002 Article A001 en

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CONTEXT AND RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

1. Vietnam experienced a strong recovery in 2022. The shift to “living with COVID,” along
with an impressive vaccination campaign, and strong domestic and foreign demand spurred
activity in 2022. GDP grew at the historically high rate of 8 percent. Average annual inflation
registered at 3.2 percent; however, price pressures, especially in core items, picked up steadily
during the year. Strong external demand early in the year helped reduce the current account
deficit to 0.3 percent of GDP.
2. Economic activity deteriorated sharply, however, starting in late 2022 due to

domestic and external headwinds. Economic growth slowed to 3.7 percent y-o-y in the first
half of 2023, with investment recording one of the worst performances in more than a decade.
The unexpected and abrupt deterioration in the outlook was driven by domestic financial
distress, turmoil in the real estate sector, and a sharp contraction in exports (12 percent y-o-y in
the first 6 months of 2023) due to a decline in foreign demand that has hit the region. On the
upside, the labor market displayed some resilience—the unemployment rate remained low, at 2.3
percent in June. However, some manufacturing firms have started to reduce working hours and
lay off workers, most of whom are moving to the service sector, often with informal status.
3. Liquidity distress in the FX and

financial markets surfaced in late 2022.
Pressures on the dong mounted throughout
2022 as global interest rates rose sharply,
opening a large gap with domestic rates.
Capital outflows, including the sale of FX
reserves by the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV)
to contain rising FX pressures, contributed to
a decline in liquidity in the financial system. In
October 2022, Sai Gon Joint Stock
Commercial Bank (SCB), the fifth largest bank
by assets, suffered a deposit run and was
placed under SBV’s control. Liquidity in the interbank market deteriorated sharply. However, after
4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

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taking control of SCB, the SBV has provided ample liquidity and, by early 2023, liquidity pressures
in the banking sector had eased. 1
4. The turbulence in the real estate

and corporate bond markets remains a
source of pressure to the economy and
the financial sector (Box 1). The liquidity
crunch emerged in the context of rising
private debt, especially during the low-
growth pandemic years. Many real estate
developers became highly leveraged in
recent years and faced financial distress as
interest rates rose and sales declined in late
2022. In addition, the corporate bond
market, where real estate represents the
largest market share, came to a halt amidst a decline in investor confidence and a crackdown on
illegal activities (which also involved real estate issuers). In turn, this aggravated the liquidity
squeeze, with a growing number of developers defaulting on bond payments. Furthermore,
some banks highly exposed to the real estate market are facing a deterioration in asset quality.
The authorities promptly issued a series of regulations aimed at facilitating access to funding and
reducing bankruptcy risks in the near term (Text Table 1). While these measures can provide
temporary relief, they could create their own risks down the road without further reforms.
5. Monetary policy has been nimble, adjusting to contain risks in a fast-changing

environment. Like other peer countries facing inflation and exchange rate pressures, the SBV
increased its main policy rates in the fall of 2022—the cumulative hike reached 200 basis points.
It also raised the 2023 inflation target from 4 to
4.5 percent. After peaking at 4.9 percent in
January 2023, headline inflation declined
sharply in recent months (down to 2 percent y-
o-y in June 2023), while the drop in core
inflation was more modest (from 5.2 to 4.3
percent). As the SBV reduced its FX
interventions in late 2022, the dong
temporarily depreciated but pressures abated
following the policy rate hikes. Since March
2023, the SBV has lowered its main policy rates
by a cumulative 150-200 basis points to
support the faltering economic activity, while the exchange rate has remained stable and modest
reserve accumulation has resumed in 2023.
1
In addition, in June 2023, Vietnam was placed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on its list of jurisdictions
under increased monitoring as it works to address strategic deficiencies in its AML-CFT regime.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5

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Box 1. Real Estate Sector and Corporate Bond Market Turbulence

Vietnam’s corporate bond market, after expanding at a fast pace over the last 6 years, experienced a
sudden stop in issuances starting in late 2022. Outstanding bonds rose from 6.6 to 12 percent of total
credit (8.6 to 15 percent of GDP) between 2018 and 2021. However, the market froze in the last quarter of
2022, and market activity remains limited while defaults continue. Bondholders, especially retail investors,
are pressuring underwriting banks to buy back bonds.
Distress among real estate developers increased as funding sources dried up and legal bottlenecks
intensified. Real estate transaction activity slowed since late 2022 (after booming in previous quarters), as
demand weakened and new projects coming to the market fell due to delays in securing authorizations
and land use titles. The delays arose amid heightened uncertainty around how land and construction
regulations were being applied, especially given overlapping, unclear, and sometimes inconsistent real
estate related laws and regulations. In addition, developers’ profitability declined further due to higher
financing and other costs, and funding pressures were exacerbated due to the freeze of the bond market.
Consequently, 56 developers, including the second largest, defaulted on bond payments in the first
5 months of 2023 (over 70 percent of total defaulted value). Risks remain elevated as a majority of
upcoming maturities are for developer issued bonds. In addition, some homebuyers received bridge loans
to finance pre-sales and other financial incentives from developers. Rollover risks for these loans have risen
due to market uncertainty. On the upside, the market appears to distinguish between developers, with
stock prices falling significantly more for those most leveraged. Medium-term prospects for real estate
demand also remain promising, given low levels of urbanization and limited supply of affordable housing.

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6. Fiscal policy was countercyclical in 2022, as spending was kept under control
despite rising inflation. The fiscal position improved to an estimated small surplus in 2022 from
a deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP in 2021. While the economic recovery and high oil prices drove
revenues higher, with public wages frozen, current spending fell sharply as a share of GDP.
Capital spending reached 6 percent of GDP despite a slow start to the investment programs in
the 2022-23 Program for Socio-economic Recovery and Development (PRD). Public debt fell to
an estimated 35 percent of GDP due to strong nominal GDP growth and an improved primary
fiscal balance.
Text Table 1. Vietnam: Measures Addressing the Real Estate and Corporate Bond
Market Turbulence

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OUTLOOK AND RISKS

7. Economic growth is projected to GDP Dynamics Pre and Post COVID
bounce back in the second half of the 180 20
Gap (RHS) Current Projection
year. After a weak first half, growth in 2023 160 Jan 2020 WEO Projections Actual
15
is expected to accelerate and reach 140 10
4.7 percent for the whole year, assuming 120 5
that the real estate turbulence is contained,

100 0
80 -5
and exports and credit growth pick up
60 -10
gradually in the second semester and in
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2024. Given the opening up of the output Sources: Vietnamese Authorities, IMF Staff Calcualtions.
Notes: GDP is normalized to 100 in 2016. The Jan 2020 WEO line corresponds to GDP projections for 2020-2024
gap, inflation is expected to remain below

based on the annual growth rates estimated in the January 2020 WEO Update, applied to the 2019 GDP level
consistent with the latest GDP revision by the GSO. Gap is the percentage point difference between the Jan 2020
WEO and Current GDP trajectories.
the 4.5 percent target. The current account

balance will improve to a small surplus in 2023, driven partly by a rebound in tourism.
Merchandise export and import volumes are expected to decline relative to 2022 due to
depressed demand. The exit from the pandemic has been challenging and has left some scarring,
but the economy is expected to revert to the pre-COVID growth trajectory over the medium term
as reforms are implemented.
8. Downside risks to growth loom large. Uncertainty surrounding the forecast is high. The
main external risk is a deeper and more persistent weakness in external demand. While recently
benefitting from some business diversion from China, Vietnam stands to lose from a slowdown in
global trade due to geoeconomic fragmentation. Domestic downside risks mostly emanate from
a further deterioration of financial conditions, which could damage growth prospects over the
medium term (Box 2). Further energy shortages after the episodes in May-June 2023 could harm
economic activity and business sentiment. On the upside, a faster than anticipated deployment
of public investment may boost growth.
Authorities’ Views
9. The authorities agreed with staff’s overall assessment, although they are more
optimistic about the rebound in the second half of the year. The authorities are maintaining
their 2023 economic growth target of 6-6.5 percent while recognizing that external and domestic
risks make achieving that target a harder task. They expect that their economic policy mix and a
recovery in external demand will allow for strong growth in the second half of the year. They
agreed with staff that inflation pressures have subsided and the SBV is confident the inflation
target will be met.

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Box 2. Growth Risks from Financial Turbulence
A Financial Stress Index (FSI) shows that turbulence in the markets is increasing but, at present,
remains lower than in past distress events. The FSI captures episodes of high credit intermediation costs or
disruptions to credit supply, based on text analysis of the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports (Ahir,
Dell’Ariccia, Furceri, Papageorgiou, and Qi, forthcoming).1 The FSI shows the presence of financial distress at
the moment. The index is far from the peak reached during the Asian financial crisis, but it is close to the
values of 2014, when an attempt to clean up the rising levels of bad debts from banks’ balance sheets slowed
down credit provision to the economy.
Empirical analysis shows that the impact on economic activity from heightened financial distress
could be severe. Using estimates derived in Ahir et al. (forthcoming), an episode of financial turmoil of the
intensity (measured by the FSI) experienced in Vietnam in the second quarter of 2023 is estimated to lead
to a GDP loss in the order of 0.15 percent in 2023 and around 0.35 percent in every year between 2024
through 2027. If Vietnam’s FSI reached the peak value recorded in 2014, the loss of GDP could be around
0.3 percent in 2023 and around 0.7 percent in 2024-2027. Were the FSI to reach the maximum level
measured during the Asian financial crisis, GDP would decline by up to 1.4 percent in 2023, and around 3
percent in 2024-2027—losses consistent with an average annual growth in 2023-27 of 5.6 percent, instead
of the 6.2 percent projected in this report.
1 The FSI counts the number of instances in which two keywords jointly appear in a sentence/paragraph of a EIU
report, and scales that by the number of words in the report. The keywords are: (i) credit, financial, bank, lending,
and fund, and; (ii) crisis, crunch, squeeze, bailout, rescue, tight, contract, and reluctant. Ahir and coauthors build the
index for the period 1967Q1-2018Q4, and the Vietnam team extended it to 2023Q2.
POLICY DISCUSSION
10. Amid heightened uncertainty, there was broad agreement that the policy priorities
should be to restore strong growth and protect financial stability. Discussions centered
around the policy mix, achieving greater balance between monetary and fiscal policies, and the
need for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to tackle with greater urgency immediate
challenges regarding: (i) the real estate and corporate bond market distress, and (ii) the financial
system, given the turmoil stemming from the real estate sector and the rise in non-performing
loans due to weak economic activity. Finally, achieving Vietnam’s medium-term goals will require
executing the ambitious agenda of climate and structural reforms.

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A. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
11. Monetary policy actions should be cautious given significant underlying risks, while
fiscal policy has more flexibility in supporting activity. During the first half of 2023, policy
rate cuts were the first line of response to the slowdown—as headline inflation fell well below
target, the negative output gap widened, and the dong remained stable, partially thanks to a
large trade surplus in the first half of the
year. However, further cuts would bring
policy rates to historically (pre-COVID)
low levels and could reignite disruptive
FX dynamics—as global rates are likely
to stay high for longer and the large
trade surplus of the first half of the year
is likely to unwind as the economy
strengthens—heightening the risk of
exchange rate depreciation passing
through to inflation (Annex IV). In
addition, with banks facing increasing
non-performing loans and high loan-to-
deposit ratios, incentivizing credit growth would be risky and likely ineffective. Instead, fiscal
policy could take the lead in sustaining demand given the highly leveraged corporates and weak
external demand. If inflationary pressures re-emerge, policy rates may need to be increased once
again. Conversely, if more generalized financial distress materializes or the economic slowdown
proves deeper, further support measures could be needed, which reinforces the need for keeping
monetary policy’s powder dry for now.
12. Greater exchange rate flexibility would help absorb external shocks. The widening of
the exchange rate trading band in October 2022 was a positive step. After drawing down
reserves to fend off disruptive FX dynamics in 2022, the SBV has been gradually rebuilding its FX
reserve buffers given favorable market conditions. Interventions in FX markets should be limited
to smooth volatility and not to counter persistent trends. Greater exchange rate flexibility would
require lower FX reserve buffers and strengthen the policy rate transmission mechanism.
13. Accelerating modernization of the monetary policy framework would help better
manage the different challenges. In recent years, the SBV has worked to improve its
forecasting capacity and its monetary policy decision-making process. Further progress could
entail introducing an interest rate corridor and improving liquidity forecasting. Monetary policy
should gradually move away from tools such as credit growth ceilings and deposit interest rate
caps and adopt market-based mechanisms along with appropriate macroprudential measures—
for example, by introducing a systemic risk surcharge for domestically important banks,
countercyclical buffers, and loan-to-value or debt-to-income limits on borrowers.

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14. The SBV remains committed to keeping inflation in check and agrees that there is
limited space for further monetary loosening. While lower inflation allowed policy rate cuts to
support growth, the authorities are aware of the risks of further monetary loosening. Policies are
aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability in the current challenging external environment.
The SBV acknowledged that favorable market conditions in the first half of the year have allowed
it to start rebuilding foreign exchange reserve buffers. The authorities reiterated that they do not
target any level of the VND/USD exchange rate.
B. Fiscal Policy
15. Fiscal policy is expected to become expansionary in 2023-24 to boost domestic

demand. The fiscal deficit is projected to reach 1⅓ percent of GDP in 2023. Public wages, frozen
since 2019, were set to rise by 20.8 percent in July, with an estimated annual budgetary impact of
1.2 percent of GDP, helping reduce the gap between public and private compensation. Public
investment is expected to accelerate. Revenues are expected to fall mainly due to weaker
economic activity and lower revenues from oil revenues and land use rights. Temporary tax
deferrals, cuts in environmental taxes, and cuts to VAT rates and car registration fees in the
second half of 2023 will also provide some relief to firms and households. However, frequent
changes to tax rates and excessive use of deferrals add uncertainty to the tax system and can
undermine tax collection. Some of the tax cuts are regressive and have negative effects on
climate and congestion. Instead, policies could focus on spending to address infrastructure and
social needs. Vietnam’s medium-term strategy, including fiscal rules, provides a medium-term
anchor to ensure sustainable debt. 2
16. Further fiscal support could be considered, especially if the economic recovery
disappoints. Given the slowdown and the constraints faced by monetary policy, going forward,
fiscal policy can take a leading role in supporting aggregate demand. For instance, the
government could scale up social safety nets—and consider cash transfers to provide swift relief
to poorer households. Building on successful fiscal consolidation in recent years, there is fiscal
space to provide further support. If the current turmoil proves more damaging to the economy
and the financial sector, targeted support could be considered, including to help real estate
developers restructure. To contain costs, it is recommended that any support goes through the
budget, is temporary, and there are mechanisms in place to control and monitor risk exposure
from guarantees or other contingent liabilities.
17. Revenue mobilization efforts over the medium term are needed to reverse the
trend of tax erosion and create space to bolster social spending and address infrastructure
gaps. Tax revenues have been eroded since their peak in the late 2000s, in contrast to trends in
regional peers (and despite Vietnam’s tax rates being close to peers’ average). Implementing the
2
The strategy for 2021-26 sets a debt ceiling of 60 percent of GDP. In addition, budget deficits (which are based
on very conservative revenue projections) need to converge to below 3 percent of GDP.

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Tax System Reform Strategy 2021-2030 would help widen the tax base and enhance tax
compliance. Reforms could include reducing exemptions and rationalizing preferential regimes
for FDI firms, broadening the VAT base, and raising environmental tax and excise duties. The
planned introduction of a unified property tax and a land registry would also be important.
Composition of Tax Revenues, 2000-22 Tax Revenues in Asia, 2000-22

(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
20 Corporate income tax 25 Asia LICs Asia EMs Asia AEs Vietnam
Personal income tax
18 Taxes on goods & services
16 Taxes on international transactions 20
Other taxes
14
12 15
10
8 10
6
4 5
2
0 0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2000s 2010s 2020-22
Sources: Vietnamese authorities. Sources: World Economic Outlook database.
Values for 2000s are based on staff's adjustment of historical GDP to produce a Vietnam's value for 2000s is based on staff's adjustment of historical GDP to produce a
consistent GDP time series and they would be much higher without the adjustment. consistent GDP time series and it would be much higher without the adjustment.
18. The adoption of the global minimum corporate tax (GMT) in 2024 will increase tax
revenues but will require improvements to the investment climate. Vietnam could be among
those most affected by the GMT—as it has often granted tax incentives to multinational
enterprises to attract FDI, including lower income taxes, that will be eroded. The effects of the
higher tax can be compensated by improving the business environment, upgrading
infrastructure, and enhancing human capital.
19. Strengthening the fiscal framework and budget processes would increase
transparency and enhance the quality and effectiveness of fiscal policy. The budget process
is weakened by overly conservative revenue projections in recent years. A budget based on
realistic projections and assessment of risks would allow to better decide on the appropriate
fiscal space and level of spending and debt, while increasing transparency. The scope and
duration of permitted carryover spending could be more limited and ensure that all spending is
integrated in the budget process. It would be important to accelerate efforts to strengthen
macro-fiscal capacity (projections, risk assessment, impact of fiscal measures). Conducting
expenditure reviews would help identify priorities and improve the quality of expenditures.
20. The authorities reiterated their objective of maintaining macroeconomic stability

and confirmed their fiscal structural reform agenda. They noted that fiscal policy has already
played a role in supporting output and are confident that the combined revenue and
expenditure measures in 2023 will help boost demand. They agreed there is fiscal space to
provide further support if needed given the past successful consolidation efforts that reduced
public debt. To reform the tax base and support businesses, they have proposed a revision of
several tax laws. The authorities are considering measures that limit the possible negative
economic impacts of adopting the GMT that are consistent with international agreements. They
cautioned that revenue collection is volatile and prefer to be conservative in the budget.

