(2032) Sgca (I) 5

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
[2023] SGCA(I) 5
Civil Appeal No 8 of 2022
Between
CSDS Aircraft Sales &

Leasing Inc
… Appellant
And
Singapore Airlines Limited
… Respondent
In the matter of SIC/S 4/2019 (Assessment of Damages No 1 of 2022)
Between

… Plaintiff
And
CSDS Aircraft Sales &

Leasing Inc
… Defendant
GROUNDS OF DECISION
[Damages — Assessment — Valuation of aircraft]

[Evidence — Weight of evidence — Expert opinion evidence]
This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the
court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance
with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law
Reports.
CSDS Aircraft Sales & Leasing Inc

v
[2023] SGCA(I) 5
Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 8 of 2022

Steven Chong JCA and Beverley McLachlin IJ
5 May 2023
19 June 2023
Steven Chong JCA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):
Introduction
1 This appeal, CA/CAS 8/2022 (“CAS 8”), concerns an award of damages

by an International Judge (the “Judge”) of the Singapore International
Commercial Court (the “SICC”) in Singapore Airlines Ltd v CSDS Aircraft
Sales & Leasing Inc [2022] SGHC(I) 15 (the “Judgment”), following an
assessment of damages hearing. The facts of the underlying suit are
unremarkable.
2 The appellant, CSDS Aircraft Sales & Leasing Inc (“CSDS”) entered
into a contract dated 19 September 2018 (the “Agreement”) to purchase from
the respondent, Singapore Airlines Ltd (“SIA”), a Boeing 777-212 aircraft (the
“Aircraft”) without engines at the price of US$6.5m. CSDS paid the deposit of
US$250,000, but failed to make payment of the balance sum of US$6.25m.
CSDS Aircraft Sales & Leasing Inc [2023] SGCA(I) 5
v Singapore Airlines Ltd
Following the trial on liability (as reported in Singapore Airlines Ltd v CSDS
Aircraft Sales & Leasing Inc [2021] 5 SLR 26), the SICC found that CSDS was
in repudiatory breach of contract and this breach was accepted by SIA as
bringing the contract to an end on 4 November 2018 (this finding was upheld
on appeal in CSDS Aircraft Sales & Leasing Inc v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2022]
1 SLR 284). Thereafter, the outstanding issue was the assessment of damages
for losses consequent upon the breach.
3 It was common ground between the parties that the measure of damages
for the repudiatory breach would be the difference between the contract price
and the market value of the Aircraft under s 50(3) of the English Sale of Goods
Act 1979 (c 54) (UK) (the “SGA 1979”). The key issue before the Judge, and
also before us on appeal, pertained to the proper determination of the market
value of the Aircraft. The Judge relied on both the factual and expert evidence
on record to arrive at the market valuation of the Aircraft at US$1.5m (Judgment
at [52]).
4 The crux of CSDS’ case was that the Judge had erred when he entirely
disregarded the expert evidence to arrive at his own valuation. As we will
explain below, this submission was wrong both factually and as a matter of legal
principle. Contrary to CSDS’ submission, the Judge did in fact take into account
the expert evidence. Further, the assessment of the available evidence does not
require the court to undertake a binary exercise in preferring one category of
evidence over the other. The weight to be ascribed to any expert evidence is
typically fact-sensitive and must necessarily take into account the factual matrix
before the court. The court’s task is to assess all the evidence holistically, both
factual and expert evidence, and to ascribe the appropriate weight depending on
2
the issue, the nature and inherent reliability of the evidence. These principles
assume central importance in this appeal.
5 We heard and dismissed CAS 8 on 5 May 2023 with brief grounds. In

these detailed grounds, we will expound on the role of the court in evaluating
the interaction between factual and expert evidence in relation to the same issue
concerning valuation, and how they each play a useful role in providing a reality
check on the probative weight of the evidence.
The background
The factual evidence underlying the dispute
6 By way of background, SIA is a Singapore company that carries on the

business of an international carrier by air, whilst CSDS is a US company
carrying on the business of aircraft sales and leasing. Following the finding that
CSDS was in repudiatory breach of the Agreement, SIA claimed the following
heads of damages:
(a) the difference in the contract price and the market value of the
Aircraft, under s 50(3) of the SGA 1979, which would, it was submitted,
allow for a reasonable time for negotiation and conclusion of a substitute
sale following acceptance of the repudiation;
(b) parking and maintenance fees from 4 November 2018 until the
expiry of that reasonable time; and
(c) marketing, brokerage and legal costs.
7 Despite various efforts by SIA to resell the Aircraft without engines after
4 November 2018, no successful substitute sale was concluded. These were
3
attempted by way of issuing Requests for Proposals (“RFP”) on 20 November

