[ G.R. No.

238875, March 16, 2021 ]

SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N. PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO

"BAM" AQUINO IV, LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO 'SONNY' F.
TRILLANES IV, PETITIONERS, VS. ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND SALVADOR S. PANELO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 239483, March 16, 2021]

PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (PCICC), LORETTA

ANN P. ROSALES, DR. AURORA CORAZON A. PARONG, EVELYN BALAIS-SERRANO, JOSE
NOEL D. OLANO, REBECCA DESIREE E. LOZADA, EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, ANALIZA T.
UGAY, NIZA CONCEPCION ARAZAS, GLORIA ESTER CATIBAYAN-GUARIN, RAY PAOLO
"ARPEE" J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT TERUEL ANDRES, AND AXLE P. SIMEON, PETITIONERS,
VS. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REPRESENTED BY HON. SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ALAN
PETER CAYETANO, AND THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 240954, March 16, 2021]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY REPRESENTED BY HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ALAN PETER CAYETANO AND THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
REPRESENTED BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Treaties may effectively implement the constitutional imperative to protect human rights and
consider social justice in all phases of development—but so can a statute, as Republic Act No. 9851,
the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity, does.

The president, as primary architect of our foreign policy and as head of state, is allowed by the
Constitution to make preliminary determinations on what, at any given moment, might urgently be
required in order that our foreign policy may manifest our national interest.

Absent a clear and convincing showing of a breach of the Constitution or a law, brought through an
actual, live controversy and by a party that presents direct, material, and substantial injury as a result
of such breach, this Court will stay its hand in declaring a diplomatic act as unconstitutional.

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court.
On March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the
United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this
communication the following day, March 17, 2018.
Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all
consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were
needed to enable withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court
acknowledged the Philippines' action soon after it had withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a
state of affairs correctible by this Court's finite jurisdiction. The Petitions were, therefore, moot when
they were filed.1 The International Criminal Court's subsequent consummate acceptance of the
withdrawal all but confirmed the futility of this Court's insisting on a reversal of completed actions.

In any case, despite the withdrawal, this Court finds no lesser protection of human rights within our
system of laws. Neither do we agree with petitioners' implied statements that without the treaty, the
judiciary will not be able to fulfill its mandate to protect human rights.

Moreover, the Senate never sought to enforce what would have been its prerogative to require its
concurrence for withdrawal. To date, Resolution No. 249, which seeks to express the chamber's
position on the need for concurrence, has yet to be tabled and voted on.2 Individual senators have
standing to question the constitutionality of the actions of their chamber. Yet, in this case, as shown
by the Resolution which petitioners co-authored, they acknowledged that an action by the Senate
was necessary before coming to this Court. Thus, no actual conflict or constitutional impasse has yet
arisen even as implied by their actions.

This Court cannot compel or annul actions where the relevant incidents are moot. Neither can this
Court, without due deference to the actions of a co-equal constitutional branch, act before the
Senate has acted.

Nonetheless, the President's discretion on unilaterally withdrawing from any treaty or international
agreement is not absolute.

As primary architect of foreign policy, the president enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from
treaties. However, this leeway cannot go beyond the president's authority under the Constitution and
the laws. In appropriate cases, legislative involvement is imperative. The president cannot
unilaterally withdraw from a treaty if there is subsequent legislation which affirms and implements it.

Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that is
inconsistent with a prior statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the prior
statute is amended to be consistent with the treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty. It is
passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and is ultimately signed into law by
the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and legislative participation is
limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the sovereign's democratically
elected representatives in the enactment of statutes.

The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined by

circumstances attendant to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where legislative
imprimatur impelled the president's action to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot be effected
without concomitant legislative sanction. Similarly, where the Senate's concurrence imposes as a
condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, the president enjoys no unilateral authority to
withdraw, and must then secure Senate concurrence.

Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in keeping with our legal system,
if a treaty is unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute. However, the
president may not unilaterally withdraw from a treaty: (a) when the Senate conditionally concurs,
such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the withdrawal itself will be contrary
to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law which
implements a treaty.

This Court resolves consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to: (a) declare the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute
as invalid or ineffective, since it was done without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Senate's members; and (b) compel the executive branch to notify the United Nations Secretary-
General that it is cancelling, revoking, and withdrawing the Instrument of Withdrawal.3 Petitioners
maintain that the Instrument of Withdrawal is inconsistent with the Constitution.

The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International Criminal Court, where the
gravest crimes under international law are prosecuted.4

Since 1996, under Fidel V. Ramos's (President Ramos) presidency, the Philippines has participated
in the court's establishment, taking an active role in the deliberations as a member of the Drafting
Committee.5

On December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (President
Estrada), signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.6

President Estrada's act of signing the Rome Statute signified the Philippines' intent to be bound by
the provisions of the treaty, subject to the domestic requirements for its validity and
enforceability.7 Particularly, Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution8 requires the
concurrence by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate for a treaty to be valid, binding,
effective, and enforceable.

In the meantime, on July 1, 2002, the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute entered into
force.9

On December 11, 2009, with Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute still pending, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) signed into law Republic Act No. 9851,
otherwise known as the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide,
and Other Crimes Against Humanity. Republic Act No. 9851 replicated many of the Rome Statute's
provisions.10

Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute was obtained following President Benigno Aquino III's
(President Aquino) election. On August 23, 2011, the Senate, with a vote of 17-1, passed Resolution
No. 546—enabling the Philippines' consummate accession to the Rome Statute.11

On August 30, 2011, the Philippines deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute. On
November 1, 2011, the Rome Statute entered into force in the Philippines. The country was the
16th state party to belong to the Group of Asia-Pacific State Parties in the International Criminal
Court.12

On June 30, 2016, President Aquino's term ended and President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President
Duterte) took his oath as chief executive.

On April 24, 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before the International Criminal Court
pertaining to alleged summary killings when President Duterte was the mayor of Davao City.13
On June 6, 2017, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV and Representative Gary Alejano filed a
"supplemental communication" before the International Criminal Court with regard to President
Duterte's drug war.14

On February 8, 2018, the Office of International Criminal Court Trial Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda
(Prosecutor Bensouda) commenced the preliminary examination of the atrocities allegedly
committed in the Philippines pursuant to the Duterte administration's "war on drugs."15

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced that it was withdrawing from the International
Criminal Court. President Duterte claimed that the country never became a state party to the Rome
Statute since the treaty was not published in the Official Gazette.16

On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal from the International
Criminal Court to the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the Permanent Representative of the
Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations in New York, deposited the Note Verbale to Maria
Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations' Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.17

The full text of this notification reads:

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations presents its
compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to inform the
Secretary-General of the decision of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to withdraw
from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the Statute.

The Philippines assures the community of nations that the Philippine Government continues to be
guided by the rule of law embodied in its Constitution, which also enshrines the country's long-
standing tradition of upholding human rights.

The Government affirms its commitment to fight against impunity for atrocity crimes, notwithstanding
its withdrawal from the Rome Statute, especially since the Philippines has a national legislation
punishing atrocity crimes. The Government remains resolute in effecting its principal responsibility to
ensure the long-term safety of the nation in order to promote inclusive national development and
secure a decent and dignified life for all.

The decision to withdraw is the Philippines' principled stand against those who politicize and
weaponize human rights, even as its independent and well-functioning organs and agencies
continue to exercise jurisdiction over complaints, issues, problems and concerns arising from its
efforts to protect its people.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest
consideration.18

On March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received the notification from the
Philippine government.19

On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon, Paolo Benigno
Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros, and Antonio Trillanes IV filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus,20 assailing the executive's unilateral act of withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being
unconstitutional. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 238875.
Later, Senator Pangilinan would manifest in the oral arguments incidents relating to Senate
Resolution No. 289, a "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate that Termination of, or
Withdrawal from, Treaties and International Agreements Concurred in by the Senate shall be Valid
and Effective Only Upon Concurrence by the Senate." The Resolution was noted to have not been
calendared for agenda in the Senate.21

Meanwhile, on June 13, 2018, the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court, and its members, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn
Balais-Serrano, among others, also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R.
No. 239483.22

On July 6, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Consolidated Comment to the
Petitions.23

On August 14, 2018, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed its own Petition,24 and an
Omnibus Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation and for Inclusion in the Oral Arguments.25 This Petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 240954.

Oral arguments were conducted on August 28, 2018, September 4, 2018, and October 9, 2018. At
the termination of oral arguments, this Court required the parties to file their respective memoranda
within 30 days.26

In his March 18, 2019 press release, the Assembly of State Parties' President Mr. O-Gon Kwon
"reiterated his regret regarding the withdrawal of the Philippines, effective as of 17 March 2019, from
the Rome Statute[.]"27 He expressed hope that the country rejoins the treaty in the future.28

The three consolidated Petitions before this Court seek similar reliefs.

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a treaty that the Philippines validly entered
into, the Rome Statute "has the same status as an enactment of Congress,"29 as "a law in the
Philippines."30 They claim that the President "cannot repeal a law."31 They aver that the country's
withdrawal from a treaty requires the concurrence of at least two-thirds of the Senate.32

In G.R. No. 239483, petitioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its
members assert that their rights to life, personal security, and dignity were impaired by the
withdrawal from the Rome Statute.33 Citing a decision of the South African High Court, they also
claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a multilateral treaty require the Senate's
concurrence.34 According to them, contrary to the President's assertion, the Rome Statute is
effective in Philippine jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution's incorporation clause, despite lack of
publication.35

Petitioners pray that the notification of withdrawal be declared "invalid or ineffective"36 or "void ab
initio"37 and that the executive, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine
Permanent Mission to the United Nations, be required to notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations that the notice is cancelled, revoked, or withdrawn.38

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counter that the petitioners in G.R. No.
238875 do not have locus standi as they do not represent "the official stand of the Senate as a
body."39 Neither do the petitioners in G.R. No. 239483 have standing to question "the wisdom of the
President's sovereign power to withdraw from the Rome Statute, absent any proof of actual or
immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of said withdrawal."40
Respondents claim that a Rule 65 petition is improper because the acts of the President complained
of were not in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers.41 Moreover, mandamus cannot lie
against a discretionary act of a president, much less an act which is not enjoined as a duty, such as
the ratification of a treaty.42

They posit that the Petitions do not present a justiciable controversy because the withdrawal from a
treaty is a political question, being a policy determination delegated to the "wisdom of the
executive."43 Specifically, the President is the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations."44 Respondents assert that the Constitution does not
expressly require Senate concurrence in withdrawing from a treaty.45

Respondents maintain that the withdrawal was valid for having complied with the Rome Statute,
which requires only a written notification of withdrawal.46

Respondents also allege that the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute "was an act to protect
national sovereignty from interference and to preserve the judiciary's independence,"47 which was
necessary given Prosecutor Bensouda's preliminary examination. This allegedly violates the
complementarity principle under the Rome Statute.48

Lastly, respondents aver that the rights being protected under the Rome Statute are adequately
safeguarded by domestic laws.49 The withdrawal's only effect, they say, is that the "Philippines will
no longer be under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court."50

Respondents pray that the consolidated Petitions be denied for lack of merit.51

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not petitioners have sufficiently discharged their burden of showing that this case is
justiciable. Subsumed under this issue are the following:

1. Whether or not the consolidated Petitions present an actual, justiciable controversy;

2. Whether or not each of the consolidated Petitions were timely filed;

3. Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing to file their respective Petitions;

4. Whether or not the consolidated Petitions were filed in violation of the principle of
hierarchy of courts;

5. Whether or not the issues raised by the consolidated Petitions pertain to political
questions; and

6. Whether or not petitioners' resort to the procedural vehicles of petitions for certiorari and

mandamus is proper.

Second, whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale
delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual. This
involves the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Philippines complied with all the requisites for withdrawal from the
Rome Statute;
 2. Whether or not the executive can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty. This encompasses:

a. Whether or not the executive had valid grounds to withdraw from the Rome
Statute;

b. Whether or not withdrawing from a treaty requires legislative action;

c. Whether or not the executive 's withdrawal from the Rome Statute violated any
legislative act or prerogative; and

d. Whether or not withdrawing from a treaty demands the concurrence of at least

two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.

Third, whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places the Philippines in
breach of its obligations under international law.

Lastly, whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome statute will diminish the Filipino
people's protection under international law; and even if it does, whether or not this is a justiciable
question.

Through Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, the Rome Statute, an international instrument,
was transformed and made part of the law of the land. Entry into the Rome Statute represented the
Philippines' commitment to the international community to prosecute individuals accused of
international crimes. Its validity and effectivity hinged on the passage of Senate Resolution No. 546,
which embodied the Senate's concurrence to the Philippines' accession to the Rome Statute.

Petitioners believe that President Duterte's unilateral withdrawal from the Rome Statute
transgressed legislative prerogatives.

Ultimately, this Court may only rule in an appropriate, justiciable controversy raised by a party who
suffers from direct, substantial, and material injury. Once again, we clarify our role within the
constitutional order. We take this occasion to emphasize the need for this Court to exercise restraint
in cases that fail to properly present justiciable controversies, brought by parties who fail to
demonstrate their standing. This is especially true when our pronouncements will cause confusion in
the diplomatic sphere and undermine our international standing and repute.

Petitioners are before us through the vehicles of petitions for certiorari and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Philippine Notice of Withdrawal be declared void ab initio,
and that the withdrawal itself be declared invalid. They also pray for a writ of mandamus to direct the
Executive Secretary to recall and revoke the Notice of Withdrawal, and to submit the issue before
the Senate for its deliberation.52

These Petitions fail on significant procedural grounds.

It is true that this Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, can craft a framework to interpret Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution and determine the extent to which Senate concurrence in treaty
withdrawal is imperative. However, it will be excessive for any such framework to be imposed on the
circumstances surrounding these present Petitions, seeing as how the incidents here are fait
accompli.
Petitioners insist that the protection of human rights will be weakened, yet their contentions are mere
surmises. Ample protection for human rights within the domestic sphere remain formally in place. It
is a canon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is applied."53

Contrary to petitioners' claim, these cases do not deal with the results of the ongoing preliminary
examination by Prosecutor Bensouda. Article 127 of the Rome Statute covers that.54 Neither at
issue here is whether a future president may decide to re-enter the Rome Statute and secure the
requisite Senate concurrence. It is possible that whatever the results in these cases are, a future
administration under a new president can make that decision.

