United Nations S/2023/402

Security Council Distr.: General

1 June 2023

Original: English

Situation in Mali
Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction
1. By its resolution 2640 (2022), the Security Council extended the mandate of the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
until 30 June 2023 and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every
three months on the implementation of the resolution. The present report covers
developments since the previous report (S/2023/236), issued on 30 March 2023. It
also provides an update on the four parameters for mandate implementation, as
presented in the report of the Secretary-General on the internal review of MINUSMA
(S/2023/36).

II. Major political and other related developments

A. Political transition

2. Following the finalization of the draft constitution in March, the authorities

embarked on the popularization of the document among the Malian population.
Several national stakeholders publicly expressed their positions with regard to the
constitutional reform process. Those in favour include the Adéma-Parti africain pour
la solidarité et la justice, the Union pour la République et la démocratie, the
Mouvement ensemble pour un Mali nouveau, Yelema-le changement, the
Coordination des associations et organisations féminines du Mali, the Alliance
démocratique pour la paix and the Conseil supérieur de la diaspora malienne.
Conversely, the Mouvement du 5 juin-Rassemblement des forces patriotiques-Mali
Kura, the Cadre des partis et regroupements politiques pour le retour à l’ordre
constitutionnel, the Appel du 20 février pour sauver le Mali and the Forum des
organisations de la société civile, separately called upon the authorities to abandon
the process.
3. On 5 May, the Government announced that the constitutional referendum would
be held on 18 June; the electoral campaign for the referendum would start on 2 June
and end on 16 June, and Malian Defence and Security Forces would vote in advance
on 11 June. The announcement of the new date was welcomed by the Econom ic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an important step in the
implementation of the transition timetable. The local follow-up Committee,
comprising the African Union, ECOWAS and MINUSMA, also welcomed the

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announcement and called upon the international community to adequately support

Mali in the endeavour. On 9 May, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
also welcomed the announcement and called on all national stakeholders to
constructively engage the transitional authorities in building an inclusive, democratic
and capable State.
4. Meanwhile, the operationalization of the new electoral management body, the
Independent Authority for Election Management, in the regions is ongoing, with the
aim of establishing 994 local coordination branches in 19 regions, 1 district, 159
circles and 815 communes. The selection of Authority members to be deployed to the
branches was officially finalized on 15 May. On 10 May, the Council of Ministers
adopted an ordinance amending some provisions of the electoral law to facilitate the
preparation of the referendum. The provisions include the possibility for voters to use
existing voter cards instead of the biometric identity cards that are being rolled out.
The ordnance acknowledges the complexity of establishing the new electoral
management body and its impact on the transition timeline, while also allowing for
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization to complement the
activities of the Authority.
5. Multifaced support was also extended in the context of preparations for the
elections. MINUSMA continued to coordinate its technical and logistic support with
Malian counterparts through the joint working group of the Independent Authority for
Election Management and MINUSMA. On 5 April, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) handed over computer equipment worth about $530,000 to the
Authority. The Mission continued to support women’s participation in the electoral
and political processes through various initiatives. For instance, in May, it organized
a pilot workshop in Gao on leadership and public speaking for 40 women from civil
society and political parties that will be replicated in other regions of northern and
central Mali.

B. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

6. The international mediation team pursued its consultations with the parties to
facilitate the resumption of the work of the monitoring mechanisms. On 7 April,
proposals were submitted to them to solicit engagement on issues revolving around
the following: (a) political and institutional reforms, including the identification of
and consensus around the legislative and regulatory measures aimed at facilitating the
implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; (b) defence
and security issues, in particular the swift operationalization of the ad hoc commission
mandated to resolve outstanding issues related to the chain of command within the
national defence and security forces and the integration of senior civilian officials of
the movements into the Malian Defence and Security Forces and State institutions,
preparatory measures for the launching of the global disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration process and the revision of current security arrangements; (c) the
effective launch of development projects agreed upon within the framework of the
Sustainable Development Fund and the identification of additional priority projects,
as well as the scaling up of the humanitarian response in support of affected
communities; and (d) the role of the international mediation team, including as it
relates to its arbitration authority. The parties have yet to communicate their formal
responses to the proposals. The Special Representative for Mali, together with the
chef de file continued to engage with the parties to ensure a common understanding
of the proposed actions and the way forward. In the same vein, the new Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Ahmed Attaf, visited Bamako from 23 to 25 April to urge
the signatory parties to adhere fully to the proposals made by the international
mediation team. On 12 May, the Minister for Reconciliation, Peace and National

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Cohesion, Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, met with representatives of the Coordination

des mouvements de l’Azawad and the Plateforme in Kidal to rebuild confidence and
facilitate the resumption of the work of the monitoring mechanisms. He reiterated the
Government’s commitment to the Agreement and took the opportunity to visit the
reconstituted battalion together with officials from the signatory movements,
stressing that its continued deployment in Kidal testified to the commitment of the
parties to peace.
7. These developments took place against the backdrop of rising tensions between
the parties following the 5 April flight by an aircraft of the Malian Armed Forces over
northern Malian locations, including Kidal. MINUSMA promptly liaised with the
signatory parties at the capital and regional levels to help de-escalate tensions and
issued a statement calling on the parties to exercise utmost restraint. On 6 April, the
international mediation team held a meeting and reiterated its call to the signatory
parties to refrain from statements and actions that could jeopardize efforts to revitalize
the peace process. On 24 April, the Chief of Defence Staff, in a communiqué,
informed of a significant operation in Tinfadimata, Ménaka region, that had
reportedly resulted in the arrests of 12 alleged extremists. He also called upon the
signatory armed groups to coordinate their movements with the Malian Armed Forces
to prevent tensions on the ground. Two of the 12 detainees were identified as members
of the Ménaka battalion des forces armées reconstituées and eventually released. On
27 April, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad issued a communiqué
indicating that the remaining 10 people arrested on suspicion of terrorism by Malian
Armed Forces and foreign security personnel were combatants of the signatory
movement and called for their release. To prevent further such incidents in this
increasingly volatile security landscape, MINUSMA has been working with the
parties to the Agreement to seek a consensual revision of the security arrangements.

