AVIATION

PSYCHOLOGY
BPSY541B
Dr Kritika Rastogi
Unit I: Introduction

▪ Meaning and scope of aviation psychology

▪ Role of an aviation psychologists
▪ Current issues and relevance
▪ Crew resource management: Communication, Workload Management, Decision-
making, Conflict Resolution, Leadership, Team Management, Stress Management
▪ Models on human factor; Professional bodies and safety enforcing agencies.
Meaning and Scope of Aviation Psychology

➢ Let’s Revisit the scope of Psychology

➢ Let’s Revisit the scope of I/O Psychology

Aviation Psychology
Aviation Psychology

▪ Aviation psychology involves the study of human's behaviors, actions, cognitive and
emotional processes in the aviation field and also investigates the psychological
problems encountered in the flight deck (Aviation Coaching - Kallus, Hoffmann et al.,
2004).

▪ Aviation psychology specifically focuses on pilots, flight crews and air traffic controllers
and the study of aviation psychology results in increase in work efficiency and safety by
promoting smooth operation and interaction between employees.

▪ It ensures that there is a balance between automation and employees in the aviation
field; and also maintains the emotional and physical health of the employees.

▪ A specialty in applied psychology that focuses on understanding human behavior,

emotions, and mental states as they relate to the operation and control of aviation
systems and influence the safety and efficiency of flight (APA Dictionary).
▪ Aviation psychology originated in relation with the development of aviation medicine
and work psychology.

▪ It gradually evolved into an independent subject as mental processes during flight

are highly specific and require in dept research and understanding.

▪ The development of aviation psychology started in the USSR (The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics) in 1921 with S.E. Mints, N.M. Dobrotvorskii and K.K. Platonor.
The current development in this subject mainly involves the
following examples:

▪ In dept research in engineering psychology.

▪ Study of in flight environment that influences the mental processes of the flight crew
and hence developing solutions to counter or minimize these influences.

▪ Recommending improvements that can be made in training procedures, keeping

them up to date and effective.

▪ Determining the qualification standards of pilots, ensuring that pilots meet the
minimum criteria to be able to fly.
Scope of Aviation Psychology

▪ https://youtu.be/MHKezg5wlFo
Role of Aviation Psychologist
Aviation psychologists assume responsibilities that are similar to the
international ethical standards of regular psychologists. These
responsibilities cover areas such as the following :

▪ Reduction of safety risks that protect employees from harm

▪ Selection, training and licensing of potential employees

▪ Optimization of working conditions and system development in the aviation

environment
Aviation psychologists assume responsibilities that are similar to the
international ethical standards of regular psychologists. These
responsibilities cover areas such as the following :

▪ Accident and incident investigation

▪ Crisis interventions and clinical psychological interventions

▪ Capacity and workload management that maximizing efficiency and effectiveness

▪ Quality of team work and team resources, maintaining the standard of work
delivered
What Aviation Psychologists do?

▪ Provide counselling to pilots and flight crew

Psychologist may help prepare members of staff for potential threats and teach them
how to deal with high-stress situations.

After times of crisis, such as an aviation crash or a terror threat, a psychologist may
offer emergency counselling to pilots and airline crew, as well as to passengers who
experienced any type of traumatic event.

Mental health support can also be offered to the family members of those who might
have died during a flight.
▪ Research and investigation work – Aviation psychologist may assist in the
investigation process after an unexpected event, helping authorities to understand
the behavior of pilots, flight crew and any threat that was on board prior to the
event. They may also conduct studies related to aviation safety and report it back
to airline companies.

▪ Design Training Programmes – An aviation psychologist can help in the design and
planning of training programmes for airlines to improve the performance of their
staff.
▪ Work with Engineers – Sometimes AP will work alongside engineers when designing
the cabin and cockpit. They would ensure that all the features and mechanisms are
user-friendly and safe for passengers and crew to use.

