cStudent Cover Sheet and Reflection on Feedback Form

University of Birmingham – School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion

Module Title: Just War (29256)

Module Level: LH
Student ID (SRN) 2041626
Essay/assignment title: Can it be morally permissible to kill a child in self or
other-defence?

Confirmed Word Count: 1953

Have you had an extension agreed? Yes No
If Yes, what is your extension deadline? N/A
What feedback have you received on earlier assessments, or while preparing this assessment?
 To evaluate more than explain
 To use more of my own examples
 To explain a scholar’s view more precisely

How have you responded to that feedback in this assessment?

 I have tried to dedicate more time to evaluation rather than simply explaining an argument
 I have tried to incorporate my own examples where possible
 I have tried to explain Thomson’s view as clearly as possible

What feedback on this assessment would best help you think about your next one?
 Feedback on whether the structure is correct
 Feedback on whether I need more of my own critical evaluation
 Feedback on whether I used enough of my own examples
In her 1991 article ‘Self-Defense’, Judith Jarvis Thomson gives a rights-based account of self-
defence. She argues that it is morally permissible to kill someone if they have forfeited their
right not to be killed. My aim for this essay is to discuss Thomson’s view and ultimately
defend it. My reasoning for choosing to discuss Thomson is as follows: it is uncommon to
want to defend her view, rather it is more common to take issue with it. Even those who
reach the same conclusion dispute her reasoning. However, I want to show through this
essay that there is more to be said in favour of her view than is widely appreciated. This
essay will be split into four main sections. I will begin by introducing a case study upon
which the rest of the essay will be based. Secondly, I will outline Thomson’s account.
Thirdly, I will explore a critique of her view; namely that Thomson does not appreciate the
importance of moral responsibility. Finally, I will introduce a proposed reply on Thomson’s
behalf to show that this critique fails. Therefore, I will ultimately agree with Thomson and
conclude that it can be morally permissible to kill a child in self or other-defence.

Due to the limited nature of this essay, I would like to begin by narrowing the focus to the
topic of child soldiers. I would like to present a case study upon which I will constantly refer
back to. This is necessary in order to wholly understand and evaluate Thomson’s account.
Suppose a group of soldiers are confronted by a group of child soldiers in a just war. Further
suppose that these children have been given drugs and have been indoctrinated for many
years (adapted from McMahan, 2010, 36). One of the child soldiers, let’s call him Dan, is
going to kill one of the soldiers unless the soldier kills him first. The obvious question to then
ask, goes as follows: can it be morally permissible for the soldier to kill Dan in self-defence?

I will liken these child soldiers to what Thomson refers to as ‘Innocent Aggressors’. This
being a person who poses a threat to you, but to which has no responsibility for their
actions (Thomson, 1991, 287). Take the example of Alan who unbeknownst to him had a
drug slipped into his morning coffee which makes him want to kill people. That day Alan
turns up at your house with a machete and the intention to kill you. It is true that Alan poses
an unjust threat to your life and has the intention of killing you. However, it is not the case
that Alan is responsible for his behaviour; his actions are explained by factors beyond his
control. On Thomson’s account it would be morally permissible for you to kill Alan before he
kills you with his machete. This is due to the fact that Alan forfeits his right not to be killed.
Thomson argues that this would be the same for a ‘Villainous Aggressor’ (someone who
intends to kill you) and an ‘Innocent Threat’ (someone who poses an unjust threat that is
completely out of their control) (Thomson, 1991, 283-286) In all three cases, it would be
permissible to kill the attacker in self-defence (Thomson, 1991, 287).

Let’s return to the original case study of the child soldier. It now becomes clear that Dan is
what Thomson refers to as an Innocent Aggressor. He poses an unjust threat to the soldier
and his intention is to kill him. However, Dan is not responsible for his actions since he was
drugged and indoctrinated. Thomson’s response to my initial question would thus be as
follows: it can be morally permissible for the soldier to kill Dan in self-defence as Dan has
violated his right not to be killed by posing an unjust threat to the solider. In short, Thomson
argues that it can be permissible to kill a child in self-defence if that so called child poses an
unjust threat to your life.
It is important to take a moment here to discuss the crucial distinction between forfeiting a
right and alienating/waiving it. When you alienate or waive a right, you voluntarily choose to
give up these rights. Take the common example of signing a form to allow a doctor to
perform surgery on you. In this case you are giving the doctor a permission that they did not
have before; you are removing the moral barriers represented by your rights. However, it is
essential to note that in this case you would not be forfeiting any rights. Forfeiting, on the
other hand, implies that one does not intend to lose any rights. This needs to be
distinguished from case where consent is given (e.g the doctor example).

However, I will now introduce an objection to Thomson’s account. This being she provides
an implausible account of what it means to forfeit a right. In order to forfeit a right, a person
must be morally responsible for the unjust threat that they pose. This view is supported by
Jeff McMahan, who in his paper, ‘An Ethical Perspective on Child Soldiers’, argues that the
basis of liability to defensive violence is moral responsibility (McMahan, 2010, 30). In short,
only if a person is morally responsible for their actions can it be permissible to kill them in
self-defence. Therefore, in the previously discussed case of Alan, it would be morally
impermissible for you to kill Alan in self-defence. If we return to the case study of Dan, this
critique becomes even clearer. Dan does not exercise any responsible agency; he has been
drugged and indoctrinated. According to the responsibility account, one has to be a morally
responsible agent in order to forfeit a right (McMahan, 2010, 31). Therefore, it would be
impermissible for the soldier to kill Dan in self-defence.

