Carlo Burelli, Davide Pala

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND ITS INJUSTICE.

AN (INEVITABLY SHORT) INTRODUCTION

In the last decades, the environmental conditions of our planet have dramat-
ically worsened. Consider that, for instance, due to the enormous increase of
human made CO2 emissions (by about 90% since 1970), the planet’s average
surface temperature has risen about 1.5 degrees Celsius since the 19th century,
with most of this warming occurring in the last 35 years. As many scientists
have noticed, this has hastened the melting of the glaciers and therefore brought
about a rise in the sea level; engendered droughts and created or quickened
processes of desertification; acidified the oceans; intensified the occurrences
of hurricanes; to mention but a few of the most relevant consequences. As a
result, the existence of many human beings, as well as non-human animals and
vegetable species has been seriously put at risk. In many cases, it has already
been destroyed1. This is worrying, clearly, and it becomes even more worrying
if one stresses that, in the lack of any significant reduction of CO2 emissions,
the temperature is expected to rise between 3.7 and 4.8 or 2.7 and 7.8 degrees
Celsius by the end of the century2.
Unfortunately, this is not the whole story when it comes to the deterioration
of the environment. As a matter of fact, it has been pointed out that, again
due to human action, forest areas, which are essential to provide oxygen to any
living being, have been significantly reduced, falling from 31.6% in 1960 to
30,7% of land areas in 20183 . From another perspective, moreover, it has been
estimated that, due to overfishing, over-harvesting, etc., we are losing species

1
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5
ºC, esp. ch. 3, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ (accessed: 21st May 2020).
2
Moellendorf 2015: 173.
3
https://data.worldbank.org/topic/environment (accessed: 6 May 2020).
Rivista di estetica, n.s., n. 75 (3/2020), LX, pp. 3-11 © Rosenberg & Sellier

Rde75_interni.indb 3 25/11/20 16:39

 at 100 to 1000 times the background rate, i.e., about one to five species per
year, with a precipitous decline of biodiversity4.
Now, there is no agreement on when the so-called Anthropocene started:
around 1.8 million years ago, when humans started controlling fire; around
10 000 years ago, with the beginning of agriculture; or rather more recently,
that is, in 1492 or in 1610. Nor is it clear whether the Anthropocene can be
considered a geological era proper5. However, what is sure is that there is an
environmental crisis and that such a crisis is going through an unprecedented
acceleration, becoming among one of the central issues of political agendas and
of public concern6.
Most people intuitively believe that the state of affairs just outlined is
undesirable. Nonetheless, it is far from obvious why it is particularly unjust.
Furthermore, remedying the environmental crisis is costly, sometimes severely
so. Thus, we need an account of who, precisely, ought to pay such costs, as well
as to what extent. For example, many think that the burden to tackle the en-
vironmental crisis should not fall on developing societies because they have a
right to develop. In this sense, their population’s right to live a minimally decent
life would trump their obligation to preserve the environment. Similarly, it is
not clear to what degree current people’s well-being should be traded off for
future people’s well-being. While tomorrow’s uncertainty does require some
rationally discounting of its value, it seems wrong to leave future generations
in worse conditions than the one we had – or so some argue, as we will show.
To address these normative conflicts a philosophical refection and, more specifi-
cally, a justice-based perspective, is needed. In particular, we need to dissect the
problem at stake, analyse the normative conflicts it raises, and provide reasons
to specific actors to do something about it. In the last years, the philosophical
literature has indeed started to investigate such questions. Our aim is to provide
a very general introduction to the most relevant directions undertaken by the
current debate, thus equipping the reader with a conceptual map of the recent
state of the art. Needless to say, our remarks will just raise questions rather
than providing answers. In the following, we shall focus in particular on the
anthropocentrism-critique, the intergenerational justice approach, the governance
beyond borders perspective, and the debates surrounding climate change on the
one hand, and the loss of biodiversity on the other. For reasons of simplicity, we
will treat them separately even if they are clearly intertwined.

4
UN Report: Nature’s Dangerous Decline ‘Unprecedented’; Species Extinction Rates ‘Accel-
erating’, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-unprecedent-
ed-report/ (accessed: 21st May 2020).
5
Cf. Santana 2019.
6
Cf. McNeill 2014.

