudence. He emphasized the law's historical and human dimensions rather than its
certainties and extremes. He stressed the need for courts to exercise judicial restraint in deciding social issues.[33]
Federal judge[edit]
Hand served as a United States District Judge in the Southern District of New York from 1909 to 1924. He dealt with
fields of common law, including torts, contracts, and copyright, and admiralty law. His initial unfamiliarity with some
of these specialties, along with his limited courtroom experience, caused him anxiety at first.[58] Most of Hand's early
cases concerned bankruptcy issues, which he found tiresome, and patent law, which fascinated him.[59]
Hand made some important decisions in the area of free speech. A frequently cited 1913 decision is United States
v. Kennerley,[60] an obscenity case concerning Daniel Carson Goodman's Hagar Revelly, a social-hygiene novel
about the "wiles of vice," which had caught the attention of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice.
[61]
Hand allowed the case to go forward on the basis of the Hicklin test, which stemmed back to a seminal English
decision of 1868, Regina v. Hicklin.[62] In his opinion, Hand recommended updating the law, arguing that the
obscenity rule should not simply protect the most susceptible readers but should reflect community standards:
It seems hardly likely that we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters or serious discussion as to be
content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few,
or that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and beautiful sides of
human nature.[63]
Following his appointment as a judge, Hand became politically active in the cause of New Nationalism.[64] With
reservations, in 1911 he supported Theodore Roosevelt's return to national politics. He approved of the former
president's plans to legislate on behalf of the underprivileged and to control corporations, as well as of his campaign
against the abuse of judicial power.[65] Hand sought to influence Roosevelt's views on these subjects, both in person
and in print, and wrote articles for Roosevelt's magazine, The Outlook.[66] His hopes of swaying Roosevelt were often
dashed. Roosevelt's poor grasp of legal issues particularly exasperated Hand.[67]
Despite overwhelming support for Roosevelt in the primaries and polls, the Republicans renominated the incumbent
President Taft. A furious Roosevelt bolted from the party to form the Progressive Party, nicknamed the "Bull Moose"
movement. Most Republican progressives followed him, including Hand.[68] The splitting of the Republican vote,
however, harmed both Roosevelt's and Taft's chances of winning the November 1912 presidential election. As Hand
expected, Roosevelt lost to the Democratic Party's Woodrow Wilson, though he polled more votes than Taft.[69]
Hand took the defeat in his stride. He considered the election merely as a first step in a reform campaign for "real
national democracy".[70] Though he had limited his public involvement in the election campaign, he now took part in
planning a party structure.[71] He also accepted the Progressive nomination for chief judge of New York Court of
Appeals, then an elective position, in September 1913.[72] He refused to campaign, however, and later admitted that
"the thought of harassing the electorate was more than I could bear".[73] His vow of silence affected his showing, and
he received only 13% of the votes.[74] Hand came to regret his candidacy: "I ought to have lain off, as I now view it; I
was a judge and a judge has no business to mess into such things."[75]
By 1916, Hand realized that the Progressive Party had no future, as the liberal policies of the Democratic
government were making much of its program redundant. Roosevelt's decision not to stand in the 1916 presidential
election dealt the party its death blow.[77] Hand had already turned to an alternative political outlet in Herbert
Croly's The New Republic, a liberal magazine which he had helped launch in 1914.[78] Hand wrote a series of
unsigned articles for the magazine on issues of social reform and judicial power; his only signed article was "The
Hope of the Minimum Wage", published in November 1916, which called for laws to protect the underprivileged.
Often attending staff dinners and meetings, Hand became a close friend of the gifted young editor Walter Lippmann.
[79]
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 had coincided with the founding of the magazine, whose pages often
debated the events in Europe. The New Republic adopted a cautiously sympathetic stance towards the Allies, which
Hand supported wholeheartedly. After the United States entered the war in 1917, Hand considered leaving the
bench to assist the war effort. Several possible war-related positions were suggested to him. Nothing came of them,
aside from his chairing a committee on intellectual property law that suggested treaty amendments for the Paris
Peace Conference.[80]
Hand made his most memorable decision of the war in 1917 in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.[81] After the country
joined the war, Congress had enacted an Espionage Act that made it a federal crime to hinder the war effort. The
first test of the new law came two weeks later when the postmaster of New York City refused to deliver the August
issue of The Masses, a self-described "revolutionary journal". The edition contained drawings, cartoons, and articles
criticizing the government's decision to go to war.[82]
The publishing company sought an injunction to prevent the ban, and the case came before Judge Hand.[83] In July
1917, he ruled that the journal should not be barred from distribution through the mail. Though The
Masses supported those who refused to serve in the forces, its text did not, in Hand's view, tell readers that
they must violate the law. Hand argued that suspect material should be judged on what he called an "incitement
test": only if its language directly urged readers to violate the law was it seditious—otherwise freedom of speech
should be protected.[84] This focus on the words themselves, rather than on their effect, was novel and daring; but
Hand's decision was promptly stayed, and later overturned on appeal.[85] He always maintained that his ruling had
been correct. Between 1918 and 1919, he attempted to convince Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., a man he greatly admired, of his argument. His efforts at first appeared fruitless, but Holmes' dissenting opinion
in Abrams v. United States in November 1919 urged greater protection of political speech.[86] Scholars have credited
the critiques of Hand, Ernst Freund, Louis Brandeis, and Zechariah Chafee for the change in Holmes's views.[87] In
the long-term, Hand's decision proved a landmark in the history of free speech in the country.[88] In Brandenburg v.
