AIR POWER

METAMORPHOSIS
RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT
FORCE MODERNIZATION

CHRISTOPHER J. BOWIE
AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS
RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT
FORCE MODERNIZATION

CHRISTOPHER J. BOWIE

2023
ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA)
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy
research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security
strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and
emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed
decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation.

©2023 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Christopher J. Bowie is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments. Trained as a historian, Dr. Bowie earned his B.A. magna cum laude at the University
of Minnesota and his doctorate from Oxford University. Over the past four decades, he worked at
the RAND Corporation as a senior analyst on air power issues, the Air Force (on the Secretary of
the Air Force’s staff group and as a member of the Senior Executive Service developing Air Force
strategic planning), and at Northrop Grumman Corporation (where he served as Director of the
Corporate Analysis Center). He retired in early 2021 to pursue independent writing, travel, reading,
and his hobby of building model cars and aircraft.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank fellow CSBA staff members Dr. Tom Mahnken, Dr. Evan Montgomery, Dr. Carl
Rehberg, and Dr. Christopher Bassler for their valuable critiques, comments, and feedback on
earlier drafts of this paper. Much appreciation as well to Joseph Ross and James Mersol, who
shepherded this paper through the publication process. The analysis and findings presented here
are solely the responsibility of the authors. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group
of contributors, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete
list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors.

Cover Graphic: The U.S. Air Force unveils the B-21 Raider at a ceremony in Palmdale, Calif., Dec. 2,
2022. Photo by Chad McNeely, Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs.
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
CHAPTER 1: CHALLENGES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC DRIVE THE NEED FOR CHANGE. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USAF Fighter-Bomber Ratios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHAPTER 2: RADICAL CHANGES IN USAF FORCE STRUCTURE: 1955–1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHAPTER 3: A MULTI-ROLE B-21 CONCEPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CHAPTER 4: A POTENTIAL PATH FORWARD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
APPENDIX A: POTENTIAL FORCE STRUCTURE EVOLUTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
APPENDIX B: O&S COST ESTIMATES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
APPENDIX C: RANGE-PAYLOAD CALCULATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
LIST OF ACRONYMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

FIGURES
FIGURE 1: EXPANDING REACH OF CHINESE OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
FIGURE 2: AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FIGURE 3: USAF FIGHTER AND BOMBER FORCE LEVELS AND RATIO (1950-2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FIGURE 4: CHANGES IN USAF FORCE STRUCTURE: 1955–1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FIGURE 5: POTENTIAL USAF FORCE STRUCTURE SHIFTS: 2023–2038. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FIGURE 6: FORCE EVOLUTION: FY23–FY38. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

TABLES
TABLE 1: FORCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
TABLE 2: FORCE STRUCTURE PROCUREMENT AND EVOLUTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
TABLE 3: TOTAL ANNUAL COST PER AIRCRAFT EQUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
TABLE 4: ESTIMATED ANNUAL O&S COSTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
TABLE 5: RANGE-PAYLOAD CALCULATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 www.csbaonline.org i

Executive Summary
This report aims to stimulate a discussion and debate over current Air Force modernization
plans for its combat force. Given the central role of air power in future joint operations and
the threats posed by our primary strategic competitor, a change in direction appears neces-
sary to maintain an effective deterrent and warfighting force. The suggestions outlined in
this study would yield a significantly different future combat force, one that appears better
suited to the nation’s geo-strategic needs while also offering significant operational, logis-
tical, and budgetary advantages.

Changes in the geo-strategic environment are driving the need to alter course. U.S. national
security strategy has identified China as the United States’ primary strategic competitor,
particularly after Russia’s disastrous incursion into Ukraine, which has shattered assump-
tions of the combat effectiveness of its conventional military. For the past three decades,
Chinese leadership has watched the United States project power in regional conflicts using
a highly successful concept of operations—land-based and carrier-based fighters to gain
control of the air, airlift and sealift to deploy ground forces, and fighters and bombers to
strike from the air in coordination with ground force thrusts. The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has responded with a set of anti-access/area denial capabilities aimed at disrupting
this approach. It is fielding a growing force of ballistic and cruise missiles combined with
medium bombers and naval combatants to strike American and allied forward airfields,
aircraft carriers, and surface ships. In addition, China is deploying advanced air defenses
to defend against U.S. air power and fielding advanced fighters equipped with long-range
missiles to attack our refueling and intelligence aircraft. This mix of capabilities threatens to
undermine U.S. power projection capabilities and deterrence in the Western Pacific.

Given the vast distances and limited basing options in the Pacific, the Air Force must
increase its long-range capabilities to enable operations from a wider array of bases located
at greater ranges from Chinese offensive systems. This study outlines a proposed reshaping
to increase long-range power projection capabilities in a “worst case” scenario; Air Force
budgets remain flat over the next 15 years and all force structure trades take place within
the Air Force. Increases in Air Force funding—either from larger defense budgets or an
ii CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

increase in the Air Force’s share of the budget—would support a wider range of options and
reduce risk.

The USAF faced a similar threat in the mid-1950s from the Soviet Union and, in response,
executed a significant restructuring of its force posture within a decade. To deter a Soviet
nuclear attack during a crisis, the USAF in the mid-1950s planned to deploy hundreds of
medium bombers to bases located on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Concern over the
vulnerability of this force to a disarming strike led the USAF to reshape its force posture
radically; the Air Force accelerated the procurement of heavy bombers, large aerial refueling
aircraft, and ballistic missiles while retiring medium bombers, smaller tankers, and signif-
icant portions of the fighter force. The reshaping, which took place over roughly a decade,
resulted in a 40% reduction in the size of the combat force, but provided significantly greater
range/payload capabilities, reduced vulnerability, and increased strategic stability.

China’s evolving threat to USAF forward bases in the Pacific poses a similar challenge and
the need to rethink the USAF’s combat force structure plans. The plans laid out in this
report seek to increase USAF long-range power projection capabilities by leveraging the
USAF’s newest aircraft, the B-21 stealth bomber. The core change is a proposed doubling
of B-21 production rates and plans for a larger B-21 force. The key characteristics of the
next-generation bomber—range, payload, stealth, and an open systems digital backbone—
could enable the B-21 to be potentially equipped with additional weapons and subsystems
to conduct a wider range of missions in the new security environment. The aircraft will
likely feature a large weapons bay or bays that can be fitted with a variety of payloads:
strike weapons, anti-ship missiles, long-range air-to-air missiles, directed energy cannons,
small unmanned aircraft, and Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR) and elec-
tronic warfare (EW) systems. Integration should be made easier using its open-architecture
avionics. A large fleet of multi-mission B-21s could offer long-range strike, anti-ship, air-
to-air, ISR, and EW capabilities to form a potent and formidable addition to the USAF’s
warfighting force.