Rde75_interni.indb 4 25/11/20 16:39

 The Anthropocentrism-Critique First, some have claimed that despite the
phenomena that constitute what we have called the environmental crisis are
deeply different from one another, they all share one problematic feature. That
is, they all are the consequence of a mistaken but widespread anthropocentric
worldview, which conceives humans as separate from and superior to the rest of
nature. As a consequence, animals and natural resources can be employed by
human beings as they see fit and, as such, may well be dominated and exploited
by them7. This influential perspective can be traced back to the Judeo-Christian
Bible, where humans are created in the image of God and are allowed to «subdue»
Earth and to «have dominion» over other living creatures. However, critics of
anthropocentrism note that this is also a staple assumption of western culture
more generally, which can be found in the work of diverse scholars, such as,
for instance, Aristotle. Anthropocentric intellectuals generally attribute intrinsic
value to human life, but they assign only instrumental value to the natural world,
i.e., they deem it valuable only insofar as it can benefit humankind. According
to the objectors to anthropocentrism, we should instead acknowledge that non-
human animals do have a moral status which is comparable to that of humans,
or, if not comparable, worthy of respect nonetheless8. The environment, on
the other side, while not having a moral status, might well possess an intrinsic
rather the merely instrumental value – we should value it, in other terms, for
its own sake, rather than just as a means to pursue further goals. Otherwise,
in a hypothetical scenario in which every human disappeared, there would be
nothing wrong if the last human being destroyed the environment. And this is
highly counter-intuitive according to some9.
This view, we submit, has the undeniable merit to denounce the lack of
robust constraints on human capacity to exploit non-human animals and the
environment. For, first, non-human animals possess, quite uncontroversially,
a capacity for feeling pain which cannot be dismissed altogether. Second, the
environment is arguably much more than a commodity in the hands of humans
and as such it should be treated.
The other side of the coin, however, is that the anthropocentrism-critique
risks overlooking important human needs. For example, societies, especially if
poor, need to develop in order for them to be able to satisfy – at the least – the
basic needs of their population. Nonetheless, this development, even when sus-
tainable, will require a significant amount of exploitation of both non-human
animals and the environment10. In other words, burdened societies should be

7
On the domination of non-human animals and the environment see for ex. Krause 2019.
8
Cf. Garner 2002.
9
Routley R., Routley V. 1980.
10
Moellendorf 2011. Cf. Shue 1993.

Rde75_interni.indb 5 25/11/20 16:39

 granted a (limited) right to develop even at the cost of some environmental
damage. Granted this, the greatest challenge for the approach here in analysis is
to show that the countries’ right to develop is compatible with the recognition
of either the moral status of animals, notably when considered equal to that of
humans, or the intrinsic value of the environment.
Some have tried to reply to the critics of anthropocentrism by stressing that,
although anthropocentric views have often had, as a consequence, the domina-
tion of humans over nature, this is not by default. In other words, the fact that
animals, plants and the environment have value only in virtue of the benefits
they provide to human lives does not necessarily entail that individuals can do
with them whatever they please. As such, anthropocentrism is not by definition
inhospitable to environmental rights. The advantage of this intermediate posi-
tion is that it can avoid relying on the strong ontological commitments made
by non-anthropocentrists in attributing intrinsic value to nature11. As we shall
see below, an example of this intermediate position is provided by those authors
who believe that an obligation to preserve the environment stems from the need
of future human beings to live minimally decent lives.
Intergenerational Justice Other authors have approached the environmen-
tal crisis from the perspective of intergenerational justice. The core idea here is
that the overexploitation of the environment is wrong in that it does not leave
enough (sufficientarian basis) or equal opportunities and resources (egalitarian
basis) to the following generations. In other terms, contra the previous approach,
the main concern in this case is the well-being of humans, and of future hu-
mans in particular. This perspective, then, suggests to moderate our impact on
the environment by taking into account the interests of future generations so
that they have at least those resources necessary to enjoy a decent life or, more
demandingly, a life that is comparable to the one enjoyed by many individuals
of current developed countries12.
This approach, apparently, has the advantage of clearly introducing a tem-
poral dimension within the debates surrounding the environmental crisis.
Undeniably, indeed, future humans will suffer the most from it. And yet, the
intergenerational justice approach does not seem to capture what is distinctively
wrong with such a crisis. After all, one might ask whether the exploitation of
the environment would be fully justified had it not any significant impact on
future human beings. Crucially, moreover, it is far from clear what our specific
obligations toward future humans are, and what to do once this question is

11
Norton 1984.
For a good introduction to this debate see Grosseries 2001. For a republican approach on
12

the matter according to which present generations exercise an arbitrary – namely, unchecked
and uncontrolled – power over future generations see Nolt 2011. For a utilitarian view of the
matter: Stern 2007; Nordhaus 2014.