2018, 12 March 2019 and May 2019. The RFPs provided the general
specifications, incident history and maintenance status of the Aircraft to
prospective purchasers. There were also attempts to sell the component parts of
the Aircraft in circumstances where the Aircraft could not fly without passing
various tests and obtaining certifications at some expense.
The November 2018 RFP and the revised bid
8 On 29 November 2018, SIA issued an RFP for the sale of the Aircraft
without engines by placing a public advertisement on “Aeroconnect” (a web-
based aviation marketplace with over 9,000 key commercial contacts), and by
sending an RFP to its usual list of 200 or so prospective purchasers (the
“November 2018 RFP”). Under the November 2018 RFP, buyers had the option
of either (a) ferrying the Aircraft out of Singapore with its own engines, or
(b) dismantling the airframe and harvesting the aircraft components.
9 On the evidence of SIA’s senior manager responsible for aircraft sales,

the highest bid received pursuant to the November 2018 RFP was US$2.1m.
However, the party who submitted the bid subsequently informed SIA that it
would have to reduce and/or withdraw its bid. This was due to difficulties which
made the sale of the Aircraft or its components uneconomic. To elaborate on
these difficulties:
(a) By 10 November 2018, even though the Certificate of

Airworthiness for the Aircraft continued to be valid, the Aircraft was not
allowed to be ferried to another destination while the Aircraft remained
under Singapore registration, unless the Aircraft underwent a series of
extensive and expensive maintenance checks (which had expired).
4
(b) As the sale was to be without engines, in order to remove the

Aircraft, a purchaser would have to bring in its own engines, utilise its
own crew, and then change the registration of the Aircraft. Alternatively,
a buyer seeking to harvest the Aircraft for its components would have to
dismantle the Aircraft in Singapore and dispose of the airframe after
doing so (which would also involve significant costs).
(c) Additionally, the Changi Airport Group (“CAG”) did not permit
disposal of the airframe at the “airside” at Singapore Changi Airport.
10 Given the circumstances, SIA had to explore alternatives. As it

happened, CAG had expressed an interest in taking the Aircraft’s airframe for
training purposes (on the condition that the landing gear, windows and doors
remained intact), in exchange for assisting to dismantle and dispose of the
airframe at no cost. This would allow other purchasers to harvest the remaining
parts. SIA considered CAG’s proposal as being worthwhile to explore. In the
circumstances, SIA requested the top three bidders who previously responded
to the November 2018 RFP to offer a revised bid for the Aircraft components,
without the airframe, landing gear, windows and doors. The highest bid for the
revised inventory components only amounted to US$600,000, which SIA
decided not to pursue as it was inadequate.
The March 2019 RFP
11 A further RFP was then issued on 12 March 2019 based on components

to be harvested in two phases in 2019 (the “March 2019 RFP”). Under the
March 2019 RFP, a prospective purchaser may harvest a selected list of
components, with an option of bidding for the landing gear, but leaving the
airframe intact for CAG. SIA sent this RFP to the usual list of prospective
5
purchasers, comprising some 200 parties. SIA eventually received three bids,
and the highest bid was US$1.315m for the components without the airframe.
12 However, SIA did not proceed with this bid as it considered redeploying
the Aircraft to meet the operational needs of its sister airlines, SilkAir or Scoot.
But if extensions to leases on the other aircrafts could be negotiated for SilkAir
or Scoot, then the redeployment of the Aircraft would not be needed – as in fact
ultimately proved to be the case.
13 Around May 2019, whilst preserving options, SIA placed public

advertisements on “Aeroconnect” and “Airfax” (a publication on the worldwide
availability of commercial transport aircraft) for the sale of the Aircraft. While
SIA received a few enquiries, no firm offer was made.
Other attempts from August 2019 to October 2020
14 By August 2019, SIA decided not to proceed with the deployment of the
Aircraft to its sister airlines. SIA then recontacted the highest bidder for the
March 2019 RFP (at US$1.315m) to enquire if it was still interested in pursuing
its previous bid. However, the bidder was no longer keen and did not make an
offer.
15 Up until October 2019, SIA continued to place public advertisements on

