Government Service Insurance System v.

City Treasurer of the City of

Manila, 609 SCRA 330 (2009)
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on pure question of law are the November 15, 2007
Decision1 and January 7, 2009 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49 in Manila, in Civil
Case No. 02-104827, a suit to nullify the assessment of real property taxes on certain properties
belonging to petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The Facts

Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak 25th St.,
Bonifacio Drive, Manila (Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in
Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros property). Title to the Concepcion-Arroceros property was transferred
to this Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No. 8353 dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the
Katigbak property was under lease.

The controversy started when the City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter 4 dated September 13,
2002 to GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia informing him of the unpaid real
property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002, broken down as
follows: (a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the
Concepcion-Arroceros property. The letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in the
scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid
taxes remain unsettled before that date.

On September 16, 2002, the City Treasurer of Manila issued separate Notices of Realty Tax
Delinquency5 for the subject properties, with the usual warning of seizure and/or sale. On October 8,
2002, GSIS, through its legal counsel, wrote back emphasizing the GSIS’ exemption from all kinds of
taxes, including realty taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA) 8291.6

Two days after, GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 7 with prayer for a restraining and
injunctive relief before the Manila RTC. In it, GSIS prayed for the nullification of the assessments
thus made and that respondents City of Manila officials be permanently enjoined from proceedings
against GSIS’ property. GSIS would later amend its petition8 to include the fact that: (a) the Katigbak
property, covered by TCT Nos. 117685 and 119465 in the name of GSIS, has, since November
1991, been leased to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), which has contractually
bound itself to pay any realty taxes that may be imposed on the subject property; and (b) the
Concepcion-Arroceros property is partly occupied by GSIS and partly occupied by the MeTC of
Manila.

The Ruling of the RTC

By Decision of November 15, 2007, the RTC dismissed GSIS’ petition, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, DISMISSING the petition for
lack of merit, and declaring the assessment conducted by the respondents City of Manila on the
subject real properties of GSIS as valid pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED.9

GSIS sought but was denied reconsideration per the assailed Order dated January 7, 2009.

Thus, the instant petition for review on pure question of law.

The Issues

1. Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of real property taxes from 1992 to 2002;

2. Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of real property taxes on the property it
leased to a taxable entity; and

3. Whether petitioner’s real properties are exempt from warrants of levy and from tax sale for
non-payment of real property taxes.10

The Court’s Ruling

The issues raised may be formulated in the following wise: first, whether GSIS under its charter is
exempt from real property taxation; second, assuming that it is so exempt, whether GSIS is liable for
real property taxes for its properties leased to a taxable entity; and third, whether the properties of
GSIS are exempt from levy.
In the main, it is petitioner’s posture that both its old charter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and
present charter, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997, exempt the agency and its properties from all
forms of taxes and assessments, inclusive of realty tax. Excepting, respondents counter that GSIS
may not successfully resist the city’s notices and warrants of levy on the basis of its exemption under
RA 8291, real property taxation being governed by RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC, hereinafter).

The petition is meritorious.

1st Issue
First Core Issue: GSIS Exempt from Real Property Tax

Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146

In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 18611 was enacted abolishing the then pension systems under
Act No. 1638, as amended, and establishing the GSIS to manage the pension system, life and
retirement insurance, and other benefits of all government employees. Under what may be
considered as its first charter, the GSIS was set up as a non-stock corporation managed by a board
of trustees. Notably, Section 26 of CA 186 provided exemption from any legal process and liens but
only for insurance policies and their proceeds, thus:

Section 26. Exemption from legal process and liens. — No policy of life insurance issued under this
Act, or the proceeds thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted
under this Act, shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken,
appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or
liability of such member, or his beneficiary, or any other person who may have a right thereunder,
either before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof, when not made payable to a named
beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of his debt. x x x

In 1977, PD 1146,12 otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977,
was issued, providing for an expanded insurance system for government employees. Sec. 33 of PD
1146 provided for a new tax treatment for GSIS, thus:

Section 33. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the System shall be preserved and maintained at
all times and that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept
as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the System and/or their employees. Taxes
imposed on the System tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any
laws to the contrary, the System, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and
benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.

The benefits granted under this Act shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment,
levy or other processes. This, however, shall not apply to obligations of the member to the System,
or to the employer, or when the benefits granted herein are assigned by the member with the
authority of the System. (Emphasis ours.)

A scrutiny of PD 1146 reveals that the non-stock corporate structure of GSIS, as established under
CA 186, remained unchanged. Sec. 3413 of PD 1146 pertinently provides that the GSIS, as created
by CA 186, shall implement the provisions of PD 1146.

RA 7160 lifted GSIS tax exemption

Then came the enactment in 1991 of the LGC or RA 7160, providing the exercise of local
government units (LGUs) of their power to tax, the scope and limitations thereof, 14 and the
exemptions from taxations. Of particular pertinence is the general provision on withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges in Sec. 193 of the LGC, and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption
from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of the succeeding Sec. 234, thus:

SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions,
are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

SEC. 234. Exemption from Real Property Tax. – x x x Except as provided herein, any exemption
from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporation are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
From the foregoing provisos, there can be no serious doubt about the Congress’ intention to
withdraw, subject to certain defined exceptions, tax exemptions granted prior to the passage of RA
7160. The question that easily comes to mind then is whether or not the full tax exemption
heretofore granted to GSIS under PD 1146, particular insofar as realty tax is concerned, was
deemed withdrawn. We answer in the affirmative.

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,[15] the Court held that the express
withdrawal by the LGC of previously granted exemptions from realty taxes applied to
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), such as the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority. In City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City,16 the Court,
citing Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority, declared the GSIS liable for real property taxes
for the years 1992 to 1994 (contested real estate tax assessment therein), its previous exemption
under PD 1146 being considered withdrawn with the enactment of the LGC in 1991.

Significantly, the Court, in City of Davao, stated the observation that the GSIS’ tax-exempt status
withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997 by RA 8291.17

Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291

Indeed, almost 20 years to the day after the issuance of the GSIS charter, i.e., PD 1146, it was
further amended and expanded by RA 8291 which took effect on June 24, 1997. 18 Under it, the full
tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a virtual
replication of the earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146. Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all
times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low
as possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on
the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate
necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary,
the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be
exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions
shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the
GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws,
ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force
and effect.

Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless
this section is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a
provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential
factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the
guaranty of the national government to secure such solvency or liability.

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or
administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial
obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or
in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is
in favor of the GSIS. (Emphasis ours.)

The foregoing exempting proviso, couched as it were in an encompassing manner, brooks no other
construction but that GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes. While not determinative of this case, it
is to be noted that prominently added in GSIS’ present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied
repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express
repeal by a subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full exemption benefits granted the GSIS,
unless the following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause must expressly, specifically,
and categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and (2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the
exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund.
These restrictions for a future express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso an
irrepealable law, for such restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of
the legislature to so amend it. The restrictions merely enhance other provisos in the law ensuring the
solvency of the GSIS fund. 1avvphi1

Given the foregoing perspectives, the following may be assumed: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 33 of PD
1146, GSIS enjoyed tax exemption from real estate taxes, among other tax burdens, until January 1,
1992 when the LGC took effect and withdrew exemptions from payment of real estate taxes
privileges granted under PD 1146; (2) RA 8291 restored in 1997 the tax exempt status of GSIS by
reenacting under its Sec. 39 what was once Sec. 33 of P.D. 1146; 19 and (3) If any real estate tax is
due to the City of Manila, it is, following City of Davao, only for the interim period, or from 1992 to
1996, to be precise.

Real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS considered paid

While recognizing the exempt status of GSIS owing to the reenactment of the full tax exemption
clause under Sec. 39 of RA 8291 in 1997, the ponencia in City of Davao appeared to have failed to
take stock of and fully appreciate the all-embracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39
which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid "any assessment against the GSIS as of the
approval of this Act." If only to stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of said
Sec. 39:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – x x x Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its
assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless
expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of
this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances,
opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed,
superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. (Emphasis added.)

GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government

Apart from the foregoing consideration, the Court’s fairly recent ruling in Manila International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals,20 a case likewise involving real estate tax assessments by a Metro
Manila city on the real properties administered by MIAA, argues for the non-tax liability of GSIS for
real estate taxes. There, the Court held that MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having been
organized either as a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as a non-stock
corporation because it has no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the National
Government and, hence, outside the purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC
providing in context that "unless otherwise provided," local governments cannot tax national
government instrumentalities. And as the Court pronounced in Manila International Airport Authority,
the airport lands and buildings MIAA administers belong to the Republic of the Philippines, which
makes MIAA a mere trustee of such assets. No less than the Administrative Code of 1987
recognizes a scenario where a piece of land owned by the Republic is titled in the name of a
department, agency, or instrumentality. The following provision of the said Code suggests as much:

Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.––Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following: x x x x

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of x x x any
corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. 21

While perhaps not of governing sway in all fours inasmuch as what were involved in Manila
International Airport Authority, e.g., airfields and runways, are properties of the public dominion and,
hence, outside the commerce of man, the rationale underpinning the disposition in that case is
squarely applicable to GSIS, both MIAA and GSIS being similarly situated. First, while created under
CA 186 as a non-stock corporation, a status that has remained unchanged even when it operated
under PD 1146 and RA 8291, GSIS is not, in the context of the afore quoted Sec. 193 of the LGC, a
GOCC following the teaching of Manila International Airport Authority, for, like MIAA, GSIS’ capital is
not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of. And by members, the
reference is to those who, under Sec. 87 of the Corporation Code, make up the non-stock
corporation, and not to the compulsory members of the system who are government employees. Its
management is entrusted to a Board of Trustees whose members are appointed by the President.

Second, the subject properties under GSIS’s name are likewise owned by the Republic. The GSIS is
but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or
acquired for the enhancement of the system. This particular property arrangement is clearly shown
by the fact that the disposal or conveyance of said subject properties are either done by or through
the authority of the President of the Philippines. Specifically, in the case of the Concepcion-
Arroceros property, it was transferred, conveyed, and ceded to this Court on April 27, 2005 through
a presidential proclamation, Proclamation No. 835. Pertinently, the text of the proclamation
announces that the Concepcion-Arroceros property was earlier ceded to the GSIS on October 13,
1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 78 for office purposes and had since been titled to GSIS which
constructed an office building thereon. Thus, the transfer on April 27, 2005 of the Concepcion-
Arroceros property to this Court by the President through Proclamation No. 835. This illustrates the
nature of the government ownership of the subject GSIS properties, as indubitably shown in the last
clause of Presidential Proclamation No. 835:

WHEREAS, by virtue of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended),
Presidential Decree No. 1455, and the Administrative Code of 1987, the President is authorized to
transfer any government property that is no longer needed by the agency to which it belongs
to other branches or agencies of the government. (Emphasis ours.)

Third, GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits
of all government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an
essential and vital function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities,
ought to perform if social security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with
reasonable dispatch. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Republic guarantees the fulfillment of the
obligations of the GSIS to its members (government employees and their beneficiaries) when and as
they become due. This guarantee was first formalized under Sec. 24 22 of CA 186, then Sec. 823 of PD
1146, and finally in Sec. 824 of RA 8291.

2nd issue
Second Core Issue: Beneficial Use Doctrine Applicable

The foregoing notwithstanding, the leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant to the
"beneficial use" principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC.

It is true that said Sec. 234(a), quoted below, exempts from real estate taxes real property owned by
the Republic, unless the beneficial use of the property is, for consideration, transferred to a taxable
person.

SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable
person.

This exemption, however, must be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which prohibits
LGUs from imposing taxes or fees of any kind on the national government, its agencies, and
instrumentalities:

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

xxxx

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities, and local government units. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus read together, the provisions allow the Republic to grant the beneficial use of its property to an
agency or instrumentality of the national government. Such grant does not necessarily result in the
loss of the tax exemption. The tax exemption the property of the Republic or its instrumentality
carries ceases only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC of 1991, "beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." GSIS, as a government
instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost
in a sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficial use to
MHC, doubtless a taxable person. Thus, the real estate tax assessment of PhP 54,826,599.37
covering 1992 to 2002 over the subject Katigbak property is valid insofar as said tax delinquency is
concerned as assessed over said property.

Taxable entity having beneficial use of leased

property liable for real property taxes thereon

The next query as to which between GSIS, as the owner of the Katigbak property, or MHC, as the
lessee thereof, is liable to pay the accrued real estate tax, need not detain us long. MHC ought to
pay.

Doctrine of Beneficial Use

As we declared in Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim, "the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is
chargeable against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it
regardless of whether or not he is the owner." Of the same tenor is the Court’s holding in the
subsequent Manila Electric Company v. Barlis25 and later in Republic v. City of Kidapawan.26 Actual
use refers to the purpose for which the property is principally or predominantly utilized by the person
in possession thereof.27

Being in possession and having actual use of the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is
liable for the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property from 1992 to 2002.

The foregoing is not all. As it were, MHC has obligated itself under the GSIS-MHC Contract of Lease
to shoulder such assessment. Stipulation l8 of the contract pertinently reads:

18. By law, the Lessor, [GSIS], is exempt from taxes, assessments and levies. Should there be any
change in the law or the interpretation thereof or any other circumstances which would subject the
Leased Property to any kind of tax, assessment or levy which would constitute a charge against the
Lessor or create a lien against the Leased Property, the Lessee agrees and obligates itself to
shoulder and pay such tax, assessment or levy as it becomes due.28 (Emphasis ours.)

As a matter of law and contract, therefore, MHC stands liable to pay the realty taxes due on the
Katigbak property. Considering, however, that MHC has not been impleaded in the instant case, the
remedy of the City of Manila is to serve the realty tax assessment covering the subject Katigbak
property to MHC and to pursue other available remedies in case of nonpayment, for said property
cannot be levied upon as shall be explained below.

3rd Issue
Third Core Issue: GSIS Properties Exempt from Levy

In light of the foregoing disquisition, the issue of the propriety of the threatened levy of subject
properties by the City of Manila to answer for the demanded realty tax deficiency is now moot and
academic. A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability. Nonetheless, it will not be
remiss to note that it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal processes. This is the clear import of the
third paragraph of Sec. 39, RA 8291, which we quote anew for clarity:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – x x x.

xxxx

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or
administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial
obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or
in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is
in favor of the GSIS. (Emphasis ours.)

Benificial rule--ensure the solvency of GSIS fund

The Court would not be indulging in pure speculative exercise to say that the underlying legislative
intent behind the above exempting proviso cannot be other than to isolate GSIS funds and
properties from legal processes that will either impair the solvency of its fund or hamper its operation
that would ultimately require an increase in the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of
the system. Throughout GSIS’ life under three different charters, the need to ensure the solvency of
GSIS fund has always been a legislative concern, a concern expressed in the tax-exempting
provisions.

Thus, even granting arguendo that GSIS’ liability for realty taxes attached from 1992, when RA 7160
effectively lifted its tax exemption under PD 1146, to 1996, when RA 8291 restored the tax incentive,
the levy on the subject properties to answer for the assessed realty tax delinquencies cannot still be
sustained. The simple reason: The governing law, RA 8291, in force at the time of the levy prohibits
it. And in the final analysis, the proscription against the levy extends to the leased Katigbak property,
the beneficial use doctrine, notwithstanding.

