Arthur Te vs. Court of Appeals, And Liliana Choa (G.R. No.

126746)
November 29, 2000 | KAPUNAN, J. | Prejudicial Question on the Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:
In this case, Arthur Te (the petitioner) and Liliana Choa (the private respondent) got married in a civil
ceremony on September 14, 1988. They never lived together as a married couple, and shortly after
Liliana gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, Arthur stopped visiting her.

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage to Liliana was still valid, Arthur entered into a second marriage
with Julieta Santella. Following a complaint filed by Liliana in June 1990, an information was filed
against Arthur for bigamy on August 9, 1990 (Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409).

Simultaneously, on July 20, 1990, Arthur initiated an action in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) to annul his marriage to Liliana, claiming that he was coerced into marrying her and that she
had concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage. He also alleged that she
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital duties.

In addition, on November 8, 1990, Liliana filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) against Arthur and Julieta to revoke their engineering licenses. She argued that
they engaged in immoral behavior by living together and marrying despite knowing that Arthur was
already married to her. She also accused Arthur of falsifying information in his marriage contract with
Julieta.

During the criminal trial for bigamy, Arthur filed a demurrer to evidence and a motion to remove the
trial judge, claiming bias. However, the RTC denied both motions.

Subsequently, Arthur filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging several issues
related to the trial judge's behavior, due process violations, and the sufficiency of evidence in the
bigamy case. He also attempted to suspend the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board,
arguing that the resolution of the annulment case was pivotal and could affect his right against self-
incrimination in the bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals consolidated these petitions and, on August 31, 1994, issued its decision. It
upheld the RTC's denial of the motion to remove the trial judge, finding no concrete evidence of bias.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that there was no prejudicial question warranting suspension of
proceedings and that the denial of the demurrer to evidence was justified since the prosecution had
presented sufficient evidence of bigamy.

The Court of Appeals further determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the Board's
decision to continue the administrative proceedings, as it considered the administrative case separate
from the civil and criminal cases.

Following this decision, Arthur's motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not marriage annulment case be resolved before passing judgment on the
criminal and administrative cases, given its potential impact as a prejudicial question?
2. Whether or not the respondent committed a serious error in refusing to suspend the legal
criminal and administrative] proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration
of nullity of marriage
3. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused its discretion and committed an error of law in
not holding that the demurrer to evidence should have been given due course.
4. Whether or not the respondent committed a serious legal error in not holding that the trial
judge a quo should have inhibited himself.
HELD/RULING:
No, a marriage, even if it is void or voidable, is considered valid until a judicial proceeding declares it
otherwise. Consequently, it cannot be employed as a prejudicial question in relation to the preceding
criminal case and administrative case involving the petitioner. Additionally, the second marriage was
evidently null and void from the beginning. Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code takes precedence,
which stipulates that the absolute nullity of a prior marriage cannot be invoked for remarriage
purposes unless a final judgment officially declares the previous marriage void.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s
engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of
prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules.

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said
civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the
nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.

The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

In Landicho vs. Relova, we held that: Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption of marriage exists.It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial
question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at
the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial
question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall
not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent
involving the same facts as the administrative case: The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil
cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or
registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before
the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without waiting
for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. It must also be noted that the allegations in
the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged
bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as
father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. The existence of
these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish
the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that
the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the
signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid
marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract
between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced,
and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by
him ever took place. We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of
a grave abuse of such discretion.

In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a
prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not
review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that
such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is
to adduce evidence in his defense. The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s
misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case
against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense
charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was
not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.

The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed
the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the
conclusion. Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s
guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that
petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties. Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo
in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and
bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said
such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet
been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident
and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the
case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same.

According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the
foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit. We agree with the appellate court that
the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was
biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a
judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial
is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
partiality.39 Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among
those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to
inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just
and valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit
himself from hearing and deciding the case. This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by
respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the
denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.40 The instances
when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his
counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of
petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord
with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that
petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident
which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s
counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified
delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.