To increase B-21 production rates and reduce unit costs, the Air Force has two options. It
could require the current prime contractor to ramp up production (higher production rates
should yield a reduction in unit price) or provide the design to a second contractor and open
a second assembly line. The latter option could utilize the power of competition to spur cost
reductions—each year, the two production lines would compete against each other for a
larger share of the buy. Such a policy has been used with smaller acquisition programs, but
not to date with modern combat aircraft.

Increasing B-21 production rates within static Air Force budget toplines, however, would
require some difficult force structure trades. This study proposes the retirement of most
of the non-stealthy legacy fighter force and reductions in the planned numbers of F-35s.
Production of USAF F-35s would end as B-21 deliveries ramped up. Force levels for the
F-22, the USAF’s most capable fighter, are maintained. The versatile but aging F-15Es are
replaced with the F-15X to provide forces for homeland air defense and operations against
 www.csbaonline.org iii

less sophisticated adversaries. Plans to field unmanned systems and a longer-range next-
generation fighter would also proceed. Based on historical experience, the new fighter will
not enter service until the late 2030s or early 2040s; the proposed force provides additional
long-range capabilities sooner. A multi-mission B-21 could operate with the new fighter and
unmanned systems using novel weapons and concepts of operations.

The proposed plan would result in the following force structure attributes roughly 15 years
(three Future Year Defense Plans or FYDPs) from now:

• Fighter-bomber ratios are a useful metric to illustrate what proportion of the force can
conduct long-range operations. The fighter-bomber ratio since the 1970s onward has
stayed at roughly 13 to one and has now increased to 15:1. Under current plans, these
ratios will stay roughly the same. In the postulated force structure, the fighter/bomber
ratio would shrink to 3:1—a ratio more in line with Air Force experience in the 1950s and
early 1960s and one better matched to the new strategic environment.

• Operating and sustainment (O&S) costs for the smaller proposed force would be
approximately 25% lower than the current force ($16.7B vs. $21.8B in $FY23). Logistical
efficiencies could also be gained as the force goes from nine different types of aircraft to
five. The O&S savings could be applied to procurement accounts.

• Although the new combat force is roughly two-thirds the size of today’s force, its overall
range-payload capability by the late 2030s will depend heavily on the unknown char-
acteristics of the B-21. Assuming modest B-21 capabilities, the overall range-payload
would be slightly lower than the current force, but significantly greater if the new aircraft
features capabilities similar to current bombers.

The proposed force significantly increases U.S. power projection and deterrent capabili-
ties. It poses a difficult defensive challenge for an adversary, which would need to deal with
multiple potential axes of attack as well as enhanced air-to-air and anti-ship capabilities. A
smaller fraction of our force would be forward-based and subject to attack.

That said, this plan is not without risk. The proposed force, though more capable, draws
down the legacy fighter forces and overall fighter force levels, resulting in a combat force
roughly two-thirds the size of today’s force. The United States could maintain its deterrent
posture in the Pacific theater by replacing legacy fighters in the Pacific theater with F-35s,
F-22s, and bombers, but the shift would need to be managed carefully. U.S. allies around
the world would need to assume more military responsibilities. An increase in the Air Force
budget, due to either an overall defense budget increase or an increase in the Air Force’s
share of the budget, could be used to slow the drawdown of the legacy fighter force and
extend F-35 production. Given the decline in Russian power and the importance of air and
naval power in the Western Pacific, there are strong arguments for adjusting Service budget
shares, but uncertainty surrounds prospects for success.
iv CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

The risks generated by this option must be weighed against the risks of not adjusting our
force posture. If the United States continues on its current course, it could end up with a
force ill-suited to the challenges posed by China. Air Force planners in the 1950s faced a
similar dilemma and took bold and decisive action. China has responded effectively after
observing our concepts of operations since the 1991 Gulf War. The United States should be
able to do the same starting now. At the very least, a debate over current plans and the future
of the USAF combat force is warranted.
 www.csbaonline.org 1

CHAPTER 1

Challenges in the Western

Pacific Drive the Need
for Change
With the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower. As
demonstrated in the Gulf War in 1991, Serbia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq from
2003 onward, no smaller power could defend itself against U.S. conventional military power.
The United States demonstrated a remarkably effective style of power projection—land-
based and carrier-based fighters to gain control of the air, airlift and sealift to deploy ground
forces, and fighters and bombers to strike from the air in coordination with ground forces.
Using this concept of operations in largely uncontested air environments, the United States
was able to achieve military objectives with minimal losses.

Over the past 30 years, U.S. adversaries have been watching—and adapting. U.S. national
security strategy identifies China as the United States’ most challenging strategic compet-
itor, particularly after Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine that severely damaged prewar
assumptions of the operational effectiveness of its conventional forces.1 China has developed
what the Pentagon calls anti-access, area denial capabilities—basically, a mix of capabilities
to prevent U.S. forces from being able to do to China what the United States did to enemy
forces over the past three decades. China is fielding ballistic and cruise missiles combined
with medium bombers and ships to strike forward airfields, aircraft carriers, and surface
ships. Figure 1, developed by the RAND Corporation, illustrates the expanding reach of
Chinese missile systems in the Western Pacific. In addition, China is deploying advanced air
defenses to defend against U.S. air power and advanced fighters equipped with long-range

1 The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington DC, October 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
2 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

missiles to attack U.S. refueling and intelligence aircraft. This mix of capabilities under-
mines U.S. power projection operations and deterrence in the Western Pacific.

FIGURE 1: EXPANDING REACH OF CHINESE OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER

Kaneda AFB Kaneda AFB

& 15 & 15
-11 -11
DF DF
Anderson AFB Anderson AFB
1996 2003

Kaneda AFB Kaneda AFB

H -10 0 ) -10 -10

)
15 &D H-1 15 DH DH
1 & 1 C (w
/D 1 & 1 C& ( w/
D F-1 D F-2 H-6 D F-1 D F-2 H-6
Anderson AFB Anderson AFB
2010 2017

Threat level: 10s of missiles 100s of missiles 1000s of missiles

Source: CSBA recreation of a graphic from David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military
Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation,
2018) p. 10.

The emerging military environment requires a significant shift in the U.S. approach to power
projection. No longer can the United States assume that it can quickly gain control of the
air and then impose its will on an adversary using the joint force. A detailed analysis by the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments concluded that fighters, even with refueling
support, must be based within 1,000 to 1,500 nm of enemy targets to conduct sustained
combat operations.2 Regional base access constraints have continued to grow since the end
of the Cold War, which could prevent the United States from basing short-range aircraft
close enough to project power. Potentially more problematic, however, is that technological
advances in precision-guided missiles and munitions may have increased the vulnerability
of forward bases and aircraft carriers.