Summary
In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an
instrumentality of the national government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by
the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. Following the
"beneficial use" rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property,
leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on
the taxable beneficial user. The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction
sale, notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means that the City of Manila has to satisfy its
tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the
Katigbak property and, in case of nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public auction
of the leased property.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The November 15, 2007 Decision and
January 7, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the real property tax assessments issued by the City of Manila to the
Government Service Insurance System on the subject properties are declared VOID, except that the
real property tax assessment pertaining to the leased Katigbak property shall be valid if served on
the Manila Hotel Corporation, as lessee which has actual and beneficial use thereof. The City of
Manila is permanently restrained from levying on or selling at public auction the subject properties to
satisfy the payment of the real property tax delinquency.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410 (2008)
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well
as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x
x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test
as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory
drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the
quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election
laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on
the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May
10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the
Department of Health.
 SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x
x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign
period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May
10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines,
and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or
an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to
allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To have standing,
one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject
matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is
wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

Issue
The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in
the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously
as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work
to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates
for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal
would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and
effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and
the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose,
per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive
and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be
exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and
55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and

Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring
forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug
dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement,
shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following
conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But
while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity
of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al.
v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving
the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation
with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a
high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the
urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter
alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by
joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because
of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug -
testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test
for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show
choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug -
testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued,
unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non -
athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no
distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of
the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that
the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind
of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the
well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing
of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited
not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not
merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have
been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right
to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the
abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities
are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state's exercise of police power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as
"swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which
the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing
that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much
as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration
lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug
results shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it
not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated
since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid
back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the
chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers,
all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm
of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation
of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not
so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school
rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees,
the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall
be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA
9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as
here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver
by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435 (2016)
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all
foundlings from public service.

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search,
but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the
quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino,
then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these
inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there is no grave
abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I
of the Constitution.

This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single foundling as
natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof may exist to
show that a foundling is not natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its
place in the scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different
from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship.

[1]
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He
prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
[2]
Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15. The
[3]
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by
David, which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator
for allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being
[4]
qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The
[5]
assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents
[6]
are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo
[7]
Militar found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later
[8]
turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of
[9]
the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the
[10]
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of
Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:

Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO,
ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS
PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET,
JARO . . .[11]
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
[12]
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The
Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
[13]
Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A.
[14]
Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality.

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan
Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted
[15]
by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe. This hand-written notation appears on Senator
Poe's foundling certificate:

NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court
Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974,
under Sp. Proc. No. 138.[16]
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned
[17]
18 years old. The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for
[18]
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.

[19]
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. Her
passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013,
[20]
and March 18, 2014. Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic
[21]
passport on December 19, 2013.
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but
[22]
eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. In 1991, she
earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
[23]
Massachusetts.

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an
[24]
American and Filipino national since birth. The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San
[25]
Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila. On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States
[26]
with her husband. For some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United
[27]
States.

Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie
[28]
(Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika). Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992.
Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born
[29]
in the Philippines.

[30]
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She
[31]
was subsequently given a United States passport.

Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the
[32]
Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. To support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe
[33]
and her daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004. After the Elections,
[34]
she returned to the United States on July 8, 2004. It was during her stay in the Philippines
[35]
that she gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.

Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into a
[36] [37]
coma." Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004. On December
[38]
14, 2004, her father died. She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her
[39]
father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate.

In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for work again
[40]
in the United States.

[41]
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. After consulting her children, they all agreed
[42]
to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces. In early 2005, they
notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to
[43] [44]
the Philippines the following semester. She came back on May 24, 2005. Her children
[45]
also arrived in the first half of 2005. However, her husband stayed in the United States to
[46]
"finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there."

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax
[47]
Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.

[48]
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines:

I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion.[49]
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine
[50]
Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. She also "filed applications for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at
[51]
that time."

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006
through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F.
[52]
Fernandez, Jr:

A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate that
David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents and
is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen
and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed
to have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.[53] (Emphasis in the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the Philippines in
[54]
accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225." Until now, the Order "has not
[55]
been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other agency of Government."

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the name of
[56]
Senator Poe and her children. It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per
Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18,
[57]
2006."

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31,
[58]
2006.

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using
[59]
her United States Passport No. 170377935. She used her passport "after having taken her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced
[60]
her American citizenship on 20 October 2010." The following are the flight records given by
the Bureau of Immigration:

Departures Flight No.

November 1, 2006 SQ071
July 20, 2007 PR730
October 31, 2007 PR300
October 2, 2008 PR358
April 20, 2009 PR104
July 31, 2009 PR730
October 19, 2009 PR102
November 15,
PR103
2009
December 27,
PR112
2009
March 27, 2010 PR102

Arrivals Flight No.

November 4, 2006 SQ076
July 23, 2007 PR731
November 5, 2007 PR337
May 8, 2008 PR103
October 5, 2008 PR359
May 21, 2009 PR105
August 3, 2009 PR733
November 15,
PR103[61]
2009
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as
[62]
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On
October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
[63]
United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship, stating:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No. 107
Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I
hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship,
together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto
pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of
[64]
any duress or undue influence. (Emphasis in the original)

[65]
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010. On October
21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October
[66]
26, 2010. Her oath of office stated:

PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN

Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson,

Movie and Television Review and Classification Board , ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin
ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng
Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas;
na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang
lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika
ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o
hangaring umiwas.

Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng

Maynila, Pilipinas.[67] (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
[68] [69]
States in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011. On this
occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of
[70]
U.S. Citizenship. On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of
[71]
Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe. The certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen
[72]
Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.

[73]
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. On September 27, 2012, she
executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on
[74] [75]
October 2, 2012. She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
[76]
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of
Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated
[77]
by the 1987 Constitution."

Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David "to
[78]
correct the formal defects of his petition." David filed his amended Petition on August 17,
[79]
2015.

On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, through
its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon
[80]
Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended Petition.

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of
Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from the Bureau of
[81]
Immigration on August 25, 2015. The documents requested included Senator Poe's record
[82]
of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate. On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral
[83]
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion. The same Resolution directed
the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of
[84]
Immigration and the National Statistics Office. The subpoenas ordered the officials to
appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the Senate
[85]
bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents. The subpoenas were complied with by
[86]
both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015.

On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for
Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4)
[87]
Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court.

On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the
[88]
parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before September 9, 2015. The
[89]
Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on September 11, 2015. During the
Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground of
[90]
prescription."

[91]
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015. The
parties were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the
[92]
submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test
[93]
results. The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through
[94]
Resolution No. 15-08. On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding
[95]
the results of DNA Testing, which stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took
[96]
provided results that would shed light to the real identity of her biological parents." The
Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue
and submit any development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted
"the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal
[97]
arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal." On November 6, 2015, through
Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered
[98]
the case submitted for resolution."

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision
finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
[99]
Senator. The Decision stated:

We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue to
be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine
citizenship.

. . . .

In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,

Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.

Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire
natural-born Philippine citizenship.

. . . .

To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen
from that time on until today.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[100] (Citations omitted)

[101]
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. The Senate Electoral Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to
[102]
comment on the Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on December 1,
[103]
2015. David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
[104]
December 3, 2015:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November
2015.

The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November 2015
issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by
counsel for Respondent on 01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and
submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the
Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."

SO ORDERED.[105] (Emphasis in the original)

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received by David.
[106] [107]
On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this Court.

On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to
comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
[108] [109]
notice." The Resolution also set oral arguments on January 19, 2016. The Senate
Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on
[110] [111]
December 30, 2015. Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.

This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on Elections case
on the issue of private respondent's citizenship.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's
Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and
conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.

Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of two (2) factors:
first, the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal;
and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—through which one
who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this
Court.

I. A

The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a
[112]
creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

. . . .

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members . Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-
[113]
judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections ) the power to rule on
[114]
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as
well as of the House of Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct
constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body. The
resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal system an
"independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially
[115]
created for that singular purpose." The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral
Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests
[116]
relating to members of the National Assembly. This was a departure from the system
introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve such contests in
the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended to make room for a bicameral
legislature, a corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate electoral tribunals
[117]
for each chamber of Congress. The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral
tribunals, but they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.

All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide for the
creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been
unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.

[118]
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. . .
. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcohn as "full, clear and complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power
was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . The
same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution.[119]
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested
in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the
election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the
President and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be
initiated.

