Against Fragmentation: Radhakamal Mukerjee's Philosophy of Social Science

Author(s): N. Jayaram
Source: Sociological Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January - April 2014), pp. 4-20
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43854950
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 Sociological Bulletin
63 (1), January - April 2014, pp. 4-20
© Indian Sociological Society

Against Fragmentation:
Radhakamal Mukerjee's Philosophy
of Social Science*

N. Jayaram

I deem it a special honour to have been invited to deliver The

Radhakamal Mukerjee Memorial Lecture, the fourth in the series, the
first three lectures having been delivered by my illustrious senior
colleagues Professors T.N. Madan, D.N. Dhanagare, and Yogendra
Singh respectively. I thank the President of the Indian Sociological
Society and the members of the Radhakamal Mukerjee Memorial
Endowment Committee for this honour.

On Choosing the Topic

Radhakamal Mukerjee (1889-1968) (henceforth Mukerjee1) was a

versatile scholar whose scholarship encompassed a variety of disciplines
and a wide range of topics both theoretical and substantive (see Madan
201 1; see also Madan 2013: 4-15). For me, as a student of sociology, his
floating freely across disciplines and topics of study had been enigmatic.
Perhaps, for that reason, 1 did not evince much interest in his writings.
Thanks to my erstwhile colleague and friend Manish K. Thakur, who
perhaps has the most comprehensive understanding of Mukerjee's works,
I came to realise that I have disregarded the seminal insights of an
ingenious thinker. Manish was my neighbour and companion fellow
during my year-long (June 2012-June 2013) sojourn at the Indian
Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla and since he was engaged in writing
a monograph on Mukerjee's works (see Thakur [Forthcoming]), this
pioneer of Indian sociology appeared in our conversations frequently. In
retrospect, I realise, Mukerjee was not an intellectual wanderer, but was
advancing a different vantage point for understanding the dynamics of
human society.2

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Against Fragmentation 5

Thus, I had not to spend mu

lecture when the invitation c
Mukerjee's neglected classic, T
treatise in which he expounded
Although published by Macm
1960, some of the chapters h
reputed journals as Sociology an
sophy, and the Proceedings of t
One chapter of the book had bee
the Indian Sociological Assoc
Mukerjee 1961).
Having decided on the topic
The Philosophy of Social Scie
understand, let alone critique
complex, the canvass on whic
concepts that he deploys are
writing style is prolix, involve
more difficult to read and revi
through this dense and complex
some seminal ideas, which are
own inimitable style, Mukerj
Alvin W. Gouldner (1985) and
also that of Ramkrishna Mukhe
with different points of referenc
The thrust of Mukerjee's phil
of social science' (pp. 9-223). T
nature of social reality' (pp. 2
'the general theory of social
constitute the theme and title
Philosophy of Social Science.
elucidated the logic of social
orientations of social science, a
social reality. In brief, critical
social sciences, Mukerjee advan
science. In what follows, I will
seminal ideas.

The Philosophy of Social Science

According to physicist Michael V. Berry, scientists engaged in the study

of natural phenomena often encounter two problems:

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 6 N. J ay ar am

(1) How are the qua

'characteristic' in gen
to events in the natu
that a theory or scie
limited number of
60).

