Preliminary Concepts of Double Jeopardy - Case #3

People v. Nazareno

Facts:

A criminal case was filed against PNP officers who were involved in the purchase of overpriced pistols.
After due hearing, the Sandiganbayan acquitted the respondents Cesar Nazareno, Everlino Nartatez
and Nicasio Ma. Custodio (collectively, the respondents) of the charge of violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Sandiganbayan concluded that the AFP prices (data used by COA) did not offer
sufficient basis for comparison to be able to establish firmly alleged overpricing in the purchase of the
subject firearms by the PNP. The audit team (COA) merely relied on the AFP prices and did not conduct
any actual canvass of the gun prices which is required by law as evidence for the conviction of the crime.

Accordingly, People seek reversal of the decision through rule 45 under the rules of court.

Respondents object to the petition mainly because the review sought violates their constitutional right
against double jeopardy.

Issue:

WON the appeal made by People on the decision for the acquittal of the accused is violative of their
constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because a judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer
reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. This constitutional right is implemented in Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, reads:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

by citing People v. Velasco, SC further explained the reason behind the double jeopardy rule as follows:

"(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty".

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction". The interest in the finality-of-
acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose",
a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability.” With this right of repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Answers:

Guide Question # 2: Which provision of the Rules of Court embodies the right against double
jeopardy?

This constitutional right is implemented in Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, reads:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

Guide Question #5: What is the rationale underlying the right against double jeopardy?

"(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty".
People v. Matag

Facts:

Accused, Antonio Magat, was charged with two counts of rape committed against his own daughter. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. On
January 10, 1997, RTC sentenced Magat to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each
case based on his plea of guilt. After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the
complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence, accused was re-
arraigned on both information where he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, accused was found guilty
by the RTC of Quezon City of rape on two occasions and was sentenced to penalty of death for each
case. Hence, an automatic review was conducted.

Accused contends that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against
double jeopardy.

Guide Question:

In the case of People v. Magat, was there a valid and standing plea at the time that the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction? Was there a violation of the right against double jeopardy? Explain.

Issue:

WON the second arraignment and trial of the same crime on the accused was violate of the right against
double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that the January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-
appellant on his own plea of quilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the
plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a
plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense and not
lesser penalty. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court provides:

"SECTION 2. Plea of guilt to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the
trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. "A conviction under this plea shall
be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the
rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court
which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have
attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against accused is void, double jeopardy will not lie on the current
trial.
People v. Balisacan

Facts:

On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan, accused, was charged with homicide for killing Leonicio Bulaoat.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and his counsel made a
petition to prove mitigating circumstances to lower the penalty. The accused testified to self-defense and
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender. On the basis of this testimony, RTC acquitted the
accused.

Consequently, the prosecutor appealed the decision of the RTC acquitting the accused of the offense
charged despite the latter’s plea of guilt.

Guide Questions:

In the case of People v. Balisacan, was there a valid and standing plea at the time that the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction? Was there a violation of the right against double jeopardy? Explain.

Issue:

WON the current appeal of the prosecution on the acquittal of the accused is violative against right of
double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court set aside the decision and remanded the court to another proceeding because
the plea of guilt was invalid. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It
forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to
impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Thus, the trial on merits conducted based on
self-defense notwithstanding the plea of guilt rendered the plea viod or vacated. In the present case, it is
true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of
being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony,
therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and
the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea
of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing
plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.
Tangan v. People

Facts:

Petitioner, Eladio Tangan, filed a petition seeking annulment of the resolution of respondent judge,
denying his motion to quash the information charging him of two offense from one incident. The pivotal
issue, the petitioner raises is whether or not the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 19350 for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition used in the commission of Homicide denied and punished
under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, arising out of the same incident which is the subject
matter of the previous amended information in Criminal Case No. 17587, namely the shooting to death of
Generoso Miranda III, subjects petitioner to jeopardy in violation of the constitutional mandate against
putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Guide Question:

In the case of Tangan v. People, was there a violation of the right against double jeopardy? Explain.

Issue:

WON there is double jeopardy in filing a separate case for homicide and illegal possession of firearms.

Rulling:

No. There is no double jeopardy in the filing of the information for homicide in Criminal Case No. 17587
and in the filing of the information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition used in the
commission of homicide in Criminal Case No. 19350 for the simple reason that the first jeopardy had not
yet attached. It is well-settled that the mere filing of two information or complaints charging the same
offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in
jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double
jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has
been terminated without his express consent. It is the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or the
acquittal of the accused or termination of the case that bars further prosecution of the same offense or
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact- Finding Board to investigate the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The minority and majority reports of the Board both agreed that Rolando
Galman was not the assassin but was merely a fall guy of the military, which plotted the assassination
itself. The minority report tags 26 persons, headed by General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos
rejected the reports of the Board and stuck to his claim that it was Galman who killed Aquino. Thereafter,
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan acquitted the respondents of the crime charged, declaring them
innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.

A petition of second motion for reconsideration were filed by Saturnina Galman, wife of the late Rolando
Galman, and 29 others alleging that respondent courts committed serious irregularities constituting
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had ordered
the respondent courts to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce
a verdict of acquittal. In his comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, affirmed the allegations
and revealed that Malacanang had planned the scenario of the trial.

Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and
academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-
accused on December 2, 1985.

Guide Question:

In the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, was the first jeopardy terminated? Explain.

Issue:

WON the current case constitutes violation of right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of right against double jeopardy because the
initial decision of the trial court acquitting the accuseds is void. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of
the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. Manifestly, the prosecution
and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all.
It neither binds nor bars anyone. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore.
People v. Espinosa

Facts:

Initially, cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed before the Sandiganbayan
by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondent Espinosa, e t al. Later, the OMB moved to
withdraw ex parte the cases filed against Espinosa and the Sandiganbayan the same. Thereafter,
however, the OMB filed in the same court seven information for Malversation of Public Funds against
Espinosa, e t al.

In his Motion to Quash the Informations, Espinosa argued that double jeopardy had already attached. He
had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases and the motion filed to withdraw them had been granted
without his express consent.

Petitioner countered, that private respondent has waived his right to invoke double jeopardy in the light of
his allegedly "conditional" arraignment.

Guide Question:

In the case of People v. Espinosa, was the dismissal of the case with the express consent of the
accused? Was there a violation of the right against double jeopardy? Explain.

Issue:

WON the current cases filed against the accused constitutes a violation of right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that there was no waiver of the right and the cases filed violates the right
against double jeopardy of the accused. The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out
convincingly. Such waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. As can be gleaned from the
Memorandum of petitioner, the waiver on the constitutional right lacks requirements, thus invalid.
Consequently, Espinosa has amply shown that he learned of the Motion only after the cases had been
dismissed. It is clear that the dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without the express consent
of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the right against double jeopardy. But it does
unequivocally show the fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such right.