Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/17/2023 Page 1 of 28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

GRACE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Defendant.
/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami’s (“Defendant”)

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Complaint.1 (“Mot.”) (ECF No. 117). Plaintiffs

filed a response2 (“Resp.”) (ECF No. 119), and Defendant filed a reply.3 (“Reply”) (ECF No.

123). The Motion is now ripe for review.

Defendant’s Motion is the latest in a long line of efforts to dismiss or discredit Plaintiffs’

claim that the City of Miami’s Commission Districts are racially gerrymandered. See (ECF Nos.

19, 34, 36, 40, 55, 59, 80, 85, 104, 117, 123). To the extent Defendant properly raises arguments

1
For the reasons explained below, the Supplemental Complaint necessarily adds information to
the Amended Complaint, see (“Amended Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”) (ECF No. 23), and
accordingly, the Court considers the two filings in tandem. Thus, the Court construes the instant
Motion as seeking dismissal of the entire Action, not just the Supplemental Complaint.
2
Plaintiffs in this Action are Clarice Cooper, Yanelis Valdes, Jared Johnson, Alexandra
Contreras Steven Miro, GRACE, Inc., Engage Miami, Inc., South Dade Branch of the NAACP
and Miami-Dade Branch of the NAACP (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).
3
Plaintiffs moved to strike the Reply for failure to adhere to the Court’s formatting and length
instructions. See (ECF No. 124). Though Defendant’s Reply is noncompliant, the Court issued
a paperless order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, finding that Defendant’s noncompliance
was inadvertent. See (ECF No. 129). The Court therefore considers the Reply in adjudicating
this Motion.
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here, the arguments are largely identical to ones the Court has already considered and rejected.

Like a broken record, Defendant once more raises the same unavailing arguments. Once more,

the Court rejects them.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After filing its original Complaint on December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Amended

Complaint on February 10, 2023. Plaintiffs’ sole claim alleges that, in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, all five Miami City Commission districts as

drawn in Resolution 22-131 (“2022 Enacted Plan” or “Enjoined Plan”) are racially

gerrymandered. See generally Am. Compl.

A. Preliminary Injunction

Also on February 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Expedited Motion for Preliminary

Injunction. See (ECF No. 26). Therein, Plaintiffs requested that the Court enjoin Defendant

from “calling, conducting, supervising, or certifying any elections under the [2022] Enacted

Plan, beginning with the regular 2023 elections, until the entry of a final judgment.” Id. at 36.

Defendant opposed the motion, see (ECF No. 36), and the Court referred the motion to United

States Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis for a Report and Recommendation. See (ECF No. 27).

With the benefit of an evidentiary hearing that lasted over five hours, which included

ninety-three exhibits from Plaintiff and twelve exhibits from Defendant, and testimony from the

City’s redistricting consultant, Miguel De Grandy, Esq. (“De Grandy”), see (ECF No. 48),

Magistrate Judge Louis issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 52). In the

R&R, Magistrate Judge Louis described the redistricting process, expert reports, and other

exhibits and record materials with great detail. See generally id. After examining the

contemporaneous statements of various Commissioners and considering the relevant record

2
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materials, Magistrate Judge Louis found that race predominated in the design of each district. Id.

at 77–87. Evaluating each prong of the preliminary injunction test, Magistrate Judge Louis

found that (1) Plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2)

Plaintiffs stood to suffer irreparable harm, and (3) any harm that Defendant would suffer was

outweighed by the harm Plaintiffs would suffer as a result of racial gerrymandering. See id. at

60–100. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Louis recommended that the Court enjoin Defendant

from using the 2022 Enacted Plan until the entry of a final judgment. Id. at 100.

The Court carefully considered the R&R as well as the objections thereto. Ultimately,

the Court adopted the R&R in full. See (“Injunction Order”) (ECF No. 60). Following the

issuance of the Injunction Order, the Court issued a scheduling order requiring Defendant to

enact a proposed remedial map (in the event that the Parties did not settle by mediation) and file

it with the Court by June 30, 2023. See (ECF No. 69). Plaintiffs were to notify the Court of any

objections to Defendant’s proposed remedial map, and in turn, Defendant was entitled to file a

memorandum of law in support of it. See id. at 1–2. The Court issued this scheduling order to

ensure that Defendant could provide the Court with a remedial plan, and that the Court could

review such plan, by August 1, 2023, the date by which the Miami-Dade County Board of

Elections required a remedial map to administer the then-upcoming November 2023 elections.

See id. at 2; see also (ECF No. 26 at 36).

B. Passage of the Remedial Plan

Though the City Commission passed the plan on June 14, 2023, Defendant filed its

Notice of Passage of Redistricting Plan (“Notice”) two weeks later on June 30, 2023. (ECF No.

77). In doing so, Defendant informed the Court that it had passed a redistricting plan, Resolution

23-271 (“Remedial Plan”), in an effort to remedy the constitutional shortcomings of the Enjoined

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Plan. Defendant then advanced two arguments: (1) the instant Action was moot because the

Remedial Plan fully replaced the Enjoined Plan; and (2) the Remedial Plan would function as the

operative map going forward. See (ECF Nos. 77, 80)

i. Motion to Dismiss for Mootness

After filing the Notice, Defendant moved to dismiss this Action as moot. See (ECF No.

80). Its argument was quite simple: the City did not adopt a remedial plan, but rather,

Resolution 23-271 was a new redistricting plan that would replace the Enjoined Plan altogether.

Id. at 4. By ignoring the remedial posture of the case, Defendant asserted that the passage of the

Remedial Plan left the Court without jurisdiction to consider whether the Remedial Plan

corrected the constitutional infirmities the Court found were substantially likely to exist in the

Enjoined Plan. See generally id.

The Court found that Defendant’s argument squarely contradicted Supreme Court

precedent and similarly, the Eleventh Circuit had rejected a nearly identical argument. (ECF No.