Ergo, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

 Pimentel v. People, (G.R. No. 172060)
September 13,2010 | Carpio, J. | Prejudicial Question on the Nullity of Marriage

Facts:

 On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed a case against Joselito Pimentel for
attempted parricide in Quezon City.
 On February 7, 2005, Joselito received a summons to appear in a different court in Antipolo
City for a case about the nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity, filed by
Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel.
 On February 11, 2005, Joselito asked the Quezon City court to pause his case because the
outcome of the Antipolo case might affect the parricide case. The Quezon City court said no,
ruling that the issues in the parricide case were about the injuries to Maria Chrysantine and
could proceed even if their marriage's validity was in question.
 Joselito asked the Quezon City court to reconsider, but they said no again.
 So, Joselito appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the Quezon City court's decisions
in May and August 2005.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

The rule is unequivocal. The civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information for Frustrated Parricide was officially dated on August 30, 2004. It was subsequently
raffled to the RTC Quezon City on October 25, 2004, as confirmed by the stamped date of receipt on
the Information. The RTC Quezon City scheduled pre-trial and trial proceedings for Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415 on February 14, 2005. Notably, the petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No.
04-7392 on February 7, 2005.

On the other hand, the respondent's petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated November 4, 2004,
and officially filed on November 5, 2004. It is evident that the civil case for annulment was initiated
after the criminal case for frustrated parricide had already been filed. Consequently, this non-
compliance with the stipulations of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
renders the civil action invalid due to its subsequent filing following the criminal action.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
 but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.

The crime of parricide hinges on the relationship between the offender and the victim, which sets it
apart from murder or homicide. However, the issue in an annulment of marriage case isn't closely
connected to the issue in a parricide case. Furthermore, the relationship between the offender and the
victim doesn't determine the accused's guilt or innocence.

In the annulment case, the question is whether the petitioner is psychologically incapable of fulfilling
marital obligations. In the parricide case, the question is whether the accused attempted to kill the
victim but failed due to other reasons. At the time of the alleged crime, the petitioner and the victim
were married. Even if their marriage is annulled, it won't affect the alleged crime committed during
their marriage.

We can't rely on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, which dealt with the effect of declaring a second
marriage void on criminal liability for bigamy. That case didn't involve a prejudicial question, and it
recognized that even void marriages can have legal consequences under certain circumstances.

In conclusion, the court upholds the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing the trial in the parricide case
to proceed because the resolution of the annulment case doesn't determine the petitioner's guilt or
innocence in the criminal case.

Ergo, the petition is denied, and the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed.

\
 Geluz v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. L-16439, 2 SCRA 801)
July 20,1961 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Damages for an Unborn Fetus

Facts:

This case revolves around the abortion procedure undergone by Nita Villanueva, administered by the
defendant, Dr. Antonio Geluz. Notably, Villanueva had previously undergone two other abortions, all
conducted by Dr. Geluz, much to the concern of her husband, Oscar Lazo. In response to these
events, the plaintiff, Oscar Lazo, filed a civil damages case, which was initially granted by the Court of
First Instance of Manila. This decision was later upheld by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, Dr.
Geluz has filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the case's legal aspects.

Issue:

Whether or not it is legally permissible to claim pecuniary damages in connection with the abortion of
an unborn fetus that lacks legal personality.

Ruling:

In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erroneously based their award of
damages on the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which sets a minimum amount for
the death of a person. However, it is crucial to recognize that this provision does not apply to the
situation of an unborn fetus without legal personality. Under our legal system, such a fetus does not
attain the status of a natural person and thus lacks the capacity for rights and obligations.