“Aeroconnect” and “Airfax”, and advertised the Aircraft for sale at aviation
trade fairs in Singapore. SIA also engaged with a number of different parties in
attempts to sell the Aircraft, but all without success.
16 Between November 2019 and May 2020, as SIA was in settlement

discussions with CSDS that involved the delivery of the Aircraft, SIA did not
6
take steps to sell or advertise the Aircraft in this period whilst it was in active
discussions. As it transpired, SIA and CSDS were not eventually able to reach
a settlement.
17 Finally, by October 2020, after the discussions with CSDS had come to
an end and it appeared that there was no longer any market for the Aircraft
(COVID-19 had severely impacted the market by then), SIA decided to part out
the Aircraft. Having outlined the factual evidence on record, we turn next to
examine the expert evidence.
The expert evidence on the market value of the Aircraft
18 SIA adduced expert evidence from Mr Philip Seymour (“Mr Seymour”),

a senior certified aircraft appraiser. Although CSDS attempted to present
opposing evidence from its own expert, the expert was eventually not tendered
for cross-examination and no reliance could be placed on that expert’s report.
As a result, the only expert evidence before the court came from Mr Seymour.
19 Mr Seymour provided a valuation of the Aircraft based on information

obtained from the International Bureau of Aviation Group Limited (“IBA”)
which publishes the Aircraft Values Book (“AVB”) of various aircrafts, in
particular, the market values of B777-200 and B777-200ER aircrafts at various
dates:
7
20 However, the Aircraft’s actual model was a B777-212 aircraft. As only

the valuations for B777-200 and B777-200ER aircrafts were available, certain
adjustments had to be made. There were two options available for Mr Seymour
to arrive at the Aircraft’s notional valuation. The first would be to start from the
market value of the cheaper B777-200 model and adjust upwards to reach the
Aircraft’s model (a B777-212 model), and the second is to start from the more
expensive B777-200ER model and extrapolate downwards.
21 Mr Seymour adopted the first method. He opined that the Aircraft (a

B777-212 model) had specifications that were more similar to those of the
B777-200 model than the B777-200ER model because, amongst other reasons,
the maximum take-off weight (“MTOW”) values were closer. The B777-212
model uses Trent 884 engines with an MTOW of 555,000lbs, which was only
10,000lbs less than the B777-200 model which uses Trent 875 engines. This
meant that the notional value of the Aircraft should be derived by using the AVB
of the B777-200 model as a starting point given the more suitable comparability.
22 Mr Seymour’s valuation methodology for the Aircraft can be broken

down into the following steps:
8
(a) Step 1: The AVB market value of a B777-200 aircraft was stated
by the IBA to be US$14.02m in both February 2019 and August 2019.
(b) Step 2: Mr Seymour marked up these values by approximately

11% to account for the difference in the MTOW for the Aircraft, which
was 10,000lbs higher. He also added a premium for the “better than
average” standard of maintenance of the Aircraft. This resulted in a
notional market value of the Aircraft with engines at US$15.62m in
February 2019 and US$15.4m in August 2019.
(c) Step 3: Since the figures included the values of two engines on
the notional aircraft (whereas the Aircraft was sold without engines),
Mr Seymour then deducted the value of two Trent 884 engines found on
B777-212 models like the Aircraft (instead of Trent 875 engines found
on B777-200 models) to determine the value of the Aircraft without
engines. The market value of two Trent 884 engines was US$11.76m in
both February 2019 and August 2019. After subtracting these, the
9
resulting figures were US$3.86m in February 2019 and US$3.64m in

August 2019.
(d) Steps 4–6: Various adjustments were made to the Aircraft’s

valuation to account for specific technical and maintenance factors, and
the Aircraft being out of use for a long period, etc. The final median
point market value as of February 2019 and August 2019 was US$2.14m
and US$1.17m respectively (and the mid-point of these figures for
May 2019 would have been US$1.66m) (Judgment at [50]).
23 As we will elaborate below, a key point of contention regarding

Mr Seymour’s valuation methodology was whether he was correct in deducting
the value of two Trent 884 engines (found on the B777-212 models like the
Aircraft) instead of Trent 875 engines (found on B777-200 models). This matter
is further complicated by Mr Seymour’s concession at the trial that he could
have been mistaken in this regard. Having set out the relevant evidence, we
summarise the key findings by the Judge below.
Decision below
24 The Judge assessed the factual evidence, in particular SIA’s attempts to

sell the Aircraft from November 2018 to October 2020 and the various RFPs
issued (Judgment at [18]–[25]). Based on this evidence, the Judge opined that
the best offer resulting in a net realisation was the US$1.315m bid from the
March 2019 RFP, and that could have been concluded in a period of six months
from 4 November 2018 (ie, 4 May 2019) (Judgment at [26]–[27]). The six-
month period was a reasonable time to conclude a substitute sale of the Aircraft
as the market was weak and there were particular difficulties standing in the
way of the sale of the Aircraft (Judgment at [47]–[48]).
10
25 The Judge also considered the expert evidence from Mr Seymour which
he found to be objective, careful and conservative (Judgment at [15]), apart from
two problematic aspects. The first aspect related to Mr Seymour’s concession
at the trial that, having utilised the value of a B777-200 model and adjusted it
upwards to obtain the notional value for the Aircraft (a B777-212 model), he
should have deducted the value of Trent 875 engines rather than Trent 884
engines. The Judge thought that this was a mistaken concession by Mr Seymour
(Judgment at [14] and [33]).
26 The second issue related to a missing adjustment in Mr Seymour’s

calculations regarding the difference between the engine thrust of a B777-200
model at 74,500lbs and that of the Aircraft itself (a B777-212 model) at
85,940lbs (Judgment at [32] and [35]). However, the Judge was unsure how to
correct for this differential without expert evidence (Judgment at [36]).
27 Nevertheless, considering both the expert and factual evidence, the