▪ Mental Health and Wellness Services – A psychologist may provide guidance and
coaching to staff members to improve their performance, to help deal with jet-lag
and to maintain their general well-being.

▪ Administration or Policy-Making Positions - Sometimes, Psychologist can work with

government agencies or airline companies ensuring that employers are complying
with health and safety regulations. Research work can also be conducted to improve
laws and safety within the field.
Aviation Psychology Officer Captain Sam James

▪ https://youtu.be/mEvD2jf7ank
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(CRM)
Introduction

▪ Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) is the effective use of all available

resources for flight crew personnel to assure a safe and efficient operation, reducing
error, avoiding stress and increasing efficiency.
▪ CRM is a set of training procedures for use in environment where human error can
have devastating effects. Used primarily for improving air safety.
▪ CRM focuses on effective interpersonal communication, leadership and decision
making in the cockpit.

Cabin Flight
Crew Tech-Crew
▪ CRM was developed as a response to new insights into the causes of aircraft
accidents which followed from the introduction of flight data recorders (FDRs) and
cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) into modern jet aircraft.

▪ Under experimental conditions, data was collected on basic of that additional skill
sets were identified for crew and need of training was introduced collectively called
as CRM.

▪ CRM can be defined as a management system which makes optimum use of all
available resources - equipment, procedures and people - to promote safety and
enhance the efficiency of flight operations.
Goals of CRM

Knowledge

Skills

Attitude
Cause of Aircraft Accidents

Cause of Air Craft Accidents

Weather

Equipmen
t

Maintena
nce

ATC etc

Air- Crew Error Other Technical Reasons

Data Analysed from 1959-90
CRM: History and Importance

▪ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tpx3e1kCMCA

Q1. What is your definition of CRM? Write it in your own words with citation (example
Rastogi, 22)
Q2. What you understand by layers of SHEL?
Q3. Significance of H-FACS.
Activity

▪ Identify the human error by analysing the air accidents and crashes in groups/pairs
and present your point

https://youtu.be/doYtsh994kk
Evolution of CRM

▪ CRM corresponds to a revolution in accident causation models

Evaluation of CRM Program

First Generation

Second Generation

Third Generation

Fourth Generation
First Generation

▪ First generation aimed at individual attitudes, leadership, and communication.

▪ The objective was to prevent accidents owing to flawed flight-crew team performance.

▪ The safety paradigm was that safety was a function of flight-crew performance
exclusively, and that there were individuals with either the “right” or the “wrong stuff.”

▪ The resistance to initial CRM training by segments of the pilot community (Helmreich,
1992) led to a revision of the original approach, thus, giving birth to the second
generation of CRM training. In an attempt to overcome resistance, this second
generation essentially distanced itself from the notion of the “right/wrong stuff.”
Second Generation

▪ Second generation aimed at individual attitudes, leadership, and communication, but

expanded to include situation awareness, the error chain, stress management, and
decision making.

▪ Like the first, the second generation of CRM training aimed at preventing accidents
through improved crew performance, and its underlying safety paradigm was that
safety was a consequence of improved crew synergy.
▪ Both first and second generation of CRM training relied intensively on role-playing
and nonaviation related games, and they resorted to repetitive accident case
studies.
▪ A distinct characteristic of first and second generation of CRM training programs was
that they appeared to consciously and purposefully introduce and maintain a clear
separation between technical and CRM training.
▪ The introduction of “glass cockpits” led to the development of a third generation of
CRM training, with a broadened human-factors knowledge base, and with particular
attention to the cognitive dimensions of small teams acting in dynamic
environments as well to the importance of shared mental models (Orasanu, 1993).
▪ The third generation of CRM programs also revisited human–machine interface
issues, in the relationship between pilots and computers. It was during this third
generation that Cockpit Resource Management became CRM.
Third Generation

▪ Third generation aimed at improving the overall system performance through improved
performance of the system’s basic flight operational units (aircraft /crew system; flight/cabin crew
system).

