4 The aims of comparative law* 1

H. Patrick Glenn

1 INTRODUCTION
The idea that comparative law must have a specific aim or aims became
widespread through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as com-
parative law itself came to be recognized as a specific discipline. The idea
assumes that comparative law is distinct from law itself, or subsidiary to
it, and requires justification which law in its entirety would not. Today,
however, comparative legal reasoning is increasingly evident in almost
all dimensions of the practice and study of law, such that the aims of
comparative law are increasingly difficult to state within a small compass.
Comparative law is increasingly integrated into law itself, as a fundamen-
tal technique and means of support. The argument has thus already been
made that comparative law should disappear as an autonomous subject
(Reimann, 1996) or at least be seen as an integral dimension of all forms of
legal endeavour (Glenn, 1999).
These different attitudes towards the comparing of laws, and the aims of
doing so, have been evident throughout legal history. Greek lawyers used
the law of other Greek city-states to decide cases and the process of com-
parison was here no different from that of comparing one internal norm to
another in the decision-making process. Aristotle, however, surveyed the
constitutions of the then-known world with a view to improvement or per-
fection, and the use of comparative law as a subsidiary instrument of law
reform is here evident. In the same manner, the Romans would have sent a
delegation to Greece prior to the drafting of the Twelve Tables, generally
thought to be at the origin of Roman law, though more informal com-
parison of laws would inevitably have occurred in practice in the Roman
provinces (leaving, however, few records). The importance of comparative
legal reasoning declined in some measure in the process of development
of the ius commune on the continent of Europe, as Roman law and con-
temporary rationality became the main instruments in the development
of this particular corpus of law. Given the belief that a universal law was

* See also: Legal culture; Legal history and comparative law; Methodology of compara-
tive law.

65

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 65 30/08/2012 12:08

 66 Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law, second edition

possible, driven by religious and imperial convictions, comparison became

seen as a potential source of contamination (Thunis, 2004, 6). Outside the
academy, however, informal comparison was essential to legal practice, as
everywhere the refined features of the ius commune and other European
common laws had to be measured against local forms of normativity
(Glenn, 2005). The later middle ages were a time of proliferation of laws
on the same territory, and comparison was essential to their reconciliation
in particular cases.
From the time of what is known as the Enlightenment, and the Western
imperialism which accompanied it, different forms of legal comparison
remained in evidence. In the process of construction of European states,
many sources of law were used and the sixteenth century saw major doc-
trinal efforts to draw out the best from Roman, canonical and customary
sources. This may have been driven initially by curiosity and a spirit of
scientific enquiry, but eventually it became constructivist in character as
centralizing forces, royal or otherwise, formulated modern laws according
to the range of comparative examples provided by the research. Beyond
Europe, however, and the process has continued to the present day, the
common laws of the European colonizers had to be constantly compared
with local laws which were never displaced in their entirety (Glenn, 2005).
European authority was largely persuasive in character and necessarily
coexisted alongside local law, whether written or unwritten. Comparative
law here was the stuff of daily practice.
The contemporary discipline of academic comparative law developed as
a response to the fragmentation of European laws following the nineteenth
century codifications and development of the concept of national stare
decisis (David and Brierley, 1985, 2; Constantinesco, 1972, 66). The nine-
teenth century thus saw the creation of a number of national comparative
law associations and comparative law reviews, while the World Congress
of Comparative Law held in Paris in 1900 is generally seen as marking the
arrival of the discipline in the scientific world (Ancel, 1971, 18). Articulation
of the aims of this distinct academic discipline was essential and, while
diverse aims were eventually brought forward, they shared some common
characteristics. As the discipline of comparative law is today questioned,
however, so are its traditionally stated aims subject to critical examination.