Judge concluded that the maximum market price obtainable for the Aircraft
before 4 May 2019 was US$1.5m (Judgment at [50]–[52]). Therefore, the
consequential damages suffered by SIA amounted to US$4.75m (being the
contract price of US$6.5m, less the US$250,000 deposit paid and the US$1.5m
market valuation). Lastly, the Judge also awarded the attendant parking and
maintenance charges required to store and maintain the Aircraft for inspection
by potential buyers for six months amounting to S$233,829.87, and
miscellaneous legal costs of US$10,000 (Judgment at [54]–[57]).
The parties’ submissions and the issues raised in the appeal
28 CSDS averred that the Judge erred in completely disregarding

Mr Seymour’s expert evidence and instead the Judge used unsubstantiated
11
factual evidence to determine the Aircraft’s market value. CSDS claimed that
the third-party offer of US$1.315m should not be considered because the price
at which the seller can resell the goods to a third party is irrelevant. Instead, the
Judge should have corrected Mr Seymour’s valuation methodology and relied
solely on the expert evidence. In particular, the Judge should have concluded
that Mr Seymour was indeed mistaken in deducting the value of Trent 884
engines (totalling US$11.76m) instead of Trent 875 engines (totalling
US$7.06m), which Mr Seymour had conceded to under cross-examination. Had
the Trent 875 engines been deducted instead, along with other adjustments, SIA
would not be entitled to any damages as the market value of the Aircraft would
have exceeded the purchase price of US$6.5m. Lastly, CSDS disputed the
Judge’s finding that the Aircraft could only be sold within six months (which
CSDS argued should have been three months instead) as the market was not
weak, and this had follow-on consequences on the parking and maintenance
charges to be paid.
29 As against this, SIA submitted that the Judge’s decision should be

upheld. There was no reason to criticise the Judge’s finding that the market
value of the Aircraft was US$1.5m as of 4 May 2019 which was arrived at after
careful consideration of both the factual and expert evidence presented to the
court. In doing so, the Judge was entitled to rely on the highest bid from the
March 2019 RFP to determine the market value of the Aircraft. Lastly, there
was no basis to disturb the Judge’s finding that the reasonable time for a
substitute sale was within six months, given the weak market and the particular
difficulties standing in the way of the sale. As such, there was no basis to
challenge the parking and maintenance charges for that six-month period.
12
30 Based on the parties’ respective submissions, the following key issues

arose for our determination on appeal:
(a) First, did the Judge err in determining that the market value of
the Aircraft was US$1.5m at the time when the substitute sale ought to
have been concluded? This question gave rise to related sub-issues:
(i) whether the Judge had wrongly disregarded

Mr Seymour’s expert evidence;
(ii) whether the third-party offer in the March 2019 RFP

should be given due weight in determining the market value of
the Aircraft; and
(iii) whether the concession made by Mr Seymour should not

have been ignored.
(b) Second, did the Judge err in finding that the reasonable time to
conclude a substitute sale of the Aircraft was six months (ie, May 2019),
and consequently, whether there was any basis to challenge the parking
and maintenance fees?
Our decision
31 As indicated above, having reviewed the submissions of the parties, we

dismissed CAS 8. We deal with each of the issues raised in turn.
13
Issue 1: The market valuation of the Aircraft
The court’s role in assessing factual and expert evidence, and whether the
Judge had wrongly disregarded Mr Seymour’s expert evidence
32 The court’s determination as to whether it should accept parts of an

expert’s evidence is guided by considerations of consistency, logic and
coherence – and this requires a scrutiny of the expert’s methodology and the
objective facts which he relied on to arrive at his opinion (Armstrong, Carol
Ann (executrix of the estate of Peter Traynor, deceased, and on behalf of the
dependents of Peter Traynor, deceased) v Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd and
another and other appeals [2020] 1 SLR 133 at [90]).
33 It is axiomatic that the process of valuing assets is largely fact-sensitive