The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section
17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with
Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of
[120]
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:

The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final
action taken by the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases.
In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] , the Court has explained that
while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so,
however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . .
upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be
a remedy for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process
or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself
calls for remedial action.[121] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there has been
an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.

I. B

A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal
from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil
[122]
action. The viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of
[123]
discretion."

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:

[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave. [124]
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual
inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not
[125]
accounted for.

A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a

misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave
[126]
abuse of discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our
law.

Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from settled
principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent
against a party.

Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is
premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not
[127]
misrepresentation, of the evidence; (b) where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far
from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards
[128]
when the law is replete with standards that can be used"; "(c) where the tribunal's action
on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the
[129]
point of being grossly unreasonable"; and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or
[130]
irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.

I. C

We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive
reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations
of all its provisions.

Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological
parents are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly
makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original
jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial
precedent.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established personal circumstances
of private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending
her on a proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it
arose because private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout
her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on burdening
private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short months, the
one thing that she has never been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known about her finding.
Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in
proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
[131]
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."

In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune of
having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-
class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting
and defending the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.

II

Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall
be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not
qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a
foundling whose parents are unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus
sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is
supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of
the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave reverted to natural-born
status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.

Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section
1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as private respondent's foundling status is
settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With private respondent having
supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is
not a natural-born Filipino.

III

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have

biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must
consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling,
[132]
remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.

Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's purpose so as

to identify which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more
contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words—text—and how they are
situated within the whole document—context—govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning
from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is
more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating
the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.

III. A

The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily begin with the
text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from which
[133]
this Court determines constitutional intent.

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the
[134]
basic precept of verba legis. The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was
ratified and approved by a direct act of the People exercising their right of suffrage, they
approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution,
therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal,
understanding. Thus:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[135] (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the
framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of
these components' interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not
simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a
[136]
singular, whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be understood
and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational
[137]
principles to its finest fixings.

The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each provision at the
[138]
heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the

Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.[139] (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously
considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle
that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
[140]
[our] legal system." Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law. Nevertheless,
judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was
originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous
[141]
intent that the text brings to effect. Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of
considering prior interpretation as immutable.

Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has evolved.
Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re-adoption—often with
accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel,
provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.

One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current iteration with prior
counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for
more conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items
in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers,
and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change
galvanizes meaning.

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but
[142] [143]
even in organic laws and in similar mechanisms introduced by colonial rulers whose
precepts nevertheless still resonate today.

Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal interpretation must

grapple with the truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In Social Weather
[144]
Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, this Court explained the place of a holistic
approach in legal interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be
plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words
"paid for" evinces no distinction between direct purchasers and those who purchase via
subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from
actually using the word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation.
The variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what they
claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The
dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be
belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday
conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical
rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle,
rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In
reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes
that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to
consider context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social
ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the
bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that
describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider
not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it
is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered
provision but a norm that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of
those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution. [145] (Emphasis
supplied)
III. B

Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when
[146]
the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. It is only then that one can go beyond the
strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been
ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to
verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.

Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the

business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic
democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of
government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial
intervention in order to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To
remain true to its democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by
a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle underlies the
basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards
this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual
[147]
case, may be entertained.

When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions
[148]
on similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns), as well as thematically similar
statutes and international norms that form part of our legal system. This includes discerning
the purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts under consideration. It is also
only at this juncture—when external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying
notions of the framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other similar
accounts, can be illuminating.

III. C

In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from the
supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who
adopted the basic document is the weakest approach.

These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, they allow for
the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or
exhaustively articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent
and have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a
proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that motivated them
were based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can also
misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical
episodes through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.

Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always uniform with the
original understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the
polls gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's understanding
thereof.[149] (Emphasis supplied)
IV

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need
for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the
logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The
Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of
its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.

On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which
principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-
born citizens." This definition must be harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which
includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to
the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private
respondent's Filipino parentage.

On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its
mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law,
equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading
validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments,
executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from birth
means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-
born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is
qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

V. A

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[150]
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship . Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term "natural-born
citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section
1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count themselves as
natural-born.

The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated when
supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and natural-born
citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted,
but tardily defined, foreign concept.

V. B

[151]
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have rights." It
is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right
[152]
to petition the government for redress of grievance.

Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is part.
[153]
Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state,
considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits
and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.

[154]
Tecson v. Commission on Elections reckoned with the historical development of our
[155]
concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule. Under the Spanish, the
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish
[156]
subjects." Church records show that native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The
alternative identification of native inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the
[157]
colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior. Natives were, thus, reduced to
subservience in their own land.

Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not just
peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the
Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed
[158]
by special laws. It was only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction
of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
[159]
citizens, thus:

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.[160]
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain to
the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on December
10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically convert the native inhabitants to American
[161]
citizens. Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the
Congress of the United States:

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

Thus -
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by Congress.[162]
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had ceased to
be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
[163]
entitled to the protection of the United States."

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the Philippine
[164]
Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:

Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the Philippine
Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not
account for the status of children born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish
subjects. A view was expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by
[165]
place of birth), which was operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.

On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on
acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.[166]
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced
the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
[167]
amended:

Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not
[168]
a citizen of some other country."

There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring citizenship. It
was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage vis-a-vis the determination
[169]
of citizenship. Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provided:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's
provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
Article VII, Section 3 read:

SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-President, unless he

be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and
has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the
election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define the term.

Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law provisions that
stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands—was
[170]
discriminatory towards women. The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic situation:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
citizenship.[171]
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term "natural-born
citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provided:

SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. [172]
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on
citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
[173]
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution."

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[174]
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of natural-born
citizens, as follows:

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship . Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that was
transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.

In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term "natural-born
citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the presidency.
[175]
It is not defined in that Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale for
inclusion as a requirement for the presidency are not even found in the records of
[176]
constitutional deliberations. However, it has been suggested that, as the United States
was under British colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of being natural-born
was introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the administration of national
government:

It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a letter
sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787,
which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the
admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare
expressly that the Command in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve
on, any but a natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served valiantly
in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another
theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to rumors
that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch. [177]
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.

V. C

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the
Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-
[178]
born. Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal articulates this definition
by dichotomy:

[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino.[179]
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of naturalized
citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former
aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the
[180]
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens."

One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally required to file a
[181]
verified petition. He or she must establish. among others, that he or she is of legal age, is
of good moral character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and
principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time.
[182]
Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the
[183]
public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.

V. D

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. Section 2
categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional definition is further clarified
in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship.
Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written
into the interpreted text, thus establishing its contemporaneous intent.

Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is
misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's mere enumeration but
blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.

Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2 that
is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look
into whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls
for an inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual
naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more effective way to terminate
this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of proof.

At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as well
as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies
are misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly
devised. The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
[184]
capacity to act is restricted. It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before
the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is
contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be
discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It
privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.

So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is clear. It

should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be
contrasted, not against other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be
thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.

V. E

Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.

Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either
one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.

That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not
determinative of citizenship.

Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not
even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically
Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.

Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship of
everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure
Filipino bloodline.

Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be
sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either
or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.

V. F

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings attests to
how at least one—if not both—of her biological parents were Filipino citizens.

Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin with,
she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By
now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still
lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by
sheer economic cost, prohibitive.

However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish
her parentage.

In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-
[185]
Felipe v. People:

Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken
either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a
necessary or probable consequence.[186]
[187]
People v. Raganas further defines circumstantial evidence:

Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue,
which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause
and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.[188] (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in
reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of
[189]
circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. There is no rational basis for making the
use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may

result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof
that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial
evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent
standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the
[190]
Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on
[191]
September 3, 1968. In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a
[192]
predominantly Filipino population. Private respondent is described as having "brown
[193]
almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She
[194]
stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo.

