Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. Mandaluyong GR No. 135087

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 328 11/13/23, 2:36 AM
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 137

Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong
*
G.R. No. 135087. March 14, 2000.
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioners, vs. CITY

OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Eminent domain is the

right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare.·Eminent domain is the
right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable
attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of
government to serve the common need and advance the general
welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every
independent government without the necessity for constitutional
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of

civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public
use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but
limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. Thus, our
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018bc4d30e8515d27f75000d00d40059004a/p/ASW629/?username=Guest Page 1 of 16
own Constitution provides that „[p]rivate property shall not be

taken for public use without just compensation.‰ Furthermore, the
due process and equal protection clauses act as additional
safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental
power.
Same; Same; The power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local government units, other public entities and public
utilities.·The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in
nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly
delegated to local government units, other public entities and public
utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is
necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may
only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the
delegating law.
Same; Same; Despite the existence of this legislative grant in
favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to
determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegating law.·Despite the existence of this
legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of
the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is
being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. In fact, the
courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving
questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by
local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised
by the national legislature.
Same; Same; Requisites to be complied with by the local
government unit in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
·The courts have the obligation to determine whether the
following requisites have been complied with by the local
government unit concerned: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws. 4. A valid and
139
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 139
definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Same; Same; An ordinance, not a resolution, is required for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.·In the present case, the
City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain
over petitionersÊ property by means of a resolution, in contravention
of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from
ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a
resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; An ordinance promulgated by the local legislative
body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of
eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the
complaint with the proper court.·It is noted that as soon as the
complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter
upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing
with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property
to be expropriated. Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the
local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise
the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the
latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the
court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the
defendant is entitled.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 155.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Marius Corpus for petitioners.
Roberto L. Lim and Jimmy D. Lacebal for respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition
1
for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
petitioners pray for the reversal of the Order dated July
28, 1998
________________
1 Alberto Suguitan passed away on October 2, 1998. On November 25,

1998 the Court allowed the heirs of Alberto Suguitan to substitute the
latter as petitioner.
140

issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig

in SCA No. 875 entitled „City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S.
Suguitan, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to

Dismiss is hereby DENIED and an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION
is hereby issued declaring that the plaintiff, City of Mandaluyong,
has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together with
existing improvements thereon more specifically covered by
Transfer Certificate Of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds for
Metro Manila District II for the public use or purpose as stated in
the Complaint, upon payment of just compensation.
Accordingly, in order to ascertain the just compensation, the
parties are hereby directed to submit to the Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof, a list of independent appraisers from
which the Court will select three (3) to be appointed as
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court.
2
SO ORDERED.
It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994,

the Sangguniang Panlungsod 3of Mandaluyong City issued
Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then Mayor
Benjamin
_________________
2 Rollo, 17-18.
3
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
Lungsod Ng Mandaluyong
RESOLUTION NO. 396, S-1994
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS TO

INITIATE AND INSTITUTE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO EFFECT THE
EXPROPRIATION OF THAT PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 56264.
BE IT APPROVED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Mandaluyong in session assembled:
WHEREAS, the daily influx of patients to the Mandaluyong Medical Center
has considerably increased to a point that it could not accommodate some more.
141
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 141

S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the

property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and
Sto.
___________________
WHEREAS, as the Mandaluyong Medical Center is the only institution that

delivers health and medical services for free to the less fortunate residents of
the City of Mandaluyong, it is imperative that appropriate steps be undertaken
in order that those that need its services may be accommodated.
WHEREAS, adjacent to the Mandaluyong Medical Center is a two storey
building erected on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
56264 of the Registry of Deeds for Mandaluyong Branch.
WHEREAS, above structure and the land upon which the same is erected is
very ideal for the projected expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center in
order that it may continue to serve a greater number of less fortunate residents
of the City.
WHEREAS, and it appearing that the owner of the above property is not
desirous of selling the same even under reasonable terms and conditions, there
is a need that the power of eminent domain be exercised by the City
Government in order that public health and welfare may continuously be
served in a proper and suitable manner.
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion duly seconded, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to authorize, as Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos is hereby authorized, to initiate and institute appropriate
action for the expropriation of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds for Mandaluyong Branch, including
the improvements erected thereon in order that the proposed expansion of the
Mandaluyong Medical Center may be implemented.