Ohio (1969), the Supreme Court announced a standard for protecting free speech that in effect recognized
his Masses opinion as law.[89]
Hand had known that ruling against the government might harm his prospects of promotion.[90] By the time of the
case, he was already the most senior judge of his district. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit often summoned him to sit with that court to hear appeals, a task he found stimulating. In 1917, he lobbied
for promotion to the Second Circuit, but the unpopularity of his Masses decision and his reputation as a liberal stood
against him. He was passed over in favor of Martin T. Manton.[91]
In the final months of the war, Hand increasingly supported President Woodrow Wilson's post-war foreign policy
objectives. He believed the United States should endorse the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles,
despite their flaws. This position estranged him from Croly and others at The New Republic, who vehemently
rejected both. Alienated from his old circle on the magazine and by the reactionary and isolationist mood of the
country, Hand found himself politically homeless.[92]
Postwar years[edit]
Learned Hand's 75th birthday in 1947 was much celebrated in the press and in legal circles. C. C. Burlingham,
Hand's former sponsor, for example, called him "now unquestionably the first among American judges".[122] Hand
remained modest in the face of such acclaim. He continued to work as before, combining his role as presiding judge
of the Second Circuit with his engagement in political issues. In 1947, he voiced his opposition to a proposed "group
libel" statute that would have banned defamation of racial or minority groups. He argued that such a law would imply
that intolerance could base itself upon evidence. The effect of the proposed prosecutions, he said, would be "rather
to exacerbate than to assuage the feelings which lie behind the defamation of groups".[123]
McCarthyism[edit]
In the postwar period, Hand shared the dismay of his compatriots about Stalinism and the onset of the Cold War. At
the same time, he was sensitive to the domestic problems created by what he saw as a hysterical fear of
international Communism. Already in 1947, he noted that "the frantic witch hunters are given free rein to set up a
sort of Inquisition, detecting heresy wherever non-conformity appears".[124] Hand was distressed by the crusade
against domestic subversion that became part of American public life after the war.[125] He particularly despised the
anti-Communist campaign of Senator Joseph McCarthy that began in 1950 and which became known
as McCarthyism. Though Hand expressed his horror of McCarthyism privately, he hesitated to do so publicly
because cases arising from it were likely to come before his court.[126]
During this period, Hand took part in three notable cases that posed a particular challenge to his impartiality on Cold
War issues: United States v. Coplon, United States v. Dennis, and United States v. Remington.[127]
Coplon case[edit]
Department of Justice worker Judith Coplon had been sentenced to 15 years in prison for stealing and attempting to
pass on defense information. In 1950, her appeal came before a Second Circuit panel that included Learned Hand.
It rested on her claim that her rights under the Fourth Amendment had been infringed by a warrantless search, and
that details of illegal wiretaps had not been fully disclosed at her trial. Hand made it clear that Coplon was guilty of
the charges. However, he rejected the trial judge's conclusion that a warrantless arrest had been justified. He ruled
therefore that papers seized during the arrest had been inadmissible as evidence.[128] The trial judge's failure to
disclose all the wiretap records, Hand concluded, made a reversal of Coplon's conviction necessary. In his
written opinion, Hand stated that "[F]ew weapons in the arsenal of freedom are more useful than the power to
compel a government to disclose the evidence on which it seeks to forfeit the liberty of its citizens."[129] Hand
received hate mail after this decision.
Dennis v. United States[edit]
By contrast, in the 1950 case Dennis v. United States, Hand affirmed the convictions under the 1940 Smith Act of
eleven leaders of the Communist Party of the United States for subversion. He ruled that calls for the violent
overthrow of the American government posed enough of a "probable danger" to justify the invasion of free speech.
[130]
After the case, he was attacked from the opposite political direction for appearing to side with McCarthyism.[131]
Remington case[edit]
In 1953, Hand wrote a scathing dissent from a Second Circuit decision to affirm the perjury conviction of William
Remington, a government economist accused of Communist sympathies and activities. In 1951, the same panel had
overturned Remington's previous conviction for perjury, but in the appeal of the later case Hand was outvoted two to
one. The prosecution produced stronger evidence against Remington this time, much of it obtained from his wife.
Sentenced to three years imprisonment, Remington was murdered in November 1954 by three fellow inmates, who
beat him over the head with a brick wrapped in a sock. According to Hand's biographer Gunther, "The image of
Remington being bludgeoned to death in prison haunted Hand for the rest of his life."[132]
Only after stepping down as a full-time judge in 1951 did Hand join the public debate on McCarthyism. Shortly after
his semi-retirement, he gave an unscripted speech that was published in The Washington Post, an anti-McCarthy
newspaper.