▪ It added the concepts of mental models, stress and fatigue management, automation
management, vigilance, and human reliability to the basic issues included in the two first
generations of CRM programs.

▪ It further included discussions intended to develop not only skills, but also understanding and
knowledge.

▪ It places emphasis on team building and in the integration of CRM with technical performance. This
generation includes the first attempts to assess CRM training; therefore, to allow such assessment,
special training is designed for check airmen and instructors. Lastly, the training transcends
beyond the cockpit door to include flight attendants, maintenance personnel, dispatchers, and air-
traffic controllers
▪ Change in its underlying safety paradigm: safety was now considered to be a
proactive rather than reactive endeavor.

▪ gradual shift from nonaviation games and role-playing toward the realities of
aviation, such as the justification of operational doctrines.
Fourth Generation

▪ Fourth generation aims at improving the overall system performance through improved
performance of as many system’s components as possible.

▪ It includes topics, such as interaction among teams, shared mental models, role and
status, and organizational synergy.

▪ Addresses specialized curriculum topics, including automation and fatigue, joint training
between flight and cabin crew, crew-performance training directly derived from the
incident data and, very importantly, includes an added focus on cultural issues,
including national and organizational culture, and the particular issues of multinational
crews.

▪ The safety paradigm corresponds to the shift in the safety thinking observed since the
beginning of the 1990s: safety is one positive outcome of the system’s health.
 Summary
▪ First generation: Derived from classical management development; focused on management
styles and interpersonal skills; aimed at fixing the “wrong stuff .”

▪ Second generation: Focused on concepts (situational awareness, stress management) and

modular in conception (error chain, decision-making models).

▪ Third generation: Observes a systems approach, with a focus on specific skills and behaviors.

▪ Fourth generation: Addresses specialized curriculum topics, including automation and fatigue,
joint training between flight and cabin crew, crew-performance training directly derived from the
incident data and, very importantly, includes an added focus on cultural issues, including national
and organizational culture, and the particular issues of multinational crews.
Input Factors Group Process Crew Performance
Group Process Factors
CRM Based Flight Performance Model
Threat and Error Management (TEM) in CRM

The research indicated that error minimization by sound training, etc. was important,
the need for a major paradigm shift was required in the fact that, irrespective of the
training or the zeal of the pilot, if human beings were involved, errors would occur.

Once this is accepted (and it still meets with resistance from some traditional aviation
trainers), the next step is logical.

That is, if error is inevitable, then we can develop strategies only by studying the
nature of the error in the operational contexts, to best identify and manage these
errors to prevent them from becoming consequential.

Accidents are not caused by error alone, but by mismanaged error.

▪ The operational context in which pilots fly is complex and continuously variable.
Planning plays a very important role, but owing to the real-time nature of changing
conditions during flight, flexibility and the ability to almost continuously review and
modify plans are also essential skills.

▪ Issues that individually make up this operational context are labeled as threats. They
can be overt or latent.

1. Overt threats are those that are observable or tangible to the crew. Examples
include poor weather, aircraft malfunctions, terrain, etc. Overt threats are certain
in aviation and little can be done at the crew level to completely avoid them.
2. Latent threats are often not readily observable at a crew level, but are concealed
within the fabric of the particular operation or the aviation system.
▪ Examples of latent threats include ATC practices, industrial issues, poor procedures,
and/or manuals and operational pressure owing to conflicting goals between
commercial and safety objectives.
Type of Errors

TEM model lists error under four areas. These are:

1. Intentional noncompliance. These are intentional deviations from regulations

and/or operators’ procedures.

2. Procedural. This is where the intention is correct, but the execution is flawed. They
also include errors where the crew simply forgot to do something that was intended—
the so-called slips and lapses.
3. Communication Error- This includes missing, misinterpreting, or failing to
communicate pertinent information. It can be between crewmembers or between the
crew and external agencies (e.g., ATC, maintenance personnel, etc.).