2 COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF

LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE

Many distinguished comparative lawyers have insisted on the virtues of

comparative law as a means of expanding knowledge generally and as a

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 66 30/08/2012 12:08

 The aims of comparative law 67

means of better understanding law (Ancel, 1971, 10; David and Brierley,
1985, 4; Ewald, 1995; Glendon, Carozza and Picker, 2006, 14 (‘pursuit
of knowledge as an end in itself’); Örücü, 2004, 33; Rheinstein, 1967, 554
(usefulness of ‘insights ... in and by themselves’); Zweigert and Kötz, 1998,
15 (‘primary aim ... as of all sciences, is knowledge’). For Professor Sacco
there is a ‘false problem’ of the goal or aim of a scientific discipline, since
the objective of any science is that of knowledge (Sacco, 1991, 1). It is of
course difficult to argue against learning and knowledge, yet the question
is a more precise one as to whether this is a sufficient and necessary aim of
comparative law as a distinct academic or scientific discipline. All of the
authors in question, and many others, acknowledge further, more prag-
matic and utilitarian objectives, recognizing implicitly that the pursuit of
knowledge is not in itself sufficient to justify the existence of any particular
discipline. The justification of particular disciplines must be established
not only on the basis of the general need for learning and knowledge, but
in relation to how that need is satisfied by other disciplines. Comparative
law as an academic discipline here exhibits the circumstances of its origins.
Given the normative closure of nationalist legal theory in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, comparative law became necessary as a means of
knowledge of law beyond national political boundaries. In the language of
Jacques Vanderlinden, the comparative lawyer fulfilled an essential voca-
tion of ‘opening doors’ (Vanderlinden, 1995, 423). To the extent today
that doors are no longer closed (and comparative lawyers have played an
important role in this process), the aim of comparative law of providing
basic information on the law of the world has become less fundamental
and necessary, as has the discipline itself. If law is no longer considered
exclusively in terms of national sources, then it is the discipline of law in its
entirety which must assume the cognitive burden of providing information
on law beyond national borders. There has already been some recognition
of this in programmes of legal education which teach more than a single
national law, though these programmes are still of recent date.
In assessing the importance of comparative law as a means of learning
and knowledge, however, it is important also to examine the nature of the
learning and knowledge which has been produced, notably in classifying
the laws of the world.

3 COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF

EVOLUTIONARY AND TAXONOMIC SCIENCE

As a distinct academic discipline or science, comparative law had to

establish its precise scientific aims or objectives, and these were naturally

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 67 30/08/2012 12:08

 68 Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law, second edition

conditioned by the prevailing scientific ideas of the nineteenth and twen-

tieth centuries. Darwinism was important for the biological sciences
throughout this period, remaining so today, and there was an ensuing
form of social Darwinism which had its effect in the social sciences. This
meant that, parallel to Western imperialism, much work in the social
sciences was directed to establishing the progression of human develop-
ment and the multiple stages of that progression. Different peoples, and
laws, were at different stages of social development, and comparative law
could play an important role in the discovery of this evolutionary process.
Imperialism, moreover, could be considered an entirely justifiable process
if it accelerated a progression of development which would take place in
any event. Much of the comparative law of the nineteenth century was
carried out within this manner of thought (David and Brierley, 1985, 5,
with references; Constantinesco, 1972, 118–26) and ongoing references to
‘primitive’ peoples and laws are a part of its legacy. There are still refer-
ences to comparative law illustrating the ‘evolution’ of societies (Collins,
1991, 396, referring to the ‘bankrupt predicament’ of evolutionary social
theory), but today this must be taken as simply referring to comparison’s
ability to highlight diachronic change, and not to any fundamental laws of
human progression.
The evolutionary aims of comparative law were closely related, however,
to another scientific objective, which was that of establishing a taxonomy
of the laws of the world according to various notions of legal families or
ideal types of laws. This aim of comparative law was influenced by the
emergence of many comparative and taxonomic disciplines in the nine-
teenth century (comparative anatomy, comparative literature, etc.) and
by the notion of ideal types (of Western construction) given prominence
in the social sciences by Max Weber. These taxonomic efforts assumed
static and positive national laws as objects of the taxonomic process. They
were often related to notions of social progress or evolution, since, while
taxonomy was possible, there could still be progression from one stage
of development to another. This idea of classification of the laws of the
world, like that of legal evolution, has today lost much of its interest. In
spite of great efforts expended (for a tabulation, see Vanderlinden, 1995,
228, 417), no conclusive results were reached and today there is increasing
doubt as to the criteria of classification and as to the stability of the laws
to be classified. This reflects a certain disenchantment in the social sciences
generally with respect to objectives and methods drawn from the physical
sciences. It has been observed that human beings, unlike physical objects
and the world of nature, have a tendency to ‘answer back’ and that this
must be accommodated by the academic discipline in question.
Some dissatisfaction having emerged with the large, scientific aims of

