G.R. No. 151258

Supreme Court E-Library
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 527

Villareal vs. People
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151258. February 1, 2012]
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 154954. February 1, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO
MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL,
SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA,
MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO,
ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS,
JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 155101. February 1, 2012]
FIDELITO DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080. February 1, 2012]
GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO

ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO
ADRIANO, respondents.
528 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE; THAT NO

ACT CONSTITUTES A CRIME UNLESS IT IS MADE
SO BY LAW. — Although courts must not remain indifferent
to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of
a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system — “[N]o
act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so by law.” Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
2. ID.; EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY; DEATH OF
PETITIONER EXTINGUISHED HIS CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR BOTH PERSONAL AND PECUNIARY
PENALTIES INCLUDING CIVIL LIABILITY DIRECTLY
ARISING FROM THE DELICT COMPLAINED OF. —
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the
death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final
judgment. The term “personal penalties” refers to the service
of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term “pecuniary
penalties” (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including
civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained
of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability based
on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the
death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate
civil action. Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal
extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising
from the delict complained of.
3. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE; VIOLATED WHEN ACCUSED STRIPPED
OF ALL HIS PRE-ASSIGNED TRIAL DATES; THE SAME,
HOWEVER, WILL NOT VACATE A FINDING OF GUILT
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. —
Article III, Section 14(2) [of the Constitution] provides that
“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused … shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel…” This
constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in
one’s defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 529

in person at every stage of the proceedings. x x x Stripping

the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a
patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process. Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty
plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be
heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the
criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case
to the trial court. In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that x x x
a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL;
DISMISSAL PURSUANT THEREOF IS TANTAMOUNT
TO ACQUITTAL AND APPEAL THEREFORE VIOLATES
THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNLESS
CAPRICIOUS; CASE AT BAR. — The right of the accused
to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. x x x We have consistently
ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant
to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to
acquittal. As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of
the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of
double jeopardy. As we have previously discussed, however,
where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.
x x x We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s
dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, [et al.] on the
basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. x x x This
Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended
Information was filed against Escalona, [et al.] x x x On 29
November 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately, the
initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005
or almost 12 years after arraignment.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. —
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal
justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with
an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused — the accused cannot again be charged with the same
or an identical offense. x x x Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules
of Court, implements this particular constitutional right.
x x x The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state
from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal

or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular

appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45
of the same Rules.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY-OF-ACQUITTAL DOCTRINE;
EXCEPTIONS. — As we have reiterated in People v. Court
of Appeals and Galicia, “[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even
in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for
the same offense. x x x We further stressed that “an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence
of the finality of his acquittal.” This prohibition, however, is
not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal
of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the
latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the
prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;
(2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THERE HAS BEEN
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The third instance
refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. Here, the party
asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical
or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot
be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; PRESENT WHERE
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY TO A
POINT SO GRAVE AS TO DEPRIVE IT OF ITS VERY
POWER TO DISPENSE JUSTICE. — Indeed, we have ruled
in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 531

applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty

against the accused. We have also recognized, however, that
certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon
a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances
of grave abuse of discretion.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED CANNOT BE HELD
CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES
WHEN ACTUAL DEATH OCCURS. — Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable
for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different
from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have
committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction
of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim,
courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework
governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and
not subject to discretion. x x x We emphasize that these two
types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with
each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable
for physical injuries when actual death occurs.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; INTENTIONAL FELONY; MALICIOUS
INTENT MUST BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. — In order for an intentional felony
to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of
dolo or “malice.” The term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex
idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.
x x x The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination
to do a certain act. The element of intent — on which this
Court shall focus — is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to
the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains
to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act. While
motive is the “moving power” that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the “purpose” of using a particular
means to produce the result. On the other hand, the term
“felonious” means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. x x x As is required
of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious
intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

11. ID.; CONSPIRACY; ABSENT MALICIOUS INTENT, THERE

IS NO CONSPIRACY BUT CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.
— Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code — which provides that
“conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it” — is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies
committed by means of dolo or malice. x x x In culpable felonies
or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional. x x x If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent — but with lack of foresight,
carelessness, or negligence — the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.
12. ID.; HOMICIDE; INTENT TO KILL IN THE FRATERNITY
INITIATION RITES, NOT ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE. — As to the existence of animus interficendi
on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu. x
x x At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would
be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them.
x x x While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of
the death of the former’s purported NPA brother, and then
blamed Lenny Villa’s father for stealing the parking space of
Dizon’s father. According to the Solicitor General, these x x
x were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the
Aquila Fraternity. x x x Thus, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternity’s
psychological initiation.
13. ID.; PHYSICAL INJURIES; INTENT TO INJURE; HOW
ESTABLISHED. — In order to be found guilty of any of the
felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence
of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from
the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. x x x In People v. Regato,
we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action,
conduct, and external acts of the accused. What persons do is
the best index of their intention. We have also ruled that the
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 533

method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of

the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative
of the intent of the perpetrator.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT IN THE FRATERNITY INITIATION RITES. —
Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The
night before the commencement of the rites, they were briefed
on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and
that they could quit anytime. x x x Even after going through
Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of
initiation. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking,
paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were
done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, x x x the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that
the acts were done pursuant to tradition. x x x Other than the
paddle, no other “weapon” was used to inflict injuries on Lenny.
The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the
arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries,
which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the
initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent.
All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the
same process of “traditional” initiation; there is no proof that
Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment.
15. ID.; FELONIES COMMITTED BY CULPA; NEGLIGENCE,
HOW DETERMINED. — The Revised Penal Code punishes
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According
to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
x x x The test for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man
in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence
of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on
the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
16. ID.; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE;
COMMITTED FOR THE DEATH OF A NEOPHYTE IN

THE FRATERNITY INITIATION RITES. — [T]he collective

acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It
must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates
a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With
the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal
officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect
of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to
all those who directly participated in and contributed to the
infliction of physical injuries.
17. ID.; ID.; PROPER CIVIL DAMAGES. — Civil indemnity ex
delicto [in the amount of P50,000] is automatically awarded
for the sole fact of death of the victim. The heirs of the victim
are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including
expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim,
so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents. The
heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief
suffered on account of the victim’s death. This penalty is
pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code. x x x Thus, we
hereby affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the amount
of P1,000,000.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Quiason Makalintal Barrot Torres & Ibarra for Artemio