4. Operational Decision Error- These are decision-making errors in areas which are
not standardized by regulations or operator procedures and compromise safety. To be
categorized as a decision error in the TEM framework, at least one of three conditions
must exist.
First, the crew must have had other more conservative options available and decided
not to take them. The second condition is that the decision was not discussed
between the crew members. Third is that the crew had time available but did not use it
to evaluate the decision.
RR Model
Individualistic and Collectivist Culture

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

Cultural preferences on Communication Styles, Leadership,
Coordination, Conflict Resolution

▪ Helmreich and Merritt (1998) summed up the implications of these cultural

preferences on communication styles, leadership, coordination, conflict resolution,
and role expectations as follows:
▪ People in individualist cultures consider the implications of their behaviors within
narrowly defined areas of personal costs and benefits; while those in collectivist
cultures consider the implications of their behavior in a context that extends beyond
their immediate family.
▪ Communication in individualist cultures is direct, succinct, personal, and
instrumental; communication in collectivist cultures is indirect, elaborate, contextual,
and affective.
▪ Differences in communication styles affect the feedback and monitoring: people in
individualist cultures provide precise, immediate, and verbal feedback; feedback in
collectivist cultures tends to be vague, delayed, nonpersonal, and nonverbal.
People in individualist cultures place more
emphasis on resolving conflicts than being
agreeable; in collectivist cultures, it is more
important to be agreeable than to be right.

Further implications in conflict resolution arise

from the fact that while collectivist cultures
address the broad context and avoid focus on
specific detail, individualist cultures
concentrate on the key issues and play down
the broad context.

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

• Conflict resolution in collectivist cultures
follows strategies based on compromise,
avoidance, collaboration and, lastly,
competition. The order is almost reversed in
individualist cultures: collaboration,
competition, compromise, and lastly,
avoidance.

• In collectivist cultures, the superiors have

considerable authority and discretion. In
individualist cultures, the leaders are bound by
rules that have been previously negotiated in
detail by all involved. While leaders in
individualist cultures “hold office” and are
therefore accountable, superiors in collectivist
cultures “hold the power” and are not
questioned.
Communication Patterns

Individualistic Culture Collectivist Culture

Values of freedom and Independent Group Harmony and Consensus

Individual as an autonomous entity Individuals as interdependent entities

Competitiveness Cooperativeness

Egalitarianism Hierarchism

self-reliance self-denial
Class Activity- Identify the source of Communication Barriers

▪ Conveying the Information

▪ Monitoring and Feedback of Team Members

▪ Vigilance

▪ Team Building and Group Dynamics

Barriers in Effective Communication

▪ Lack of Common Experience

▪ Confusion Between the Symbol and the Symbolized Object

▪ Overuse of Abstractions

▪ External Factors

▪ Interference
Skills to Enhance Effective Communication

▪ Role Playing

▪ Instructional Communication

▪ Listening

▪ Questioning

▪ Instructional Enhancement
Human Performance Model

Interventions can be logically only of two types:

1. changing the operators to better fit the system

2. changing the system to better fit the operators

One of the more widely used models of human performance is the SHEL model,
originated by Edwards (1988) and later modified by Hawkins (1993). The SHEL model
consists of the following elements:
S—software: procedures, manuals, checklists, and literal software

H—hardware: the physical system (aircraft, ship, operating suite) and its components

E—environment: the situation in which the other elements (L, H, and S) operate,
including working conditions, weather, organizational structure, and climate

L—liveware: the people (pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, etc.).

SHEL Model of Human Performance
▪ The SHELL model adopts a systems perspective that suggests the human is rarely, if
ever, the sole cause of an accident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).

▪ The systems perspective considers a variety of contextual and task-related factors

that interact with the human operator within the aviation system and how the
interactions affect operator performance (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).