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C. Tackling the Distress in the Real Estate and Corporate Bond Markets
21. Addressing excessive corporate leverage swiftly would help limit the impact of the
real estate turmoil and promote a sound corporate bond market. An intergovernmental
taskforce is working with local governments to identify and address legal obstacles and
administrative delays preventing completion of real estate projects. However, solving the
financial distress stemming from the real estate-corporate bond nexus will likely require a more
comprehensive response. Unaddressed corporate balance sheet problems, especially among real
estate developers, could percolate throughout the economy and the banking system.
International experience shows that the lack of an efficient framework to deal with debt
overhang cases results in higher costs that take longer to mend. 3 Moreover, ensuring the
corporate bond market is a sustainable source of funding for the private sector requires reforms
to enhance governance and boost investors’ confidence.
22. The necessary deleveraging of high private debt could be made more efficient, and
with appropriate burden sharing to not compromise financial stability, by:
• In the short term, promoting swift restructuring of viable firms through out-of-court workouts
and hybrid solutions for debt restructuring, while liquidating non-viable firms. In addition, if
there are concerns regarding completion of ongoing projects deemed critical, the authorities
could consider targeted fiscal support subject to adequate safeguards and with appropriate
burden sharing between public and private stakeholders. If the real estate turmoil intensifies,
the authorities could provide subsidized financing or guarantees to banks for onward lending
to viable developers.
• Over the medium term, strengthening the effectiveness of the debt enforcement and
insolvency framework to deal with debt overhang in real estate and other sectors of the
economy (Box 3). A more effective insolvency regime would contribute to a better allocation
of resources in the economy and the development of the corporate bond market. Banks have
been granted extraordinary powers until end-2023 to seize collateral (Resolution 42), which
has helped process their nonperforming loans. However, including such temporary
regulation into the Law on Credit Institutions would enshrine unequal treatment of secured
creditors and could hinder the establishment of an effective debt enforcement and
insolvency framework.
23. Further institutional reforms would help strengthen governance of domestic capital
markets and restore investors’ confidence. Such reforms include ensuring that investor
protection and transparency principles are respected to restore confidence in the corporate bond
market and that all investors are treated equally when issuers make use of recently adopted
temporary measures. Improving the capacity of rating agencies and making the process for the
public listing of bonds less cumbersome would also boost confidence in the bond market and
make it a more durable and stable source of funding.
3 See “Systemic Banking Crises Revisited,” IMF WP/18/206.

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Box 3. Improving Vietnam’s Crisis Preparedness

Vietnam has ample room to improve its preparedness to tackle widespread corporate debt distress.
Staff developed a crisis preparedness indicator based on the existence and availability of a set of insolvency
and restructuring tools known to be most useful in a debt crisis. The analysis shows several important
shortcomings in Vietnam’s overall crisis preparedness:
• Vietnam lacks enhanced mechanisms for out-of-court
restructuring and a legal framework conducive to
restructuring. Effective multi-creditor workouts for
distressed but viable firms rely on enhanced mechanisms
(e.g., a set of principles, master restructuring agreements,
and the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms)
to aid coordinated solutions. An effective debt
enforcement regime creates incentives for negotiation,
and an enabling framework avoids obstacles in other laws
(e.g., tax, banking) to restructurings.
• Hybrid restructurings are yet to be introduced in Vietnam’s framework. They involve limited formal
intervention by courts to confirm or facilitate informal restructuring agreements, allowing for quick
restructuring, without over-burdening the courts.
• The Vietnamese corporate reorganization proceeding is largely untested and needs improvements. A
debtor in possession reorganization could create appropriate incentives for debtors to seek
reorganization. Technical aspects of the stay of creditor actions, the treatment of executory contracts,
and post-petition finance could be addressed. Safeguards for dissenting creditors would increase
confidence in the process.
• The liquidation framework does not provide rapid and significant recoveries for creditors. For
effectiveness and simplicity, it should allow the possibility of selling the business as a going concern and
allow secured creditors to enforce on their collateral. The use of e-auctions and other modern
technologies would improve the efficiency of liquidations.
• Some institutional aspects may be particularly useful in the event of a corporate debt crisis. In Vietnam,
the specialization of courts on insolvency matters and the use of modern technology for case
management are limited. The regulation of insolvency representatives needs reforms, including on
proper qualifications and relevant training.
Specific challenges of the real estate sector accentuate the gaps in crisis-preparedness. Real estate
developers can be highly leveraged and exposed to liquidity risk as they invest in land and inventory or face
legal obstacles. Uncompleted real estate projects adversely affect banks, investors, and consumers. Some
key issues affecting insolvency and creditor rights include the following:
• Prompt enforcement mechanisms minimize the losses of creditors and increase their confidence in real
estate collateral. In Vietnam, collateral enforcement needs strengthening for all economic actors and
in all situations under the broader debt enforcement framework.
• Pre-sales can involve fraud and mismanagement risks and buyers may find themselves in the position of
unsecured creditors. This may justify the adoption of protection measures for pre-sales, either
preventive (e.g., mechanisms to allocate sale proceeds for the project) or reactive (e.g., dealing with
conflicts between homebuyers and lenders).
• Typically, liquidators can complete work-in-progress or inventory if that maximizes value, even if a
developer is in liquidation. Additional financing can be provided by existing creditors or a new lender.
The challenge is facilitating such financing with adequate priority given existing secured creditors.

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24. The authorities stressed they are making significant efforts to resolve legal and
regulatory bottlenecks in the real estate sector and address social housing needs. A new
land law (among other real estate related laws) will be presented to the National Assembly for
approval later this year. Affordable housing remains a priority, and the government recently
approved a USD 5 billion credit package for social housing projects. On the corporate bond
market, the authorities noted there are signs the situation is improving and investors’ sentiment
has gradually stabilized thanks to the implementation of measures to stabilize the market. In
addition, the authorities are working to increase the capacity of rating agencies and researching
ways to incentivize institutional investor participation.
D. Protecting Financial Stability
25. SBV acted decisively in 2022 to protect financial stability within the limitations of
the existing legal framework; but the real estate turmoil and economic downturn pose
increasing risks. SBV took control of SCB in October 2022 using the special control regime and
provided it with (secured and unsecured) funding. The authorities also took several ad-hoc
measures to support corporates under financial distress due to the problems in the real estate
market and deteriorating economic conditions. These included temporary forbearance on bank
loans and allowing (unlisted) bond buybacks by banks. These measures imply that more risks will
be shifted to the banks amidst an unfavorable environment. Asset quality has been worsening;
the combined non-performing loan (NPL) ratio 4 reached 5.5 percent by end-March, and the
aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio approached 100 percent (excluding government deposits) as
loans have been outgrowing deposits for several years. Some banks are also highly exposed to
the ailing real estate sector. Bank capitalization was 11.5 percent at end-2022 and some banks
have been actively raising capital, but further efforts may be needed.
26. The stress in 2022 highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation on

prevention and management of crises. Establishing a crisis and financial stability monitoring
function at the SBV, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in the short term, is
critical to improve coordination and information sharing, and should involve all relevant actors.
Such a function could include: (i) coordinating the consistent identification and monitoring of
weaker banks and defining remedial actions; (ii) estimating losses and resolution costs (including
fiscal) and discussing contingency plans; (iii) monitoring forbearance measures and improving
bank balance sheet transparency; and (iv) conducting bank solvency and liquidity stress tests to
inform on financial stability risks. Data sharing, confidentiality, and developing communication
strategies will be critical for the function.
27. The ongoing revision of the Law on Credit Institutions (LCI) is a very timely
opportunity to modernize the bank resolution and emergency liquidity frameworks.
4 This ratio is composed of the NPLs at the banks, restructured loans and impaired loans at VAMC.

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Resolving banks has proven to be a complex and overly lengthy process due to constraints in the
legal framework. For instance, the SBV is still working on the resolution of banks placed under
special control in 2015. As recent experience in Vietnam and other countries shows, bank distress
can emerge suddenly. As such, having an effective bank resolution framework that ensures swift
action can be taken and contingency plans to enhance crisis preparedness are in place is vital.
Similarly, an emergency liquidity framework that makes liquidity available to illiquid but solvent
banks against adequate collateral and appropriate pricing is needed.
28. Amendments to the LCI could provide adequate tools and powers to SBV. 5 The LCI
could be strengthened by adopting international standards, in particular by: reinforcing the role
and responsibilities of SBV (including in the early intervention regime), clarifying decision-making
procedures, offering legal protection to SBV staff, and including the option to transfer parts of a
bank under special control to a viable bank. It will be important to clearly specify the objectives
and the elements of recovery planning, early intervention, and resolution regimes. Caution and
adequate safeguards are necessary when requiring other parties (Deposit Insurance of Vietnam,
banks) to support the restructuring of a bank put in early intervention, in terms of providing
liquidity and loss absorption.
29. The recent setbacks in the banking system also call for additional reforms to
strengthen financial sector resilience over the medium term. Priorities include:
• Strengthening bank regulation and supervision. For example, by increasing the operational
independence of SBV, improving coordination between relevant institutions, enhancing risk-
based supervision, and introducing a framework for consolidated supervision of banking
groups.
• Fully disclosing ownerships and related party lending.
• Enhancing securities markets oversight and implementing risk-based supervision of securities
markets participants.
30. Non-cash payments in Vietnam are rising rapidly, necessitating an improvement in

fintech regulation. Transactions through most non-cash payment channels doubled in 2022
compared to 2021. More than 2.8 million mobile money accounts were opened in 2022, of which
70 percent were in rural, remote, and isolated areas. This development has boosted financial
inclusion but has come with an increase in identity theft and fraud, calling for oversight by the
SBV. Some of the priority areas include operationalizing the regulatory sandbox, improving the
regulatory framework and supervision of payment service providers, and increasing data
collection and analysis on all fintech service providers.
5 Changes to the LCI include: (i) expanding SBV’s powers in early intervention measures (EIM) including the ability
to provide special loans; (ii) involving other actors (e.g., DIV) during EIM to support the bank in distress; (iii)
introduction of a mechanism to deal with bank runs; (iv) elaboration of the special control regime, dissolution,
mergers, DIV payouts and bankruptcy and (v) adding a chapter on bad debts.

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31. The authorities recognized the risks and are taking measures to address them,
while agreeing that reforms to strengthen resilience of the financial sector remain a
priority. To this end, SBV has intensified its monitoring of the banks and taken measures to allow
banks to deal with rising NPLs. The authorities have established a steering committee to identify
further policy options. They are revising the LCI in order to enhance the ability of SBV to
intervene in troubled banks and expressed interest in CD to support the process. The authorities
intend to make progress on the implementation of the Basel II framework and the development
of regulation for the fintech sector.
E. Climate and Structural Policies
32. Achieving the ambitious medium-term growth and climate goals will require
accelerating reforms to improve the business environment, critical infrastructure, and
human capital. Following a period of high economic growth, building on decades of market-
oriented structural reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic posed a severe test to the resilience of the
economy. To resume the transition to upper-middle income and, eventually, advanced economy
status requires further reforms to sustain growth and manage risks. The economy has faced
several challenges. For example, legal uncertainty (e.g., due to complex and sometimes
inconsistent laws) is undermining investment. Weaknesses and delays in the implementation of
public infrastructure, including to ensure reliable energy supply, also pose a risk. Efforts to
promote economic development will also need to align with climate objectives. Further
investment in education would help spur productivity and reduce the dual economy.
33. The newly approved Power Development Plan 8 (PDP8) and the planned Emissions
Trading System (ETS) have the potential to transform Vietnam’s energy sector. The
authorities are committed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, but Vietnam’s power sector is
currently highly reliant on coal. The PDP8 and ETS will shift electricity generation to a lower
carbon, more sustainable mix, while improving energy security and accessibility. The goal of
doubling electricity generation will require large expansions of renewable energy and alleviating
current transmission bottlenecks. Renewable energy generation targets under PDP8 are
estimated to require investments averaging USD 12 billion per year between 2021 and 2030.
Most of this investment is envisaged to be private, which requires a clear legal and regulatory
framework that promotes appropriate incentives (including on pricing mechanisms).
34. The planned ETS could be a cost-effective method of achieving emissions

reductions targets but will require careful design of accompanying policies (Annex VI). The
ETS creates market incentives to promote energy efficiency and shift supply towards more
sustainable sources of energy by making carbon-intensive fuels like coal more expensive. The
ETS can increase firms’ costs, with larger increases in more energy-intensive sectors, and raise
energy prices for households. Part of the substantial revenues generated by the ETS can be used
to fund measures (such as cash transfers to households) to limit these impacts. The success of

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the transition will also depend on the ability to scale up renewable energy to replace coal and
other carbon-intensive fuels to sustain the economic development goals.
35. The National Strategy for Climate Change until 2050, issued in 2022, is a step in the
right direction, but calls for translating principles and strategies into concrete actions and
plans. Climate trends and projections indicate macro-critical risks for Vietnam that warrant swift
and effective adaptation actions (annex VII). In its 2022 Nationally Determined Contribution,
Vietnam made an unconditional commitment to reduce emissions by 15.8 percent below
business-as-usual levels by 2030. It also made the commitment to reach Net Zero emissions by
2050. Such measures require investing in capacity to integrate climate change considerations at
all levels of governments, including budgeting and fiscal planning. This process can be facilitated
by updating Public Financial Management practices to include climate considerations. Mobilizing
external funding and private sector involvement, including through the Just Energy Transition
Partnership (estimated at USD 15.5 billion), will be key given large needs. Ensuring appropriate
financial market regulation would facilitate the issuance of green bonds.
36. Improving the quality of infrastructure investment and social spending is crucial to
support the country’s development goals and climate agenda. In this context, the Public
Investment Law was revised in 2019 and the new Public-Private Partnership Law was issued in
2020, however, progress in implementation of the latter has been slow. Competitive bidding in
procurement is planned, but the effectiveness of project selection and appraisal remains to be
improved. It would be useful to conduct a Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA)
update together with a Climate-PIMA to identify further reform priorities. Improvements to the
social protection system to address incomplete coverage and fragmented delivery are warranted,
especially given the high share of informal workers.
37. Product and labor market reforms are crucial to unlock Vietnam’s medium-term
potential. Reforms aimed at fostering technological diffusion and reducing economic dualism by
fostering greater interactions between FDI and domestic firms (e.g., through dense local supplier
networks) would boost productivity. Efforts to increase human capital levels and reduce skill
mismatches would further improve growth prospects. There is evidence of potentially excessive
labor market churning (Annex V), partly underpinned by pervasive informality, which acts as a
deterrent for firms to invest in upskilling their workforce.
38. Sustaining the gains in reducing corruption will involve continued efforts to
strengthen governance. Indicators of perceived corruption improved significantly following a
scaled-up anti-corruption campaign in recent years. However, further efforts could be taken to
strengthen governance in several areas, including through the ongoing development of the
national database on asset and income. Other reforms include making laws and administrative
processes clearer, simpler, and more transparent to provide greater legal certainty, reduce scope
for excessive discretion by public officials, and limit red tape. Addressing shortcomings on
AML/CFT, including those identified by FAFT, will require, among other actions, increasing risk
understanding and risk-based supervision, improving domestic coordination and international

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cooperation, identifying ultimate beneficial owners, and enacting other amendments to bring the
current framework closer to best international practices.
39. Addressing data gaps would increase transparency and help better inform policy
making and risk management. On the fiscal front, the lengthy delay in compiling final accounts,
sizeable discrepancies, and lack of spending details in the budget reports hamper the timely
monitoring and best use of fiscal policy. 6 The magnitude of errors and omissions in the balance
of payments in 2022 (over 7 percent of GDP) reduces the ability to assess the external position.
Other key weaknesses include the lack of publication of a property price index and related real-
estate indicators (reflecting the lack of a land registry), and the absence of data on job vacancies,
informal sector-related trackers, and on the international investment position. A unified and
collaborative data sharing system between the central and local governments as well as among
government agencies is crucial to support comprehensive economic surveillance.
40. The authorities reiterated their commitment to climate goals and that structural
reforms are key to long-term growth. They agreed that achieving climate goals will be
challenging and stressed the need for joint international efforts, including financial and capacity
building support. The authorities agreed with the need to improve institutions to support the
economic transition towards a developed economy. They noted there are ongoing efforts to
address legal uncertainties and ease excessive administrative burdens to improve the business
environment and promote economic growth. They welcomed the ongoing Fund support on
improving the fiscal statistics but cautioned that it could take time to make the required
upgrades to the legislative and IT frameworks. The authorities are committed to improve
AML/CFT framework and have developed a government action plan to guide the work.
STAFF APPRAISAL
41. As Vietnam emerges from the effects of COVID-19, it is encouraged to embark on a
set of reforms to sustain the high, green, and inclusive economic growth that it aspires to
achieve. Economic growth averaged 7 percent between 2014-2019, before slowing to 2.7
percent during the pandemic. The robust rebound in 2022 was disrupted by further external and
internal shocks. As the economy develops, Vietnam will need to strengthen institutions further
and adopt reforms to make the economy more resilient to shocks and promote its appropriately
ambitious development agenda over the medium term.
42. At the current juncture, the policy mix should prioritize consolidating
macro-financial stability in the face of the large external and domestic shocks. Further
monetary easing and policies to boost credit growth carry risks, reinforcing the need for fiscal
6 A first step solution is compiling cash budget execution data from the Treasury and Budget Management
Information System (TABMIS).

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policy to take the lead in supporting economic activity. The SBV was able to both contain
inflation pressures and stabilize liquidity in financial markets in a very challenging environment in
2022, and appropriately shifted policies in early 2023 as the economy weakened abruptly and
inflation pressures subsided. Going forward, the SBV will have to continue to operate with
caution under a complex outlook and limited policy space, especially given the high global
interest rates, while risks in the financial system have risen. The exchange rate regime should
move towards greater flexibility, along with a modernization of the monetary policy framework.
43. Fiscal policy has ample space available to support growth and the most vulnerable,
thanks to prudent policies. In the current environment, fiscal policy can be more effective in
promoting domestic demand moving forward, given highly leveraged corporates and weak
external demand. However, policy implementation should be stepped up, including by
addressing bottlenecks in the public investment cycle. Ramping up social safety nets and cash
transfers to the most vulnerable would help sustain more inclusive growth. Strengthening the
budget processes would ensure the effectiveness and transparency of fiscal policy. Over the
medium term, further efforts are warranted to mobilize revenues to bolster social spending and
infrastructure investment.
44. The external sector position is assessed to be stronger than warranted by

fundamentals and desirable policies. Structural policies aimed at promoting investment and
expanding safety nets would help external rebalancing. However, this assessment is subject to
significant uncertainty given the large errors and omissions that emerged in 2022 due to
unrecorded capital outflows affecting the balance of payments. FX reserves were assessed at
below what standard metrics would suggest as appropriate at end 2022 but the SBV is already
rebuilding its buffers.
45. Bold reforms would strengthen the resilience of the financial system and enhance
the authorities’ ability to prevent and manage crises. As international and domestic events
illustrate, financial distress can emerge suddenly. As such, Vietnam should accelerate reforms to
protect financial stability. In the short term, these include establishing a crisis and financial
stability monitoring function to identify and address risks to financial stability, with the SBV
coordinating with the Ministry of Finance. Resolution and emergency liquidity frameworks should
be promptly strengthened in line with international standards. To bolster banks’ capital buffers,
the SBV could consider restricting dividend payments at weaker institutions. In the medium term,
the supervisory framework could be further enhanced.
46. Solving the problems in the real estate and corporate bond markets will require
further efforts in fostering corporate restructuring and developing efficient insolvency
frameworks. There is room for Vietnam to improve in all areas of crisis preparedness and build
public trust in its insolvency system. In the short term, the focus should be on deploying out-of-
court and hybrid solutions for debt restructuring. Reforms in other areas should be pursued over
time. Bolstering institutions, including by strengthening supervision, ensuring investor protection,
and increasing transparency would help restore confidence in the corporate bond market.