Villareal.
Alfredo Tadiar for Gerardo Villa.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Augusto S. Jimenez, Sr. for Antonio Mariano Almeda.
Ramon U. Braganza for Junel Anthony Ama.
De Guzman and Celis Law Office for Ronan de Guzman.
Felipe Antonio B. Remolio for Vincent Tecson.
Gonzales Batiller David Leabres and Reyes for Nelson
Victorino.
Santiago & Santiago for Anselmo Adriano.
Tagle Chua Cruz & Aquino for Fideito Dizon.
Farcon Gabriel Farcon and Associates for Renato Bantug,
Jr. and Joseph Lledo.
Saguisag and Associates for Zosimo Mendoza.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 535

Flores Cabrera Gonzales & Concepcion Law Offices for

Jaime Maria Flores II.
Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Abel Abas for themselves
and Junel Anthony Ama.
Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law Offices
for Paul Angelo santos.
Baterina Baterina Casals Lozada & Tiblani for Gerarda Villa.
Apostol Gumaru & Balgua Law Office for Santiago Ranada III.
Jose Alberto C. Flaminiano for Dalmacio L. Lim, Jr.
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr. for Vicente Verdalero.
Picazo Buyco Tan Fider & Santos for Jonas karl Perez.
Tomas Carmelo T. Araneta for Sabban & Montecillo.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa

— the victim in this case — on 10 February 1991 led to a very
strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups
were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This
widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special
law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize
hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage members from
making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.3 Moreover, the law was meant to
counteract the exculpatory implications of “consent” and “initial
innocent act” in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere
act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.4
1
Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript
of Session Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9 th Congress, 1 st Regular
Sess. at 21-22 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].
2
Id.
3
Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9th
Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].
4
Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December
1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing

activities in the country.5 Within a year of his death, six more
cases of hazing-related deaths emerged — those of Frederick
Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan
of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo
in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval
Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant
Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of
the Philippines in Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments,
in this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death,
they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our
criminal justice system — “[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless
it is made so by law.” 7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as
immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent
any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law,
judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed
by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the
elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R.
No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals
(CA) 8 and the trial court, 9 are as follows:
5
Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.
6
Id.
7
U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599 (1914). The Court declared, “In the
Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United
States and England as common law crimes;” id. at 604.
8
CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5;
rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 62-66.
9
RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)],
pp. 1-57; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 109-167.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 537

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo

de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to
join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza,
Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto Francis “Bert” Navera,
Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny”
Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by
some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby
of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes
on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they
could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to
last for three days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement
of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already
received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the
neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” These rites included
the “Indian Run,” which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet
of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to
the neophytes; the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their
legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran
over their legs; the “Rounds,” in which the neophytes were held
at the back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during
initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows
on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round,” in which the auxiliaries were
given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the

neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong
answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours,
the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members 10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened
the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon
and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and
to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling
to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense
pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by
the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner.
They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused
by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought
he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny
was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping
him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping
10
As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, “resident brods”
are those fraternity members who are currently students of the Ateneo
Law School, while “alumni brods” are those fraternity members who are
graduates or former students of the law school; see Villareal’s Petition for
Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 5-7; rollo (G.R. No.
151258), pp. 17-19.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 539

bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against
the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No.
C-38340(91) were jointly tried. 11 On the other hand, the trial
against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.12
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment,
or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against
the remaining nine accused commenced anew. 14
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) 15 set
aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation.
Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants — Victorino,
Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
11
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9;
rollo, p. 110.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.
14
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo
(G.R. No. 178057), p. 131.
15
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with
Concurring Opinion).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 541

Brigola (Victorino et al.) — were acquitted, as their

individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants — Vincent Tecson, Junel
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato
Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) — were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants — Fidelito Dizon and
Artemio Villareal — were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced
them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional
amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground
of violation of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on different
dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied
the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders
and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19
16
RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo
(G.R. No. 178057), p. 1114.
17
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo,
pp. 139-141.
18
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred
in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
19
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 37-39, supra note 14; rollo,
pp. 166-168.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated

Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 — Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two
reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision
dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 — first, denial
of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 20
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel
for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10
August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died
on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter
of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive
the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 — Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
Certiorari, questioning the CA’s Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520.21 Petitioner sets forth two main issues — first, that he
was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court’s
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he
was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him
the same “ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of
the other accused.”22
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which
forfeited Dizon’s right to present evidence during trial. The
trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier
date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented
20
Villareal’s Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258),
p. 13; rollo, p. 25.
21
Dizon’s Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101),
p. 1; rollo, p. 3.
22
Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 543

separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right

should not have been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did
not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original
pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should
have likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his
acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were
not tainted by evil motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling
session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He
also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites “decided that [Lenny] was fit
enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to
do the paddling….”24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument
of the Solicitor General that “the individual blows inflicted by
Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny’s death.”25
The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, “on the contrary,
Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken
collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.”26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was
motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny’s father could not
have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter
did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same
place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was
the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his
utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of
the “psychological initiation.” He then cites the testimony of
Lenny’s co-neophyte — witness Marquez — who admitted
knowing “it was not true and that he was just making it up….”27
23
24
25
26
Id. at 23-24; rollo, pp. 25-26.
27

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill

will was negated by his show of concern for Villa after the
initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the
neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of
the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent
the latter’s chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together
with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made
him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill
motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion
and concern for the victim’s well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 — People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal
of the CA’s Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution
dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries. 28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit
hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial
court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there
was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused
Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 29 The said
article provides: “Criminal liability shall be incurred… [b]y
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.”
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is
inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court’s finding of conspiracy
28
People’s Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954),
p. 2; rollo, p. 13.
29
Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 545

and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the accused must
be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 — Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated
25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-
G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153. 30 The Petition involves the
dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to “several pending incidents,” the trial court ordered a
separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos,
Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon
(Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings
against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court
found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result,
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the
nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
“various reasons,” the initial trial of the case did not commence
until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment
of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal
case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert
their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time.
She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for
the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were
not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present
evidence constitutes denial of due process;
30
Villa’s Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R.
Nos. 178057 and 178080), p. 1; rollo, p. 84.