[M]y friends, will you not agree that any society which begins to be doubtful of itself; in which one man looks at
another and says: "He may be a traitor," in which that spirit has disappeared which says: "I will not accept that, I will
not believe that—I will demand proof. I will not say of my brother that he may be a traitor," but I will say, "Produce
what you have. I will judge it fairly, and if he is, he shall pay the penalties; but I will not take it on rumor. I will not
take it on hearsay. I will remember that what has brought us up from savagery is a loyalty to truth, and truth cannot
emerge unless it is subjected to the utmost scrutiny"—will you not agree that a society which has lost sight of that,
cannot survive?[133]
Hand followed this up with an address to the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York the next
year. Once again, his attack on McCarthyism won approval from many liberals. Asked to send a copy of his views to
McCarthy, Hand replied that he had Richard Nixon in mind as well.[134] Despite his concerns about Nixon as vice
president, Hand voted for Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 election, later crediting Eisenhower with bringing about
McCarthy's downfall in 1954.[135]
Philosophy[edit]
Hand's study of philosophy at Harvard left a lasting imprint on his thought. As a student, he lost his faith in God, and
from that point on he became a skeptic.[156] Hand's view of the world has been identified as relativistic; in the words of
scholar Kathryn Griffith, "[i]t was his devotion to a concept of relative values that prompted him to question opinions
of the Supreme Court which appeared to place one value absolutely above the others, whether the value was that of
individual freedom or equality or the protection of young people from obscene literature."[157] Hand instead sought
objective standards in constitutional law, most famously in obscenity and civil liberties cases.[158] He saw the
Constitution and the law as compromises to resolve conflicting interests, possessing no moral force of their own.
[159]
This denial that any divine or natural rights are embodied in the Constitution led Hand to a positivistic view of
the Bill of Rights.[160] In this approach, provisions of the Constitution, such as freedom of press, freedom of speech,
and equal protection, should be interpreted through their wording and in the light of historical analysis rather than as
"guides on concrete occasions".[161] For Hand, moral values were a product of their times and a matter of taste.[157]
Hand's civil instincts were at odds with the duty of a judge to stay aloof from politics.[162] As a judge he respected
even bad laws; as a member of society he felt free to question the decisions behind legislation. In his opinion,
members of a democratic society should be involved in legislative decision-making.[163] He therefore regarded
toleration as a prerequisite of civil liberty. In practice, this even meant that those who wish to promote ideas
repugnant to the majority should be free to do so, within broad limits.[164]
Hand's skepticism extended to his political philosophy: he once described himself as "a conservative among liberals,
and a liberal among conservatives".[165] As early as 1898, he rejected his family's Jeffersonian Democratic tradition.
[166]
His thoughts on liberty, collected in The Spirit of Liberty (1952), began by recalling the political philosophies
of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.[167] Jefferson believed that each individual has a right to freedom, and
that government, though necessary, threatens that freedom. In contrast, Hamilton argued that freedom depends on
government: too much freedom leads to anarchy and the tyranny of the mob.[168] Hand, who believed,
following Thomas Hobbes, that the rule of law is the only alternative to the rule of brutality,[169] leaned towards
Hamilton.[170] Since the freedom granted to the American pioneers was no longer feasible,[171] he accepted that
individual liberty should be moderated by society's norms.[172] He nevertheless saw the liberty to create and to
choose as vital to peoples' humanity and entitled to legal protection. He assumed the goal of human beings to be
the "good life", defined as each individual chooses.[173]
Between 1910 and 1916, Hand tried to translate his political philosophy into political action. Having read Croly's The
Promise of American Life and its anti-Jeffersonian plea for government intervention in economic and social issues,
he joined the Progressive Party.[174] However, he discovered that party politicking was incompatible not only with his
role as a judge but with his philosophical objectivity. The pragmatic philosophy Hand had imbibed from William
James at Harvard required each issue to be individually judged on its merits, without partiality. In contrast, political
action required partisanship and a choice between values.[174] After 1916, Hand preferred to retreat from party politics
into a detached skepticism. His belief in central planning resurfaced during the 1930s in his growing approval
of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, as he once again—though this time as an observer—endorsed a program of
government intervention.[175] Hand was also an interventionist on foreign policy, supporting U.S. involvement in
both world wars, and disdained isolationism.[176]
Jurisprudence[edit]
Hand has been called one of the United States' most significant judicial philosophers.[177] A leading advocate
of judicial restraint, he took seriously Alexander Hamilton's formulation that "the judiciary ... may truly be said to
have neither force nor will, but merely judgement."[178] Any judicial ruling that had the effect of legislating from the
bench troubled Hand. In 1908, in his article "Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day", he attacked the 1905
Supreme Court ruling in Lochner v. New York, which had struck down a law prohibiting bakery staff from working
more than ten hours a day. The Supreme Court went on to strike down a series of similar worker-protective laws on
the grounds that they restricted freedom of contract.[179] Hand regarded this principle as undemocratic.[180] "For the
state to intervene", he argued, "to make more just and equal the relative strategic advantages of the two parties to
the contract, of whom one is under the pressure of absolute want, while the other is not, is as proper a legislative
function as that it should neutralize the relative advantages arising from fraudulent cunning or from superior
force."[181]
The issue concerned Hand again during the New Deal period, when the Supreme Court repeatedly overturned or
blocked Franklin D. Roosevelt's legislation.[182] As an instinctive democrat, Hand was appalled that an elected
government should have its laws struck down in this way. He viewed it as a judicial "usurpation" for the Supreme
Court to assume the role of a third chamber in these cases.[183] As far as he was concerned, the Constitution already
provided a full set of checks and balances on legislation.[184] Nevertheless, Hand did not hesitate to condemn
Roosevelt's frustrated attempt to pack the Supreme Court in 1937,[185] which led commentators to warn
of totalitarianism. The answer, for Hand, lay in the separation of powers: courts should be independent and act on
the legislation of elected governments.[186]
Hand's democratic respect for legislation meant that he hardly ever struck down a law.[187] Whenever his decisions
went against the government, he based them only on the boundaries of law in particular cases. He adhered to the
doctrine of presumptive validity, which assumes that legislators know what they are doing when they pass a law.