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 68 30/08/2012 12:08

 The aims of comparative law 69

comparative law, it has increasingly been justified, in recent years, by more

pragmatic and utilitarian considerations.

4 PRAGMATIC AND UTILITARIAN AIMS OF

COMPARATIVE LAW

In a world of national laws, it became inevitable that the work of com-

parative lawyers would be looked at through the prism of national law.
Many of the aims of comparative law have thus been expressed in terms
of its contribution, in different ways, to national law. In this respect the
contemporary discipline continues in much more intensive form the con-
structivist tradition, dating from Aristotle and extending through the
period of state construction in Europe. Comparative law would thus, on a
purely cognitive level, contribute to a better understanding of one’s own,
national law through the contrasts and greater range of information it
provides (Ancel, 1971, 9; Constantinesco, 1974, 290; David and Brierley,
1985, 3; Glendon, Carozza and Picker, 2006, 14; Rodière, 1979, 47). As
a practical consequence, it would be a primary instrument of domestic
law reform through legislation, and the necessity of comparative research
is a constant theme on the agenda of law reform agencies and ministries
of justice (Coing, 1978; Grossfeld, 1990, 15; Gutteridge, 1949, 35; Kahn-
Freund, 1974 (famously arguing of dangers of ‘transplants’ based on
different power structures); Pound, 1936, 60; Rabel, 1967, 3; Schlesinger
et al., 1998, 37; Watson, 1976 (replying to Kahn-Freund and arguing
for a general principle of transferability of laws without regard to social
context); Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, 15). Particularly in common law juris-
dictions the contribution of comparative law to the development of case
law has been urged (Gutteridge, 1949, 37; Markesinis, 2003; Rheinstein,
1967, 555; Schlesinger, Baade, Herzog and Wise, 1998, 3). Improvement
of national law has been formulated recently in terms of improvement of
its economic efficiency or wealth-producing capacity and there has been
interesting use of comparative reasoning to demonstrate the utility of dif-
ferent national models in the pursuit of this particular objective, notably
with respect to different forms of corporate governance. A number of
large studies, written by economists, have also attempted to demonstrate
the relative efficiency of entire traditions of civil and common law (e.g.,
La Porta et al., 1998). It has been said, however, that comparative law is
both a means of evaluating the efficiency of different models and also of
recognizing the resistance of particular national traditions (the language
of ‘path dependency’ is often used) in the ‘evolution’ towards efficiency
(Mattei, 1997, 121). While comparative law has been used most frequently

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 69 30/08/2012 12:08

 70 Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law, second edition

in the perfecting of national private law, there is a growing tendency to

deploy it as a means of interpretation of national constitutions (Tushnet,
1999).
The aims of improving national legislation or national case law
scarcely exhaust, however, the pragmatic or utilitarian applications of
comparative legal reasoning. A larger pragmatic objective is the regional
or international harmonization of law, of great importance today within
Europe but also in the worldwide process of development of interna-
tional and transnational law (Constantinesco, 1974, 343, 370; Örücü,
2004, 37; Schlesinger et al., 1998, 37–43; Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, 16).
In the context of Europe in particular, comparative law is an indispen-
sable method in the work of the European courts, which draw on the
national law of all member states both in enunciating the law of the
European Union and in the application of the European Convention on
Human Rights (van der Mensbrugghe, 2003). Regional or topic-specific
forms of harmonization would today be seen, however, as the maximum
limits of the comparative process of harmonization. Earlier sentiments,
notably those of Saleilles, in favour of development of a ‘common law
of humanity’ (Jamin, 2000) are today considered as utopian in character.
Comparative law is also said to be an indispensable aid to international
forms of legal practice (Ancel, 1971, 9; Glendon, Carozza and Picker,
2006, 14; Rheinstein, 1967, 555; Rodière, 1979, 38), and it is today the
case that comparison of national laws is a fundamental process in the
practice of transnational law firms and in the process of international
arbitrations. The process is no longer limited to obtaining expert foreign
advice on the content of foreign law, pursuant to a national choice of law
rule, but now extends to broader forms of evaluation of national laws
for purposes of choice of forum and choice and application of national
law, in the context of either international litigation or international
arbitration (Glenn, 2001).