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47. The next step for the ambitious climate agenda would be to swiftly translate goals
into specific actions. The implementation of the PDP8 and the ETS will transform Vietnam’s
energy sector and help achieve both economic development and climate goals. However, it will
require enhancing the legal and regulatory framework to promote private investment and
develop a compensation scheme for those most impacted during the transition. Funding,
including international support, is critical to pursue mitigation and adaptation policies.
48. Further efforts to enhance anti-corruption frameworks and close gaps in

governance and data reliability would be welcome. Despite improvements, strengthening
governance is warranted in several areas, including the development of an income and assets
national database. Anti-corruption efforts would benefit from greater legal certainty, including
through stronger institutions and simplified laws and regulations, and less burdensome
administrative procedures. In addition, overcoming data deficiencies, most notably, in fiscal and
balance of payments accounts, would improve policy making and the monitoring of risks. It will
be important to press ahead with the plans to strengthen the AML/CFT framework.
49. It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard
12-month cycle.

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Figure 1. Recent Economic Developments
After two years of subdued activity during the pandemic, the …but it is currently facing headwinds that started blowing late
economy rebounded strongly in 2022… last year.
Real GDP Growth Purchasing Manufacturing Index
(In percent, y/y) (0-100, index)
9 55
8
50
7
6 45
5
4 40
3
35
2
1 30
Jan-19
May-19
Jul-19
May-20
May-22
Nov-19
Jan-20
Jul-20
May-21
Nov-20
Jan-21
Jul-21
Nov-21
Jan-22
Jul-22
May-23
Nov-22
Jan-23
Mar-19
Sep-19
Mar-20
Sep-20
Mar-21
Sep-21
Mar-22
Sep-22
Mar-23
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Sources: Vietnamese authorities. Sources: Haver.
Domestic demand is still holding up… …but exports are plunging, leading firms to cut back
production.
Retail Sales of Trade Goods and Services Index of Industrial Production
(In percent, real, 3-month moving average, y/y) (In percent, 3-month moving average, y/y)
35
Trade 30 Headline Wearing Apparel Electronics
120
Retaurants and Hotels 25
20
70 Other Services 15
10
5
20
0
-5
-30 -10
-15
-20
-80
Jan-19
May-19
Jul-19
May-20
May-23
Nov-19
Jan-20
Jul-20
May-21
Nov-20
Jan-21
Jul-21
Nov-21
Jan-22
May-22
Jul-22
Nov-22
Jan-23
Mar-19
Sep-19
Mar-20
Sep-20
Mar-21
Sep-21
Mar-22
Sep-22
Mar-23
Jan-19
May-19
Jul-19
May-20
May-23
Nov-19
Jan-20
Jul-20
Nov-20
Jan-21
May-21
Jul-21
Nov-21
Jan-22
May-22
Jul-22
Nov-22
Jan-23
Mar-19
Sep-19
Mar-20
Sep-20
Mar-21
Sep-21
Mar-22
Sep-22
Mar-23
Sources: Vietnamese authorities. Sources: Vietnamese authorities.
GDP growth was historically low in 2023H1, with industry Consumption and investment slowed down while the trade
having one of the worst performances in over a decade. surplus was due to imports declining more than exports.
Contributions to Growth, by Economic Activity Contributions to Growth, by Expenditure

(In percent, y/y) (In percent, y/y)
15
15
10 10
5 5
0 0
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery
Industry and Construction
-5 -5
Services Private Consumption Investment
Others Public Consumption Net Exports
-10 Total GDP
-10 GDP
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
Sources: Vietnamese authorities, IMF staff calculations. Sources: Vietnamese authorities, IMF staff calculations.

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Figure 2. Prices and Wages
Headline inflation is declining fast… …largely due to a fall in commodity prices, especially fuel.
Headline CPI Inflation Global Commodity Price Inflation

(In percent, y/y) (In percent, y/y)
7 150
6 125 All Commodities
5 100 Fuel
4 75
Nonfuel
3
50
2
25
1
0
0
-25
-1
-2 -50
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
Jan-19
May-19
Jul-19
May-20
May-21
May-22
May-23
Nov-19
Jan-20
Jul-20
Nov-20
Jan-21
Jul-21
Nov-21
Jan-22
Jul-22
Nov-22
Jan-23
Mar-19
Sep-19
Mar-20
Sep-20
Mar-21
Sep-21
Mar-22
Sep-22
Mar-23
Sources: Vietnamese authorities. Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
Lower shipping costs … … are also contributing to cool producer prices, especially in
manufacturing.
Baltic Exchange Freightos Container Index Input Producer Price Inflation
(Index) (In percent, y/y)
12000 12.00 Agriculture Industry Services
10.00
10000
8.00
8000
6.00
6000 4.00
2.00
4000
0.00
2000 -2.00
-4.00
0
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
Jan-19
May-19
Jul-19
May-20
Nov-19
Jan-20
Jul-20
May-21
Nov-20
Jan-21
Jul-21
Nov-21
Jan-22
May-22
Jul-22
Nov-22
Jan-23
May-23
Mar-19
Sep-19
Mar-20
Sep-20
Mar-21
Sep-21
Mar-22
Sep-22
Mar-23
Sources: Haver. Sources: Haver.
Core inflation is also declining, but more gradually than The labor market remains resilient, but real wages have
headline as the price of housing remains elevated. started to decline as some firms cut down on working hours.
Core CPI Decomposition

(In percent, y/y)
6.0
Processed food; meals out; beverages
5.0 Housing
Other goods and services
4.0 Core CPI
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
Jan-19
May-19
Jul-19
Jan-20
May-20
Jul-20
Jan-22
May-22
Jul-22
Mar-19
Nov-19
Nov-20
Jan-21
May-21
Jul-21
Nov-21
Nov-22
Jan-23
May-23
Sep-19
Mar-20
Sep-20
Mar-21
Sep-21
Mar-22
Sep-22
Mar-23
Sources: Vietnamese authorities and IMF staff calculations.

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Figure 3. External Sector
… as weak external demand depressed exports, especially of

Merchandise trade slowed in the first half of 2023…
textiles, electronics, and furniture.
Services exports rebounded strongly in 2022 and the first half … due to higher tourism, though arrivals still lag pre-
of 2023… pandemic levels.
FDI commitment and disbursement levels in 2023 fell below

The SBV widened the exchange rate trading band in 2022.
recent trends.

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Figure 4. Monetary Sector

Policy rates were tightened in the fall of 2022, but reversed While other countries mostly increased or kept policy rates
partially since March 2023… constant.
Both lending and deposit rates have risen in late 2022 as After a strong 2022, credit growth weakened in 2023 while M2
policy rates were raised. growth has continued declining.
Credit growth in 2022 was concentrated in other activities Stock prices peaked out and declined in later 2022 due to
(including real estate) and trade, due to their strong growth uncertainty in global/domestic financial market and real
early in the year. sector.

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Figure 5. Fiscal Sector

…along with strong GDP growth, contributing to a fall in PPG
The fiscal position improved in 2022…
debt ratio.
Fiscal Balance Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt
(In percent of GDP) (In percent of GDP)
2 70
1 60
0 50
-1 40
-2 30
-3 20
-4 10
0
-5
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Est. Est.
-6 Foreign debt Domestic debt
Fiscal balance Primary balance
-7 Total Statutory debt limit
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Est. Est. Sources: Vietnamese authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Sources: Vietnamese authorities; and IMF staff calculations. Note: The formal PPG debt ceiling was revised from 65 to 60 percent of GDP in 2021.
The declining trend in tax revenues needs to be reversed … …to finance increasing infrastructure and development needs.
General Government Tax Revenue Spending Needs to Achieve Selected SDGs

(In percent of GDP) (additional total spending, in percent of GDP)
20
ASEAN VNM EMDE Linear (VNM) Budget Provision (2017 Estimates)

Water (annual)
18 Additional Total Spending Needs (2030)
Electricity (annual)
16
14 Roads (annual)
12 0 1 2 3 4 5
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Sources: Baum (IMF WP 2020/31).

Notes: Additional spending needs are based on current budget provisions above
Sources: IMF staff calculations. which spending would need to increase.
Reforms are needed to strengthen public investment … and expand coverage of social protection systems.
management … Social Protection Coverage, by Quintile
Public Investment Management Institutions 90
1. Fiscal Targets&Rules
2. National & Sectoral
80
15. Monitoring of Assets
Planning
70
3. Coordination btw
14.Project Management
Entities 60
Coverage (%)
13.Portfolio 50
Management and 4. Project Appraisal
Oversight 40
12. Availability of 5. Infrastructure

30
Funding Financing
20
10 Vietnam (mean) EMD Asia (mean) EME
11. Procurement 6. Multiyear Budgeting
0
7. Budget
10. Project Selection Comprehensiveness &
Q1 (Poorest) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (Richest)
8. Budgeting for Unity
9. Maintenance Sources: IMF FAD Social Protection & Labor - Assessment Tool (SPL-AT)
Investment
Institutional Strength Effectiveness
Source: IMF (2018). Vietnam: Public Investment Management Assessment – PIMA.

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Figure 6. Financial Sector Developments

Bank profitability remained high in 2022, driven by strong However, capital adequacy remained weak, especially in
credit growth and NIMs. SOCBs.
Bank Profitability
(ROA in Q2)
1.0
System SOCBs Private (Joint Stock Commercial Banks)
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff calculations.
…and liquidity tightened sharply as lending grew faster than

NPLs are picking up again since June 2022.
deposits.
Bond defaults could rise further as real estate developer issued Share prices have fallen steeply for the most leveraged
bonds form the bulk of upcoming maturities. developers.

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Table 1. Vietnam: Selected Economic Indicators, 2019–2024

Projections
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Output
Real GDP (percent change) 7.4 2.9 2.6 8.0 4.7 5.8
Output Gap (percent of GDP) 0.4 -0.4 -1.9 -0.1 -1.1 -1.1
Prices (percent change)
CPI (period average) 2.8 3.2 1.8 3.2 3.7 3.5
Core inflation (period average) 2.0 2.3 0.9 2.7 4.2 3.4
Saving and investment (in percent of GDP)
Gross national saving 35.6 36.3 31.3 33.1 32.4 32.4
Gross investment 32.0 31.9 33.5 33.4 32.1 31.8
Private 26.6 24.9 27.2 27.4 25.5 24.8
Public 5.3 7.0 6.2 6.0 6.6 7.0
State budget finances (in percent of GDP) 1/
Revenue and grants 19.4 18.4 18.7 19.0 18.4 18.5
Expenditure 19.8 21.3 20.1 18.8 19.6 20.2
Expense 14.5 14.3 13.9 12.8 13.0 13.2
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 5.3 7.0 6.2 6.0 6.6 7.0
Net lending (+)/borrowing(-) 2/ -0.4 -2.9 -1.4 0.3 -1.3 -1.7
Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period) 40.8 41.1 39.1 35.3 33.6 32.3
Money and credit (percent change, end of period)
Broad money (M2) 14.8 14.5 10.7 6.2 6.1 6.9
Credit to the economy 12.8 11.6 13.5 14.0 9.0 9.7
Balance of payments (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

Current account balance (including official transfers) 3.7 4.3 -2.2 -0.3 0.2 0.7
Exports f.o.b. 79.6 81.6 90.9 91.4 81.6 80.9
Imports f.o.b. 73.2 72.7 86.7 85.0 75.8 75.1
Capital and financial account 3/ 5.7 2.4 8.3 2.3 2.5 1.8
Gross international reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars) 4/ 78.5 95.2 109.4 86.7 98.7 110.5
In months of prospective GNFS imports 3.5 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.1
Total external debt (end of period) 37.0 37.6 37.9 36.2 36.6 36.5
Nominal exchange rate (dong/U.S. dollar, end of period) 23,173 23,098 22,826 23,633 ... ...
Memorandum items (current prices):

GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars) 331.8 346.3 369.7 406.5 438.2 476.9
Per capita GDP (in U.S. dollars) 3,439 3,549 3,753 4,087 4,365 4,707
Sources: Vietnamese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Follows the format of the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001. Large EBFs are outside the state budget but inside the general government
(revenue amounting to 6-7 percent of GDP).
2/ Excludes net lending of Vietnam Development Bank and revenue and expenditure of Vietnam Social Security.
3/ Incorporates a projection for negative errors and omissions going forward (i.e. unrecorded imports and short-term capital outfows).
4/ Excludes government deposits.

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Table 2. Vietnam: Medium-Term Projections, 2019–2028

Projections
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
Output
Real GDP (percent change) 7.4 2.9 2.6 8.0 4.7 5.8 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8
Output Gap (percent of GDP) 0.4 -0.4 -1.9 -0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0
Prices (percent change)

CPI (period average) 2.8 3.2 1.8 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4
CPI (end of period) 5.2 0.2 1.8 4.6 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Core inflation (period average) 2.0 2.3 0.9 2.7 4.2 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.5
Core inflation (end of period) 2.8 1.0 0.8 4.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5
Saving and investment (in percent of GDP)
Gross national saving 35.6 36.3 31.3 33.1 32.4 32.4 32.8 33.2 33.4 33.5
Gross investment 32.0 31.9 33.5 33.4 32.1 31.8 32.0 32.2 32.3 32.4
Private 26.6 24.9 27.2 27.4 25.5 24.8 24.7 24.9 25.0 25.0
Public 5.3 7.0 6.2 6.0 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4
State budget finances (in percent of GDP) 1/
Revenue and grants 19.4 18.4 18.7 19.0 18.4 18.5 18.8 19.0 19.2 19.4
Of which: Oil revenue 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
Expenditure 19.8 21.3 20.1 18.8 19.6 20.2 20.8 21.0 21.3 21.4
Expense 14.5 14.3 13.9 12.8 13.0 13.2 13.5 13.7 14.0 14.0
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 5.3 7.0 6.2 6.0 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4
Net lending (+)/borrowing(-) 2/ -0.4 -2.9 -1.4 0.3 -1.3 -1.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 -2.0
Net lending /borrowing including EBFs 0.3 -1.8 -0.5 1.1 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8
Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period) 40.8 41.1 39.1 35.3 33.6 32.3 31.3 30.7 30.1 29.5
Money and credit (percent change, end of period)
Broad money (M2) 14.8 14.5 10.7 6.2 6.1 6.9 7.9 8.5 9.0 9.0
Credit to the economy 12.8 11.6 13.5 14.0 9.0 9.7 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
Balance of payments (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

Current account balance (including official transfers) 3.7 4.3 -2.2 -0.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1
Exports f.o.b. 79.6 81.6 90.9 91.4 81.6 80.9 82.2 84.4 86.7 89.0
Imports f.o.b. 73.2 72.7 86.7 85.0 75.8 75.1 76.5 78.6 80.9 83.3
Capital and financial account 3/ 5.7 2.4 8.3 2.3 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5
Gross international reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars) 4/ 78.5 95.2 109.4 86.7 98.7 110.5 122.7 136.3 151.5 168.6
In months of prospective GNFS imports 3.5 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Total external debt (end of period) 37.0 37.6 37.9 36.2 36.6 36.5 36.2 35.8 35.4 35.0
Nominal exchange rate (dong/U.S. dollar, end of period) 23,173 23,098 22,826 23,633 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Memorandum items (current prices):

GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars) 331.8 346.3 369.7 406.5 438.2 476.9 520.8 564.8 611.6 662.8
Per capita GDP (in U.S. dollars) 3,439 3,549 3,753 4,087 4,365 4,707 5,097 5,483 5,890 6,334

1/ Follows the format of the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001. Large EBFs are outside the state budget but inside the general government (revenue
amounting to 6-7 percent of GDP).
2/ Excludes net lending of Vietnam Development Bank and revenue and expenditure of Vietnam Social Security.
3/ Incorporates a projection for negative errors and omissions going forward (i.e. unrecorded imports and short-term capital outfows).

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Table 3. Vietnam: Balance of Payments, 2019–2028
(In billions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

Prelim. Projections
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
Current account balance 12.5 15.1 -8.1 -1.1 1.0 3.2 4.2 5.7 6.6 7.4
Trade balance 21.0 30.7 15.7 25.7 25.4 27.9 29.8 32.2 35.1 38.1
Of which: Oil balance -3.6 -1.5 -2.1 -6.0 -4.9 -4.7 -4.8 -4.8 -4.9 -5.0
Exports, f.o.b. 264.3 282.6 336.2 371.3 357.5 386.0 428.0 476.4 530.2 590.1
Of which: Oil 2.0 1.6 1.7 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4
Imports, f.o.b. 243.3 251.9 320.5 345.6 332.1 358.0 398.3 444.2 495.0 551.9
Of which: Oil 5.6 3.1 3.8 8.4 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Nonfactor services -0.9 -10.3 -15.4 -12.6 -10.4 -9.9 -11.1 -12.5 -14.0 -15.8
Receipts 20.4 7.6 5.3 12.9 15.4 17.6 19.1 20.8 22.6 24.5
Payments 21.4 17.9 20.7 25.5 25.8 27.5 30.2 33.3 36.6 40.3
Investment income -16.8 -14.8 -18.7 -19.7 -20.2 -21.3 -21.8 -22.4 -24.1 -25.9
Receipts 2.2 1.4 1.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3
Payments 19.0 16.2 19.7 22.0 22.2 23.6 24.1 24.8 26.5 28.2
Transfers 9.2 9.5 10.3 5.6 6.2 6.5 7.3 8.4 9.6 11.0
Private (net) 8.7 8.9 9.6 5.0 5.7 6.3 7.2 8.3 9.5 11.0
Official (net) 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Capital and financial account balance 19.0 8.5 30.8 9.5 11.0 8.5 8.0 7.8 8.6 9.7
Direct investment (net) 15.7 15.4 15.3 15.2 14.7 15.5 17.0 18.4 20.0 21.7
Of which: Foreign direct investment in Vietnam 16.1 15.8 15.7 17.9 17.5 18.4 20.1 21.7 23.4 25.3
Portfolio investment 3.0 -1.3 0.3 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6
Medium- and long-term loans 4.9 2.4 2.8 2.2 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.4
Disbursements 13.0 11.5 15.2 15.6 18.7 20.8 22.6 23.7 25.6 27.7
Amortization 8.1 9.1 12.4 13.5 15.8 17.4 18.6 20.5 22.4 24.3
Short-term capital 1/ -4.6 -8.0 12.5 -9.4 -6.9 -10.8 -13.4 -14.2 -15.1 -15.9
Errors and omissions -8.2 -6.9 -8.4 -31.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall balance 23.3 16.6 14.3 -22.7 12.0 11.7 12.2 13.6 15.2 17.1
Memorandum items:
Gross international reserves 2/ 78.5 95.2 109.4 86.7 98.7 110.5 122.7 136.3 151.5 168.6
In months of prospective GNFS imports 3.5 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Current account balance (in percent of GDP) 3.8 4.3 -2.2 -0.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1
Export value (percent change) 8.4 6.9 18.9 10.5 -3.7 8.0 10.9 11.3 11.3 11.3
Export value (in percent of GDP) 79.6 81.6 90.9 91.4 81.6 80.9 82.2 84.4 86.7 89.0
Import value (percent change) 7.1 3.5 27.2 7.8 -3.9 7.8 11.2 11.5 11.4 11.5
Import value (in percent of GDP) 73.3 72.7 86.7 85.0 75.8 75.1 76.5 78.6 80.9 83.3
External debt 122.7 130.3 140.2 147.2 160.2 174.0 188.5 202.1 216.5 232.0
In percent of GDP 3/ 37.0 37.6 37.9 36.2 36.6 36.5 36.2 35.8 35.4 35.0
GDP 331.8 346.3 369.7 406.5 438.2 476.9 520.8 564.8 611.6 662.8
1/ Incorporates a projection for negative errors and omissions going forward (i.e. unrecorded imports and US dollar
currency holdings by residents outside the formal financial sector).
3/ Uses interbank exchange rate.