[188]
Even when a law was uncongenial to him, or when it seemed contradictory, Hand set himself to interpret
the legislative intent.[189] Sometimes, however, he was obliged to draw the line between federal and state laws, as
in United States v. Schechter Poultry. In this important case, he ruled that a New Deal law on working conditions did
not apply to a New York poultry firm that conducted its business only within the state.[190] Hand wrote in his opinion:
"It is always a serious thing to declare any act of Congress unconstitutional, and especially in a case where it is part
of a comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation of the nation as a whole. With the wisdom of that plan we have
nothing whatever to do ..."[190] Hand also occasionally went against the government in the area of free speech. He
believed that courts should protect the right to free speech even against the majority will. In Hand's view, judges
must remain detached at times when public opinion is hostile to minorities and governments issue laws to repress
those minorities.[191] Hand was the first judge to rule on a case arising from the Espionage Act of 1917, which sought
to silence opposition to the war effort. In his decision on Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, he defined his position on
political incitement:
Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them in
execution, and it would be folly to disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation,
legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political
agitation which in normal times is a safeguard for free government. The distinction is not scholastic subterfuge, but a
hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom.[192]
In the case of United States v. Dennis in 1950, Hand made a ruling that appeared to contradict his Masses decision.
By then, a series of precedents had intervened, often based on Oliver Wendell Holmes's "clear and present danger"
test, leaving him less room for maneuver.[193] Hand felt he had "no choice" but to agree that threats against the
government by a group of Communists were illegal under the repressive Smith Act of 1940.[194] In order to do so, he
interpreted the "clear and present danger" in a new way. "In each case," he wrote, "[courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger." This formula allowed more scope for curbing free speech in cases where, as the government believed with
Communism, the danger was grave, whether it was immediate or not.[195] Critics and disappointed liberals accused
Hand of placing his concern for judicial restraint ahead of freedom of speech.[196] Hand confided to a friend that, if it
had been up to him, he would "never have prosecuted those birds".[197]
In the opinion of Kathryn Griffith, "The importance of Learned Hand's philosophy in terms of practical application to
the courts lies generally in his view of the pragmatic origin of all law, but most specifically in his unique interpretation
of the Bill of Rights."[198] Hand proposed that the Bill of Rights was not law at all but a set of "admonitory" principles to
ensure the fair exercise of constitutional powers.[199] He therefore opposed the use of its "due process of law" clauses
as a pretext for national intervention in state legislation. He even advocated the removal of those clauses from the
Constitution. In Hand's analysis, "due process" is no more than a stock phrase to cover a long tradition of common
law procedure.[200] He contended that the term had inflated in scope beyond the meaning intended in the Bill of
Rights. The result was the misuse of due process to invade rights that the Constitution was designed to protect. For
Hand, a law passed by an elected body should be presumed to meet the test of due process. A court that decides
otherwise and strikes down such a law is acting undemocratically.[201] Hand maintained this stance even when the
Supreme Court struck down anti-liberal laws that he detested.[202] His reasoning has never been widely accepted.
Critics of his position included his colleague on the Second Circuit, Jerome Frank, who wrote: "[I]t seems to me that
here, most uncharacteristically, Judge Hand indulges in a judgement far too sweeping, one which rests on a too-
sharp either-or, all or nothing, dichotomy. ... Obviously the courts cannot do the whole job. But just as obviously,
they can sometimes help to arrest evil popular trends at their inception."[203]
Richard Posner, an influential appellate judge reviewing a biography of Hand, asserts that Hand "displayed a
positive antipathy toward constitutional law. To exaggerate only a little, he didn't think judges should have anything
to do with it."[204] Posner suggests that although Hand is remembered today as one of the three greatest judges in
American history, his status as a truly "great judge" was not based on his "slight" contributions to First Amendment
jurisprudence or other fields of constitutional law, but rather on his decisions in other areas such as antitrust,
intellectual property, and tort law.[204]
Influence[edit]
Learned Hand wrote approximately four thousand judicial opinions during his career. Admired for their clarity and
analytic precision, they have been quoted more often in Supreme Court opinions and by legal scholars than those of
any other lower-court judge.[1] Both Hand's dissent in United States v. Kennerley[60] and his ruling in United States v.