5 RESULTING TENDENCIES OF DISCIPLINE OF

COMPARATIVE LAW

This brief survey of the recent aims of comparative law reveals the
present vulnerability of the discipline and the reasons for dissatisfac-
tion with its stated aims. For while comparative law and comparative
lawyers have succeeded in demonstrating the utility of comparative
law, this has generally been for constructivist purposes and in a way
which has lent support to the idea of the autonomy and exclusivity of
national law. It is as though one opens a door in order to close it more

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 70 30/08/2012 12:08

 The aims of comparative law 71

securely, or to allow in (only) a particular, invited guest. Use of com-

parative law in the process of law reform would thus be in the hands
of a very select group of people, following whose work national law
would have been improved and would have become more self-sufficient.
Establishing taxonomies of comparative law, as in a museum of con-
temporary law, would reinforce the autonomous existence of the objects
of classification. Taxonomy consists of the establishing of boundaries
and the comparison once terminated would leave fixed and determined
objects. Categorized state laws would be more certain in their exist-
ence following the process. At the level of regional or international
harmonization, the comparison would also be purposive and of limited
duration. The measure of comparison suggested by these aims of com-
parative law would thus be compatible with an underlying epistemology
of separation, of peoples and of laws. Comparative law as a pragmatic
and utilitarian subsidiary discipline would also, necessarily, be taught
as a separate discipline and would pose no danger to the exclusivist
teaching of state law. Courses of comparative law would even reinforce
this hegemonic teaching of the ius unum, since all appreciation of other
laws could thus be left in the curriculum of law faculties to the specific
course of comparative law. It is symptomatic of this underlying attitude
that courses in comparative law are in general courses of foreign law, in
which no comparison with local law takes place. The fear of contamin-
ation would remain with us; comparative law would need to acquire a
more subversive character (Muir Watt, 2000).

6 COMPARATIVE LAW AS COMPARISON

What is to be done? It may be possible to re-state the aims of compara-

tive law in a more subversive, and effective, manner by returning to the
original idea of comparison. The word comes to us, appropriately enough,
as a combination of other words. ‘Com’ is the archaic form of the Latin
‘cum’ or ‘with’. ‘Par’ is the Latin for ‘equal’, giving us in different lan-
guages ‘peer’, ‘pair’, ‘paire’, ‘Paar’, ‘par’ and so on. So the Oxford English
Dictionary gives us, prior to all of the contemporary meanings of the word
‘compare’, a ‘literal’ meaning which is to pair or bring together, and the
bringing together must be taken to be of those things which are taken as
equals. Equality would here not imply similarity or close correspondence
(Merryman and Clark, 1978, 27, on comparison implying difference;
Legrand, 1999, 36, on justification of difference) but simply equal treat-
ment or standing in the process of bringing together. There is thus an
English word ‘compear’ which means to appear or come together in a