During the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies conducted an extensive air
base survivability program in Europe. The Western powers constructed hardened aircraft
and personnel shelters, fielded additional operating surfaces, procured rapid runway
repair equipment, developed additional airbases, and conducted multiple exercises to test

2 Christopher J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2002), pp. 11–14, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2002.09.24-Anti-Access-
Threat-Theater-Air-Bases.pdf.
 www.csbaonline.org 3

these capabilities. The threat to these bases consisted primarily of Soviet fighter-bombers
delivering sticks of unguided bombs (as well as a limited number of ballistic missiles).
Adversaries equipped with precision-guided weapons, however, raise questions over the
long-term viability of operating combat aircraft within the range of such weapons. Levels of
hardening in the western Pacific are much lower than in Europe during the Cold War—nor
are airbases available in similar numbers. Without shelters, aircraft are vulnerable to attack
by missiles fitted with cluster munitions. But even if the United States and its allies executed
an aggressive base resiliency program along the lines pursued in Europe, hardened shelters
cannot move and thus can be targeted and destroyed. U.S. forces demonstrated this very
effectively in operations against Iraq and Libya. Improving airbase resiliency would force
an adversary to expend more weapons to damage airbases, but it appears that U.S. combat
air operations are at risk of significant disruption. Chinese offensive forces may also pose a
significant threat to U.S. aircraft carriers, which may need to pull back to conduct operations
at reduced risk.

For the Air Force, the threat posed by China in the Western Pacific thus heightens the value
of longer-range systems that can operate from more distant locations. The air campaign
operations against Afghanistan in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks serve as a useful illustration.
The United States possessed no significant bases in Afghanistan or neighboring nations.
Accordingly, both land-based and carrier-based aircraft were forced to transit long distances
to reach target areas. As highlighted in Figure 2, USAF fighters flew from bases in the Gulf,
naval aircraft from carriers outside the Persian Gulf, and bombers from CONUS and Diego
Garcia. The long-range aircraft, although comprising a small percentage of the overall force,
delivered about 2/3rds of the total ordnance.3 The advent of all-weather precision-guided
weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) enabled planners to take advan-
tage of the bomber’s large payload (a capability first demonstrated in combat with B-2
strikes against Serbia in 1999).

3 See William Arkin, “Weapons Total from Afghanistan Includes Large Amount of Cannon Fire,” Defense Daily 213, No.
42, March 5, 2002, for munition totals. The total number of bombers includes 8 B-1Bs and 10 B-52Hs. Two B-2s were
only used for the initial strikes. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-ops-air.htm. The
exact number of fighters deployed for OEF is uncertain; a RAND report by Ben Lambeth suggests there were upwards
of 175 to 275 combat and combat support aircraft deployed for the opening months of OEF. Benjamin Lambeth, Air
Power Against Terror (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2006), p. 65. Based on these sources, I calculate that
the 18 bombers represented roughly 11% of the combat strike force.
4
Figure 2
CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

FIGURE 2: AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN

Combat
aircraft (~200)
11%
Bombers

1,400 nm 89%
USAF/USN
Fighters
900 nm

Carriers
Munitions
Delivered
~17,500
34%
USAF/USN
Fighters

Diego Garcia 66%

Bombers
61% are
2,400 nm precision
guided

Source: Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror (Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 2006) p. 65 and William Arkin, “Weapons Total
from Afghanistan Includes Large Amount of Cannon Fire,” Defense Daily 213, No. 42, March 5, 2002.

Operations in the Pacific theater are likely to feature similar characteristics. Nearby bases
may be unavailable for political reasons or because of adversary strikes, thus forcing land-
based aircraft to operate from very long ranges. Carrier aircraft may also be forced to
operate at extended ranges due to threats against the carrier itself. Accordingly, long-range
aircraft will become the primary means to project power. Unlike Afghanistan, however,
U.S. forces will also have to deal with formidable defenses, such as advanced surface-to-air
missiles and modern fighters, which will place a premium on survivable aircraft.

The overall thrust is that the Air Force needs to increase the number of survivable, long-
range air power forces so that it can operate from more bases at reduced risk from Chinese
offensive systems. The longer the distance, the greater the number of potential bases from
which to operate. In addition, operating from longer ranges reduces the number of missiles
that can threaten bases. To travel over longer ranges, missiles must be larger and thus more
expensive, resulting in smaller inventories. In addition, the missile would be subject to more
defensive “shot opportunities” during its flight.

USAF Fighter-Bomber Ratios

The USAF currently fields a fighter-centric force structure. Although the strategic envi-
ronment increases the value of long-range systems, it appears little will change under
current plans. Figure 3 provides an overview of USAF fighter and bomber force levels from
1950-2016. The solid line shows the ratio of fighters to bombers over this same period—a
useful metric to illustrate what proportion of the force can conduct long-range operations.
 www.csbaonline.org 5

Fighter-bomber ratios on the order of 3:1 characterized the force structure until the mid-
1960s. 4 The increasing emphasis in subsequent decades on shorter-range fighters made
strategic sense given the pressures of the Vietnam War, where a large number of bases
within fighter range were available for operations. As strategy in the 1970s and 1980s
focused on deterring Soviet aggression against Western Europe, the relatively short
distances and plentiful basing options in this theater led to increased investment in fighter
forces. Tactical aircraft also featured higher survivability compared to the bombers of the
period, and extensive base hardening reduced threats to theater bases.

As a result, the ratio of fighters to bombers began to increase steadily starting in the mid-
1960s to reach a ratio of 10-14 fighters per bomber by the mid-1980s. These ratios have been
roughly maintained through the present day even as overall force levels drew down. The

Figure 3
current ratio is over fifteen fighters per bomber, illustrating a continued emphasis on short-
range forces.5

FIGURE 3: USAF FIGHTER AND BOMBER FORCE LEVELS AND RATIO (1950-2016)

14,000 16

14
12,000

12
10,000

Fighter/Bomber Ratio
Number of Aircraft

10
8,000

6,000
6

4,000
4

2,000
2

0 0
FY50 FY60 FY70 FY80 FY90 FY00 FY10

Bombers Fighters Fighter/Bomber Ratio

Source: Data drawn from James Ruehrmund and Christopher Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory 1950-2016 (Arlington:
Mitchell Aerospace Institute, 2018).