These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological
parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with
how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment,
would have behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the
possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously
coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof
of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.

[195]
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, the Solicitor
General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private respondent was born a
Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his
[196]
statistical inference:

NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and
2010-2014

FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN

YEAR
IN THE PHILIPPINES IN THE PHILIPPINES
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
1967 1,440 840,302
1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
2010 1,244 1,782,877
 2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible][197]

Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18%
newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private
respondent was born a Filipino citizen.

Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half a
century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to
private respondent's parentage.

VI

Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained by a general

assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and considering that we have just
discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is
opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden of
proving—through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status.

Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a mere
showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.

Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all newborns who
have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on
private respondent's supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her
an impossible condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when
there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is
simply not known.

"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies
[198]
on the party making the allegations; that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the
[199]
issue" Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of
evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.
[200] [201]
The other party then bears the "burden of going forward" with the evidence
considering that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the
action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
[202]
the requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner's to
discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
respondent.

Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in
favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological
parents are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother
is a Filipino.

The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means
substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to
private respondent.

Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other
uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as substantive evidence of
private respondent's parentage:

(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;

(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;

(3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;

(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a foundling;

(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and

(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As against
petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that at
least one of private respondent's parents is a Filipino.

VII

Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading
that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s
reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in
the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus
natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section
1(2), any such countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's
biological parents are not Filipino citizens.

VII. A

Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's Dissenting Opinion to
the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or
[203]
presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case. He
insists that it is private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino
parentage.

Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates that actual
proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly
established in jurisprudence.

In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the allegations
that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe,
Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that:
first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the
[204]
country was still under Spanish colonial rule; and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of
residence, as indicated in his dearth certificate, must have also been his place of residence
before death, which subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of
[205]
Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. This Court then noted that
Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan
F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he
was born while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to
Filipino fathers, was in effect:

In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan
F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954,
in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.[206]
[207] [208]
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan and Go v. Ramos (which merely
cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.

Paa, decided in 1967, stated:

It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor
of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the State.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more recent ruling
in Tecson.

Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a
sentence specifically referencing the duty of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's
pronouncement—using the definitive article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific
only to Chan and to his circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic
language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in
that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged in favor of a claimant of Philippine
citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used other words that would show absolute or
sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of all claimants of Philippine citizenship."

The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its statements,
therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced
showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already
indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast,
petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of
both of her parents' foreign citizenship.

Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear that the same
pronouncement was generally applicable:

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In any case, Go
was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided
by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops are
different from those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and
undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates
unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.

VII. B

The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a
Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole
[211]
purpose."

As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in
light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal
protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect
human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for
requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.

Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to
enhance children's well-being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may
undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory
conditions and, especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the
veneer of the legal apparatus:
 ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

. . . .

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being . It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.

....

ARTICLE XV
The Family

. . . .

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

. . . .

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:

(1) President;[212]
(2) Vice-President;[213]
(3) Senator;[214]
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;[215]
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;[216]
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission;[217]
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;[218]
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;[219]
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;[220]
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;[221] and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.[222]
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include, among
[223] [224]
others, city fiscals, assistant city fiscals, Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of
[225]
the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices. Certain professions are also limited to
[226] [227]
natural-born citizens, as are other legally established benefits and incentives.

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country
in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means
such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their
aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all
through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to
exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no
fault of their own.

If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.

The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities
for public service:
 ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

. . . .

SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service , and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

....

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

....

ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like circumstances
and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
[228]
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"

Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial

[229]
distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are
both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of their birth.
Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them—an inability
arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to
statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much
benefits and protection from the state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this
classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very
beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.

This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the
Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and development of children.
It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.

Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are human persons
whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:

ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

. . . .

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII. C

Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of constitutional
text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines (unless
substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented)
is validated by a parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution
with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of
executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the
Philippines.

Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens at
birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect children.
Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put this mandate into effect.

Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
provides:

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed at all
times:

. . . .

(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will ensure
the observance of international standards of child protection, especially those to which the
Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be conducted in the best
interest of the child and in a manner which allows the child to participate and to express
himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the program and policy formulation and
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned
government agency. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" as the
"totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical,
psychological and emotional development."

[230]
Consistent with this statute is our ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection of: first, children's
rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and
[231]
third, against discrimination on account of their birth status. Pertinent portions of the
Convention read:

Preamble

The State Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

. . . .

Have agreed as follows:

. . . .

Article 2
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to
each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the
child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status.

2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against
all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take
all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
. . . .

Article 7
1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to
a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be
cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
[232]
The Philippines likewise ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be
allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends
them against discrimination:

Article 24. . . .

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

. . . .

Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
[233]
related instruments and whatever its particular designation." Under Article VII, Section 21
of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate before they became
binding:

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It
then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health
[234]
Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied
to domestic conflicts.[235] (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is necessary.
Thereafter, the whole of government—including the judiciary—is duty-bound to abide by the
treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of

discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon
birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to
unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.

Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of
promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from discrimination. Other legislative
enactments demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.

Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is
formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino
Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who is neglected,
[236]
orphaned, or abandoned."

[237]
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552:

SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the Department or the
child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to
locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered
as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country Adoption Act
of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes
foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be adopted:

SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for placement, the following
documents must be submitted: to the Board:

a) Child study;

b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;

d) Medical evaluation/history;

e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth
certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate
their adoption by foreigners:

SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true copy of the
Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended birth certificates as
issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required.
In case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following,
shall be required:

a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate of
the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed after the birth of the
child.

b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.

c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.[238] (Emphasis supplied)

Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on
account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their
citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they
are natural-born citizens.

Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized
her natural-born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until
circumstances made it appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines.
Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private
respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts.

First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic
adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on
October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—an
[239]
office that requires natural-born citizenship.

VIII

As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born

citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225
crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied
with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. A

"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by

[240]
law." Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was
naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private
respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen.
However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine
[241]
citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.

[242]
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Republic Act No.
[243]
8171 specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
[244]
other countries."

The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words, to
ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
[245]
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." This Court shed light on this
[246]
in Calilung v. Commission on Elections: "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of
[247]
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country."

Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and immutable despite
naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
provides:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act
9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries " retain," that is, keep, their Philippine
citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and
capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance
and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the
other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and
capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section
2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that
leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-
born status as though it was never lost at all.

VIII. B
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.
It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities
[248]
and responsibilities." However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of other
faculties:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities . - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or

b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces

of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective
public office must comply with all of the following requirements:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition
[249]
of one's status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and
political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws,
[250]
provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.

[251]
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws.
This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.
[252]

Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
[253]
any public officer authorized to administer an oath." This, along with satisfying the other
qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.

[254]
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, this required sworn
renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that
"[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times
and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
[255]
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law." It is also
in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office
elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from being appointed
or elected to public office in the Philippines.

VIII. C

Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she
[256]
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Second, on August 31,
[257]
2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. This evidences
her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote
within the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.
[258]
This was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
[259]
Nationality of the United States before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12,
[260]
2011, which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate
[261]
of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011 and the approval of this certificate by the
[262]
Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has
also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as
stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. D

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic Act
No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is
wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of
acts to perfect citizenship.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as

articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to
erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an
irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.

To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies reference to the
preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only
mean a reversion to "the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the
investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have used a word such as "reacquire."
Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements.

Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that repatriation involves
the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original nationality:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino .
[263]
(Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in
keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
[264]
citizenship." In Bengson's words, the once naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought
back to his or her natural-born status. There may have been an interruption in the recognition
of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of
natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a
Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is
recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have
consequences de facto.

Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of
Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating
the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no
singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must comply.
 IX

[265]
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless is not only to set a
dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the
bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright
irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence
at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any
economic relief.

If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate an
interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their being
abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by
mechanical judicial fiat.

Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against other
reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but
always with justice in mind.