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano
for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding
of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability
of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when
it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty
only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 — Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition
was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for
petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death
of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties
is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The
term “personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,31 while the term “pecuniary penalties”
(las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,32 including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil
liability ex delicto).33 However, civil liability based on a source
31
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200
SCRA 644.
32
People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA
122, citing J. Aquino’s Concurring Opinion in People v. Satorre, G.R. No.
L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
33
People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA
239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 547

of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused
and is recoverable through a separate civil action.34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished
his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties,
including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates
for the reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on
the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October
1993. 35 The Order likewise stated that “it will not entertain any
postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented
their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the
line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part
to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed
as waiver to present evidence.”36
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused
manifested in open court that his client — Antonio General —
would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who
had already testified.37 Because of this development and pursuant
to the trial court’s Order that the parties “should be ready at all
times down the line,” the trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on the next trial date — 25 August 1993 — instead of
his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed
to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993. 38 Counsel
for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a
34
People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.
35
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.

Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear

in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to
present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.39
The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and
treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation
of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court. 40
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to
present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.41
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived
of due process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to
present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the
25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified,
since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to
start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on
the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask
for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed
by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred
in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby
invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution itself.42 Article III, Section
14(2) thereof, provides that “in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused … shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel…” This constitutional right includes the right to
present evidence in one’s defense, 43 as well as the right to be
39
Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
40
41
Id.
42
People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328
Phil. 1123 (1996), citing People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 (1980); and
People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).
43
People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311
SCRA 585 (1999).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 549

present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the

proceedings.44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set
the hearing of the defense’s presentation of evidence for 21, 22
and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to “lack of quorum in the regular membership” of the
Sandiganbayan’s Second Division and upon the agreement of
the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June
1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The
Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the
confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that
he had waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at “yesterday’s and today’s scheduled hearings.”
In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s non-appearance during the 22 June
1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for
trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates…
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing
should not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver
must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person
or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan’s counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as
in the present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the
accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver
of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure
44
People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354,
360 (1997).
45
Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).

to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to

the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned.
The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of
his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to
explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal
case involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly.
The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so
that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the
waiver x x x. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner
to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right
to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered
the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another
accused — General — had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates;
and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks
later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates
for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its
Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one
out of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial evidence. Stripping
the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent
denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea,
an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard
does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial
court. 47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have
adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution
or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that
a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.48
46
Id.
47
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
48
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 551

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts

on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any
“procedural unfairness or irregularity” that would substantially
prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon
in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide
the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition
is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and
the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing
of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that “all actions of
the petitioner were part of the traditional rites,” and that “the
alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official
activity of the fraternity.” 49 He even argues that “Dizon did not
request for the extension and he participated only after the activity
was sanctioned.”50
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned
over from one judge or justice to another — at the trial court,
at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case
for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only
inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going
on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since
the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they
failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise
a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them,
and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner
also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions
to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that “the prosecution could not be faulted for
49
Dizon’s Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.
50

the delay in the movement of this case when the original records
and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these
were in the Court of Appeals.” 51
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined
in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.52
This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious,
capricious or oppressive delays. 53 The right is deemed violated
when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements
of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. 54 In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should
do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.55 The conduct
of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also
to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the
assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought
upon the defendant. 57
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a
dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused to
speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. 58 As a consequence, an
51
Villa’s Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo,
p. 102.
52
People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006,
499 SCRA 688.
53
People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil.
820 (1970).
54
People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.
55
People v. Tampal, supra.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra;
Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94, 107 (2005);
People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994); People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142
(1989); and People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 553

appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to

a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.59 As we have
previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case
is capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy is
not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of
jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal
of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano
on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The
court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal
that the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the
proceedings in the case below:
xxx xxx xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the
order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies
of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing
factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners
are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial
has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the
fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order
of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of
59
See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.

the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early
as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order
requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals.
The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the
same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of
the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with.
It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records
were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack
of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until
August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was
no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the
latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the
court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a
considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever
is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon
x x x. 63 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final

amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De
Vera. 64 On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned. 65
Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence
until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan,
the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for
63
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 24-30, supra note 14; rollo, pp.
151-157.
64
65
Id.
66
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 555

close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts

to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases — a clear
violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of
the delay in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs.
Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition
of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where
the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman’s duty to act promptly on complaints before him;
and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the
information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint
was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where
the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already. 68 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.’s
right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes
accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects
of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal
justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with
an offense, and the case is terminated — either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused –— the accused cannot again be charged with the same
or an identical offense.69 This principle is founded upon the
67
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).
68
Id.
69
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).

law of reason, justice and conscience.70 It is embodied in the

civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of
England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.71 It
found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the
United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the
fundamental rights of the citizen, 72 viz:
Article III — Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements

this particular constitutional right, provides as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from

appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to
increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari
on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. 74
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
74
Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 557

The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following:

(a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before
a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and
(d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against
him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendant’s express consent. 75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and
Galicia, “[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes
as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal,
from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing
a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty.” 76 We further stressed that “an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal.”77
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may
challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the
imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived
of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount
to a deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there is a finding
75
People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal
Procedure, Rule 117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No. 103323, 21 January
1993, 217 SCRA 386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26
January 1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v. Maquiling, supra note 74.
76
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February
2007, 516 SCRA 383, 397, citing People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686, 689 (1999).
77
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco,
340 SCRA 207, 240 (2000).
78
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar,
138 SCRA 166 (1985); Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA 693 (1985); People
v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 (1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975).

of mistrial; 79 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of

discretion. 80
The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under
Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.81
Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence
of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of
law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority
to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its
very power to dispense justice. 83 In such an event, the accused
cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari,
which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al.
and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation
of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, “the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because
private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of
79
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People
v. Tria-Tirona, 463 SCRA 462, 469-470 (2005); and People v. Velasco, 340
SCRA 207 (2000)]; People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1
(2004); Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing People v. Bocar, supra.
80
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People
v. Serrano, supra note 76 at 690; People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710,
5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
81
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No.
172832, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 506.
82
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.
83
People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra
note 74 at 704.
84
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 559

law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position

Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioner’s Comment x x x.” 85 Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual
responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.86
The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical
blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as
the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing. 87
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine,
reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave
abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because
it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.89 Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an
application for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the
rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition
contra Victorino, et al. — the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug — the four fraternity members
convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double
jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition
85
People’s Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.
86
Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.
87
Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.
88
See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602
SCRA 50, citing First Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989,
4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.
89
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade
Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10 (1997).
90
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of
Manila, 276 SCRA 133, (1997); Jamer v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 278 SCRA 632 (1997); and Azores v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 252 SCRA 387 (1996).