Uncertainty surrounds force structure estimates a decade or more into the future, but the
following provides a rough perspective. The USAF plans to replace its 1,666 non-stealthy
legacy fighters (A-10, F-15C/D, F-15E, and F-16) with 1,763 F-35s and some number of

4 Data drawn from James Ruehrmund and Christopher Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory
1950–2016 (Arlington: Mitchell Aerospace Institute, 2018), https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/arsenal-of-
airpower-usaf-aircraft-inventory-1950-2016/.

5 Based on the 2022 Almanac edition of Air Force Magazine, the USAF fields 141 bombers and 2,153 fighters.
6 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

F-15EXs.6 For other elements of the fighter force, it plans to maintain a reduced number of
F-22s and develop a new air superiority fighter and unmanned systems. Based on F-22 and
F-35 development timelines, the new fighter will not enter service until the late 2030s or
early 2040s.7 For the bomber force, current plans are to re-engine 76 B-52s and retire 45
aging B-1Bs and 20 B-2s, replacing them with 100 B-21s. Accordingly, fighter/bomber ratios
are likely to remain similar to current ratios well into the 2030s and beyond.

Based on the requirements of the future security environment, the USAF should consider
a more significant shift in the ratio between short-range and long-range systems. The Air
Force needs to field more long-range bombers, which appear to offer significantly greater
utility and reduced basing vulnerability compared to short-range fighters. In essence, USAF
fighter-bomber force ratios should consider moving back toward the ratios seen in the 1950s
and 1960s so that a greater proportion of the force can operate from more bases at reduced
risk while still delivering a powerful offensive punch.

Is such a force structure metamorphosis possible? Air Force history would answer in the
affirmative. In the mid-1950s, facing similar concerns over the vulnerability of its theater-
based combat forces, the Air Force executed a radical restructuring of its force structure
within a decade.

6 1,763 F-35s is the official planned acquisition, but whether this total number will be acquired remains uncertain.

7 F-22 development began in 1981. The first combat ready aircraft was delivered to Langley Air Force Base in 2005—24
years after the start of development. The F-35 entered development in 1993 and entered service in 2015—22 years
after the start of development.
 www.csbaonline.org 7

CHAPTER 2

Radical Changes in USAF

Force Structure: 1955–1965
After World War II, the advent of nuclear weapons drove U.S. planners to focus on deterring
nuclear conflict. In a crisis, the Air Force planned to deploy hundreds of medium bombers
to overseas bases around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. In this concept of operations,
the aircraft would be refueled, armed with nuclear weapons, and placed on alert. Thousands
of air defense fighter aircraft in North America and in other theaters, combined with Army
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, would provide defense against Soviet bombers.8

A ground-breaking study by the RAND Corporation in the mid-1950s revealed that the plan
unfortunately threatened to undermine the stability of the nuclear balance by increasing the
incentives for the Soviets to launch a disarming first strike. The forward bases were vulner-
able to a knockout blow by the adversary—in fact, the Air Force was making it easier for
Soviet forces to strike at these locations by moving the aircraft within range of more Soviet
strike assets.9 In some ways, the vulnerability of forward-based assets was similar to the
position the United States now faces in the Western Pacific. In addition, the launch of the
Sputnik satellite in 1957 showed that the Soviets would soon be fielding Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which U.S. forces could not defend against. In short, these devel-
opments undermined U.S. deterrent capabilities and the stability of the nuclear balance.

The realization of U.S. vulnerability led in turn to radical changes in the USAF force struc-
ture within a decade.10

8 Christopher J. Bright, Continental Defense in the Eisenhower Era: Nuclear Antiaircraft Arms and the Cold War
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

9 For an analysis of the R-266 RAND study led by Albert Wohlstetter, see Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 97–110.

10 Changes in force structure drawn from Ruehrmund and Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower.
8 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

• The USAF decided to emphasize heavy bombers bedded down on a large number of
bases in the Continental United States or CONUS to maximize the distance from the
Soviet Union (and thus gain increased warning times from ballistic missiles). One-third
was placed on alert status to minimize vulnerability to a “bolt from the blue” and
enhance strategic stability.

• B-52 heavy bomber production was ramped up to increase intercontinental strike capa-
bility. From 1955 to 1965, the heavy bomber force almost tripled in size, going from 191
aircraft to 702, all of which were B-52s.

• The heavy bombers required refueling support to reach many targets when operating
from the CONUS. The medium tanker force, consisting of propeller-driven aircraft, was
cut by over 70% (from 745 to 205) and replaced by the new KC-135 jet tanker, which
numbered 785 strong in 1965 and offered roughly double the fuel offload of medium
tankers like the KC-97.

• The medium bomber force (primarily B-47s) was cut by 2/3rds, declining from 1,520
aircraft to 542. As highlighted by the RAND analysis, placing large numbers of aircraft
close to Soviet striking power was viewed as a strategic error.

• A crash program to develop and deploy ICBMs resulted in the USAF going from no
ICBMs in 1955 to over 800 ten years later—most of which were Minuteman solid-fuel
missiles housed in hardened silos in the CONUS. The ICBM force posed a nearly insur-
mountable obstacle to deter the Soviet Union from launching a disarming first strike.

• The fighter force (primarily those providing CONUS air defense) was cut in half, going
from 7,509 in 1955 to 3,880 in 1965. In essence, this meant retiring over five wings each
year--360 fighters per year on average from 1955 to 1965.

Figure 4 provides an overview of the changes, which decreased combat force levels by 40
percent, but reshaped the USAF force structure for the capabilities needed in the new stra-
tegic environment.
Figure 4 www.csbaonline.org 9

FIGURE 4: CHANGES IN USAF FORCE STRUCTURE: 1955–1965

12000

10000
Number of Aircraft

8000
Fighters
Jet Tankers
6000 Propeller Tankers
ICBMs
Medium Bomber
4000
Heavy Bomber

2000

0
1955 1965

Source: Data drawn from James Ruehrmund and Christopher Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory 1950–2016 (Arlington:
Mitchell Aerospace Institute, 2018).
10 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION
 www.csbaonline.org 11

CHAPTER 3

A Multi-Role B-21 Concept

The only system currently available to increase USAF long-range combat capabilities is
the B-21, which is beginning testing and production. The new jet is planned to provide
conventional strike capabilities and form the backbone of the nuclear Triad’s penetrating air-
breathing leg.11 One hundred B-21s are planned at a production rate of roughly 15 per year.12
The core change recommended here would be a doubling of B-21 production rates and an
increase in the planned number of new bombers. Future B-21 force-level goals will depend
on the success of proposals outlined below that leverage its potential to conduct a wider
range of missions. The key characteristics of the new generation bomber—range, payload,
stealth, and an open systems digital backbone—could enable the B-21 to be potentially
equipped with additional weapons and subsystems to conduct a wider range of missions in
the new security environment.13

To increase B-21 production rates and reduce unit costs, the Air Force has two options. It
could require the current prime contractor to ramp up production (higher production rates
should yield a reduction in unit price) or provide the design to a second contractor and open

11 The air-breathing leg of the nuclear Triad (joining land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs) helps enhance the stability of the nuclear balance. The high
survivability of bombers promises an aggressor than at attack would be met with devastating retaliation, while its
relatively slow speed compared to ballistic missiles means it does not pose a credible first strike threat. Because the
force can be generated, dispersed, and launched under positive control, the bomber, unlike the other legs, provides
the nation’s leaders with a highly flexible means of sending unmistakable messages to an adversary to stabilize crises.
Survivable penetrating bombers offer important advantages on in the nuclear role, such as the crew’s capability
to assess whether sites have useful targets present and whether high priority locations targeted by more than one
weapon require a follow-up attack.