C. Stabilization and the restoration of State authority in the centre

8. MINUSMA continued to support the State’s stabilization efforts in the central

regions, including through conflict management initiatives. In this regard, seven new
communal reconciliation committees were created, and members were trained during
the reporting period. As a result, on 8 April, the Government’s Adviser on economic
and financial affairs intervened in Syn, Djenné cercle, Mopti region to manage a land
conflict that had blocked the final demarcation of an important transhumance path
that passes through agricultural lands. MINUSMA also continued to support the
revamping of land commissions to prevent and resolve conflict, improve governance
and extend State authority, while contributing to the legitimacy of State authority at
the communal and village levels, including in areas under the influence of extremist
groups. From 2 to 4 May, MINUSMA provided technical and logistical support to the
Judge of Douentza, Douentza region, in holding civil and criminal hearings in his
jurisdiction.

III. Security developments and the Mission’s response

9. Fighting continued in Gao and Ménaka regions, with Islamic State in the Greater
Sahara expanding the area under its control. In central Mali, groups affiliated with
Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin continued to pose a significant threat, as
exemplified by the complex attacks on Sévaré on 22 April. Extremist attacks against
State targets such as customs and forestry posts also persisted in southern and western
Mali. On the basis of figures collected by the Mission, from 1 July 2022 to 22 May
2023, a total of 1,002 civilians died and 445 others were injured because of armed
conflict, improvised explosive device incidents and criminal acts, which marks a

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decrease from the 1,556 civilians killed and the 530 injured between 1 July 2021 and
30 June 2022. The decrease in the number of civilian casualties may be attributed to
the pressure exerted by the military operations of the Malian Armed Forces on
extremist groups, as well as a change of tactics by the latter (e.g. issuing ultimatums
to populations to leave ahead of attacks).

North Mali
10. In Timbuktu region, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State
in the Greater Sahara activities were concentrated in the Gourma Rharous cercle,
where those groups were fighting for influence. In response, Malian Armed Forces
intensified their presence. On 1 April, an improvised explosive device attack
destroyed a checkpoint of the Malian Defence and Security Forces located
approximately 2.5 km from MINUSMA Goundam camp. No casualties were reported.
Coordination between the Mission and the Malian Defence and Security Forces
continued, resulting in three patrols per week to provide security to civilian
populations in the city of Timbuktu, as well as foot and motorized patrols in the
cercles of Ber and Goundam. In the latter, MINUSMA has been conducting long-
range patrols to Niafunké, Diré and Tonka on a weekly basis to support the free
movement of people and goods. The Mission supported two regional workshops on
strengthening the capacities of advisory security committees in Taoudenni and
Timbuktu, from 4 to 6 and 10 to 12 April, respectively. As envisioned in the
Agreement, participants included State officials, Malian Defence and Security Forces
and civil society representatives.
11. In Gao region, Ansongo cercle experienced the highest number of incidents
related to activities of extremist groups and opportunistic criminality. On 20 April,
alleged combatants of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara attacked a post of the
Malian Armed Forces in Labbezanga village, killing one soldier and injuring another.
Protesting rising insecurity, the local population in Bara blocked the Gao-Ansongo
road on 26 April. In response, Malian Armed Forces reinforced patrols in the area. On
10 and 11 May, MINUSMA also patrolled Bara village and, on 11 May, conducted a
deterrence flight in coordination with Malian Armed Forces to deter extremist group
activities in the area. In Ansongo, the Mission rehabilitated a military camp to support
the deployment of Malian Armed Forces and ameliorate the living conditions of
Malian soldiers. Within the same project, and in compliance with the human rights
due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces,
MINUSMA built a checkpoint for Malian Defence and Security Forces in support of
their efforts to secure Ansongo town and the surrounding areas. In Gao and Ansongo,
the Mission conducted daily patrols to ensure the protection of the towns and the sites
for internally displaced persons.
12. In Ménaka region, elements of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara stormed the
village of Tidermene on 10 April, signalling the expansion of the group’s presence
into all six cercles of the region. The Malian Armed Forces have conducted operations
in Anderanboukane, Inékar and Tidermene cercles. On 31 March, Malian Armed
Forces undertook aerial dominance and deterrence flyovers covering Ménaka town,
Tinfadimata and Anderamboukane cercle. Similar flights were later undertaken on
12 and 17 April in Talataye (Gao region), Tidermene and Ménaka cercles. On 11 April,
MINUSMA conducted a medical evacuation for two soldiers of the Malian Armed
Forces who had suffered injuries during the attack by Islamic State in the Greater
Sahara on Tidermene. The continued fighting has resulted in new waves of
displacement. At the end of April, 78,484 registered internally displaced persons were
living in 23 different sites in Ménaka. To ensure security for the local and displaced
populations, MINUSMA undertook two patrols during the day and two at night in
Ménaka town, including sites for internally displaced persons, seven days per week.

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In addition, joint patrols with the Malian security forces are conducted three times
per week, and the Mission is providing fuel for these joint activities.
13. On 21 May, an improvised explosive device exploded against a MINUSMA
convoy 12 km from Tessalit, Kidal region. No peacekeeper was seriously injured.

Central Mali
14. Since 30 June 2022, despite sustained efforts by the Government to improve the
situation, the central regions of Mali continued to experience a high level of insecurity.
15. On 22 April, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin carried out complex
attacks against bases of the Malian Armed Forces in Sevaré town, including the Air
Force base, next to the airport and MINUSMA camp. The attacks killed 10 civilians,
injured 61 others and severely damaged civilian infrastructure, including 20 houses
and shelters for internally displaced persons in the Sarema neighbourhood. Overall,
the attacks directly affected 366 civilians, including 144 internally displaced persons.
Local authorities, the humanitarian community and the United Nations country team
provided humanitarian assistance.
16. The Malian Armed Forces continued to conduct counterterrorism ope rations in
various locations, such as in Douentza and Haire (Douentza region), and in
Bandiagara and Dourou (Bandiagara region) to free areas from the presence of
extremist groups. Reprisal attacks by extremist groups against civilians suspected of
collaborating with State forces continued, sometimes involving the abduction of
individuals, including customary authorities. Following reports of an ultimatum
against the local population in Débéré for collaborating with the Malian Armed Forces
and allowing MINUSMA patrols in the area, the village chief was abducted on
15 April; he was eventually released on 25 April, unharmed. A field mission to Débéré
that MINUSMA had scheduled as part of its outreach and protection plan was
cancelled out of concern that it could provoke a retaliatory response against the
community. The Mission is planning to resume activities and assessing the best way
forward in consultation with local authorities and communities. MINUSMA
continued its patrols around Douentza, convoys and patrols along RR30 towards
Timbuktu, RN-16 north of Mopti, and along RN-15 to Bandiagara, including to
protect the critical infrastructures of the Yawakanda and Songho bridges. During the
reporting period, MINUSMA suffered four improvised explosive device atta cks in the
centre but they did not inflict serious injuries to peacekeepers.