of a higher penalty against the accused.91 We have also recognized,

however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive
judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice.92 The present case is one of
those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the
exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and
Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the
physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature.
However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no
precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or
the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be
merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category
of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period
of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must
likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner
as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R,
June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the
crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries
[People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa,
81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the
injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug,
Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.93 (Emphasis supplied
and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94
in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of
91
De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil.
420 (2002); People v. Leones, 418 Phil. 804 (2001); People v. Ruiz, 171
Phil. 400 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955), citing People
v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954).
92
See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note
76; and People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, supra note 79.
93
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
94
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 561

slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of “the

death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine
the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required.”95
The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that
case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of
slight physical injuries, because the victim’s injuries neither
caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.96
Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were not even serious.98
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was
patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical
injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused “were found to have inflicted
more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa.” 99 It then adopted the
NBI medico-legal officer’s findings that the antecedent cause
of Lenny Villa’s death was the “multiple traumatic injuries” he
suffered from the initiation rites.100 Considering that the CA
found that the “physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa
was] serious in nature,” 101 it was patently erroneous for the
court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the
perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even
if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person
95
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo,
pp. 82-83.
96
People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
100
101
Id.

is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the

unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death
of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the
legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CA’s application of the legal framework governing
physical injuries — punished under Articles 262 to 266 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies — is
therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According
to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable
penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework
governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under
Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions.
We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from
and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused
cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual
death occurs.102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon
— as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death
of Lenny Villa — is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From
proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of
the multiple injuries he suffered, 103 the only logical conclusion
is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who
have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction
of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on
his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we
find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore
give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
102
See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).
103
rollo, p. 170.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 563

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the
time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical
injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles
263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against
the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were
guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally
inflicted.104
The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability.
It ruled that there could have been no conspiracy since the
neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to
the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused
fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the
accused — Victorino et al. — were acquitted; 4 of them —
Tecson et al. — were found guilty of slight physical injuries;
and the remaining 2 — Dizon and Villareal — were found guilty
of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case
wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to
take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously,
or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an
ex ante situation in which a man — driven by his own desire
to join a society of men — pledged to go through physically
and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he
could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how
our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing
Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the
underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as
on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
104

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of
thought.105 The classical theory posits that a human person is
essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose
between good and evil. 106 It asserts that one should only be
adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free
will appears unimpaired.107 The basic postulate of the classical
penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings
who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure
and pain. 108 They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with
punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or
advantage in committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability
is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.110
The identity of mens rea — defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent — is the predominant
consideration. 111 Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary
that the act be committed by means of dolo or “malice.”113
The term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex idea involving the
elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.114 The first element,
105
RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE – VOLUME
ONE 3 (1961); see People v. Estrada, 389 Phil. 216 (2000); People v.
Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
106
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE:
ANNOTATED AND COMMENTED – BOOK ONE 4 (3 rd ed. 1958); see
People v. Estrada, supra.
107
FRANCISCO, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.
108
AQUINO, supra note 105 at 3.
109
Id.
110
GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PENAL SCIENCES AND PHILIPPINE
CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1974).
111
People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
112
FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 33.
113
Id. at 33-34.
114
MARIANO A. ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (ACT NO.
3815) 21-24 (1946).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 565

freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power

to choose between two things.115 The second element, intelligence,
concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts,
as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an
illicit act. 116 The last element, intent, involves an aim or a
determination to do a certain act.117
The element of intent — on which this Court shall focus –
is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially
a forbidden act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.119 It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns
the result of the act.120 While motive is the “moving power”
that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the
“purpose” of using a particular means to produce the result.121
On the other hand, the term “felonious” means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.122 With these elements taken together, the requirement
of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent,
which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying
a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires
the existence of dolus malus — that the act or omission be
done “willfully,” “maliciously,” “with deliberate evil intent,”
and “with malice aforethought.”123 The maxim is actus non facit
115
Id. at 21.
116
Id. at 21.
117
Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.
118
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 670 (8 th abr. ed. 2005); see People v.
Regato, 212 Phil. 268 (1984).
119
Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.
120
ALBERT, supra note 114 at 23.
121
People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176
Phil. 20 (1978), citing People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E.
286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.
122
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 118 at 520.
123
See FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 34; ALBERT, supra note 114
at 23-25.

reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind
of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.124
As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence
of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.125
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order
for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code
— which provides that “conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it” — is to be interpreted to
refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice.
The phrase “coming to an agreement” connotes the existence
of a prefaced “intent” to cause injury to another, an element
present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal
negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the
wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without
malice or criminal design.126 Here, a person performs an initial
lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. 127
Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a
requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony
committed by means of culpa.128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony
is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the
124
U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.
488 (1910).
125
U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521
(2002), citing Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966); People v.
Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S.
v. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil. 323 (1929);
People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614 (1937); and People v. Penesa, supra
note 94.
126
People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis,
74 Phil. 257 (1943); FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 51-52, citing People
v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).
127
See generally FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 51.
128
Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v.
Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232 (1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 567

intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony

of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo130 immediately
before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.131 Intent
to kill — or animus interficendi — cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent. 132 Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death
resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent
— but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence —
the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.134
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our
society.135 It is said that, throughout history, hazing in some
form or another has been associated with organizations ranging
from military groups to indigenous tribes. 136 Some say that
elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during
which new students who enrolled in European universities worked
as servants for upperclassmen. 137 It is believed that the concept
129
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA
737, citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA
188, 196-197.
130
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
131
Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra
note 129.
132
Dado v. People, supra note 125.
133
People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW – VOL. 1, 473-474 (12 th ED., 1932).
134
See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen,
G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21
Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).
135
A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard
Legislation for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
407 (2000).
136
Id.
137
In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div.
Nov. 9, 2010) (U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal

of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,138 where young men recruited

into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate
the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.139
Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to
these values of ancient Greek civilization.140 According to a
scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a “tradition”
or “ritual” whereby prospective members are asked to prove
their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they
seek to attain membership through hazing.141
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom
requires a student wishing to join an organization to receive an
invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.142
The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.143 During
the “program,” neophytes are required to interview and to get to
know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history;
to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a
specified grade point average; to participate in the organization’s
activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow
neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.144
Hazing and Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31 McGeorge L Rev. 1087, 1088-1089