Petitioners want a different political result from what the President has done, and so they implore this
Court to veto his action, raising serious policy implications in so doing. This Court must exercise
restraint in the face of political posturing, and must anchor its determinations not on political results,
but on principles and the text found in the Constitution and law. The most basic of these principles
are parameters that determine the justiciability of cases. Judicial office impels capacity to rule in
keeping with what the Constitution or law mandates, even when potentially contrary to what a
magistrate may prefer politically.

II

To understand the implications of these cases, a brief overview of the Rome Statute is necessary.

On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted in a conference
participated in by 120 states.55 It created the International Criminal Court, a permanent autonomous
institution,56 that was given jurisdiction to "investigate, prosecute, and try" individuals accused of
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression.57

On the heels of World War I, during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, an international tribunal that
will prosecute leaders accused of international crimes was first proposed in modern times. In 1937,
the League of Nations held a conference in Geneva, where 13 states signed the first convention
aiming to establish a permanent international court. However, none of the states ratified it and its
aims failed to materialize.58

Following World War II and the Axis Powers' aggressive military campaigns59 in Europe and
Asia,60 the allied powers established ad hoc tribunals to try Axis leaders accused of international
crimes.61

Consequently, a draft of the charter of an international tribunal was prepared in a meeting in London
among representatives from France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. On August 8, 1945, the London Agreement was signed. It established the
Nuremburg International Military Tribunal.62 The tribunal sat in Nuremberg, Germany and tried the
most notorious Nazi war criminals.63 Its jurisdiction was limited to crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity.64 Nineteen other states subsequently supported the London
Agreement.65

In January 1946, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur,
established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, more commonly known as the Tokyo
International Military Tribunal.66 The Tokyo Trial was conducted from May 3, 1946 to November 12,
1948.67
Upon termination of their respective trials, the Nuremburg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals
also ceased to operate.68

The United Nations General Assembly later put to task the International Law Commission, a
committee of legal experts who worked for the development and codification of international law. The
commission was asked to look into the possibility of establishing a permanent international criminal
court. Drafts were subsequently produced, but the Cold War impeded its progress.69

As work continued on the draft, the United Nations Security Council established two more ad hoc
tribunals in the early 1990s. To address large-scale atrocities involving the Yugoslavian wars of
dissolution and the Rwandan genocide of 1994,70 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were established. These temporary
tribunals underscored the need for a permanent international court.

In 1994, the International Law Commission submitted a proposal to the United Nations General
Assembly, creating a permanent international criminal court.71 The year after, a Preparatory
Committee was convened.72

In April 1998, the amended draft treaty was presented to the United Nations General Assembly, and
the Rome Conference commenced in June 1998.73

On July 17, 1998, 120 states voted in favor of the draft treaty, resulting in its adoption.74

On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force upon
ratification by 60 states.75 This formally constituted the International Criminal Court.

The International Criminal Court has an international legal personality,76 and sits at The Hague in
the Netherlands.77 It may exercise its functions and powers "on the territory of any [s]tate [p]arty
and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other [s]tate."78

State parties to the Rome Statute recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over
the following:

ARTICLE 5
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court

1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with
respect to the following crimes:

(a) The crime of genocide;

(b) Crimes against humanity;

(c) War crimes;

(d) The crime of aggression.

The International Criminal Court's jurisdiction is "complementary to national criminal

jurisdictions."79 Complementarity means that the International Criminal Court may only exercise
jurisdiction if domestic courts were "unwilling or unable" to prosecute.80 Article 17 of the Rome
Statute contemplates these situations:

2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to
the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following
exist, as applicable:

(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;

(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the

circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;

(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or

impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.

3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total
or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain
the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over natural persons. Criminal liability shall attach to
one who:

(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;

(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted;

(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise
assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its
commission;

(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime
by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional
and shall either:

i. Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or

ii. Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;

(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide;

(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means
of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of
 the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up
the criminal purpose.81

Individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute does not affect state responsibility in
international law.82 Further, the Rome Statute provides additional grounds of criminal responsibility
for commanders and other superiors.83

In determining liability under the Rome Statute, a person's official capacity is irrelevant:

1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no
case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising
its jurisdiction over such a person.84

The Rome Statute provides that state parties are obliged to give their full cooperation toward the
International Criminal Court's investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction.85 The
International Criminal Court may request, "through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate
channel as may be designated by each State Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession," state parties to cooperate.86 It may employ measures to "ensure the safety or physical
or psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their families."87

The International Criminal Court may also ask for cooperation and assistance from any
intergovernmental organization pursuant to an agreement with the organization and in accordance
with its competence and mandate.88 State parties are required to ensure that their national law
provides a procedure "for all of the forms of cooperation" specified in Part 9 of the treaty.89

A state party's failure to comply with the International Criminal Court's request to cooperate would
warrant the International Criminal Court's finding to that effect. It will then "refer the matter to the
Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the International
Criminal Court, to the Security Council."90

The Assembly of States Parties is the International Criminal Court's management oversight and
legislative body, comprised of representatives of all the states that ratified and acceded to the Rome
Statute.91

Upon a finding of conviction, the International Criminal Court may impose any of the following
penalties:

(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum
of 30 years; or

(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.
2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:

(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;

(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from
that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. 92

All disputes involving the International Criminal Court's judicial functions are settled by its
decision.93 Disputes of at least two state parties which relate to the application of the Rome Statute,
and which are unsettled by "negotiations within three months of their commencement, shall be
referred to the Assembly of States Parties." The Assembly may "settle the dispute or may make
recommendations on further means of settlement of the dispute."94

Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state party may withdraw from it:

1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after
the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising
from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which
may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in
connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing
State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of
any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which
the withdrawal became effective.

Burundi is, thus far, the only other state party to withdraw from the Rome Statute. In accordance with
Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, it sent a written notification of withdrawal to the Secretary-
General of the International Criminal Court on October 27, 2016. Burundi's withdrawal was effected
on October 26, 2017.95

Following Burundi, South Africa, Gambia, and the Philippines manifested their intent to withdraw.
Nonetheless, Gambia and South Africa rescinded their notifications of withdrawal on February 10,
2017 and March 7, 2017, respectively.96

III

On March 24, 1998, President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 387, which created a task
force on the proposed establishment of the International Criminal Court. The task force was
composed of the following:

Department of Foreign Affairs Chairman

Department of Justice Co-
Chairman
Office of the Solicitor General Member
Office of the Executive Secretary/(Office of Member
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel)
 Department of Interior and Local Member
Government
University of the Philippines Member97
College of Law

The task force had the following duties:

1. Undertake studies and researches pertaining to the proposed establishment of the

International Criminal Court;

2. Formulate policy recommendations to serve as inputs in the review and consolidation of

the Philippine Government's position in the Preparatory Committee meetings of the ICC and
the United Nations General Assembly;

3. Identify and recommend legislative measures necessary in the furtherance of the

foregoing;

4. Serve as a forum for the resolution of issues and concerns pertaining to the establishment
of the ICC;

5. Pursue other related functions which may be deemed necessary by the President.98

From June 15, 1998 to July 17, 1998, the Philippines participated in the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome.
Then Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Lauro L. Baja, the Philippine Head of Delegation,99 delivered a
speech that explained the country's position, commitment, and historical participation on the
establishment of the International Criminal Court. His points are summarized, as follows:

7. Mr. Baja (Philippines) said that his country aspired to the establishment of an international
criminal court that would dispense justice efficiently and effectively; an institution that was
ineffective in addressing the problem of impunity of the perpetrators of the most heinous
violations of the laws of humanity would not serve justice or help to maintain international
peace and security. The position of the Philippines, consistent with its constitutional and
legal traditions, was based on those considerations and on its desire to uphold the current
evolution of international law.

8. National judicial systems should have primacy in trying crimes and punishing the guilty.
The International Criminal Court should complement those systems and seek action only
when national institutions did not exist, could not function or were otherwise unavailable. The
Court should have jurisdiction over the core crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and aggression, but its Statute should contain an additional provision allowing for
the future inclusion of other crimes that affect the very fabric of the international system.

9. The Prosecutor should be independent and be entitled to investigate complaints proprio

motu, subject to the safeguards provided by a supervisory pre-trial chamber. The use of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, must be considered a war crime.
The definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity should include special
consideration of the interests of minors and of gender sensitivity. The Statute should provide
for an age below which there was exemption from criminal responsibility, and persons under
18 years of age should not be recruited into the armed forces. The sexual abuse of women
 committed as an act of war or in a way that constituted a crime against humanity should be
deemed particularly reprehensible. The crime of rape should be gender-neutral and
classified as a crime against persons. A schedule of penalties should be prescribed for each
core crime defined in the Statute, following the principle that there was no crime if there was
no penalty, which would also meet the due process requirement that the accused should be
fully apprised of the charges against them and of the penalties attaching to the alleged
crimes.

10. The Philippines supported the positions set out by the States members of the Movement
of Non-Aligned Countries at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, in May
1998, and was prepared to make the necessary changes to its national laws required by the
establishment of the Court.100 (Emphasis supplied)

In the same conference, the Philippines, through its Alternate Head of Delegation, Hon. Franklin M.
Ebdalin,101 voted to adopt the Rome Statute, and explained its vote:

[T]he Statute contained the vital elements of an international criminal court, with jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, gender-based and sex-related crimes and acts
committed in non-international armed conflicts. The Prosecutor could initiate proceedings proprio
motu, independently of the Security Council.

22. The restrictions on admissibility had been reduced to an acceptable minimum. The
principle of complementarity was assured, giving due regard to the national jurisdiction and
sovereignty of States parties. Finally, there were provisions for restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims.

23. On the other hand, some provisions detracted from those strengths. Some new
definitions of war crimes constituted a retrograde step in the development of international
law. The applicability of the aggression provisions had been postponed pending specific
definition of the crime, and States parties had the option of reservations on the applicability
of war crimes provisions. Finally, the Security Council could seek deferral of prosecution for
a one-year period, renewable for an apparently unlimited number of times.

24. Nevertheless, he was confident that the International Criminal Court could succeed with
the support of the international community and had therefore decided to vote in favour of the
Statute.102 (Emphasis supplied)

On December 28, 2000, the Philippines103 signed the Rome Statute. However, it was still "subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory [s]tates."104 It was also necessary that
instruments of ratification be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.105

Later, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Representative Loretta Ann Rosales, the Philippine Coalition
for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, the Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines, and the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, among others, filed a petition
for mandamus before this Court to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department
of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate for its
concurrence.106

Their petition was dismissed. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary,107 this Court noted that it was
beyond its "jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text
of the Rome Statute to the Senate."108 Pimentel Jr. quoted Justice Isagani A. Cruz, who had earlier
explained the following concerning the treaty-making process:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange
of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as
between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to
his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full
powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is
standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with
the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be
brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties
are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened
for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the
purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final
consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily
signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first
on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the
contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be
bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are
made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which
negotiated them.

....

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the
parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.109 (Emphasis in the original)

This Court declared that submission to ratification is "generally held to be an executive act,"110 and
it binds the state to the signed statute. It concluded that upon signature through a representative, the
president exercises discretion on whether to ratify the statute or not:

After the treaty is signed by the state's representative, the President, being accountable to the
people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty
and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President
has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not
to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or
even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of
treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to
ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a
treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on
superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has
no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties.111 (Citations omitted)

In 2009, President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. 9851, which replicated many
of the then unratified Rome Statute's provisions.

Some provisions, however, are significantly different. In some aspects, the law went beyond the
Rome Statute. It broadened the definition of torture, added the conscription of child soldiers as a war
crime,112 and stipulated jurisdiction over crimes against humanity anywhere in the world, as long as
the offender or victim is Filipino.113 This removes complementarity as a requirement for prosecution
of crimes against humanity under the ratified treaty. While the treaty's language had to be refined to
take the interests of other countries into consideration,114 the law was independently passed
considering all our interests. This independent, voluntary initiative strengthened our own criminal
justice system.

On February 28, 2011, President Aquino sent the signed Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.115 On August 23, 2011, the Senate passed Resolution No. 546, which embodied the
country's accession to the Rome Statute.116

On August 30, 2011, the Philippines deposited its instrument of ratification to the United Nations
Secretary-General. Thus, the Rome Statute took effect in the Philippines on November 1, 2011.117

IV

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines treaties as "international
agreement[s] concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation."118

In our jurisdiction, we characterize treaties as "international agreements entered into by the

Philippines which require legislative concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include
compacts like conventions, declarations, covenants and acts."119

Treaties under the Vienna Convention include all written international agreements, regardless of
their nomenclature. In international law, no difference exists in the agreements' binding effect on
states, notwithstanding how nations opt to designate the document.

However, Philippine law distinguishes treaties from executive agreements.

Treaties and executive agreements are equally binding on the Philippines. However, an executive
agreement: "(a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with
a narrower range of subject matters."120 Executive agreements dispense with Senate concurrence
"because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded."121 They simply implement existing
policies, and are thus entered into:

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d'être of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative

authorizations.122 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

However, this Court had previously stated that this difference in form is immaterial in international
law:

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international
agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of
international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty — which connotes a formal,
solemn instrument — to engagements concluded in modem, simplified forms that no longer
necessitate ratification. An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol,
agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some
other form. Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining
international rights and obligations.123 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

This Court also cautioned that this local affectation does not mean that the constitutionally required
Senate concurrence may be conveniently disregarded:

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international
agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the
constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive.
There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and
translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of
executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the
Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not
expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are
products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely
executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as
being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes
precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive
agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types
of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion.
Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign relations, this
power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well
as by existing domestic and international laws[.]124 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

International agreements125 fall under these two general categories, and are outlined in Executive
Order No. 459, which provides guidelines on how these agreements enter into force in the domestic
sphere.126

VI

Though both are sources of international law, treaties must be distinguished from generally accepted
principles of international law.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the sources of international
law:127

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

recognized by the contesting states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.

Two constitutional provisions incorporate or transform portions of international law into the domestic
sphere, namely: (1) Article II, Section 2, which embodies the incorporation method; and (2) Article
VII, Section 21, which covers the transformation method. They state:

ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies Principles

....