IV. Human rights situation

17. MINUSMA continued to support the Malian authorities in strengthening the
institutional framework for the promotion and protection of human rights. On 20 April,
MINUSMA and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights signed a memorandum of
understanding for the provision of technical support to the Government’s efforts to
respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including through the operationaliza tion of
the National Human Rights Directorate mandated to streamline and monitor respect
for human rights in different State institutions. MINUSMA also supported the Malian
authorities in the preparation of the country’s national report for the fourth cycl e of
the Human Rights Council universal periodic review, held on 2 May. With MINUSMA
support, the Malian Defence and Security Forces continued efforts to integrate human
rights into their operations and institutions. Cooperation with the Malian Defence and
Security Forces included the project to equip the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff
with a national team of trainers and the production of a manual on human rights
training specifically designed for the Malian Defence and Security Forces.

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18. Monitoring and documentation of violence against civilians during April

indicate that extremist groups continued to be the main perpetrators, followed by self -
defence groups and armed militias, and signatory armed groups. Some violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law were documented during operations
conducted by the Malian Armed Forces. Overall, MINUSMA verified 132 human
rights violations (33) and abuses (99). The violations and abuses included 89 people
killed, 31 injured and 12 abducted or forcibly disappeared.
19. On 12 May, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) published a fact-finding report that concluded that there were strong
indications that troops of the Malian Armed Forces and foreign security personnel
had killed over 500 people during a five-day military operation in the village of Moura
in the Mopti region of central Mali in March 2022. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights recommended that the Malian authorities publi sh
the findings of their announced investigations into possible violations of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law in Moura, prosecute all alleged
perpetrators and ensure that the victims and/or their family members have access to
justice and obtain full reparation where appropriate.
20. On 13 May, the transitional Government issued a communiqué stating it
“vehemently denounces this biased report, which is based on a fictitious story and
does not meet established international standards”. The transitional Government held
that “no Moura civilians lost their lives during the military operation” . Recalling the
judicial investigation it had launched on 9 April 2022, the transitional Government
stated that “the Government of Mali is determined to bring this procedure to a
successful conclusion, with strict respect for human rights and in complete
independence”. In connection with the Mission’s use of satellite imagery for fact-
finding purposes, the transitional Government further stated it would immediately
open a judicial investigation against the fact-finding mission and its accomplices for
“espionage”, “undermining the external security of the State” and “military
conspiracy”. On 19 May, the Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to MINUSMA
asking for a list of the personnel who had taken part in the fact-finding mission.
21. In April, the United Nations and non-governmental partners recorded 470
incidents of sexual violence, of which 51 were conflict-related. All the victims were
female, including 11 girls between 12 and 17 years of age. Elements of signatory
armed groups accounted for 18 per cent of the perpetrators, and unidentified armed
elements for 82 per cent. The United Nations verified grave violations affecting 154
children, including 5 who were victims of double violations. These violations
included recruitment and use (96), killing and maiming (32), sexual violence (3),
abduction (6), attacks on schools and hospitals (8) and denial of humanitarian access
to children (9).

V. Humanitarian situation
22. During the reporting period, the humanitarian situation remained alarming.
Humanitarian organizations working through the United Nations-coordinated
humanitarian response plan estimated that, in 2023, 8.8 million people would require
humanitarian assistance and protection across the country – a 17 per cent increase
over 2022. The most severe humanitarian needs are concentrated in parts of Mopti,
Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal and Ménaka regions.
23. As at 30 April, the overall displaced population was estimated at 375,539
individuals, an 8.9 per cent decrease from 412,387 in December 2022: 208,210
internally displaced persons, or 55 per cent, in the central regions of Bandiagara,
Douentza, Mopti, San and Ségou; and 151,384 internally displaced persons, or 40 per

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cent, in Gao, Kidal Ménaka and Timbuktu regions. Heightened insecurity in Kidal
and Ménaka regions has increased displacement there, whereas a relative
improvement in security in Mopti and Ségou regions has resulted in lowe r figures.
However, in the regions of Mopti and Ségou alone, more than 3 million people need
humanitarian assistance, compared with 2.8 million in 2022. Under the 2023
humanitarian response plan, $751.5 million is required to assist 5.7 million people
across the country. As at 19 May, donors had provided $82.9 million in funding – or
11 per cent of the required funds.
24. Humanitarian organizations continued to face access-related challenges owing
mainly to conflict and criminality, with the greatest number of incidents reported in
Ségou, Mopti, Gao, Ménaka and Timbuktu regions. In January 2023, a World Health
Organization staff member was kidnapped in Ménaka and later freed. MINUSMA
continued to secure convoys and locations where humanitarians stay overnight.
MINUSMA also continued to secure road axis to ease access to civilians.