Answering these questions necessitates an engagement with the study of

(a) the inner logic of scientific theories and (b) the relations between
theory and experimentation. The field of study that engages with these
and similar questions is called the philosophy of science. This field has
been enriched since the publication in 1934 of Logik der Forschung [The
Logic of Scientific Discovery ' by the Austro-British philosopher Karl
Raimund Popper (1902-94), regarded as one of the greatest philosophers
of science of the 20th century.5
Since the English translation of Popper's Logik der Forschung
became available as The Logic of Scientific Discovery only in 1959,
Mukerjee, who did not know the German language, does not make a
reference to it. However, he was conversant with the philosophy of
science, which he recognised as an 'important discipline concerned with
the analysis, clarification and systematization of the methods and
theories of the natural sciences' (p. 9). He appears to have kept abreast
with the publications such as Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy of
Science, The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, and The
Philosophical Review. He quotes profusely from the English publications
or translations of a host of scholars who had contributed to the debates in
the philosophy of science in English: the list of names includes E.D.
Adrian, Floyd Allport, Arthur Bentley, L. von Bertalanffy, Max Born,
Arnold Brecht, Junius F. Brown, Baker Brownwell, E.S. Brightman,
Morris R. Cohen, Louis De Broglie, John Dewey, Arthur Eddington,
Robert Hartman, Carl Gustav Hempel, Felix Kaufmann, Ray Lepley,
Kurt Lewin, George Herbert Mead, Gardner Murphy, Ernest Nagel,
Charles Peirce, A.C. Rosander, Alfred North Whitehead, Paul Weiss,
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Alfred Schutz, Norman Kemp Smith,
William James, among others.
More important, given his 'perpetual quest for indigenous modes of
thought and methodological orientation' (Thakur 2012: 106) and his in-
depth understanding of Advaita Vedanta, Bhagvad Gita, Srimad Bhaga-
vata, Kathopanishad, Mahabharata, and the Buddhist and Jaina texts,
Mukeijee constantly drew parallels between the precepts of western
philosophy of science and the indigenous intellectual traditions and
blended the two. For instance, he draws parallels between Robert Julius
Oppenheimer's formulations on the role of semantics or 'symbology' for

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 Against Fragmentation 7

human understanding and analy

epistemology, which posited 'th
perspectives basic for the descr
37).
Exercises in the philosophy of social science have often imitated the
philosophy of science and tried to develop it as a discipline parallel to the
latter. Alan Ryan's The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1970) and
Michael Lessnoff s The Structure of Social Science (1974) are typical
illustrations of this.6 Lessnoff, in fact, closely follows Nagel's The
Structure of Science (1961) in its schema as well as its title. The
uniqueness of Mukerjee's articulation of the philosophy of social science
is that, instead of seeing it as a parallel exercise, he sees it as a
continuation or extension of the philosophy of science. As he puts it, the
philosophy of social science is 'a powerful and indispensable tool' for
the completion of 'the task of unification of human knowledge syste-
matically sought by the philosophy of science' (pp. vii, ix).
More important, more than any western scholar writing on this
subject, excepting perhaps with the notable exception of Ryan (1970),
Mukeijee clarified that the philosophy of social science is not 'a fresh
addition to the social sciences, but is concerned with the analysis,
description and clarification of the foundations of the existing social
sciences' (p. vii). Some elaboration on this point is necessary. Since
Mukeijee does not offer that, I turn to Ryan.
Philosophy, Ryan observes and Mukeijee would concur,

is a self-conscious discipline in a way that does not characterise any other

academic discipline, a feature of doing philosophy which . . . accounts for
the hold it exercises on many people as well as for the frustration which it
is liable to induce in both its practitioners and spectators (1970: 2).

What is peculiar about the questions that the philosophers of social

science or science, for that matter, ask 'are not questions in the sciences
with which we are concerned, but questions about these sciences' (ibid.:
4). Following philosopher E.R. Emmet, Ryan holds, these 'are not first-
order or factual questions, but rather second-order or conceptual
questions' (ibid.). What makes the second-order questions philosophical
is that 'they cannot be decided by appeal to the known methods of
obtaining the facts' (ibid. : 5).
The relevance and significance of a philosophy of (social) science
lies in the fact that the (social) scientists themselves have often engaged
in philosophical scrutiny of their ideas and practices once they are beset
with doubts and difficulties of a particularly striking sort (see Kuhn
1962: 84-89). In his intellectual engagement with a host of existential

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 8 N. Jayaram

issues Mukeijee e
the fragmentati
through articula
embody 'the co
phenomena' (p. v