Rde75_interni.indb 6 25/11/20 16:39

 clarified. Do we owe them just «enough», as sufficientarians claim, or does every
generation have to enjoy an equal amount of goods, as egalitarians believe? And
what should we do to accomplish these aims, respectively? Does the egalitarian
goal meet any feasibility-requirement? Furthermore, most people believe that
it is rational to discount the future because it is uncertain. If I have to choose
between gaining 10 dollars now and 10 dollars tomorrow, I should prefer get-
ting them now because there is no telling what might happen tomorrow. If so,
it might be reasonable to apply a similar discounting to future generations,
given the uncertainty that they will actually exist. But how much is it right to
discount the future? Finally, the intergenerational justice debates is vulnerable
to what Parfit has famously called the non-identity problem13. That is, the idea
according to which, when dealing with future people, we are in a situation in
which the absence of allegedly harmful actions (e.g., we stop polluting) also
involves the inexistence of the allegedly harmed people (i.e., future genera-
tions harmed by pollution). Indeed, many of our actions «affect the temporal
sequence of our actions, including the moment of our sexual intercourse. As a
result, they will also affect the very identity of the people who will be born»14.
As such, despite many of our actions seem now at least intuitively harmful to
future generations, they should be considered harmless nonetheless: absent them,
in fact, future harmed individuals would simply not come into being. In short,
then, the intergenerational approach should explain how we can harm future
individuals in the first place. And this task can be a difficult one15.
Global Governance Another view worth mentioning is the global govern-
ance approach. The driving motivation behind it is that, whatever the specific
justice-based account we adopt to assess the environmental crisis, there is
certainly a need for common action in order to effectively address it. In more
detail, according to the global governance approach, states individually do not
simply have the capacity to effectively cope with problems and dynamics global
in nature – think of, notably, climate change. As such, they need to cooperate.
However, lacking any fully binding mechanism forcing states to cooperate at
the international as well as supranational level, this need for cooperation can
hardly be satisfied in the contemporary world. That is why global governance
scholars advocate the establishment of strong international institutions or even
a political cosmopolis as the only manner through which the environmental crisis
can be successfully tackled16.

13
Parfit 1987.
14
Grosseries 2001: 296.
15
An interesting solution to the non-identity problem has been discussed by Gardner 2015.
For the need for strong international institutions see for ex.: Held 1995; Caney 2006;
16

Habermas 2012. For the idea of a political cosmopolis: Cabrera 2004.

Rde75_interni.indb 7 25/11/20 16:39

 Now, this kind of literature is to be welcomed given the attention it attributes
to non-ideal concerns such as what to do in order to lead less than ideal agents to
cooperate vis-à-vis collective problems which overcome their individual capacity
to effectively address them. And we do in fact believe that binding international
institutions of some sort are necessary in order to solve most of the problems
raised by the environmental crisis. And yet, it precisely at the non-ideal level
that the global governance approach reveals its greatest weakness. For on this
view it ultimately remains unclear how self-interested and sovereign actors such
as states could be incentivised to build supranational and international institu-
tions meant to constrain their behaviour in a significant way. Nor is it clear
how much domination and even violence the establishment of these institutions
would bring about notwithstanding the recommendation to accomplish this in
a legitimate as well as gradual way17. In short, further considerations are needed
to support this approach.
Climate Change Other authors have adopted a narrower perspective and
focused on specific questions raised by the environmental crisis rather than ap-
proaching it as a whole. Importantly, many have addressed it through the lenses
of climate change given its apparent impact on the environment. Despite the
differences among the approaches, the core thought now is that climate change
exposes individuals to a variety of great risks which are bad in that they may
impact on individuals’ basic needs (e.g., the need to basic food, shelter, and
security) – and, according to some, on the related human rights as a result18.
These basic needs, as such, ground the duty on people to mitigate these risks if
possible, to put individuals in the condition to adapt when the risks are already
too high, and to compensate in case of failure19.
It is then a further complicated question how to establish by whom this set
of duties should be discharged. For some, the duty to mitigate climate change
and to reduce emissions should be divided among states on an equal per capita
basis20. However, such a division seems unfair insofar in that it does not really
treat people equally. As a matter of fact, what should be equal is each person’s
needs and well being rather than their emissions21. According to others, the du-
ties to mitigate climate change, help to adapt, and compensate should instead
fall on the most developed countries in the first place. After all, these countries
have contributed to causing climate change to a greater extent than other coun-