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

....

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in

by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Emphasis supplied)

The sources of international law—international conventions, international custom, general principles

of law, and judicial decisions—are treated differently in our jurisdiction.
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution declares that international custom and general principles of
law are adopted as part of the law of the land. No further act is necessary to facilitate this:

"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary

international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta
sunt servanda, among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been
depicted in this wise:

Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of
international law because they have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of
human societies." O'Connell holds that certain principles are part of international law because they
are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These principles, he
believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal
systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine
whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution.128 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied)

In his separate opinion in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan,129 Justice Jose
C. Vitug (Justice Vitug) underscored that as a source of international law, general principles of law
are only secondary to international conventions and international customs. He stressed that while
international conventions and customs are "based on the consent of nations,"130 general principles
of law have yet to have a binding definition:131

Article 38 (1) (c) is identified as being a "secondary source" of international law and, therefore, not
ranked at par with treaties and customary international law. The phrase is innately vague; and its
exact meaning still eludes any general consensus. The widely preferred opinion, however, appears
to be that of Oppenheim which views "general principles of law" as being inclusive of principles of
private or municipal law when these are applicable to international relations. Where, in certain cases,
there is no applicable treaty nor a generality of state practice giving rise to customary law, the
international court is expected to rely upon certain legal notions of justice and equity in order to
deduce a new rule for application to a novel situation. This reliance or "borrowing" by the
international tribunal from general principles of municipal jurisprudence is explained in many ways by
the fact that municipal or private law has a higher level of development compared to international
law. Brownlie submits that the term "generally-accepted principles of international law" could also
refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of law, or to logical propositions resulting from
judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal law analogies.

In order to qualify as a product of the subsidiary law-creating process, a principle of law must fulfill
three requirements: (1) it must be a general principle of law as distinct from a legal rule of more
limited functional scope, (2) it must be recognized by civilized nations, and (3) it must be shared by a
fair number of states in the community of nations.

....

Clarifying the term "generally-accepted principles of international law" during the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna points out that "when we talk
of generally-accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, we mean that it is
part of the statutory part of laws, not of the Constitution.["]

The remark is shared by Professor Merlin M. Magallona who expresses that the phrase "as part of
the law of the land" in the incorporation clause refers to the levels of legal rules below the
Constitution such as legislative acts and judicial decisions. Thus, he contends, it is incorrect to so
interpret this phrase as including the Constitution itself because it would mean that the "generally-
accepted principles of international law" falls in parity with the Constitution.132 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

In Rubrico v. Arroyo,133 Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Carpio Morales) refined Justice
Vitug's proposed framework.  She conceded that the Constitution's mention of generally accepted
ℒαwρhi ৷

principles of international law was "not quite the same" as, and was not specifically included in
Article 38's "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations[.]"134 Yet, she noted:

Renowned publicist Ian Brownlie suggested, however, that "general principles of international
law" may refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38 (1) (c), or to
logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and
municipal analogies.

Indeed, judicial reasoning has been the bedrock of Philippine jurisprudence on the determination of

generally accepted principles of international law and consequent application of the incorporation
clause.

In Kuroda v. Jalandoni, the Court held that while the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague
Convention and became a signatory to the Geneva Convention only in 1947, a Philippine Military
Commission had jurisdiction over war crimes committed in violation of the two conventions before
1947. The Court reasoned that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions
formed part of generally accepted principles of international law. Kuroda thus recognized that
principles of customary international law do not cease to be so, and are in fact reinforced, when
codified in multilateral treaties.

In International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, the Court invalidated as discriminatory

the practice of International School, Inc. of according foreign hires higher salaries than local hires.
The Court found that, among other things, there was a general principle against discrimination
evidenced by a number of international conventions proscribing it, which had been incorporated as
part of national laws through the Constitution.

The Court thus subsumes within the rubric of "generally accepted principles of international law"
both "international custom" and "general principles of law," two distinct sources of international law
recognized by the ICJ Statute. 135 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In other words, Justice Carpio Morales opined that, per jurisprudence, international customs and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations form part of the law of the land.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent in Bayan Muna v. Romulo,136 echoed Justice Carpio
Morales's supposition and further discussed:

[T]he doctrine of incorporation which mandates that the Philippines is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law which automatically form part of Philippine law by operation of the
Constitution.

In Kuroda v. Jalandoni, this Court held that this constitutional provision "is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory." The pertinent portion of Kuroda states:
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva Conventions form part
of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. . . . Such rule and
principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive
in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Hence, generally accepted principles of international law form part of Philippine laws even if they do
not derive from treaty obligations of the Philippines.

Generally accepted principles of international law, as referred to in the Constitution, include

customary international law. Customary international law is one of the primary sources of
international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Customary
international law consists of acts which, by repetition of States of similar international acts for a
number of years, occur out of a sense of obligation, and taken by a significant number of States. It is
based on custom, which is a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions, which has grown
under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to international law, obligatory or
right. Thus, customary international law requires the concurrence of two elements: "1 the
established, wide-spread, and consistent practice on the part of the States; and 2 a psychological
element known as opinion juris sive necessitatis (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of
law requiring it."137 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, generally accepted principles of international law include international customs and general
principles of law. Under the incorporation clause, these principles form part of the law of the land.
And, "by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law."138

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, treaties become "valid and effective" upon the
Senate's concurrence:

The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It then
has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21
of the Constitution ... Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.139

As discussed in Bayan v. Zamora,140 concurring m a treaty or international agreement is:

. . . essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own
erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever
action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the
legality of the act.141
Thus, in doing so:

. . . the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of
powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments
remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours.142

However, the provision on treaty-making is under Article VII of the Constitution, which concerns the
executive department. A review of the evolution of this constitutional provision may aid this Court in
interpreting its text.

In his concurring opinion in Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v. Ochoa,143 Justice

Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) discussed the antecedents of the transformation method:

Under the 1935 Constitution, the President has the "power, with the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the National Assembly, to make treaties . . . ." The provision, Article VII, Section 11,
paragraph 7 is part of the enumeration of the President's powers under Section 11, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution. This recognition clearly marked treaty making to be an executive function, but its
exercise was nevertheless subject to the concurrence of the National Assembly. A subsequent
amendment to the 1935 Constitution, which divided the country's legislative branch into two houses,
transferred the function of treaty concurrence to the Senate, and required that two-thirds of its
members assent to the treaty.

By 1973, the Philippines adopted a presidential parliamentary system of government, which merged
some of the functions of the Executive and Legislative branches of government in one branch.
Despite this change, concurrence was still seen as necessary in the treaty-making process, as
Article VIII, Section 14 required that a treaty should be first concurred in by a majority of all Members
of the Batasang Pambansa before they could be considered valid and effective in the Philippines,
thus:

SEC. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.

This change in the provision on treaty ratification and concurrence is significant for the following
reasons:

First, the change clarified the effect of the lack of concurrence to a treaty, that is, a treaty without
legislative concurrence shall not be valid and effective in the Philippines.

Second, the change of wording also reflected the dual nature of the Philippines' approach in
international relations. Under this approach, the Philippines sees international law and its
international obligations from two perspectives: first, from the international plane, where international
law reigns supreme over national laws; and second, from the domestic plane, where the
international obligations and international customary laws are considered in the same footing as
national laws, and do not necessarily prevail over the latter. The Philippines' treatment of
international obligations as statutes in its domestic plane also means that they cannot contravene
the Constitution, including the mandated process by which they become effective in Philippine
jurisdiction.

Thus, while a treaty ratified by the President is binding upon the Philippines in the international
plane, it would need the concurrence of the legislature before it can be considered as valid and
effective in the Philippine domestic jurisdiction. Prior to and even without concurrence, the treaty,
once ratified, is valid and binding upon the Philippines in the international plane. But in order to take
effect in the Philippine domestic plane, it would have to first undergo legislative concurrence as
required under the Constitution.

Third, that the provision had been couched in the negative emphasizes the mandatory nature of
legislative concurrence before a treaty may be considered valid and effective in the Philippines.

The phrasing of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1973 Constitution has been retained in the 1987
Constitution, except for three changes: First, the Batasang Pambansa has been changed to the
Senate to reflect the current setup of our legislature and our tripartite system of
government. Second, the vote required has been increased to two-thirds, reflective of the practice
under the amended 1935 Constitution. Third, the term "international agreement" has been added,
aside from the term treaty. Thus, aside from treaties, "international agreements" now need
concurrence before being considered as valid and effective in the Philippines.144 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

The 1935145 and 1973146 Constitutions used the same words as Article II, Section 2147 of the
present Constitution does, and adopted "the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land."148 However, there have been significant changes in constitutional
provisions on treaty-making.

Article VII, Section 10(7) of the 1935 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 10. . . .

....

(7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate to make treaties, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. He shall receive ambassadors and other public
ministers duly accredited to the Government of the Philippines.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the power to make treaties was lodged in the President, subject to the
Senate's concurrence. Although the 1973 Constitution shifted our system of government from
presidential to parliamentary, its provision on treaty-making still required the concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa, the body on which legislative power rested:

ARTICLE VIII
Batasang Pambansa

SECTION 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.
(Emphasis supplied)

On this note, it has been previously surmised that:

The concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa was duly limited to treaties.

However, the first clause of this provision, "except as otherwise provided," leaves room for the
exception to the requirement of legislative concurrence. Under Article XIV, Section 15 of the 1973
Constitution, requirements of national welfare and interest allow the President to enter into not only
treaties but also international agreements without legislative concurrence, thus:

ARTICLE XIV THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 15. Any provision of paragraph one, Section fourteen, Article Eight and of this Article
notwithstanding, the Prime Minister may enter into international treaties or agreements as the
national welfare and interest may require.

This Court, in the recent case of Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, characterized this exception as
having "left a large margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature
altogether." This Court noted this as "a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave
the President the power to enter into treaties only with the concurrence of the National Assembly."

As in the 1935 Constitution, this exception is no longer present in the current formulation of the
provision. The power and responsibility to enter into treaties is now shared by the executive and
legislative departments. Furthermore, the role of the legislative department is expanded to cover not
only treaties but international agreements in general as well, thus:

ARTICLE VII Executive Department

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

In discussing the power of the Senate to concur with treaties entered into by the President, this
Court in Bayan v. Zamora remarked on the significance of this legislative power:

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as
an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or
reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of
discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate
partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and
of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to
their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this
treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable
toward our nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle
that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the
courts to inquire.

Therefore, having an option does not necessarily mean absolute discretion on the choice of
international agreement. There are certain national interest issues and policies covered by all sorts
of international agreements, which may not be dealt with by the President alone. An interpretation
that the executive has unlimited discretion to determine if an agreement requires senate
concurrence not only runs counter to the principle of checks and balances; it may also render the
constitutional requirement of senate concurrence meaningless:
If executive-agreement authority is un-contained, and if what may be the proper subject-
matter of a treaty may also be included within the scope of executive-agreement power, the
constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence could be rendered meaningless. The
requirement could be circumvented by an expedient resort to executive agreement.

The definite provision for Senate concurrence in the Constitution indomitably signifies that there
must be a regime of national interests, policies and problems which the Executive branch of the
government cannot deal with in terms of foreign relations except through treaties concurred in by the
Senate under Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution.  The problem is how to define that
ℒαwρhi ৷

regime, i.e., that which is outside the scope of executive-agreement power of the President and
which exclusively belongs to treaty-making as subject to Senate concurrence.

Article VII, Section 21 does not limit the requirement of senate concurrence to treaties alone.
It may cover other international agreements, including those classified as executive
agreements, if: (1) they are more permanent in nature; (2) their purposes go beyond the
executive function of carrying out national policies and traditions; and (3) they amend
existing treaties or statutes.

As long as the subject matter of the agreement covers political issues and national policies of a more
permanent character, the international agreement must be concurred in by the
Senate.149 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The constitutional framers were not linguistically ignorant. Treaties follow a different process to
become part of the law of the land. Their delineation from generally accepted principles of
international law was deliberate. So was the use of different terminologies and mechanisms in
rendering them valid and effective.

In consonance with the Constitution and existing laws, presidents act within their competence when
they enter into treaties. However, for treaties to be effective in this jurisdiction, Senate concurrence
must be obtained. The president may not engage in foreign relations in direct contravention of the
Constitution and our laws:

After the treaty is signed by the state's representative, the President, being accountable to the
people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty
and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people.150

As explained in Pimentel, Jr.:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. . . .

....
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the
legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of
checks and balance necessary in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.151 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

The context of the provision in question, alongside others, provides enlightenment. Under Article VI
of the Constitution, legislative power is checked by the executive:

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.

Conversely, some executive powers under Article VII of the Constitution are checked by the
legislature, by one of its chambers, by legislative committees, or by other bodies attached to the
legislature:

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.

....

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

....

SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress.

....

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, treaty-making is a function lodged in the executive branch, which is headed by the president.
Nevertheless, a treaty's effectivity depends on the Senate's concurrence, in accordance with the
Constitution's system of checks and balances.

VII

While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar
express mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in
the Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president
the unilateral power to terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the controversy around which the
present consolidated Petitions revolve.

Frameworks in evaluating executive action, vis-à-vis legislative prerogatives, have been formulated
in other jurisdictions. Judicious discernment makes these frameworks worthy of consideration.

To be clear, however, while legal principles in a legal system similar to ours may hold persuasive
value in our courts, we will not adopt such principles without considering our own unique cultural,
political, and economic contexts. The Philippines has long struggled against colonialism. We will not
betray efforts at evolving our own just but unique modalities for judicial review by summarily adopting
foreign notions.
In Goldwater v. Carter,152 a case resolved by the United States Supreme Court, certain members of
Congress assailed then President Jimmy Carter's (President Carter) unilateral abrogation of the
Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. Relevant events were chronicled in a Yale Law journal
article:

On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced his intention to recognize and establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and to terminate, as of January 1, 1980, the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan. Seven U.S. Senators and eight
Members of the House of Representatives sued the President and the Secretary of State in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought an injunction and a declaration that the
President's attempt to unilaterally terminate the treaty was "unconstitutional, illegal, null and void"
unless "made by and with the full consultation of the entire Congress, and with either the advice and
consent of the Senate, or the approval of both Houses of Congress."