ADOPTED on this 13th day of October, 1994, at the City of Mandaluyong.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AND
APPROVED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF MANDALUYONG IN REGULAR
SESSION HELD ON THE DATE AND PLACE FIRST ABOVE GIVEN.
(sgd.)
WILLIARD S. WONG
Sanggunian Secretary
142

Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of

414square meters and more particularly described under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of
Deeds ofMetro Manila District II. The intended purpose of
the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong
Medical Center.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter
dated January 20, 19954 offering to buy his property, but
Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, on March 13,51995,
the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for
expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The
case was docketed as SCA No. 875. 6
Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based
on the following grounds·(1) the power of eminent domain
is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is
no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject
property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate
the said property without payment of just compensation;
(4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and
appropriation for the payment of the property being
expropriated; and (5) expropriation of SuguitanÊs property
is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same
for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and
opposition to the motion. On October 24,7 1995, the trial
court denied SuguitanÊs motion to dismiss.
On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by
the respondent, the trial court issued an order allowing the
City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of

SuguitanÊs
__________________
ATTESTED: APPROVED:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
RAMON M. GUZMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS
Vice-Mayor Mayor
Presiding Officer On: OCT. 19, 1994
4 Rollo, 59.
5 Ibid., 20-25.
6 Ibid., 26-37.
7 Ibid., 60; RTC Records, 86.
143
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 143

property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of

the fair market value of the subject property based upon
the current tax declaration of such property. On December
15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of
the subject property by virtue of a writ of8 possession issued
by the trial court on December 14, 1995. On July 28, 1998,
the court granted the assailed order of expropriation.
Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may
only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by
means of an ordinance9 as required by section 19 of Republic
Act (RA) 10No. 7160, and not by means of a mere
resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly
and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that
pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a
sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation
proceedings with the Regional Trial Court. RespondentÊs
position, which11 was upheld by the trial court, was
explained, thus:
. . . in the exercise of the respondent City of MandaluyongÊs power of
eminent domain, a „resolution‰ empowering the City Mayor to

initiate such expropriation proceedings and thereafter when the
court has already determine[d] with certainty the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows
an Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungsod appropriating funds
for the payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
12
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Petitioners refute respondentÊs contention that only a

resolution is necessary upon the initiation of expropriation
proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order
to
________________
8 Ibid., 60-62.
9 Otherwise known as the „Local Government Code of 1991‰
(hereinafter, „[the] Code‰).
10 Rollo, 8.
11 Ibid., 15.
12 Ibid., 50-51.
144

appropriate the funds for the payment of just

compensation, explaining that the resolution mentioned in
article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting
administrative authority to the local chief executive to file
the expropriation case in court and to represent the local
government unit in such case, but does not dispense with
the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of13 the power
of eminent domain under section 19 of the Code.
The petition is imbued with merit.
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign
state to appropriate private
14
property to particular uses to
promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of
sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of
government to serve the common need and advance the
15
general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain
appertains to every independent government16
without the
necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions
found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating
to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government,17but limit a
power which would otherwise be without limit. Thus, our
own Constitution provides that „[p]rivate property shall not18
be taken for public use without just compensation.‰
Furthermore,
19
the due process and equal protection
clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of this governmental power.
________________
13 Ibid., 10.
14 Jeffress v. Town of Greenville, 70 S.E. 919, 921, 154 N.C. 490, cited
in Words and Phrases, vol. 14, p. 469 (1952).
15 Ryan v. Housing Authority of City of Newark, 15 A.2d 647, 650, 125
N.J.L., 336.
16 Schrader v. Third Judicial Dist. Court in and for Eureka County, 73
P.2d 493, 495, 58 Nev. 188.
17 Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 40 Phil. 550 (1919).
18 Art. III, sec. 9.
19 1987 Constitution, art. III, sec. 1.
145
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 145

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects

an individualÊs right to private property, a constitutionally-
protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately
20
connected
with the rights to life and liberty, the need for its
circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. 21 In City of
Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila we said:
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the