17
On the need for gradualism in matter of institutional change: Buckinx 2011.
18
On climate change and human rights: Caney 2010.
19
On the duties to mitigate, adapt, and compensate: Moellendorf 2015.
20
See for ex. Vanderheiden 2009; and Page 2017.
21
Cf. Caney 2011; Cf. Gardiner 2004.

Rde75_interni.indb 8 25/11/20 16:39

 tries (responsibility for the past approach)22. And yet, intuitive as this idea might
be, it remains actually hard to specify how much harm has resulted from their
contribution and hence difficult to make them pay in proportion to their causal
impact. Moreover, many damages to the climate were brought about when
developed countries had little knowledge of climate change, so their ignorance
should perhaps count as a mitigating factor. For others, then, it is better to
distribute the burden of mitigating climate change, of creating the conditions
for adaption and of compensation according to ones’ own capacity. The greater
the latter the greater the burden (ability to pay principle)23. The problem with
this position is that, while meeting the ought-implies-can criterion, it seems
unfair to pay for faults which are not our own. Complementarily, it is somewhat
counter-intuitive to ignore the historical record of countries’ different impact
on climate. Other authors, then, have advanced hybrid positions which try to
combine the principles above in a way that preserves their advantages while
avoiding their shortcomings24.
Finally, according to more future-oriented proposals, no matter the approach
we choose to attribute the primary duties to mitigate, enable adaptation and
compensate, the point is to make sure that primary duty bearers in effect comply
with these duties. Otherwise, climate change would not be effectively addressed.
To accomplish this, that is, to avoid future harms, second-order responsibilities are
needed. In particular, the second-order responsibility to design social contexts
in a way that induces primary duty bearers to comply with their first-order du-
ties. In this way, therefore, the debate on climate change has been transformed
into a debate about the international institutions we need to ensure that states
discharge their duties25.
The Loss of Biodiversity The last problem commonly associated with the
environmental crisis, which is crucial to discuss, is the loss of biodiversity, i.e.,
the reduction in the number of different species in the environment26. Many
have stressed that this notion is quite vague27 and intrinsically value-laden, to
the point that an uncontroversial empirical operationalisation of the concept
is difficult to achieve28. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity defines
biodiversity along different dimensions as «the variability among living organ-
isms from all sources including […] diversity within species, between species

22
Gardiner 2004: 578-583.
23
For ex.: Shue 1999.
24
Among others: Page 2008.
25
Caney 2014.
26
Wilson 1989.
27
Callicott, Crowder, Mumford 1999.
28
Norton 1994.

Rde75_interni.indb 9 25/11/20 16:39

 and of ecosystems»29. Linking these three dimensions to a plethora of different
indicators, biodiversity is widely acknowledged to be declining30.
There are two major sources of this loss of biodiversity. The first is the increase
in human population and its geographical expansion, which brings about human
appropriation of natural resources, modification of habitats and climate and the
spread of exotic pathogens, plants and animals. The second is the significant
increase in habitats’ temperature due to climate change.
Recently, the American Academy of Sciences emphatically claimed that the
current situation is much more serious than a mere reduction in biological
diversity. What we are witnessing is a genuine «mass extinction», the result of
«biological annihilation» on an unprecedented scale31. Dwindling population
sizes and range shrinkages are worrying trends commonly associated with the
loss of biodiversity. However, according to recent studies, species are not only
exhibiting fewer individuals, surviving in fewer habitats. They are genuinely dying
out, or are about to die out. Roughly a third of the species losing populations
are not currently considered endangered, even though they may be at serious
risk of becoming extinct. The current rate of population decline is frightening
and escalating: nearly half of the 177 mammal species surveyed lost more than
80% of their distribution between 1900 and 2015. The loss of biodiversity and
the increase in species extinction have an obvious impact on the environment.
Different normative considerations are given for why biodiversity is valuable
and why its loss is a problem. Most empirical scientists believe is essential for
future life on earth because it discharges a key functional role in ecosystems,
and biotic impoverishment can markedly alter the biogeochemical and dynamic
properties of ecosystems. In the aptly dramatic words of leading scientists:
«humanity will eventually pay a very high price for the decimation of the only
assemblage of life that we know of in the universe»32.
Many philosophers endorse a similar perspective, considering biodiversity
instrumentally valuable, because its loss will generate clear harms to human
beings, bringing about dramatic ecological, economic and social consequences33.
Such conceptions view biodiversity in the broadly anthropocentric light discussed
above34. Other philosophers believe that species and life on earth have intrin-