It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must always
sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us,
as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional competence
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the
Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed
Decision and Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.

Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to

hold office as Senator of the Republic.

SO ORDERED.
Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking
any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In substance,
the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population
of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona
Sipocot Pasacao
Cabusao San
Fernando
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
Milaor Camaligan
Naga Magarao
Pili Bombon
Ocampo Calabanga
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No.
9716:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego 176,383
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District Libmanan San 276,777
Minalabac Fernando
Pamplona Gainza
Pasacao Milaor
3rd District (formerly 2nd Naga Camaligan 439,043
District) Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga
 4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of
the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the
Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step,
marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on
the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now
before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for such new district.4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the
Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former
second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the
new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the
former third and fourth districts of the province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) x x x x

(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in
the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be
supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing
legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000
inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement.

In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative
seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of
district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly
250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found
in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used
by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.

Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the
creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same
manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative
district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and

2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in

Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution. 12

The provision subject of this case states:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal
of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.

On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9716.

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for
the creation of a legislative district in a city.

In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an
additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly
valid reapportionment law.

We first pass upon the threshold issues.

The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the
following reasons:

1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents
maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or
quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.

3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition
is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been
 ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original jurisdiction.

The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is
in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No.
9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by
reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and
substance.

The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural
rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important
issue of overreaching significance to society.15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts,
and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski
case ratiocinates:

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is
in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of
the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.23

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The
beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in
a province.

We deny the petition.

We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When
there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there
is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To
doubt is to sustain.25

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion
than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city
to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the
subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC. 27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the
law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic
Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone
district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a
population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand," to wit:

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities
only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does
not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within
a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to
be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its
population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely

an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations
on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing
the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to
the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila.
Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population
had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an
absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the
sole, though it was among, several determinants.

From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country
into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner:
first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member
and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the Ordinance to
be appended to the 1987 Constitution:

Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn,
apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan
Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration
as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56
million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each
province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73
provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).

Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.

Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:

INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was
more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and
Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried
whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.

Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in
Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be
apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must
be compact, adjacent and contiguous.

Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the
northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.

xxxx

Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of
265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important
towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its
transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north
and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there
would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He
then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.

Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that
District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second
District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in
the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that
said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.

In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto
Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000
while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.

Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of
Aborlan.

There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.

APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN

There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body. 34

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.

Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:

At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the
Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and
Baguio City.

REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO

Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in
one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for
Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City
so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second
District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is
only 141,149.

Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the
year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for
purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise,
Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and
offices that are also there.

Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united,
Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through
Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.

Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the
Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of
many government offices and functions.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the
earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was
put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by
the Body.

Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will
have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun,
Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The
Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.

It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the
distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing
area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such
consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness." 36 In the districting
of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among
the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional,
political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong
proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:

x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an
additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not
allowed by the Constitution.

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non
for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has
increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─

based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional
Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section
5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the
Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;

2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly
based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the
reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon
by the petitioners.

3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:

(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of
Districts One and Two.41

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population
of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district
should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several
other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the
text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional
debates on the exact issue presented by this petition. 1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.
Aldaba v. Commission on Elections, 611 SCRA 137 (2010)
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of
the Decision dated 25 January 2010.1

The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in the
Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III
Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City’s population in 2010, is non-
justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City’s population
indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report 2) and as
of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July 2008, 3 and Certification of
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 20084) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic
Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.

We find no reason to grant the motion.

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating
legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review power, 5 then
there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such
as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in
Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation.
Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment
law alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation:

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions,
this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as
purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the
court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political
power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the
question is properly brought before it.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does
not render it political instead of judicial.

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for
approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means.
Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and
impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with
the precepts of the Constitution.6 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court
has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," a duty
mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the
COMELEC’s theory, this Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts
no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify
their creation. There can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.7

Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to
measure Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-
authoritative. On Miranda’s Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will
be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"),
this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be
based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared official by the National Statistical
and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of
the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by
the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using Miranda’s own growth rate
assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the
constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2007
which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does
not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator’s designated
certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use demographic
projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of
2010. 1avvphi1

Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report, the Certification of
the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay,
dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population indicator
under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report merely
contains preliminary data on the population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to
reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos City’s population
at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos
City’s claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year
2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement." 8 This
unbecoming attack by the government’s chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the
government’s census authority has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know that
absent convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity
in the performance of its functions.

The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its
ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business.
To elevate the water district’s so-called population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications
enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally gathered
by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though
these private entities are not in the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific
training, experience and competence to handle, collate and process them.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the Malolos
City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, much less
during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct population census are
local government units (that is, province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval
of the NSCB and

under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing.9

By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population
figures,10 the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized
certifications. EO 135’s stringent standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be
diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the legislative
function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at
least 250,000 constituents.

There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591. The
COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of
Miranda’s certificate.11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a parallel
statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express prohibition. 12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed
to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city’s
population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-
urbanized or an independent component city.13 Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of
EO 135’s paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the
population requirement in the creation and conversion of local government units shall be proved
exclusively by an NSO certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less
important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus
both processes should be subject to the same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010
elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in
compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from
the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the
geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that
each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create
a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of
the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an
insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the
constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation,
the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the
constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation
of the minimum mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on

Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.

SO ORDERED.
Navarro v. Ermita, 612 SCRA 131 (2010)
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional.

Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers
and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del
Norte once as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to
have previously filed a similar petition, which was dismissed on technical grounds.1 They allege that
the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of
Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory,
Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area.

The facts are as follows:

The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June
19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao
City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven
municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.

Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics
Office (NSO),2 the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416,
broken down as follows:

Mainland 281,111

Surigao City 118,534

Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354

Dinagat Island 106,951

How a province is created?

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province
may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than ₱20 million based on 1991
constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of
the province.

On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient
population in the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands.3

In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the
assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual
population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did
not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor
Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes,
the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576. 4

The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was
₱82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.

On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted
into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to
determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of
Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.5

On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of
Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.6

On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their
appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected
during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the
elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its
corporate existence.7

Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not
valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by
the Local Government Code.

Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent
appointments and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat
Islands be declared null and void. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother Province of Surigao
del Norte.

Petitioners raised the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT
ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER
SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATION OF DINAGAT AS A NEW PROVINCE BY THE

RESPONDENTS IS AN ACT OF GERRYMANDERING.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESULT OF THE PLEBISCITE IS CREDIBLE AND TRULY REFLECTS
THE MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE.8

In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat

Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal standing to
question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been
directly injured by its creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in controversy.
Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and academic because the existence of the Province
of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the petition should be dismissed.

The contention is without merit.

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,9 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws,
even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes
aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in
keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution.10

Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.11 The courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 12

The main issue is whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a
province because it failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement, despite its
compliance with the income requirement. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers,
which falls short of the statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based
on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat
Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a population of at least 250,000
inhabitants.

Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of Representatives and the
Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."13 The preceding italicized
provision contained in the Implementing Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated
as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioners assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that they
seek to implement, the law prevails.

On the other hand, respondents contend in their respective Memoranda that the Province of Dinagat
Islands met the legal standard for its creation.
1avvphi1

First, the Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the
proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices
was ₱82,696,433.25.

Second, the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the Province of
Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands; thus, it is
exempt from the required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code.

Third, in the special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte, with the
assistance of a District Census Coordinator of the NSO, the number of inhabitants in the Province of
Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or almost three years before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006,
was 371,576, which is more than the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

In his Memorandum, respondent Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the
special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2, 2003
was never certified by the NSO, it is credible since it was conducted with the aid of a representative
of the NSO. He alleged that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of NSO
officials, who testified during the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, and who questioned neither the conduct of the special census nor the validity of the
result.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is granted.

The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
states:

SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."14

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the
creation of a province, thus:

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income
of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
 (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. 15

As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires

a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.

If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does "territory," under Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code, include not only the land mass above the water, but also that which is
beneath it?

To answer the question above, the discussion in Tan v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 16 is
enlightening.