91 at 4–5). Specifically, the Court stated the following:

Defendant’s argument is unavailing. In fact, the Supreme Court has addressed

and rejected a mootness argument that is almost identical to Defendant’s. See
N.C. v. Covington (Covington III), 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018) (per curiam). As is the
case here, the defendants in Covington III argued that “plaintiffs’ racial
gerrymandering claims ceased to exist when the [legislature] enacted remedial
plans for the State House and State Senate and repealed the old plans.” Id. at
2552. The Court flatly rejected the argument. According to the Court, “the
plaintiffs’ claims that they were organized into legislative districts on the basis of
their race did not become moot simply because the General Assembly drew new
district lines around them. To the contrary, [the plaintiffs] argued in the District
Court that some of the new districts were mere continuations of the old,
gerrymandered districts.” Id. at 2553. The Court further elaborated, “[b]ecause
the plaintiffs asserted that they remained segregated on the basis of race, their

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claims remained the subject of a live dispute, and the District Court properly
retained jurisdiction.”[4] Id.

Equally as illustrative is the Middle District of Florida’s consideration of how to

approach the evaluation of a remedial map when a court has found the original
map substantially likely to be unconstitutional. Jacksonville Branch of NAACP v.
City of Jacksonville (Jacksonville II), 2022 WL 17751416, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
19, 2022). There, the court explained that when “the legislative body enacts a
new redistricting plan in an effort to remedy the constitutional violation, this plan
‘will then be the governing law unless it, too, is challenged and found to violate
the constitution.’” See id. (quoting Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978)).
However, in concluding that a court has a continuing obligation to ensure the new
map passed constitutional muster, the Jacksonville II Court explained that it had
the “duty to ensure that any remedy ‘so far as possible eliminate[s] the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar[s] like discrimination in the
future.’” See id. (quoting Covington II, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 424). With this in
mind, the Jacksonville II Court undertook an analysis of whether the remedial
plan, which was passed by the Jacksonville City Council and signed by the
Mayor, was constitutionally adequate. See id. at *1, *17. Ultimately, the court
concluded that it was not. See id. at *17.

(ECF No. 91 at 4–6) (alterations in original). Thus, the Court found that “in accord with nearly

sixty years of Supreme Court precedent, the Court . . . has a continuing duty to ensure the

Remedial Plan does not suffer from the same constitutional defects that the Court found were

substantially likely to exist in the Enacted Plan.” Id. at 6.

In a last-ditch attempt to render this Action moot, Defendant also argued that Abbott v.

Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) alters the framework by which a court must analyze mootness in

the redistricting context. See generally (ECF No. 85). The Court quickly rejected Defendant’s

invitation to interpret Abbott as uprooting decades of well-established precedent. See (ECF No.

91 at 6–10). Instead, the Court held that it would afford the enacting legislature, in this case the

City Commissioners, the good faith presumption to which they are entitled to receive under

4
Plaintiffs asserted that under the Remedial Plan, they remain segregated on the basis of race.
See (ECF No. 83 at 22) (“A district-by-district analysis reveals that the Commission perpetuated,
rather than remedied, the [2022 Enacted Plan’s] racial gerrymandering.”).
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Abbott when the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the Remedial Plan. See id. at 9–10. The

Court also made clear, however, that it would not read Abbott as requiring it to shirk its duty to

ensure the Remedial Plan did not perpetuate the same constitutional infirmities as the Enacted

Plan.5 See id. at 10. Thus, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Action as moot.

ii. The Court Rejects the Constitutionally Flawed Remedial Plan

Upon disposing of Defendant’s mootness argument, the Court turned to its examination

of the Remedial Plan. Plaintiffs responded to the Notice and argued that by passing the

Remedial Plan, “[Defendant] has doubled down” and created “a ‘new’ map that closely

resembles the Enjoined Plan.” (ECF No. 83 at 2). Since Plaintiffs believed that Defendant’s

Remedial Plan did not remedy the likely constitutional violations the Court identified, Plaintiffs

argued that the Court should reject Defendant’s Remedial Plan and adopt one of Plaintiffs’

alternative maps (“P4”) which allegedly complied with all legal requirements and honored

Defendant’s legitimate, non-race-based policy choices. See id. at 2–3.

In a fifty-page order (“Order”) (ECF No. 94), the Court sustained Plaintiffs’ objections

and found that “the Remedial Plan does not completely correct the constitutional defects the

Court found were substantially likely to exist in the Enjoined Plan.” Id. at 1. To come to this

conclusion, the Court began its analysis by stating “[l]egislative enactments, including a remedial

plan, are still cloaked with the ‘presumption of legislative good faith,’ even after a finding of past

discrimination, and the ‘burden of proof lies with [Plaintiffs], not the State’ to demonstrate the

remedial map is unconstitutional.” Id. at 16 (quoting Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324) (alterations in

original. While presuming the good faith of the City Commissioners, the Court nevertheless

5
In a later motion to stay pending appeal, Defendant argued again that the passage of the
Remedial Plan rendered the case moot, even though the Court had already dismissed this exact
argument. See (ECF No. 104 at 1, 3). Fitting with the theme of the instant Motion, Defendant
reiterates its already-rejected mootness argument again here.
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found that Plaintiffs met their burden to demonstrate that the Remedial Plan was

unconstitutional. In support of this holding, the Court relied first on direct evidence showing that

the Commissioners intended to maintain the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan. See

id. at 20–24. Specifically, the Court focused on the explicit statements from multiple

Commissioners expressing their intent to maintain the race-based sorting in any potential

remedial plan, and how the Commissioners instructed De Grandy accordingly. See id. at 24

(finding “[t]he directive to De Grandy is clear, and the Commissioners’ statements during the

May 11 meeting combined with their directive to De Grandy support a finding that the

Commissioners intended for the Remedial Plan to preserve the prior racial breakdown of the

Enjoined Plan, thus perpetuating rather than remedying the unconstitutional racial

gerrymandering”). Second, the Court considered circumstantial evidence demonstrating that

racial considerations predominated when designing the Remedial Plan. See id. at 24–40. In

doing so, the Court analyzed the Remedial Plan’s core retention rate from the Enjoined Plan,

how the alterations to one of De Grandy’s proposed maps which culminated in the Remedial

Plan preserved the Enjoined Plan’s racial demographics, and how a district-by-district analysis

demonstrated the continued racial predominance present in the Remedial Plan’s design. See id.