▪ As a result, the SHELL model considers both active and latent failures in the aviation
system.
Various Interfaces in SHEL

1. Liveware-Software (L-S)

▪ During training, flight crew members utilize the software (e.g. procedural knowledge) associated with
normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

▪ Limits subjective interpretation and enhance crew coordination

The designer and Trainers must consider:

▪ Currency and accuracy of information

▪ User-friendliness of format and vocabulary
▪ Clarity of information
▪ Subdivision and indexing to facilitate user retrieval of information
▪ Presentation of numerical data
▪ Use of abbreviations
▪ Symbolic codes and other language devices
▪ Presentation of instructions using diagrams and/or sentences etc.
Divergences of the L-S interface can occur through the
following (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993):

▪ Insufficient or inappropriate procedures

▪ Misinterpretation of confusing or ambiguous symbology and checklists

▪ Confusing, misleading or cluttered documents, maps or charts

▪ Irrational indexing of an operations manual

2. Liveware-Hardware (L-H)

▪ The L-H component consists of the interactions between the human operator and
the machine, better known as the Human-machine Interface or HMI.
Areas of L-H Interface
• PAX and crew seats to fit the sitting characteristics of the human body

• Cockpit displays, switches and controls

• Match the sensory, informational processing, tactile, and movement characteristics of human users

• Facilitating the action sequencing

• Minimizing workload

• Safeguards for incorrect or inadvertent operation

Discrepancies at the L-H interface may occur through (Cacciabue,
2004):

▪ Poorly designed equipment

▪ Inappropriate or missing operational material
▪ Badly located or coded instruments and control devices
▪ Warning systems that fail in alerting, and providing correct informational or guidance
functions in abnormal situations etc.
3. Liveware-Environment (L-E)

▪ Engineering systems to protect crews and passengers from discomfort, damage,

stress and distraction caused by the physical environment
▪ Air conditioning systems to control aircraft cabin temperature
▪ Sound-proofing to reduce noise
▪ Pressurization systems to control cabin air pressure
▪ Protective systems to combat ozone concentrations
▪ Using window shades to prevent circadian disruptions
▪ Expanding infrastructure, passenger terminals and airport facilities to accommodate
more people due to larger jets (e.g. Airbus A380) and the growth in air transport
Divergences at the L-E interface include

▪ Reduced performance and errors resulting from disturbed biological rhythms (jet lag)
as a result of long-range flying and irregular work-sleep patterns

▪ Pilot perceptual errors induced by environmental conditions such as visual illusions

during aircraft approach/landing at nighttime

▪ Flawed operator performance and errors as a result of management failure

4. Liveware-Liveware (L-L)

▪ Human-human group interactions can positively or negatively influence behavior and

performance including the development and implementation of behavioral norms.
Therefore, the L-L interface is largely concerned with (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993;
Johnston et al, 2001):
• Interpersonal relations

• Leadership

• Crew cooperation, coordination and communication

• Dynamics of social interactions

• Teamwork

• Cultural interactions

• Personality and attitude interactions

The L-L interface and the issues involved have contributed to the development of
cockpit/crew resource management (CRM) programs in an attempt to reduce error at
the interface between aviation professionals.
Examples of mismatches at the L-L interface include (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993):
▪ Communication errors due to misleading, ambiguous, inappropriate or poorly
constructed communication between individuals

▪ Reduced performance and error from an imbalanced authority relationship between

aircraft captain and first officer

▪ Poor structure of shared authority, i.e., who is responsible for specific actions and
when those actions will be performed
Development of Expertise

One model from the general literature on expertise development specifies five
developmental levels—from novice to expert—that reflect an increasing capacity to
internalize, abstract, and apply rules (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986):
1. A novice learns basic facts, terminology, and rules and how they are applied in well-
defined circumstances.
2. An advanced beginner begins to develop a feel for rules through repeated practical
application. The student begins to understand the use of concepts and rules in
situations that are similar to those in prior examples.
3. Competence means a deep-enough understanding of the rules to know when they are
applicable and how to apply them in novel situations.
4. Proficiency indicates a refined and internalized sense of the rules.
5. An expert produces increasingly abstract representations and is able to map novel
situations to the internalized representations.
It is cited by the Global Accident Information Network (GAIN 2001) in its chapter on
human factors to illustrate the continuous interaction among the elements.