When the 96th Congress opened, several Senators introduced resolutions asserting that the
President had encroached on Congress's constitutional role with respect to treaty termination
generally and the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty in particular. In October 1979, the district court held
that to be effective under the Constitution, the President's notice of termination had to receive the
approval of either two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both houses of Congress.

A fragmented D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, heard the case on an expedited basis on November 13
and just seventeen days later ruled for the President. Declining to treat the matter as a political
question, the circuit court instead held on the merits that the President had not exceeded his
authority in terminating the bilateral treaty in accordance with its terms. Pressed to decide the case
before the designated January 1, 1980 termination date, the Supreme Court issued no majority
opinion. Instead, in a 6-3 per curiam decision, the Court dismissed the complaint without oral
argument as nonjusticiable.153 (Citations omitted)

Even back in 1979, before the case reached the United States Supreme Court, Circuit Court Judge
MacKinnon154 had previously cautioned that a grant of absolute power of unilateral termination to
the president may be easily used in the future to "develop other excuses to feed upon congressional
prerogatives that a Congress lacking in vigilance allows to lapse into desuetude."155 The District
Court eventually ruled that President Carter did not exceed his authority in terminating the bilateral
agreement without Senate concurrence.

In a Resolution, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the
Court of Appeals judgment, and remanded the case to the District Court, "with directions to dismiss
the complaint."156

Four justices observed that there is an "absence of any constitutional provision governing the
termination of a treaty" and that "different termination procedures may be appropriate for different
treaties."157

Observations articulated in Goldwater reveal stark similarities between the American and the
Philippine legal systems concerning ensuing debates on the necessity of Senate concurrence in
abrogating treaties:

No constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the power to terminate treaties.
Further, Art. II, 2, of the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably
commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone....
We are asked to decide whether the President may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without
congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be easy, but it only requires us to apply
normal principles of interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue.... The present case
involves neither review of the President's activities as Commander in Chief nor impermissible
interference in the field of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to decide, for
example, whether a treaty required the President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."... This case "touches" foreign relations, but the question presented to us concerns only
the constitutional division of power between Congress and the President.158 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied)

Yale Law School Professor Harold Hongju Koh159 (Professor Koh) opined that a president has no
general unilateral power to terminate treaties; instead, Senate concurrence on treaty abrogation is
imperative.160 He posited:

In future cases, the constitutional requirements for termination should be decided based on the type
of agreement in question, the degree of congressional approval and subject matter in question, and
Congress's effort to guide the termination and withdrawal process by framework
legislation.161 (Emphasis supplied)

Professor Koh proposed the operation of what he dubbed as the "mirror principle," where "the
degree of legislative approval needed to exit an international agreement must parallel the degree of
legislative approval originally required to enter it."162 He further said:

Under the mirror principle, the Executive may terminate, without congressional participation,
genuinely "sole" executive agreements that have lawfully been made without congressional input.
But the President may not entirely exclude Congress from the withdrawal or termination process
regarding congressional-executive agreements or treaties that were initially concluded with
considerable legislative input. That principle would make Congress's input necessary for
disengagement even from such international agreements as the Paris Climate Agreement, which
broadly implicate Congress's commerce powers, and which—while never subjected to an up-or-
down vote—were nevertheless enacted against a significant background of congressional
awareness and support that implicitly authorized the presidential making, but not the unmaking, of
climate change agreements. Congress also should participate in an attempt to withdraw the United
States even from such political agreements as the Iran Nuclear Deal (also known as the JCPOA),
where the President is exercising plenary foreign commerce powers that were delegated by
Congress and where the U.S. termination has now triggered actionable claims of violation of
international law.163 (Citations omitted)

Professor Koh considered that, as a functional matter, overboard unilateral executive power to
terminate treaties risks presidents making "overly hasty, partisan, or parochial withdrawals," thus
weakening systemic stability, as well as the credibility and negotiating leverage of all presidents.164

The mirror principle echoes the points raised by Justice Robert H. Jackson's renowned
concurrence165 in the separation-of-powers case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.166 There, he laid down three categories of executive action as regards the necessity of
concomitant legislative action:

Category One: "when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate";
Category Two: "when the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain"; and

Category Three: "when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at his lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."167

This framework has since been dubbed as the Youngstown framework,168 and was adopted in

subsequent American cases, among them Medellin v. Texas.169

Medellin involved a review of the president's power in foreign affairs. In turn, Medellin was

considered in our jurisdiction by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) in examining
the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement.170 Chief Justice Puno, opined:

An examination of Bayan v. Zamora, which upheld the validity of the VFA, is necessary in light of a
recent change in U.S. policy on treaty enforcement. Of significance is the case of Medellin v. Texas,
where it was held by the U.S. Supreme Court that while treaties entered into by the President with
the concurrence of the Senate are binding international commitments, they are not domestic law
unless Congress enacts implementing legislation or unless the treaty itself is "self-executing".

An Examination of Medellin v. Texas

In Medellin v. Texas, Jose Ernesto Medellin (Medellin), a Mexican national, was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal murders of two Houston
teenagers. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.

Medellin then filed an application for post-conviction relief and claimed that the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention) accorded him the right to notify the Mexican consulate of
his detention; and because the local law enforcement officers failed to inform him of this right, he
prayed for the grant of a new trial.

The trial court, as affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, rejected the Vienna Convention
claim. It was ruled that Medellin failed to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities
impacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment. Medellin then filed his first habeas
corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which also rejected his petition. It held that Medellin
failed to show prejudice arising from the Vienna Convention.

While Medellin's petition was pending, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in
the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The ICJ held that the U.S.
violated Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform 51 named Mexican nationals,
including Medellin, of their Vienna Convention rights. The ICJ ruled that those named individuals
were entitled to a review and reconsideration of their U.S. state court convictions and sentences
regardless of their failure to comply with generally applicable state rules governing challenges to
criminal convictions.

In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon — issued after Avena but involving individuals who were not named in
the Avena judgment, contrary to the ICJ's determination — the U.S. Federal Supreme Court held
that the Vienna Convention did not preclude the application of state default rules. The U.S.
President, George W. Bush, then issued a Memorandum (President's Memorandum) stating that the
United States would discharge its international obligations under Avena by having State courts give
effect to the decision.

Relying on Avena and the President's Memorandum, Medellin filed a second Texas state-
court habeas corpus application, challenging his state capital murder conviction and death sentence
on the ground that he had not been informed of his Vienna Convention rights. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's application as an abuse of the writ, since under Texas law, a
petition for habeas corpus may not be filed successively, and neither Avena nor the President's
Memorandum was binding federal law that could displace the State's limitations on filing
successive habeas applications.

Medellin repaired to the U.S. Supreme Court. In his petition, Medellin contends that the Optional
Protocol, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute supplied the "relevant obligation" to give
the Avena judgment binding effect in the domestic courts of the United States.

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum
constitutes directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas corpus petitions. It held that while an international treaty may constitute an
international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes
implementing it or unless the treaty itself is "self-executing". It further held that decisions of the ICJ
are not binding domestic law; and that absent an act of Congress or Constitutional authority, the US.
President lacks the power to enforce international treaties or decisions of the ICJ.

Requirements for Domestic Enforceability of Treaties in the U.S.

The new ruling is clear-cut: "while a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not
binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is ratified on that basis."

The Avena judgment creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, but it is
not automatically binding domestic law because none of the relevant treaty sources — the Optional
Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute — creates binding federal law in the absence of
implementing legislation, and no such legislation has been enacted.

The Court adopted a textual approach in determining whether the relevant treaty sources are self-
executory[.]171 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Later, Saguisag v. Ochoa172 reviewed the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation

Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. In Saguisag,
Justice Brion found the Youngstown framework to be a better approach than simply anchoring this
Court's position in one constitutional provision. He proposed the examination of the president's act in
the context of how our system of government works:

[E]ntry into international agreements is a shared function among the three branches of government.
In this light and in the context that the President's actions should be viewed under our tripartite
system of government, I cannot agree with the ponencia's assertion that the case should he
examined solely and strictly through the constitutional limitation found in Article XVIII, Section 25 of
the Constitution.

IV.B (2) Standards in Examining the President's Treaty-Making Powers

Because the Executive's foreign relations power operates within the larger constitutional framework
of separation of powers, I find the examination of the President's actions through this larger
framework to be the better approach m the present cases. This analytical framework, incidentally, is
not the result of my original and independent thought; it was devised by U.S. Supreme Court
Associate Justice Robert Jackson in his Concurring Opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.

Justice Jackson's framework for evaluating executive action categorizes the President's actions into
three: first, when the President acts with authority from the Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, as it includes all the powers he possesses in his own right and everything that Congress
can delegate.

Second, "when the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely on his own independent powers, but there is a [twilight zone where] he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or where its distribution is uncertain." In this situation,
presidential authority can derive support from "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence."

Third, "when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his actions "only by disabling
the Congress from acting upon the subject."

This framework has been recently adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas, a case
involving the President's foreign affairs powers and one that can be directly instructive in deciding
the present case.

In examining the validity of an executive act, the Court takes into consideration the varying degrees
of authority that the President possesses. Acts of the President with the authorization of Congress
should have the "widest latitude of judicial interpretation" and should be "supported by the strongest
of presumptions." For the judiciary to overrule the executive action, it must decide that the
government itself lacks the power. In contrast, executive acts that are without congressional
imprimatur would have to be very carefully examined.173 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

The Youngstown framework was favorably considered and employed by this Court in its discussions
in Gonzales v. Marcos174 penned by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando.

In Gonzales, Ramon A. Gonzales alleged that in issuing Executive Order No. 30, the President
encroached on the legislative prerogative when it created:

[A] trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines entrusted with the task to construct national theatre, a national music hall, an arts
building and facilities, to awaken our people's consciousness in the nation's cultural heritage and to
encourage its assistance in the preservation, promotion, enhancement and development thereof,
with the Board of Trustees to be appointed by the President, the Center having as its estate the real
and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial commitments that could
thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future[.]175 (Citation omitted)

However, during the pendency of the case, Presidential Decree No. 15 was promulgated, creating
the Cultural Center of the Philippines. This development prompted this Court to dismiss the appeal.
In so doing, this Court proceeded to explain:
It would be an unduly narrow or restrictive view of such a principle if the public funds that accrued by
way of donation from the United States and financial contributions for the Cultural Center project
could not be legally considered as "governmental property." They may be acquired under the
concept of dominium, the state as a persona in law not being deprived of such an attribute,
thereafter to be administered by virtue of its prerogative of imperium. What is a more appropriate
agency for assuring that they be not wasted or frittered away than the Executive, the department
precisely entrusted with management functions? It would thus appear that for the President to refrain
from taking positive steps and await the action of the then Congress could be tantamount to
dereliction of duty. He had to act; time was of the essence. Delay was far from conducive to public
interest. It was as simple as that. Certainly then, it could be only under the most strained
construction of executive power to conclude that in taking the step he took, he transgressed on
terrain constitutionally reserved for Congress.

This is not to preclude legislative action in the premises. While to the Presidency under the 1935
Constitution was entrusted the responsibility for administering public property, the then Congress
could provide guidelines for such a task. Relevant in this connection is the excerpt from an opinion of
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer "When the President acts in absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperative of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." To vary the phraseology,
to recall Thomas Reed Powell, if Congress would continue to keep its peace notwithstanding the
action taken by the executive department, it may be considered as silently vocal. In plainer
language, it could be an instance of silence meaning consent. The Executive Order assailed was
issued on June 25, 1966. Congress until the time of the filing of the petition on August 26, 1969
remained quiescent. Parenthetically, it may be observed that petitioner waited until almost the day of
inaugurating the Cultural Center on September 11, 1969 before filing his petition in the lower court.
However worthy of commendation was his resolute determination to keep the Presidency within the
bounds of its competence, it cannot be denied that the remedy, if any, could be supplied by
Congress asserting itself in the premises. Instead, there was apparent conformity on its part to the
way the President saw fit to administer such governmental property.176 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

The Youngstown framework was also employed by Chief Justice Puno in evaluating the situations
subject of Bayan v. Zamora177 and Akbayan v. Aquino.178

In Bayan, Chief Justice Puno, citing the Youngstown framework, stated: "The U.S. Supreme Court
itself has 'intimated that the President might act in external affairs without congressional authority,
but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress."'179 He reiterated this in Akbayan.

Thus, in appropriate cases, the validity of the president's actions—when there are countervailing
legislative prerogatives—may be appraised in light of the Youngstown framework.

All told, the president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and enters into international
agreements. However, the president's power is not absolute, but is checked by the Constitution,
which requires Senate concurrence. Treaty-making is a power lodged in the executive, and is
balanced by the legislative branch. The textual configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to the
basic separation of powers and to a system of checks and balances. Presidential discretion is
recognized, but it is not absolute. While no constitutional mechanism exists on how the Philippines
withdraws from an international agreement, the president's unbridled discretion vis-à-vis treaty
abrogation may run counter to the basic prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and
domestic operation of treaties.

VIII

The mirror principle and the Youngstown framework are suitable starting points in reviewing the
president's acts in the exercise of a power shared with the legislature. However, their concepts and
methods cannot be adopted mechanically and indiscriminately. A compelling wisdom underlies
them, but operationalizing them domestically requires careful consideration and adjustment in view
of circumstances unique to the Philippine context.

The mirror principle is anchored on balancing executive action with the extent of legislative
participation in entering into treaties. It is sound logic to maintain that the same constitutional
requirements of congressional approval—which attended the effecting of treaties following original
entry into them—must also be followed in their termination.

As proposed by Chief Justices Fernando and Puno, along with Justice Brion,
the Youngstown framework may also guide us in reviewing executive action vis-à-vis the necessity
of concomitant legislative action in withdrawing from treaties. When the president clearly shares
power with the legislature, and yet disavows treaties despite no accompanying action by Congress,
the Youngstown framework considers this an instance when the president relies exclusively on their
limited independent powers. Thus, the validity of the withdrawal, the exercise of which should have
been concurrent with Congress, must be critically examined. The basic, underlying fact of powers
being shared makes it difficult to sustain the president's unilateral action.

Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts, and
considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court adopts the
following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from
international agreements.

First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines
to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes.

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. It mandates the president to "ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed."180 Both in negotiating and enforcing treaties, the president must ensure
that all actions are in keeping with the Constitution and statutes. Accordingly, during negotiations,
the president can insist on terms that are consistent with the Constitution and statutes, or refuse to
pursue negotiations if those negotiations' direction is such that the treaty will turn out to be repugnant
to the Constitution and our statutes. Moreover, the president should not be bound to abide by a
treaty previously entered into should it be established that such treaty runs afoul of the Constitution
and our statutes.

There are treaties that implement mandates provided in the Constitution, such as human rights.
Considering the circumstances of each historical period our nation encounters, there will be many
means to acknowledge and strengthen existing constitutional mandates. Participating in and
adhering to the creation of a body such as the International Criminal Court by becoming a party to
the Rome Statute is one such means, but so is passing a law that, regardless of international
relations, replicates many of the Rome Statute's provisions and even expands its protections. In
such instances, it is not for this Court—absent concrete facts creating an actual controversy—to
make policy judgments as to which between a treaty and a statute is more effective, and thus,
preferable.
Within the hierarchy of the Philippine legal system—that is, as instruments akin to statutes—treaties
cannot contravene the Constitution. Moreover, when repugnant to statues enacted by Congress,
treaties and international agreements must give way.

Article VII, Section 21 provides for legislative involvement in making treaties and international
agreements valid and effective, that is, by making Senate concurrence a necessary condition. From
this, two points are discernible: (1) that there is a difference in the extent of legislative participation in
enacting laws as against rendering a treaty or international agreement valid and effective; and (2)
that Senate concurrence, while a necessary condition, is not in itself a sufficient condition for the
validity and effectivity of treaties.

In enacting laws, both houses of Congress participate. A bill undergoes three readings in each
chamber. A bill passed by either chamber is scrutinized by the other, and both chambers consolidate
their respective versions through a bicameral conference. Only after extensive participation by the
people's elected representatives—members of the Senate who are elected at large, and, those in
the House of Representatives who represent districts or national, regional, or sectoral party-list
organizations—is a bill presented to the president for signature.

In contrast, in the case of a treaty or international agreement, the president, or those acting under
their authority, negotiates its terms. It is merely the finalized instrument that is presented to the
Senate alone, and only for its concurrence. Following the president's signature, the Senate may
either agree or disagree to the entirety of the treaty or international agreement. It cannot refine or
modify the terms. It cannot improve what it deems deficient, or tame apparently excessive
stipulations.

The legislature's highly limited participation means that a treaty or international agreement did not
weather the rigors that attend regular lawmaking. It is true that an effective treaty underwent a
special process involving one of our two legislative chambers, but this also means that it bypassed
the conventional republican mill.

Having passed scrutiny by hundreds of the people's elected representatives in two separate
chambers which are committed—by constitutional dictum—to adopting legislation, statutes enacted
by Congress necessarily carry greater democratic weight than an agreement negotiated by a single
person. This is true, even if that person is the chief executive who acts with the aid of unelected
subalterns. This nuancing between treaties and international agreements, on one hand, and statutes
on the other, is an imperative borne by the Philippines basic democratic and republican nature: that
the sovereignty that resides in the people is exercised through elected representatives.181

Thus, a valid treaty or international agreement may be effective just as a statute is effective. It has
the force and effect of law. Still, statutes enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In case
of conflict between a law and a treaty, it is the statute that must prevail.

The second point proceeds from the first. The validity and effectivity of a treaty rests on its being in
harmony with the Constitution and statutes. The Constitution was ratified through a direct act of the
sovereign Filipino people voting in a plebiscite; statutes are adopted through concerted action by
their elected representatives. Senate concurrence is the formal act that renders a treaty or
international agreement effective, but it is not, in substance, the sole criterion for validity and
effectivity. Ultimately, a treaty must conform to the Constitution and statutes.

These premises give the president leeway in withdrawing from treaties that he or she determines to
be contrary to the Constitution or statutes.
In the event that courts determine the unconstitutionality of a treaty, the president may unilaterally
withdraw from it.

Owing to the preeminence of statutes enacted by elected representatives and hurdling the rigorous
legislative process, the subsequent enactment of a law that is inconsistent with a treaty likewise
allows the president to withdraw from that treaty.

As the chief executive, the president swore to preserve and defend the Constitution, and faithfully
execute laws. This includes the duty of appraising executive action, and ensuring that treaties and
international agreements are not inimical to public interest. The abrogation of treaties that are
inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes is in keeping with the president's duty to uphold the
Constitution and our laws.

Thus, even sans a judicial determination that a treaty is unconstitutional, the president also enjoy
much leeway in withdrawing from an agreement which, in his or her judgment, runs afoul of prior
existing law or the Constitution. In ensuring compliance with the Constitution and laws, the president
performs his or her sworn duty in abrogating a treaty that, per his or her bona fide judgment, is not in
accord with the Constitution or a law. Between this and withdrawal owing to a prior judicial
determination of unconstitutionality or repugnance to statute however, withdrawal under this basis
may be relatively more susceptible of judicial challenge. This may be the subject of judicial review,
on whether there was grave abuse of discretion concerning the president's arbitrary, baseless, or
whimsical determination of unconstitutionality or repugnance to statute.

Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into
pursuant to congressional imprimatur.

The Constitution devised a system of checks and balances in the exercise of powers among the
branches of government.  For instance, as a legislative check on executive power, Congress may
1aшphi1

authorize the president to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts subject to limitations and restrictions it may impose.182 The president can
likewise grant amnesty, but with the concurrence of a majority of all members of Congress.183

Considering that effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative
branches,184 Congress may expressly authorize the president to enter into a treaty with conditions
or limitations as to negotiating prerogatives.

Similarly, a statute subsequently passed to implement a prior treaty signifies legislative approbation
of prior executive action. This lends greater weight to what would otherwise have been a course of
action pursued through executive discretion. When such a statute is adopted, the president cannot
withdraw from the treaty being implemented unless the statute itself is repealed.

When a treaty was entered into upon Congress's express will, the president may not unilaterally
abrogate that treaty. In such an instance, the president who signed the treaty simply implemented
the law enacted by Congress. While the president performed his or her function as primary architect
of international policy, it was in keeping with a statute. The president had no sole authority, and the
treaty negotiations were premised nor only upon his or her own diplomatic powers, but on the
specific investiture made by Congress. This means that the president negotiated not entirely out of
his or her own volition, but with the express mandate of Congress, and more important, within the
parameters that Congress has set.

While this distinction is immaterial in international law, jurisprudence has treated this as a class of
executive agreements. To recall an executive agreement implements an existing policy, and is
entered "to adjust the details of a treaty . . . pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; executive agreements [hinge] on prior constitutional or legislative
authorizations."185 Executive agreements "inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective."186

Consistent with the mirror principle, any withdrawal from an international agreement must reflect how
it was entered into. As the agreement was entered pursuant to congressional imprimatur, withdrawal
from it must likewise be authorized by a law.

Here, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9851 well ahead of the Senate's concurrence to the Rome
Statute. Republic Act No. 9851 is broader than the Rome Statute itself. This reveals not only an
independent, but even a more encompassing legislative will—even overtaking the course—of
international relations. Our elected representatives have seen it fit to enact a municipal law that
safeguards a broader scope of rights, regardless of whether the Philippines formally joins the
International Criminal Court through accession to the Rome Statute.

Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate
concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence.

The Senate may concur with a treaty or international agreement expressly indicating a condition that
withdrawal from it must likewise be with its concurrence. It may be embodied in the same resolution
in which it expressed its concurrence. It may also be that the Senate eventually indicated such a
condition in a subsequent resolution. Encompassing legislative action may also make it a general
requirement for Senate concurrence to be obtained in any treaty abrogation. This may mean the
Senate invoking its prerogative through legislative action taken in tandem with the House of
Representatives—through a statute or joint resolution—or by adopting, on its own, a comprehensive
resolution. Regardless of the manner by which it is invoked, what controls is the Senate's exercise of
its prerogative to impose concurrence as a condition.

As effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative branches, the
Senate's power to concur with treaties necessarily includes the power to impose conditions for its
concurrence. The requirement of Senate concurrence may then be rendered meaningless if it is
curtailed.

Petitioner Senator Pangilinan manifested that the Senate has adopted this condition in other
resolutions through which the Senate concurred with treaties. However, the Senate imposed no such
condition when it concurred in the Philippines' accession to the Rome Statute. Likewise, the Senate
has yet to pass a resolution indicating that its assent should have been obtained in withdrawing from
the Rome Statute. While there was an attempt to pass such a resolution, it has yet to be calendared,
and thus, has no binding effect on the Senate as a collegial body.

In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to
withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a
determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have
clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by
judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the executive to
proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to be
obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with
withdrawal.

IX
It is wrong to state that matters of foreign relations are political questions, and thus, beyond the
judiciary's reach.

The Constitution expressly states that this Court, through its power of judicial review, may declare
any treaty or international agreement unconstitutional:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.187 (Emphasis supplied)

We take this opportunity to clarify the pronouncements made in Secretary of Justice v.

Lantion,188 where this Court summarized the rules when courts are confronted with a conflict
between a rule of international law and municipal law. It stated:

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision[.] In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts. . . for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances[.] The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution[.]189 (Citations omitted)

Lantion discussed the incorporation doctrine embodied in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.
Through incorporation, the Philippines adopts international custom and general principle of law as
part of the law of the land. Lantion clarified that despite being part of the legal system, this "does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere."190 However, it goes on to state that "lex posterior derogat priori takes effect—a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty."191

Previously, we have extensively discussed how, despite being both sources of international law,
treaties must be distinguished from generally accepted principles of international law. Article II,
Section 2 automatically incorporates generally accepted principles of international law into the
domestic sphere. On the other hand, Article VII, Section 21 operates differently and concerns an
entirely distinct source of international law. It signifies that treaties and international agreements are
not automatically incorporated to the Philippine legal system, but are transformed into domestic law
by Senate concurrence.

Thus, Lantion’s pronouncement that—"lex posterior derogat priori takes effect—a treaty may repeal

a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty"192—is misplaced and unsupported by its internal logic.
Its fallacy frustrates its viability as precedent. Besides, it was mere obiter dictum as this Court did not
even rule on the constitutionality of the assailed Republic of the Philippines-United States Extradition
Treaty.

Courts, in which judicial power is vested, may void executive and legislative acts when they violate
the Constitution.193

The president is the head of state and chief executive. The Constitution mandates that in performing
his or her functions, the president must "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."194 Thus, upon
assuming office, a president swears to "faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties. . . preserve
and defend [the] Constitution, execute. . . laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to
the service of the Nation."195

Accordingly, in fulfilling his or her functions as primary architect of foreign policy, and in negotiating
and enforcing treaties, all of the president's actions must always be within the bounds of the
Constitution and our laws. This mandate is exceeded when acting outside what the Constitution or
our laws allow. When any such excess is so grave, whimsical, arbitrary, or attended by bad faith, it
can be invalidated through judicial review.

The Petitions here raise interesting legal questions. However, the factual backdrop of these
consolidated cases renders inopportune a ruling on the issues presented to this Court.

Separation of powers is fundamental in our legal system. The Constitution delineated the powers
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, with each having
autonomy and supremacy within its own sphere.196 This is moderated by a system of checks and
balances "carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts" of each branch.197

Among the three branches, the judiciary was designated as the arbiter in allocating constitutional
boundaries.198 Judicial power is defined in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution as:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

A plain reading of the Constitution identifies two instances when judicial power is exercised: (1)
in settling actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; and
(2) in determining whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
In justifying judicial review in its traditional sense, Justice Jose P. Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission199 underscored that when this Court allocates constitutional boundaries, it neither
asserts supremacy nor annuls the legislature's acts. It simply carries out the obligations that the
Constitution imposed upon it to determine conflicting claims and to establish the parties' rights in an
actual controversy:

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution.200

The latter conception of judicial power that jurisprudence refers to as the

"expanded certiorari jurisdiction"201 was an innovation of the 1987 Constitution:202

This situation changed after 1987 when the new Constitution "expanded" the scope of judicial
power[.]

....

In Francisco v. The House of Representatives, we recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was
meant "to ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by
'any branch or instrumentalities of government."' Thus, the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section
1 engraves, for the first time in its history, into black letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of
this Court, whose nature and purpose had been provided in the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion.

....

Meanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce this "expanded"
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of "grave abuse of
discretion" as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court based on its power to relax its rules allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions
invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction based on its power to relax its Rules. This is however an
ad hoc approach that does not fully consider the accompanying implications, among them, that Rule
65 is an essentially distinct remedy that cannot simply be bodily lifted for application under the
judicial power's expanded mode. The terms of Rule 65, too, are not fully aligned with what the
Court's expanded jurisdiction signifies and requires.

On the basis of almost thirty years' experience with the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Court
should now fully recognize the attendant distinctions and should be aware that the continued use of
Rule 65 on an ad hoc basis as the operational remedy in implementing its expanded jurisdiction
may, in the longer term, result in problems of uneven, misguided, or even incorrect application of the
courts' expanded mandate.203

Tañada v. Angara204 characterized this not only as a power, but as a duty ordained by the
Constitution:
It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature "

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse
of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality
or department of the government.205 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Despite its expansion, judicial review has its limits. In deciding matters involving grave abuse of
discretion, courts cannot brush aside the requisite of an actual case or controversy. The clause
articulating expanded certiorari jurisdiction requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act which, in essence, is the actual case or controversy.
Thus, "even now, under the regime of the textually broadened power of judicial review articulated in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
not dispensed with."206

In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and

Employment:207

An actual case or controversy is "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented
are "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
The conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this
Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive action.

....

Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to
provide advisory opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or
hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as
to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from concretely lived facts are
chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits. They can
argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have more motives to
choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties,
there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a
breach of constitutional text.208

Thus, whether in its traditional or expanded scope, the exercise of judicial review requires the
concurrence of these requisites for justiciability:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance . . . ; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.209 (Citations omitted)

XI
The Petitions are moot. They fail to present a persisting case or controversy that impels this Court's
review.