in nature and is typically reliant on expert evidence to assist the court (Abhilash
s/o Kunchian Krishnan v Yeo Hock Huat and another [2019] 1 SLR 873
(“Abhilash”) at [3]). Evidence of a genuine third-party offer to acquire an asset,
made at arm’s length, and which is not speculative or conditional should be
taken into account when determining fair market value (Abhilash at [76]; Lim
Chong Poon v Chiang Sing Jeong [2020] SGCA 27 (“Lim Chong Poon”) at
[20]), although such offers would not invariably represent the best evidence
under all circumstances.
34 In other words, the court must factor into its analysis all categories of
evidence (both factual and expert) when arriving at its conclusion on valuation.
These pieces of evidence must be tested against one another, having regard to
logic and common sense. For example, in Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda
International Capital Ltd and another [2023] 3 SLR 140 (at [27]–[29]), the
SICC rejected certain assumptions made by the expert in her valuation report
14
on the value of a production licence as those assumptions did not square with
the factual matrix and there was no evidential basis to support them. Thus, the
expert’s calculations were found to be incorrect and unreliable.
35 Contrary to CSDS’ assertions, there is no binary choice to be made in

only considering one category of evidence to the exclusion of the other. The
weight to be ascribed to each category of evidence depends on the issue in
question, the nature of the evidence and its inherent reliability. The court should
be guided by the particular needs of the case in deciding how to apportion
weight between the factual and expert evidence (Tristram Hodgkinson and
Mark James, Expert Evidence: Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed,
2020) (“Expert Evidence”) at [12-011]). In doing so, the court is at liberty to
decide which class of evidence it prefers, and there is no hierarchy of evidence
on particular issues including the determination of the market value of an asset
(Expert Evidence at [12-010]).
36 In this connection, we disagreed with CSDS’ argument that the Judge

had completely disregarded Mr Seymour’s expert evidence when ascertaining
the market value of the Aircraft. This is self-evident from the Judge’s reasoning
(Judgment at [50] and [52]):
50 If regard is had to Mr Seymour’s figures and a market

value, determined in the abstract without reference to what
actually happened in the efforts to conclude a sale, and working
on the basis of six months as a reasonable period in which to
conclude a sale, it is the date of 4 May 2019 to which attention
should be directed. On his conclusions, the value of the Aircraft
at February 2019 was between US$1.94m and US$2.34m and
at August 2019 was between US$970,000 and US$1.37m. The
median point of each range is US$2.14m and US$1.17m. As
May is the median point between those dates, a median figure
between those figures would be US$1.66m.
…
15
52 In the circumstances and doing the best that I can on

the evidence, both expert and factual, and bearing in mind that
the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff, in my judgement the
maximum price which could have been obtained at any stage
before 4 May 2019 was US$1.5m, representing an uplift from
the bid of US$1.315m for parts which was made in March 2019.
That is not too different from Mr Seymour’s conclusion for that
date albeit made with a missing element in his computation. At
the end of the day, it is the factual evidence which must be
decisive here, allowing only for a bit of latitude because of the
uncertainties of the situation and taking into account
Mr Seymour’s evidence.
[emphasis added]
As observed, the Judge first referred to Mr Seymour’s estimated market value

of the Aircraft as of May 2019 (by taking the midpoint of the February and
August 2019 figures), which was US$1.66m. The Judge noted that this figure
was determined in the abstract without reference to what actually happened.
Thereafter, the Judge considered holistically all facets of the evidence, both
expert and factual, and concluded that the maximum market value obtainable
was US$1.5m which “represented an uplift from the bid of US$1.315m” in the
March 2019 RFP and this was “not too different from Mr Seymour’s conclusion
for that date”. Thus, the Judge did not turn a Nelsonian eye to the expert
evidence. Rather, the Judge merely decided to ascribe more weight to the March
2019 RFP bid (which he was entitled to do) when he found that “it is the factual
evidence which must be decisive”, but also “taking into account Mr Seymour’s
evidence”.
37 Therefore, the question then is whether the Judge erred in giving more
weight to the third-party offer, which we now address.
16
Whether the third-party offer in the March 2019 RFP should be given due
weight in determining the market value of the Aircraft
38 In determining the market value of an asset, the actual price at which the
seller has resold the asset to a third party at a later date after the buyer’s
repudiation may be treated as evidence of the market value where it is difficult
to assess (James Edelman, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed,
2021) (“McGregor on Damages”) at [25-121]; Chitty on Contracts vol 2 (Hugh
G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2021) (“Chitty on Contracts”) at
[46-380]). In AerCap Partners I Ltd v Avia Asset Management AB [2010]
EWHC 2431 (Comm), in relation to a dispute concerning the sale of two Boeing
aircrafts, the seller was held to be entitled to the difference between the contract
price and the substantially lower price at which it actually resold the aircrafts
many months after the buyer’s contractual repudiation. This was on the basis
that the resale price constituted good evidence of the market value, and no other
available market had appeared until the time of the resale (at [115] and [117]).
The same principles apply to third-party offers, ie, that they may provide
informational value as to the fair market value of an asset, though not having
determinative weight (Abhilash at [73]). The aggrieved seller may be able to
establish proof of the market value by “seeking several offers for the goods from
prospective buyers with a view to accepting the best price obtainable” (Chitty
on Contracts at [46-380], footnote 1709) and these include “the price of an offer
not yet crystalised into a contract” (McGregor on Damages at [25-121],
footnote 547).
39 The present appeal deals squarely with a situation where it was difficult
to ascertain the market value of the asset in question, and thus reference to third-
party offers was relevant. It is pertinent to highlight the unique conditions in
relation to the sale of the Aircraft. It was to be sold without engines. This, as the
17
evidence has borne out, created enormous difficulties in attracting prospective