It is also referenced in the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA 2002) publication on

human factors in aircraft maintenance.

The SHEL model has also been used extensively outside aviation, particularly in the
field of medicine (cf. Bradshaw 2003; Molloy and O’Boyle 2005).
According to Fitts (1954; Fitts and Posner 1967), there are three phases to skill
acquisition:
▪ The cognitive phase is characterized by slow, declarative learning of primarily verbal
information.

▪ The associative phase is characterized by the detection and elimination of errors in

performance and the strengthening of connections.

▪ The autonomous phase is characterized by automated and rapid performance,

requiring less deliberate attention and fewer resources.
Workload Management

▪ Workload might simply be defined as the demand placed on the human

operator.

▪ Workload is the demand placed on an operator’s mental resources used for

attention, perception, reasonable decision-making and action.

▪ Workload can also be defined as the ratio of the resources required by the
task to the amount of available resources.
▪ A psychophysiological approach (called “psychophysiological engineering”) to
the evaluation of human-machine interaction has been developed with a
particular emphasis on the mental workload of pilots (Cabon and Mollard,
2002).

▪ Workload is an individual experience, and workload measurement methods must

take into account human variability.
Relationship between workload and performance (de
Waard,1996)
Theoretical workload performance plot as a function of time
(Andre, 2001)
Behavioural Marker for workload distribution/situational
awareness

▪ Avoids “tunnel vision”, being aware of factors such as stress that can reduce vigilance
● Actively monitors weather, aircraft systems, instruments, and ATC, sharing relevant information

● Stays “ahead of curve” in preparing for expected or contingency situations

● Verbally insures that cockpit and cabin crew are aware of plans

● Workload distribution is clearly communicated and acknowledged

● Ensures that secondary operational tasks are prioritized

● Recognizes and reports work overloads in self and others

● Plans for sufficient time prior to maneuvers for programming of automation

● Ensures that all crewmembers are aware of status and changes in automation

● Recognizes potential distractions caused by automation and takes appropriate preventive action
The Decision-Making Component of Accidents

▪ That study sparked a great deal of interest in how pilots make decisions that put
them at risk of being in an accident, and how decision making might be improved.

▪ One of the first outcomes from this focus on decision making was a report by Berlin
et al. (1982a) in which they described a training program aimed specifically at
addressing the decision-making shortcomings identified in the Jensen and Benel
study.
Working at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University under the sponsorship of the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Berlin et al. (1982a) developed a training
program and student manual that included the following:

Three Subject Areas

Six Action Ways

Poor Judgment Behavior Chain

Three Mental Processes of Safe Flight

Five Hazardous Thought Patterns

Three Subject Area

▪ pilot—the pilot’s state of health, competency in a given situation, level of fatigue,

and other factors affecting performance

▪ aircraft—considerations of airworthiness, power plant, and performance criteria such

as weight and balance

▪ environment—weather, airfield altitude and temperature, • and outside inputs such

as weather briefings or ATC instructions
Six Action Ways
Stress and Stress Management in Aviation Industry

▪ We are continually bombarded with influences, expectations, and demands placed

on us by our surroundings. Work commitments or the lack of time and resources to
complete tasks are typical examples. Both paid work and unpaid work (e.g., caring
for family members) are applicable factors in this regard.

▪ To meet social demands or solve work-related tasks, the individual relies on different
sets of resources, including knowledge, experience, and personal attributes.