VI. Operational and other challenges

25. A series of developments over the past year – including the departure of several
troop- and police-contributing countries, constraints in the use of air assets for
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance purposes and the non-availability since
July 2022 of three of the four combat escort convoy companies – have seriously
affected the ability of MINUSMA to perform mandated tasks effectively and to
predictably sustain its footprint across the country. To maximize increasingly limited
resources to effectively implement the mandate, in early 2023 the Mission developed
and implemented an integrated plan providing that MINUSMA w ould give priority
(a) to resupply and base defence tasks; and (b) to supporting the implementation of
priority activities by civilian pillars. Following the announcement of the decision of
the Government of Egypt to phase out its combat convoy battalion, an evaluation of
the escort model has been under way. The Government of Tunisia confirmed the
deployment of an additional C-130 aircraft to Bamako. In April, an assessment and
advisory visit was conducted with a view to replacing the outgoing Ivorian light
infantry battalion in sector West and for the Jordanian quick reaction force in sector
East. An armed helicopter unit from Pakistan is under deployment, with the cargo to
be delivered by the end of May 2023.
26. The use of improvised explosive devices continued to pose serious threats to the
security of peacekeepers and hamper the Mission’s mobility. From 1 July 2022 to
11 May 2023, a total of 33 improvised explosive device incidents were reported,
resulting in 9 peacekeepers killed and 33 seriously injured, representing a decrease in
such incidents compared with the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022, in which
85 such incidents had resulted in 17 peacekeepers killed and 37 others seriously
injured. While better preparedness to counter such attacks through equipment and
training was shown to have had a positive impact in terms of reducing risks for
peacekeepers, the results have to be weighed against the intensification of the threat
posed by the devices, including through regional expansion, better emplaced devices
and higher explosive charges. On 2 May, MINUSMA established a threat mitigation
cell. Bringing together specialized personnel from civilian and uniformed
components, the cell integrates all elements of planning, operations, logistics,
intelligence and training relating to the evolving threat in a headquarters cell that is
supported by a network of personnel in the sectors to ensure a direct line of support,
feedback and lessons learned.
27. The reporting period witnessed a surge in misinformation and disinformation
against the Mission. In the aftermath of the 22 April attack against the Malian Armed

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Forces in Sevaré, allegations and fake news on the role of the Mission contributed to
heightened anti-MINUSMA rhetoric, including calls for violence against MINUSMA
staff and premises, mainly conveyed through social media. MINUSMA posted factual
statements on social media, intensified media outreach and launched a broadcast via
message applications to rectify false statements. On 26 April, MINUSMA re ached out
to a major social media platform asking for the deletion of a video inciting violence
against the Mission. The video was deleted by the platform on the same day.
MINUSMA extensively engaged Malian partners, who were crucial in dispelling false
allegations. The local authorities in Mopti publicly expressed support for the
Mission’s work and stressed the importance of its partnership with the Malian
authorities. The regional authorities and the regional youth council also engaged with
youth groups, stressing that the Government would not tolerate violence.

VII. Parameters for effective engagement by the Mission

A. Advances in the political transition

28. On 19 April, the technical committee tasked with monitoring the transition
timetable, made up of experts from ECOWAS, the African Union and MINUSMA as
well as their Malian counterparts, met to assess the progress made on the 57 activities
identified by the Malian authorities to be rolled out between July 2022 and March
2024. At the session, it was assessed that 38 activities had been undertaken, of which
23 had been fully completed. The ongoing 15 activities, some of which experienced
delays, related to the electoral register (2), the constitutional referendum (7), local
elections (3), the organization of legislative and presidential elections (2), as well as
the operationalization of the Independent Authority for Election Management (1). In
total, 19 activities were reported to be pending.
29. The stated objectives of the new electoral law promulgated in July 2022 and
amended in February 2023 are to address shortcomings in the electoral system,
including those identified by Malians as important drivers of the 2020 post -electoral
crisis. As mentioned above, the Independent Authority for Election Management was
set up at the national level, and the operationalization of its structures in the regions
was ongoing at the time of writing. The objectives of the six laws on territorial and
administrative organization (see S/2023/236), adopted on 19 October 2022 and
enacted on 13 March 2023, are to address structural governance shortcomings and to
increase democratic local governance.
30. The holding of the constitutional referendum on 18 June will be a major
milestone in the implementation of the political transition. Following concerns
expressed by Malian stakeholders on the contents and process of the draft constitution,
transitional authorities took several initiatives to enhance inclusivity and build
consensus. These included nationwide consultations during the drafting phase and the
creation of a 72-member commission tasked with finalizing the draft constitution.

B. Progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace

and Reconciliation

31. Despite renewed momentum in the second quarter of 2022, the parties have not
met in the framework of the Agreement monitoring mechanisms since last year. The
high-level decision-making meeting held in August 2022 was followed by a
ministerial-level session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee in September.
Fifteen women from the signatory parties were nominated to participate in the
monitoring mechanisms of the Agreement, increasing the overall number of women

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to 24. New difficulties emerged in December 2022, after the signatory movements
decided to suspend their participation in the monitoring mechanisms. To facilitate a
resolution of the differences, the international mediation team engaged extensively
with the signatory parties and exercised its good offices through a series of
consultations in Algiers, Bamako and Kidal. Those efforts also included bilateral
engagements of my Special Representative. The proposals crafted by MINUSMA and
validated by the international mediation team, pending with the parties at the time of
writing, is aimed at creating conditions for the resumption of the work of the
monitoring mechanisms and decisive progress in the implementation of the
outstanding provisions of the Agreement.
32. It is important to note, however, that the six bills on administrative and territorial
reorganization mentioned above are largely aligned with the Agreement’s provision
calling for new institutional architecture to enable the northern populations to
administer themselves through their own representatives elected to regional and local
councils and increase their representation in national institutions. It is also important
to note that the Independent Observer released a comparative study in March, whic h
had been commissioned by the international mediation team and which showed
overlaps between the draft constitution and the Agreement. According to the study,
the draft constitution did retain the spirit and incorporated several aspects of the
Agreement, including the creation of the Sénat as the higher chamber of Parliament,
the endorsement of the role of traditional justice mechanisms such as the qadis, as
well as the recognition of Malian national languages as being official in the country.
If adopted, the new constitution would result in the implementation of some
provisions of the Agreement.