29
The full text is available at: https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/
For example, multiple biodiversity indicators considered are taxonomic diversity; phyloge-
30

netic diversity; genetic diversity; functional diversity; spatial or temporal diversity; interaction
diversity; landscape diversity. Cf. Naeem, Duffy, Zavaleta 2012.
31
Ceballos, Ehrlich, Dirzo 2017.
32
Ceballos, Ehrlich, Dirzo 2017.
33
Randall 1988.
34
Norton 2014.

10

Rde75_interni.indb 10 25/11/20 16:39

 sic value, i.e., in and of itself35 and independently from its benefits to human
beings36. This a more radical position because it allows potentially significant
sacrifice of human welfare for the preservation of the environment. Regardless
of the specific reasons for why it is considered valuable, most scholars agree that
it is a crucial challenge that requires a timely coordinated answer.
This special issue will investigate the philosophical foundations of the environ-
mental crisis outlined above and the practical import of its consequences. The
special issue is divided in four sections, from the most theoretical to the most
applied. The first section is entitled Ontological Reflections on the Environment
and addresses questions about what the environment is and how we should
conceive it. Is it simply a factual object or is it rather a value-laden entity? Should
its value be understood in relation to humans or does it have an intrinsic value?
The second section addresses the environmental crisis through the normative
lenses of the concept of responsibility and is entitled: Responsibility for the
Environment. In a nutshell, it asks: given that the environment has a certain
value, who should remedy the damages that humans have caused? How could
we ensure that such remedial responsibilities are discharged by their bearers? The
third section is called: The Environment and Human Rights and it connects the
previous debate with the wide literature on human rights. Is a clean environment
implied by other human rights? Is it helpful to add a clean environment to our
current lists of human rights? How should this right be balanced against other
human rights, such as the right to economic development? Fourth, and finally,
the last section, New Problems and Perspectives, introduces some new paths that
the literature may and perhaps should take.
Tiziana Andina opens the first section on the ontology of the environment
by analysing the structure of social actions. In particular, according to the au-
thor some social actions have a transgenerational nature. That is, they create a
bond among generations. This is because these actions, to be carried out, need
the cooperation of future individuals, who, moreover, will have to cope with
the effects of these actions. This means that through such transgenerational
actions present generations in effect burden future generations with a series of
duties – namely, to complete the action undertaken and to pay the costs for its
effects if present. What is problematic from a normative perspective, however, is
that, despite this intergenerational bond, present generations generally refuse to
consider future generations as having also rights rather than just duties. This is
apparent if one looks at climate change, the author claims: many societies have
industrialised (social action) and therefore polluted the atmosphere; they have
left the costs of completing industrialisation and of paying for its externalities
(duties) to future generations; and yet, while doing this, they have not taken