State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of
private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must
be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals

with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake
Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec, 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without
his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental
authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the
power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all
free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens,
constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the
law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and
to protect it from abuse . . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th
Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22
Phil., 411.)
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in

nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may
be validly delegated to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities, although the scope of this
delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than
that of the
________________
20 Joaquin G. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines: A Commentary, vol. 1, p. 43 (1987).
21 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
146

delegating authority and may only be exercised in22strict

compliance with the terms of the delegating law. The
basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by
local government units is section 19 of RA 7160 which
provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally,
That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of

local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to
determine whether the power of eminent domain23 is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law. In fact,
the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in
resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this
delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances 24
when it is directly exercised by the national legislature.
________________
22 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, id.; Moday v. Court

of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 (1997).
23 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, id.
24 Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 62 (1991); See also Republic
of the Philippines v. La Orden de PO. Benedictinos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA
649 (1961); City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, id.
147
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 147

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the

following requisites have been complied with by the local
government unit concerned:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative

council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner of the property sought 25to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to

exercise the power of eminent domain over petitionersÊ
property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the
first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from
ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance,
not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. We reiterate our ruling in 26Municipality of
Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation regarding the
distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that
1998 case we held that:
We are not convinced by petitionerÊs insistence that the terms

„resolution‰ and „ordinance‰ are synonymous. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a
general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently·a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
__________________
25 Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA
678 [1998].
26 Id.
148

We cannot uphold respondentÊs contention that an

ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the
court has determined the amount of just compensation. An
examination of the applicable law will show that an
ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint
with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the
power of eminent domain is already being exercised.
Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that
expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages:
(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the

authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends
with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint;
(2) the second phase is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken; this is done by
the court with the 27
assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners.
Clearly, although the determination and award of just

compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the
transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the
last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot
be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at

this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether
or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its
power of eminent domain.
_______________
27 National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 (1992), citing

Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989).
149
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 149

Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the

plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon the
possession of the real property involved upon depositing
with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the 28current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated. Therefore,
an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body
authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of
eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter
of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after
the court has determined the amount of just compensation
to which the defendant is entitled.
Neither is respondentÊs position improved by its reliance
upon Article 36(a), Rule VI of the IRR which provides that:
If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use,

purpose, or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its
chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
The Court has already discussed this inconsistency

between the Code and the IRR, which is more apparent
than real, in29 Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty
Corporation, which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules,

which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA
7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely
seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law
is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems
to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing
rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in
exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the
LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.
_______________
28 Code, sec. 19.

29 Supra note 25.
150

Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional

policy of promoting local autonomy, we cannot grant
judicial sanction to a local government unitÊs exercise of its
delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the
very law giving it such power.
It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case
will not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting
the necessary ordinance and thereafter reinstituting
expropriation proceedings, for so30 long as it has complied
with all other legal requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima,

JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.·Inherently possessed by the national legislature,

the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to
local governments, other public entities and public utilities.

(Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 [1997])
··o0o··
_____________
30 Id.
151
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 328 11/13/23, 2:36 AM

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 137

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioners, vs. CITY

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Eminent domain is the

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong

recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of

own Constitution provides that „[p]rivate property shall not be

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 139

Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1 Alberto Suguitan passed away on October 2, 1998. On November 25,

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to

It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994,

RESOLUTION NO. 396, S-1994

RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS TO

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 141

S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the

WHEREAS, as the Mandaluyong Medical Center is the only institution that

Mandaluyong Medical Center may be implemented.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AND

APPROVED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF MANDALUYONG IN REGULAR

SESSION HELD ON THE DATE AND PLACE FIRST ABOVE GIVEN.

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of

City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 143

property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of

. . . in the exercise of the respondent City of MandaluyongÊs power of

eminent domain, a „resolution‰ empowering the City Mayor to

Petitioners refute respondentÊs contention that only a

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

appropriate the funds for the payment of just

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 145

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the

be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in

20 Joaquin G. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the

146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

delegating authority and may only be exercised in22strict

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of

22 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, id.; Moday v. Court

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 147

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the

government unit concerned:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative

In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to

We are not convinced by petitionerÊs insistence that the terms

25 Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

We cannot uphold respondentÊs contention that an

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the

Clearly, although the determination and award of just

in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at

27 National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 (1992), citing