a.

Discipline and Removal from Office

i. Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals GR. No. 168079 July 17,
2007
ii. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 123792, March 8, 1999 ***PLEASE
DOUBLE CHECK****
iii. In Re Raul M. Gonzalez AM No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
iv. REMOLONA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 137473,
August 2, 2001
v. NARVASA V. SANCHEZ, GR. No. 169449 March 26, 2010
vi. QUEZON V. BORROMEO, GR. No. 70953 April 9, 1987
vii. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. CORTEZ GR. No. 155732 June 3,
2004
b. Preventive Suspension - GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 131012,
April 21, 1999
c. Termination of Office
i. By Resignation
1. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, 353 SCRA 452 [2001] GR Nos.
146710-15 March 2, 2001
2. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, ET AL. V.
COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 118883 January 16, 1998
ii. By Expiration of term
1. By abandonment - CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE, 357 SCRA 657
[2001 GR. No. 133132 January 25, 2000
iii. De facto resignation - PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA, 306
SCRA 287 GR. No. 138965 March 5, 2007
iv. By removal
1. PABLICO V. VILLAPANDO, 385 SCRA 601 [2002] GR. No.
147870 July 31, 2002
2. ROSALES V. MIJAREs, 442 SCRA 532 [2004] GR. No. 154095
November 17, 2004
v. By Impeachment - PHIL CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 11; Art. XI, Sec. 3
vi. By Forfeiture - PHIL CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 3
 vii. By Abolition
1. CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE, 351 SCRA 359 (2001)
GR. No. 133132 January 25, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners were appointed Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM, created under RA 6975
entitled "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under A Reorganized Department of
The Interior And Local Government, And for Other Purposes”. They assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which petitioners herein, were separated from
office. Section 8 of the said act provides that, "Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of office
of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their
reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except for current
Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who may be
appointed by the President for a maximum term of two (2) years."
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
security of tenure.
It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. As such, they cannot be removed or
5

suspended from office, except for cause provided by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by
6

law" refers to ". . . reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of
discretion may deem sufficient." 7

The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that
9

Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in the
position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of
funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made
11 12

in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 13

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as
the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested
14

with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition.

RULING:
NO.
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration' that that office is vacant. While it is
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the
power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or
holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It
cannot be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested
with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
emoluments.
This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do — declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by declaring
that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby removing
petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done
pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.

RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners' positions. In order to determine whether there has
been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the new law
in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM.

Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described a collegial body within the DILG whereas RA
8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program coordination. This
does not result in the creation of an entirely new office.

Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,

supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.

Regarding the respondents’ contention that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the
abolition of petitioners' offices, it was held that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to
effect such a reorganization.

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of

government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
28

abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the
29

loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be
valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison: 30

. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition,"
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely
to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place
and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where
there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of ample funds.

No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551,
insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as
expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office
without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new
appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government
employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is
considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace
petitioners are not valid.32
 2. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, ETC. V.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 142801-802
[2001]

FACTS:

On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued EO 1273 establishing the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). The EIIB was designated to perform
particular functions on intelligence and investigation.

11 years after, President Joseph Estrada issued EO No. 191, deactivating the EIIB. He also
ordered the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of
Investigation.

President Estrada then issued EO No. 1968 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task
Force “Aduana.”

On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223 providing that all EIIB
personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service
effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition,
redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.

Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before the SC, invoking its
power of judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. They anchor their petition in the
following arguments:

Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a violation
of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to
make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of
which are essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the
power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.

Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys
the totality of the executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the
Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said
executive orders were issued in the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and
to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was not abolished, it was only
deactivated.

ISSUE:

-WHETHER OR NOT the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department?

-WHETHER OR NOT the reorganization is valid?

RULING:
Surely, there exists a distinction between the words “deactivate” and “abolish.” To
“deactivate” means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning
personnel,13 while to “abolish” means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely.14 In
essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently.15 Thus,
while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office
continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and
abolition are both reorganization measures.

(1) The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of
law.17 Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished
by the same legislature that brought it into existence.18

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office,19 or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.

Under Section 31, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, “the President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.” For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments
or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that
reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance.26 It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize.