(2000); and SYMPOSIUM, THE WORKS OF PLATO (THE MODERN
LIBRARY 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a
Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and
Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC.
138
In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
139
Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But
We’ll Never Tell): How the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act
May Help Colleges and Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 SW. U. L.
REV. 477, 480 (2004), citing Rutledge, supra.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment,
Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad is
the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV.
133, 147-8 (1997).
143
Id.
144
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 569

Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to

involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.145
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite
or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission to an
organization.146 In hazing, the “recruit,” “pledge,” “neophyte,”
“initiate,” “applicant” — or any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a person — is generally placed
in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to
do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.147
It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade,
abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in
the organization. 148 These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.149
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new.
In fact, more than a century ago, our national hero — Andres
Bonifacio — organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The
Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and
Daughters of the Nation). 150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started
as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European
Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved
by the Catholic Church. 151 The Katipunan’s ideology was
brought home to each member through the society’s initiation
145
Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).
146
See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known
as the Anti-Hazing Law.
147
Id.
148
In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing WEBSTER’S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1041 (1986); and People v. Lenti, 44
Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).
149
See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known
as the Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining and Understanding
Psychological Damages, 2 ANN.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
150
REYNALDO C. ILETO, THE DIORAMA EXPERIENCE: A VISUAL
HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES 84 (2004).
151
Id.

ritual. 152 It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room,

lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and
resolve.153 They were made to go through vigorous trials such
as “pagsuot sa isang lungga” or “[pagtalon] sa balon.” 154 It
would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of
“pangherong bakal sa pisngi” and to endure a “matalas na
punyal.”155 As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero
was made to sign membership papers with his own blood. 156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported
by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As
can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in
the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the
Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced
the fourth classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that
sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or
drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate
themselves.157 In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved
in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during
his second year at West Point.158
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985,
the candidate-victim was injured during the shriner’s hazing
event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
152
Id.
153
Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 —
Cartilla del Katipunan, quoted in LUIS CAMARA DERY, ALAY SA INANG
BAYAN: PANIBAGONG PAGBIBIGAY KAHULUGAN SA KASAYSAYAN
NG HIMAGSIKAN NG 1896, 16-24 (1999).
154
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 17.
155
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 18.
156
ILETO, supra note 150.
157
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY
OF WEST POINT 222 (1999).
158
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 571

membership. 159 The ritual involved what was known as the

“mattress-rotating barrel trick.”160 It required each candidate
to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto
connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate
was required to climb. 161 Members of Hejaz would stand on
each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates
en route to the barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers
in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a
ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly
onto the neophyte paratroopers’ chests.163 The victims were shown
writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked
medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri
State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students
to enter into a pledgeship program. 165 The fraternity members
159
Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753
(S.C. 1985) (U.S.). (The South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia,
that (1) evidence supported the jury finding that the manner in which the
association carried out “mattress-rotating barrel trick,” a hazing event,
was hazardous and constituted actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate
was not barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony,
January 31, 1997, available at<http://articles.cnn.com/1997-01-31/us/
9701_31_hazing_1_hazing-incident-camp-lejeune-marines?_s=PM:US>
(visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath
No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S.
Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 364 (1998).
164
CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.
165
State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the
pledges — Michael Davis — blacked out and never regained consciousness.
He died the following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed
the trial court’s conviction of hazing. Id.)

subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including

repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the
back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the
pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches
to the body; and “body slamming,” an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped
them to the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges
through a seven-station circle of physical abuse. 167
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went
through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order
at the Auburn University in Alabama.168 The hazing included
the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after
it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and
vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed
and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating
foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and “yerks” (a mixture of
hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing
chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the
fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running
errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. “meetings,” during
which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and
(7) “running the gauntlet,” during which the pledges were pushed,
kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down
a flight of stairs.169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999,
the victim — Sylvester Lloyd — was accepted to pledge at the
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing;
and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity’s
assumption of the risk defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which
entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the
victim’s negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the other matters. Id.)
169
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 573

Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170

He participated in initiation activities, which included various
forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion
and embarrassment.171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002,
the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during
the fraternity’s initiation rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates
went through psychological and physical hazing, including being
paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university student in
Florida – sought initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa
Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The
pledge’s efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of
initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with
other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned
on his face and buttocks. 175 In these rituals described as
“preliminaries,” which lasted for two evenings, he received
170
Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565,
1999 WL 47153 (Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The plaintiff filed
a law suit against Cornell University for the latter’s liability resulting
from the injuries the former sustained during the alleged hazing by the
fraternity. The New York district court granted defendant Cornell’s motion
to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. Id.)
171
Id.
172
Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa.
Super.Ct. 2002). (The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1) the fraternity
owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by
fraternity was not established; (3) individual fraternity members owed
the duty to protect the initiate from harm; and (4) the evidence raised the
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraternity’s chapter advisor
breached the duty of care to initiate. Id.)
173
Id.
174
Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.).
(The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction for felony
hazing and remanded the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury
instruction. Id.)
175
Id.

approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.176 During the last

two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges
sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night
initiation. 178 Jones and several other candidates passed out.179
The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the
proverbial “birth by fire,” through which the pledge who has
successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth. 180
Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization
to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and
ensures the future of the organization. 181 Alleged benefits of
joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit d’corp associated with close, almost
filial, friendship and common cause. 182
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response
to hazing in the military.183 The hazing of recruits and plebes
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Rutledge, supra note 137.
181
Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway
to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, September 1991, at 63.
182
Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake,
Reconceptualizing the University’s Duty to Provide A Safe Learning
Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Jennifer L.
Spaziano, It’s All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis
of University Liability for Actions of Student Organizations, 22 PEPP. L.
REV. 213 (1994); Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?,
TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 63; and Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing
Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and Custodial
Liability of National Fraternities, 7 REV. LITIG. 191, 210 (1988)].
183
Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-
Fraternity and Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61 Miss. L.J. 111, 117 (1991), citing
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 575

in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited

all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until
1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct “whereby any one sustains an injury to
his [or her] person therefrom.” 185
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large
part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College
Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly
began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing
hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or
civil statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in
the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively
light consequences for even the most severe situations.188 Only
a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony
in case death or great bodily harm occurs.189
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor,
except hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which
is a Class 4 felony. 190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and
not more than three years.191 Indiana criminal law provides that
Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent 154,

155 (1906). According to Lewis, the 1874 statute outlawing hazing was
directed specifically at the United States Naval Academy.
184
Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing
Rites: A Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey’s Anti-Hazing Act, 26
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.
185
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.
186
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.
187
Acquaviva, supra at 313.
188
Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement
of Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 377, 377 (2002).
189
Id.
190
Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).
191
730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010
Sess.) (U.S.).