In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an "existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory."210

An actual case deals with conflicting rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. It involves
definite facts and incidents to be appreciated, and laws to be applied, interpreted and enforced vis-à-
vis ascertained facts. It must be "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief."211

A constitutional question may not be presented to this Court at an inopportune time. When it is
premature, this Court's ruling shall be relegated as an advisory opinion for a potential, future
occurrence. When belated, concerning matters that are moot, the decision will no longer affect the
parties.

Either way, courts must avoid resolving hypothetical problems or academic questions. This exercise
of judicial restraint ensures that the judiciary will not encroach on the powers of other branches of
government. As Angara v. Electoral Commission212 explained:

[T]his power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.213

The requirement of a bona fide controversy precludes advisory opinions and judicial legislation. For
this Court, "only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case,
may be entertained,"214 and only when they are raised at the opportune time.

A case is moot when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."215 There may have been
conflicting rights, disputed facts, or meritorious claims warranting this Court's intervention, but a
supervening event rendered the issue stale. In Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory
Administration:216

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on
the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is
because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because,
in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.217 (Citations omitted)

On March 19, 2019, the International Criminal Court itself, through Mr. O-Gon Kwon, the president of
the Assembly of States Parties, announced the Philippines' departure from the Rome Statute
effective March 17, 2019. It made this declaration with regret and the hope that such departure "is
only temporary and that it will re-join the Rome Statute family in the future."218
This declaration, coming from the International Court itself, settles any doubt on whether there are
lingering factual occurrences that may be adjudicated. No longer is there an unsettled incident
demanding resolution. Any discussion on the Philippines' withdrawal is, at this juncture, merely a
matter of theory.

However, even prior to the filing of these Petitions,219 the President had already completed the
irreversible act of withdrawing from the Rome Statute.

To reiterate, Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute provides the mechanism on how its state parties
may withdraw:

A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the
notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

The Philippines announced its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 15, 2018, and
formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations
Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet on March 16, 2018. The Secretary-General received the
notification on March 17, 2018. For all intents and purposes, and in keeping with what the
Rome Statute plainly requires, the Philippines had, by then, completed all the requisite acts
of withdrawal. The Philippines has done all that were needed to facilitate the withdrawal. Any
subsequent discussion would pertain to matters that are fait accompli.

On March 20, 2018, the International Criminal Court issued a statement on the Philippines' Notice of
Withdrawal. The United Nations certified that the Philippines deposited the written notification on
March 17, 2018. It stressed that while withdrawal from the Rome Statute is a sovereign decision, it
has no impact on any pending proceedings.220 In any case, the International Criminal Court
expressed no reservation on the efficacy of the withdrawal.

At that point, this Court's interference and ruling on what course of action to take would mean an
imposition of its will not only on the executive, but also on the International Criminal Court itself. That
is not the function of this Court, which takes on a passive role in resolving actual controversies when
proper parties raise them at an opportune time. In the international arena, it is the president that has
the authority to conduct foreign relations and represent the country. This Court cannot encroach on
matters beyond its jurisdiction.

Moreover, while its text provides a mechanism on how to withdraw from it, the Rome Statute does
not have any proviso on the reversal of a state party's withdrawal. We fail to see how this Court can
revoke—as what petitioners are in effect asking us to do—the country's withdrawal from the Rome
Statute, without writing new terms into the Rome Statute.

Petitioners harp on the withdrawal's effectivity, which was one year from the United Nations
Secretary-General's receipt of the notification. However, this one-year period only pertains to
the effectivity, or when exactly the legal consequences of the withdrawal takes effect. It neither
concerns approval nor finality of the withdrawal. Parenthetically, this one-year period does not
undermine or diminish the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction and power to continue a probe
that it has commenced while a state was a party to the Rome Statute.

Here, the withdrawal has been communicated and accepted, and there are no means to retract it.
This Court cannot extend the reliefs that petitioners seek. The Philippines's withdrawal from the
Rome Statute has been properly received and acknowledged by the United Nations Secretary-
General, and has taken effect. These are all that the Rome Statute entails, and these are all that the
international community would require for a valid withdrawal. Having been consummated, these
actions bind the Philippines.

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners posit:

If the Executive can unilaterally withdraw from any treaty or international agreement, he is in a
position to abrogate some of the basic norms in our legal system. Thus, the Executive can
unilaterally withdraw from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva
Conventions[,] and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, without any checking
mechanism from Congress. This would be an undemocratic concentration of power in the Executive
that could not have been contemplated by the Constitution.221

We reiterate that courts may only rule on an actual case. This Court has no jurisdiction to rule on
matters that are abstract, hypothetical, or merely potential. Petitioners' fear that the President may
unilaterally withdraw from other treaties has not transpired and cannot be taken cognizance of by
this Court in this case. We have the duty to determine when we should stay our hand, and refuse to
rule on cases where the issues are speculative and theoretical, and consequently, not justiciable.222

Legislative and executive powers impel the concerned branches of government into assuming a
more proactive role in our constitutional order. Judicial power, on the other hand, limits this Court
into taking a passive stance. Such is the consequence of separation of powers. Until an actual case
is brought before us by the proper parties at the opportune time, where the constitutional question is
the very lis mota, we cannot act on an issue, no matter how much it agonizes us.

XII

Parties have standing if they stand to be benefited if the case is resolved in their favor, or if they
shall suffer should the case be decided against them.223

In Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,224 this Court explained:

Much like the requirement of an actual case or controversy, legal standing ensures that a party is
seeking a concrete outcome or relief that may be granted by courts:

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."

The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both
"built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government."
In addition, economic reasons justify the rule. Thus:

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate
constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity
of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden
their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is
an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended m the name of the real
party-in-interest, interest being "material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree
or judgment of the case[,] [not just] mere curiosity about the question involved." Whether a suit is
public or private, the parties must have "a present substantial interest," not a "mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those who bring the suit must possess
their own right to the relief sought. . . .

Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned citizens, this Court has noted
that the party must claim some kind of injury-in-fact.225 (Citations omitted)

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators were then incumbent minority senators who allege that the
Senate's constitutional prerogative to concur in the government's decision to withdraw from the
Rome Statute has been impaired. They add that they were likewise suing as citizens, as this case
allegedly involves a "public right and its object . . . is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty."226

Petitioners-senators also claim that the issue has transcendental importance, which may potentially
impact constitutional checks and balances, our domestic legal system, and the country's relations
with the international community.227

In G.R. No. 239483, petitioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its
individual members assert that, as Philippine citizens and as human beings, they have rights to life
and personal security. The withdrawal from the Rome Statute, they claim, violates their rights to
ample remedies for the protection of their rights, "and of their other fundamental rights especially the
right to life."228

They likewise contend that their Petition is a taxpayers' suit, since the executive department spent
substantial taxpayer's money in attending negotiations and in participating in the drafting of what
would be the Rome Statute.229

In G.R. No. 240954, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines comes to this Court on essentially the
same ground: as a group of concerned citizens, it invokes its members' right to life and due process
that may be affected by the withdrawal. Additionally, it claims that as a body that aims to uphold the
rule of law, it has standing to the question whether the withdrawal was proper.230

Jurisprudence has consistently recognized each legislator's individual standing and prerogative
independent of the House of Representatives or the Senate as a collegial body.231 A legislator's
individual standing and prerogative remains and is not abandoned in this case. However, the precise
circumstances here subvert the otherwise generally recognized standing which anchors the
individual legislators' capacity to seek relief. Here, the Senate's inaction makes premature
petitioners-senators' capacity to seek relief. The Senate's institutional reticence subverts the
capacities otherwise properly accruing to petitioners-senators.

The Senate has refrained from passing a resolution indicating that its assent should have been
obtained in withdrawing from the Rome Statute. Senate Resolution No. 289,232 or the "Resolution
Expressing the Sense of the Senate that Termination of, or Withdrawal from, Treaties and
International Agreements Concurred in by the Senate shall be Valid and Effective Only Upon
Concurrence by the Senate," has been presented to but, thus far, never adopted by the Senate.
During the September 4, 2018 oral arguments, petitioner Senator Pangilinan himself manifested the
resolution's pendency, which he claimed was "not rejected . . . but was not calendared for
adoption."233 Thus, Senate Resolution No. 289 has absolutely no legal effect. Such reticence on
this matter means that, as a collegial body, and in its wisdom, the Senate has chosen not to assert
any right or prerogative which it may feel pertains to it, if any, to limit, balance, or otherwise inhibit
the President's act.

The passage of Resolution No. 289 would have been a definite basis on which petitioners-senators
can claim a right. However, the Senate itself appears to have not seen the need for it. Thus,
petitioners-senators cannot validly come to this Court with a case that is already foreclosed by their
own institution's inaction.

Moreover, as discussed, petitioner Senator Pangilinan mentioned during oral arguments that the
Senate has passed 17 resolutions concurring on different treaties, each of which came with a clause
that specifically required its concurrence for withdrawal.234 In contrast, no similar clause was
contained in Senate Resolution No. 546,235 through which the Senate ratified the Rome Statute.
Thus, the Senate's inaction itself precludes a source from which petitioners-senators could claim a
right to require Senate concurrence to withdrawing from the Rome Statute.

Incidentally, in Goldwater, the United States Supreme Court also declined to rule on the substance
of the case. There, then Senator Barry Goldwater and other Congress members assailed then
President Carter's unilateral nullification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, claiming that
this should have required Senate concurrence. However, Congress had not formally taken a stance
contrary to the president's action through any resolution. There was a draft Senate resolution, but no
vote was taken on it.236 Justice Powell noted:

This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial review
Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the President is not
ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system.
The differences should, and almost invariably do, turn on political, rather than legal,
considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.
Otherwise, we would encourage small groups, or even individual Members, of Congress to seek
judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the
conflict.

In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty
with Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a change in the supreme
law of the land. Congress has taken no official action. In the present posture of this case, we do not
know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches. Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is
necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, no final vote has been taken on the
resolution. Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution would have retroactive effect. It cannot be
said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses
not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.237 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similarly, this Court should stay its hand when the Senate itself, as a collegial body, has not officially
confronted the President's act. This is in keeping with the limits of judicial review.

On the other hand, persons invoking their rights as citizens must satisfy the following requisites to
file a suit: (1) they must have "personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of government"; (2) "the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action";
and (3) "the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action."238

In G.R. Nos. 239483 and 240954, what petitioners assail is an act of the President, in the exercise of
his executive power. They failed to show the actual or imminent injury that they sustained as a result
of the President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Again, "whether a suit is public or private, the
parties must have 'a present substantial interest,' not a 'mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest."'239

Similarly, petitioners have no standing as taxpayers. In cases involving expenditure of public funds,
also known as a taxpayer's suit, "there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional[.]"240

Petitioners here failed to show any illegal expenditure of public funds. To allow these petitioners who
suffer no injury to invoke this Court's discretion would be to allow everyone to come to courts on the
flimsiest of grounds.

Parties must possess their own right to the relief sought, and a general invocation of citizen's or a
taxpayer's rights is insufficient. This Court must not indiscriminately open its doors to every person
urging it to take cognizance of a case where they have no demonstrable injury. This may ultimately
render this Court ineffective to dispense justice as cases clog its docket.241

This Court has also recognized that an association may file petitions on behalf of its members on the
basis of third party standing. However, to do so, the association must meet the following
requirements: (1) "the [party bringing suit] must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving [it] a
'sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute"; (2) "the party must have a
close relation to the third party"; and (3) "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability
to protect his or her own interests."242

In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health,243 this

Court found that an association "has the legal personality to represent its members because the
results of the case will affect their vital interests":244

The modern view. . . . fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An
association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

....

We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized ... to act as the
representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes
embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members,
because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. . . The respondent [association] is
but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of
their voices and the redress of their grievances.245

In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines,246 this Court did not allow the
association of bus operators to represent its members. There were no board resolutions or articles of
incorporation presented to show that it was authorized to file the petition on the members' behalf.
Some of the associations even had their certificates of incorporation revoked. This Court ruled that it
is insufficient to simply allege that the petitioners are associations that represent their members who
will be directly injured by the implementation of a law:

The associations in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc., and The Executive Secretary were allowed to sue on behalf of their
members because they sufficiently established who their members were, that their members
authorized the associations to sue on their behalf, and that the members would be directly injured by
the challenged governmental acts.

The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or corporations whose members are
those who suffer direct and substantial injury depends on a few factors.

In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore, there should also be a clear
and convincing demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able to
sue.

Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing demonstration that the representation of
the association is more efficient for the petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more
efficient for this Court to hear only one voice from the association. In other words, the association
should show special reasons for bringing the action themselves rather than as a class suit, allowed
when the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons. In
a class suit, a number of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit
of all the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the class to which
they belong.

In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third parties represented by the petitioner
would have special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the action themselves.
Understandably, the cost to patrons in the White Light case to bring the action themselves—i.e., the
amount they would pay for the lease of the motels—will be too small compared with the cost of the
suit. But viewed in another way, whoever among the patrons files the case even for its
transcendental interest endows benefits on a substantial number of interested parties without
recovering their costs. This is the free rider problem in economics. It is a negative externality which
operates as a disincentive to sue and assert a transcendental right.247 (Citation omitted, emphasis
supplied)

Here, both petitioners-associations, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Philippine Coalition
for the International Criminal Court, failed to convince this Court why they must be heard as
associations. Advocating human rights as an institution is insufficient. No special reason was
alleged, let alone proved, why its allegedly injured members may not file the case themselves.

Worse, the members of the Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court joined the case
as petitioners, albeit likewise failing to exhibit actual or imminent injury from which they stand to
suffer.

XIII

Transcendental importance is often invoked in instances when the petitioners fail to establish
standing in accordance with customary requirements. However, its general invocation cannot negate
the requirement of locus standi. Facts must be undisputed, only legal issues must be present: and
proper and sufficient justifications why this Court should not simply stay its hand must be clear.
Falcis explained:

Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of

hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to
constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this
Court emphasized that transcendental importance — originally cited to relax rules on legal standing
and not as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts — applies only to cases with purely
legal issues. We explained that the decisive factor in whether this Court should permit the invocation
of transcendental importance is not merely the presence of "special and important reason[,]" but the
nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be no disputed
facts, and the issues raised should only be questions of law:

[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the
resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation
or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the
case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are
specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.