offers given the substantial costs associated with ferrying the Aircraft out of
Singapore or in dismantling it for parts (see above at [9]). Indeed, a higher bid
was initially made pursuant to the November 2018 RFP at US$2.1m, but that
was later withdrawn shortly after due to the aforementioned impediments which
made the transaction uneconomic.
40 Further, as the Judge correctly found, although there was an available

market for the Aircraft, the market was comparatively soft and first-generation
Boeing aircrafts were proving difficult to sell (Judgment at [44] and [46]). This
was supported by the objective factual evidence. After multiple rounds of RFPs
issued by SIA and various public advertisements issued over a span of two years
(see above at [8]–[15]), there was only one serious and viable offer on the table
– the March 2019 RFP bid for $1.315m. This was a tangible and real offer that
should be given due regard as it was genuine, made at arm’s length, and was not
speculative or conditional (Abhilash at [76]; Lim Chong Poon at [20]). Instead,
it was only by reason of SIA’s own conduct, in not proceeding with the March
2019 RFP bid when considering the redeployment of the Aircraft (see above at
[12]), that the offer had lapsed.
41 Under such circumstances, where there was a concrete and serious offer
to purchase the Aircraft in question (in contrast to a hypothetical sale), in the
absence of good reason not to give weight to such evidence, the third-party offer
should represent the most cogent evidence of the market value of the Aircraft.
This was effectively the Judge’s finding (Judgment at [52]), when he found the
factual evidence to be “decisive”. This was particularly the case when there was
scant demand for an Aircraft without engines that could not be easily transported
out of Singapore, which was why the sale was so difficult to consummate. Apart
18
from making general submissions that SIA could have achieved a better offer,
no objective evidence was led by CSDS that the Aircraft could have been sold
at a price significantly above the March 2019 RFP bid. This is especially so in
this case where CSDS had taken the position at the trial that the March 2019
RFP bid should have been taken up by SIA as it was “a good deal”. Hence, the
Judge did not err in considering the third-party offer of US$1.315m as a basis
for determining the Aircraft’s market value.
42 Where there is both expert and factual evidence before the court in
relation to the same issue on asset valuation, the Judge should evaluate the
probative weight of both categories to determine whether any adjustments need
to be made to best reflect the market value. In this way, the factual evidence
would play a useful role in furnishing a reality check on the expert evidence (see
above at [34]). Here, the March 2019 RFP bid was US$1.315m, while the
median point market valuation by Mr Seymour for May 2019 was US$1.66m.
We observe that these figures were remarkably close to one another, suggesting
that Mr Seymour’s valuation at US$1.66m was not unfounded or divorced from
reality.
43 The Judge also applied an uplift from the US$1.315m bid to reach the
US$1.5m figure taking into account “the uncertainties of the situation”
(Judgment at [52]). It should be highlighted that this uplift was to the advantage
of CSDS as it would mean a lower computation of damages. We also observe
that the figure of US$1.5m would approximate the arithmetic mean of
US$1.315m and US$1.66m, which is derived from both factual and expert
evidence. We thus saw no reason to disturb the market valuation of US$1.5m.
19
44 Lastly, with regard to the missing adjustment in Mr Seymour’s expert

evidence pertaining to the difference between the engine thrust of a B777-200
model and that of the Aircraft (see above at [26]), this was in fact the reason
why the Judge was chary not to place complete reliance on Mr Seymour’s
evidence (Judgment at [36] and [51]), which we agreed with. Ultimately, it bears
mention that while there was sound logic adopted by Mr Seymour in his
methodology, his valuation was based on an extrapolation of the market value
of a similar B777-200 aircraft. Therein lies the inherent inadequacies in placing
complete reliance. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the expert evidence still
served a valuable function in providing a cross-check on the March 2019 RFP
bid. We found that the Judge had adequately given weight to both sources of
evidence in arriving at the eventual valuation.
Whether the concession made by Mr Seymour should not have been ignored
45 The other issue raised by CSDS concerned the Judge’s decision to