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Table 4a. Vietnam: Consolidated State Budgetary Operations, 2019-2024 1/

(In trillions of dong)
Est. Proj. Proj.
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Total revenue and grants 1496 1479 1587 1810 1914 2124
Tax revenue 1122 1056 1181 1376 1450 1612
Oil revenues 56 32 44 78 63 63
CIT 42 26 32 60 49 49
Natural resource tax 14 6 12 18 15 15
Non-oil tax revenues 1066 1024 1137 1298 1387 1549
PIT 109 115 128 163 178 198
CIT 229 231 286 279 305 340
VAT 363 340 376 445 468 530
Trade 97 79 90 114 112 120
Others 269 259 257 296 324 362
Grants 5 5 17 8 8 8
Other revenue 369 419 389 427 455 504
Expenditure 1527 1710 1708 1786 2044 2316

Expense 1115 1146 1180 1216 1357 1514
Interest 107 106 102 95 97 103
Other expense 1008 1040 1079 1121 1260 1410
Net acquisition of non-financial assets 412 563 528 570 687 803
Net lending (+)/borrowing (-) -31 -230 -122 24 -131 -192
Net incurrence of liabilities 65 9 -24 60 131 192

Net incurrence of financial liabilities 127 196 53 67 128 189
Domestic 90 165 113 116 127 164
Foreign 37 31 -60 -49 1 25
Disbursement 79 112 -8 61 116 136
Amortization 42 81 53 110 115 111
Net acquisition of financial assets -62 -187 -77 -7 3 3
of which: Privatization receipts 54 30 4 4 3 3
Statistical discrepancies 2/ -35 221 146 -84 … …
Memorandum items:
Net lending/borrowing including VSS 153 -136 -30 117 -39 -103
Net lending/borrowing including EBFs 22 -145 -42 104 -54 -120
Public and publicly guaranteed debt 40.8 41.1 39.1 35.3 33.6 32.3
Primary balance (% GDP) 1.0 -1.5 -0.2 1.3 -0.3 -0.8
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (% potential GDP) 0.9 -1.5 0.1 1.3 -0.1 -0.6
Cyclically Adjusted Non-Oil Primary Balance (% potential GDP) 0.2 -1.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.7 -1.1
Nominal GDP (in trillions of dong) 7707 8044 8480 9513 10412 11466
1/ Government Finance Statistics 2001 presentation. The baseline projections include assumptions of lower trade-related tax revenue due to international trade
agreements, gradual improvements in tax collection, and current plans for SOE equitization/divestment. Figures consolidate central and provincial government
accounts, but exclude net lending of Vietnam Development Bank and revenue and expenditure of Vietnam Social Security and other extra-budgetary funds.
2/ Difference between net lending/borrowing and identified below-the-line financing.

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Table 4b. Vietnam: Consolidated State Budgetary Operations, 2019-2024 1/

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Est. Proj. Proj.
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Total revenue and grants 19.4 18.4 18.7 19.0 18.4 18.5
Tax revenue 14.6 13.1 13.9 14.5 13.9 14.1
Oil revenues 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6
CIT 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4
Natural resource tax 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Non-oil tax revenues 13.8 12.7 13.4 13.6 13.3 13.5
PIT 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7
CIT 3.0 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.9 3.0
VAT 4.7 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.5 4.6
Trade 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0
Others 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2
Grants 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other revenue 4.8 5.2 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4
Expenditure 19.8 21.3 20.1 18.8 19.6 20.2

Expense 14.5 14.3 13.9 12.8 13.0 13.2
Interest 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9
Other expense 13.1 12.9 12.7 11.8 12.1 12.3
Net acquisition of non-financial assets 5.3 7.0 6.2 6.0 6.6 7.0
Net lending (+)/borrowing (-) -0.4 -2.9 -1.4 0.3 -1.3 -1.7
Net incurrence of liabilities 0.8 0.1 -0.3 0.6 1.3 1.7

Net incurrence of financial liabilities 1.7 2.4 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.7
Domestic 1.2 2.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4
Foreign 0.5 0.4 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.2
Disbursement 1.0 1.4 -0.1 0.6 1.1 1.2
Amortization 0.5 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.1 1.0
Net acquisition of financial assets -0.8 -2.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0
of which: Privatization receipts 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Statistical discrepancies 2/ -0.5 2.7 1.7 -0.9 … …
Memorandum items:
Net lending/borrowing including VSS 2.0 -1.7 -0.4 1.2 -0.4 -0.9
Net lending/borrowing including EBFs 0.3 -1.8 -0.5 1.1 -0.5 -1.0
Public and publicly guaranteed debt 40.8 41.1 39.1 35.3 33.6 32.3
Primary balance 1.0 -1.5 -0.2 1.3 -0.3 -0.8
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (% potential GDP) 0.9 -1.5 0.1 1.3 -0.1 -0.6
Cyclically Adjusted Non-Oil Primary Balance (% potential GDP) 0.2 -1.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.7 -1.1
Nominal GDP (in trillions of dong) 7,707 8,044 8,480 9,513 10,412 11,466
1/ Government Finance Statistics 2001 presentation. The baseline projections include assumptions of lower trade-related tax revenue due to international trade
agreements, gradual improvements in tax collection, and current plans for SOE equitization/divestment. Figures consolidate central and provincial government
accounts, but exclude net lending of Vietnam Development Bank and revenue and expenditure of Vietnam Social Security and other extra-budgetary funds.
2/ Difference between net lending/borrowing and identified below-the-line financing.

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Table 5. Vietnam: Monetary Survey, 2019-2024 1/
(In trillions of dong, unless otherwise indicated)

Proj.
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Net foreign assets 2,131 2,642 2,737 2,361 2,750 3,164

State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 1,813 2,199 2,536 2,049 2,379 2,694
Commercial banks 319 443 200 312 371 470
Net domestic assets 8,443 9,469 10,665 11,866 12,351 12,985

Domestic credit 8,583 9,647 10,860 12,103 13,289 14,693
Net claims on government 257 354 312 80 181 313
SBV -276 -485 -551 -450 … …
Credit institutions 533 839 863 530 … …
Credit to the economy 8,326 9,293 10,548 12,023 13,107 14,380
Claims on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 450 465 443 425 … …
Claims on other sectors 7,877 8,829 10,105 11,598 … …
In dong 7,847 8,794 9,966 11,509 … …
In foreign currency 480 499 583 514 … …
By state-owned banks (SOCBs) 3,911 4,251 4,731 5,348 … …
By non-SOCBs 4,415 5,042 5,817 6,675 … …
Other items net -140 -178 -195 -237 … …
Total liquidity (M2) 10,574 12,111 13,402 14,227 15,101 16,149
Dong liquidity 9,718 11,141 12,467 13,193 … …
Deposits 8,520 9,803 10,947 11,840 … …
Currency outside banks 1,198 1,338 1,520 1,353 … …
Foreign currency deposits 856 969 936 1,034 … …
Memorandum items:
Reserve money (year-on-year percent change) 24.0 10.0 12.5 -13.1 6.1 6.9
Liquidity (M2; year-on-year percent change) 14.8 14.5 10.7 6.2 6.1 6.9
Currency/deposits (in percent) 12.8 12.4 12.8 10.5 … …
Credit/deposits (total, in percent) 88.8 86.3 88.8 93.4 … …
Credit/deposits (dong, in percent) 92 90 91 97 … …
Credit/deposits (foreign currency, in percent) 56 51 62 50 … …
Credit to the economy
Total (in percent of GDP) 108.0 115.5 124.4 126.4 125.9 125.4
Total (year-on-year percent change) 12.8 11.6 13.5 14.0 9.0 9.7
In dong (year-on-year percent change) 13.5 12.1 13.3 15.5 … …
In FC (year-on-year percent change) 2.5 4.0 16.8 -11.7 … …
In FC at constant exchange rate (year on year percent change) 1.6 4.6 18.2 -13.9 … …
To SOEs (year-on-year percent change) -5.0 3.3 -4.6 -4.0 … …
To other sectors (year-on-year percent change) 14.1 12.1 14.5 14.8 … …
To SOEs (percent of total) 5.4 5.0 4.2 3.5 … …
Nominal GDP (in trillions of dong) 7,707 8,044 8,480 9,513 10,412 11,466
Sources: SBV; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes the SBV and deposit-taking credit institutions.

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Table 6. Vietnam: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2018-2022

(In percent)
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 11.9 11.8 11.1 11.3 11.5

Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.1
Non-performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital 9.3 7.5 8.0 4.3 9.1
Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 1/ 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.9
Return on Assets 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.1
Return on Equity 12.3 12.4 11.9 14.9 13.9
Interest Margin to Gross Income 70.0 68.6 68.7 67.0 70.8
Non-interest Expenses to Gross Income 48.9 47.1 47.4 40.2 42.0
Liquid Assets to Total Assets (Liquid Asset Ratio) 11.3 11.7 11.3 10.3 9.2
Source: Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI)

1/ Excluding restructured and VAMC loans.

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Annex I. Progress Against IMF Recommendations
Policies 2022 Article IV Consultations Actions Since 2022 Article IV Consultations

Recommendations
Fiscal Policy Fiscal policy should strike a balance To a large extent, fiscal support in 2022 delivered through the
between providing temporary, targeted Program for Recovery and Development (PRD) focused on
support and facilitating economic investment in infrastructure and temporary tax cuts. There was
transformation. more limited spending on housing support, childcare, training
and job search assistance.
Fiscal policies should be agile given fluid The fiscal balance was tighter than expected as the economic
economic conditions recovery in 2022 was stronger than expected at the time of the
2022 Article IV.
Longer-term spending priorities should Vietnam and development partners agreed to a USD15.5 billion
promote more inclusive growth. Just Energy Transition Partnership. Work on Vietnam’s climate
change reform plan is underway to achieve net zero emission by
2050. The 2023 budget includes large public investment
increases.
Revenue mobilization efforts are critical to The MOF conducted assessments of the implementation of key
accommodate higher development tax laws (including CIT, Excise, VAT, PIT, environmental tax, land
spending. taxes, natural resource tax, export and import tax) and collected
comments on amendments of these laws to raise revenue intake
over the medium term by strengthening tax administration,
especially in e-commerce and digital businesses, broadening VAT
base, raising some excise taxes, and amending tax incentives.
Strengthen public financial management A comprehensive Treasury modernization program is underway,

frameworks. focusing on: budget execution, active cash management, internal
audit, re-designing the Charter of Accounts, improving
information system. But, weaknesses remain on fiscal accounting
and reporting.
Pension reforms are needed to address An ongoing CD assistance on social security fund reform focuses
unfunded pension liabilities and improve on improving the coverage of pension fund. Training on pension
the coverage, adequacy, sustainability, and fund modeling is also being conducted to support VSS in
fairness of pensions. forecasting its long-term financial position to ensure its
sustainability.
Monetary Monetary policy should be data Monetary policy was tightened in second half of 2022 to contain
dependent, forward looking, and inflation and mitigate exchange rate depreciation pressures. The
Policy
increasingly vigilant of rising inflation risks. policy was loosened in early 2023 as headline inflation receded.
Greater exchange rate flexibility In October 2022, the FX trading band was widened to +/-5
percent from +/-3 percent.
Continue to modernize the monetary The modernization of the monetary policy framework is ongoing,
framework. with the SBV enhancing its analytical and forecasting capacity
through IMF-supported FPAS TA.

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Policies 2022 Article IV Consultations Actions Since 2022 Article IV Consultations

Recommendations
Financial Close monitoring of risks in the banking SBV has been closely monitoring risks in the banking sector and
sector, and loan classification and acted swiftly to contain contagion from the bank run. Loan
Sector
provisioning rules should be normalized. classification and provisioning rules have been normalized for
Policies loans restructured after January 1, 2023. Full normalization of
accounting and provisioning rules will take effect on January 1,
2024.
Enhance banking sector resilience. Adoption of Basel II is continuing. The amendments to the law
on Credit Institutions are being debated.
Strengthen the macroprudential Macro-prudential measures to limit risks from real estate and
framework. consumer loans and reduce maturity mismatches were
introduced.
Strengthen AML system A new AML-CFT law was passed and came into effect in March
2023, but it does not fully address the shortcomings identified.
Documents guiding the implementation of the AML-CFT law
have also been issued.
Deepening capital markets In September 2022, Vietnam revised the rules on corporate bond
issuances toward more transparency and limited the
participation of small retail investors. However, as the corporate
bond market was a facing severe liquidity issues, a March 2023
decree delayed the credit rating requirement and the limits on
retail investors to January 1, 2024.
Harness digital transformation Vietnam has made progress toward digital transformation in
both public service and business. More public services can be
provided through the e-government Portal, including tax and
customs services, and a national personal identification has been
introduced.
Structural Improve further the business environment Vietnam is working on amendments of several economic laws,
and reduce corruption. including: credit institutions, land, real estate business, housing
policies
law, and e-commerce. The government is further promoting e-
government, reducing regulations and licensing requirements to
simplify and improve the business environment.
Improve the quality of the labor force and Limited vocational training and job search assistance was
reduce skill mismatches undertaken under the PRD.

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Annex II. Integration of Capacity Development Assistance in

Surveillance
Overview
1. To achieve its ambitious development objectives, Vietnam needs to continue to

modernize its economic institutions. The IMF and other development partners are actively
engaged in their respective areas of expertise and are coordinating regularly.
2. CD has been well integrated with IMF surveillance. High-quality CD remains central in
strengthening the effective implementation of IMF policy advice and engagements with the
authorities. The main surveillance priorities include modernizing policy frameworks, enhancing
financial stability, and improving data quality and transparency to help Vietnam transition to the
next phase of its development.
3. Fund CD assistance focuses on Vietnam’s ambitious reform agenda. IMF CD assistance is

playing a key role in SBV’s plan to modernize its monetary policy framework via the FPAS. A FSSR
was undertaken and a broad reform roadmap was design to help enhance financial stability. The IMF
stands ready to continue helping the SBV strengthen financial stability. In the field of public finance,
the IMF continues to support the authorities’ efforts to strengthen treasury management, domestic
revenue mobilization, tax administration, and public debt management. IMF technical assistance will
also continue to support the authorities’ initiatives to improve the coverage, quality, and timeliness
of fiscal statistics. Vietnam has also benefitted from IMF TA and capacity building on AML/CFT,
central bank digital currency, cybersecurity, pension fund reform, customs modernization, and
climate policies.

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Table 1. Vietnam: Integrating Fund Surveillance and Capacity Development
Area Surveillance Capacity Development Recent

Recommendations Actions/Plans
Monetary policy Continue to modernize the Phase 1 on the Forecasting and Policy Analysis
monetary policy framework. System (FPAS) on enhancing analytical and
forecasting capacity was successfully
completed. Phase II on integration to policy
discussion started in April 2022.
Financial Policy Strengthen the resilience of the A Financial Sector Stability Review was
banking sector and modernize undertaken in 2022 and identified gaps in the
the macroprudential framework. financial sector infrastructure, policies, and
statistics.
Central bank Strengthen the central bank TA on strengthening SBV internal audit started
governance capacity on internal audit toward in August 2022 and aims at developing
more transparence and risk- capacity in the application of risk-based
based management internal auditing.
Tax Policy Strengthen revenue mobilization The property tax CD is ongoing.

by enhancing tax policy
Tax Strengthen revenue mobilization The Fund continues to work closely with
Administration by improving tax administration General Taxation Department on the
implementation of the Tax System Reform
Strategy for 2021-2030. A multiple-year CD
program is ongoing with priorities given to
further support compliance on risk
management and improvement of core tax
administration functions.
Treasury Improve public financial The Vietnam State Treasury received TA on

management management implementation of its Modernization Strategy
and fiscal data, accounting and for 2021-30, including internal audit,
reporting.
improvement of Chart of Accounts and cash
management. CD assistance has also been
provided in improving quality of financial
reports, shortening timing of state budget
finalization report and upgrading Treasury’s
Financial Management Information System.

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Table 1. Vietnam: Integrating Fund Surveillance and Capacity Development

(Concluded)
Debt Improve public debt Helped improve public debt management and
management management, accounting and reporting by providing training on the
reporting. development of a Medium-Term Debt Strategy,
as well as review current institutional
arrangements for public debt management.
Helped the MOF to assess its legal framework
regarding external debt statistics and develop a
roadmap for improvement of external debt
statistics by currency and residency.
Social Security Expanding social security A potential multi-year CD program with the
Fund coverage Vietnam Social Security Fund (VSS) on
management expanding the social security coverage.
Provided training courses to VSS to help
project its long-term financial position and
distributional features of public pensions.
Customs Strengthening compliance Assisted General Department of Vietnam

modernization management and enforcement in Customs (GDVC) in strengthening compliance
Customs management. Regarding enforcement function,
the CD assistance will focus on intelligence,
surveillance, and criminal investigation.
Data and Improve the coverage, quality, TA and training continue in the following areas:
statistics transparency, and timeliness of transitioning Vietnam’s state budget data to
statistics. Government Financial Statistics Manual 2014
(GFSM 2014) and publishing budget data for
2020-21, in line with GFSM 2014;
macroeconomic analysis and forecasting,
national accounts, monetary and financial data
reporting; and external sector statistics.
AML/CFT AML/CFT framework and A multi-year TA program to help resolve gaps

execution should be has been agreed. The TA program has started
strengthened in line with the with a scoping mission in November 2022
FATF standards to address key
country risks.
Macroeconomic Strengthening the capacity of The scoping mission identified areas of
Framework macroeconomic analysis and improvement and formulated a multi-year CD
forecasting. action plan.