Given that an action for pecuniary damages stemming from personal injury or death primarily
concerns the injured party, it follows that if no such action can be initiated on behalf of the unborn
child due to its pre-natal death and lack of legal personality, neither can this right of action be derived
by the parents or heirs. The provisional personality attributed to a conceived child under Article 40 of
the Civil Code is explicitly limited by the requirement that the child must be subsequently born alive. In
this case, it is undisputed that the child was deceased upon separation from the mother's womb.

This legal stance aligns with prevailing American jurisprudence, which generally does not permit
recovery for the death of an unborn child.

This is not to say that the parents are entirely without recourse. They can seek damages for injuries
directly inflicted upon them, distinct from the rights and integrity of the deceased. These damages
may encompass moral damages for the distress and anguish arising from the loss of their spes
hominis (the hope of a child) and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as
exemplary damages if the circumstances warrant such a remedy. However, in this particular case, the
lower court and the Court of Appeals found no grounds for awarding moral damages, primarily
because the husband appeared indifferent to the previous abortions, all performed by the same
doctor.

In summary, while the appellant's actions in causing the abortion were both criminal and morally
reprehensible, they do not provide a factual or legal basis for an award of damages under the
circumstances presented. Thus, the decision is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, with no
costs imposed.
 Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., (G.R. No. L-15499, 4 SCRA 526)
February 28,1962 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Rights of Legal Redemption (Succession)

Facts:

This is an appeal stemming from a decision by the Court of First Instance of Manila, which dismissed
the plaintiff-appellant's action for legal redemption.

The case centers on a property, a house and lot located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, co-owned by various
individuals as reflected in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789. Among the co-owners was Jose V.
Ramirez, who passed away on October 20, 1951. A legal process was initiated to settle his estate, as
it included a one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the said property. While Jose V. Ramirez's last will and
testament had been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings remained pending due to creditor
claims surpassing the deceased's assets. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was designated as the
judicial administrator.

During this period, on December 9, 1958, Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners, sold
her 1/6 share in the property to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., the defendant-appellant, for P500,000.00.
After executing an affidavit, attesting to the notification of potential redemptioners, the sale was
registered, and a new title was issued in favor of the buyer and other co-owners.

On the same day, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. notified the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the judicial
administrator of Jose V. Ramirez's estate, about the sale. The bank, in turn, forwarded this
information, along with its own communication, to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, the plaintiff-appellant, through
her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal. Mrs. Butte received these letters on December 11 and 12,
1958. In addition to the defendant-appellant's letter, Mrs. Chambers, the vendor's attorney-in-fact,
wrote to the bank on December 11, 1958, confirming the sale. This letter reached the bank on
December 15, 1958, and it was subsequently delivered to Mrs. Butte's counsel on December 16,
1958, with Mrs. Butte receiving it on December 19, 1958.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, through her lawyer, Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a
letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check amounting to P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc., as an offer to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Upon the
refusal of this offer, plaintiff consigned the amount in court on the same day and initiated legal action
for redemption. She also sought the determination of the fair market value of the property, which she
deemed excessively high, and requested the transfer of the property ownership, along with actual,
moral, and exemplary damages.

Following the defendant's response containing a counterclaim and the plaintiff's reply, a trial was
conducted. Subsequently, on May 13, 1959, the court issued a decision that dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint, citing her lack of the right to redeem the property and, if she did have such a right, her
exercise of it beyond the 30-day statutory period for legal redemptions outlined in the Civil Code. The
defendant's counterclaim for damages was also dismissed due to insufficient evidence. Both parties
appealed directly to this Court.

Issue/s:

 Whether or not can the plaintiff-appellant, who was left 1/3 of the free portion of Jose V.
Ramirez's estate, legally redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez
while the estate's judicial administrator is in place and before the final distribution of her share
in the probate proceedings?
 Whether or not did she exercise the right of legal redemption within the timeframe specified
by the law?

Ruling:

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share
sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6
undivided property of Jose V. Ramirez
The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other-co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)

ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)

It's evident that Angela M. Butte, the appellant, has the right to exercise legal redemption. As an heir
in the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her fellow heirs obtained a stake in the 1/6 share previously
owned by J.V. Ramirez in the Santa Cruz property right after his passing. According to the law, when
someone passes away, their rights and obligations are transferred to their heirs immediately upon
their death. This succession right covers all property-related matters that the deceased person leaves
behind.

