Morigo vs People of the Philippines Case Digest

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines

Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from
Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at
Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the
issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
TE VS CA

Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in Sept 1988. They do not live together but meet
regularly until after Liliana gave birth that Arthur stopped visiting her.

On May 20, 1990, while their marriage was still subsisting, Arthur contracted a second
marriage with Julieta Santella.

On August 1990, Liliana filed an information charging Arthur with bigamy.

Meanwhile, in July 1990, Arthur Te filed an action for annulment on the ground that he
was forced to marry her, that she concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of
their marriage and psychologically incapacity.

On November 8, 1990, Liliana also filed with the (PRC) an administrative case against
petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality and an act of falsification against Arthur
when he stated in his 2nd marriage contract that he was still single.

After the prosecution or criminal case, petitoner filed demurrer to evidence and motion to
inhibit the judge were filed but were eventually denied by the court.

Thus:
<A.> petitioner filed a petition for certiorari filed with the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge,Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for(1) exhibiting
antagonism and animosity towards his counsel;(2) violating the due process by denying his
motion for reconsideration and demurrer to evidence(3) x x x
(4) ruling that in a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is
sufficient for conviction of an accused.

<B.>Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC amotion to suspend the
proceedings therein in view of the pendencyof the case for annulment of his 1st marriage
and case for bigamy,but it was subsequently denied.

Thus, he filed with the CA another petition for certiorari against Board for grave abuse
of discretion:(1) NOT holding that the annulment case is prejudicial to theoutcome of the
administrative case;(2) X X X(3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32
of theRules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does
not allow the suspension of the administrativeproceeding before the PRC Board despite
the pendency of criminaland/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondentinvolving the same set of facts.
ISSUES

WON there is a prejudicial question between the civil case of annulment and criminal case
of bigamy

WON there is a prejudicial question between the civil case of annulment and
administrative case

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.[21] The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of
a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22]
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.[23] Petitioners argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent
had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue,
because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve
him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and People
vs. Aragon[25] cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is
found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioners marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding
Willaware ProCorp. vs Jesichris ManuCorp. (28)
Caption:
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products Corporation the petitioner
from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing
Company. The respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan,
Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company has been manufacturing
in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware
Products Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing
Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of petitioner’s office to
respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondent’s employees had transferred to
petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s products, especially its plastic-made
automotive parts.That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and
colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts
and to the same customers. Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber
in the manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing,
shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same
automotive parts with plastic material was taken from respondent’s idea of using plastic for automotive
parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair
competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused
[respondent] damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the date of
respondent’s complaint.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors
and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
2. Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
3. Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?

Held:
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the
use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in
business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where
the means use dare fair and legitimate.

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and
in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's
fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).