The Crisis in Social Science

A versatile scholar that he was, Mukeijee was trenchantly critical of the

trend towards specialisation and compartmentalisation of knowledge
about human beings, the society they live in, and the culture which
defines their life. The fragmentation of social science into specialised
disciplines and the fractionalisation of disciplines into sub-disciplines, he
held, 'has brought about ...confusion in human thought and chaos in
valuation' {ibid.). Since there are profound disagreements among the
social sciences with regard to goals, assumptions, and methods, they are
unable 'to assess the vast contemporary social transformations and their
motivations and trends or to offer effective guidance in social prediction
and control' (pp. 9-10).
The history of social sciences in the 20th century is a sad reading of
regression, according Mukeijee. He finds 'so preoccupied were these
[social sciences] with an analytic and specialised treatment of social
relations and processes within their limited boundaries' that 'the integ-
ration of social institutions and moral values with the whole development
of human thought and experience in the Hegelian system had so little
influence on the[ir] goals and methods' (p. 9). 'Metaphysical individual-
ism, psychological atomism and rationalism and social biologism of the
19th century', according to Mukerjee, 'all have contributed separately and
collectively to break up the real unity between the social and the
individual in both social and moral theory and practice' {ibid.).
Different disciplines - economics, ethics, law (jurisprudence),
political science, psychology, religion (theology), and sociology -
'interpret human motives and actions in different ways and refuse to see
man, society and the way of human living as integrated wholes' (p. 11).
To quote Mukeijee,

Neither man can obtain inner harmony, nor can society and its institutions
safeguard their ends and purposes, so long as the social sciences under-
stand or treat the same social situation in a strikingly divergent manner. In
fact the crisis in modern culture is largely the outcome of the segregation
of different aspects of life, economic, political, moral or religious, brought
about by the various disciplines concerned with them. Economics and
politics attempt to treat human affairs as if men are actuated only by the

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 Against Fragmentation 9

quest for wealth and power re

religion deal with the ideal ends
have no concern with man's relations to fellowman in the economic and
the political spheres. Neither economics nor politics can judge whether the
prevalent industrial system or political organisation is sound unless it takes
into consideration their effects on the quality of man's social living and his
values and virtues embodied in his manifold social relations and behaviour
(pp. 11-12).

It is ironical, according to Mukeijee, that even sociology, whose

early development was characterised by 'the integrative and compre-
hensive theoretical pattern', has also fallen 'a victim to the reigning
tendencies of abstraction, isolation and specialisation' (p. 12). Twentieth-
century sociology, according Mukeijee,

has built itself either on the postulates of raw instincts, egoism and self-
interest of the individual or on those of herd and class interests, and
neglected the common meanings, symbols and values embodying the
living social tissue that constitutes the matrix of human relations and
behaviour. Social relations, behaviour and institutions are all treated
without any reference to values through which the former are actuated,
sustained and transmitted. The dominant individualism, utilitarianism and
'scientism' of the age have indeed, warped the development of the master
of discipline of sociology that was founded with the aim of a philosophical
integration of all social knowledge {ibid.).

In working with the concept of the 'abstract individual' rather than 'the
social self or person', emphasising 'mechanistic causation and evolution
in a naturalistic sense' rather than 'individual and social judgment and
effort', and more importantly, eschewing 'value considerations and the
moral aspirations of man that provide the true clue to the coordination of
the various social disciplines based on an integrated pattern of social
values and norms' {ibid.), sociology has failed in its original objective of
being the queen of social sciences.
As about the fragmentation and fractionalisation of social sciences,
Mukerjee was critical of another trend in the development of social
sciences, namely, the 'logic-tight' compartmentalisation of social
sciences, on the one hand, and ethics and the humanities, on the other.
He writes,

The social sciences deal with social facts and processes and that in
abstraction in a limited field isolated from man's total being and total
environment, and ethics, philosophy, aesthetics, metaphysics and religion
deal with truth-values, aesthetic values and moral values that are treated as
eternal essences in a cosmic frame independent of the trials and conflicts of