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Annex III. Impact of an Interest Rate Shock on the Corporate

Sector in Vietnam 1
This annex examines the impact of an interest rate shock on the default risk of the non-financial
corporate sector in Vietnam. Simulations suggest that a 20 percent increase in borrowing costs could
increase the share of firms- and debt-at-risk by 11 and 13 percentage points, respectively. Small and
micro firms are most vulnerable to interest rate hikes. Although larger firms can weather the shock
better, their high leverage ratios remain a concern.
1. Vietnamese firms were vulnerable to interest rate shocks even prior to the pandemic.
The share of debt-at-risk (i.e., the debt of firms with interest coverage ratio, or ICR, less than 1) is
used as a metric of firms’ debt service capacity. 2 An ICR lower than 1 means that operating earnings
are insufficient to cover interest payment obligations, which is taken as a proxy for high default risk.
Calculations based on 150 thousand firms in the Orbis database show that 42 percent of firms in
2020 were at risk (ICR<1), a small increase from the 39 percent in 2019. Total debt of these firms
stood at 37.3 percent of total corporate debt in Vietnam. This is consistent with Kroeger et al. (2020),
who report a share of firm- and debt-at-risk of 33.5 percent and 28.7 percent, respectively, in 2017. 3
2. Three simulations quantify the impact of interest rate hikes of different magnitude on
firms’ default risk. The scenarios consider rising firms’ interest payments resulting in average
borrowing rates increasing by 20 percent (Scenario 1), 40 percent (Scenario 2), and 60 percent
(Scenario 3). With a calculated borrowing rate of 6.6 percent on average in 2020 (baseline), the
shocks imply borrowing rates of 7.9, 9.2, and 10.6 percent, on average, in the three scenarios. 4
3. According to the simulation, more than 10 percent of firms (and debt) would be re-
classified as high risk due to the interest rate hikes in Scenario 1. A 20 percent rise in borrowing
rates would increase the share of firms-at-risk (ICR<1) by 12 percentage points, making 53.2 percent
of firms at risk of default. Correspondingly, 49 percent of total debt (an additional 13 percentage
points compared to the baseline scenario) would be categorized as risky under Scenario 1. Firms-
and debt-at-risk are expected to continue rising if interest rates increase further as in Scenario 2 and
Scenario 3, but at a slower pace. This suggests that a non-negligible share of firms is at the edge of
1 Prepared by Anh Thi Ngoc Nguyen, Federico Díez, and Giacomo Magistretti.
2 Interest coverage ratio is defined as earnings before tax and interest payment (EBIT) over interest payment.
3 See Thilo Kroeger, Anh Thi Ngoc Nguyen, Yuanyan Sophia Zhang, Pham Dinh Thuy, Nguyen Huy Minh, and Duong
Danh Tuan, 2020, “Corporate Vulnerabilities and Implications of COVID-19,”, IMF Working Paper No.20/260.
4 By using 2020 data, the latest available year with good coverage at the time of writing, the exercise assumes that
debt and profits remained constant since then. If profit growth was higher than debt growth in 2021-22, then the
simulations would be an upper bound of the true effect. Conversely, if debt grew faster than profits in 2021-22, which
would be consistent with the last five years of pre-pandemic data, then the impact of the shock would be more
severe than what is calculated in this annex.

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the ICR threshold cutoff, and even a Debt profile and Firm Profile by Scenario
relatively small hike in interest rate would (Based on the categorization of ICR, percent)
put them in danger of default.
4. Smaller firms, and firms in

sectors such as construction,
wholesale trade, and real estate are
most vulnerable to interest rate
shocks (Figure 1). These industries
would likely witness more than 10
percentage point increases in the share
of debt at risk under Scenario 1. Small
and micro firms would suffer
disproportionately from interest shocks,
with over 20 percent of debt re-categorized at high risk of default even under a relatively mild
increase in borrowing rates.
Figure 1. Vietnam: Simulation Results

Simulation: Debt at Risk by Industry Simulation: Debt at Risk by Firm Size
(2020 data, share of debt at firms with ICR<1, as percent of total debt) (2020 data, share of debt at firms with CIR<1, as percent of total debt)
100 90
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
80 80
60 70
40 60
20 50
0 40
Agriculture
Wholesale
Real estate
Construction
Hospitality
Others
Mining
ICT
Scientific
Entertainment
Manufacturing
Transporting & Storage
30
20
10
0
large medium small micro
Industry Average
Sources: Orbis and IMF staff calculations. Sources: Orbis and IMF staff calculations.
5. Some firms, particularly larger firms, Positive Net Interest Revenues by Firm Size
(Share of firms, 2020 data, percent)
have sufficiently high financial revenue to
cover their interest payments. Since firms’
financial revenues comprise interest earnings and
investment income, higher interest rates could
potentially benefit firms holding a high share of
interest-bearing assets. In 2020, around 10
percent of firms had positive net interest
revenues, defined as the difference between
financial income and interest payments. This
implies that an increase in interest rates would

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benefit these firms, at least in terms of their financial activities. 5 Large firms (in terms of employees)
would disproportionately benefit, as 32 percent of them had positive net interest revenues
compared to only 7 percent of micro firms.
6. However, large firms are also more

Leverage Level by Firm Size
leveraged, pointing to possible pockets of (Current liabilities to current assets ratio, 2020 data, percent)
vulnerability. Large firms have the highest ratios
of current liabilities to current assets. This
observation partly reflects their greater ability to
tap financial markets as compared to smaller
firms, which are more likely to rely on retained
earnings. That said, in the current context of
uncertainty and economic slowdown, some large
firms could become more vulnerable to increasing
borrowing costs unless their working capital
needs are carefully managed.
5
Interest rate hikes will likely negatively impact operational income, leaving the net effect a priori indeterminate.

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Annex IV. Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Inflation in Vietnam1

This annex provides two pieces of evidence on the impact of changes in the VND/USD exchange rate
(ER) on the CPI in Vietnam. First, it shows the correlation between ER and price changes was
substantial during the last major depreciation episode in 2010-11. Second, it estimates an exchange
rate pass-through (ERPT) to CPI inflation in ASEAN countries, including Vietnam, of 0.3 percentage
points 12 months after a 10 percent change in the ER, increasing to 1.7 in case of depreciations. These
findings imply that falls in the value of the dong can have meaningful consequences for inflation.
1. It is challenging to quantify the ERPT in Vietnam based on recent data. Tight regulation
of prices of fuel and electricity, limited ER volatility, and low inflation in the past decade prevent an
accurate quantification of the ERPT in Vietnam. Mindful of these constraints, the analysis in this
annex first documents the co-movement between the ER and inflation in the last major episode of
ER depreciation and inflation in 2010-11. Second, it estimates the ERPT in ASEAN countries, an
informative benchmark given that Vietnam has an import share in household consumption—a proxy
for the preconditions that make the ERPT relevant in a country—of 15 percent, similar to the median
among ASEAN countries. 2
Step 1. Exchange Rate and Inflation in Vietnam
2. Inflation picked up sharply in 2010-11, a few months after sharp ER depreciation. The
top-left panel in Figure 1 shows that while there has been no significant co-movement recently, the
time-difference correlation between ER depreciation and overall CPI inflation was large and strongly
positive during the 2010-11 period, peaking at over 0.8 about six months after the depreciation. 3
The correlation was the highest for transport and housing (including fuel for cooking and
electricity)—CPI categories with a direct connection to fuel, a large share of which is imported and
priced in dollars—and food and catering services—mostly impacted by a stronger dollar through
rising costs of imported fertilizer, animal feed, and transportation.
1 Prepared by Faizaan Kisat, Giacomo Magistretti, and Ryoichi Okuma.

2Estimated from input-output tables published by the Asian Development Bank, the median import share in
household consumption is calculated as the share of imported inputs over total inputs into household demand in
2020.
3 The dong depreciated by about 13 percent against the dollar between January and December 2010.

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Figure 1. Vietnam: Correlation between ER and CPI in Vietnam
Source: Vietnam authorities and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Correlations are calculated between the year-on-year percent changes in ER and CPI, with ER leading CPI by
k months. The ER is the interbank one (monthly average), a proxy for the actual rate faced by firms and households.
Step 2. Estimating the ERPT for ASEAN Countries
3. Inflation in ASEAN countries increases by 0.3 percentage points one year after a 10
percent change in the ER, and by 1.7 percent after depreciations. Local projections are used to
trace out impulse responses for the ERPT in ASEAN countries since 2000. 4 The pass-through
coefficients can be interpreted as the percent (age point) change in CPI inflation 0–12 months after a
percent (age point) change of the exchange rate. In the baseline model, the ERPT is estimated as a
0.3 percentage points increase in inflation after a 10 percent depreciation (Figure 2, left panel). 5
When condensing only depreciation episodes, the ERPT is estimated at 1.7 percent 12 months after
a 10 percent ER decline (Figure 2, right panel), substantially larger than the baseline estimate. The
ERPT for appreciations is much lower and close to zero up to 3 months after the shock, before
turning negative and reaching about -0.9 percent 12 months after a 10 percent ER appreciation. This
4
The countries in the sample include Brunei (2000-2022), Indonesia (2000-2022), Lao PDR (2000-July 2021), Malaysia
(July 2005-2022), Philippines (2000-2022), Singapore (2000-2022), Thailand (2000-2022), and Vietnam (2000-2022).
The empirical model estimated follows Caselli and Roitman (2016):
𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
Δ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ Δ𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 Δ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 Δ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝑠𝑠=1 𝑠𝑠=1
where Δ𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the y-o-y percent change in the nominal ER relative to the US dollar in country 𝑖𝑖 at month 𝑡𝑡 (a
positive value for Δ𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents a depreciation of the local currency). Δ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the y-o-y percent change in the
domestic CPI, and Δ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
is the yoy percent change in the US CPI (a proxy for foreign prices). Both domestic and
foreign prices are included with a lag of six periods (i.e., 𝑝𝑝 = 6). 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 are country fixed effects. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ is the error term.
5
These estimates are in line with the literature. Carriere-Swallow, et al. (2016) estimate an ERPT of around 0.1 for
Asian EMs for the period 2003-2015. Similarly, Ha, Stocker and Yilmazkuday (2019) estimate an ERPT of 0.08 for
emerging market and developing economies over 1998-2017. Both studies also find a broad-based decline in ERPTs
since the late 1990s, in line with the relatively moderate ERPT estimates for our sample period.

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asymmetry is consistent with previous studies (Bussiere, 2013), and may be explained by export
price rigidities being more binding in case of appreciations than depreciations.
Figure 2. Vietnam: ERPT in ASEAN Countries
Sources: Haver and IMF staff calculations

Note: The figure presents results the 𝛽𝛽ℎ coefficients, and associated 95 percent confidence intervals, from estimating the
equation in the Appendix, where ℎ denotes the number of months after an exchange rate shock.
4. Monetary policy credibility and lower volatility in ER movements dampen the ERPT.
The literature finds that countries with more credible central banks or inflation targeting regimes
generally display lower ERPTs (Carriere-Swallow, Gruss, Magud, & Valencia, 2016; Caselli & Roitman,
2016), as producers are less likely to raise prices following bursts of depreciation if they believe that
the central bank will promptly act to keep inflation stable after an ER shock. The strong focus on
inflation containment of ASEAN countries since the early 2000s (Filardo & Genberg, 2009), including
by the SBV with the practice of setting annual inflation targets, may have therefore contributed to
the relatively low ERPT values estimated in this annex. Existing studies have also documented larger
ERPTs following more severe depreciation episodes, which have been less frequent in ASEAN
countries in the sample period relative to other emerging markets outside Asia.

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References
Bussiere, Matthieu. 2013. "Exchange Rate Pass-through to Trade Prices: The Role of Nonlinearities and
Asymmetries." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 75 (5): 731-758.
Carriere-Swallow, Yan, Bertrand Gruss, Nicolas E Magud, and Fabian Valencia. 2016. "Monetary Policy
Credibility and Exchange Rate Pass-Through." IMF WP/16/240, International Monetary Fund.
Caselli, Francesca G., and Agustin Roitman. 2016. Non-Linear Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Emerging
Markets. WP/16/1, International Monetary Fund.
Filardo, Andrew, and Hans Genberg. 2009. "Targeting inflation in Asia and the Pacific: lessons from the
recent past." Research Paper, Bank for International Settlements.
Ha, Jongrim, M. Marc Stocker, and Hakan Yilmazkuday. 2019. "Inflation and Exchange Rate Pass-
Through." Policy Research Working Paper 8780, World Bank Group.

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Annex V. Estimating Worker Flows and Labor Market Dynamism1

This annex uses the Vietnamese Labor Force Survey to estimate worker flows and explore the
dynamism behind headline labor statistics. While overall employment changed little over the years
(except during the pandemic), this masks sizable labor fluidity, with around 4.7 percent of the working-
age population changing labor status every quarter. Females, youths, and those less educated are the
most likely to change. Furthermore, labor market dynamism comes largely from the informal sector
while there seems to be barriers to formalization. There are also signs of excessive churning, which
makes it costly for firms to invest in labor training, hindering long-term human capital accumulation.
1. Vietnam’s employment recovery from the pandemic has reinforced long-standing

questions about the functioning of the labor market. While headline employment and
unemployment numbers have reverted to pre-pandemic levels, labor-skill mismatches, high levels of
labor informality, and lack of adequate training of workers remain a concern (IMF, 2022).
2. The annex utilizes the Labor Force Survey (LFS) to measure labor mobility in Vietnam. 2
A panel is constructed with individuals observed at two continuous points in time to measure
quarterly labor movement rates, including worker flows, job finding rates, and employment exit
rate. 3 Data limitations prevent analyzing overall job switching, but it can identify those who move
between self-employment and wage jobs as well as those switching between informal and formal
jobs—which allows to gauge the magnitude of worker flows within the employment pool.
3. Aggregate headline employment and unemployment numbers mask a significant

degree of labor market churning. Aggregate data indicate that employment increased, on
average, by 254 thousand (or 0.35 percent of working-age population) each quarter in 2018 while
the corresponding figure was 4 thousand (0.01 percent of working-age population) for
unemployment. However, using the panel LFS for 2017 and 2018, calculations suggest that about 4.7
percent of the working-age population changed their labor status across employment,
unemployment, and inactivity in each quarter (Table 1).
Table 1. Vietnam: Gross Worker Flows in Vietnam

Employment → Employment Unemployment Unemployment Inactivity → Inactivity →
Total
Unemployment → Inactivity → Employment → Inactivity Employment Unemployment
0.3 1.2 0.5 0.2 2.1 0.3 4.7
Note: Gross worker flows are expressed as a percentage of the population aged 15+.
1
Prepared by Anh Ngoc Nguyen with inputs from Federico Díez.
2
The LFS survey is an individual-level representative survey conducted on a quarterly basis, with household groups
visited over two continuous quarters before being visited again for another two continuous quarters after 6 months.
3
The survey only tracks individuals within a year, and there are almost no continuous data points between years, i.e.,
in Q4 of the previous year and Q1 of the current year. Therefore, the reported results do not capture labor transitions
happening during Q4-Q1 and might suffer from a downward bias as this is the most active period of labor
movement.

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4. Some demographic groups are more likely to change their labor status:
• By gender. Females are more likely to switch labor Status-Changing Ratio

status: 5.4 percent of working-age females move (by group, percent)
8
across employment, unemployment and inactivity 7
within each quarter. The corresponding figure for 6
males is 4 percent.
5
• By age. Youths are the most likely to change their 2
labor status: 7.4 percent of them moves each

1
quarter, while only 3 (6.2) percent of the prime age

Male Female 15-29 30-59 60+ Up to Vocational Tertiary
secondary
Gender Age Education level
(older) group change status. Sources: Vietnam LFS 2017-18 and IMF staff calculations.
• By education level. university graduates or higher

tend to stay within their labor status more than those without a tertiary education.
5. Transitions between labor statuses are greatly affected by informality and self-
employment—issues that are pervasive in Vietnam.
• Job-finding rates. Around 14 percent of the non-employed find a job on a quarterly basis, 88
percent in informal (versus formal) jobs. Roughly 41 percent start as a salaried worker, while 59
are self-employed. Further, the unemployed are more likely to find a job than those inactive, 4
which is in line with the findings by Donovan et al. (2020), that use data from 42 countries. As is
typical in developing countries, there is a large share of marginally-attached inactive workers
(i.e., who do not actively search for jobs but can easily start working if they happen to find a
suitable one). For instance, 18.4 percent of the inactive in Vietnam are marginally-attached,
explaining the finding from Table 1 that worker flows between inactivity and employment are
much larger than the flows between unemployment and employment. These results also suggest
the importance of the inactive as a potential source of labor supply.
• Employment-exit rates. Employment-exit rates are estimated to be 1.7 percent. Workers who
exit the employment status are mainly self-employed (65 percent) and work informally (87
percent). Upon leaving employment, 25 percent move to the unemployment pool and 75
percent become inactive.
• Transition rates between self-employment and wage jobs. The transition rate from self-
employment to a wage-earning job is 5 percent, which is rather low relative to peers (Donovan
et al 2020). As a large share of self-employed workers in Vietnam work informally with lower
wages and limited social protection (Dabla-Norris et al. 2020) than wage workers, this finding
could be of concern as it is suggestive of barriers preventing self-employed workers from
moving to more secure wage jobs. At the same time, the wage job to self-employment transition
rate is 4.8 percent, comparable with peers, and almost cancels out the reverse flow from self-
employment to wage jobs.
4
Among the unemployed, 40 percent found a job within a quarter; this rate is about 11 percent for those inactive.