a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs

hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits
criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means
of a deadly weapon. 193 As an element of a Class C felony –
criminal recklessness – resulting in serious bodily injury, death
falls under the category of “serious bodily injury.”194 A person
who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term
of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years. 195 Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a
Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk
to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case
it becomes a Class C felony. 196 A Class C felony provides for
an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years. 197
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state
jail felony.198 An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony
is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not
more than two years or not less than 180 days. 199 Under Utah
law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty
of a third-degree felony.200 A person who has been convicted of
192
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
193
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
194
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.)
(U.S.) citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).
195
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.)
(U.S.).
196
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).
197
Mo. Stat. Ann. § 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First
Extraordinary Gen. Ass. Sess.).
198
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.152
(Vernon 1996) (U.S.).
199
Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code § 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through
2009 Legis. Sess.) (U.S.).
200
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (1999)
(U.S.).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 577

a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a

term not to exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides
that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony,
the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor. 202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class
G felony if hazing results in the death of another.203 A Class G
felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment
not to exceed 10 years, or both.204
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with
limited remedies, as there was no hazing statute.205 This situation
was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,
wherein Barry Ballou’s family resorted to a civil action for
wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.206
The existence of animus interficendi
or intent to kill not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation — in this case, fraternity
initiation rites — does not automatically amount to the absence
of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a
guilty mind — whether or not there is a contextual background
or factual premise — they are still criminally liable for intentional
felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in
agreement that — with the exception of Villareal and Dizon —
accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the
201
Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.)
(U.S.).
202
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code § 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).
203
See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. § 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).
204
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).
205
Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.
206
Id.

animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other

neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision
of the trial court and found that the two accused had the animus
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict
physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against
Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill
will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father’s
parking space had been stolen by the victim’s father.207 As to
Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family
of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareal’s brother.208 The CA then ruled
as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez.
It was very clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The
evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa,
appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the
consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime
of homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of
Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of animus
interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the
supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary
to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez’s testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room
and we were briefed as to what to expect during
the next three days and we were told the members
of the fraternity and their batch and we were also
told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
207
208
Id.
209
Id.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 579

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house

and we were made to ride a van and we were brought
to another place in Kalookan City which I later
found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head
down and to link our arms and then the driver of
the van and other members of the Aquilans who
were inside left us inside the van, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the
effect, “Villa akin ka,” “Asuncion Patay ka” and
the people outside pound the van, rock the van,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and
how strong a voice these remarks uttered upon your
arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense
of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked
through and through, what were the voices or
utterances that you heard?
Witness “Villa akin ka,” “Asuncion patay ka,” “Recinto
patay ka sa amin,” etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they
continue during the rocking of the van which lasted
for 5 minutes?
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on
hearing voices, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating]
were being inflicted, was there any utterances by
anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were

discouraging, and some were encouraging others
who were pounding and beating us, it was just
like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked
us whether “matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.”
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those
particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were
utterances simultaneously, I could not really pin
point who uttered those words, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during
the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what
were the utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon
stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I
quote “ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung
kapatid ko,” so that would in turn sort of justifying
him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead
of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and
then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to
the effect that “this guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father,” sir. So, that’s why
he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was
accusing you of having your family have his brother
killed, what was your response?
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 581

Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and

that he was just making it up sir. So he said that
I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just
in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering
those words/statements so that it would in turn justify
him and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular
mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father stole the
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall
who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation
so there were different people who heard from time
to time, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the
next accusation against Lenny Villa’s father was
made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon
came near to us and when Lenny Villa’s turn, I
heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to
Lenny Villa’s father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s
thighs and sometime he stand up and he kicked
his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right
now. You mentioned also that accusations made

by Dizon “you or your family had his brother

killed,” can you inform this Honorable Court what
exactly were the accusations that were charged
against you while inflicting blows upon you in
particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told
me in particular if I knew that his family who had
his brother killed, and he said that his brother was
an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story
that he made up and I said that I knew nothing
about it and he continued inflicting blows on me,
sir. And another incident was when a talk was being
given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court
and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was
drinking beer, and he said and I quote: “Marquez,
Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw
yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid,
yari ka sa akin,” sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness That’s all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did
ever a doctor or a physician came around as promised
to you earlier?
Witness No, sir. 210 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified

thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr.
Marquez, have you stated that there was a briefing
that was conducted immediately before your
initiation as regards to what to expect during
the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
210
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 583

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what
they told you to expect during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to
a particular place, we would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed,
humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would
be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could
immediately go back to school. All the bruises
would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So,
if we wear the regular school uniforms like long
sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have
no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would
have bruises on your body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements
that you expect that would create bruises to your
body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would
be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much
of the initiation procedures is psychological
in nature?
Witness Combination, sir. 211 (Emphasis supplied)
211
TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 29-32, 43.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist
only of physical initiation, meaning body contact,
is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called
psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of
things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made
belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify
you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps
quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was
initiating you, he said or he was supposed to
have said according to you that your family were
responsible for the killing of his brother who
was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement
said to you by Dizon that you did not believe
him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing
you perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned
before, terrifying you, scaring you or
frightening you into quitting the initiation, this
is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason,
I think, why he was saying those things was
because he wanted to inflict injury.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 585

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only
perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling
this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were]
subjected to the same forms of initiation by all
the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped
on you or kicked you said something similar as
was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express
for instance, the masters would run on your thighs,
right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed
by the initiating masters not only on you but
also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever
forms of initiation was administered by one
master, was also administered by one master
on a neophyte, was also administered by
another master on the other neophyte, this is
correct?
Witness Yes, sir. 212 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives

attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were “baseless,” 213
212
TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 24-28.
213
People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131;
rollo, p. 626; People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258),
pp. 120-3; rollo, pp. 727-730.