In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein contended that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new
Province of Negros del Norte, was unconstitutional for it was not in accord with Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code. Although what was
applicable then was the 1973 Constitution and the former Local Government Code, the provisions
pertinent to the case are substantially similar to the provisions in this case.

Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio (barangay in the 1987 Constitution) may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

The requisites for the creation of a province in Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 are similar to
the requisites in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but the requirements for
population and territory/land area are lower now, while the income requirement is higher. Sec. 197 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code, provides:

SEC. 197.—Requisites for Creation.—A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three
thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an
average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and
income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and
infrastructure funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. 17

In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping the
COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite scheduled on January 3, 1986. Since the Court was in
recess, it was unable to consider the petition on time. Petitioners filed a supplemental pleading,
averring that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held as scheduled, but there were
still serious issues raised in the case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such
exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by the Court.

At issue in Tan was the land area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, and the validity of the
plebiscite, which did not include voters of the parent Province of Negros Occidental, but only those
living within the territory of the new Province of Negros del Norte.

The Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area of the proposed
new province and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct the conduct
of a new plebiscite, because the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province did not
exist as it failed to satisfy the land area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the
new Province of Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area
of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below the statutory
requirement then of 3,500 square kilometers.

Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of the required territory
of the province to be created, what is contemplated is not only the land area, but also the land and
water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. The respondents submitted that in
this regard, the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the
extent of the territory of the new province.

The Court stated that "[s]uch an interpretation is strained, incorrect and fallacious." 18 It held:

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in
this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly,
reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the
waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical
contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World
Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above
sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses
of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words
associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R.,
p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
"territory" — the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the
word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also
territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section
197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute
should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the
words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664). 19

The discussion of the Court in Tan on the definition and usage of the terms "territory," and
"contiguous," and the meaning of the provision, "The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands," contained in Sec. 197 of the former Local Government Code, which provides
for the requisites in the creation of a new province, is applicable in this case since there is no reason
for a change in their respective definitions, usage, or meaning in its counterpart provision in the
present Local Government Code contained in Sec. 461 thereof.

The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),20 thus:

ART. 9. Provinces.—(a) Requisites for creation—A province shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income; and

(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which
must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code
when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local
Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be
complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code.21 There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law.22

Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" is
null and void.
Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
They contend that the exemption from the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers is
germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop political and territorial
subdivisions into self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals.23 They assert that in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,24 the
Court declared as valid the implementing rules and regulations of a statute, even though the
administrative agency added certain provisions in the implementing rules that were not found in the
law.

In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, the provisions in the implementing rules
and regulations, which were questioned by petitioner therein, merely filled in the details in
accordance with a known standard. The law that was questioned was R.A. No. 9207, otherwise
known as "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003." It was
therein declared that the "policy of the State [was] to secure the land tenure of the urban poor.
Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes." Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207 created
the National Government Center Administration Committee, which was tasked to administer,
formulate the guidelines and policies and implement the land disposition of the areas covered by the
law.

Petitioners therein contended that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixed the selling rate of a lot at
₱700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 did not provide for the price. In addition, Sec. 3.2 (c.1) of the IRR
penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval
of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by
R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and
should be nullified.

In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., the Court held:

Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed
by the law.

In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate
guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in
this authority and the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to
formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under
this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key
particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted
from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter
possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.

The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of
administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement
as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that
the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.

The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to
execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s authority to
formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay
down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are
reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the
parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell
and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 25

Hence, the provisions in the implementing rules and regulations that were questioned in Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. merely filled in the necessary details to implement the objective of the
law in accordance with a known standard, and were thus germane to the purpose of the law.

In this case, the pertinent provision in the IRR did not fill in any detail in accordance with a known
standard provided for by the law. Instead, the IRR added an exemption to the standard or criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code in the creation of a province as regards the land area
requirement, which exemption is not found in the Code. As such, the provision in the IRR that the
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one or more
islands is not in conformity with the standard or criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code;
hence, it is null and void.

Contrary to the contention of respondents, the extraneous provision cannot be considered as

germane to the purpose of the law to develop territorial and political subdivisions into self-reliant
communities because, in the first place, it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in
creating a territorial subdivision.

Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia,26 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the IRRs
issued by the Oversight Committee composed of members of the legislative and executive branches
of the government are entitled to great weight and respect, as they are in the nature of executive
construction.

The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue was whether or not Galarosa could continue to serve
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond June 30, 1992, the date when the term of office of
the elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired. Galarosa was the incumbent
president of the Katipunang Bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality of
Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; and was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
of Sorsogon pursuant to Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Sec. 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the former Local Government Code.

Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code of 199127 states that the duly elected presidents of
the liga [ng mga barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the component cities
and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang
bayan, sangguniang panglungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as
such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga chapters which, in no case, shall be
beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned. The section, however, does not fix the
specific duration of their term as liga president. The Court held that this was left to the by-laws of
the liga pursuant to Art. 211(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. Moreover, there was no indication that Secs. 49128 and 494 should be given
retroactive effect to adversely affect the presidents of the ABC; hence, the said provisions were to be
applied prospectively.

The Court stated that there is no law that prohibits ABC presidents from holding over as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan. On the contrary, the IRR, prepared and issued by the Oversight Committee
upon specific mandate of Sec. 533 of the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants
the hold-over authority to the ABC presidents under Art. 210, Rule XXIX. 29 The Court upheld the
application of the hold-over doctrine in the provisions of the IRR and the issuances of the DILG,
whose purpose was to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor
may be chosen and inducted into office.

The Court held that Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code could not have been intended to allow
a gap in the representation of the barangays, through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian.
Since the term of office of the punong barangays elected in the March 28, 1989 election and the
term of office of the presidents of the ABC had not yet expired, and taking into account the special
role conferred upon, and the broader powers and functions vested in the barangays by the Code, it
was inferred that the Code never intended to deprive the barangays of their representation in
the sangguniang bayan during the interregnum when the liga had yet to be formally organized with
the election of its officers.

Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa, the Court considered the relevant provisions in the
IRR formulated by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issuances of the DILG in the nature of
executive construction, which were entitled to great weight and respect.

Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the law’s four
corners.30 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms.31 If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history
of the law,32 or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive construction.

In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in
absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province
composed of one or more islands from the land-area requirement cannot be considered an
executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous
provision not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null and void.
 Whether R.A. No. 9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands

It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local
Government Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement.

R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land
area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less,
including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore,
failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.

The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less
than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population
conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only
106,951.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population
in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified
by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that
with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao
del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time
of the creation of the new province.35

Respondents contended that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of the
officials of the NSO during the deliberations on the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands, since they did not object to the result of the special census conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte.

The contention of respondents does not persuade.

Although the NSO representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated
November 24, 2005 did not object to the

result of the provincial government’s special census, which was conducted with the assistance of an
NSO district census coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result was not
certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the Local Government Code. Moreover, the NSO
representative, Statistician II Ma. Solita C. Vergara, stated that based on their computation, the
population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants would be attained by the Province of Dinagat Islands
by the year 2065. The computation was based on the growth rate of the population, excluding
migration.

The pertinent portion of the deliberation on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat
reads:

THE CHAIRMAN (Hon. Alfredo S. Lim): . . . There is no problem with the land area
requirement and to the income requirement. The problem is with the population requirement.

xxxx

Now because of this question, we would like to make it of record the stand and reply of
National Statistics Office. Can we hear now from Ms. Solita Vergara?

MS. VERGARA. We only certify population based on the counts proclaimed by the
President. And in this case, we only certify the population based on the results of the 2000
census of population and housing.

THE CHAIRMAN. Is that…

MS. VERGARA. Sir, as per Batas Pambansa, BP 72, we only follow kung ano po ‘yong
mandated by the law. So, as mandated by the law, we only certify those counts proclaimed
official by the President.