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• Transition rates for formal-informal work. Informal work constitutes a large share of total
employment, with around 20 percent of workers even in formal firms working informally (Dabla-
Norris et al. 2020). The figure shows labor flows as share of total informal, formal, and total
employment. Around 6 percent of informal
workers change their work status every Informal-Formal Transition Rates
quarter, either by getting a formal job (3.8 (Percentage)
percent) or by exiting from employment (2.1

percent). Further, roughly 10 percent of
formal workers change their status quarterly:
8.7 percent get an informal job 5 and 0.8
percent exit employment. Overall, 7 percent
of the currently employed either exits
employment (1.7 percent) or changes
formality status (2.8 percent from informal to
formal and 2.4 percent the other way
around).
6. The inactive working age population is an important source of labor supply and
should be considered as one of key targets for labor market upskilling and training. While the
unemployed have a much higher job-finding rate, the inactivity pool provides three quarters of total
new employment given the sizable number of people in the pool.
7. Labor market churning can affect long term human capital accumulation. While data
limitations preclude an in-depth assessment of job-to-job transitions, transitions between self-
employment and wage jobs and between informal and formal work point to excessive churning in
the labor market. For instance, the transition rate from a wage job to self-employment is 4.8 percent.
Combined with 1.4 percent of wage workers exiting employment, it implies that over 6 percent of
wage jobs need to be replaced in a given quarter. Similarly, the formal job exit rate is around 10
percent, so 10 percent of formal jobs need to be re-hired within a quarter. These numbers would be
even higher if it were possible to account for workers switching between wage/formal jobs. This
high turnover, in turn, creates disincentives for workers and firms to invest in human capital and
training, impacting longer term human capital accumulation. As noted in IMF (2022), university-level
and vocational-technical skills are under-supplied in Vietnam, and on-the-job skill acquisition does
not fill the gap, as few firms provide formal training. Skill mismatches are particularly pronounced
for low-skilled and informal workers, reinforcing labor market duality.
8. Labor fluidity mainly comes from the informal sector, while the formal sector is
relatively segmented for the non-employed. The analysis reveals the presence of bidirectional
formal-informal flows within the employment pool. This bidirectional mobility implies a relatively
integrated labor market, in line with findings in Dabla-Norris et. al (2020). However, the formal
sector is more likely to be segmented and difficult to access for the jobless as flows to the sector
5
The data suggests that those moving from formal to informal works are less educated, have lower incomes, and are
more likely to have worked on the service sector than those staying formal.

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from the non-employment pool are limited. Among new workers entering the employment pool,
only 12 percent get formal jobs, suggesting that there are barriers that hinder workers from
accessing formal jobs. It is also possible that the informal sector serves as a bridge, or “interim
training”, in which the non-employed first get informal jobs, accumulate experience, and then can
move to formal work.
9. These findings point to the need for enhancing active labor policies aimed to address
market segmentation and hurdles to finding formal jobs. Improvements in labor training, skill
upgrading and job matching for people who are not working are essential. If the segmented formal
sector is a result of high costs of hiring, training or firing workers, such that informal jobs are used as
a transition mechanism, addressing these distortions would be critical. Overall, both supply and
demand side reforms are needed to help remove labor market barriers and facilitate greater labor
market dynamism.

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References
Dabla-Norris, Era, Ganelli, G., Nguyen, A.T.N, Nguyen, M.T.T, and Vu, T.T.T. 2020. “Role of Individual
Characteristics and Policies in Driving Labor Informality in Vietnam,” IMF Working Paper, No.20/273.
Davis, S.J., and Haltiwanger J., 2014. “Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance.” National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 20479.
Donovan, K., Lu W.J, and Schoellman T. 2020. “Labor Market Dynamics and Development.” Staff
Report No. 596, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Gomes, P. 2012. “Labour Market Flows: Facts from the United Kingdom.” Labour Economics 19(2):
165–75.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. “Vietnam: 2022 Article IV Consultation, Staff Report”,
Country Report No. 2022/209, IMF, Washington, D.C.
Lin, C.Y, and Miyamoto H., 2012. “Gross Worker Flows and Unemployment Dynamics in Japan.”
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 26(1): 44–61.

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Annex VI. Climate Mitigation: Introducing an Emission Trading

System in Vietnam 1
Achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 will likely require carbon pricing. The government plans to pilot
an emission trading system (ETS) in 2025 and make it fully operational by 2028. The ETS will bring
many benefits such as on health, pollution, and revenues, while its heterogenous impacts on
households and firms could be mitigated through a comprehensive strategy and policy responses
during the transition.
1. Vietnam has committed to mitigating its emissions and shifting away from coal power,
including by setting an objective of net-zero emissions by 2050. Vietnam has historically had
very low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per capita, but, over the past two decades, it has seen
some of the fastest emissions growth rates in the world. From 2000 to 2015, as GDP per capita
increased from $390 to $2,000, per capita emissions more than quadrupled. However, the
government announced at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference the intention to achieve net-
zero emissions by 2050. Vietnam also committed to end all investment in new coal power
generation, scale up deployment of clean power generation, phase out existing coal power by the
2040s, and increase deployment of green technologies.
2. Achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 in Vietnam would require one of the most
ambitious efforts in cutting CO2 emissions among its peers. A linear emissions pathway to
emissions neutrality between 2022 and 2050 would imply reducing GHGs to 333 million tonnes by
2030, a 32 percent reduction relative to 2021 levels, which puts Vietnam among the most ambitious
middle-income countries along with Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa in pledging to reduce
emissions. In comparison, some middle- and low-income countries (e.g., China, India) currently have
non-binding pledges for 2030 (see chart below).
3. Achieving a substantial emissions reduction will likely require carbon pricing. The 2020
revised Law on Environmental Protection establishes a mandate for the MOF to design a domestic
ETS and a crediting mechanism that encompass a cap, a method of allowance allocation, and
domestic and international offsets. The government has decided on an ETS over carbon taxes as the
preferred instrument for carbon pricing. A pilot ETS is expected to start by 2025 and to become fully
operational by 2028.
1
Prepared by Antung A. Liu and Yuan Xiao.

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Carbon Pricing: Impacts and Responses
4. Pricing carbon would bring Current and Illustrative CO2 Emissions Cuts for G20
many benefits to Vietnam, while its Countries versus 2030 BAU
costs could be managed by a Emissions cuts in 2030 vs. baseline, percent
gradual introduction and carefully increasing ambition
designed accompanying measures. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
It would help to transition the Australia

Canada
economy to using more sustainable EU-27 Current
Japan NDC
energy sources, reduce pollution and High-income
countries Korea
congestion, benefit the health and United Kingdom
United States 1.5C
quality of living of Vietnamese Saudi Arabia
Other HICs
citizens, generate substantial fiscal HIC average
revenues that can be invested or Argentina
Brazil 1.8C
spent on public services, and China
Mexico
contribute to the global effort to
Middle-
income Russia 2C
fight climate change. The ETS,
countries South Africa scenarios
Turkey
through increases in energy costs, Other MICs
MIC average
would have heterogenous impacts on India
households and firms, but as the Low-income
countries
Indonesia
Other LICs
analysis in this annex and LIC average
G20
international experience show, Annex I Parties
appropriate policy responses and a Non-Annex I Parties
African Group
UNFCCC
good communication strategy would country AOSIS
groups Arab States
help maximize the net benefits (Box BASIC
1). 2 The scenarios below are chosen G77 + China
LMDC
to illustrate the quantitative World
implications, but there are many Intensity ICPF 2C 1.8C 1.5C Current NDC
paths to Net Zero by 2050. In fact, Source. Black and others (2022).Ax1
many countries use transitional

periods to gradually phase in the new
policy.
5. We examine three scenarios to illustrate the effects of reducing the number of permits
that will be available in the ETS along with a coal tax. 3 These three scenarios are presented
alongside the Business-As-Usual scenario, where no policies restricting carbon are implemented. 4
2
Dabla-Norris et al. (2021).
3
The quantitative assessment of carbon pricing is based on the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT). CPAT is a
spreadsheet-based model providing projections of fuel use and GHG emissions for the major energy sectors in 188
countries. CPAT, which was developed jointly by IMF and World Bank staff.
4
Vietnam’s 2022 NDC lists an unconditional emissions target of 781.6 million tons of CO2 equivalent by 2030 and a
conditional emissions target of 524.2 million tons. IMF models suggest that these targets will be easy to hit, even
under the Business-As Usual scenario. As a result, the 2050 Net Zero target is the focus of this current report.

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• High Reductions Scenario: the quantity of ETS permits is reduced sufficiently to establish Vietnam
on the linear path to Net Zero by 2050. The ETS permits are combined with a $US 10 per
gigajoule (GJ) tax on coal (see Table 1.) This coal excise tax shifts more of the increase in price to
coal and away from other energy resources. 5
• Medium Reductions
Emissions Permits by Scenario
Scenario: permits are
800
reduced sufficiently to
bring Vietnam two- 700
thirds of the way to the 600
linear path to Net Zero.
500
A $US 6 per GJ excise
tax on coal is required 400
mtCO2e
in this scenario. 300
200
• Low Reductions scenario:
permits are reduced to 100
bring Vietnam one- 0

thirds of the way to the 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
linear path to Net Zero. High Reductions Medium Reductions Low Reductions
In this scenario, a $US 2 Business As Usual Net Zero Pathway
per GJ excise tax on coal Source: IMF Staff using CPAT.
is required.
6. The model assumes that limiting the number of carbon emissions permits and taxing
coal will result in a broader set of changes to the economy. As the prices of carbon-intensive
sources of energy like coal and gasoline rise, households and firms are incentivized to become more
energy efficient, reducing the quantity of energy demanded. Renewable sources of energy like solar
power or wind power will become more economical and should expand as a result.
5 Our policy scenarios include a coal tax because of Vietnam’s heavy reliance on coal and the government’s intention
to shift away from coal power. Coal accounted for about 30 percent of installed capacity, 59 percent of electricity
generation, and 71 percent of CO2 emissions in 2020.

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Box 1. The International Experience on Carbon Pricing

To date, 70 carbon pricing initiatives in 47 countries have been implemented, covering 23% of global
greenhouse gas initiatives in 2022. Carbon pricing, which includes both carbon taxes and emissions trading
systems (ETSs) have been implemented in each country in the European Union (EU), China, South Korea, New
Zealand, and areas of the U.S.
Prices on carbon vary widely, with most countries pricing emissions in the range of US$20 through
US$100 per ton. The most widely used price, from the EU’s ETS, was US $83 per ton in 2022. Empirical
evidence has consistently found that pricing carbon has resulted in large cuts of emissions (e.g., Bayer and
Aklin 2020).
The evidence on the effect of carbon prices on GDP is still emerging. Previously, most macroeconomic
models have predicted that a price on carbon will negatively affect economic growth, especially if revenues
are not used to invest in other growth-promoting initiatives such as cutting taxes and investing in
infrastructure. However, a nascent empirical literature on the experience of countries with carbon prices
suggests that the actual effect on GDP has been near zero (Andersson, 2019, Metcalf & Stock, forthcoming).
The reasons for the difference between the ex-ante and ex-post literatures are not yet understood.
Many countries adopting an ETS use transitional periods to gradually phase in the new policy. For
example, the first two phases of the European Union’s ETS lasted between 2005 and 2012. During these
phases, the EU targeted a reduction in emissions of 7% from 2005 levels. To further decrease the burden on
firms, most allowances were given to firms for free during the first phase. Prices of emissions permits were
low during much of these first two phases, limiting the effectiveness of the ETS in reducing emissions. Later
ETS systems such as that in California and in New Zealand enacted a price floor, a minimum level by which
permits could be bought and sold, to ensure that their policies would be effective in reducing emissions.
To help maintain competitiveness, the EU passed legislation enacting a Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism (CBAM), expected to enter into force in October 2023. The CBAM will require importers of
goods from 5 emission-intensive, trade-exposed sectors to purchase permits based on the carbon intensity
of their goods; these permits will be priced at the same level as EU ETS permits. A CBAM is intended to
reduce the competitive advantage of importers over domestic producers; firms in jurisdictions without their
own carbon price will be most affected.
Countries have used the revenues generated on environmental spending, tax cuts, direct transfers,
and reducing the deficit. Most countries raise under 1% of GDP in new revenues, with only Uruguay,
Bulgaria, Estonia, and Poland reaping revenues higher than that threshold. Spending has also varied widely.
Environmental economists have long encouraged governments to use revenues to cut taxes or enact
household transfers1. Carbon tax revenues have often been used to enact tax cuts, while ETS permit auction
revenue has most often been legally earmarked for new initiatives like environmental spending (Marten &
van Dender, 2019).
1
For example, when Iran eliminated fuel subsidies, it also enacted an unconditional cash transfer to households intended to
maintain household purchasing power.
7. As expected, pricing carbon will have significant effects on the costs of energy.
Depending on the scenario, the price of permits will vary and the number of permits will be reduced.
One of the largest sources of energy in Vietnam is oil; its price will rise 96%, 33%, or 7% by 2030
under the high, medium, or low reductions scenarios respectively. Electricity prices will rise by 80%,
50%, or 20% under these scenarios. Because each scenario couples Vietnam’s ETS with an excise tax
on coal, the largest price increases are reserved for this energy source: coal prices are expected to
rise by 443%, 207%, or 60% under each scenario.

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8. However, the ETS will also generate Annual Revenues from Pricing Carbon by Scenario, 2030
substantial revenues for Vietnam, beyond

cutting emissions. As the figure illustrates, if
emissions permits from Vietnam’s ETS are fully
auctioned, they can generate substantial
revenues. The High Reductions, Medium
Reductions, and Low Reductions scenarios are
projected to generate new fiscal revenues in the
amount of 6.9%, 3.9%, and 1.4% of GDP
respectively in 2030. These new revenues are
Source: IMF Staff using CPAT
annual and can be used to help achieve Notes: Calculations account for erosion of revenue from pre-
Vietnam’s development goals and mitigate the existing fuel taxes.
impacts of higher energy costs on households

and firms.
9. In addition to these new fiscal revenues,

pricing carbon is expected to produce major co-
benefits for Vietnam. Transport co-benefits are
realized when higher prices on gasoline and diesel
result in less driving of private vehicles and more
usage of public transportation decreasing road
congestion. Air pollution co-benefits (e.g., reduced
deaths from improved air quality) are realized when
airborne pollutants in coal, such as sulfur dioxide
and particulate matter, are decreased as coal is
replaced in Vietnam’s energy systems. Liu and Xiao
(2023) find that these co-benefits could total 4.5%,
3.0%, or 1.5% of GDP in the High Reductions,
Medium Reductions, and Low Reductions scenarios.
10. Price increases to energy will have a significant impact on costs for Vietnamese
industrial firms. Because the ETS is expected to be phased in between 2028 and 2030, the cost of
energy will rise quickly for firms, with larger cost increases for more energy-intensive sectors of the
economy. Price increases will be passed through the economy. For example, the price of iron and
steel will rise, increasing the costs for purchasers of those products such as construction firms and
shipping companies. These increases in price could result in two competitiveness disadvantages if
other countries do not enact similar measures. First, domestic producers will be at a cost
disadvantage in the domestic market if they pay a price for emissions while foreign producers do
not. Second, domestic exporters will be at a disadvantage in foreign markets if they must pay a price
for emissions that emitters in other countries do not. The degree of these effects depends on

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progress in other countries—this is one of the reasons it is critical to have global efforts to address
climate change.
Table 1. Vietnam: Energy Price Increases Under Reductions Scenarios, 2030
High Medium Low
Fuel Unit Baseline price Reductions Reductions Reductions
Scenario Scenario Scenario
Gasoline US$ per liter 0.84 1.15 0.95 0.86
Diesel US$ per liter 0.65 1.00 0.77 0.68
LPG US$ per liter 0.73 0.95 0.80 0.74
Kerosene US$ per liter 0.56 0.88 0.67 0.58
Oil US$ per barrel 56.9 111.8 75.9 61.1
US$ per
Coal 4.75 25.8 14.58 7.60
gigajoule (GJ)
US$ per
Natural gas 8.89 15.42 11.15 9.39
gigajoule (GJ)
Electricity US$ per kwh 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.12
Source. IMF staff using CPAT.
11. To address the issue of competitiveness, a variety of options could be considered.

Because rises in energy prices will increase costs to exporters while giving an advantage to
importers, the issue of export competitiveness is likely to be important in Vietnam. To address
competitiveness, Vietnam might consider a Border Cost Adjustment, where exporters are refunded
for the price paid for permits as goods cross the border. The EU is currently enacting a Carbon
Border Adjustment Mechanism, and a BCA in Vietnam would ensure that it keep carbon revenues
when exporting to the EU. However, this is a complex framework that requires building significant
capacity. It might also consider exempting export-dependent, energy-intensive sectors from the ETS,
as many countries have done for at least a few years after a new ETS.
12. Several complementary policy tools could address the issue of leakage. Leakage can
occur if firms leave Vietnam because costs have risen too much. Vietnam could consider giving
incumbent firms free allowances, as was done in Korea, New Zealand, and the EU. Alternatively,
Vietnam could use a Tradeable Permit System in some industries, as was done in China and Canada.
Finally, Vietnam could consider recycling ETS revenues, returning funds to trade-exposed firms in
the form of lump sum transfers, tax cuts, or output-based rebates. When deciding on the approach
will need to consider the different trade-offs, including the use of ETS revenues as discussed below.
13. The ETS needs to be accompanied by other policies to help households during the
transition. 6 The effect of the High Reductions scenario on household consumption is displayed in
the first panel of Figure 1. 7 While increases in the cost of electricity and of gasoline reduce
6The ETS will have the effect of increasing coal prices, negatively impacting the coal mining industry. ETS revenues
could also be deployed for transition assistance for displaced workers from affected industries.
7To analyze the effect of carbon pricing on Vietnamese households, we begin by analyzing their patterns of
consumption from the Vietnam Household Livings Standards Survey of 2016. After dividing households into deciles,
we then analyze the energy intensity of the bundles of consumption for each of these deciles.

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household consumption, increases in prices of other goods consumed have the largest negative
impact. Because poorer households spend larger fractions of their incomes on energy, they are most
hurt by rises in energy prices. An ETS with no accompanying reforms is regressive and is likely to be
unpopular.
14. The simulation suggests that targeted transfers using revenues from the ETS could
leave the poorest households better off, more than compensating for increases in energy
prices. Using revenues for targeted transfers and public investment could make the policy both
progressive while also boosting consumption for the poorest households. More generally, it can also
reduce any potential negative impact on growth—e.g., high quality public investment gives a boost
to domestic demand and can contribute to rising productivity. As an example, in the second graph
of Figure 1, we apply 30 percent of carbon pricing revenues in targeted transfers for the bottom 40
percent of households. On net, the bottom two deciles of households are left better off by this set of
policies, while impact on the next two deciles is near zero. Using a larger proportion of revenues on
transfer would yield even larger benefits for the poorest households. This accompanying reform
reverses the regressivity of an ETS, as also found for other Asian countries. 8 When policies raising
energy prices are accompanied with progressivity-boosting transfers, they are much more likely to
be popular with Vietnamese households.
Figure 1. Vietnam: Burden on Households from Medium Reductions Scenario, 2030

Relative Consumption Effect (% of Consumption), No Relative Consumption Effect (% of Consumption),
Transfers, 2030 With Transfers, 2030
Source: IMF staff calculations using CPAT.

Note: Panels show relative to consumption impact of the carbon price on consumption deciles before (left) and
after (right) revenue recycling. Revenue recycling assumes 30 percent of carbon pricing revenues are used for
targeted transfers.
8 Dabla-Norris et al. (2021).