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)

ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
(657a)

ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from
the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)

The principle that the appellant, Angela M. Butte, is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is
crystal clear. When it comes to the succession of a deceased person, our Civil Code establishes a
fundamental rule: the capacity of an heir is determined as of the moment the decedent passed away
(Art. 1034). This applies to the computation of the legitime (Art. 908) and the inofficiousness of a
donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, legacies of credit and remission are valid only for the amount
due and outstanding at the time of the testator's death (Art. 935), and any fruits generated after that
moment belong to the legatee (Art. 948).

As a result of this fundamental succession rule, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez gained ownership of his
undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property immediately upon his death. They became co-owners of the
property at that very moment, alongside the surviving original co-owners. Being a co-owner of an
undivided share inherently means being a co-owner of the entire property. Therefore, any one of the
Ramirez heirs, as co-owners, had the exclusive right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as
soon as another co-owner, Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, sold her undivided share to a third party,
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of redemption was exclusively tied to the share for redemption
purposes, without consideration for the redemptioner's overall share in the estate.

The presence of a judicial administrator for Jose V. Ramirez's estate does not alter this situation.
While the Rules of Court grant the administrator the right to manage the real and personal estate of
the deceased to satisfy debts and administrative expenses, and to initiate or defend actions
concerning the property or rights of the deceased, these rights do not encompass the right of legal
redemption over the undivided share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. The reason is
straightforward: this right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to Uy & Sons,
Inc. was finalized, eight years after the death of Jose V. Ramirez. It was not part of his estate. This
redemption right vested directly in the heirs, in their individual capacity, rather than being derived from
their deceased relative. When Jose V. Ramirez passed away, none of the other co-owners had sold
their undivided share to a stranger, so there was no right of redemption at the time. Furthermore,
since death extinguishes civil personality and juridical capacity, Jose V. Ramirez could not have
acquired the right of redemption eight years after his demise.

It might be argued that the specific share of appellant Mrs. Butte in Jose V. Ramirez's estate has not
been determined yet, and it remains contingent. The liquidation of the estate might necessitate the
sale of the decedent's undivided portion in the Sta. Cruz property, in which case Mrs. Butte would not
have any interest in that undivided portion. Nevertheless, as long as that undivided share remains in
the estate, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez collectively own it, just as the deceased did during his lifetime.
These heirs are now co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property, just as Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner
when he was alive. Therefore, any of the Ramirez heirs, in their capacity as co-owners, had the right
of legal redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her pro-indiviso interest to Uy & Sons. Even if,
subsequently, the undivided share of Ramirez (and his heirs) is eventually sold to settle the estate's
debts, their ownership of it before the sale would not be retroactively affected. The law only requires
that the legal redemptioner be a co-owner at the time another co-owner's undivided share is sold to a
third party. Whether or not the redemptioner retains co-ownership after exercising the legal
redemption is not relevant from a legal standpoint.

Furthermore, it cannot be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his
heirs would be considered as never having owned that share. This would only hold true if the
inheritance is repudiated or the heir's status as such is invalidated. In cases where heirship is
uncontested, the purchaser of hereditary property does not obtain title directly from the deceased
Ramirez because a deceased person cannot transfer title. Nor does the administrator, who has no
ownership over any part of the estate, convey title. The purchaser derives their title from the Ramirez
heirs, represented by the administrator, acting as their trustee or legal representative.