The Court therefore rejected the Remedial Plan after finding that both direct and circumstantial

evidence demonstrated that race continued to be the predominant factor.

Because Defendant could not enact a constitutional remedial map by August 1, 2023, the

date by which the Miami-Dade Board of Elections required a remedial map to conduct the

November elections, and because there was no time for the City Commission to draw a new map

or for the Court to order a special master to craft an alternative plan, the Court faced the

“unwelcome burden” associated with crafting a new map for implementation. See id. at 40–41.

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Accordingly, the Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ proposed map, P4, to determine whether it (1) was a

sufficient constitutional remedy to the Enjoined Plan, (2) complied with the City Commission’s

legitimate, non-race-based policy goals, (3) complied with traditional redistricting criteria, and

(4) complied with state and federal law. See id. at 41–50. The Court found that P4 properly

satisfied each of those criteria and subsequently adopted it as the Court’s Interim Remedial Plan

(“Court’s Map”) pending final judgment in this Action. Id. at 50.

C. Defendant Appeals to the Eleventh Circuit

On July 31, 2023, immediately after the Court issued its Remedial Order, Defendant filed

an emergency motion to stay with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.6 Defendant raised

many arguments in favor of its motion, including one brief paragraph based on Purcell v.

Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).7 See App. Doc. 2 at 25–26. Simply put, Defendant argued that the

“Purcell principle” should prevent this Court from implementing a remedial map ahead of the

November elections to avoid potential chaos and voter confusion that may ensue.8 See id.

In support of its Purcell argument, Defendant made serious misrepresentations to the

Eleventh Circuit regarding the feasibility of election administration. First, with regard to the

Court’s Remedial Order, Defendant stated that “[w]ith the [Court’s] Map, the County would

have to start from scratch, adding further confusion and delay.” App. Doc. 12 at 9 n.3. Not so.

The Miami-Dade Board of Elections specified that it was prepared to use either the Court’s Map,

or the Remedial Plan, depending on the outcome of the motion to stay, and it was preparing to

6
Defendant also filed an emergency motion to stay before this Court. See (ECF No. 97). The
Court denied the motion. See (ECF Nos. 98, 101).
7
References to filings at the Eleventh Circuit will be cited as “App. Doc. __.”
8
While Defendant invoked the Purcell principle, the Court notes that much of the delay was
attributable to Defendant. Though Defendant passed the Remedial Plan on June 14, 2023, it
waited until June 30, 2023 to file the Notice with the Court. See Notice.
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implement both. See Christina Vazquez and Chris Gothner, City, ‘Frustrated’ Plaintiffs Await

New Ruling After Court Pauses New Miami Commission Map, WPLG Local 10 (updated Aug. 2,

2023, 8:14 AM), https://www.local10.com/news/local/2023/08/01/city-frustrated-plaintiffs-

await-new-ruling-after-court-pauses-new-miami-commission-map/ (“The spokesperson [for the

Miami-Dade Elections Department] explained, ‘We did ask for the map so that we can do certain

preliminary work with both sets of maps while waiting for an order from the Appellate Court.’”).

Defendant next asserted that the Miami-Dade Board of Elections would need to engage in

a “time-consuming” precinct redrawing process to implement the Court’s Plan, see App. Doc. 12

at 9 n.3, but in doing so, Defendant did not inform the Eleventh Circuit that: (1) the re-

precincting process at that time had not taken into account either the Court’s Plan or the

Remedial Plan, or (2) the Miami-Dade Board of Elections indicated that they would implement

either map without redrawing precincts at all. See Reprecincting, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,

https://www.miamidade.gov/global/elections/reprecincting.page (“On June 21, 2023, the Miami-

Dade Board of County Commissioners passed Resolution R-536-23, approving the reprecincting

plan.”); (ECF No. 24-30) (explaining that “any major or wholesale changes to district boundaries

made after March[] will most likely have to wait until after the City of Miami’s November 2023

municipal election.”).

But, in perhaps the most misleading aspect of its motion to stay, Defendant invoked the

Purcell principle to assert that the August 1, 2023 deadline was suddenly too close to the

November election, see App. Doc. 2 at 25–26, even though Defendant repeatedly acknowledged

that date as one by which a remedial plan would need to be in place. See (ECF Nos. 24-30, 36 at

22, 73 at 139:12–15). Indeed, the Miami-Dade Board of Elections, Defendant’s agent, was the

entity which informed the Court that a remedial map was required by August 1, 2023. See (ECF

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No. 24-30) (“As it relates to the conduct of the City of Miami November 2023 municipal

election, any changes in the City of Miami Commission District boundaries which would be

reflected in the November 2023 election must be provided through a final, non-appealable order

setting those boundaries by August 1, 2023.”). Based on the Parties understanding of the August

1, 2023, deadline, the Court worked backwards from that date to craft a briefing schedule to

ensure there was time to implement a sufficient remedy. Injunction Order at 27 n.11 (citing

Jacksonville Branch of NAACP v. City of Jacksonville, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 3:22-CV-493-

MMH-LLL, 2022 WL 7089087, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2022)). In fact, in its proposed

scheduling order following the preliminary injunction, Defendant averred that it was amendable

to Plaintiffs’ proposal that the Court approve an interim remedial plan by August 1, 2023.9

Relying in part on Defendant’s (mis)representations about the election’s feasibility, a

divided Eleventh Circuit panel granted the stay solely on Purcell grounds. See Grace et. al v.