(2) It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to
resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have
been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried
out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.27 Pertinently, Republic Act No. 665628 provides for the circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result
of reorganization, to wit:

(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;

(b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;

(c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
(d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and

(e) where the removal violates the order of separation

In the examination of the pertinent Executive Orders, it shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the
creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the
EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task
Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the
government.

Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides
that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who
are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing agencies. Their
tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they
belong is called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their employment with the Task force is
only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their employment with the existing agencies.
And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.

Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control
and supervision of the President as base of the government's anti-smuggling campaign. Such a
smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or
office and to use their respective personnel, facilities and resources; and 2) "to select and recruit
personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP for assignment to the Task Force." Obviously, the idea
is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing
departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a
whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the government
because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.

And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of
the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIB's expenses. Tracing from the yearly
General Appropriations Act, it appears that the allotted amount for the EIIB's general administration,
support, and operations for the year 1995, was P128,031,000;31 for 1996, P182,156,000;32 for
1998, P219,889,000;33 and, for 1999, P238,743,000.34 These amounts were far above
the P50,000,00035 allocation to the Task Force Aduana for the year 2000.

It was then held that petitioners' right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in
our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the 'abolition,' which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid
'abolition' takes and whatever 'abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid 'abolition'
as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary.

3. EUGENIO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 243 SCRA 196

[1995] GR. No. 115863, March 31, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES
eligibility. On September 15. 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.

On October 1. 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 93-4359 which resolves
to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career
Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the
Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service. The said
resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul,
among others, resolution No. 93-4359

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished CESB, an
office created by law, through the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359

RULING: Yes. The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the PD
No. 1, which adopted the Integrated Plan. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.

This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily
a legislative function. Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function.

In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is
supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative
department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether
these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by
the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office
and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside
funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control. From its inception,
the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is
expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook." The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally interrelated government agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination”.

4. FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS, 242 SCRA 192 (1995) GR. No.

116418, March 7, 1995

5. PAN V. PENA, 579 SCRA 314 (2009) GR. No. 174244 Feb 13,
2009
viii. What are the other modes of termination of office?

II. Election Law

a. As to voters
i. Right to suffrage - PHIL CONST. Art. III, Sec. 16
ii. Residency Requirement; ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC, 248
SCRA 300 [1995 GR. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
iii. Registration of Voters ; KABATAAN PARTY-LIST V. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 221318, December 16, 2015

b. As to candidates
i. Certificates of Candidacy – QUINTO V. COMELEC GR. No. 189698
December 1, 2009
ii. Qualifications and Disqualifications-
1. Omnibus Election Code (“OEC”), Secs. 63-78;
2. Local Government Code of the Philippines (1991), Secs. 39-40
iii. Campaign and Election Propaganda
1. OEC, Secs. 79-93
2. Comelec Resolution No. 10732,
3. PENAERA V. COMELEC GR. No. 181613 Sept 11, 2009
4. DIOSECE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC GR. No. 205728, Jan
21, 2015
 5. GMA NETWORK INC. V. COMELEC GR. Nos. 205367,
205374, 205592, 205852, 206360 Sept 2, 2014
iv. Electoral Contributions and Expenditures- CHAVEZ V. COMELEC GR.
No. 162777 Aug. 31, 2004

c. Challenges to candidacy
i. Omnibus Election Code Sec. 68 v Sec. 78
ii. LABO V. COMELEC GR. No. 105111 July 3, 1992
iii. FERMIN V. COMELEC GR. Nos. 179695 Dec 18, 2008
iv. MARQUEZ V. COMELEC GR. No. 258435, June 28, 2022
v. MAQUILING V. COMELEC GR. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
vi. TIMBOL V. COMELEC GR. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

d. Elections
i. Election Day Procedure - OEC Sec. 190-220
ii. Automated Elections – R.A. No. 8436 as amended by R.A. No. 9369.
iii. Postponement and Failure of Elections - OEC Secs. 5 and 6.
1. PASANDALAN V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150312
2. Abayon v. COMELEC G.R. No. 222236 ,May 3 2016.
iv. Special Elections – OEC Sec. 7, 14.
v. Election Protests – DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V. RAMOS P.E.T. Case
No. 001 February 13, 1996