Having established the right of appellant Angela M. Butte to exercise redemption, the next crucial
question is whether she initiated or offered the redemption within the 30-day timeframe stipulated by
the law. This timeframe is rigid because the law aims to provide clarity regarding the purchaser's title
within the defined 30-day period. It's worth noting that, for the purposes of law, the notice given by the
buyer should not be considered when determining whether the redemption was timely. Article 1623 of
the law explicitly dictates that the 30-day countdown for redemption commences upon written notice
by the seller. The Philippine legislature deliberately selected this particular method of notification, and
it should be regarded as the sole method (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] 528). As
established in Wampler vs. Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affirmed in 75 Law Ed. [U.S.] 275) —

Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume until the
contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed, which warranted the legislature in so
legislating.

The requirement that the seller, not the buyer, should give notice serves a clear purpose. The seller of
an undivided interest is best positioned to identify co-owners who must be informed of the sale. Seller-
initiated notice eliminates doubts about the sale's validity and prevents the seller from contesting it
later. This assurance wouldn't exist if the buyer gave the notice.

In this case, the effective notice was given by Mrs. Chambers, acting as the attorney-in-fact for the
seller, Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. On December 11, 1958, she informed the Bank of the
Philippine Islands that Marie's share in the property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for
P500,000. The bank received this notice on December 15, 1958, and forwarded it to Mrs. Butte, her
attorney, who received it on December 16, 1958. Mrs. Butte attempted to redeem the property, and
when the buyer refused, she deposited the P500,000 on January 15, 1959. This fell within the thirty-
day redemption period, as stipulated by the Civil Code.

The date when the Administrator Bank received the notice (December 15) can't be considered as the
start of the thirty days because the Administrator of the estate had no right to redeem Marie Garnier's
share, which wasn't part of Jose V. Ramirez's estate.

The claim that P500,000 was an excessive price for the Garnier share is unsubstantiated and can't be
based solely on one realtor's estimate.
Since the redemption and consignation were properly executed, the counterclaim by Uy & Sons, Inc.
for damages and attorney's fees, based on the assumption that the plaintiff's action was baseless, is
untenable.

Ergo, the consignation of P500,000 by Angela M. Butte was deemed proper. Angela M. Butte
exercised her right to redeem the one-sixth share of the land correctly within the specified time. Also,
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. is ordered to accept the consigned amount and convey the specified portion
within 30 days after the decision becomes final, accounting for rentals and fruits. The case is returned
to the court of origin for further proceedings in line with this ruling.

Joaquin v. Navarro, (G.R. No. L-5426 ,93 Phil. 257)

 May 29,1953 |Tuason, J. | Rights of Succession & Statutory Presumption

Facts:

 Feliciano Lopez is the sole witness and a Holocaust survivor.

 On February 6, 1945, the Navarro family sought refuge in the ground floor of the German
Club building during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The building was crowded with
refugees, under attack, and on fire.
 The Japanese began shooting at people inside the building, especially those trying to escape.
The three Navarro daughters were hit and fell near the entrance.
 Joaquin Navarro Sr., Joaquin Navarro Jr., his wife Adela/Angela Conde, and a friend
Francisco Lopez escaped the building, leaving Angela Joaquin behind.
 Joaquin Navarro Jr. was shot and killed by a Japanese soldier. The others hid outside the
Club to avoid bullets. The building eventually collapsed, presumably trapping Angela Joaquin
inside.
 The surviving family members found refuge in an air raid shelter but were later forced to leave
due to shelling. They encountered Japanese patrols and Joaquin Navarro Sr. and his
daughter-in-law were killed.
 The order of deaths is crucial for succession rights involving Ramon Joaquin (petitioner) and
Antonio C. Navarro (respondent).
 The RTC ruled the sequence of death as: Navarro girls, Joaquin Navarro Jr., Angela Joaquin
de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro Sr.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with a modification: Navarro girls, Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, Joaquin Navarro Jr., Joaquin Navarro Sr.
 The case centers on the presumption of survivorship according to Rule 123, Section 69(ii) of
the Revised Rules of Court when two people perish simultaneously in a calamity without
evidence of who died first. This petition seeks clarification on the sequence of deaths for
succession purposes.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not statutory presumption be invoked in the case at bar.