35
Callicott 1986.
36
Regan 1986.

11

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 into account the interests (which ground rights) of future generations, not even
the basic ones (e.g., to survive). This is an injustice. Because of this, present
generations should acknowledge that future individuals are right-holders as
well, and steer the future in ways that will not prejudice their rights, especially
the one to survive (e.g., current societies should significantly reduce emissions).
Francesca De Vecchi looks instead at the environment through the lenses
of a phenomenological perspective which emphasises a personalistic rather
than naturalistic outlook. The paper explores the idea of the environment as
common-surrounding, something upon which human beings inevitably project
value when they perceive it. The paper argues that qualitative social ontology in
particular provides a crucial contribution in accounting for the environment and
its crisis because the value qualities of the entities of the common-surrounding
world are essential parts of their very identity. An appropriate conception of
the environment is crucial to any philosophical investigation of its crisis. How-
ever, De Vecchi conception also carries normative consequences. Viewing the
environment as part of us, we have strong reasons to care about it. Moreover,
the qualitative perspective identifies what is at stake not only in the existence
of such entities, but also in the quality of their existence and fulfilment.
Davide Vecchi opens the second section on responsibility supporting the idea
that we have a responsibility as a human species to care for the environment.
Traditionally, liberal political philosophy conceives responsibility in individual
terms. Collective responsibility is usually thought of as reducible to specific ac-
tors within the group, and it is stronger the more formally organised the group
is. Davide Vecchi criticises the atomistic liberal conception by drawing instead
on the literature on organismality, i.e., the biological property that grounds spe-
cies collective moral responsibility. He argues that an organismal group comes
into existence when it is characterised by (a) spatial proximity, (b) genomic
homogeneity, (c) partner fidelity and (d) adaptive beneficial cooperation. The
human species, according to Vecchi, might be considered highly organismal
and thus a moral agent in the full sense of the term. As such, this agent ought
to care for the environment.
Silvia Bacchetta focuses on how to ensure that responsible parties are actu-
ally compliant with the agreed distribution of the costs of reparation. Focusing
on the Paris accord, the paper outlines a misalignment between the reasons for
agreeing to the compact and the reason for complying with it. In particular,
a significant flaw lies in approaching international deals with the strategy of
maximising flexibility: it indeed becomes easier to find an agreement, but the
flexibility results in very low institutional capacity to ensure reasonable compli-
ance. The paper advocates that global environmental institutions should not
only deliver the ratification of an agreement, but they should also have the
means to oversee its implementation as well, by monitoring countries’ progress
and enforcing their compliance.

12

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 The paper of Sebastian Muders introduces the third section of this special
issue, whose focus is on human rights as related to the environmental crisis. In
particular, Muders explores the concept of human dignity which is often said
to ground human rights and to account for the special status of humans. The
rationale behind the paper is the following: if it is true that there is something
special with human dignity, then we should show some concern for the envi-
ronment because it is the context which enables creatures with such a special
feature to live. At the same time, however, it would also be clear that the re-
spect for humans generally trumps the respect owed to non-human animals as
well non-animal species. In more detail, Muders notices that human dignity
is usually said to possess three fundamental features: it is final, inherent, and
absolute. The author first clarifies the meaning of these terms. Second, he shows
that human dignity has indeed these three characteristics and that, third, they
are properties of a single value. As such, human dignity cannot but confer a
special status upon humans.
Markku Oksanen, instead, asks whether human rights can be understood as
one of the causes of the current environmental crisis or they actually represent a
solution to it. Indeed, on the one hand, focusing on human rights qua rights held
by humans involves stressing further the supposed primacy of humans over any
non-human being. Moreover, the fulfilment of human rights requires a certain
degree of exploitation of the environment as well as non-human animals. On
the other hand, however, some human rights, such as the one to clean water
and air, could actually be beneficial to the environment and its protection. The
author argues that we should ultimately take the latter route and support a con-
ception of human rights which, despite its focus on the protection of humans
in the first place, is as eco-friendly as possible.
The last section of this special issue covers new questions that might, and
perhaps should, prompt additional attention in the future. The first paper is by
Andrea Borghini, Nicola Piras and Beatrice Serini and it focuses on the issue
of food, notably its ontology: what food is and how we should think about it.
With the degradation of the environment and the expansion of human popula-
tion, the need to feed ourselves will become an increasingly salient issue. The
paper criticises an erroneous dichotomy in the way we think about overcoming
this issue: either we blindly hope that technology will deliver sustainable and
pleasurable sustenance to future generations, or we think that we will have
to drastically change our dietary customs. Both alternatives rest however on
a purely naturalistic understanding of food. Food, Borghini, Piras and Serini
argue instead, is a socially constructed object: it is not just plain nourishment
and any proposed solution would only work if it properly understands food as
a fundamental part of a complex social world.
The second paper by Sue Spaid outlines a new idea of justice through
which we should assess the environmental crisis. That is, what the author calls
hydrological justice, namely, an idea of justice according to which we should

13

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 treat hydrological problems as extremely relevant if not primary when it comes
to effectively addressing the environmental crisis. This kind of justice, the
author claims, requires transparency, kinship and the use of coercion to tackle
hydrological questions. Moreover, this idea of justice should complement the
idea of climate justice as to offer a comprehensive assessment of our current
environmental crisis.

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