C. Freedom of movement for the Mission, including for intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance assets critical for the safety and
security of peacekeepers

33. MINUSMA continued to be subject to movement restrictions both on the ground

and in the air. Between 1 April and 11 May 2023, MINUSMA requested 565 flight
authorizations, of which 167 were not authorized (29.5 per cent). Among those, 47
flights were intended to support the Mission’s logistical operations, and 120
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance flights were to enhance situational
awareness and the security of peacekeepers. Restrictions remained uneven across
sectors. A total of 160 flights were not authorized for north Mali (105 in sector East,
including 5 Gao-Ménaka passenger and cargo resupply flights; 46 in sector North;
and 9 in sector West) and a total of seven for the centre. To ensure the safety of
convoys and camps, MINUSMA used other air assets, such as specialized helicopters
equipped with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability and dedicated
fixed-wing aircraft equipped with such capability along resupply routes, particularly
on the Gao-Kidal-Tessalit and Mopti-Timbuktu axis as well as over the MINUSMA
camps of Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu, Ber and Goundam, during day and night. All
casualty and medical evacuation flights requested were approved without delay.
34. MINUSMA also recorded two restrictions on ground movements. On 21 April,
despite the information on movements having been with national counterparts, one
MINUSMA patrol was denied access to N’Tomi Kono village, located 40 km from
Sévaré, without receiving further details from Malian Armed Forces. Similarly, on
2 May, another patrol was blocked at the Malian Armed Forces checkpoint of Thy
village, 9 km north of Sévaré. In the centre, since April, MINUSMA has had no access
to Djenné and Sofara towns to conduct civilian protection patrols, owing to military
operations of the Malian Armed Forces. For the same reason, in Gao, MINUSMA
continued to have no access to southern areas of Ansongo and Tessit.

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35. Although MINUSMA was able to exercise its right to import goods for its use
without restrictions, impediments, taxes or charges, Malian authorities imposed
additional clearance measures for medical supplies, in particular medicines. This
required additional coordination between the Mission, the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the transit of MINUSMA civilian and military
aeromedical evacuation teams. There were no impediments to freedom of entry and
departure for Mission personnel. One staff member was arrested and detained for two
days on charges of terrorist activities, when breaking the temporarily imposed
movement restrictions. During the ensuing legal process, the prosecutor dropped the
charges and the staff member was released.

D. Ability to implement the entire Security Council mandate,

including its human rights provisions

36. Since January, the Mission has submitted five official requests to Malian
authorities to conduct human rights in situ fact-finding missions, of which four were
denied. However, 43 remote fact-finding activities and/or missions were conducted
in the same period, including in Bamako, Gao, Mopti and Ségou.
37. The Government and MINUSMA continued to cooperate on a number of
important initiatives, including with regard to the provision of technical and capacity -
building assistance to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the Malian
Defence and Security Forces.

VIII. Regional developments

38. During the reporting period, the relations between Mali and neighbouring
countries witnessed significant improvements. In March, the fourth joint technical
commission of Mali and Côte d’Ivoire met in Bamako from 22 to 24 March to discuss
bilateral cooperation and measures to prevent the recurrence of diplomatic tensions
between the two countries.
39. Bilateral security cooperation and cross-border partnerships for the fight against
terrorism were also strengthened. On 9 March, the transitional President, Colonel
Assimi Goïta, received the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Niger to discuss
security cooperation. Soon after the visit, the Niger conducted a military operation in
the border area with Mali in late March. Similarly, Burkina Faso and Mali have held
several high-level meetings since February 2023, resulting in increased security
cooperation, including the launch of a large-scale military operation to combat
insecurity along border areas.

IX. Consultations with stakeholders

40. Since the internal review and the position of the transitional Government of Mali
annexed therein (S/2023/36), the Malian authorities have reiterated that none of the
options proposed meet the expectations of the Malian people and their own priorities.
At the time of writing, the authorities indicated that they were still c onsulting
internally to define a position in the context of the Mission’s mandate renewal.
41. The African Union, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel and relevant
Member States were consulted and expressed their support to MINUSMA and its
continued presence in Mali, as well as its support to the transition and the Agreement.
They stressed the importance of the stability of Mali for the entire region. None
expressed a preference for option 3, viewing the time as not right for a conversion

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into a special political mission. Most stressed that the Mission’s withdrawal would be
very detrimental to Mali and regional security. Several countries in the region, deeply
concerned about the expansion of extremist groups perceived as an existential threat
and about instability spilling over, have advocated for a strengthened mandate and
presence, with some opting for option 1, which calls for an increase in the troop
ceiling to give MINUSMA the full capacity to implement its current mandate in all
areas of deployment. The African Union, ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the
Sahel expressed similar fears and a preference for option 1, should Mali agree. Should
that not be the case, they felt option 2 – with adjustments to the mandate to make it
more robust – should be considered. Most countries in the region that also contribute
uniformed personnel stressed the importance of continuing to support the political
transition and the Agreement, while reiterating the need to listen to Malian voices.
Some countries, including in the region, pointed out the risks associated with option
2 (b), which could be perceived as “abandoning” Mali if the Mission were to withdraw
from the centre. Many Member States have indicated that they consider Option 2 (a)
to be the most realistic, and suggested recentring the mandate on the transition and
the Agreement while emphasizing the balance to be maintained between the tasks that
the Mission could reasonably accomplish in the current context, and the absence of
additional resources. One Member State indicated that a review of the mandate would
be useful while others stated that, in its current form, the mandate remained relevant.
Several Member States increasingly view the four parameters as a pertinent
framework through which concrete progress in the situation in Mali could be
measured beyond June 2023.

X. Implications of the options for the reconfiguration of

the Mission
42. The options for the configuration of MINUSMA, as outlined in the report on the
internal review of the Mission (S/2023/36), are expanded below, on the basis of the
findings of a joint military and police capability study conducted in April.
43. To offset the withdrawal of several troop-contributing countries and optimize
the use of resources at its disposal, the Mission made immediate adjustments to its
force along the following lines: (a) generation of three stand-alone combat convoy
companies (one troop-contributing country has already been invited to deploy);
(b) reallocation of the mobile task force headroom to strengthen overall force
protection capabilities and ensure that all sectors have a quick reaction force as a
sector reserve (already in place in three out of four sectors); and (c) reassignment of
mobile task force military staff officers to the improvised explosive device threat
mitigation cell, Ménaka and other vital cells, such as information operations and
strategic communications. With regard to the police component, the Mission will
redeploy one formed police unit to Ansongo and a newly generated formed police unit
will deploy to Ménaka instead of Kidal, where it was initially meant to replace the
unit withdrawn by Benin. Whereas all actions pertaining to personnel already in
theatre will be implemented by the end of the 2023, the generation and deployment
of additional units will likely continue into 2024.