City of Miami, No. 23-12472, 2023 WL 528232 (11th Cir. 2023). There was no constitutional

map in place to return to, and thus, the appeal solely focused on whether the Remedial Plan or

the Court’s Plan would govern in the interim remedial period.10 Therefore, the Commission

Districts were necessarily going to change; to the extent any hardship on election administration

or voter confusion would result from the Court’s Plan, so too would it result from the Remedial

9
The Parties each submitted proposed scheduling orders to the Court. Both Plaintiffs’ and
Defendant’s proposed scheduling orders are attached to this Order as Exhibits A and B,
respectively. Therein, Defendant affirmatively indicates that it was amenable to Plaintiffs’
proposed schedule if the City could not pass a remedial map and the Court would not stay the
injunction. Despite such qualifiers, Defendant’s language, at a minimum, implicitly admits that
it understood August 1, 2023 as the date by which a map must be implemented.
10
Defendant initially appealed the preliminary injunction, but voluntarily dismissed it. (ECF No.
88). Thus, the outcome of the appeal could not result in the return to the Enjoined Plan. The
subject of this appeal was solely to determine whether the Remedial Plan (which the Court held
unconstitutional) or the Court’s Plan would take effect in the upcoming election.
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Plan’s implementation. But the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Purcell could apply under these

circumstances and granted the stay. See generally id.; but see Injunction Order at 28 (“The

Eleventh Circuit has found the Purcell principle to apply when an election is set to begin in less

than four months, but not when the elections for a single county occurred five months after an

injunction. From the time of this [Injunction] Order, the November 2023 election is over four

months away from May. To find that this Order implicates the Purcell Principle would extend

the eve of an election farther than the Eleventh Circuit has before.”) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). While the Court does not second guess the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the

Court notes that Defendant’s Purcell arguments misrepresented key facts related to that analysis.

D. Supplemental Complaint

After the Eleventh Circuit granted Defendant’s Emergency Motion to Stay, Plaintiffs

filed the Supplemental Complaint. See (“Supp. Compl.”) (ECF No. 109). Plaintiffs filed the

Supplemental Complaint to “allege[] that the five Miami City Commission districts continue to

be racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (ECF No. 105 at 1). In

doing so, Plaintiffs “include[] supplemental facts” relating to the Remedial Plan. Id. In

response, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for

failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement “give[s] the defendant fair notice of

what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted). The court takes the plaintiff’s factual

allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v.

McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must contain enough facts to plausibly allege the required elements. Watts

v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007). A pleading that offers “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal

conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.

Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the Court makes two findings which are vital to the adjudication of

this Motion. First, the Court construes the Supplemental Complaint in conjunction with the

Amended Complaint and hereafter refers to the combination of the two pleadings as the

“Operative Complaint.” Second, the Court will not consider evidence outside the Operative

Complaint given that the instant Motion seeks dismissal based on Federal Rule of Procedure

12(b)(6).

Regarding how the Court should consider the Supplemental Complaint, Defendant argues

that “Plaintiffs’ Amended [sic] [Complaint] and Supplemental Complaint cannot be read

together because they are contradictory and inconsistent in their allegations.” Reply at 2

(emphasis in original). Defendant avers that because the Amended Complaint and Supplemental

Complaint are allegedly inconsistent, the Court should dismiss both pleadings. See id. at 6–7

(arguing that the two pleadings plead inconsistent allegations regarding packed districts and

racial gerrymandering). Plaintiffs respond that under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a supplemental

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pleading is clearly treated as an update to the original complaint and urge the Court to consider

the two pleadings jointly. See Resp. at 2–3. According to Plaintiffs, construing the pleadings

together results in an operative pleading where the core allegations “are that the City enacted a

racially gerrymandered map in [the Enjoined Plan] and then passed essentially ‘the same map,

for the same reasons, under a new name.’” Id. at 3 (citations omitted).

A basic review of civil procedure forecloses Defendant’s argument. Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(d) provides: “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just

terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or

event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Id. An amended

pleading differs from a supplemental pleading because “[t]he former relate[s] to matters that

occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading and entirely replace[s] the earlier pleading;

the latter deal with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and represent additions to or

continuations of the earlier pleadings.” 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. K. Kane, 4 Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1504 at 177 (emphasis added). Here, as Plaintiffs correctly argue, the

Supplemental Complaint operates as an extension of the Amended Complaint. The Court will

therefore consider the factual allegations together from both pleadings when adjudicating the

instant Motion.11

11
Defendant’s argument about factual inconsistencies between the two pleadings, namely, that
Plaintiffs first accused Defendant of packing Hispanic voters into three districts but now alleges
Defendant sought to “balance” these voter populations, does not undermine the requirement that
the Court consider the two pleadings together as a matter of procedural law. See Mot. at 5.
Rather, Defendant’s argument is substantive in nature. By asserting it, Defendant argues that
Plaintiffs cannot plausibly state a claim given the alleged contradictions in their pleadings. See
Reply at 2. Such an argument is not the basis for considering the two pleadings separately.
Moreover, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ allegations are inconsistent because the
Amended Complaint alleges that the City originally packed Hispanic voters into three districts,
and then when creating the Remedial Plan, the City made race-based decisions to avoid
consolidating Hispanic voters into one single district. See Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 67, 115.
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As to the second issue, the Court will not accept Defendant’s invitation to examine

evidence in the record contained outside the four corners of the Operative Complaint.

Throughout its Motion, Defendant refers to Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative maps and related

materials to support its arguments. See Mot. at 3, 4, 8, 10, 11. Defendant argues that the Court

should consider this record material when adjudicating the instant Motion. See id. at 2 (citing

Hodges v. Bezzeo, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2002)); Reply at 4 (citing Brooks v.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997); Kelly Auto., Inc. v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-60910-CIV, 2011 WL 13217400, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18,

2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-60910-Civ, 2011 WL 13217401 (S.D. Fla.