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 10 N. Jayaram

the work-a-day wo
of ethics provide th
in all social discipli
and higher motives

As envisaged by
intended to counte
trend towards the

Towards the

The objective of th
to integrate know
In other words,
commonness of hu
an interchange a
methods of the v
and culture' {ibid
his vision of disc
(1880-1936) and
structure' or 'so
Radcliffe-Brown
1968), and Talcott
of social science ai
complete man and
Mukeijee observe
'the history of in
system, its implic
to it' (p. vii). Rath
sciences to revea
dimensions and n
man' {ibid.).
I may clarify that, for Mukerjee, emphasis on and advocacy of an
'interdisciplinary approach' has a special meaning. It does not, for him,
simply mean building bridges or crossing disciplinary boundaries, as
connoted in such expressions as 'inter-disciplinary' and 'trans-
disciplinary' approach, respectively. Much less is he referring to 'multi-
disciplinary' approach. Throughout his book, he uses 'interdisciplinary'
as a whole word, and not as a hyphenated word; this semantic nuance has
profound significance. His interdisciplinary approach is intended to
stimulate 'the development of new logical techniques converting what
are today areas of ideological struggle and conflict into fields of
dispassionate scientific analysis' {ibid.).

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Against Fragmentation 1 1

Thus, moving beyond seeking

epistemologies, Mukeijee sought t
that is premised upon ontological
pect, it is significant that he doe
sciences, as Ryan would do a deca
of the philosophy of social sci
rejects the dichotomy between
stands and interprets human natu
manifold aims and goals set forth
ordering or hierarchy by comm
viii). His philosophy of social scie
Man and Personality (Anthropo
theory of Human Motivations,
Ethics (and Axiology) and theor
(Sociology and Culturology as in W

The Ontology and Epistemo

Social scientists before Muke

integrated theory; the names of
come to mind. What is unique to
theory is his delineation of its on
tion. The notion of social 'field' o
he calls, the 'qualitative integri
unifying, and coordinating con
'transactions', borrowing Dewe
clarifies, are philosophical postula

These stress both tension and regu

social adjustment and inter-relation
elude the analytical methods of sc
which is the central social process
values, cannot well be defined and categorised by science. Multi-
dimensionality is the essence of human activity and values, and demands
philosophical procedures and treatment (p. 2).

Mukeijee 's version of the integrated theory focuses on the

'conceptual triad': 'Man-Communication-Social Situation', or 'Person-
Value-Institution', 'comprising the self-perpetuating interactions of
human beings, goals and pattern of institutions dealt with by the various
social sciences' (p. viii). Following Dewey, Mukerjee finds the unique-
ness of social experience as a result of 'the constant interchanges
between man and his environing world "with their pervasive qualitative

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12 N. Jayaram
unity" and vast pot
range of associatio
under the concept
movements and cu
world, albeit confin
I would like to dra
that Mukerjee uses t
the preface to th
Situation' or 'Person
triad is 'Man-Comm
That is, in the pref
first sequence and
sequence. Mukeijee
confusion gets conf
'Man-Values-Societ
not affect his int
phenomena dealt wi
dimensions or order
Mukeijee alludes
Frédéric Le Play
'triangular biologi
chological "field"
philosophical field
from the advances
individual person,
independent, but s
coordinates of the t
the same integral 'f
universality and i
transcendence in th
group function, and
The search for the
society essentially
'qualitative unity' of
levels or dimension
for such a search is
neutics and interp
understandable con
the German intellec
intellectual tradit
methods.

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 Against Fragmentation 13
What constitutes the data for such a search? What is that social
scientists must explore to arrive at the 'fields' or 'patterns' that Mukerjee
speaks of? According to Mukeijee, Homo sapiens are symbolising
animals engaged in constant give and take. The 'common gaols,
meanings and values, and communication' through which they find their
'real or authentic self comprises the fundamental data of the social
sciences' (p. viii). Communication or 'communion' is the process that
holds 'the key to the dynamics of society, spirit and culture' {ibid.). For
social science, 'it embodies the full potentialities of the antinomic and
complementary modes of immediacy and eternity, self-acceptance and
self-transcendence that like the threads of warp and woof weave the
ever-richer fabric of persons, values and culture' (ibid.).
The social sciences, fragmented as they are, cannot see the
'spontaneity and openness of the social reality' (p. 2). To steer clear of
the resultant 'epistemological error' (ibid.), Mukeijee stresses on the
importance of interdependence or complementarity and dialectics. He
writes,

In the social sciences the interdependences or 'transactions' are circular

and self-perpetuating in their nature. The more the social sciences grip the
modern concepts of circularity, qualitative unity and 'openness' of the
social reality, the greater is the possibility of finding an order or 'pattern',
and the wholeness or sum in different fields of social relations' (p. 1 1).