Option 1: full capacity to implement the Mission’s mandate in its entirety

across all areas of its deployment
44. Option 1, and its sub-options (a) and (b), allow an augmentation of uniformed
personnel that would restore the Mission’s mobility, manoeuvrability and
responsiveness, as it would free up infantry units currently providing security and
convoy escorts, to advance the implementation of the Mission’s two strategic
priorities.

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Option 1 (a): augmentation by 3,600 military and 360 police personnel

45. This option would give MINUSMA the means to support the improvement of
the political and security situation in northern and central Mali and simultaneously
advance its two strategic priorities. In the north, the Mission would preserve the space
for the implementation of the Agreement by defending population centres against the
operations of extremist groups and safeguarding the ceasefire; and, when signatory
parties resume the implementation of the Agreement, it would support the
demobilization disarmament and reintegration process, the redeployment of the
reconstituted Malian Defence and Security Forces and civilian administration in
northern Mali and the implementation of the development projects envisioned in the
Agreement. In the centre, the Mission would have the means to implement its
protection of civilians’ mandate. Strengthening the police component with 360
formed police unit personnel instead of the 80 police personnel initially envisaged in
the report on the internal review of the Mission (S/2023/36), would allow joint patrols
with Malian security forces in the main urban centres of northern and central Mali
and secure sites for internally displaced persons. MINUSMA could prevent the return
of extremist groups to recently liberated areas by providing a security umbrella for
the restoration of basic services and delivery of peace dividends in the framework of
the stabilization strategy of the Government of Mali, as called for by the transitional
Government in the annex to the above-mentioned report.
46. Generating the additional personnel for the formed police unit personnel could
take up to one year, while generating additional military forces could take up to two
years. Those estimates are made on the basis of middle-ground scenarios, assuming
support from the Government, including for the allocation of land for new
infrastructure, and pledges from troop-contributing countries that meet MINUSMA
statement of unit requirements.

Option 1 (b): augmentation by approximately 2,000 uniformed personnel,

including 360 police personnel
47. This option would also improve the overall ability of MINUSMA to implement
its mandate; in the event of a deteriorating security situation, however, the Mission
would not be able simultaneously to contribute to the creation of a secure environment
and advance its two strategic priorities. In such a context, the Mission would be forced
to prioritize security tasks at the expense of integrated operations between the civilian
and uniformed pillars, which would have a negative impact on the Mission’s overall
support to the peace process, to the restoration of State authority and to the protection
of civilians in the centre.
48. MINUSMA would be able to deliver additional logistical support to the Malian
Defence and Security Forces but would lack the military and police strength to
oversee the stabilization of areas liberated from extremist armed groups. Force and
police generation timelines would be similar to option 1 (a). Except for the
construction of a new camp in Bourem, infrastructure work would be limited to
expanding existing camps.

Option 2: maintaining focus on the strategic priorities with a consolidated footprint

49. Within the existing resources and troop ceiling, a reconfiguration would be
needed to enable an efficient use of uniformed personnel, also in support of civilian-
led activities.

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Option 2 (a): reconfiguration to support existing mandated priorities

50. Given the volatility and sensitivity of the current context, any handover of bases
should be contingent on progress in the peace process. The Mission’s continued
presence in the centre would allow it to support Malian authorities in the
implementation of their stabilization strategy, as well as to support Malian-led efforts
to secure the electoral process. Contingent on the cooperation of Malian authorities,
MINUSMA would conduct fact-finding missions and pursue its contribution to the
fight against impunity in the part of the country where the largest number of
allegations of human rights violations and abuses have been reported over the past
years. The presence of MINUSMA would continue to provide a security umbrella to
humanitarian actors in their efforts to assist internally displaced persons, host
communities and returnees.
51. As is the case now, some logistical support may be provided to the Malian
Defence and Security Forces, but it would fall short of the expectations of the
transitional Government, as conveyed in its paper, which is annexed to the report on
the internal review of MINUSMA (S/2023/36).

Option 2 (b): reconfiguration within existing troop ceiling, focusing primarily

on supporting the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali
52. The Mission would focus its efforts on safeguarding the ceasefire and
accompanying signatory parties in the implementation of the Agreement, including
restoration of basic services, security provisions and peace dividends. In close
cooperation with Malian authorities, it would strive to protect the main urban centres
from the extremist threat and contribute to the creation of a secure environment for
the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
53. The Mission’s mandated tasks in the centre, including support to the
Government’s strategy for the stabilization of these regions, would need to be
transitioned to the United Nations country team. These tasks include support to
stabilization and restoration of State authority; efforts to ensure accountability; the
protection of civilians, including through dialogue, engagement and the establishment
of a protective environment; and the promotion and protection of human rights. The
full continuation of those substantive responsibilities would depend on generating
additional resources for, and increasing the field presence of, the United Nations
country team. Technical and logistical electoral assistance would continue to be
provided, through the electoral management body and the Ministry of Territorial
Administration and Decentralization. However, MINUSMA would not contribute to
securing the legislative and presidential polls in central Mali, the most densely
populated region of the country.
54. MINUSMA would end its patrols along the main axes and the securing of key
infrastructure in central Mali. These tasks would have to be taken over by the Malian
Defence and Security Forces to prevent the border areas with Burkina Faso from
falling under the control of extremist groups, thereby dividing the country and
endangering civilian, humanitarian and MINUSMA movements on the critical routes
between southern and northern Mali. New attacks against civilians, including in
Ogossagou, cannot be excluded.
55. The Mission’s support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces would be
limited to supporting the operationalization of the reconstituted units in the north.
Full implementation of this option would take several months, as it would require
moving personnel to their new duty stations under difficult conditions, exacerbated
by the limited availability of combat convoy companies, the need to adapt existing

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infrastructure to meet new requirements and the necessary work associated with
closing vacated sites.