12 Current plans are to procure approximately 15 B-21s per year. John A. Tirpak, “The Raider Takes Shape,” Air and
Space Forces Magazine, December 1, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-raider-takes-shape/.

13 Brian Wang, “B-21 Stealth Bomber Will Be Built for Easily Upgradable Software and Hardware,” Nextbigfuture,
https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/04/b21-stealth-bomber-will-be-built-for-easily-upgradable-software-
and-hardware.html; J.J. Gertler, Air Force B-21 Raider Long Range Strike Bomber, R344463 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, September 2021), p.6.
12 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

a second assembly line. For the latter option, cost reductions could be spurred by competing
the two production lines against each other yearly—whichever company made the best offer
would receive a larger share of the annual production, thus maintaining continuous compe-
tition during the life of the procurement cycle.14 Competition in the production phase has
been used successfully in fourteen missile programs, the Tomahawk cruise missile, and the
F-15/F-16 engine procurement to improve performance and reduce cost.15 That said, such an
approach has not been used to date with a modern combat aircraft.

For conventional strike operations, the B-21 offers many advantages to support U.S. power
projection operations in the emerging security environment. The aircraft’s long range
enables it to operate from more bases at a reduced risk from enemy strike systems, hold the
full range of adversary targets at risk, and threaten multiple penetration axes to complicate
an adversary’s defensive challenges. When facing the lethal air defenses of the future, its
stealth characteristics minimize the chances of an adversary detecting and engaging. Stealth
also allows the aircraft to get closer to enemy targets without detection and thus employ less
expensive, shorter-range precision weapons to strike more targets per sortie.

But technological advances offer the potential for the B-21 platform to do even more. An
innovative analysis of air-to-air combat by Dr. John Stillion indicates that the lethality of
air-to-air missiles means the Air Force should explore new concepts in its approach to air
superiority.16 Fighters have traditionally offered the advantages of speed and maneuver-
ability to gain the upper hand in air combat. But advanced long-range missiles, which have
greatly increased in capability, have emerged as the dominant kill system in modern air
engagements. Speed and maneuverability have limited utility when evading modern missiles
and generate a cost in terms of airframe weight, radar signature, and range. Stillion’s anal-
ysis notes that the advantage of speed has declined significantly due to the advent of infrared
search and track (IRST) sensors; even stealthy supersonic aircraft at high speed generate a
significant heat signature. Stillion concludes that trends in air-to-air combat indicate that
the Air Force should consider a larger, sub-sonic aircraft as part of its future air superiority
force. Such a vehicle could be equipped with larger sensors to locate low-observable adver-
saries at longer range—and carry larger, long-range missiles to kill those adversaries before
they can engage. The combination of such an aircraft working in coordination with air supe-
riority fighters offers many intriguing operational possibilities.

14 During the tanker competition between Boeing and EADS in 2009-10, some analysts suggested the Air Force procure
both aircraft. Each year, the Air Force could launch a competition between the two companies—whichever company
made the best offer would get a larger share of the annual buy. For the B-21 program, another possibility would be for
one company to focus on fielding the strike version while the second company developed the multi-role variant.

15 For analysis of such competitions, see Jacques Gansler, William Lucyshyn, and Michael Arendt, Competition in
Defense Acquisitions (College Park, MD: Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 2009), https://dair.nps.edu/
handle/123456789/2429. This analysis indicates that the additional costs of establishing a second production line are
outweighed by the reduction in costs spurred by competition.

16 John Stillion, Trends in Air-to-Air Combat: Implications for Future Air Superiority (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015).
 www.csbaonline.org 13

Indeed, factoring in the demands of future strike capabilities and Stillion’s analysis of future
air-to-air operations, it appears a myriad of technologies has come together to field a single
platform that can be configured to conduct a wide variety of missions. The Air Force has
revealed almost nothing about the B-21 aircraft, so the following observations must neces-
sarily be speculative. The B-21 was designed from the outset with an open-architecture
digital backbone, which increases the speed at which new capabilities can be incorporated.
Since it is designed as a bomber (and official depictions show a platform similar to the B-2),
the aircraft will likely feature a large weapons bay or bays that could be fitted with a variety
of payloads: strike weapons, anti-ship missiles, air-to-air missiles, directed energy cannon,
small unmanned aircraft, and Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR) systems.17 In
addition to its long-range and small signature, the B-21 will likely be equipped with a new
generation of multi-function sensors (similar to those currently deployed on the F-22, F-35,
and upgraded F-16s and F-15s). If fitted with the appropriate software, these apertures can
provide radar detection and targeting, electronic jamming, signals intelligence (SIGINT),
and communications.18

Accordingly, it is possible to envision a B-21 fleet capable of conducting the following missions:

Strike: The aircraft’s current primary role. The B-21 will be able to carry a mix of direct
attack precision munitions (thus enabling striking a large number of aimpoints per sortie),
medium-range stand-off weapons (to further increase the aircraft’s engagement swath when
penetrating or dealing with heavy defenses), and nuclear weapons (to maintain the pene-
trating air-breathing leg of the nuclear Triad). As was done with B-52s in previous years,
B-21s could also be equipped with anti-ship missiles to augment naval strike capability,
something that will no doubt be in great demand during conflicts in the western Pacific.

Air-to-air: A bomber’s inherent range and endurance also offer significant advantages in
sustaining combat air patrols efficiently. As suggested by Stillion, a B-21’s large payload bay
or bays could be fitted with long-range air-to-air missiles to “out-stick” U.S. adversaries. The
Chinese, for example, are developing the PL-15 air-to-air missile with a range estimated at
around 200 nm. The smaller size of F-22 and F-35 weapon bays forces the use of smaller
missiles, which do not feature the kinetic energy and range offered by larger missiles. For
example, the Navy’s ship-launched SM-6 comprises ten times the mass of an advanced
medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM); a variant of such a missile launched from a
B-21’s bay could reach out significantly farther than the AMRAAM or even the PL-15.