▪ Due to this cognitive evaluation, what one individual considers a stressor is not
necessarily considered a stressor by someone else (noted in, for example, Lazarus
and Folkman 1984). Balance between external demands and personal attributes is
perceived as challenging and satisfying to the individual (Frankenhaeuser 1991),
whereas imbalance is a precursor to emotional, physical, and behavioral
consequences.
▪ Frankenhaeuser’s (1991) bio-psychosocial model (depicted in Figure 6.1) delineates
the relationship between stress and health. In this model, the person is subjected to
various demands, such as intense workloads, time constraints, shift work, problems,
or conflicts.
Outcome of Stress

According to a review provided by Orasanu (1997), stress may have the following
effects:

▪ People make more errors.

▪ Attention is reduced, causing tunnel vision or selective hearing.
▪ Scanning (vision) becomes more chaotic.
▪ Short-term memory is reduced.
▪ Change of strategy: speed gains preference to accuracy. People act as thoug time
limits apply. Strategies are simplified.
▪ cognitive functions are subject to a number of stress-related consequences in terms
of how we perceive our surroundings, process information, and make decisions.

▪ An important aspect regarding aviation is the need to take in and monitor

information constantly. In a high-stress situation, the capacity to do so diminishes,
reducing the ability to understand what is being said over the radio or what another
person says. Similarly, the information that is supplied to someone stressed may be
poorly understood or not understood at all.
Work Stress leads to:

Cognitive Mal- Burnouts Job Engagement Conflicts

Functioning and Satisfaction
The job demands–resources model for burnout and
engagement
LEADERSHIP

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA-NC

▪ Characteristics of a Good Leader

▪ Two dimensions were identified as characteristic of effective leaders: that they were
considerate and that they took initiative in generating structure. Other research
groups have identified similar dimensions, but with different denotations, such as
“relation-oriented leadership” and “task-oriented leadership.”
Transactional Leadership

▪ In transactional leadership, the exchange of rewards for results and completion of

tasks is emphasized.

▪ Alternatively, the employees are allowed to do their jobs as long as production

targets are achieved; that is, error correction is considered sufficient.

▪ This may involve a passive, apprehensive style (the manager /leader avoids action
until something goes wrong) or an active style (the manager reacts to errors made
by employees).
Transformational Leadership

▪ In transformational leadership, emphasis is not only on transactions between

employees and management (work for payment and other benefits), but also on the
leader’s ability to inspire, motivate, and devise original ideas.

▪ The person must be charismatic, set a good example, and be able to communicate
his or her vision, thus elevating employees toward the organization’s common goal.

▪ This leadership type is also described according to its impact on employees.

Transformational leadership is associated with increased work satisfaction and
motivates employees to perform better.
▪ These two leadership styles are not mutually exclusive rather they complement each
other.
▪ A manager–employee relationship often starts as a transactional relation— that is, a
process of clarifying the expectations that both sides have. However,
transformational leadership is necessary if employees are to be motivated to put in
additional effort (Bass 2007).
▪ Transformational leaders motivate employees to work not only for immediate
rewards in self-interest, but also for the benefit of the group, the company, or,
indeed, the country.
▪ Work becomes an activity greater than something done just to get paid, and this
recognition contributes to an increase in employees’ self-esteem and devotion to
their tasks
▪ Gender issues and leadership have been subject to plenty of discussion.

▪ A model for the relationship among safety elements was developed by Barling,
Loughlin, and Kelloway (2002). In this model, transformational leadership affects the
security climate, which, in turn, affects the occurrence of accidents. The model also
contained the important notion of safety awareness.

▪ Others have researched corresponding models for different sectors—for example,

factory workers in Israel, where safety climate was found to be a mediating variable
between leadership styles and the number of accidents (Zohar 2002)
▪ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fpo2w0haspM
The Seven Points of Crew Resource Management
▪ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwTwKdzFmIs
Beyond Crew Resource Management
▪ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WoFI3B-JPPU
Crew Resource Management in Action
▪ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKZ8r2NH0SM
CRM Threat & Error Management