2. Whether or not Angela Joaquin died before her son Joaquin Navarro.

Ruling:
Supreme Court order in resolving a complex issue of survivorship and succession rights in the
absence of direct evidence regarding the sequence of deaths of the individuals involved. Two legal
provisions have been brought to our attention: Rule 123, Section 69(ii) of the Revised Rules of Court
and Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 (now Art. 43). However, upon careful consideration of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case, SC find that neither of these provisions applies.

Rule 123, Section 69(ii) of the Revised Rules of Court establishes a presumption of survivorship
based on probabilities arising from the strength and ages of the sexes. Here, we have Joaquin
Navarro Jr., a 30-year-old male in his prime years, and Angela, a 60-year-old female. However, it is
essential to emphasize that the facts as presented by the testimony of Feliciano Lopez provide a
substantial basis for resolving the issue without invoking this statutory presumption.

Lopez's account sheds light on the situation during the calamity in question. From his testimony, we
can reasonably infer that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. Joaquin, being in the prime of
life at 30, managed to dash about 15 meters from the building within about 5 or less seconds. In
contrast, Angela, his mother, may have perished within those 5 seconds, but the probabilities of her
doing so appeared remote. Lopez's account indicates that the Japanese soldiers were primarily
targeting those attempting to escape the building. Furthermore, Angela made frantic efforts to
dissuade her husband and son from leaving, suggesting that she did not view the perils of staying as
immediately life-threatening.
Moreover, the collapse of the clubhouse occurred approximately 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro
Jr.'s tragic demise. This substantial time lapse contradicts the notion that Angela Joaquin perished
within seconds of her son's death. The Court of Appeals mentioned that the interval between Joaquin
Navarro Jr.'s death and the collapse was merely "minutes," but our analysis suggests that it was
significantly longer than five seconds, allowing for a reasonable inference that Angela Joaquin was
still alive when her son expired.

Considering the compelling facts before us, we find it unnecessary to invoke the statutory
presumption of survivorship. The circumstances, as narrated by Feliciano Lopez, support the
inference that Joaquin Navarro Jr. passed away before his mother Angela Joaquin, Sr.

Ergo, SC reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
which established that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died first. This ruling aligns with the interests of the
respondent, Antonio Navarro, and stands as the final judgment in this matter.
 Roldan v. Philippine Veterans Board, (G.R. No. L-11973, 105 Phil. 1081)
June 30,1959 |Montemayor, J. | Juridical Persons & Juridical Personality

Facts:
Roldan, a first-grade Civil Service eligible, was appointed as a clerk in the Philippine Veterans Board
on March 26, 1953, with an annual compensation of P2,160. Subsequently, due to his age, Roldan
was separated from service on March 25, 1954, and Juan Domingo was appointed in his place.

Roldan initiated Quo Warranto proceedings against Domingo, which resulted in a favorable decision
for Roldan, declaring his ouster illegal. As a result, Roldan was reinstated to his former position on
September 24, 1955.

Roldan then filed the present action against the Philippine Veterans Board and its members to recover
his back wages for the 18-month period during which he was out of service. He also sought moral
damages and attorney's fees.

The trial court, presided over by Judge Luis B. Reyes, dismissed the complaint, citing Republic Act
No. 65, which established the Philippine Veterans Board as a mere agency of the government. The
court held that the salaries of the employees of the Board, including Roldan, were annually
appropriated by law, and therefore, the payment of Roldan's back wages could only be made through
congressional appropriation. The court also referred to the case of Metropolitan Transportation
Service (Metran) v. Paredes as a precedent.

Issue:

Whether or not Felipe M. Roldan can file a lawsuit against the Philippine Veterans Board and its
members to claim back wages and damages, or is such a lawsuit effectively an action against the
government itself, requiring government consent to proceed?