Mukerjee was opposed to the positivist postulate of atomism and the

positivist procedure of dividing the 'multi-dimensional world' in which
human beings live into isolated entities or variables. Following physics,
he posited the theory of complementarity:

Corresponding to the complementary wave and particle conceptions of

electron or light and of those of position and velocity, we have the
mutually exclusive but complementary concepts of instinct and reason,
gratification and frustration, freedom and discipline, intrinsic and
instrumental values, isolation and communion, self-acceptance and self-
transcendence in the social and moral sciences. Man, values and culture are
organised and yet divided across the ages by the above incompatible, yet
complementary assumptions and attitudes in the various dimension of life
and its adjustment (p. 2).

It is the task of the philosophy of social science, according to Mukerjee,

to integrate the contradictory and complementary theories derived from
the analysis of the 'Man-Communication-Institution' or 'Person-Value-
Culture' triad.

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 14 N. Jay ar am
Dialectics

The logical corollary of 'dynamic reciprocity' in Mukeijee's 'Man-

Communication-Institution' or 'Person-Value-Culture' triad is his
endorsement of the principles of dialectics. The principles of dialectics
that Mukeijee adheres to are essentially in the idealist conception of
Hegel than in the materialist conception of Marx. As Mukeijee has it,

Man attains complete knowledge and experience through a dialectic of

reason and impulse, egoism and communion, intrinsic and instrumental
values. All human relations and institutions similarly embody a ceaseless
tension and integration of polar and complementary modes or categories.
Only through a dialectical movement of such opposite principles and
values as freedom and order, stability and change, unity and individual,
instrument and final purpose can human society relate itself to the total
universe and ultimate reality, and find a definition of its true meaning and
purpose (p. viii).

Thus, he argues, both in philosophy and in the social sciences it is

important to recognise that 'man and nature, freedom and destiny are not
separate', and to restore 'intellect and faith, reason and intuition ... to
their roles for the perception and fusion of inner being with outer reality'
{ibid.).
Mukerjee draws our attention to the fact that as human beings we
simultaneously identify ourselves with our fellow human beings and
differentiate from them. We are at once 'a part and a whole, an
individual and a universe. Human relations and values fixate and
transcend simultaneously in action and contemplation' (p. 3). This, h
observes, is 'the familiar rhythm of animal need and human aspiration,
egoism and communion, self-acceptance and self-transcendence' {ibid.).
This he identifies with reference to each coordinate of the triad: Man-
Values-Society.
With reference to the first coordinate, that is, man (human being),
'The dialectic of society is but the echo and embodiment of the
psychological polarities of immediacy and eternity, irrationality and
reason, freedom and necessity, and of the metaphysical polarities of
being and becoming, immanence and transcendence, unity and indi-
viduation' {ibid.). This is the focus of psychology.
With reference to the second coordinate, that is, human values,
Mukerjee delineates the progression through 'the polarity of opposite
principles - self-discipline and self-actualisation, self-realisation and
selflessness, self-expression and orderliness, self-valuation and self-

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Against Fragmentation 1 5

transcendence' (ibid.). This is th

education, ethics, art and religion
With reference to the thir
corresponding to the above, Muk
every group, institution and huma
an unceasing dialectic in which
contains its contradiction and t
Thus, sociology, economics, politi
the polar principles and categor
competition and collectivism, fre
respectively.
The antinomies relating to th
according to Mukeijee, are subsum
the basic and comprehensive e
human personality and the har
development of social relations an
indeed the universal laws of prog
This leads Mukeijee to speak
knowledge and values' (ibid.):

Man thinks and lives dialectically.

the values that lie deep-seated i
tendencies. Yet neither man nor so
of all knowledge, values, human
institutions. Due largely to the ina
truth mankind recurrently pas
conflicts, revolutions and wars (p.