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 71 30/08/2012 12:08

 72 Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law, second edition

court of law, for purposes of peaceful resolution of a particular dispute,

and without prejudice to ongoing difference. This ‘literal’ meaning of the
word is remarkable, in contrast to present understanding of comparative
law, in having no limitation in time or underlying, instrumental purpose.
One brings together, and if there are tendencies to drift apart, one contin-
ues to bring together. The process of comparison would thus in no way
imply resulting uniformity. Indeed if anything it implies the reverse, that
differences remain which must be somehow brought together, such that
coexistence of difference is possible. This is subversive. It implies rejection
of a millennium of teaching of Western law as a ius unum, whether the ius
unum is the ius commune or the law of the state. It implies a discipline of
conciliation of laws as opposed to one of the conflict of laws. It implies
legal theory which is cognizant of the realities of life and legal practice
in the world. For comparative law it would imply a new emphasis on the
importance of comparative legal reasoning in the world, and less emphasis
on the autonomy of the discipline itself.
The aim of com-paring would be without prejudice to some of the
existing aims of comparative law. Comparative law could continue to
be an aid in simply understanding one’s own law. Domestic law is also
always in need of improvement, and comparative law can be useful in
this constructive process. These objectives would be situated, however,
in a broader context or cadre which is that of the ongoing relations of
interdependent laws in an interdependent world. The contemporary
world is no longer one of the construction of national laws, but rather of
their necessary collaboration. There are more and more demonstrations
of the viability of transnational law (Glenn, 2003) and more and more
indications of the willingness of judges to resort to a broader range of
sources of law (Abrahamson and Fischer, 1997; L’Heureux-Dubé, 1998;
Drobnig and van Erp, 1998; Canivet, Andenas and Fairgrieve, 2004).
Governments are finding ways of collaborating at effective levels of
management and no longer simply through formal diplomatic channels
(Slaughter, 2004). Legal education may be (slowly) overcoming its hege-
monic biases. The notion of global government has given way to that
of global governance. Lawyers have acquired an historically unknown
mobility, as has the legal information which they rely upon and produce.
In all of this, comparative legal reasoning is essential and comparative
lawyers have an important, though far from exclusive, place. The aims of
comparative law thus would come to parallel those of law itself. Perhaps
more accurately, it could be said that law would be recognized as an
inherently comparative process, as opposed to a single, universal corpus
of rules.

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 72 30/08/2012 12:08

 The aims of comparative law 73

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahamson, Shirley S. and Michael J. Fischer (1997), ‘All the World’s a Courtroom:
Judging in the New Millennium’, Hofstra Law Review, 26, 273–92.
Ancel, Marc (1971), Utilité et méthodes du droit comparé, Neuchâtel: Editions Ides et
Calendes.
Canivet, Guy, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (2004), Comparative Law before the
Courts, London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law.
Coing, Helmut (1978), ‘Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlage von Gesetzgebung im 19.
Jahrhundert’, Ius Commune, 7, 168–78.
Collins, Hugh (1991), ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’, Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, 11, 396–406.
Constantinesco, Léontin-Jean (1972, 1974, 1983), Traité de droit comparé, vols 1–3, Paris:
LGDJ.
David, René (1973), ‘Méthode et buts de la recherche comparative en matière de droit’, in
M. Rotondi, Inchieste di diritto comparato, Milan and New York: Cedam and Oceana
Publications, pp. 87–102.
David, René and John E. C. Brierley (1985), Major Legal Systems in the World Today,
London: Stevens & Sons.
Drobnig, U. and S. van Erp (1998), The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, The Hague,
London and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
Ewald, William (1995), ‘Comparative Jurisprudence: What Was it Like to Try a Rat?’,
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 143, 1889–2149.
Glendon, Mary Ann, Paolo G. Carozza and Colin B. Picker (2006), Comparative Legal
Traditions, St. Paul, MN: West Group.
Glenn, H. Patrick (1999), ‘Vers un droit comparé intégré’, Revue internationale de droit
comparé, 1999, 841–52.
Glenn, H. Patrick (2001), ‘Comparative Law and Legal Practice: On Removing the Borders’,
Tulane Law Review, 75, 977–1002.
Glenn, H. Patrick (2003), ‘A Transnational Concept of Law’, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 839–62.
Glenn, H. Patrick (2005), On Common Laws, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glenn, H. Patrick (2006), ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions’,
in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 421–40.
Glenn, H. Patrick (2010), Legal Traditions of the World, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Grossfeld, Bernhard (1990), The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Gutteridge, H. C. (1949), Comparative Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hyland, Richard (1996), ‘Comparative Law’, in R. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 184–99.
Jamin, Christophe (2000), ‘Le vieux rêve de Saleilles et Lambert revisité: À propos du
Congres international de droit comparé de Paris’, Revue internationale de droit comparé,
2000, 733–51.
Kahn-Freund, Otto (1974), ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’, Modern Law
Review 37, 1–27.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998),
‘Law and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–55.
Legrand, Pierre (1999), Le droit comparé, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Lepaulle, Pierre (1921–2), ‘The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological
Jurisprudence’, Harvard Law Review, 35, 838–58.
L’Heureux-Dubé, Claire (1998), ‘The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court’, Tulsa Law Journal, 34, 15–40.

