Ethics Essay
Ethics Essay
Ethics Essay
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Divine command theory is a deontological and meta-ethical theory in which moral
obligation consists in obedience to divine commands and therefore the morally ‘good’
action is the one that is consistent with God’s commands. Many different versions of the
theory have been presented yet I will be focusing specifically on the traditional account and
Robert Adams’ modification of this. In order to wholly understand Adams’ adaptation of it is
necessary to first explore the traditional Divine Command Theory in order to see how
Adams successfully adapts this. After discussing Adams’ improvements, such defining God as
omnibenevolent I will then evaluate ideas put forward by scholars who are opposed to
Adams’ modification such as Michael Austin. Ultimately, I will argue that whilst Adams’
modification of the Divine Command Theory overcomes certain criticisms it cannot
overcome all.
Traditional Divine Command theorists contend that an act is right if and only if the action
was commanded by God. For example, adultery is wrong if and only if God asserts that it is
wrong. This is due to the fact that God is omniscient and honest therefore he must know
that adultery is wrong. Therefore, that which is good has been commanded by God and this
knowledge of God’s commands comes directly from the Bible meaning according to Divine
Command theorists ethics should be grounded in the Bible. However, it is important to note
that the Divine Command Theory emphasises God as having the role of creating the facts;
just having the biconditional itself is not Divine Command theory, God’s commands create
these moral facts. There are many benefits to adopting the outlook that morality can only
be binding if it originates with God, for example it proves the idea of God’s omnipotence of
sovereignty. This is due to the fact that God would be reinforced as the supreme Lord of
Christianity therefore when a Christian asks what God’s will is, the question is a direct
appeal to a personal will, not to an independently existing rule.
In his dialogue ‘Euthyphro’, Plato outlines the main idea of the Divine Command Theory in
the first horn of his famous ‘Euthyphro dilemma’ (Plato, 380BCE [2007], 10a). After
Euthyphro explains that he is getting ready to bring murder charges against his own father
both he and Socrates discuss morality (Plato, 380BCE [2007], 4a). Euthyphro is certain that
prosecuting his father is the right thing to do as God commands it which leads Socrates to
pose the question of whether actions are right because God commands them, or whether
God commands actions because they are right (Plato, 380BCE [2007], 10a). If we take the
first horn of the dilemma (which Divine Command Theory does) then it faces serious
problems and these criticisms greatly outweigh the strength mentioned above. A persuasive
critique comes from James Rachels who argues that it makes morality into something
arbitrary (Rachels, 2003, 50). Therefore, it would be logically possible for immoral acts such
as rape to become morally good actions if God suddenly commanded them to be so. This
could lead to the entire concept of goodness and value becoming vacuous. Through these
criticisms it is clear that the traditional Divine Command Theory is insufficient when guiding
humans in morality and this could be the reason why it is a minority view even amongst
theists today.
Robert Adams, in ‘Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again’ argues that it is possible to
escape the two horns of Euthyphro’s dilemma by basing the Divine Command Theory on
God’s everlasting love (Adams, 1979, 222). Adams proposes what he calls a ‘modified’ Divine
Command Theory which attempts to define what being ethically wrong consists of (Adams,
1979, 221). Adams identifies being wrong as going against the commandments of an
omnibenevolent (all-loving) God, and therefore by extension, Adam’s Divine Command
Theory requires the assumption that God loves us (Adams, 1979, 222). Additionally, Adams
defines being morally right or wrong as objective (Adams, 1979, 221). By this Adams is
proposing that that our subjective opinions are irrelevant when discussing whether acts
such as stealing are wrong (Adams, 1979, 221) That is, the act of stealing is seen to be
ethically wrong irrespective of whether anyone actually believes that lying is wrong, as it is
contrary to the commands of an all loving God. The main way in which Adams revises the
traditional Divine Command Theory is that he adds the idea of an all loving God rather than
simply following the commands of a God (Adams, 1979, 222). This seems to remove the
criticism from James Rachels discussed earlier that if God commanded us to be immoral this
would seem like the right thing to do (Rachels, 2003, 50). In adding a simple characteristic to
God’s nature, Adams suggests that God cannot command cruelty for it is own sake as it is
inconceivable that an omnibenevolent God would knowingly command immoral acts such
as killing of innocent people or rape. It is important to note here that Adams is not
suggesting that it would be logically impossible for God to command cruelty for its own
sake, but simply that it would be inconceivable for him to do so due to his loving nature.
Adams’ modified Divine Command Theory seems to overcome the issues highlighted in the
‘Euthyphro dilemma’. It avoids the problem of the first horn of the dilemma as morality is
founded on God’s loving nature and therefore God would not command cruelty for its own
sake. Adam’s theory also seems to avoid the second horn of the dilemma as God exists
outside the moral law due to him being the ultimate source of morality.
Due to the many flaws of this approach it is quite evident that although Adams improves the
criteria of the original Divine Command Theory, it is not enough. Rather, one might look
towards other modifications, such as that put forward by Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski
proposes what she calls ‘Divine Motivation Theory’ where ethically right or wrong actions
are determined according to God’s motives rather than his commandments. This can be
seen as a more plausible adaption of the traditional Divine Command Theory as in Adams’
modification there needs to be a reason for God to desire the good yet in Zagebski’s
approach the motive already provides the reason. Furthermore, it solves the problem of
God’s attributes, that being his omnipotence and omnibenevolence being in conflict.
In conclusion, although Adam’s modified version of the Divine Command Theory is able to
somewhat solve the ‘Euthyphro dilemma’ and is a significant improvement upon the
traditional Divine Command Theory nevertheless the criticisms discussed show how the
Bible, and therefore God’s commands should not be seen as the only authority for ethical
practices. Austin ultimately shows how God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence
contradict each other and therefore Adams’ modification ultimately fails (Austin, 2006, 7a).
In contrast approaches such as that of Zagzebski could be seen as preferable when looking
towards Divine Command Theories.
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