The Air Force would need to conduct detailed combat simulations of stealthy bombers
equipped with long-range missiles to determine the true potential and flesh out operational
concepts for this mission. For example, a mix of F-35s and F-22s backed by B-21s carrying

17 Gertler, Air Force B-21 Raider Long Range Strike Bomber, p.4.

18 “Need Insight Into the Whole Electromagnetic Spectrum? Multifunction Sensors Deliver,” Northrop Grumman,
https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/multifunction-sensors-see-across-electromagnetic-spectrum/
14 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

longer-range missiles could offer a formidable air defense capability. The fighters could
provide targeting information to the B-21’s long-range weapons and then kill any remaining
stragglers. Additional possibilities could be developed to harness the potential of unmanned
aircraft and the new sixth-generation fighter as that system takes shape. A wide range of
potential operational concepts using such a mix of capabilities should be explored.

The B-21’s weapons bay or bays and electrical power could potentially enable it to carry a
laser cannon should this technology bear fruit in the next decade or so.19 Laser armaments
would potentially enable a B-21 to shoot down missiles shot at the bomber for self-defense
and potentially pose a serious air-to-air threat to enemy fighters. Larger aircraft like the
B-21 would be able to carry more powerful directed energy weapons than fighters due to
larger internal volume and greater electrical power, thus gaining and maintaining a long-
term advantage.

Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR): The B-21’s multi-function aper-

tures could provide significant ISR capabilities. The aircraft could sense using the radar
mode and/or listen to electronic signals in a passive mode. That said, should larger,
more specialized devices (such as electro-optical cameras or more advanced SIGINT
capabilities) be needed, these could potentially be housed in a weapons bay with the
appropriate apertures.

Electronic warfare (EW): The B-21’s multi-function apertures could potentially be used
for electronic combat (though it must be recognized that emissions would help an adver-
sary locate the aircraft). Again, size matters. A larger aircraft with larger apertures and more
electrical power has more potential capability than a smaller aircraft. Large EW payloads
could also be carried in a weapons bay to enable more powerful electronic warfare support
if needed.

Other missions: The B-21’s weapons bay could be filled with smaller unmanned systems
to engage adversary fighters, confuse defenses, conduct ISR, and execute other missions.
Being able to launch small unmanned systems at long range would help address the problem
of basing for small UAVs with limited range.

A large fleet of B-21s would be a potent and formidable addition to the USAF’s warfighting
force. A multi-mission B-21 could offer long-range penetrating strike, anti-ship, air-to-air,
ISR, and EW capabilities. The aircraft’s long range significantly increases the number of
potential basing options, reducing the need to operate from vulnerable, close-in bases. It
could also require less refueling support would be needed compared to fighters, so there
might be operational efficiencies there as well.

19 The Air Force is currently developing a laser weapon for fighter aircraft under the Self-Protect High Energy Laser
Demonstration program. See Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force delays timeline for testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense
News, June 30, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-
laser-on-a-fighter-jet/.
 www.csbaonline.org 15

CHAPTER 4

A Potential Path Forward

Increasing B-21 production rates and the planned buy, however, will require some difficult
force trades. To illustrate the issue, this study assumes a “worst case” scenario where Air
Force budgets remain flat over the next 15 years (three Future Year Defense Plans or FYDPs)
and that all force structure trades occur within the Air Force. Increases in the defense
budget or successful Air Force efforts to gain a large share of the defense spending would
obviously enable more flexibility and less drastic reductions.

The recommended policy in military and business affairs when retiring capabilities is to
execute the drawdown as quickly as possible to avoid expending resources on capabilities
slated for retirement and invest instead in the future.20 This study accordingly retires almost
all the non-stealthy legacy fighter force (F-16s, F-15Cs, and A-10s) over the next five years
to free up operations and sustainment (O&S) dollars. These legacy forces consume approxi-
mately $10B (FY23) per year in O&S, which could be shifted into the procurement of other
systems.21 As older fighters in the Pacific are drawn down, in-theater force levels could be
maintained with F-35s, F-22s, and bombers to bolster deterrence. U.S. allies in other parts
of the world would need to assume more military responsibilities. The legacy fighter draw-
down could be slowed if concerns over the signal this could send to adversaries outweigh
budgetary pressures.

Current plans are for the Air Force to acquire 1,763 F-35 fighters over the next two decades.
In this proposed plan, the Air Force would increase F-35 procurement rates to 100 per year
through 2028, then stop as production of the B-21 ramps up. These rates would yield a force
of over 800 F-35s. Production for the Navy, Marines, and allies would keep the line open,
though at a reduced rate, should additional production be needed.

20 For an analysis of this issue, see Paul Hill, Tom Glennan, and Susan Bodilly, Obstacles to the Termination of Air Force
Activities, R-3033-AF (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1986).

21 See Appendix B for details on force sustainment cost calculations.

16 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

The proposed force structure retains the flexible and relatively long-range F-15Es, which,
as these aircraft age out, are replaced with the newly developed F-15EX, which features
significant upgrades in sensors and electronic systems. The F-15E/EXs could support conti-
nental air defense operations and combat operations against less sophisticated powers.
The proposed force also retains the current force of F-22s and continues development of a
new long-range air superiority aircraft to maintain sixth-generation fighter options for the
future. Given historical experience, the new fighter would not become available until the
late 2030s or early 2040s. The potential of the B-21 to support air superiority missions thus
could become more valuable. The proposed force structure also continues development of
unmanned systems as they mature.

In terms of bombers, the proposed force structure retains re-engined B-52s, which can
deliver a heavy stand-off punch, and sufficient quantities of stand-off weapons. It also envi-
sions retiring B-2s as B-21s enter service in numbers into the early 2030s. Currently, the
B-2 is the only long-range survivable aircraft in the U.S. inventory and should be kept viable
until the new bomber is ready for operations. The B-1B fleet reportedly has structural prob-
lems that may be very difficult and costly to repair.22 That said, if the structural problems are
solvable at a reasonable cost, retaining the B-1s fitted with stand-off weapons would add to
the USAF’s long-range punch. This analysis assumes retirement of the B-1Bs, but if retention
at an affordable cost is possible, the Air Force should explore maintaining this force element.

For the B-21, the proposed force structure doubles the B-21 procurement rate to 30 per year
by 2030 and adds subsystems to increase its capability to conduct a wider range of missions.
By 2038, the United States would have a force of 295 B-21s.