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 73 30/08/2012 12:08

 74 Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law, second edition

Markesinis, Basil (2003), Comparative Law in the Courtroom and Classroom: The Story of the
Last Thirty-five Years, Oxford: Hart.
Mattei, Ugo (1997), Comparative Law and Economics, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of
Michigan Press.
Mattei, Ugo, Teemu Ruskola and Antonio Gidi (2009), Schlesinger’s Comparative Law, 7th
edn, New York: Foundation Press.
Merryman, John Henry and David S. Clark (1978), Comparative Law: Western European and
Latin American Legal Systems, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Muir Watt, Horatia (2000), ‘La fonction subversive du droit comparé’, Revue internationale
de droit comparé, 52 (3), 503–27.
Örücü, Esin (2004), The Enigma of Comparative Law, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
Örücü, Esin and D. Nelken (eds) (2007), Comparative Law: A Handbook, Oxford: Hart.
Pound, Roscoe (1936), ‘What May We Expect from Comparative Law?’, American Bar
Association Journal, 22, 56–60.
Rabel, Ernst (1967), ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung’, in H. Leser
(ed.), Ernst Rabel: Gesammelte Aufsätze, vol. III, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),
pp. 1–21.
Reimann, M. (1996), ‘The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject’, Tulane
European and Civil Law Forum, 11, 49–72.
Reimann, Mathias (2001), ‘Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the
International Age’, Tulane Law Review, 75, 1103–19.
Rheinstein, Max (1967), ‘Comparative Law – Its Functions, Methods and Uses’, in
M. Rotondi (ed.), Inchieste di diritto comparato, Milan and New York: Cedam and Oceana
Publications, pp. 545–56.
Rodière, René (1979), Introduction au droit comparé, Paris: Dalloz.
Sacco, Rodolfo (1991), ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’,
American Journal of Comparative Law, 39, 1–34, 343–401.
Schlesinger, Rudolf B., Hans W. Baade, Peter E. Herzog and Edward M. Wise (1998),
Comparative Law, 6th edn, New York: Foundation Press.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2004), A New World Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Thunis, X. (2004), ‘L’empire de la comparaison’, in F. R. van der Mensbrugghe (ed.),
L’utilisation de la méthode comparative en droit européen, Namur: Presses universitaires de
Namur, pp. 5–15.
Tushnet, Mark (1999), ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’, Yale Law
Journal, 108, 1225–309.
van der Mensbrugghe, François (ed.) (2003), L’utilisation de la méthode comparative en droit
européen, Namur, Belgium: Presses universitaires de Namur.
Vanderlinden, Jacques (1995), Comparer les droits, Diegem, Belgium: Kluwer/Story-Scientia.
Watson, Alan (1976), ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’, Law Quarterly Review, 92,
79–84.
Zweigert, Konrad and Hein Kötz (1998), Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn, trans.
Tony Weir, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

H. Patrick Glenn - 9781781006108

Downloaded from https://www.elgaronline.com/ at 10/29/2023 06:01:14AM
via O P Jindal Global University (JGU)

SMITS ENCY V2 9781849804158 PRINT .indd 74 30/08/2012 12:08