Levine[205] have often been cited in obscenity cases.[206] Hand's view that literary works should be judged as a whole
and in relation to their intended readership is now accepted in American law. His use of historical data to
gauge legislative intent has become a widespread practice. According to Archibald Cox: "The opinions of Judge
Hand have had significant influence both in breaking down the restrictions imposed by the dry literalism of
conservative tradition and in showing how to use with sympathetic understanding the information afforded by the
legislative and administrative processes."[207] Hand's decision in the 1917 Masses case influenced Zechariah
Chafee's widely read book, Freedom of Speech (1920). In his dedication, Chafee wrote, "[Hand] during the turmoil
of war courageously maintained the traditions of English-speaking freedom and gave it new clearness and strength
for the wiser years to come."[208]
Learned Hand played a key role in the interpretation of new federal crime laws in the period following the passing of
the U.S. Criminal Code in 1909.[209] In a series of judicial opinions and speeches, he opposed excessive concern for
criminal defendants, and wrote "Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has
always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. ... What we need to fear is the archaic formalism
and watery sentiment that obstructs, delays and defeats the prosecution of crime." He insisted that harmless trial
errors should not automatically lead to a reversal on appeal. Hand balanced these views with important decisions to
protect a defendant's constitutional rights concerning unreasonable searches, forced confessions and cumulative
sentences.[210]
His opinions have also proved lasting in fields of commercial law. Law students studying torts often encounter
Hand's 1947 decision for United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,[211] which gave a formula for determining liability in
cases of negligence.[212] Hand's interpretations of complex Internal Revenue Codes, which he called "a thicket of
verbiage", have been used as guides in the gray area between individual and corporate taxes.[213] In an opinion
sometimes seen as condoning tax avoidance, Hand stated in 1947 that "there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible".[214] He was referring to reporting of individual income through
corporate tax forms for legitimate business reasons. In tax decisions, as in all statutory cases, Hand studied the
intent of the original legislation. His opinions became a valuable guide to tax administrators.[215] Hand's landmark
decision in United States v. Aluminum Company of America in 1945 influenced the development of antitrust law.
[216]
His decisions in patent, copyright, and admiralty cases have contributed to the development of law in those fields.
[217]
Hand was also a founding member of the American Law Institute, where he helped develop the
influential Restatements of the Law serving as models for refining and improving state codes in various fields.
[218]
One American Law Institute recommendation was to decriminalize sexual conduct such as adultery and
homosexuality, for which reason the July–August 1955 issue of the Mattachine Society Review, the magazine of the
country's first nationwide homosexual organization, published a salute to Judge Hand featuring his photograph on
the cover.[219]
After Hand's lectures and publications became widely known, his influence reached courts throughout the country.
[220]
On the occasion of his 75th birthday on January 27, 1947, The Washington Post reported: "He has won
recognition as a judges' judge. His opinions command respect wherever our law extends, not because of his
standing in the judicial hierarchy, but because of the clarity of thought and the cogency of reasoning that shape
them."[221]
To the wider public, who knew little of his legal work, Hand was by then a folk hero.[222] Social scientist Marvin Schick
has pointed out that this mythic status is a paradox.[223] Because Hand never served on the Supreme Court, the
majority of his cases were routine and his judgments rooted in precedent. On Hand's retirement in 1951, Felix
Frankfurter predicted that his "actual decisions will be all deader than the Dodo before long, as at least many of
them are already".[224] Working for a lower court, however, saved Hand from the taint of political influence that often
hung over the Supreme Court. Hand's eloquence as a writer played a larger part in the spread of his influence than
the substance of his decisions; and Schick believes that the Hand myth brushes over contradictions in his legal
philosophy. Hand's reputation as a libertarian obscures the fact that he was cautious as a judge. Though a liberal,
he argued for judicial restraint in interpreting the Constitution, and regarded the advancement of civil liberties as a
task for the legislature, not the courts. In his 1958 Holmes Lectures, for example, he voiced doubts about the
constitutionality of the Warren Court's civil rights rulings.[225] This philosophy of judicial restraint failed to influence the
decisions of the Supreme Court during Hand's lifetime and afterwards.
Finally, in an essay called Origin of a Hero discussing his novel the Rector of Justin, author Louis Auchincloss says
the main character was not based on a headmaster; certainly not as was often speculated Groton's famous Endicott
Peabody. "If you want to disguise a real life character," Auchincloss advised fellow novelists, "just change his
profession." His actual model for the Rector of Justin was "the greatest man it has been my good luck to know" –
Judge Learned Hand.[226]
Selected works[edit]
Hand, Learned (1941), Liberty, Stamford, CT: Overbrook, OCLC 2413475.
Hand, Learned (1952), Irving Dilliard (eds.), The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand, New
York: Knopf, OCLC 513793.