Still, it does not follow that this Court should proceed to exercise its power of judicial review just
because a case is attended with purely legal issues. Jurisdiction ought to be distinguished from
justiciability. Jurisdiction pertains to competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a case." On the other
hand,

[d]etermining whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is justiciable is an exercise of the power
granted to a court with jurisdiction over a case that involves constitutional adjudication. Thus, even if
this Court has jurisdiction, the canons of constitutional adjudication in our jurisdiction allow us to
disregard the questions raised at our discretion.

Appraising justiciability is typified by constitutional avoidance. This remains a matter of enabling this
Court to act in keeping with its capabilities. Matters of policy are properly left to government organs
that are better equipped at framing them. Justiciability demands that issues and judicial
pronouncements be properly framed in relation to established facts:

Angara v. Electoral Commission imbues these rules with its libertarian character.
Principally, Angara emphasized the liberal deference to another constitutional department or organ
given the majoritarian and representative character of the political deliberations in their forums. It is
not merely a judicial stance dictated by courtesy, but is rooted on the very nature of this Court.
Unless congealed in constitutional or statutory text and imperatively called for by the actual and non-
controversial facts of the case, this Court does not express policy. This Court should channel
democratic deliberation where it should take place.

....

Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious and deliberate caution. This Court should
refrain from speculating on the facts of a case and should allow parties to shape their case instead.
Likewise, this Court should avoid projecting hypothetica.l situations where none of the parties can
fully argue simply because they have not established the facts or are not interested in the issues
raised by the hypothetical situations. In a way, courts are mandated to adopt an attitude of judicial
skepticism. What we think may be happening may not at all be the case. Therefore, this Court
should always await the proper case to be properly pleaded and proved.
Thus, concerning the extent to which transcendental importance carves exceptions to the
requirements of justiciability, "[t]he elements supported by the facts of an actual case, and the
imperatives of our role as the Supreme Court within a specific cultural or historic context, must be
made clear":

They should be properly pleaded by the petitioner so that whether there is any transcendental
importance to a case is made an issue. That a case has transcendental importance, as applied, may
have been too ambiguous and subjective that it undermines the structural relationship that this Court
has with the sovereign people and other departments under the Constitution. Our rules on
jurisdiction and our interpretation of what is justiciable, refined with relevant cases, may be enough.

Otherwise, this Court would cede unfettered prerogative on parties. It would enable the
parties to impose their own determination of what issues are of paramount; national
significance, warranting immediate attention by the highest court of the land.248 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Associations, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission249 lists
the following considerations to determine whether an issue is of transcendental importance:

(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency
or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest in the questions being raised.250 (Citation omitted)

Here, all petitioners invoked the supposed transcendental importance of the constitutional issues.
However, none of the exceptional conditions warranting the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction is
present here. This case does not involve funds or assets. Neither was there any express disregard
of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioners also failed to show that no other party has a
more direct, personal, and material interest. Petitioners failed to invoke any source of right to bring
these Petitions.

This Court is competent to decide legal principles only in properly justiciable cases. That a party
must have standing in court is not a mere technical rule that may easily be waived. Courts should be
scrupulous in protecting the principles of justiciability, or else their legitimacy may be
undermined.251 Transcendental importance of issues excusing requisite standing should not be so
recklessly invoked, and is justified only in extraordinary circumstances.

The alleged transcendental importance of the issues raised here will be better served when there
are actual cases with the proper parties suffering an actual or imminent injury. No injury so great and
so imminent was shown here, such that this Court cannot instead adjudicate on the occasion of an
appropriate case.

XIV

The writ of certiorari which may be issued under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be distinguished
from the writ of certiorari that may be issued pursuant to the
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction"252 under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the 1987
Constitution.253 The latter is a remedy for breaches of constitutional rights by any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Meanwhile, the special civil action under Rule 65 is limited to a
review of judicial and quasi-judicial acts. The following summarizes the distinctions between the two
avenues for certiorari:
 Certiorari under Rule 65 Expanded Certiorari

Basis Rule 65 of the Rules of Court Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph

2 of the Constitution

Assailed without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

act grave abuse of discretion amounting to amounting to lack or excess of
lack or excess of jurisdiction jurisdiction

By whom any tribunal, board or officer exercising any branch or instrumentality of

judicial or quasi-judicial functions the government

Other requisites there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law

While these two avenues are distinct, this Court has allowed—in view of its power to relax its rules of
procedure—recourse to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 to enable reliefs that invoke
expanded certiorari jurisdiction.254

Regardless, "the expansion of this Court's judicial power is by no means an abandonment of the
need to satisfy the basic requisites of justiciability."255 Ultimately, the nature of judicial power means
that this Court is competent to decide legal principles only when there is an actual case brought by
the proper parties who suffer direct, material, and substantial injury.

XV

The special civil actions of petitions for certiorari and mandamus cannot afford petitioners the reliefs
they seek.

Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to resolve constitutional issues. Instead, they "are filed to
address the jurisdictional excesses of officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions."256 Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only when the following requisites are present (1)
the writ "must be directed against a tribunal, a board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions"; (2) "the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion"; and (3) "there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."257

Not every instance of abuse of discretion should lead this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review. The abuse of discretion must be grave, amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Sinon v.
Civil Service Commission258 explains:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.259 (Citation omitted)

A writ of certiorari is unavailing here. The assailed government act is the President's withdrawal from
the Rome Statute. This, by any stretch of the imagination, may not be considered an exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial power.

A political question exists when the issue does not call on this Court to determine legality and
adjudicate, but to interpret the wisdom of a law or an act.260 It has been defined as a question
"which, under the Constitution, [is] to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government."261

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora:262

One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that
political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal
branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the
Constitution.

. . . In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, prominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one
question.263 (Citation omitted)

Courts cannot resolve a political question. It is not within the purview of judicial functions, and must
be left to the sound discretion of the political agents—the executive or the legislature.

It is true that we have previously said that it is wrong to mistake matters of foreign relations as
political questions, which are completely beyond the reach of judicial review. Nevertheless,
generally, the pursuit of foreign relations is in the executive domain, and thus, pertains to the
president,264 the primary architect of foreign policy. As explained in Bayan v. Zamora:265
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the
sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy, his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is then
conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation . . . is
"executive altogether."266 (Citations omitted)

Between the executive and this Court, it is the executive that represents the Philippines in the
international sphere. This Court interprets laws hut its determinations are effective only within the
bounds of Philippine jurisdiction. Even within these bounds, this Court must caution itself in
interpreting the Constitution and our laws, for it can undermine the discretion of the political
agencies. This Court's mandate is clear: it is the presence of grave abuse of discretion that
sanctions us to act. It is not merely discretion, but abuse of that discretion; and it is not only abuse of
discretion, but grave abuse of discretion.

The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the mechanism provided
in the treaty. The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's withdrawal. A state
party and its agents cannot be faulted for merely acting within what the Rome Statute expressly
allows.

As far as established facts go, all there is for this Court to rely on are the manifest actions of the
executive, which have nonetheless all been consistent with the letter of the Rome Statute.
Suggestions have been made about supposed political motivations, but they remain just that:
suggestions and suppositions.

Were the situation different—where it is shown that the President's exercise of discretion ran afoul of
established procedure; or was done in manifest disregard of previously declared periods for
rectification, terms, guidelines, or injunctions, belying any rhyme or reason in the course of action
hastily and haphazardly taken; or was borne out of vindictiveness, as retaliation, merely out of
personal motives, to please personal tastes or to placate personal perceived injuries—whimsical and
arbitrary exercise of discretion may be appreciated, impelling this Court to rule on the substance of
petitions and grant the reliefs sought.

XVI

Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may tile a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Lihaylihay v. Treasurer of the Philippines267 discussed the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus:

A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second, "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled."

The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a
correlative duty incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them
by law.

Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a prospective
entitlement that is yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that
"[m]andamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already established."
In Pefianco v. Moral, this Court underscored that a writ of mandamus "never issues in doubtful
cases."

Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act mandated by law.
Clear in the text of Rule 65, Section 3 is the requirement that respondents "unlawfully neglect" the
performance of a duty. The mere existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of its
performance does not suffice.

The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. A court cannot subvert
legally vested authority for a body or officer to exercise discretion. In Sy Ha v. Galang:

[M]andamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

This Court distinguished discretionary functions from ministerial duties, and related the exercise of
discretion to judicial and quasi-judicial powers. In Samson v. Barrios:

Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law
of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgments and
consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or
duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. . . .
Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of discretion of an inferior tribunal . . . , when the act
complained of is either judicial or quasi-judicial. . . . It is the proper remedy when the case presented
is outside of the exercise of judicial discretion. . . .

Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it is shown that "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule
65, i.e., certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.268 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial, and not
those that are discretionary. Petitioners must show that they have a clear legal right and that there
was a neglected duty which was incumbent upon the public officer.

Here, however, there is no showing that the President has the ministerial duty imposed by law to
retract his withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Certainly, there is no constitutional or statutory
provision granting petitioners the right to compel the executive to withdraw from any treaty. It was
discretionary upon the President, as primary architect of our foreign policy, to perform the assailed
act.

Moreover, issuing a writ of mandamus will not ipso facto restore the Philippines to membership in
the International Criminal Court. No provision in the Rome Statute directs how a state party may
reverse its withdrawal from the treaty. It cannot be guaranteed that the Note Verbale's depositary,
the United Nations Secretary-General, will assent to this Court's compulsion to reverse the country's
withdrawal.

This Court is not an international court. It may only rule on the effect of international law on the
domestic sphere. What is within its purview is not the effectivity of laws among states, but the effect
of international law on the Constitution and our municipal laws. Not only do petitioners pray for a
relief directed at a discretionary function, but the relief they seek through this Court's finite authority
is ineffectual and futile. Ultimately, mandamus will not lie.

XVII

Pacta sunt servanda is a generally accepted principle of international law that preserves the sanctity
of treaties. This principle is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention:

Article 26
"Pacta sunt servanda"

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

A supplementary provision is found in Article 46:

Article 46
Provisions of internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties

1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of
its internal law of fundamental importance.

2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the
matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

A state party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law to justify its failure to perform a treaty.
Under international law, we cannot plead our own laws to excuse our noncompliance with our
obligations.

The March 15, 2018 Note Verbale submitted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, through our
Ambassador to the United Nations, partly reads:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has the honor to inform the Secretary-General, in
his capacity as depositary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, of its decision to
withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Statute.
The Philippines assures the community of nations that the Philippine Government continues to be
guided by the rule of law embodied in its Constitution, which also enshrines the country's long-
standing tradition of upholding human rights.

The Government affirms its commitment to fight against impunity for atrocity crimes, notwithstanding
its withdrawal from the Rome Statute, especially since the Philippines has a national legislation
punishing atrocity crimes. The Government remains resolute in effecting its principal responsibility to
ensure the long-term safety of the nation in order to promote inclusive national development and
secure a decent and dignified life for all.

The decision to withdraw is the Philippines' principled stand against those who politicize and
weaponize human rights, even as its independent and well-functioning organs and agencies
continue to exercise jurisdiction over complaints, issues, problems and concerns arising from its
efforts to protect its people.269 (Emphasis supplied)

The Philippines' withdrawal was submitted in accordance with relevant provisions of the Rome
Statute. The President complied with the provisions of the treaty from which the country withdrew.
There cannot be a violation of pacta sunt servanda when the executive acted precisely in
accordance with the procedure laid out by that treaty. Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute states:

1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after
the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

From its text, the Rome Statute provides no room to reverse the accepted withdrawal from it. While
there is a one-year period before the withdrawal takes effect, it is unclear whether we can read into
that proviso a permission for a state party to rethink its position, and retreat from its withdrawal.

In any case, this Court has no competence to interpret with finality—let alone bind the International
Criminal Court, the Assembly of States Parties, individual state parties, and the entire international
community—what this provision means, and conclude that undoing a withdrawal is viable. In the
face of how the Rome Statute enables withdrawal but does not contemplate the undoing of a
withdrawal, this Court cannot compel external recognition of any prospective undoing which it shall
order. To do so could even mean courting international embarrassment.

Just the same, any such potential embarrassment or other unpalatable consequences arc risks that
we, as a country, are willing to take is better left to those tasked with crafting foreign policy.

The Rome Statute contemplates amendments, and is replete with provisions on it:

Article 121
Amendments

1. After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party
may propose amendments thereto. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States
Parties.
2. No sooner than three months from the date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties,
at its next meeting, shall, by a majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take
up the proposal. The Assembly may deal with the proposal directly or convene a Review
Conference if the issue involved so warrants.

3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a

Review Conference which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority
States Parties.

4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States
Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them.

5. Any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those
States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted
the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the
amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory.

6. If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance

with paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw
from this Statute with immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject
to article 127, paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force of
such amendment.

7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any
amendment adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review
Conference.

Article 122
Amendments to provisions of an institutional nature

1. Amendments to provisions of this Statute which are of an exclusively institutional nature,

namely, article 35, article 36, paragraphs 8 and 9, article 37, article 38, article 39,
paragraphs 1 (first two sentences), 2 and 4, article 42, paragraphs 4 to 9, article 43,
paragraphs 2 and 3, and articles 44, 46, 47 and 49, may be proposed at any time,
notwithstanding article 121, paragraph 1, by any State Party. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or such other
person designated by the Assembly of States Parties who shall promptly circulate it to all
States Parties and to others participating in the Assembly.

2. Amendments under this article in which consensus cannot be reached shall be adopted by
the Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference, by a two-thirds majority of States
Parties. Such amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties six months after their
adoption by the Assembly of, as the case may be, by the Conference.

Article 123
Review of Statute

1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute.
 Such review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The
Conference shall be open to those participating in the Assembly of State Parties and on the
same conditions.

2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the purposes set out in
paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, upon approval by a majority
of States Parties, convene a Review Conference.

3. The provisions of article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption and entry into
force of any amendment to the Statute considered in a Review Conference.