In sum, this plan postulates that the Air Force retire most of its non-stealth legacy fighters,
build up the stealth fighter force, continue development of a new air superiority fighter and
unmanned systems, retain the B-52s, and double B-21 production rates while planning for a
much larger B-21 force. The resulting changes in USAF force structure are illustrated in the
following chart.

Figure 5 below provides a summary overview of today’s combat force structure compared to
the proposed future force structure (see Appendix A for more details):

22 John A. Tirpak, “B-1s Can Make it to Finish Line, But Big Repairs Will Be Common Along the Way,” Air and Space
Forces Magazine, January 3, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/b-1s-can-make-it-to-finish-line-but-big-repairs-
will-be-common-along-the-way/.
Figure 5 www.csbaonline.org 17

FIGURE 5: POTENTIAL USAF FORCE STRUCTURE SHIFTS: 2023–2038

2500

2000
F-16 Sh
or
tR
an
ge
Number of Aircraft

1500
F-15E/EX

F-15E/EX F-22

F-15C/D
1000

A-10 F-35

500 F-22

F-35
e
Rang
B-21
Long
B-2
0
B-1B B-52 B-52

FY23 FY38
Source: Data for the current inventory was provided by the “Air Force and Space Force Almanac 2022,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, July 1,
2022. See Appendix A for an overview of the proposed changes in force structure.

TABLE 1: FORCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON

Aircraft FY23 FY38

B-52 76 76

B-1B 45 0

B-21 0 295

B-2 20 0

F-35 302 802

F-22 185 185

A-10 281 0

F-15C/D 232 0

F-15E/EX 218 218

F-16 935 0

Total 2,294 1,576

18 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

The proposed force offers the following attributes:

• The fighter/bomber ratio would shrink from 15:1 to 3:1—a ratio more in line with Air
Force experience in the 1950s. A significantly larger proportion of the force could
conduct long-range operations.

• Over 80% of the proposed fighter and bomber force would be stealthy compared to
the 22% level today. The general warfighter consensus is that the lethality of modern
defenses makes stealth “table stakes” for conducting offensive air operations.

• O&S costs for the proposed force would be approximately 25% lower ($16.7B per year
compared to the current force, which consumes $21.8B per year). The savings could be
applied to procurement accounts.23 Logistical efficiencies may also be gained as the force
goes from nine different types of aircraft to five.

• Although the new combat force of fighters and bombers is about 30% smaller, its overall
range-payload capability (a rough measure of combat capability) will depend heavily on
the unknown characteristics of the B-21. Assuming modest B-21 capabilities, the overall
range-payload would be slightly lower than the current force, but significantly greater if
the new aircraft features capabilities similar to current bombers.24

• The cost of the additional B-21s would be partially offset by the savings provided by
retiring the non-stealth legacy fighters and reducing the Air Force F-35 buy. Each B-21,
as currently planned, costs $660M in $FY23—though increased production rates should
generate a reduction in costs.25 The non-stealthy legacy force currently requires about
$10B per year for O&S, which could support the procurement of roughly 15 additional
B-21s per year. A B-21 costs about the same as six F-35s.26 Accordingly, the savings from
961 F-35s could procure approximately 160 additional B-21s.27

23 See Appendix B for details on rough estimates on O&S costs. Although the proposed force features more modern
sophisticated aircraft, Air Force data shows that O&S costs for all types of aircraft is a function of fleet size, not the
type of aircraft. This is due to the high fixed costs associated with a particular fleet. The Air Force would be able to
calculate much more accurate estimates.

24 See Appendix C for details on the payload-range calculations.

25 Assumes procurement unit cost of $511M in $FY10 per aircraft inflated to $FY23. See Tirpak, “The Raider Takes Shape.”

26 The F-35 FY20 SAR states the unit cost at $83.1M in $FY12. Inflating to $FY23 results in a unit cost of $105M.
Department of Defense, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program (F-35) (Washington, DC: DOD,
2019), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/
FY_2019_SARS/20-F-0568_DOC_32_F-35_SAR_Dec_2019_Full.pdf.

27 Under current plans, the USAF plans to buy 1,763 F-35s. Subtracting 802 from this total yields 961.
 www.csbaonline.org 19

CHAPTER 5

Concluding Thoughts
Such a transformation will not happen overnight. Even if production rates are doubled, the
B-21 will not enter service in large numbers for almost another decade (though sooner than
the next generation fighter). The USAF could explore developing the multi-role potential of
the aircraft over the next several years as F-35 production is accelerated in the near term
and development of the next generation fighter and new unmanned systems take shape.
These timelines provide an opportunity for Air Force planners to conduct the detailed
operations analysis and live flying exercises needed to determine the potential of the
new concepts.

Such a force, comprised primarily of stealthy aircraft, would significantly increase U.S.
power projection and deterrent capabilities. It poses a difficult defensive challenge for
an adversary, which would need to deal with multiple potential axes of attack as well as
enhanced air-to-air and maritime strike capabilities—thus enhancing deterrence. A smaller
fraction of our force would be forward-based and subject to heavy attack. The proposed force
also offers significant logistical advantages, going from nine different types of aircraft to
five, and could reduce annual O&S costs by around 25%.

That said, this plan is not without risk. The proposed force, though more capable, draws
down the legacy fighter forces and overall fighter force levels, resulting in a combat force
roughly two-thirds the size of today’s force. The United States could maintain its deterrent
posture in the Pacific theater by replacing legacy fighters in the Pacific theater with F-35s,
F-22s, and bombers, but the shift would need to be managed carefully. US allies around the
world would need to assume greater military responsibilities. Increased Air Force budgets
could slow the drawdown of the legacy fighter force and extend F-35 production, but this
would require increased defense spending and/or a change in the Air Force’s share of the
budget. Given the decline in Russian power and the importance of air and naval power in the
Western Pacific, there are strong arguments for adjusting Service budget shares, but uncer-
tainty surrounds prospects for success.
20 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

If the United States continues on its current course, it could end up with a force ill-suited to
the challenges posed by China. Air Force planners in the 1950s faced a similar dilemma and
took bold and decisive action. China has responded effectively after observing our concepts
of operations over the past three decades. The United States should be able to do the same
starting now. At the very least, a debate over current plans and the future of the combat force
is warranted.
 www.csbaonline.org 21

APPENDIX A

Potential Force Structure

Evolution
The stacked area chart above shows the proposed force structure evolution over this period.
The legacy fighter force would be drawn down over the next five years as the F-35 force
increases in size. The typical rule when planning retirements is to draw down as fast as
possible in order to reap the savings and get the pain over with quickly. The fighter force
reduction could be spread out over more years, but this would reduce the potential savings

Figure 6
in O&S spending.