Nov. 4, 2011)).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Adinolfe v. United Tech. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1169 (11th Cir.

2014). The court takes the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). “In

general, if [the Court] considers materials outside of the complaint, a district court must convert

the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion,” which requires notice of the conversion

to the parties. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Securities, LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th

Cir. 2010). There is an exception to this general rule, however, which allows a district court to

consider materials outside the complaint if those materials are “(1) central to plaintiff’s claim,

and (2) [the] authenticity [of such materials] [are] not challenged.” Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d

1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340

(11th Cir. 2005).

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Defendant avers that reference to these materials, particularly insofar as they may be used

to compare Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative maps to the Remedial Plan, are central to Plaintiffs’

claim. See Reply at 3. Defendant’s attempt to redirect the Court’s focus to Plaintiffs’ proposed

maps demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of this Action. The Operative Complaint

alleges that all five of Miami’s City Commission Districts are racially gerrymandered in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Enjoined Plan, and the Remedial Plan does not

remedy the unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. See generally Am. Compl.; Supp. Compl.

How can it be that Plaintiffs’ proposed plans from the remedial stage of this Action, which are

not functional, are central to the claim contesting the constitutionality of the Enjoined and

Remedial Plans? Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, nowhere in the Operative Complaint do

Plaintiffs rely on their proposed alternative maps in support of their claims that the Enjoined Plan

or Remedial Plan are racially gerrymandered; Plaintiffs mention their alternative maps in passing

to demonstrate why De Grandy and the City Commissioners did not approve of them in the

remedial process. See Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 35, 37, 96–98, 116–17, 167. Whether Plaintiffs’

proposed maps (which do not form a basis of their claim) could pass constitutional muster has no

bearing on whether the Enjoined Plan or Remedial Plan can do the same.

Asking the Court to consider Plaintiffs’ alternative maps when adjudicating this Motion

is central to Defendant’s misplaced argument that it parrots throughout: if the Remedial Plan is

similar to Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative maps, then “[Plaintiffs’] plans demonstrate that the

City did not racially gerrymander any districts.” Reply at 4. But by advancing this argument,

Defendant turns this Action on its head. It is not Plaintiffs’ proposed maps from the remedial

stage of this case that are on trial—the inquiry is solely focused on the legal sufficiency of

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the Enjoined Plan and the Remedial Plan. At this stage, the

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Court will not accept Defendant’s invitation to consider its factual arguments and evidence

involving Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative maps—these are materials outside the motion to

dismiss record, and evaluating those materials would be wholly inappropriate at this stage in the

proceeding.

A. Plaintiffs Have Standing

Defendant reasserts its argument that Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing. See Mot.

at 14. Before filing this Motion, Defendant filed a prior motion to dismiss alleging, among other

things, that Plaintiffs lacked standing, see (ECF No. 34), which the Court subsequently denied as

moot. (ECF No. 110). Though it does not restate the allegations in this Motion, Defendant seeks

to incorporate the standing argument from its prior motion to dismiss here. See Mot. at 14; see

also Reply at 8–9 (reiterating standing arguments that were brought in the prior motion to

dismiss).

Defendant conveniently omits that the Court has already adjudicated the issue of whether

Plaintiffs have standing. See (ECF No. 60 at 4–7). In the briefing for the preliminary injunction

motion, Defendant raised the same standing argument. See (ECF No. 36 at 20–21). The Court

gave extended consideration to the argument and rejected it. See (ECF No. 60 at 4–7). Unhappy

with the result, Defendant raises the argument again, even though there are no new Plaintiffs and

no new facts that would alter the standing analysis. See Mot. at 14; Reply at 8–9. The Court

incorporates its reasoning from the Injunction Order and will not expend its resources repeating

to Defendant what it has already made clear. Plaintiffs have standing.

B. The Action is Not Moot

Defendant also reasserts the stale argument that the instant Action is moot. See Mot. at

15. According to Defendant, the Court should first dismiss only the Supplemental Complaint.

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See id. Then, with only the Amended Complaint remaining, Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs

cannot proceed solely on a challenge of the Enjoined Plan when it has been superseded by the

[Remedial] Plan.” Id. Defendant argues because the remedial stage of this case has ended,

Plaintiffs cannot proceed once the Supplemental Complaint has been dismissed. See id. In

response, Plaintiffs aver that “[n]early every sentence of [Defendant’s] mootness argument is

legally incorrect” because (1) the Court must consider the Amended Complaint jointly with the

Supplemental Complaint, meaning the Court cannot dismiss only the latter, and (2) the Court has

already ruled that Defendant’s mootness argument is incorrect. See Resp. at 11–12.

As the Court explained above, the Supplemental Complaint updates the Amended

Complaint—it does not amend or supersede it. 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. K. Kane, 4

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504 at 177. Thus, the scenario that Defendant identifies

where the Court dismisses the Supplemental Complaint but not the Amended Complaint cannot

exist—either the two pleadings considered together are dismissed, or neither are. Procedurally,

there is no instance where the Court would dismiss only the Supplemental Complaint but leave

the Amended Complaint intact. Therefore, to the extent Defendant’s mootness argument hinges

on such a scenario, its argument is unavailing.

But as a substantive matter, Defendant’s mootness argument is incorrect. See Section

I.b.i., supra. Defendant has now raised this argument four times. (ECF Nos. 80, 86, 104, 117).

Defendant’s persistence in raising this argument does not suddenly alter the Court’s analysis—

the Court has already rejected the argument and clearly explained its rationale. See (ECF Nos.