disregard Mr Seymour’s concession at the trial that he had made a mistake in
deducting the value of B777-212 engines instead of B777-200 engines at Step 3
of the valuation methodology (see above at [22(c)]), ie, deducting the value of
the Trent 884 engines rather than the Trent 875 engines.
46 We begin by setting out the context of this concession. During cross-

examination, it was put to Mr Seymour that “if you choose to start with the 200
non-extended range [ie, the B777-200 model] then it is proper for you to use the
Trent 875 engines instead”. In response, Mr Seymour said “I think -- yeah, I
think that's fair.” The Judge then questioned Mr Seymour again about this
alleged error in his calculations. Mr Seymour confirmed that he had made an
error and responded by clarifying the following:
20
A: ... What I did was I took the value of the 884 engine which
was fitted and removed that from the calculation.
...
A: … With hindsight, as it was pointed out to me under cross-
examination, I should have deducted the Trent 875 value, that
engine value, from my starting point; not the Trent 884 and up.
From what I understand now, that would have led to a higher
value of the aircraft because there would have been a lower
deduction for the engine value.
47 However, the Judge disagreed that Mr Seymour was necessarily wrong,

and opined that his original methodology in deducting the Trent 884 engines
was correct:
Court: Why would you do that if the notional value you have
arrived at for this plane, by reference to 200, is the starting
point? You have arrived at a notional value for this plane by
taking account of the difference in MTOW, and so on, and then
when you are taking the engines out of that notional value for
this plane, you should take out the engines that are on this
plane; not the engines that would be on the other plane …
...
Court: ... You were cross-examined and essentially you
thought you were wrong in that approach. I am suggesting
maybe you weren't wrong in the first place …
There was no further re-examination by SIA’s counsel on this point due to the
intervention by the Judge, where doubt was expressed over Mr Seymour’s
concession.
48 In our assessment, the Judge was entitled to reject Mr Seymour’s

mistaken concession.
49 First, there is no rule of law that the court must unquestioningly accept
the unchallenged evidence of any witness, even for expert witnesses. The task
of the court remains substantially the same – to evaluate the evidence in the
21
context of the factual matrix for its inherent reliability, content credibility and
coherence (Sakthivel Punithavathi v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983 at
[76]). The court should carefully consider the factual or other premises on which
the expert based his opinion, and should examine the correctness of the expert’s
premises and reasoning process (Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as
Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129 at [23]). Although a court will give weight
to a concession extracted from the cross-examination of an expert, the court
must still apply its mind as to the conclusions to be drawn from the concession
made (see, for eg, Poh Fu Tek and others v Lee Shung Guan and others [2018]
4 SLR 425 at [62]–[64]).
50 If the evidence of the expert does not make sense, it is entirely open to
the court to disregard it just like any other inherently tenuous or questionable
evidence. This should be contrasted with other cases such as Lo Sook Ling Adela
v Au Mei Yin Christina and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 326, where the court was
found to have wrongly rejected the views of an expert without any sound
grounds, concerning a scientific issue outside the learnings of the court (at [48]).
51 Second, and flowing from the above, the Judge was thus entitled to find
that Mr Seymour was mistaken in making the concession as that was an obvious
non sequitur (Judgment at [14]). As explained by the Judge (see above at [47]),
it would defy logic for Mr Seymour to deduct the value of the two cheaper
Trent 875 engines found on the B777-200 model after marking up the value of
the B777-200 aircraft (ie, Step 2 of the calculations, see above at [22(b)]) to
arrive at the more expensive model of the Aircraft, a B777-212 model, that
would notionally possess Trent 884 engines.
22
52 Third, and circling back to the point that the factual evidence serves a
valuable function in providing a reality check on the expert evidence (see above
at [42]), if Mr Seymour’s concession was given effect to by the Judge, then the
market value of the Aircraft would have been in excess of US$6m (as there
would be a lower deduction of US$7.06m instead of US$11.76m). This would
bear no resemblance whatsoever with the reality that after multiple rounds of
issuing RFPs to more than 200 potential buyers over a period of two years, these
efforts only attracted the highest viable offer of US$1.315m.
53 Therefore, in the light of the objective evidence before the court, we

found that the Judge did not err in rejecting Mr Seymour’s concession at the
trial. Consequently, we affirmed the Judge’s findings on the market value of the
Aircraft at US$1.5m based on Mr Seymour’s original valuation in his expert
report, examined in tandem with the factual evidence.
Issue 2: The reasonable time to conclude a substitute sale of the Aircraft
54 Next, we also found that there was no reason to disturb the Judge’s
finding that the reasonable time to conclude the substitute sale of the Aircraft
would be six months from 4 November 2018.
55 It is crucial to underscore that the market value of the Aircraft