since the statements of the accused were “just part of the

psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of
the neophytes”; that “[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified
by Bienvenido Marquez”; and that the “harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of ‘tradition’ concurred and
accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation
rites.” 214
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring
mistake of substantial proportion on the part of the CA — it
mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the
CA’s primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to
kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional
felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquez’s
testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both
“accusations” against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by
the CA. It was “Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s]
thigh”; and who told witness Marquez, “[I]to, yung pamilya
nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko.” It was also Dizon who
jumped on Villa’s thighs while saying, “[T]his guy, his father
stole the parking space of my father.” With the testimony clarified,
we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence
of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon,
we refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of
the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of
witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that
they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed,
and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, “Patay
ka, Recinto,” “Yari ka, Recinto,” “Villa, akin ka,” “Asuncion,
214
People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131;
rollo, pp. 625-626; People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258),
pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 587

gulpi ka,” “Putang ina mo, Asuncion,” “Putang ina nyo, patay
kayo sa amin,” or some other words to that effect.215 While
beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of
the former’s purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny
Villa’s father for stealing the parking space of Dizon’s father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including
those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological
initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting
psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe
accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories,
so that he could “justify” giving the neophytes harder blows,
all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even
one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue
and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in
the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations
on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina
spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. — so as to capture the intent that we conveyed
during the period of interpellations on why we included the phrase
“or psychological pain and suffering.”
xxx xxx xxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte
or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain
acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian
roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of
the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of
the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the
215
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note
9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
216
People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-
131; rollo, pp. 625-626; People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No.
151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.

building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making

him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made
to jump towards the inside portion of the building — these are the
mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these
organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared
during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some
mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or
insanity. This is what we want to prevent. 217 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior

must not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine,
evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
within the context of the fraternity’s psychological initiation.
This Court points out that it was not even established whether
the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with
each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon’s
threats. The testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he “knew it was
not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up….”218 Even the
trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as
constituting intent to kill: “[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused
were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict
physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x.”219
The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon
guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi
cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent. 220 Instead, we adopt and
217
Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9 th Congress, 1st Regular
Sess., pp. 12-13.
218
TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People
v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992
(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
219
rollo, p. 167.
220
Dado v. People, supra note 125.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 589

reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it

ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific
intent to kill Lenny Villa. 221
The existence of animus iniuriandi
or malicious intent to injure not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent
to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision
of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since
all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be
liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under
Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,222 the employment
of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an
act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is
no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi
or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity
or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.
221
rollo, p. 167.
222
The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions
on Physical Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art. 262 — Mutilation;
(b) Art. 263 — Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264 — Administering
Injurious Substances or Beverages; (d) Art. 265 — Less Serious Physical
Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 — Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.

The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty
unless his intentions are. 223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere
infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not
make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In
Bagajo v. People, 225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick,
whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a
form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from
the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding
of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated
thus: “Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
… [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done
with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate
and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent
intent.” Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that “as
a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability
for her act of whipping her pupil.” In People v. Carmen,226 the
accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries
of Our Lady of Fatima — under the guise of a “ritual or treatment”
— plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged
his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed
him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of
“nervous breakdown” by expelling through those means the bad
spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused
the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven,
we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the
accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
223
Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan
v. People, 517 Phil. 272 (2006).
224
Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil.
564 (2001); People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v. Sara, 55
Phil. 939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 204 (1925).
225
176 Phil. 20 (1978).
226
People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 591

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial

acts of inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended
by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to
Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious
intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts
of the accused. 227 What persons do is the best index of their
intention. 228 We have also ruled that the method employed, the
kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the
injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the
perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual
background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The
night before the commencement of the rites, they were briefed
on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and
that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were
subjected to “traditional” initiation rites, including the “Indian
Run,” “Bicol Express,” “Rounds,” and the “Auxies’ Privilege
Round.” The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes’ arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They
were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected
to “traditional” initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes
were subjected to another “traditional” ritual — paddling by
the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned
to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by
functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those
227
People v. Regato, supra note 118.
228
Id.
229
Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.

who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain

on the initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive
physical blows; to help the neophytes to “pump” their legs in
order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval
after every physical activity or “round”; to serve food and water;
to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever
they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent.231 A few
days before the “rites,” he asked both his parents for permission
to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny
would go through an initiation process and would be gone for
three days. 233 The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily
consented to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be
gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join
the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity.
Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect.
It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological
tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that
the initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing.
They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any
time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified
that accused Tecson told him that “after a week, you can already
play basketball.” Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted
that he knew that the initiates would be hit “in the arms and
legs,” that a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that
230
9; rollo, pp. 147-153.
231
9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
232
rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-
38340), p. 108.
233
38340), p. 109.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 593

he expected bruises on his arms and legs…. Indeed, there can be

no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis
supplied)
Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals

during the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished
the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent
further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained
to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in
this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling,
and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily,
freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of
freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that
the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional
“rounds” on the second night were held upon the insistence of
Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with
the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused
fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including
the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other
than the paddle, no other “weapon” was used to inflict injuries
on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs
and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of
auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of
lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during
the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent.
All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the
same process of “traditional” initiation; there is no proof that
Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different
treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing
is uniquely different from common crimes.235 The totality of
the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
234
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 13-14, supra note 8; rollo,
pp. 74-75.
235

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction

of physical injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lenny’s
continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method
used even after the first day. The following discussion of the
framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results
in death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be
frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual
abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a
new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons
either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making
this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific
acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across
the land that no group or association can require the act of physical
initiation before a person can become a member without being held
criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale
for that imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said
that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking
the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as
a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 595

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage

hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking
two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are
already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling
difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing
as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent
to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is
death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime
of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent
or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun
this activity called “hazing.” Because, initially, these fraternities
or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or
maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially,
Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent
act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan
po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit.
Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin
at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong
nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte.
So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung
sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: “Huwag ninyong gagawin
iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas
ang penalty sa inyo.”
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President,
of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his
statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical
injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged

mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in

proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime without having
to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any
crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely
to initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished
Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the
intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable
at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the result.
But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just
because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the
basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely,
is being criminalized because in the context of what is happening
in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no
one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we
are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr.
President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that
the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What
is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters
or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape
responsibility and say, “We did not have the intention to kill.
This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not
have any intention to kill or maim.”
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been
charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation,
et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving
the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a
group that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My
question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution
have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during
hazing x x x
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 597

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would

the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the
prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr.
President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder.
It should be hazing, Mr. President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator
Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable
act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no
objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting
from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy
can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission
of sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I
move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase “without
consent” for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify
sodomy with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime
of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts
here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with
or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity,
sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or
without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person
joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate
the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the
malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced
with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President.
Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be
physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the
236

neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What

is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected
from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in
time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can
run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether
or not there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken
by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It
is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and
practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities
of some individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not
take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their
thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered
acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not something that
the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President.
Such that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not
only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent
of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act
of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction
of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the
initiator said, “Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented
to it.” So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with
the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any
law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation
rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would
want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because
the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering
is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like
death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 599

penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the

criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate
the offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then
the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee
amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.237
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove
intent, Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought
out the idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala
prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point
that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make
this a special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore
under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.238 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the

proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to
under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact
an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma
faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
— unique as against typical crimes — cast a cloud of doubt on
whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct
or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny’s
parents would not have consented239 to his participation in Aquila
237
Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.
238
239
38340), pp. 108-109.

Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of hazing were

considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through
Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide
that “in our nation’s very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of … hazing,
[an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.”240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum,
the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing — or
the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering — has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to
the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in
the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony.
And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws,
all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court
is constrained to rule against the trial court’s finding of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required
in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of
his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting
hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately
devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According
to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary
act done without malice, from which an immediate personal
harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
240
Vedaña v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 601

inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the

person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor. 242 In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave
fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason
of a mere lack of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm
is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent
in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the
duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the
act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.246
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being
charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and
diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.247
If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing
harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to
follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very
careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. 248 In
241
Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing LUIS B. REYES,
THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW – BOOK ONE 995 (15th
ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil. 107 (1921), citing U.S. vs. Gomez,
G.R. No. L-14068, 17 January 1919 (unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28
Phil. 560 (1914).
242
People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489;
Gan v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460 (1988).
246
Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
247
Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S.
vs. Gomez, supra note 241.
248
Id.

contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.249

It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution
or diligence that may be required of an individual, “from a
transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.”250 The
duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. 251
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac
failure secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.252 The officer
explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart
to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to
the lack of blood.253 In the present case, the victim’s heart could
no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived
of its requisite blood and oxygen. 254 The deprivation was due
to the “channeling” of the blood supply from the entire
circulatory system — including the heart, arteries, veins, venules,
and capillaries — to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots. 255
The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating
that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained
by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257
Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually
ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became
249
Id.
250
See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).
251
Id.
252
rollo, p. 146.
253
Id.
254
255
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 52-67.
256
rollo, p. 146.
257
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 68-69.
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 603

so markedly diminished as to produce death.258 The officer also

found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all
other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic
organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which
was redirected to the thighs and forearms. 259 It was concluded
that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the
victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s
arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas,
caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of
the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they
were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with
different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.261 They were
also “paddled” at the back of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped
on their faces. 263 They were made to play rough basketball.264
Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: “[T]inamaan
daw sya sa spine.” 265 The NBI medico-legal officer explained
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter. 266 The relevant portion
of the testimony is as follows:
258
rollo, p. 146; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 70-71.
259
rollo, p. 146.
260
TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 50.
261
9; rollo, pp. 127-130.
262
263
264
265
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340),
pp. 175-176.
266
rollo, p. 170.

Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on

various cross examinations of defense counsels that
the injuries that you have enumerated on the body
of the deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as
Exhibit “G-1” to “G-14” individually by themselves
would not cause the death of the victim. The question
I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
from Exhibit “G-1” to “G-14”?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise
of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to isolate such
injuries here because we are talking of the whole
body. At the same manner that as a car would not
run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in
human approach is to interpret all those injuries
in whole and not in part.267
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused
fraternity members were drinking during the initiation rites. 268
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members
were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death
of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause
them injury in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we rule
that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the
victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered,
criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical
injuries.
267
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340),
pp. 92-93.
268
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340),
pp. 110-111.
269
Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d
488 (S.C. App. 1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville,
285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 605

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident

may have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni
of Aquila Fraternity — accused Dizon and Villareal — restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites.
Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would
show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened
initiation rites — having in mind the concept of “seniority” in
fraternities — the implication of the presence of alumni should
be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further
note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during
Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress,
for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing
Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-
resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly — or
unwittingly — impose the misery of hazing and employ appalling
rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way
to establish “kinship.” A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits
it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.270 Another initiate
did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as
a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.271 Thus,
for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under
the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity
members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted
were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law
been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would
have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by
270
rollo, p. 143.
271

reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no

law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are
constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his
death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.’s individual participation in
the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273 As to
accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished
by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without
prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to
subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal
liability from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny
Villa in the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto
and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally
paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount
of P30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the
sole fact of death of the victim.274 In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, 275 we sustain the CA’s award of indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.
272
Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the
Anti-Hazing Law.
273
274
Briñas v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson,
G.R. No. 179195, 3 October 2011, citing People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No.
189580, 9 February 2011.
275
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People
v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, 25 August 2010; People v. Lindo, G.R. No.
189818, 9 August 2010; People v. Ogan, G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010;
and People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010].
VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 607

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory

damages, including expenses incurred in connection with the
death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages,
the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records
are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the
Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual
damages. 277
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for
the grief suffered on account of the victim’s death.278 This penalty
is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides
that the “spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.”279 Thus,
we hereby we affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101
finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 — finding Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries — is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
276
Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.
277
People’s Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No.
155101), p. 144; rollo, p. 1709.
278
Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071,
9 March 2011, citing Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-
593 (2004).
279
Id.

suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one

(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs
of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000,
and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus legal
interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the
date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs
de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting
Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments
in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED
and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible
consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include
the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances
that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
280
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412,
17 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.

G.R. No. 151258

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. 151258

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. 151258

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 527

[G.R. No. 151258. February 1, 2012]

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

[G.R. No. 154954. February 1, 2012]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE

[G.R. No. 155101. February 1, 2012]

FIDELITO DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

[G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080. February 1, 2012]

GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO

528 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE; THAT NO

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 529

in person at every stage of the proceedings. x x x Stripping

530 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 531

applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty

532 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

11. ID.; CONSPIRACY; ABSENT MALICIOUS INTENT, THERE

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 533

method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of

534 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

THE FRATERNITY INITIATION RITES. — [T]he collective

Quiason Makalintal Barrot Torres & Ibarra for Artemio

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 535

Flores Cabrera Gonzales & Concepcion Law Offices for

The public outrage over the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa

536 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 537

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo

538 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 539

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

540 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 541

Brigola (Victorino et al.) — were acquitted, as their

542 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 543

separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right

544 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 545

546 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 547

548 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 549

present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the

550 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to

VOL. 680, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 551

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts

552 PHILIPPINE REPORTS