91, 112 at 2 n.2). Relitigating and rejecting the same argument is hardly an efficient use of

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scarce judicial resources, and the Court will not entertain Defendant’s argument again. The

Remedial Plan does not render this Action Moot.12

C. Plaintiffs State a Claim for Relief

Finally, the Court turns to the crux of the Motion: whether Plaintiffs’ Operative

Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Operative Complaint’s sole

claim is that, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the City Commission Districts were

racially gerrymandered in the Enjoined Plan and continue to be racially gerrymandered in the

Remedial Plan. See generally Am. Compl.; Supp. Compl. For the following reasons, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs have made a showing that their claim is at least plausible. Thus, the Court

denies Defendant’s Motion.

A racial gerrymandering claim under the Fourteenth Amendment requires the Court to

undertake “a two-step analysis.” Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 291 (2017). First, Plaintiffs

must prove that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a

significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.

900, 916 (1995). Then, if Plaintiffs successfully demonstrate that race was the predominant

factor used in district line-drawing, the burden shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that its race-

based sorting of voters withstands strict scrutiny, that is, Defendant must show that consideration

of race when designing the Commission Districts constitutes a compelling interest that is

narrowly tailored to that end. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292 (citing Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.

of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 193 (2017)).

12
Plaintiffs identify that the Operative Complaint seeks recovery for Plaintiffs’ “injury flowing
from the [Enjoined Plan], through, among other relief, nominal damages. That nominal damages
claim would merit a full trial on the merits even if Plaintiffs sued only to redress injuries relating
to the Enjoined Plan.” Resp. at 12 (citing Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796
(2021)). The Court agrees. Notwithstanding Defendant’s meritless argument above, that
Plaintiffs seek damages in addition to other relief defeats Defendant’s mootness argument.
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In the Motion, Defendant separates its arguments into two segments: one focused on

Districts 1 through 4, and one focused on District 5. The Court addresses each in turn.

i. Districts 1–4.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails for two reasons: (1) the districts “reflect the

demographic reality” of the City and “are not racial gerrymanders, regardless of what the

legislators may say;” and (2) because the Remedial Plan is nearly identical to the Enjoined Plan,

the Remedial Plan “did not, in its own right, place a significant number of voters for racial

reasons.” Mot. at 11–12. Neither argument warrants dismissal.

a. Plaintiffs May Rely on Direct Evidence of Legislative Intent

As to Defendant’s first argument, it asserts that “[t]he test for racial gerrymandering is

not merely whether race was discussed, but whether it actually resulted in a racial gerrymander

of a significant number of voters.”13 Id. at 11. To Defendant, this case is unprecedented because

“[i]t confronts the question of whether a racial gerrymander[ring] case may proceed based upon

alleged motives and statements of legislators, when there is no actual gerrymandering . . . [that

is] inconsistent with the City’s actual demographics.” Id. at 14. First, Defendant contests

whether the Commissioners intended to racially gerrymander, instead suggesting that they were

merely aware “of these racial demographic realities” when engaging in districting decisions. Id.

at 13. Next, to the extent the Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly alleges it was the

Commissioners’ intent to racially gerrymander, Defendant argues that the Court should not

consider such statements of intent as sufficient to support a racial gerrymandering claim because

13
In support of its argument, Defendant offers the following illustration: “[t]he priests of an
ancient religion may say that they have to perform a yearly ritual to make the sun rise, but just
because they are claiming credit for it, does not mean that they are making the sun rise.” Mot. at
11. While no doubt a creative analogue, Defendant’s illustration is inapplicable when, as
discussed below, Plaintiffs allege that City Commissioners explicitly instructed the mapmaking
consultant to draw districts to racially sort citizens, and in turn, the consultant obliged.
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“the Districts simply reflect the demographic reality [of the City] . . . regardless of what the

legislators may say.” Id. at 11. In sum, Defendant does not believe that race could have

predominated in the design of Districts 1–4 because, despite the Commissioners’ stated intent,

the Enjoined Plan and the Remedial Plan are consistent with Miami’s racial demographics.

Defendant’s argument ignores both decades of precedent and the substance of the

Operative Complaint. Courts have long held that, to demonstrate racial predominance, a plaintiff

may show “circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct

evidence going to legislative purpose.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (emphasis added); see also Vill.

of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); Hunt v. Cromartie,

526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt (“Shaw II”), 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996). The notion that

a racial gerrymandering claim “may proceed based upon alleged motives and statements of

legislators” is hardly a novel concept, despite Defendant’s argument to the contrary. See Mot. at

14. Accepting Defendant’s argument would yield the perverse result that, when faced with a

racial gerrymandering claim, the Court should not consider the stated intent of the relevant

legislators during the districting process. The Court makes no such finding here.

Just as important, Defendant’s argument misrepresents the allegations in the Operative

Complaint. While Defendant is correct that a legislature’s mere awareness of race in the

districting process does not give rise to a racial gerrymandering claim, that is not what the

Operative Complaint alleges. See id. at 13–14 (citing Shaw v. Reno (“Shaw I”), 509 U.S. 630,

646 (1993)). The Operative Complaint contains extensive allegations that multiple

Commissioners, over the course of six public meetings, expressed their intent that Districts 1, 3

and 4 be designed such that they would remain “Hispanic districts,” and that District 2 would

remain an “Anglo district.” See (ECF Nos. 23 ¶¶ 188–350); see, e.g., id. ¶ 197 (“Again on

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February 7, Carollo explained his ‘goals from day one:’ ‘to have guaranteed Anglo

representation, and to have three districts that were Hispanics,’ concluding ‘these are my

intentions here today.’”); ¶ 199 (“Diaz de la Portilla, for example, explained on March 11, ‘our

goal here is to have an African American district, for a lack of a better term, a white district, . . .

and three Hispanic districts.’”); ¶ 200 (“In response to public criticism of gerrymandering, Reyes

was blunt: ‘Yes, we are gerrymandering to preserve those seats’ – to preserve and enhance the

maximal division of races into separate districts as much as possible.”); ¶ 207 (“At the February

7 meeting, Carollo shared that originally, District 2 ‘was gerrymandered—but it was a legal

gerrymander so that you would have an Anglo elected commissioner’”). Those quotes are just a

few of many examples—the Operative Complaint is rife with allegations that the Commissioners

intentionally gerrymandered each City Commission District and instructed De Grandy to racially

sort Miamians in the Enjoined Plan. See id. ¶¶ 86–101, 104–118, 133–140, 148–161, 188–357

(discussing direct and circumstantial evidence, such as the shapes of district borders and the

splitting up of traditional neighborhoods, each indicating that race was the predominant factor in

districting decisions). Moreover, the Operative Complaint alleges that the Remedial Plan was

implemented to preserve the same race-based sorting from the Enjoined Plan. See Supp Compl.