McMahan specifically discusses child soldiers in his paper. He argues that if child soldiers
pose a non-responsible threat (which we have established they do), just soldiers are morally
required to exercise restraint (McMahan, 2010, 33). In the case of Dan, despite the fact that
he is threating the life of the soldiers, on the responsibility account it is wrong to kill him. By
definition, an Innocent Aggressor is not responsible for their actions. McMahan thus
endorses the conclusion that innocent child soldiers, such as in the case of Dan, may not be
killed (McMahan, 2010, 36). Rather, he implies a moral responsibility account for forfeiting a
right.

However, I imagine Thomson responding to this objection with the following argument: the
responsibility account simply asks too much of us. This can be demonstrated through the
use of a case study. Suppose you are standing at the bottom of a ten-story building. Further
suppose that someone on the top floor balcony has been blown off by very strong winds
and is about to fall and kill you. Thankfully, you happen to have a device that instantly kills
someone by turning their body into dust. McMahan’s responsibility account would argue
that it would be impermissible to kill the falling person as they lack moral responsibility (due
to the wind). However, I believe this conclusion is counter-intuitive and too morally
demanding. I find it difficult to believe that the person at the bottom of the building would
simply sacrifice themselves in order to save the falling person. The same can be said for the
case of Alan. Would you really let Alan kill you just because you know he is not morally
responsible? I highly doubt it. The majority of human beings are not that selfless.

Another example which highlights the counter-intuitive conclusion that the responsibility
account leads us to is the well-known case study of Mary Bell. Mary was an 11-year-old girl
who killed two young children (aged 3 and 4) (Riddell, 2002). It can be argued that Mary was
not morally responsible due to her childhood. She was abused and nearly murdered by her
own mother (Riddell, 2002). This could mean that she was so broken due to her own abuse
that she did not have the mental capacity to know what is right and what is wrong.
Admittedly, it seems unlikely that the 3- or 4-year-old was able to fight back in self-defence
against Mary, however, let’s suppose an innocent third party was involved who happened to
have a gun on them. On the responsibility account it would be impermissible for this third
party to kill Mary as she is not fully responsible for her actions. However, I find it hard to
believe that anyone could argue that it would be impermissible to use defence against Mary
at the sake of her victims because she was abused. Mary has quite clearly forfeited her right
to life by attempting to kill them (even if she is not responsible). Mary would thus be an
Innocent Aggressor on Thomson’s account and it would be permissible to kill her in self-
defence.

Admittedly, one could reply to my response on behalf of Thomson with the following
objection: it focuses too much on the victim and what they are giving up, rather than being
a fact about the target. The whole point of Thomson’s account is that the Innocent
Aggressor forfeits their right not to be killed. Therefore, a concern with my response is that
appealing to a fact about the victim is not an appropriate defence of Thomson. This might
lead you to believe that what I am really appealing to is the partiality view. However, this
would be a mistake for the following reason: I believe Thomson’s account focuses on the
victim more than is widely appreciated. Yes, her main emphasis is on whether the aggressor
have forfeited their rights not to be killed, but this directly affects the victim. It is up to the
victim to decide whether the attacker has forfeited their right and thus whether they can
defend themselves in self-defence. I believe this to be a more intuitive approach than
working out whether the attacker is morally responsible or not. The responsibility account
puts too much pressure on the victim, whereas the rights-based account acknowledges that
a victim has to put themselves first.

It now becomes clear that it is still permissible to kill Dan in self-defence. These child
soldiers have forfeited their right to not be killed and whether they are responsible or not
does not play a part in this. It is not the case that one has to be a morally responsible agent.
Therefore, due to the critique failing, Thomson’s rights-based account still seems to succeed
and thus it can be permissible to kill a child in self-defence.

In conclusion, I have critically discussed Thomson’s rights-based account of self-defence. I

began by introducing a case study and asked the question of whether it can be morally
permissible to kill specifically a child soldier. Thomson argues that this would be permissible
due to the fact that these child soldiers have forfeited their right not to be killed. However, I
then introduced a criticism of Thomson; namely that only those who are morally responsible
can be killed in self-defence. Nevertheless, through a proposed reply from Thomson I have
proven that this critique fails. It is simply too morally demanding to expect human beings to
sacrifice themselves for others. Therefore, I conclude that if a child has forfeited their rights
not to be killed, it can be morally permissible to kill them in self or other-defence. Of course,
I have only discussed one possible critique of Thomson’s account and have shown that it
does not work. I do not deny that there might be other critiques that render her account as
unsuccessful, however that is beyond the scope of this essay.
Bibliography:
- McMahan, J. (2010) ‘An Ethical Perspective on Child Soldiers’ in Child Soldiers in the
Age of Fractured States, edited by Scott Gates and Simon Reich, University of
Pittsburgh Press, pp. 27-36. [Online] Available at:
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5vkgp3.7
- Thomson, J. (1991) ‘Self-Defense’ in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20 (4), pp. 283-
310. [Online] Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.ezproxyd.bham.ac.uk/stable/2265419?
seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
- Riddell, M. (2002) ‘Maybe we should hear more of Mary Bell’ in The Guardian.
[Online] Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/apr/21/childprotection.comment