Hand, Learned (1958), The Bill of Rights, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, OCLC 418364. (Oliver
Wendell Holmes Lectures)
Hand, Learned (1968), Hershel Shanks (eds.), The Art and Craft of Judging: The Decisions of Judge Learned
Hand, New York: Macmillan, OCLC 436539.
References[edit]
1. ^ Jump up to:a b Stone 2004, 6. ^ Charles E. Wyzanski, quoted 14. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 22
p. 200; Vile 2003, p. 319 in Schick 1970, p. 13 15. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 4
2. ^ Schick 1970, pp. 188–89 7. ^ Jump up to:a b Schick 1970, 16. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 4–5
3. ^ Dworkin 1996, p. 342. Quoted p. 13 17. ^ Vile 2003, p. 320
from Hand's 1958 Holmes 8. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 7 18. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 20, 23–25
Lectures. 9. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 6 19. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 3–4
4. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 3–5 10. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 3 20. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 20–22
5. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 3, 7, 11. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 6–9 21. ^ Two were subsequently
40; Griffith 1973, p. 3 12. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 10–11 released commercially as part of
13. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 4, 6, 11 a disc of American folksongs.
See "Judge Learned Hand 62. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 154; Rabban 100. ^ Gunther 1994,
Turns Singer In New U.S. 1999, p. 146; Regina v. Hicklin, pp. 416, 435–438
Album of Folk Musicdate=May LR 3 QB 360 (1868). 101. ^ Gunther 1994,
11, 1953", The New York 63. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 149–150 pp. 457–460; Carrington 1999,
Times, pp. 1, 15. Retrieved on 64. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 202 p. 141
July 27, 2008. Excerpts can be 65. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 202– 102. ^ United States v. A. L.
heard as part of Wade, Stephen 204; Schick 1970, p. 14 A. Schechter, 76 F.2d 617 (2d
(October 5, 1999), "Learned Cir. 1935)
66. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 206–210,
Hand", All Things Considered, 103. ^ Gunther 1994,
221–24
NPR. Retrieved on July 27, pp. 446–448, 451
67. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 212–225
2008. In 2013, The Green
68. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 227–229 104. ^ Gunther 1994,
Bag released "Songs of His
69. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 232 p. 471; Schick 1970, p. 163
Youth," a vinyl disc of several of
70. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 229–232 105. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 472
the songs, along with some of
Hand's in-studio 71. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 233. The 106. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 485
commentary. Davies, Ross new party structure 107. ^ Schick 1970, p. 5
(2013), Learned Hand Sings, incorporated Jane 108. ^ Gunther 1994,
Part One: Liner Notes for Addams' Progressive Service, pp. 503–509
'Songs of His an educational organization 109. ^ Gunther 1994,
Youth', SSRN 2271070 aimed at spreading the reformist pp. 514–516, 521; Schick 1970,
22. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 26 agenda to the public and to the p. 5
23. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 32–33 legislators. 110. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 9–10
24. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 26–30, 76 72. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 5 111. ^ Ashworth, Kenneth
25. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 30–31. 73. ^ Schick 1970, p. 14 (2001). Caught between the
26. ^ Jump up to:a b Griffith 1973, 74. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 233–236 dog and the fireplug, or how to
p. 4 75. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 237 survive public service.
76. ^ Stone 2004, p. 166 Washington, Dc: Georgetown
27. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 32
University Press. pp. 70–
28. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 40–43 77. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 239–241
71. ISBN 0-87840-847-9. Dougl
29. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 46–47 78. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 190, 241–
as, qtd in Ashworth.
30. ^ Jump up to:a b Dworkin 1996, 244
112. ^ Vile 2003, p. 324
p. 333 79. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 190, 250–
113. ^ Letter from Learned
31. ^ Carrington 1999, p. 206 251
Hand to Felix Frankfurter (Feb.
32. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 47–50 80. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 251–256
6, 1944) (available in Felix
33. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 50– 81. ^ Schick 1970, p. 176; Shanks Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript
52; Griffith 1973, p. 4 1968, pp. 84–97; Masses Division, Library of Congress,
34. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 53–55 Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Washington, D.C.). Quoted
Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) in Melvin I. Urofsky, William O.
35. ^ Carrington 1999,
p. 137; Schick 1970, 82. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 151, Douglas As a Common Law
p. 14; Griffith 1973, pp. 4–5 157; Stone 2004, pp. 157, 164– Judge, 41 Duke Law Journal
165 133, 135 n.18 (1991).
36. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 56–59
83. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 151–152 114. ^ Gunther 1994,
37. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 59–61
84. ^ Schick 1970, pp. 177– pp. 566–570; Dworkin 1996,
38. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 61–63
178; Rabban 1999, p. 335
39. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 64–65.
p. 296; Stone 2004, p. 177 115. ^ Gunther 1994,
This switch did not prove
85. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 152, 156– pp. 535–541
permanent: over the course of
160; Stone 2004, pp. 165–170 116. ^ Gunther 1994,
the years, Hand voted equally
for Democratic and Republican 86. ^ Abrams v. United States, 250 pp. 541–543. Lovett was
candidates. U.S. 616 (1919). removed from his government
40. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 68–70 87. ^ Irons 1999, pp. 270, 275, job by an Act of Congress, but
279–280; Gunther 1994, in 1946 the Supreme Court
41. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 72
pp. 161–167; Stone 2004, ruled his dismissal
42. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 78
pp. 198–207 unconstitutional as a bill of
43. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 79 attainder.