¶¶ 26–31, 55–63, 134–59. Thus, the Operative Complaint clearly alleges that the legislators

were not just aware of race when drawing the districts—they designed the districts with the

intent to racially gerrymander them. Defendant’s attempt to suggest the Operative Complaint

only alleges that City Commissioners were aware of race when drawing the districts, when the

Operative Complaint clearly alleges it was the city Commissioners’ intent to racially

gerrymander the districts, is a gross mischaracterization.

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And lastly, Defendant’s assertion that the districts are not racially gerrymandered because

they reflect the demographic reality of the city is inapposite. Plaintiffs’ claim alleges that, as

drawn, the Enjoined Plan and Remedial Plan were designed “with the express intention of

segregating people on the basis of race.” Resp. at 8. Plaintiffs are not claiming that no similar

map could ever be constitutionally drawn, rather, they are simply stating that Defendant cannot

draw a map with the deliberate intent to racially gerrymander the Commission Districts. See id.

In any event, the Court need not evaluate other alternative maps at the motion to dismiss stage.14

Accordingly, Defendant’s argument regarding the city’s demographics is unavailing.

In short, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have made a plausible showing that race was the

predominant factor in the design of Districts 1–4. Under the two-step analysis of a racial

gerrymandering claim, that is all Plaintiffs are required to show.15 Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291

(holding that Plaintiffs must make a showing that race was the predominant factor in the

districting decision, and upon making that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to

demonstrate that its race-based sorting survives strict scrutiny).

b. Defendant Improperly Compares Voters Moved Between

the Enjoined Plan and the Remedial Plan

Defendant’s second argument regarding Districts 1–4 relates to the concept that Plaintiffs

must show that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a

significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.

Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs allege the New Plan is nearly identical to the Enjoined

14
Notably, the Court has already found that an alternative map could be drawn. See Order at 40–
49 (holding Plaintiffs’ P4 was a constitutional remedial map).
15
Though the Court need not address it at this juncture, Plaintiffs also allege that the districts do
not survive strict scrutiny. See Supp. Compl. ¶ 179.

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Plan, the Remedial Plan cannot be said to have moved a significant number of people for racial

reasons. See Mot. at 12. According to Defendant, “[t]he [Remedial] Plan cannot have failed to

[sic] [have appreciably] change[d] from the Enjoined Plan, and still be a racial gerrymander.” Id.

at 12–13. Plaintiffs respond that Defendant misunderstands their claim and erroneously focuses

its argument on the movement of individuals between the Enjoined and Remedial Plans. See

Resp. at 8.

Plaintiffs are correct. At risk of being repetitive, the Court reiterates that Plaintiffs are

claiming that in both the Enjoined and Remedial Plan, “every Miamian was placed within or

without their City Commission district based on their race.”16 Id. (emphasis omitted). The

analysis is therefore focused on whether the districting process resulting in the Enjoined Plan

was a racial gerrymander, and subsequently, whether the Remedial Plan perpetuated the alleged

racial gerrymandering. Defendant’s argument about the differences between the Enjoined and

Remedial Plan is therefore improper and misunderstands the required analysis in this case.

Defendant’s argument does not disturb the Court’s prior analysis that Plaintiffs made a plausible

showing that race was the predominant factor in the design of Districts 1–4.

Defendant’s Motion is denied insofar as it seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim as to

Districts 1–4.

16
In the Reply, Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted because the Supreme Court
“expressly rejected” claims where plaintiffs proffered a racial gerrymandering claim as applied
to the whole state. Reply at 8 (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Ala. (“ALBC I”), 575 U.S.
254, 262 (2015)). An accurate reading of that case explains that racial gerrymandering claims
“appl[y] to the boundaries of individual districts. . . We have consistently described a claim of
racial gerrymandering as a claim that race was improperly used in the drawing of the boundaries
of one or more specific electoral districts.” ALBC I, 575 U.S. at 262–63 (emphasis omitted).
That passage precisely describes Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Plaintiffs are not challenging
Miami’s districts as an “undifferentiated whole,” but rather, they challenge each district
individually. See generally Am. Compl.; Supp. Compl. Indeed, the Court has rejected this exact
argument already. For an extended discussion on the topic, see Injunction Order at 6.
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ii. District 5

In the Operative Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that race was the predominant factor in

designing District 5. Am. Compl. ¶ 217. Plaintiffs also allege that because race predominated in

District 5’s design, the burden shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that its use of racial

considerations withstands strict scrutiny. Supp. Compl. ¶ 160. Subsequently, Plaintiffs allege

that though Defendant may be able to demonstrate that it considered race when designing

District 5 to comply with the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), and that doing so is a compelling

government interest, Defendant is unable to demonstrate that its use of race to design District 5

was narrowly tailored to achieve VRA compliance. See id. ¶¶ 160–173.

