Principles of Neurotheology
Principles of Neurotheology
Principles of Neurotheology
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Principles of Neurotheology
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Nathaniel Barrett
Universidad de Navarra
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Nathaniel F. Barrett, June 30, 2011. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows:
Nathaniel F. Barrett, ‘Review of Principles of Neurotheology,’ Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] 11 (2011), 133-
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Nathaniel F. Barrett, Review of Principles of Neurotheology
Newberg builds his case for neurotheology through the exposition of fifty-
four principles. Although he aspires to a set of ‘necessary’ principles that together
constitute the ‘ideological foundations’ of neurotheology (pp. 1, 267), in the
course of his argument he tends to offer the principles as suggestions or
guidelines rather than necessary axioms. The principles range from
commonsensical tenets of open inquiry (e.g. Principle III, p. 46) to some rather
tendentious claims about the neural constraints of religious belief and experience
(Principle XI, p. 64) and the ‘fundamental uncertainty’ of all beliefs about reality
(Principle XXIX, p. 214). More than anything, it seems that Newberg’s use of
principles is a rhetorical strategy designed for maximum clarity and
straightforwardness, and in this respect he succeeds admirably: one could get the
gist of his book by reading just the principles printed in bold.
However, while the principles are clear and straightforward, they are not
adequately justified. In particular, Newberg does not sufficiently examine, let
alone justify, the epistemological premises that make brain science so important
for the synthesis of religion and science. And yet Newberg’s proposal that brain
functions are a crucial tool for the interpretation of religious beliefs—what he
calls ‘neurotheological hermeneutic’ (see Principle XVII, p. 84; Chapter 5:
‘Towards a Neurotheological Hermeneutic,’ pp. 87-114)—is the most distinctive
feature of his methodological approach. Indeed, I would argue that Newberg’s
picture of how the brain determines our experience of reality is not just the
lynchpin of his planned synthesis of religious and scientific perspectives; it is the
fundamental premise of ‘neurotheology.’
The importance of Newberg’s brain-centered epistemology comes into full
view in the tenth and final chapter, ‘Epistemological Issues in Neurotheology’
(pp. 249-265), where he proposes that brain science, coupled with the
phenomenology of ‘primary epistemic states,’ might provide leverage on
questions about the ultimate nature of reality. Ironically, this leverage is gained
by placing us in an epistemological predicament of seemingly hopeless isolation.
Newberg argues that we ‘are trapped with our brain peering out into the world
and reconstructing it the best we can’ (p. 252). From this position, our only
indication of what is real is what feels real to us. By combining phenomenology
with neurobiology, however, Newberg believes that we might be able to find our
way out of our brains (pp. 262-265).
In my estimation, Newberg’s uncritical conflation of brain activity with
cognition is the book’s major flaw. No one can doubt that the brain is the most
important organ of human cognition, but that does not necessarily mean that we
are trapped within the brain. In Newberg’s vision of neurotheology, the brain is
so important that it crowds out all other objects of scientific investigation. This
narrow scientific focus is reinforced on the religious side by a preoccupation with
the phenomenology of religious experience. In his discussions of the relevant
data for building a scientific understanding of religion, Newberg focuses almost
exclusively on ‘subjective’ accounts of spiritual experience (p. 2) and makes no
mention of physical, cultural, and social environments. My guess is that this
narrow focus is justified by the assumption that all environmental factors must
be ‘filtered’ by the brain (pp. 87-88), so that a full understanding of human
1
For instance, see Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from
the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang 2009).
wish to emulate Newberg’s bold empirical stance revisit the early history of
psychical research, when a group of exceptionally open-minded scientists (such
as William James) embarked on a futile search for empirical evidence of the soul.
Such criticisms aside, Newberg’s intellectual courage and passion for
interdisciplinary research are extraordinary, and I have no doubt he will continue
to make significant contributions to the scientific understanding of religion. He is
an ideal scientific collaborator for humanistic scholars of religion, the flaws of his
proposed ‘ideological foundations’ notwithstanding. Which brings me to my last
point: does interdisciplinary research really need necessary principles or
foundations in order to be successful?