Mukeijee pins his hopes on the

these polar principles and value
ments in the open, resolve bitt
economic and political systems
thinking, and engender a toler
compose diversity' (p. 4).
One finds resonance of this lin
inductivism in science and dogm
'The history of civilization', Muk

shows that if once man and cult

polarities of life as absolute and co
derivative and adventitious, these t
deception and destruction. Man in t
deepens and widens the mind throu
their truth and value and finall

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 16 N. J ay ar am
undifferentiated, and u
the supreme good are he
forms of value (p. 4).

In this context, Muke

de Spinoza's aphorism
thing'" and the Upanis
and value - being (sat),
adjective of the non-du

Through the dialectic

Taoist namelessness, th
supreme value. If the un
his knowing, the struct
the dialectic is the log
tisms and absolutes is t
apprehension of the rea
uninhibited and undiff
method as illustrated in
East. In Eastern dialect
neighbour, society an
totality and harmony
(anantam)' (ibid. : 4-5).

What distinguishes th
philosophy, according
cognition by no means

Values

Of the cognates of the triad, Mukerjee accords prime place to values.

Perhaps no other sociologist or, for that matter, social scientist in India
has emphasised the importance of values for human beings in society and
understanding them for social sciences as did Mukeijee.8 It is hardly
surprising that five of the twelve chapters in his book The Philosophy of
Social Science (Chapters VI-X, pp. 82-149) are devoted to analysing the
various aspects of values. It is beyond the scope of this lecture to go into
the details of this analysis, excepting mentioning a few salient points.
According to Mukeijee, human beings distinctively are 'value-
creating' and 'value-fulfilling' animals. This characteristic influences not
only the structure of their personality and social relationships, but more
so their groups and institutions, which are 'expressions of and
instruments for the realisation of values' (p. 10). Human beings are 'not
only the fountain of values', they also make 'value-judgements as

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 Against Fragmentation 1 7

embodied in all inter-personal

normal functioning of groups and
Mukeijee's theory of values i
Mukeijee underlines the recipr
society. On the one hand, human
value quality and potentiality of
other hand, society and its inst
struggling, aspiring person and a
milieu for the maximum realis
logically viewed, values are thu
everyday life.
Values are useful academically, too. According to Mukeijee, they
are 'heuristic principles that explain . . . individual behaviour in relation
to the physical and the social world as well as an objective social
relationship, behaviour, institution and social system' (ibid.). The
conscious striving for values by human beings not only points to their
direction of growth, but also 'the configuration of society and
institutions' (ibid.). Considering that there are 'levels or dimensions of
values', one could expect to find 'levels or dimensions of institutional
behaviour and cultural pattern' (ibid.).
It is interesting to note that in his intellectual autobiography, first
published in 1974, more than a decade later than Mukerjee's The
Philosophy of Social Science, Popper (1976) succinctly emphasised the
importance of values. In the concluding chapter, suggestively titled 'The
Place of Values in a World of Facts' (ibid.: 193-96), 9 Popper,
disagreeing with the view 'that values enter the world only with
consciousness', argues 'I think thrft values enter the world with life; and
if there is life without consciousness . . . then, I suggest, there will also be
values, even without consciousness' (ibid.: 194). Thus, according to
Popper, there are two kinds of values: 'values created by life, by
unconscious problems, and values created by the human mind, on the
basis of previous solutions, in the attempt to solve problems which may
be better or less well understood' (ibid.). In retrospect, one is indeed
struck by the originality of Mukerjee's formulations on values and their
place both in human society and in social science.

Epilogue

Putting together The Philosophy of Social Science in 1960, Mukeijee

noted that 'an integrated theory of the person, value and the social
universe ... is yet to emerge' (p. 13). He was hopeful that a unitary social
science would blossom, and he viewed his work as laying its foundation.