In the instant Motion, Defendant does not contest that race predominated in the design of

District 5, but instead, focuses its argument entirely on whether District 5 is narrowly tailored to

achieve VRA compliance. See Mot. at 7–10. For example, Defendant argues that District 5’s

Black Voting Age Population “was set at just over 50%,” one of Plaintiffs’ proposed plans had

similar demographics in their version of District 5, and that “[a]s long as there is a basis for a

good faith reason to believe the district is narrowly tailored, courts should not second guess the

decision.”17 See id. at 8–9 (citing Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 196). At no point does Defendant

dispute that race predominated in the design of District 5.

17
Defendant spends much time discussing the “good-faith safe harbor” from Bethune-Hill. See
Mot. at 8–9. Defendant frames the issue by stating that District 5 was “objectively drawn
narrowly,” and thus, the Court must determine whether it may hold that the district was not
narrowly tailored “on the grounds that the legislative body did not have a good enough reason to
believe it.” Id. at 6. Then, Defendant asserts that, under Bethune-Hill, “[a]s long as there is a
basis for a good faith reason to believe that the district is narrowly tailored, courts should not
second guess that decision.” Id. at 9. The Court expresses no opinion on what it means for a
district to be “objectively drawn narrowly,” nor does it opine on the correctness of how
Defendant has framed the narrow tailoring issue. For the reasons articulated above, the Court
need not address factual arguments about narrow tailoring at this time.
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As noted above, Plaintiffs’ burden is to demonstrate only that race-predominated in the

design of District 5. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291. Once Plaintiffs have made such a showing,

the burden shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that its use of race in designing the district satisfies

strict scrutiny. See id. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged, and Defendant has conceded, that race

predominated in District 5. On a motion to dismiss, that is all Plaintiffs must demonstrate. As a

matter of procedure, Defendant’s arguments regarding whether District 5 is narrowly tailored is

legally irrelevant at this juncture. The inquiry could end there.

Even so, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant’s attempt to comply with the

VRA when designing District 5 was not narrowly tailored. See Supp. Compl ¶¶ 160–173.

Accepting the allegations in the Operative Complaint as true, as the Court must on a motion to

dismiss, Plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim that District 5 was racially gerrymandered in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To consider Defendant’s argument about narrow

tailoring would necessarily entail considering a variety of evidence regarding why the City

Commission chose to design District 5 in the manner that they did, and whether such evidence

comports with Bethune-Hill. While weighing such evidence against Plaintiffs’ allegations would

be appropriate at a different stage of the case, such as during summary judgment, it is

inappropriate on a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that race was the

predominant factor in District 5 and thus, the Motion is denied as to this District as well.

iii. Plaintiffs Need Not Plead a Lack of Compactness

Though the Court has already found that Plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim that each

of the five City Commission Districts were racially gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the Court finds it appropriate to separately address an additional argument that

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Defendant advances throughout its Motion. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not

allege a lack of compactness with respect to Districts 1, 3, 4, and 5. See Mot. at 10–11.

Defendant further claims that the Remedial Plan’s districts are relatively compact “and do not

have the sort of gerrymandered shapes present in gerrymandering cases.” Id. at 10. Then, after

improperly comparing one of Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative map’s compactness (which the

Court explained above it will not consider) to the Remedial Plan, Defendant asserts that “[s]ince

Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to establish a lack of compactness, their Amended and

Supplemental Complaints should be dismissed.” Reply at 10.

Defendant’s argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of racial gerrymandering

claims. To sustain this claim, “[t]he plaintiff’s burden is to show, either through circumstantial

evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative

purpose, that race was the predominant factor” in designing the districts. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.

“That entails demonstrating that the legislature subordinated other factors—compactness, respect

for political subdivisions, partisan advantage, what have you—to racial considerations.” Cooper,

581 U.S. at 291 (internal quotations omitted). But the case law does not indicate that a plaintiff

must demonstrate that a challenged plan departs from all traditional redistricting criteria. See

Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189 (holding “race may predominate even when a plan respects

traditional principles”) (citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “a conflict

or inconsistency between the [challenged] plan and traditional redistricting criteria [like

compactness] is not a threshold requirement or mandatory precondition in order for a challenger

to establish a claim of racial gerrymandering.” Id.

That is especially true in instances where, as here, Plaintiffs are alleging both

circumstantial and direct evidence of racial gerrymandering. See generally Am. Compl.; Supp.

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Compl. The argument that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs failed to allege that some

districts were not compact utterly misconstrues what Plaintiffs are required to plead.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant argues that this Action “bring[s] a racial gerrymandering case without any

actual, significant racial gerrymandering.” Mot. at 10 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding that

the Court has already found that Plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim that every Miamian was

subject to a racial gerrymander, the Court pauses to acknowledge Defendant’s assertion that its

alleged racial gerrymandering was insignificant.

Whether Defendant believes that the allegations against it are serious is irrelevant; the

Supreme Court has clearly delineated the harms that victims of racial gerrymandering suffer. In

Miller, the Supreme Court explained:

When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and
demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, think
alike, share the same political interests and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. . . Race-based assignments embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the
product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as
citizens—according to criterion barred to the Government by history and the
Constitution.

Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

This was not the first time the Supreme Court expressed its profound distaste for racial

classifications when making districting decisions. In Shaw I, the Court explained:

Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial

gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system
in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is for these
reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial
scrutiny.

Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657 (1993).

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Thus, Defendant’s blasé remarks about the seriousness (or lack thereof) of the alleged

gerrymandering miss the mark. Plaintiffs’ allegations about Defendant’s conduct, if proven,

offend fundamental constitutional rights to which every citizen is entitled. Racial

gerrymandering is not analyzed on a spectrum of varying magnitude where a defendant may

argue that it sorted voters on race, but the resulting harm was not that serious. If Miami’s

citizens were racially gerrymandered, Defendant may not escape liability by insisting that its

constitutional violation was not as bad as other, more blatant instances where voters have been

segregated by race. Any proven case of racial gerrymandering is unequivocally serious.

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and being

otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 117) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 17th

____ day of November

2023.

K. MICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

c: All counsel of record

28