Ruling:

No. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, dismissing Roldan's complaint against the
Philippine Veterans Board and its members. The ruling emphasized that the Board was not a juridical
person, making any action against it effectively an action against the government, which could not
proceed without the government's consent.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the Philippine Veterans Board,
created under Republic Act No. 65, was not a juridical person capable of being sued independently.
Any action against the Board that could result in financial liability to the government was, in essence,
an action against the government itself. Consequently, such a suit could not proceed without the
government's consent.

The Court further noted that the Board was a government agency operating under the Department of
National Defense, and it lacked the legal personality of a juridical person. It rejected the argument that
the Board could be considered a juridical entity under Article 44 of the Civil Code, emphasizing that
the Board's function was to carry out the purposes of Republic Act No. 65 and that its members were
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment.

The Court's decision was consistent with the principle that a lawsuit against a government officer or
agency that could result in a financial charge to the government must be regarded as a suit against
the government itself, requiring government consent. Therefore, Roldan's claim for back wages and
damages was effectively an action against the government, and it could not proceed without the
government's consent.

Hence, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision, dismissing Roldan's complaint, and ordered costs
to be assessed against the appellant.

Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, (G.R. No. L-11154 ,34 Phil. 311)
March 21,1916 |Trent, J. | Juridical Persons & Waiver of Immunity from Suit
Facts:
This involves an appeal by both parties from a judgment issued by the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, along with the costs of the case.

The plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in two aspects: (1) by limiting the general damages
suffered by the plaintiff to P5,000, instead of the P25,000 claimed in the complaint, and (2) by limiting
the time when the plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days, resulting in
damages of P2,666, instead of the P6,000 claimed by the plaintiff.

The Attorney-General, representing the defendant, contends that the trial court erred in three ways:
(a) by finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital resulted from the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) by holding that the Government of the
Philippine Islands is liable for the damages caused to the plaintiff, even if the collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) by rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of
P14,741.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act No. 2457 merely waives the Government's immunity from being sued or
whether it goes further to establish the Government as a juridical person with legal liability for
damages caused by its employees.

Ruling:

Yes. The Act No. 2457, enacted on February 3, 1915, authorized the plaintiff, E. Merritt, to bring a suit
against the Government in order to determine responsibility for a collision involving his motorcycle and
a General Hospital ambulance and to assess any damages resulting from this collision. The crux of
this issue hinges on the nature and extent of the Government's liability under this legislative
enactment.

It is well-established in the legal framework, both in the Philippines and in jurisprudence cited from
other jurisdictions, that governments typically enjoy immunity from being sued by individuals.
However, this immunity can be waived under specific conditions, such as when a legislative act
permits individuals to bring suit against the government.

Upon careful review of Act No. 2457, it becomes evident that the primary purpose of this legislation
was to allow individuals to bring suit against the Government to determine responsibility and assess
damages for specific cases. The Act does not expressly declare the Government as a juridical person
liable for all such cases; rather, it appears to create a mechanism for addressing specific claims and
controversies. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Act No. 2457 primarily constitutes a waiver
of immunity from suit rather than an all-encompassing concession of the Government's juridical
personhood with general legal liability.

Additionally, legal precedent from the Supreme Court of Spain, which is cited in the case, affirms that
a government's liability is limited to situations where it acts through special agents. The case makes a
clear distinction between cases where the government is liable and those where it is not, based on
whether the actions were performed by employees or agents with specific, distinct orders or
commissions. In this context, it is established that the chauffeur of the General Hospital ambulance,
who caused the accident, does not qualify as a special agent within the legal framework.

Ergo, Act No. 2457 primarily serves to waive the Government's immunity from being sued in specific
cases, such as the one at hand. It does not, by itself, establish the Government as a juridical person
with general legal liability for the negligence of its employees, especially when those employees do
not meet the criteria of special agents under the legal framework. Any broader recognition of the
Government's liability would require explicit legislative action. Therefore, the plaintiff's authorization to
sue the Government is based on the waiver of immunity, and the Government's liability is limited to
the circumstances defined in the Act and governed by existing legal principles.