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References
Andersson, J. J. (2019). Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emissions: Sweden as a Case Study. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11, 1-30.
Bayer, P. and Aklin, Michaël (2020). The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO2
emissions despite low prices. PNAS, 117 (16) 8804-8812.
Dabla-Norris et al. (2021). Fiscal Policies to Address Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific. IMF
Departmental Paper, International Monetary Fund: Washington DC.
Liu, Antung A. and Yuan Xiao (2023). Climate Mitigation Policy in Vietnam.
Marten, M., & van Dender, K. (2019). The use of revenues from carbon pricing. OECD Taxation
Working Papers.
Metcalf, G. E., & Stock, J. H. (forthcoming). The Macroeconomic Impact of Europe’s Carbon Taxes.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Parry, I. W., Black, S., & Zhunussova, K. (2022). Carbon Taxes or Emissions Trading Systems?:
Instrument Choice and Design. IMF Staff Climate Notes.
World Bank (2022). “Vietnam Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR)”, Washington, D.C.

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Annex VII. Climate Change Risks and Efficient Adaptation1

Climate change poses macro-critical risks, especially from sea-level rise, but adaptation can be highly
effective. With many competing needs the government would benefit from focusing on adaptations
with positive externalities, market reforms to facilitate efficient private adaptation, and welfare
measures to make adaptation equitable. Cost-benefit analysis can play an important role in helping
collect, aggregate, and compare information on adaptation projects.
1. Vietnam is becoming more vulnerable to climate change as it experiences higher

temperatures and sea-level rise. Average annual temperature has oscillated until approximately
the 1980s, when a clear upward trend starts (Figure 1). In the period 1985-2014, average annual
temperature in Vietnam was approximately 0.3 to 0.4 °C higher than its historical norm. The number
of days with maximum daily temperature above 35 °C has also significantly increased. Vietnam’s
long coastline and heavily populated low-lying regions make it highly vulnerable to sea level rise,
especially along the Mekong delta (World Bank CCDR, 2022). There is instead no discernible nation-
wide trend in total annual precipitation (Figure 1), in the number of days with heavy precipitations,
and in the number of consecutive dry days (World Bank CCKP).
2. Temperature and sea-level will continue to rise, while changes in precipitations and
weather extremes are more uncertain but can potentially cause large losses. Climate models
project additional warming of 0.8 °C in 2030 relative to the 1985-2014 period under all emission
scenarios (Figure 2). Temperature is projected to increase between 1.2 and 1.4 °C in 2050 (Table 1).
In 2070, the temperature is likely to further increase even with large global emission reductions
(Paris scenario)—at present trends, temperature is expected to increase by 1.8 °C in 2070, and by 2.1
°C in a High emission scenario. In 2050 sea-level rise is expected to increase by an additional 22 to
26 cm. The consensus among models shows an increase in total annual precipitation in all emission
scenarios, but not larger than normal interannual variability (Figure 2). Projections of changes in
extreme rainfall and dry periods are also very uncertain (World Bank CCKP). Tropical cyclones
periodically affect Vietnam causing large losses. While uncertainty about changes in frequency and
intensity of tropical cyclones is large, the upward trend in tropical cyclones observed in recent years
is expected to continue with medium confidence (IPCC, 2021).
3. In this context, Vietnam would greatly benefit from adapting to increasing

temperature and to additional sea-level rise, and from monitoring risks from precipitation
changes and tropical cyclones. Higher temperature throughout the year has the potential to cause
productivity losses across the economy, but especially in agriculture. Higher ocean temperature and
acidification may negatively impact fishery sector. Sea-level rise and a potential increase in the
frequency and/or intensity of tropical cyclones will amplify risks along the coastline. While scenarios
of temperature and sea-level rise change indicate robust trends that can be used to plan
incremental adaptation measures, uncertainty around scenarios suggest focusing on win-win
measures that reduce present risks and can turn to be beneficial under a wide range of scenarios.
1
Prepared by Emanuele Massetti.

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For example, projects that enhance efficient water use or effective storm water management have
both immediate benefits and will be useful under a wide range of future scenarios. Enhancing
preparedness against tropical cyclones will be beneficial even if future risks will not change
noticeably.
4. With many competing needs, the government must carefully allocate resources across
all possible uses, including adaptation to climate change, while considering the distributional
effects of its programs. This requires (1) concentrating government efforts and resources in key
areas, and (2) collecting information on how effective spending is across alternative programs and
how spending affects distinct groups in society (Bellon and Massetti, 2022).
Figure 1. Vietnam: Average Annual Timeseries for the Period (1900-2021)

(left) temperature (ºC), (right) precipitation (mm/year).
Notes: The solid line displays the 30-year average centered around each 30-year period.
Source: FADCP Climate Dataset (Massetti and Tagklis, 2023), using CRU data (Harris et al., 2020).

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Figure 2. Vietnam: Time Series of Average Annual Temperature (ºc), and Total Annual
Precipitation
(Mm/Year).
Paris Present Trends High

(SSP1-2.6) (SSP2-4.5) (SSP3-7.0)
Notes: The gray line describes historical mean annual temperature/precipitation based on observations (CRU). The
black line describes the 30-year moving average of historical data centered around each 30-year period. Colored lines
represent the median and the 80 percent range of temperature anomalies (10th and 90th percentiles) added to the
CRU value(thick black line in the year 2000. SSP1-2.6 scenario is in line with the Paris goal to keep global mean
temperature increase below 2 ºC with respect to pre-industrial times. SSP2-4.5 represents continuation of present
trends. SSP3-7.0 is a high emission scenario.
Source: FADCP Climate Dataset (Massetti and Tagklis, 2023), using CRU data (Harris et al., 2020), and CMIP6 data
(Copernicus Climate Change Service, Climate Data Store, (2021): CMIP6 climate projections).

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Table 1. Vietnam: Summary Table of Temperature Historical Observations and Projections (°C)
1985-2014 1931-1960 1961-1990 2030 2050 2070

(level) (change) (change) (2015-2044) (2035-2064) (2055-2084)
Paris
(0.5,0.8,1.3) (0.8,1.2,1.9) (0.8,1.4,2.2)
SSP1-2.6
Present Trends
24.6 -0.3 -0.4 (0.5,0.8,1.4) (0.9,1.3,2.0) (1.2,1.8,2.6)
SSP2-4.5
High
(0.6,0.8,1.4) (1.0,1.4,2.2) (1.5,2.1,3.2)
SSP3-7.0
Notes: 1985-2014 average temperature is used as the benchmark to measure observed and projected temperature change.
Future projectsions indicate the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the range of all climate models. The 50th percentile is the
“consensus” estimate.
Source: FADCP Climate Dataset (Massetti and Tagklis, 2023), using CRU data (Harris et al., 2020), and CMIP6 data
(Copernicus Climate Change Service, Climate Data Store, 2021).
5. Governments can prioritize adaptation policies with positive externalities, by

removing the market imperfections and policies that hinder efficient private adaptation, and
by ensuring a just transition. Individuals and firms have strong incentives to adapt because many
adaptation benefits tend to be local and private. However, there is a clear role for government
intervention when adaptation has large externalities (Bellon and Massetti, 2022), for example:
• Some market imperfections pertain to the nature of the adaptation goods themselves. For
example, markets invest suboptimally in adaptations with large positive externalities and public
goods, such as information about climate change, emergency preparedness plans, seawalls, basic
research in new materials, and technologies to cope with higher temperature.
• In many instances, resilience depends on networks, such as a system of dikes, a water network, or
a transportation network. As adaptation in each part of a network has impacts on the rest of the
network that may not be captured, private adaptation will tend to be underprovided.
• The extent of needed cooperation for adaptation projects depends on the extent of the externality
that is addressed by the project. As risks grow in scope and complexity, cooperation might be
needed at the national or even the international level, for example to manage floods in
transnational rivers. In general, the optimal distribution of responsibilities across levels of
government also depends on the existing allocation of responsibilities.
• Other market imperfections affect the broad functioning of the economy and make adaptation to
climate change inefficient. For example, a poor business environment and inefficient credit
markets hamper opportunities for farmers to invest in new capital to grow crops that are more
suitable to the new climate.
• Moral hazard may cause insufficient investment in adaptation if consumers, firms, and local
government expect central governments to provide relief. Governments can implement
regulations that minimize risk taking. Examples include zoning that prohibits construction in flood
zones, building codes, and mandatory insurance.

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• The government may also consider correcting market distortions resulting from their own policies.
For example, subsidies to inputs can lead to inefficient use. Of particular concern is subsidized
water use, which may worsen water scarcity problems due to climate change. Barriers to
international trade also prevent efficient climate-change-induced reallocation of capital, land use,
and other resources to maximize their productivity.
6. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can play an important role in helping collect, aggregate,
and compare information on adaptation projects. What to do, when, how, and at what cost
ultimately relies on ethical choices that should reflect the preferences of each society. However,
cost-benefit analysis (CBA), complemented by analysis and correction of distributional impacts, can
help decision makers maximize overall social welfare by avoiding wasting scarce resources. CBA
should be applied to adaptation as well as to all other development programs in a consistent
manner (Bellon and Massetti, 2022). Competing programs should be ranked using CBA and only
programs with the highest ranking should be financed. By consistently investing in projects with the
highest returns, governments can maximize the impact of their spending. This means, for example,
saving the largest number of lives, providing access to education to the largest number of children,
ensuring that the largest possible number of people are above the poverty line, and boosting long-
term growth (Bellon and Massetti, 2022).
7. Compensation might be more efficient than investments in adaptation to achieve

society’s equity preferences. Full protection of all assets and populations at risks may be very
expensive in some cases and as a result adaptation projects may have a negative NPV. While there
can be specific reasons to warrant investment even with a negative NPV, the authorities should
consider if it is possible to support the affected population in alternative ways. This can take the
form of relocation subsidies or other forms of supports with less stringent conditionality (Bellon and
Massetti, 2022).

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References
Bellon, Matthieu, and Emanuele Massetti, 2022. “Economic Principles for Integrating Adaptation to
Climate Change into Fiscal Policy.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/001, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC.
Massetti, Emanuele, and Filippos Tagklis, 2023. “Guidance Note on the FADCP Climate Dataset:
Temperature and Precipitation.” Unpublished manuscript, forthcoming, International Monetary
Fund, Washington, DC.
Harris, Ian, Timothy J. Osborn, Phil Jones, and David Lister, 2020. "Version 4 of the CRU TS monthly
high-resolution gridded multivariate climate dataset." Scientific data 7(1): 109.

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Annex VIII. External Sector Assessment

Vietnam’s external position in 2022 was assessed to be stronger than the level implied by medium-
term fundamentals and desirable policies. The current account balance (CAB) registered a deficit of 0.3
percent of GDP. The CAB is expected to improve further in 2023 as a result of China’s reopening,
subdued domestic demand, and a pick-up in net transfers. Policies geared towards promoting
investment, including a stronger rollout of public investment, and strengthening of safety nets would
support external rebalancing.
1. The CA improved noticeably from a

deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP in 2021 to a
deficit of 0.3 percent in 2022, following a
higher merchandise trade surplus and a
rebound in services exports. Vietnam’s post-
pandemic recovery boosted both domestic and
FDI-related trade activity during the first nine
months of 2022. However, merchandise trade
declined in the last quarter as external and
domestic headwinds arose, dampening FDI
imports in particular. Additionally, an increase in
tourist arrivals boosted services exports, which in 2022 were roughly 2.5 times higher than their 2021
levels. These factors increased the trade balance (including services) from 0.1 percent of GDP in 2021
to 3.2 percent in 2022. Net transfers fell by nearly 50 percent in 2022, due to higher remittance
outflows.
2. The real effective exchange rate (REER) Real Effective Exchange Rate, 2004-2022
appreciated during the first three quarters of (2010=100)
2022 before stabilizing in the remainder of the

140 Trend (HP filter)
130
year. REER movements mirrored the trends in the 120
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). The 110
depreciation of the dong versus the US dollar was 100
more muted than that in Vietnam’s other major

90
80
trading partners (EU, China) until the end of 70
2022Q3, driving up Vietnam’s NEER. As 60
depreciation pressures on the dong came to bear

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
in 2022Q4, the REER depreciated slightly, though it Sources: INS; and IMF staff calculations.
ended the year up 5.6 percent versus the end-2021 level.
3. The financial account declined in 2022 driven by short-term capital flows. Commercial
banks repaid offshore debt and more deposits were placed abroad due to a widening interest rate
differential (prior to the SBV’s rate hike in fall 2022). FDI levels remained stable during the year and
medium-term external borrowing was in line with previous years

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4. Gross international reserves fell by Financial Account

(In percent of GDP)
21 percent (USD 22.7 billion) in 2022. The 15 Net FDI
authorities used FX interventions to counter Net portfolio investment

Net medium and long term debt
Short-term capital flows
depreciation pressures against the dong and stabilize 10
the FX market, after a period of steady reserve

5
accumulation between 2017-21. As of 2022 year-end,
reserves stood at USD 86.7 billion, equivalent to 2.3 0
times short-term external debt and 65 percent of the
Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric under a -5
2019 2020 2021 2022
fixed exchange rate regime. Reserve levels were at Sources: Vietnamese authorities, IMF staff calculations
107 percent of the metric under a flexible exchange
rate. Staff assesses the end-2022 reserve levels to be
moderately below adequacy, as the exchange rate
regime is in between fixed and floating, and expects
reserves to reach adequate levels again in 2023.
5. Vietnam’s external position in 2022 is

assessed to be stronger than warranted by
fundamentals and desirable policies. Based on the
current account model, the CA gap is estimated at 3.4
percent of GDP. The gap reflects both policy and
unexplained factors. Some policy gaps have
EBA Model Estimates for 2022 (in percent of GDP) 1/
opposing signs: fiscal policy increased the gap by
CA model
1.3 percent of GDP (reflecting the tighter stance than CA-Actual -0.3
in the rest of the world) while FXI interacted with Cyclical contributions (from model) (-) -1.3
Adjusted CA 1.0
capital controls reduced the gap by 2.2 percent
(reflecting the drawdown in reserves along with the CA Norm (from model) 2/ -2.4
Standard Error 0.6
relatively closed financial account). Structural factors,
not accounted by the model (like informality and CA Gap 3.4
o/w Relative policy gap -1.5
weak social safety nets that lead to precautionary o/w fiscal policy gap 1.3
saving), also contributed to the gap. In addition, the o/w FXI*KC gap -2.2
large errors and omissions increase the uncertainty REER Gap
surrounding the assessment as the current account CA-implied

Elasticity
-5.0
0.7
balance may have been more negative than reported, REER-Index Model 21.4
REER-Level Model 16.2
reducing the gap. The CA model implies a REER gap
of -5 percent (applying an elasticity of 0.7). Instead, 1/ Vietnam transitioned from EBA-lite to EBA in 2022.
2/ Cyclically adjusted, including multilateral consistency adjustments.
the EBA REER models suggest a gap of
16.2-21.4 percent, highlighting the significant uncertainty surrounding an exchange rate assessment.

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Annex IX. Debt Sustainability Analysis

Figure 1. Vietnam: Risk of Sovereign Stress

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Figure 2. Vietnam: Debt Coverage and Disclosures

Comments
1. Debt coverage in the DSA: 1/ CG GG NFPS CPS Other
1a. If central government, are non-central government entities insignificant? n.a.
2. Subsectors included in the chosen coverage in (1) above:
Subsectors captured in the baseline Inclusion
1 Budgetary central government Yes
GG: expected
CG
2 Extra budgetary funds (EBFs) No Not applicable

3 Social security funds (SSFs) No (see commentary below)
NFPS
4 State governments Yes

CPS
5 Local governments Yes

6 Public nonfinancial corporations No
7 Central bank No
8 Other public financial corporations No
3. Instrument coverage: Currency Oth acct.
Debt IPSGSs
& Loans payable
securities 3/
deposits 2/
4. Accounting principles: Basis of recording Valuation of debt stock

Non-cash Cash Nominal Face Market
basis 4/ basis value 5/ value 6/ value 7/
5. Debt consolidation across sectors: Consolidated Non-consolidated

Color code: █ chosen coverage █ Missing from recommended coverage █ Not applicable
Reporting on intra-government debt holdings
Holder Budget. Extra- Social Nonfin.
Central Oth. pub.
central budget. security State govt.Local govt. pub. Total
Issuer bank fin corp
govt funds funds corp.
1 Budget. central govt 0
GG: expected
CG
2 Extra-budget. funds 0
3 Social security funds 0
NFPS
4 State govt. 0
CPS
5 Local govt. 0
6 Nonfin pub. corp. 0
7 Central bank 0
8 Oth. pub. fin. corp 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/ CG=Central government; GG=General government; NFPS=Nonfinancial public sector; PS=Public sector.

2/ Stock of arrears could be used as a proxy in the absence of accrual data on other accounts payable.
3/ Insurance, Pension, and Standardized Guarantee Schemes, typically including government employee pension liabilities.
4/ Includes accrual recording, commitment basis, due for payment, etc.
5/ Nominal value at any moment in time is the amount the debtor owes to the creditor. It reflects the value of the instrument at creation
and subsequent economic flows (such as transactions, exchange rate, and other valuation changes other than market price changes,
and other volume changes).
6/ The face value of a debt instrument is the undiscounted amount of principal to be paid at (or before) maturity.
7/ Market value of debt instruments is the value as if they were acquired in market transactions on the balance sheet reporting date
(reference date). Only traded debt securities have observed market values.
Commentary: Public debt of the Vietnam Social Security (VSS) is not included in Vietnam’s definition of public debt. With cross-debt
holdings of about 10 percent of GDP, its inclusion would currently reduce public debt by the same amount.

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Figure 3. Vietnam: Public Debt Structure Indicators

(Debt by currency (percent of GDP))
70
60 Projection
50
40
30
20
10
0
2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031
Foreign currency Local currency Local-linked
Note: The perimeter shown is general government.
Public debt by holder (percent of GDP) Public debt by governing law, 2022 (percent)
50
40
30
20
10
0
2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
External private creditors Domestic law
External official creditors
Foreign law ex. multilateral
Domestic other creditors
Domestic commercial banks Multilateral
Domestic central bank
Note: The perimeter shown is general government. Note: The perimeter shown is general government.
Debt by instruments (percent of GDP) Public debt by maturity (percent of GDP)
60 50
45 Proj
Proj.
50 40
35
40
30
30 25
20
20 15
10
10
5
0 0
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028
Marketable debt Nonmarketable debt Residual maturity: 6. years
≤ 1 year 1-5 years > 5 years
Note: The perimeter shown is general government. Note: The perimeter shown is general government.
Commentary: Debt has been increasingly held by domestic commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions.
The share of foreign currency debt is projected to decline as the government favors domestic financing for the
budget, with gradual decay of nonmarketable debt.