Option 3: withdrawal of uniformed units and conversion into a special

political mission
56. Without uniformed components, the Mission would not be able to maintain a
civilian presence outside of Bamako. Its capacity to support political dialogue and
reconciliation processes, build capacity for good governance and monitor, promote
and protect human rights would be limited to Bamako, with the risk of reversing some
of the gains made so far in support of the deployment of State authority. Technical
electoral assistance could still be provided to relevant ministries in Bamako. The
special political mission would not be able to contribute to the creation of conditions
for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. It would not provide any type of
logistical or operational support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces.

XI. Financial aspects

57. The General Assembly, by its resolution 76/288, appropriated the amount of
$1,245.0 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2022
to 30 June 2023. As at 17 May 2023, unpaid assessed contributions to the special
account for MINUSMA amounted to $292.0 million. The total outstanding assessed
contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to
$2,764.7 million. Reimbursement of the costs of troop and formed police personnel,
as well as for contingent-owned equipment, have been made for the period up to
31 December 2022 in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

XII. Observations
58. The present report is submitted nearly six months after the internal strate gic
review of MINUSMA, which provided a thorough assessment of the situation,
acknowledging the significant challenges that Mali continues to face after close to 10
years of international engagement to help the country end insecurity and achieve
lasting stability. In this context, the report provides three options for the future of the
Mission, while also serving to underline the continued relevance of the overall
objective of the United Nations presence in Mali, as framed back in 2013, and to
reaffirm the validity of the strategic priorities determined by the Security Council, as
they relate to the implementation of the Agreement, support to the transition and the
stabilization of the centre regions. None of the developments that occurred during the
reporting period called this conclusion into question.
59. As I stressed in January, the status quo is not and cannot be an option. It can
also neither be an option for the Malian people, who continue to bear the brunt of
unspeakable violence and whose strong yearning for a better future remains
unfulfilled, nor one for the international community, which, since 2013, has invested
heavily in the stabilization of the country. It is against this backdrop that the review
sought to identify parameters under which MINUSMA would be able to deliver on its
mandate more effectively for the benefit of Mali and its people on the basis of a strong
partnership between the United Nations and the host country.
60. Over the past months, the situation in Mali, viewed from the standpoint of those
parameters, has witnessed mixed developments. While there are areas of lingering
and serious concern, there have also been some encouraging developments. No effort
should be spared to address the former and consolidate the latter.

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61. The recent announcement of the new date for the constitutional referendum is a
positive step. Together with the reaffirmation by the authorities of their determination
to successfully bring the transition to an end in March 2024, it has injected additional
momentum into the transition process, building on steps taken since June 2022 to
pave the way for the timely restoration of constitutional order. MINUSMA and the
United Nations country team, which have supported this process, will also support
the holding of the referendum and the polls to follow. The need to ensure that these
polls take place in conditions that will allow for the free expression of the will of the
Malian people cannot be emphasized enough. Above all, it is essential that all political
stakeholders, regardless of how they position themselves on the issues at hand,
prioritize the return of Mali to constitutional order. It is equally essential that the
region, which stands to lose from instability in Mali, continue to play its part in
steering the political transition toward a peaceful conclusion. I look forward to the
leadership and stepped-up efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS, alongside the
United Nations, to contribute to creating conducive conditions for holding the
constitutional referendum and the subsequent polls.
62. An equally important process for the future of Mali relates to the
implementation of the Agreement. I am concerned about the continued paralysis of
the monitoring mechanisms, which deprives the parties of formal avenues to dialogue
among themselves as well as with their international partners. I welcome the
relentless efforts of the international mediation team, under the leadership of Algeria
as its chef de file. The proposals submitted by the team since early April offer a sound
basis for resuming the vital work of the Agreement’s monitoring mechanisms. I urge
the parties to respond to them in earnest and with the spirit of compromise that the
dire situation prevailing on the ground so desperately calls for. I note the visi t by the
Malian Minister for Reconciliation to Kidal and the discussions he had with
representatives of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and the Plateforme,
and I look forward to a tangible follow-up.
63. The launch, in mid-March, of the strategy for the stabilization of the centre
represented an important moment in the efforts to foster a comprehensive and
politically led approach to the specific challenges confronting that part of the country.
The most difficult part – translating the document into concrete action – starts now,
and I once more encourage the authorities to use the remainder of the transition to lay
the required groundwork in this respect.
64. The issue of freedom of movement in the context of the MINUSMA mandate
continued to be a challenge with the transitional Government. Resolving the matter,
however, and, more generally, building a predictable and stable partnership based on
joint planning and closer coordination in the field, remains key for the overall
effectiveness of the Mission’s support and the ability to meet the expectations of the
Malian people for greater security. The reporting period ended without the expected
advances. The Mission will continue to engage its Malian partners with the view to
addressing these challenges and ensuring a more effective use of its resources and
capabilities in support of the Malian government-led stabilization efforts.
65. I note with deep concern the conclusions of the investigation led by OHCHR on
the Moura incident. I call on the Malian authorities to swiftly follow up on the
recommendations of the report. In this respect, the early completion of a credible and
transparent investigation to hold perpetrators accountable would be of utmost
importance. Respect for human rights is not only an ethical and legal obligation but
also an operational imperative for the success of counterterrorism operations. In this
context, and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, the Mission
will continue its capacity-building support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces,
taking advantage of the many joint initiatives already launched in this respect. I also
urge greater cooperation from the Malian authorities to facilitate access for the