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 18 N. Jay ar am

Unfortunately, how
'hardly even gener
see also 1989). Discr
'for holding on to th
is not always on su
siderations; it is oft
limited research funds.
In the academic universe, disciplines have literally become regimes,
controlling everything that goes under the name of a discipline.
Obviously, the so-called inter-disciplinary approach remains forays by
some disciplines at best, and grudging concession extended by one
discipline to another at worst. The more the disciplines remain frogs in
the well (koopa mandukas ), the less they are able to see and appreciate
what lies outside. Mukerjee recognised the nature of this crisis and
offered a way out. It is not important whether we agree or not with him;
it is important that we debate him. After all, he was a giant of a social
scientist and we get to see farther standing on his shoulder.

Notes

* This forms the text of the fourth Radhakamal Mukerjee Memorial Lecture delivered
under the auspices of the Indian Sociological Society at the Thirty-ninth All India
Sociological Conference held at Karnataka State Open University, Mysore, on 28
December 2013.

1 . Radhakamal Mukerjee shares with many other social scientists the same phonetic last
name, though spelt differently. To avoid any confusion, in this lecture, I use his last
name, Mukerjee, to refer to him exclusively. Any reference to others with a similar
last name is made by their full names.
2. I am grateful to Manish K. Thakur for the interesting conversations on Mukerjee' s
location in 'Indian sociology' and for responding to my questions.
3. Page numbers refer to citations from Mukerjee 's The Philosophy of Social Science
1960).
4. I have borrowed the phrase 'against fragmentation', which appears in the title of this
lecture, from Gouldner (1985).
5. John Losee (1980) provides a historical sketch of the development of views on the
scientific method prior to 1940. Rudolph Carnap (1974), Alexander Rosenberg
(2012), and Barry Go wer (1997) provide useful introductions to the philosophy of
science. Martin Curd and J. A. Cover (1998) have put together a selection of readings
with useful commentaries on the main issues in the field. Ernest Nagel 's classic, The
Structure of Science (1961), remains a must read for scholars interested in the
subject.
6. Ryan confesses, '... almost all philosophers of the social sciences - and I among
them - draw so heavily on the distinctions first made and employed by natural
scientists and philosophers of natural science' (1970: 1). He argues, '... we must bear
in mind the standards of explanation and understanding which we apply in the natural

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 Against Fragmentation 1 9
sciences if we are to arrive at a balanced assessment of the successes and difficulties
of the social sciences' {ibid.).
1. More than Govind Sadashiv Ghurye, who succeeded him in the Department of
Sociology which Geddes established in the University of Bombay (now University of
Mumbai), it was Mukerjee who drew inspiration from Geddes' s ideas (Munshi 2013).
Geddes 's influence is visible in Mukerjee 's work on social ecology (see Regional
Sociology [1926], Social Ecology [1934], and Man and His Habitation [1939]).
Geddes' s creative thinking and social and educational experiments, Mukerjee writes,
'made the intellectual circles in India look upon him as an Indian ris hi of old. Nor
was this veneration misplaced' (Mukerjee 1932: 375).
8. Besides The Philosophy of Social Science (1960), values formed the main theme of
two of Mukerjee 's books: The Social Structure of Values (1949) and The Dimensions
of Value: A Unified Theory (1964a), and briefed five other books: The Dynamics of
Morals: A Socio-Psychological Theory of Ethics (1950), The Destiny of Civilization
(1964b), The Sickness of Civilization (1964c.), The Oneness of Mankind (1965) and
The Way of Humanism: East and West (1968).
9. Popper's chapter title is close to that of Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler' s book
The Place of Value in a World of Fact (1938). To indicate his stress on pluralism,
Popper, however, substituted 'Values' and 'Facts' for 'Value' and 'Fact' (1976: 238,
En 306). More than his pluralist stance, Popper was 'disappointed' by Köhler' s
solution to the problem of values, but also 'unconvinced' by his thesis 'that Gestalt
psychology can make an important contribution to the solution of this problem'
(ibid.: 193).

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N. Jayaram , Professor, Centre for Research Methodology, Tata Institute of Social

Sciences, V.N. Purav Marg, Deonar, Mumbai - 400088
Email: [email protected]

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