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Figure 4. Vietnam: Baseline Scenario

(Percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
Actual Medium-term projection Extended projection
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Public debt 35.3 33.6 32.3 31.3 30.7 30.1 29.5 28.9 28.2 27.6 27.1
Change in public debt -3.9 -1.7 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Contribution of identified flows -3.3 -1.3 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Primary deficit -1.3 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8
Noninterest revenues 19.0 18.4 18.5 18.8 19.0 19.2 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.6 19.7
Noninterest expenditures 17.8 18.7 19.3 19.9 20.2 20.4 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5
Automatic debt dynamics -2.0 -1.6 -1.8 -1.9 -1.7 -1.6 -1.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.2
Real interest rate and relative inflation 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Real interest rate -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Relative inflation 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Real growth rate -2.9 -1.6 -1.8 -2.1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9. -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7
Real exchange rate 0.7 … … … … … …
… … … … …
Other identified flows 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Contingent liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other transactions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Contribution of residual -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Gross financing needs 2.1 3.4 4.2 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.7
of which: debt service 3.4 3.0 3.4 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.6 1.9
Local currency 2.5 1.8 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.4
Foreign currency 0.9 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
Memo:
Real GDP growth (percent) 8.0 4.7 5.8 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6
Inflation (GDP deflator; percent) 3.9 4.5 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Nominal GDP growth (percent) 12.2 9.5 10.1 10.7 10.0 9.8 9.9 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6
Effective interest rate (percent) 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0
Contribution to change in public debt
(percent of GDP) Primary deficit
10 15
Projection
8 10 Real Interest rate
9 and relative
6 5 inflation
Real GDP growth
4 0 0
-2
0 -8 Exch. rate
2 -5 depreciation
0 -10 Other flows
-19
-2 -15
Residual
-4 -20
-6 Change in public
-25 debt
2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 Cumulative
Staff commentary: Public debt is projected to gradually decline, reflecting expectations of a narrowing of primary deficits and strong GDP growth amid
stable economic conditions. Continued revenue mobilization and spending prudency will help lower the primary deficit to around 1 percent of GDP in the
medium term. After a weaker performance owing to lackluster external demand in 2023, growth is expected to recover to the potential annual rate of 6.8
percent in the medium term, together with a projected inflation of 3.1 percent, helping to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio in check.

VIETNAM
Figure 5. Vietnam: Realism of Baseline Assumptions

Forecast track Record 1/ t+1 t+3 t+5 Comparator group:
Public debt to GDP Emerging Markets, Non-
Commodity Exporter, Surveillance
Primary deficit
r-g Color code:
Exchange rate depreciaton █ > 75th percentile
Optimistic
SFA █ 50-75th percentile
real-time t+3 t+5 █ 25-50th percentile
Pessimistic
Historical output gap revisions 2/ █ < 25th percentile
Public Debt Creating Flows Bond Issuances (bars, debt issuances (RHS,
(Percent of GDP) %GDP); lines, avg marginal interest rates (LHS, percent))
5 10 2% 5
Primary deficit
0 5 5+ yr term
Real interest rate
and relative inflation 1%
-5 0 1-5 yr term
Real GDP growth
-10 -5 0% <1 yr term
Exch. rate
depreciation -15 -10
Residual Spread vs 10-yr
-1% 0 US Treas.
-20 -15
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
5y hist
Change in public Past 5 Next 5 Implied spread,
sector debt years years Laubach rule 3/
3-Year Debt Reduction 3-Year Adjustment in Cyclically-Adjusted

(Percent of GDP) Primary Balance (percent of GDP)
12 12
Distribution 3/ percentile rank 70 Distribution 3/ percentile rank 22
10 3-year debt reduction 10
3-year reduction 3-year adjustment above 75th
above 75th percentile 3-year adjustment
8 8 percentile (2 ppts of GDP)
(5.9 ppts of GDP)
Max. 3-year Max. 3-year
6 reduction 6
adjustment
4 4
2 2
0 0
-7.5
-6.5
-5.5
-4.5
-3.5
-2.5
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
7.5
-28
-24
-20
-16
-12
-8
-4
12
16
20
24
28
0
4
8
Fiscal Adjustment and Possible Growth Paths Real GDP Growth

(lines, real growth using multiplier (LHS); bars, fiscal adj. (RHS) (in percent)
10 30
Baseline real growth (lhs)
10 0 Baseline real potential growth (lhs)
Baseline 10-yr avg. real growth (lhs)
-0.2
In percentage points of
8 Multiplier=0.5
Multiplier=1 -0.4 15
` Multiplier=1.5
In percent
6 -0.6
5
GDP
-0.8
4 -1 0
-1.2
2 Output gap (rhs)
-1.4
fiscal adjustment (rhs) 0 -15
0 -1.6
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028
Commentary: Realism analysis does not point to major concerns as past forecasts appear to be conservative and the
projections are well within norms. The primary deficit is projected to become the main driver of debt creation as the generally
tight fiscal policy in the past few years loosens.
Source : IMF Staff.

1/ Projections made in the October and April WEO vintage.
2/ Calculated as the percentile rank of the country's output gap revisions (defined as the difference between real time/period
ahead estimates and final estimates in the latest October WEO) in the total distribution of revisions across the data sample.
3/ The Laubach (2009) rule is a linear rule assuming bond spreads increase by about 4 bps in response to a 1 ppt increase
in the projected debt-to-GDP ratio.

VIETNAM
Figure 6. Vietnam: Medium-Term Risk Assessment

Value Contrib 1/ Percentile in peer group 2/
Final fanchart (pct of GDP) Debt fanchart module

80 5-25 pct Fanchart width 32.1 0.5
25-50 pct
(percent of GDP)
50-75 pct
60 75-95 pct Probability of debt non- 32.1 0.3
Actual
stabilizaiton (percent)
40 Terminal debt-to-GDP x 18.0 0.4
institutions index
20 0 25 50 75 100
0 Debt fanchart index (DFI) 1.1

2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028
Risk signal: 3/ Low
Gross financing needs (pct of GDP) Gross financing needs (GFN) module
8 Financing provided by banks Average baseline GFN 3.5 1.2
Actual (percent of GDP)
6 Baseline
Banks' claims on the gen 5.7 1.8
Stress scenario
govt (pct bank assets)
4 Chg. In banks' claims in 0.7 0.2
stress (pct banks' assets)
2 0 25 50 75 100
0 GFN financeability index (GFI) 3.3

2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 4/
Risk signal: Low
Banking crisis Commodity prices Exchange rate Contingent liab. Natural disaster
Medium-term index (index number) Medium-term risk analysis
0.50 Value Weight Contribution
0.40 Debt fanchart index (normalized) 0.3 0.5 0.1
0.30 GFN finaceability index (normalized) 0.1 0.5 0.0
0.20 Medium-term index 0.2
0.10 Risk signal: 5/ Low
0.00 Final assessment: Low
20202021 2022 2023
Medium-term index
Low risk Prob. of missed crisis, 2023-2028, if stress not predicted: 0.0 pct.
High risk Prob. of false alarms, 2023-2028, if stress predicted: 65.9 pct.
According to the debt fanchart and GFN modules, debt remains stable in the medium term and the gross financing needs remains low.
The medium-term index point to low risk. The stress scenario for FX depreciation does not change these results as FX debt is relatively
small.
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections.
1/ See Annex IV of IMF, 2022, Staff Guidance Note on the Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework for details on index
calculation.
2/ The comparison group is emerging markets, non-commodity exporter, surveillance.
3/ The signal is low risk if the DFI is below 1.13; high risk if the DFI is above 2.08; and otherwise, it is moderate risk.
4/ The signal is low risk if the GFI is below 7.6; high risk if the DFI is above 17.9; and otherwise, it is moderate risk.
5/ The signal is low risk if the GFI is below 0.26; high risk if the DFI is above 0.40; and otherwise, it is moderate risk.

VIETNAM
Figure 7. Vietnam: Long-Term Risk Analysis

Large Amortization Trigger
Risk
Projection Variable
Indication
GFN-to-GDP ratio 0.00

Medium-term
Amortization-to-GDP ratio 0.00
extrapolation
Amortization 1.00
Medium-term GFN-to-GDP ratio 0.00

extrapolation with Amortization-to-GDP ratio 0.00
debt stabilizing
Amortization 1.00
primary balance
GFN-to-GDP ratio 0.00

Historical average
Amortization-to-GDP ratio 0.00
assumptions
Amortization 1.00
Overall Risk Indication 0
Alternative Baseline Long-term Projections
GFN-to-GDP ratio Total public debt-to-GDP ratio
8.0 50
7.0 45
40
6.0
35
5.0 30
4.0 25
3.0 20
15
2.0
10
1.0 5
0.0 0
Projection Long run projection Projection Long run projection

Baseline with t+5 Baseline with t+5 and DSPB* Baseline with t+5 Baseline with t+5 and DSPB*
Historical 10-year average * DSPB: Debt Stabilizing Primary Balance.
Historical 10-year average * DSPB: Debt Stabilizing Primary Balance.
Commentary: Long-term debt is broadly stable and remain relatively low under alternative assumptions. The "Historical 10-year average" and "t+5 and DSPB" scenarios
show somewhat higher financing needs.

VIETNAM
Figure 7. Vietnam: Long-Term Risk Analysis (Continued)

Demographics: Pension
Permanent adjustment
To keep pension assets positive for:
needed in the pension
system 30 years 50 years Until 2100
(pp of GDP per year) 3.74% 7.70% 10.73%
Pension Financing Needs Total benefits paid
16% 20.0%
14% 18.0%
16.0%
12%
14.0%
10% 12.0%
8% 10.0%
6% 8.0%
6.0%
4%
4.0%
2% 2.0%
0% 0.0%
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
2053
2056
2059
2062
2065
2068
2071
2074
2077
2080
2083
2086
2089
2092
2095
2098
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
2053
2056
2059
2062
2065
2068
2071
2074
2077
2080
2083
2086
2089
2092
2095
2098
Pension financing needs Total benefits paid (per cent of GDP)
16.0 100
14.0 90
80
12.0
70
10.0 60
8.0 50
6.0 40
30
4.0
20
2.0 10
0.0 0
Baseline: Extension of fifth projection year With pension cost increase Baseline: Extension of fifth projection year With pension cost increase
Commentary: Population aging is expected to increase pension cost significantly after 2035 in the absence of reforms. The government is aware of the pressure from
population aging and is expected to implement pension reforms and revenue mobilization to meet the challenge.
Demographics: Health
8.0 50
7.0 45
40
6.0
35
5.0 30
4.0 25
3.0 20
15
2.0
10
1.0 5
0.0 0
Baseline: Extension of fifth projection year Baseline: Extension of fifth projection year
Health (Demographics) Health (Demographics)
Health (Demographics + ECG*) * ECG: Excess Cost Growth of Health. Health (Demographics + ECG*) * ECG: Excess Cost Growth of Health.
Commentary: In the long term, the health spending need is rising. It could be managed if the government devotes enough gains from its efforts to mobilize tax
revenues to health spending and implement structural reforms to improve spending efficiency.

VIETNAM
Figure 7. Vietnam: Long-Term Risk Analysis (Concluded)

Climate Change: Adaptation
8.0 50
7.0 45
40
6.0
35
5.0 30
4.0 25
3.0 20
15
2.0
10
1.0 5
0.0 0
With climate adaptation (standardized scenario) With climate adaptation (standardized scenario)
With climate adaptation (customized scenario) With climate adaptation (customized scenario)
Commentary: Investments to address climate adaptation will increase the long-term financing need. However, the government's planned ETS is expected to generate
significant revenues which could be used to finance climate adaptation. The government is also committed to prioritizing investment toward climate adaptation.
Climate Change: Mitigation
14.0 90
12.0 80
70
10.0
60
8.0 50
6.0 40
30
4.0
20
2.0 10
0.0 0
With climate mitigation (standardized scenario) With climate mitigation (standardized scenario)
With climate mitigation (customized scenario) With climate mitigation (customized scenario)
Commentary: In the absence of measures, the mitigation spending need is high in the standardized scenario. However, the government's planned ETS will operate
starting 2028 which will help reduce the spending need and generate significant revenues which could be used on shifting toward renewable energy.
Natural Resources
8.0 50
7.0 45
40
6.0
35
5.0 30
4.0 25
3.0 20
15
2.0
10
1.0 5
0.0 0
Baseline: Extension of fifth projection year Natural Resources Baseline: Extension of fifth projection year Natural Resources
Commentary: Vietnam is an oil producer. In the absence of new discoveries, the exhaustion of the oil reserves in the long run would have negative impacts on the GFN
and public debt, but as the natural resource sector constituted less than 3 percent of GDP in 2022, the sector’s influence on public debt is small.
•

VIETNAM
Annex X. Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk Likelihood of Risk Time Impact if realized Policy Response
Horizon
External Risks
High ST, MT High
Intensification Downside: Escalation of Higher commodity • Provide targeted policy support.
of regional the war in Ukraine or other prices, extended supply • Allow greater exchange rate
conflict(s). regional conflicts and chain disruptions, flexibility.
resulting economic tighter financial • Accelerate structural reforms and
sanctions disrupt trade conditions, lower improve business environment.
(e.g., energy, food, tourism, global demand, and • Diversify sourcing of intermediate
and/or critical supply chain less trade. goods.
components), remittances,
refugee flows, FDI and
financial flows, and
payment systems.
Medium ST High • Provide targeted policy support.
Abrupt global Downside: Global and Lower exports, tourism, • Allow greater exchange rate
slowdown or idiosyncratic risk factors and FDI. flexibility.
recession. combine to cause a • Facilitate reallocation of resources
synchronized sharp growth through structural reforms.
downturn, with recessions • Diversify sourcing of intermediate
in some countries, adverse goods.
spillovers through trade
and financial channels, and
markets fragmentation.
High ST/MT Medium
Deepening geo- Downside/upside: Broader Supply disruptions and • Allow greater exchange rate
economic and deeper conflict(s) and weaker confidence flexibility.
fragmentation. weakened international adversely affect • Accelerate structural reforms and
cooperation lead to a more economic activity improve business environment
rapid reconfiguration of globally. However,
trade and FDI, supply Vietnam may continue
disruptions, technological benefiting from trade
and payments systems diversion.
fragmentation, rising input
costs, financial instability, a
fracturing of
international monetary and
financial systems, and lower
potential growth.
Medium ST, MT High/Medium • Allow greater exchange rate
Monetary policy Downside: Amid high Tighter global financial flexibility.
miscalibration. economic uncertainty and conditions, lower • Tighten monetary policy when
volatility, major central capital inflows; increase economic situation allows.
banks slow monetary policy inflationary pressure. • Agile and more targeted fiscal
tightening or pivot to policy
loosen monetary policy
stance prematurely, de-
anchoring inflation
expectations and triggering
a wage-price spiral in tight
labor markets.
Medium ST, MT Medium • Allow greater exchange rate
Systemic Downside: Sharp swings in Lower external demand flexibility.
financial real interest rates, risk and tighter global • Tighten monetary policy when
instability. premia, and assets repricing financial conditions. economic situation allows.
amid economic slowdowns • Closely monitor financial stability
and policy shifts trigger risks.
insolvencies in countries • Provide targeted policy support.
with weak banks or non-
bank financial institutions,
causing markets
dislocations and adverse
cross-border spillovers.

VIETNAM
Domestic Risks
High ST, MT Medium • Establish a crisis monitoring
Slowdown in Downside: A deepening of Reduced economic function to address short-term
credit to the the current ongoing real activity accompanied risks to financial stability.
economy. estate and corporate bond by tighter financial • Urgently modernize the bank
markets turmoil could conditions as credit resolution and the emergency
adversely affect banks, risks increase. liquidity frameworks
including some that could • Contagion from troubled real
become distressed. estate developers should be
prevented to avoid posing risks to
financial stability.
• Over time, strengthen bank
regulation, supervision and
resolution frameworks, establish a
well-functioning corporate bond
market and firm insolvency
framework.
Medium ST, MT Medium • Enhance policy coordination and
Slow and Downside: coordination Hampers labor reduce regulatory and other
inconsistent and capacity issues hamper reallocation and fuels barriers
policy implementation of the supply disruptions; • Clearly communicate harmonized
Implementation. stimulus and create policy weak stimulus policies and consistent application
uncertainties. implementation slows nationally.
recovery.
Medium ST, MT Medium • Target support to viable firms and
Debt overhang Downside: businesses and Slows recovery vulnerable households.
and liquidity households deplete buffers, threatens financial • Closely monitor asset quality,
constraints. propagating balance sheet stability. enhance provisioning, and rebuild
stress. capital buffers.
High ST, MT High • Address both climate mitigation
Climate change. Downside: Vietnam is By 2100, climate and adaptation.
amongst the most change could severely • Lower the intensity of fossil fuels
vulnerable yet least impact more than 12 • Provide stronger incentives
ready/able to adapt. percent of the through taxation of fossil fuels
population and reduce • Invest in climate resilient
growth by 10 percent. infrastructure.
• Improve capacity to adapt
technological change.
“L” =Low; “M” =Medium; “H” =High. The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the
scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff). The relative likelihood of risks listed is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks
surrounding the baseline (“low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and
“high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time
of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly

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VIETNAM

CONTEXT AND RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

2. Economic activity deteriorated sharply, however, starting in late 2022 due to

3. Liquidity distress in the FX and

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4. The turbulence in the real estate

5. Monetary policy has been nimble, adjusting to contain risks in a fast-changing

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Box 1. Real Estate Sector and Corporate Bond Market Turbulence

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OUTLOOK AND RISKS

is expected to accelerate and reach 140 10

4.7 percent for the whole year, assuming 120 5

that the real estate turbulence is contained,

gap, inflation is expected to remain below

the 4.5 percent target. The current account

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Box 2. Growth Risks from Financial Turbulence

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A. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

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15. Fiscal policy is expected to become expansionary in 2023-24 to boost domestic

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Composition of Tax Revenues, 2000-22 Tax Revenues in Asia, 2000-22

20. The authorities reiterated their objective of maintaining macroeconomic stability

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3 See “Systemic Banking Crises Revisited,” IMF WP/18/206.

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Box 3. Improving Vietnam’s Crisis Preparedness

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D. Protecting Financial Stability

26. The stress in 2022 highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation on

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30. Non-cash payments in Vietnam are rising rapidly, necessitating an improvement in

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E. Climate and Structural Policies

34. The planned ETS could be a cost-effective method of achieving emissions

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44. The external sector position is assessed to be stronger than warranted by

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