THE CHAIRMAN. But the government of Surigao del Norte is headed by Governor Robert
Lyndon Ace Barbers and they conducted this census in year 2003 and yours was conducted
in year 2000. So, within that time frame, three years, there could be an increase in
population or transfer of residents, is that possible?
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, but then we only conduct census of population every 10 years and
we conduct special census every five years. So, in this case, maybe by next year, we will be
conducting the 2006.

THE CHAIRMAN. But next year will be quite a long time, the matter is now being discussed
on the table. So, is that the only thing you could say that it’s not authorized by National
Statistics Office?

MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir. We have passed a resolution—orders to the provincial offices—to
our provincial offices stating that we can provide assistance in the conduct, but then we
cannot certify the result of the conduct as official.

THE CHAIRMAN. May we hear from the Honorable Governor Robert Lyndon Ace Barbers,
your reply on the statement of the representative from National Statistics Office.

MR. BARBERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning.

Yes, your Honor, we have conducted a special census in the year 2003. We were
accompanied by one of the employees from the Provincial National Statistics Office.
However, we also admit the fact that our special census or the special census we conducted
in 2003 was not validated or certified by the National Statistics Office, as provided by law.
So, we admit on our part that the certification that I have issued based on the submission of
records of each locality or each municipality from Dinagat Island[s] were true and correct
based on our level, not on National Statistics Office level.

But with that particular objection of Executive Director Ericta on what we have conducted, I
believe, your Honor, it will be, however, moot and academic in terms of the provision under
the Local Government Code on the requirements in making one area a province because
what we need is a minimum of 20 million, as stated by the Honorable Chairman and, of
course, the land area. Now, in terms of the land area, Dinagat Island[s] is exempted because
xxx the area is composed of more than one island. In fact, there are about 47 low tide and
high tide, less than 40? xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Governor. xxxx

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Although the claim of the governor is, even if we hold in abeyance this
questioned requirement, the other two requirements, as mandated by law, is already
achieved – the income and the land area.

MS. VERGARA. We do not question po the results of any locally conducted census, kasi po
talagang we provide assistance while they’re conducting their own census. But then, ang
requirement po kasi is, basta we will not certify—we will not certify any population count as a
result noong kanilang locally conducted census. Eh, sa Local Government Code po, we all
know na ang xxx nire-require nila is a certification provided by National Statistics Office. ‘Yon
po ‘yong requirement, di ba po?

THE CHAIRMAN. Oo. But a certification, even though not issued, cannot go against actual
reality because that’s just a bureaucratic requirement. Ang ibig kong sabihin, ipagpalagay, a
couple – isang lalaki, isang babae –nagmamahalan sila. As an offshoot of this undying love,
nagkaroon ng mga anak, hindi ba, pero hindi kasal, it’s a live-in situation. Ang tanong ko
lang, whether eventually, they got married or not, that love remains. And we cannot deny
also the existence of the offspring out of that love, di ba? Kaya…’yon lang. Okay. So, we just
skip on this….

MS. VERGARA. Your Honor.

REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Please, Ms. Vergara.

MS. VERGARA. ‘Yong sinasabi n’yo po, sir, bale we computed the estimated population po
ng Dinagat Province for the next years. So, based on our computation, mari-reach po ng
Dinagat Province’yong requirement na 250,000 population by the year 2065 pa po based on
the growth rates during the period of ….

THE CHAIRMAN. 2065?

 MS. VERGARA. 2065 po.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. . . . [T]his is not the center of our argument since, as stated by the
governor, kahit ha huwag na munang i-consider itong population requirement, eh,
nakalagpas naman sila doon sa income and land area, hindi ba?

Okay. Let’s give the floor to Congresswoman Ecleo.

REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is in connection with the special census. Before this was done, I went to the NSO. I
talked to Administrator Ericta on the population. Then, I was told that the population, official
population of Dinagat is 106,000. So, I told them that I want a special census to be
conducted because there are so many houses that were not reached by the government
enumerators, and I want to have my own or our own special census with the help of the
provincial government. So, that is how it was conducted. Then, they told me that the official
population of the proposed province will be on 2010. But at this moment, that is the official
population of 106,000, even if our special census, we came up with 371,000 plus.

So, that is it.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman.

Your insights will be reflected in my reply to Senate President Drilon, so that he can also
answer the letter of Bishop Cabahug.

MS. VERGARA. Mr. Chairman, may clarifications lang din po ako.

THE CHAIRMAN. Please.

MS. VERGARA. ‘Yon po sa sinasabi naming estimated population, we only based the
computation doon sa growth rate lang po talaga, excluding the migration. xxxx

MR. CHAIRMAN. No’ng mga residents.

MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, natural growth lang po talaga siya.36

To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had
an official population of only 106,951 based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population. Less than a
year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population.
The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only
120,813,37 which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. 38

In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.

The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code.39 Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. 40

Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a
province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.

Whether the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering

Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering
on the ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534
inhabitants, from the new province for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman. According to petitioners, if Siargao were included in the creation of the new
province, the territorial requirement of 2,000 square kilometers would have been easily satisfied and
the enlarged area would have a bigger population of 200,305 inhabitants based on the 2000 Census
of Population by the NSO. But House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, because its inclusion
would result in uncertain political control. Petitioners aver that, in the past, Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman lost her congressional seat twice to a member of an influential family based in
Siargao. Therefore, the only way to complete political dominance is by gerrymandering, to carve a
new province in Dinagat Islands where the Philippine Benevolent Members Association (PMBA),
represented by the Ecleos, has the numbers.

The argument of petitioners is unsubstantiated.

"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so

contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.41 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative
district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. 42 The
Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far
as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.43

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one
island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is
an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-
Villaroman.

Allegations of fraud and irregularities during the plebiscite cannot be resolved in a special civil action
for certiorari

Lastly, petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 9355 was ratified by a doubtful mandate in a plebiscite held
on December 2, 2005, where the "yes votes" were 69,9343, while the "no votes" were 63,502. They
contend that the 100% turnout of voters in the precincts of San Jose, Basilisa, Dinagat, Cagdianao
and Libjo was contrary to human experience, and that the results were statistically improbable.
Petitioners admit that they did not file any electoral protest questioning the results of the plebiscite,
because they lacked the means to finance an expensive and protracted election case.

Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they
cannot be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which is a remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.44 Petitioners should have filed the proper action
with the Commission on Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of
the correct remedy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of
the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and
VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
BANAT VS. COMELEC

Final exam question: How the Supreme Court explained the computation?

1. First Step Allocation

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list

(Number of seat available to legislative districts / 0.8) x 0.20 = Number of seats available to
the Party list representative

Example (385/0.80)x.020=96.25 Number of seats available to the Party list representative

385+96=481

2. Second step is the 2% threshold

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent
of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;

Party-list vote cast / total valid votes = > 2%

Example:
200 partylist
13,000,000 total votes

AT-CIS 2,000,000

a. 2,000,000/13M=15.38% ---1 seat qualifying guaranteed seat+1seat++1seat

An waray 1.5M/13M=11.53%---1 seat+1seat+1seat

Tingog 1.2M/13M=9.23%---1 seat+1seat+1seat

4P’s 1.1M/13M= 8.46%---1 seat+1seat+1seat

GAB 270k/13M=2.07%--1 seat

Kabataan 200k/13M=1.5%

Total of 13 seat to the priority party-list

96 Number of seats available to the Party list representative – 13 seat = 83

The 83 seats will be allocated to the Partly-list which garnered less than 2% of the threshold.

3. Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats;
b. 1 qualifying guaranteed seat

c. Additional guaranteed seat

4. Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Three requisites of domicile Art. 6 1987 Constitution

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling"
or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23 A domicile of
origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

The difference of the term and tenure of senators and HOR.

For the Senator, under Sec. 4, Article VI shall have six years tenure in each term. A senator is
only allowed a maximum of two consecutive terms. While for HOR, under Sec. 7 of the same
Article, shall have three years of tenure in each term. A member of the HOR is only allowed for a
maximum of three consecutive term.

Read tagolino vs. comelec for section 7