FIGURE 6: FORCE EVOLUTION: FY23–FY38

2500

2000
Number of Aircraft

1500
F-16 F-15E/EX

F-22
1000 F-15C/D F-15E

A-10

F-35
500

B-2 B-21
B-1B
0 B-52
FY23 FY28 FY33 FY38

Source: Data for the current inventory was provided by the “Air Force and Space Force Almanac 2022,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, July 1,
2022. See Appendix A for an overview of the proposed changes in force structure.
22 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

The table below provides the assumed inputs into the area chart (types of aircraft procured
per year and overall force levels). In this proposed plan, F-35 production ends as B-21
production ramps up. Increased USAF budgets could allow extended F-35 produc-
tion. The Air Force could, of course, conduct much more sophisticated planning on force
evolution options.

TABLE 2: FORCE STRUCTURE PROCUREMENT AND EVOLUTION

Proposed Procurement Plan

FY23 FY28 FY33 FY38

B-52 76

B-1B 45

B-21 0 10 15 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30

B-2 20

F-35 302 100 100 100 100 100

F-22 185

A-10 281

F-15C/D 232

F-15E 218

F-15X 0 24 30 30 30 30 30 30 14

F-16 935

Proposed Force Structure Evolution

FY23 FY28 FY33 FY38

B-52 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76

B-1B 45 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

B-21 0 0 0 0 0 10 25 55 85 115 145 175 205 235 265 295

B-2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0

F-35 302 402 502 602 702 802 802 802 802 802 802 802 802 802 802 802

F-22 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185

A-10 281 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

F-15C/D 232 170 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

F-15E 218 194 164 134 104 74 44 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

F-15X 0 24 54 84 114 144 174 204 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218

F-16 935 700 400 300 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2294 1576
 www.csbaonline.org 23

APPENDIX B

O&S Cost Estimates

Data from Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
was used to calculate the total O&S cost of the current and proposed combat air force.28
Harrison’s methodology, based on Air Force data, calculates the cost to sustain a single
aircraft in a fleet, which is a much better metric than the traditional metric of cost per
flying hour.29 Harrison’s data shows that Air Force O&S costs (which includes fuel, spares,
personnel, and upgrades) for a type of aircraft are a function of fleet size due to the high
proportion of fixed costs for any particular fleet. The data illustrates that regardless of
aircraft type (bomber, fighter, tanker, stealth, or non-stealth), fleet size dominates what
it costs to sustain an aircraft fleet. Small fleets cost more per aircraft annually than large
fleets. And surprisingly, stealth aircraft cost no more to sustain than non-stealth aircraft.
Importantly, these rough estimates of O&S costs do not factor in mission-capable rates.
Higher mission-capable rates can drive up O&S spending.

Using an equation based on Harrison’s curve, O&S costs were calculated in $FY20 for each
aircraft based on fleet size. The derived equation is:

TABLE 3: TOTAL ANNUAL COST PER AIRCRAFT EQUATION

Total Annual Cost Per Aircraft = m * TAI ^ b

m= 155848817.4

b= -0.493733514

The annual cost per aircraft in $FY20 was then multiplied by the fleet size to estimate the
total O&S cost per fleet. The costs were then inflated to FY23 using DoD Green Book Data.

28 Todd Harrison, The Air Force of the Future: Comparison of Alternative Force Structures, (Washington DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, October 2019), pp 9-10.

29 Cost per flying hour is a poor metric because the costs can change radically depending on how much the aircraft is flown.
24 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

Using the 92.14 deflator for Operations and Maintenance (Budget Authority) from the
Green Book results in total annual costs for the current fleet at $21.82B ($FY23) and $16.7B
($FY23) for the proposed fleet. O&S costs for the proposed fleet would thus be approxi-
mately $5B per year less—the savings could be used to support acquisition of other systems.
Obviously, the USAF could provide much more refined analysis on what future O&S costs
would be for alternative force postures.

TABLE 4: ESTIMATED ANNUAL O&S COSTS

Inventory O&S Cost ($FY20)

Aircraft FY23 FY38 FY23 FY36

B-52 76 76 1.39 1.39

B-1B 45 0 1.07 0

B-21 0 295 0 2.77

B-2 20 0 0.7 0

F-35 302 802 2.8 4.6

F-22 185 185 2.19 2.19

A-10 281 0 2.1 2.1

F-15C/D 232 0 2.45 0

F-15E/EX 218 218 2.38 2.38

F-16 935 0 4.97 0

Totals 2,294 1,576 $20.05 $15.43

Inflated to $FY23 $21.8 $16.7

 www.csbaonline.org 25

APPENDIX C

Range-Payload Calculations
The following table provides the assumptions on aircraft combat radii and payloads to calcu-
late the range/payload capability of the fleet—a very rough measure of combat capability.
The calculations multiply radius, payload, and estimated sortie rate together for each major
aircraft type to get a ton-mile total. Bombers are assumed to fly 0.5 sorties per day and
fighters fly 1 sortie per day, since all aircraft will be flying long distance missions. Radius for
all the aircraft except B-21 comes from the Air Force Fact Sheets. Payload numbers are the
author’s estimate if data is not available from the Air Force Fact Sheets.

The Air Force has not released any data regarding B-21 capabilities. This analysis uses a
parametric approach to provide a perspective on overall force capabilities: 10 tons of payload
and 2,000 nm radius for the low end; 20 tons of payload and 3,000 nm for the high end.

TABLE 5: RANGE-PAYLOAD CALCULATIONS

Payload Radius
FY21 FY36 Sortie FY23 Ton-Miles FY38 Ton Miles
(Tons) (nm)
B-52 76 76 24.5 0.5 4176 3,887,856 3,887,856
B-1B 45 0 21 0.5 2837 1,340,483
2000-
B-21 0 295 10 to 20 0.5 2,950,000-8,850000
3000
B-2 20 0 20 0.5 3000 600,000
F-35 302 802 2 1 590 356,360 946,360
F-22 185 185 1 1 671 124,135 124,135
A-10 281 0 4 1 300 337,200
F-15C/D 232 0 2 1 685 317,840
F-15E/EX 218 218 4 1 685 597,320 597,320
F-16 934 0 2 1 676 1,262,768
Totals 8.8M 8.5M to 14.8M
26 CSBA | AIR POWER METAMORPHOSIS: RETHINKING AIR FORCE COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION

LIST OF ACRONYMS
AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
CONUS Continental United States
EW Electronic Warfare
FYDP Future Years Defense Plan
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IRST Infra-Red Search and Track
ISR Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance
O&S Operations and Sustainment
PLA People’s Liberation Army
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
USAF United States Air Force
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