88. ^ "Judge Hand's injunction
44. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 80–81 against the postmaster's 117. ^ Gunther 1994,
45. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 172–174 exclusion of The Massesfrom pp. 543–547
46. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 7 the mails, though reversed on 118. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 11–
47. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 171–73 appeal, is seen, in retrospect, as 12
48. ^ Gilbert, Alma, Maxfield the precursor of the federal 119. ^ Qtd. in Gunther 1994,
Parrish: The Masterworks, Third court's present protection of p. 549
Edition (Berkeley, California: freedom of the press." Judge 120. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 11–
Ten Speed Press, 2001) p. 110. Charles E. Wyzanski. Qtd. 13
49. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 183–187 in Griffith 1973, p. 6
121. ^ Gunther 1994,
50. ^ Jump up to:a b Gunther 1994, 89. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 151–152, pp. 549–552
pp. 187–188 170
122. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 575
51. ^ Stettner 1993, p. 25 90. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 155; Stone
123. ^ Gunther 1994,
52. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 190–193 2004, pp. 165–166
pp. 576–577
53. ^ Stettner 1993, p. 76 91. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 161, 257–
124. ^ Gunther 1994,
260, 270–71
54. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 195, 198– p. 578; Stone 2004, p. 398
202 92. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 263–266
125. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 581
55. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 101–105 93. ^ White 2007, p. 214; Schick
126. ^ Gunther 1994,
1970, p. 17
56. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 107 p. 585; Stone 2004, p. 399
94. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 270–
57. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 123–124, 127. ^ United States v.
277; Schick 1970, p. 15. Taft
128–133; Schick 1970, Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.
had once dismissed Hand as "a
p. 14; Griffith 1973, p. 5 1950); United States v. Dennis,
wild Roosevelt man and a
58. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 135–136 183 F.2d. 201 (2d Cir.
Progressive".
59. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 137–138, 1950); United States v.
95. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 281 Remington, 208 F.2d. 567 (2d
144–145
96. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 344–352 Cir. 1950)
60. ^ Jump up to:a b United States v.
97. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 362–368 128. ^ Gunther 1994,
Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) 98. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Schick 1970, pp. 592–597
p. 16 129. ^ Gunther 1994,
61. ^ Boyer 2002, pp. 46–48
99. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 418–428 p. 596; Griffith 1973, p. 37
130. ^ Schick 1970, pp. 176– the freedom to destroy liberty or 200. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 122
181; Griffith 1973, pp. 150– the social and political structure 201. ^ "The statute may be
152; Irons 1999, pp. 379–380 which protected it." Griffith far from the best solution of the
131. ^ Gunther 1994, 1973, p. 60 conflict with which it deals; but if
pp. 598–599 165. ^ Carrington 1999, it is the result of an honest effort
132. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 138; Polenberg 1995, to embody that compromise or
pp. 624–625; Stone 2004, pp. 296–301 adjustment that will secure the
p. 369 166. ^ Gunther 1994, widest acceptance and most
133. ^ Hand 1977, pp. 223– pp. 62–63 avoid resentment it is 'Due
24 167. ^ Gunther 1994, Process of Law' and conforms
134. ^ Gunther 1994, pp. 193–194 to the First Amendment." From
pp. 588–589 168. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 65 Hand's The Bill of Rights. Qtd.
in Schick 1970, p. 163
135. ^ Gunther 1994, 169. ^ Wyzanski 1964, p. vi
pp. 589–590 202. ^ Gunther 1994,
170. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 86.
p. 383; Carrington 1999, p. 140
136. ^ Gunther 1994, "Hamilton thought government
pp. 586–587, 639 consisted of combinations 203. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 140
137. ^ Schick 1970, p. 15 based on self-interest and that 204. ^ Jump up to:a b Posner
liberty did not rest on anarchy. & Gunther 1994, pp. 511, 514
138. ^ Gunther 1994,
pp. 639–643 Man required an ordered 205. ^ United States v.
society, which included not only Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
139. ^ Gunther 1994,
individual concerns but 1936); see also United States v.
pp. 570–571
collective interests and which One Book Called Ulysses, 72
140. ^ Dworkin 1996, p. 347
permitted human life to rise F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), in
141. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 620 which a trial court decision by
above that of the savage and
142. ^ Gunther 1994, made possible joint efforts and Judge John M. Woolsey was
pp. 300–302 thus more comfort, security, and affirmed by a Second Circuit
143. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 586 leisure for a better life. He panel including Hand.