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conduct of in situ human rights investigations, whose sole purpose is to further

support them in the pursuit of lasting peace and security.
66. I remain deeply concerned by the deteriorating humanitarian situation, including
alarming levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, new displacements in som e areas
and ongoing access difficulties due to insecurity. I commend humanitarian actors for
succeeding in delivering assistance to more than 2.9 million people in 2022. However,
funding remains a severe constraint, and I call on donors to contribute more
generously to the 2023 humanitarian response plan.
67. While progress in the fulfilment of the parameters outlined in the internal review
has been uneven, the Mission has nonetheless continued to play a vital role at both
the political and operational levels. With Mali entering a crucial period leading to the
return to constitutional rule, its continued presence remains invaluable. In addition,
international support to keep the peace process on track, to help meet daunting
protection needs on the ground and to facilitate the extension of State authority is
sorely needed. As the people of Mali and of the Sahel region in general grapple with
daunting security, humanitarian and governance challenges, the United Nations offers
a vital framework to sustain international solidarity, keeping in mind that the
effectiveness of the efforts made to that end is heavily dependent on the extent of the
cooperation extended to the Mission by the Malian authorities and the level of
commitment by all concerned stakeholders to the political processes that MINUSMA
is mandated to support.
68. Given the political context of the transition, I recommend that the Security
Council extend the mandate of MINUSMA for a period of one year, with its current
authorized strength of 13,289 military and 1,920 police personnel, as detailed in
paragraphs 73 to 75 of the report on the internal review (S/2023/36). I intend to use
my authority to reconfigure the Mission and deploy civilian and uniformed capacities
where they are most needed, on the basis of progress in the implementation of the
Agreement and the political transition. Considering current troop levels and the
timeline for the reconfiguration of the uniformed component, the Council could
consider streamlining MINUSMA tasks around a limited set of priorities to improve
its overall effectiveness until the end of the political transition in March 2024.
Assuming that the Mission’s mandate is renewed, the Council could also reassess the
situation at any time during the mandate.
69. The ability of MINUSMA to achieve its mandate is contingent not only on the
level of cooperation it receives from the Malian authorities and progress on political
processes but also on the extent of support received from Member States. I remain
deeply grateful to the troop- and police-contributing countries for their commitment
and the immense sacrifices made. I am encouraged by the progress made in generating
new uniformed personnel in replacement of countries that have ended or are about to
end their deployment, as well as in the mobilization of additional capabilities. These
efforts will continue to be pursued. Of equal importance is the political support of the
Security Council, whose unity is paramount going forward.
70. I pay tribute to the personnel, civilian and military, as well as to the leadership
of the Mission for their steadfastness and commitment. I deeply appreciate the strong
collaboration between the Mission and other multilateral partners and welcome the
invaluable contributions of ECOWAS, the African Union and the European Union.

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Annex I
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali: military and police strength as at 23 May 2023
Military Police

Experts on mission,
staff officers and units Individual police officers Formed police units Total police

Country Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total

Armenia – – – – – – – – – – – –
Australia 1 – 1 – – – – – – – – –
Austria 2 – 2 – – – – – – – – –
Bangladesh 1 310 68 1 378 2 – 2 215 65 280 217 65 282
Belgium 6 – 6 – – – – – – – – –
Benin 236 25 261 16 1 17 0 – 0 16 1 17
Bhutan 5 – 5 – – – – – – – – –
Bosnia and Herzegovina – – – – – – – – – – – –
Burkina Faso 635 26 661 21 16 37 132 8 140 153 24 177
Burundi 1 – 1 – – – – – – – – –
Cambodia 234 34 268 – – – – – – – – –
Cameroon 1 1 2 4 0 4 – – – 4 0 4
Canada 4 1 5 3 1 4 – – – 3 1 4
Chad 1 394 30 1 424 6 – 6 – – – 6 – 6
China 388 18 406 – – – – – – – – –
Côte d’Ivoire 642 25 667 8 4 12 – – – 8 4 12
Czechia 3 2 5 – – – – – – – – –
Denmark 2 – 2 – – – – – – – – –
Egypt 903 26 929 18 1 19 146 14 160 164 15 179
El Salvador 102 10 112 – – – – – – – – –
Estonia 1 – 1 – – – – – – – – –
Ethiopia – – – – – – – – – – – –
Finland 4 – 4 0 1 1 – – – 0 1 1
France 24 – 24 8 2 10 – – – 8 2 10
Gambia 7 1 8 5 1 6 – – – 5 1 6
Germany 612 52 664 – – – – – – – – –
Ghana 126 16 142 2 – 2 – – – 2 – 2
Guatemala 2 – 2 – – – – – – – – –
Guinea 615 53 668 3 4 7 – – – 3 4 7
Indonesia 9 – 9 4 4 8 – – – 4 4 8
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2 – 2 – – – – – – – – –
Ireland – – – – – – – – – – – –
Italy 2 – 2 3 – 3 – – – 3 – 3
Jordan 335 – 335 18 3 21 – – – 18 3 21
Kenya 7 1 8 – – – – – – – – –
Latvia – – – – – – – – – – – –

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Military Police

Experts on mission,
staff officers and units Individual police officers Formed police units Total police

Country Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total

Liberia 150 15 165 – – – – – – – – –

Lithuania 39 6 45 – – – – – – – – –
Luxembourg 2 – 2 – – – – – – – – –
Mauritania 7 – 7 – – – – – – – – –
Mexico 8 1 9 – – – – – – – – –
Nepal 164 17 181 – – – – – – – – –
Netherlands (Kingdom of the) 4 – 4 2 – 2 – – – 2 – 2
Niger 862 9 871 17 12 29 – – – 17 12 29
Nigeria 62 15 77 – 2 2 106 31 137 106 33 139
Norway 3 – 3 – – – – – – – – –
Pakistan 219 13 232 – – – – – – – – –
Portugal 2 – 2 2 – 2 – – – 2 – 2
Romania 4 – 4 – – – – – – – – –
Senegal 928 31 959 17 6 23 263 52 315 280 58 338
Sierra Leone 17 4 21 – – – – – – – – –
Spain 1 – 1 4 1 5 – – – 4 1 5
Sri Lanka 239 – 239 – – – – – – – – –
Sweden – – – – – – – – – – – –
Switzerland 5 – 5 1 – 1 – – – 1 – 1
Togo 672 63 735 14 12 26 253 26 279 267 38 305
Tunisia 81 7 88 12 5 17 – – – 12 5 17
Türkiye – – – 10 1 11 – – – 10 1 11
Ukraine – – – – – – – – – – – –
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland 8 1 9 – – – – – – – – –
United States of America 7 2 9 – – – – – – – – –
Zambia – – – – – – – – – – – –

Totals 11 102 574 11 676 200 77 277 1 115 196 1 311 1 315 273 1 588

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Annex II
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