determined by the Judge was partly premised on the March 2019 RFP bid of
$1.315m (which was at least four months after the Agreement ended on
4 November 2018). Once that bid is utilised as the reference point to assess the
reasonable time for sale, it is untenable to suggest otherwise that a substitute
sale could have been concluded within three months (ie, even before March
2019). We agreed with the Judge that after affording some buffer time for
negotiations (Judgment at [27]), the March 2019 RFP bid could have been
23
converted into a successful sale within a period of six months from 4 November
2019.
56 In that vein, once the Judge’s finding was upheld as to the reasonable
time to conclude the substitute sale, CSDS’ arguments in challenging the award
for six months of parking and maintenance fees (instead of three months) would
fall away.
Conclusion
57 For the abovementioned reasons, the appeal in CAS 8 was accordingly

dismissed. We ordered costs in favour of SIA fixed at $100,000 inclusive of
disbursements which was in line with the respective parties’ costs submissions,
and that the usual consequential orders applied.
Steven Chong Beverley McLachlin

Justice of the Court of Appeal International Judge
Shobna Chandran, Yong Manling Jasmine, Thaddaeus Aaron Tan

and Marissa Daisy Decruz (Tan Rajah & Cheah) for the appellant;
Tan Teck San Kelvin, Yip Ting Yuan Darren and Kenneth Kwek
Junjie (Drew & Napier LLC) for the respondent.
24

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

Civil Appeal No 8 of 2022

CSDS Aircraft Sales &

Singapore Airlines Limited

In the matter of SIC/S 4/2019 (Assessment of Damages No 1 of 2022)

Singapore Airlines Limited

CSDS Aircraft Sales &

[Damages — Assessment — Valuation of aircraft]

CSDS Aircraft Sales & Leasing Inc

Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 8 of 2022

Steven Chong JCA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):

1 This appeal, CA/CAS 8/2022 (“CAS 8”), concerns an award of damages

5 We heard and dismissed CAS 8 on 5 May 2023 with brief grounds. In

The factual evidence underlying the dispute

6 By way of background, SIA is a Singapore company that carries on the

(c) marketing, brokerage and legal costs.

attempted by way of issuing Requests for Proposals (“RFP”) on 20 November

The November 2018 RFP and the revised bid

9 On the evidence of SIA’s senior manager responsible for aircraft sales,

(a) By 10 November 2018, even though the Certificate of

(b) As the sale was to be without engines, in order to remove the

10 Given the circumstances, SIA had to explore alternatives. As it

The March 2019 RFP

11 A further RFP was then issued on 12 March 2019 based on components

13 Around May 2019, whilst preserving options, SIA placed public

Other attempts from August 2019 to October 2020

15 Up until October 2019, SIA continued to place public advertisements on

16 Between November 2019 and May 2020, as SIA was in settlement

The expert evidence on the market value of the Aircraft

18 SIA adduced expert evidence from Mr Philip Seymour (“Mr Seymour”),

19 Mr Seymour provided a valuation of the Aircraft based on information

20 However, the Aircraft’s actual model was a B777-212 aircraft. As only

21 Mr Seymour adopted the first method. He opined that the Aircraft (a

22 Mr Seymour’s valuation methodology for the Aircraft can be broken

(b) Step 2: Mr Seymour marked up these values by approximately

resulting figures were US$3.86m in February 2019 and US$3.64m in

(d) Steps 4–6: Various adjustments were made to the Aircraft’s

23 As we will elaborate below, a key point of contention regarding

24 The Judge assessed the factual evidence, in particular SIA’s attempts to

26 The second issue related to a missing adjustment in Mr Seymour’s

27 Nevertheless, considering both the expert and factual evidence, the

The parties’ submissions and the issues raised in the appeal

28 CSDS averred that the Judge erred in completely disregarding

29 As against this, SIA submitted that the Judge’s decision should be

30 Based on the parties’ respective submissions, the following key issues

(i) whether the Judge had wrongly disregarded

(ii) whether the third-party offer in the March 2019 RFP

(iii) whether the concession made by Mr Seymour should not

31 As indicated above, having reviewed the submissions of the parties, we

Issue 1: The market valuation of the Aircraft

32 The court’s determination as to whether it should accept parts of an

33 It is axiomatic that the process of valuing assets is largely fact-sensitive

35 Contrary to CSDS’ assertions, there is no binary choice to be made in

36 In this connection, we disagreed with CSDS’ argument that the Judge

50 If regard is had to Mr Seymour’s figures and a market

52 In the circumstances and doing the best that I can on

As observed, the Judge first referred to Mr Seymour’s estimated market value

evidence has borne out, created enormous difficulties in attracting prospective

40 Further, as the Judge correctly found, although there was an available