144. ^ Gunther 1994, believed that while Jacobins 206. ^ Griffith 1973,
pp. 84–85 cried for liberty what they really p. 157; Gunther 1994, p. 149
145. ^ Lochner v. New York, wanted was to exercise their 207. ^ Qtd. in Griffith 1973,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) own tyranny over the mob. It p. 174
146. ^ Brown v. Board of appeared to Hand that history 208. ^ Schick 1970, p. 178
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) had proved Hamilton right." 209. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 35
147. ^ Gunther 1994, 171. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 193 210. ^ Gunther 1994,
pp. 654–657; Carrington 1999, 172. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 67 pp. 304–305, 532–533; Judd
pp. 141–143 173. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 190 1947, pp. 405–422
148. ^ Gunther 1994, 174. ^ Jump up to:a b Griffith 211. ^ United States v.
pp. 662–664; Carrington 1999, 1973, pp. 56–57,60–63 Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
pp. 141–143; Griffith 1973, 175. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 453 169 (2nd Cir. 1947)
p. 109 176. ^ Gunther 1994, 212. ^ Weinrib 1995, p. 48.
149. ^ Vanessa Grigoriadis pp. 368, 535 Hand proposed that the
(January 29, 2010). "Searching 177. ^ Schick 1970, p. 191 defendant's duty is a function of
for J.D. Salinger: A Writer's three variables: the probability
178. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 83
New Hampshire Quest". Rolling of an accident's occurring, the
179. ^ Dworkin 1996, p. 412
Stone. Retrieved December gravity of loss if it should occur,
26,2018. 180. ^ Wyzanski 1964, p. viii
and burden of adequate
150. ^ Slawenski, Kenneth 181. ^ Gunther 1994,
precautions. He expressed this
(2010). J. D. Salinger: A Life. pp. 118–123
in the algebraic formula: "If the
Random House. pp. 281– 182. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 18– probability be called P; the
282. ISBN 9781611299052. 19 injury, L; and the burden, B;
Retrieved December 26, 2018. 183. ^ Horwitz 1995, liability depends on whether B is
151. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 674 p. 264; Schick 1970, pp. 162– less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
152. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 676 163; Gunther 1994, p. 122 where B is less than PL." See
153. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 677 184. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 109, also Calculus of negligence.
211 213. ^ Schick 1970, p. 169
154. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 679
185. ^ Carrington 1999, 214. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 26
155. ^ Grondahl, Paul
p. 141 215. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 26–
(December 5, 2013). "Learned
Hand (1872-1961): Judicial 186. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 219– 30. See also Chirelstein 1968,
eminence, '10th man on the 222 "Learned Hand's Contribution to
U.S. Supreme Court'". Albany 187. ^ Schick 1970, p. 164 the Law of Tax Avoidance".
Times-Union. 188. ^ White 2007, p. 235 216. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 32–
Retrieved January 11, 2016. 189. ^ Griffith 1973, p. 112 34; Schick 1970, pp. 170–171,
156. ^ "Skepticism is my only 190. ^ Jump up to:a b Griffith 188; United States v. Aluminium
gospel, but I don't want to make 1973, pp. 112–113 Company of America, 148 F.2d
a dogma out of it." Qtd. in Lewis 191. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 107– 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). In this
F. Powell, "Foreword", Gunther 108 case, the Second Circuit took
1994, p. x 192. ^ Qtd. in Griffith 1973, the place of the Supreme Court
157. ^ Jump up to:a b Griffith p. 144 under a special statute, enacted
1973, p. vii 193. ^ Gunther 1994, after the Supreme Court
158. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 405 pp. 604–605; Stone 2004, lacked quorum in the case
159. ^ Schick 1970, pp. 399–400 because of recusals. Hand's
p. 165; Dworkin 1996, p. 12 opinion set the standard for
194. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 146–
future rulings.
160. ^ Griffith 1973, 153
p. 192; Dworkin 1996, p. 342 217. ^ Schick 1970, p. 188
195. ^ Irons 1999,
161. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 131– p. 380; Schick 1970, pp. 180– 218. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 43–
140; White 2007, pp. 217–218 181; Stone 2004, p. 400 44; Gunther 1994, pp. 410–414
162. ^ Schick 1970, p. 186 196. ^ Dworkin 1996, 219. ^ Mattachine Review,
pp. 338–39 Issue No. 4, July–August 1955,
163. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 57–
cover and p. 2.
58; Dworkin 1996, pp. 342–343 197. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 603
220. ^ Schick 1970, p. 189
164. ^ "The limits Hand 198. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 192–
placed on choice are similar to 193 221. ^ Qtd. in Gunther 1994,
those John Stuart Mill placed p. 574
199. ^ Griffith 1973, pp. 130–
upon freedom when he denied 138; Horwitz 1995, pp. 262–263 222. ^ Gunther 1994, p. 550
223. ^ Schick 1970, p. 12 225. ^ Schick 1970, (1979), Life, Law, and Letters:
224. ^ Schick 1970, pp. 154, p. 355; Auerbach 1977, p. 259 Essays and Sketches,
187 226. ^ Origin of a Hero, Houghton Mifflin, ISBN 0-395-
in Auchincloss, Louis 28151-2
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