Generally, jus cogens rules of customary international law cannot be amended by treaties. As

Articles 121, 122, and 123 allow the amendment of provisions of the Rome Statute, this indicates
that the Rome Statute is not jus cogens. At best, its provisions are articulations of customary law, or
simply, treaty law. Article 121(6) sanctions the immediate withdrawal of a state party if it does not
agree with the amending provisions of the Rome Statute. Therefore, withdrawal from the Rome
Statute is not aberrant. Precisely, the option is enabled for states parties.

Petitioners' contention—that withdrawing from the Rome Statute effectively repeals a law—is
inaccurate. The Rome Statute remained in force for its states parties, and Article 127 specifically
allows state parties to withdraw.

In withdrawing from the Rome Statute, the President complied with the treaty's requirements.
Compliance with its textual provisions cannot be susceptible of an interpretation that his act violated
the treaty. Hence, withdrawal per se from the Rome Statute does not violate pacta sunt servanda.

XVIII

Petitioners in G.R. No. 239483 invoke the case of South Africa, which had previously attempted to
withdraw from the Rome Statute. When the withdrawal was challenged by the South African
Opposition Democratic Alliance, the South African High Court ruled that the president's withdrawal
was premature, procedurally irrational, and may not be done without the approval of the Parliament.
It said:

The matter was argued largely on the basis that there is no provision in the Constitution or in any
other legislation for withdrawal from international treaties. . . . However, it appears to us that there is
probably a good reason why the Constitution provides for the power of the executive to negotiate
and conclude international agreements but is silent on the power to terminate them. The reason is
this: As the executing arm of the state, the national executive needs authority to act. That authority
will flow from the Constitution or from an act of parliament. The national executive can exercise only
those powers and perform those functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, or by law which is
consistent with the Constitution. This is a basic requirement of the principle of legality and the rule of
law. The absence of a provision in the Constitution or any other legislation of a power for the
executive to terminate international agreements is therefore confirmation of the fact that such power
does not exist unless and until parliament legislates for it. It is not a lacuna or omission.270

The ruling on South Africa's withdrawal cannot be taken as binding precedent.

First, foreign judgments are not binding in our jurisdiction. At most, they may hold persuasive
value.271 Francisco v. House of Representatives272 teaches that this Court, in passing upon
constitutional questions, "should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."273

Second, a comparison of the Philippines' and South Africa's respective governmental structures and
constitutions reveals stark differences.

Our Constitution states: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."274

On the other hand, the South African Constitution provides:

SECTION 231. International Agreements

(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the
national executive

(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is
an agreement referred to in subsection (3).275 (Emphasis supplied)

Our Constitution requires that when the president enters into a treaty, at least two-thirds of all
members of the Senate must concur for it to be valid and effective. On the other hand, the South
African Constitution expressly requires that the entire parliament must approve the international
agreement.

Per our system of checks and balances, the Senate concurred with entering into the Rome Statute
through Senate Resolution No. 546. In contrast, the South African parliament had to enact a law, the
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002,276 for the
Rome Statute to be adopted in South Africa. Thus, treaty-making in South Africa is vested in their
parliament, making it a concurrently legislative and not an exclusively executive act. In the
Philippines, treaty-making is an executive act, vested in the president; the Senate's involvement is
limited to mere concurrence.

While there may be similarities between our constitutions, these are not enough to take South
Africa's case as binding precedent. We are under a presidential form of government. The way our
system of checks and balances operates is different from how such a system would operate m a
parliamentary government.

XIX

Withdrawing from the Rome Statute does not discharge a state party from the obligations it has
incurred as a member. Article 127(2) provides:

A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this
Statute while it was as a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have
accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal
investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate
and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it
prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under
consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective. (Emphasis
supplied)
A state party withdrawing from the Rome Statute must still comply with this provision. Even if it has
deposited the instrument of withdrawal, it shall not be discharged from any criminal proceedings.
Whatever process was already initiated before the International Criminal Court obliges the state
party to cooperate.

Until the withdrawal took effect on March 17, 2019, the Philippines was committed to meet its
obligations under the Rome Statute. Any and all governmental acts up to March 17, 2019 may be
taken cognizance of by the International Criminal Court.

Further, as petitioners in G.R. No. 239483 underscored:

[U]nder this reverse complementarity provision in [Republic Act No. 9851, the Preliminary
Examination opened by the [International Criminal Court] on the President's drug war is not
exactly haram (to borrow a word used in Islam to mean any act forbidden by the Divine). Assuming
such a [Preliminary Examination] proceeds . . . when Art. 18 (3) of the Rome Statute comes into
play, [Republic Ad No. 9851 may be invoked as basis by Philippine authorities to defer instead to the
[International Criminal Court] in respect of any investigation on the .same situation.277

Consequently, liability for the alleged summary killings and other atrocities committed in the course
of the war on drugs is not nullified or negated here. The Philippines remained covered and bound by
the Rome Statute until March 17, 2019.

XX

Petitioners claim that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute violated their right to be
provided with ample remedies for the protection of their right to life and security.

This fear of imagined diminution of legal remedies must be assuaged. The Constitution, which
embodies our fundamental rights, was in no way abrogated by the withdrawal. A litany of statutes
that protect our rights remain in place and enforceable.

As discussed, Republic Act No. 9851 or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, echoes the substantive
provisions of the Rome Statue. It was signed into law on December 11, 2009, two years before the
Senate concurred with the Rome Statute. Republic Act No. 9851 covers rights similarly protected
under the Rome Statute. Consequently, no new obligations arose from our membership in the
International Criminal Court. Given the variances between the Rome Statute and Republic Act No.
9851, it may even be said that the Rome Statute amended Republic Act No. 9851.

Republic Act No. 9851 declares the State policy of valuing "the dignity of every human person and
guarantee[ing] full respect for human rights, including the rights of indigenous cultural communities
and other vulnerable groups, such as women and children[.]"278 It guarantees protection against
"the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole . . . and their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level in order to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crime[.]279 It recognizes that the State must "exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes[.]"280

This is enforced by the Republic Act No. 9851's assertion of jurisdiction over crimes committed
anywhere in the world:
SECTION 17. Jurisdiction. — The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or
civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the
crime is committed, provided, any one of the following conditions is met:

(a) The accused is a Filipino citizen;

(b) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or

(c) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.

In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or
prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already
conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities
may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate
international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.

No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against foreign nationals suspected or accused of having
committed the crimes defined and penalized in this Act if they have been tried by a competent court
outside the Philippines in respect of the same offense and acquitted, or having been convicted,
already served their sentence.281

Republic Act No. 9851 expressly confers original and exclusive jurisdiction on regional trial courts
over the offenses it punishes. It also provides that this Court shall designate special courts to try
these cases.282 Unlike the Rome Statute, Republic Act No. 9851 dispenses with complementarity
as a requirement for prosecution of crimes against humanity.

Notably, Republic Act No. 9851 proclaims as state policy the protection of human rights of the
accused, the victims, and the witnesses, and provides for accessible and gender-sensitive avenues
of redress:

The State shall guarantee persons suspected or accused of having committed grave crimes under
international law all rights necessary to ensure that their trial will he fair and prompt in strict
accordance with national and international law and standards for fair trial, It shall also protect
victims, witnesses and their families, and provide appropriate redress to victims and their families.. It
shall ensure that the legal systems in place provide accessible and gender-sensitive avenues of
redress for victims of armed conflict[.]283

These State policies are operationalized in the following provisions:

SECTION 13. Protection of Victims and Witnesses. – In addition to existing provisions in Philippine

law for the protection of victims and witnesses, the following measures shall be undertaken:

(a) The Philippine court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and
physiological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the court
shall have regard of all relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature of
the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence
or violence against children. The prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the
investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial;
 (b) As an exception to the general principle of public hearings, the court may, to protect the
victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow
the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such
measures shall be implemented in the case of the victim of sexual violence or a child who is
a victim or is a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the court, having regard to all the
circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness;

(c) Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the court shall permit their views
and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be
appropriate by the court in manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the
legal representatives of the victims where the court considers it appropriate in accordance
with the established rules of procedure and evidence; and

(d) Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Act may lead to the
grave endangerment of the security of a witness for his/her family, the prosecution may, for
the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial; withhold
such evidence or information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall
be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the
accused and to a fair and impartial trial.

SECTION 14. Reparations to Victims. – In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law and

procedural rules for reparations to victims, the following measures shall be undertaken:

(a) The court shall follow the principles relating to the reparations to, or in respect of, victims,
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision, the court
may, wither upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the
scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and state the
principles on which it is acting:

(b) The court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation;
and

(c) Before making an order under this section, the court may invite and shall take account of
representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims or other interested
persons.

Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or
international law.284

Chapter III285 of Republic Act No. 9851 defines war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against
humanity, as similarly characterized in the Rome Statute.

However, there are significant differences between the Rome Statute and Republic Act No. 9851.

Republic Act No. 9851 defines torture as "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical, mental, or psychological, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the
accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to, lawful sanctions."286 Meanwhile, psychological means of torture are not covered by
the Rome Statute. This is also a departure from Republic Act No. 9745, or the Anti-Torture Act of
2009, which limits torture to those "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority"287 for specific purposes.

Republic Act No. 9851 clustered war crimes or crimes against international humanitarian law into
three categories: (1) an international armed conflict; (2) a non-international armed conflict; and (3)
other serious violations of laws and customs applicable in armed conflict. It then listed specific acts
against protected persons or properties, or against persons taking no active part in hostilities. The
broader definition of war crimes under Republic Act No. 9851 as compared with the Rome Statute is
emphasized below:

SECTION 4. War Crimes. —- For the purpose of this Act, "war crimes" or "crimes against
International Humanitarian Law" means:

(a) In case of an international armed conflict, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

....

(6) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population or unlawful confinement;

(7) Taking of hostages;

(8) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a
hostile power; and

(9) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or other protected

persons.

(b) In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of common Article 3 to the
four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed
against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention or any other cause:

(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;

....

(3) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions or Additional Protocol III in conformity with international law;

....

(6) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in

the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects, and causing death or serious injury to body or health;

....
 18) Killing or wounding a person in the knowledge that he/she is hors de combat,
including a combatant who, having laid down his/her arms or no longer having
means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;

(9) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or the military insignia and
uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems
of the Geneva Conventions or other protective signs under International
Humanitarian Law, resulting in death, serious personal injury or capture;

....

(12) Killing, wounding or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy;

....

(19) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,

enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions or a serious violation of common Article 3 to
the Geneva Conventions;

....

(21) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving

them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Convention and their Additional
Protocols;

....

(24) Committing any of the following acts;

(i) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of fifteen (15)

years into the national armed forces;

(ii) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of eighteen (18)

years into an armed force or group other than the national armed forces; and

(iii) Using children under the age of eighteen (18) years to participate actively
in hostilities; and

....

Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified herein shall suffer the penalty
provided under Section 7 of this Act.288 (Emphasis supplied)

Acts of willful killing, as opposed to "murder" under the Rome Statute, deportation or forcible transfer
of populations, torture, and the sexual offenses under the third category of war crimes are also listed
as "other crimes against humanity" under Republic Act No. 9851.

Unlike the Rome Statute, Republic Act No. 9851 also adds or includes among other crimes against
humanity persecution against any individual, group, or collectivity based on their sexual
orientation. Enforced or "involuntary disappearance of persons" is also a punishable crime against
humanity.289

Republic Act No. 9851 holds superiors liable as principals for crimes committed by subordinates
under their effective command and control.290 This provides for command responsibility "as a form
of criminal complicity" that jurisprudence has recognized:291

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in

order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to
protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency.

Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 98)1 to include command responsibility as
a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other
crimes. RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those
superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.292 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

All told, the more restrictive Rome Statute may have even weakened the substantive protections
already previously afforded by Republic Act No. 9851. In such a case, it may well be beneficial to
remove the confusion brought about by maintaining a treaty whose contents are inconsistent with
antecedent statutory provisions.

XXI

It has been opined that the principles of law in the Rome Statute are generally accepted principles of
international law. Assuming that this is true and considering the incorporation clause, the Philippines'
withdrawal from the Rome Statute would be a superfluity thus, ultimately ineffectual. The Philippines
would remain bound by obligations expressed in the Rome Statute:

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law form part of Philippine laws even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations of the Philippines.

....

Some customary international laws have been affirmed and embodied in treaties and conventions. A
treaty constitutes evidence of customary law if it is declaratory of customary law, or if it is intended to
codify customary law. In such a case, even a State not party to the treaty would be bound thereby. A
treaty which is merely a formal expression of customary international law is enforceable on all States
because of their membership in the family of nations. For instance, the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations to binding even on non-party States because the provisions of the Convention
are mostly codified rules of customary international law binding on all States even before their
codification into the Vienna Convention. Another example is the Law of the Sea, which consists
mostly of codified rules of customary international law, which have been universally observed even
before the Law of the Sea was ratified by participating States.
Corollarily, treaties may become the basis of customary international law. While States which are not
parties to treaties or international agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if widely
accepted for years by many States, may transform into customary international laws, in which case,
they bind even non-signatory States.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that even in the absence of the Constitution, generally
accepted principles of international law remain part of the laws of the Philippines. During the
interregnum, or the period after the actual takeover of power by the revolutionary government in the
Philippines, following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution), the 1973 Philippine Constitution was abrogated
and there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that even during this period, the provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
to which the Philippines is a signatory, remained in effect in the country. The Covenant and
Declaration are based on generally accepted principles of international law which are applicable in
the Philippines even in the absence of a constitution, as during the interregnum. Consequently,
applying the provisions of the Covenant and the Declaration, the Filipino people continued to enjoy
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights despite the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by 120 members of the United
Nations (UN) on 17 July 1998. It entered into force on 1 July 2002, after 60 States became party to
the Statute through ratification or accession. The adoption of the Rome Statute fulfilled the
international community's long-time dream of creating a permanent international tribunal to try
serious international crimes. The Rome Statute, which established an international criminal court
and formally declared genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity as serious
international crimes, codified generally accepted principles of international law, including customary
international laws. The principles of law embodied in the Rome Statute were already generally
accepted principles of international law even prior to the adoption of the Statute. Subsequently, the
Rome Statute itself has been widely accepted and, as of November 2010, it has been ratified by 114
states, 113 of which are members of the UN.

There are at present 192 members of the UN. Since 113 member states have already ratified the
Rome Statute, more than a majority of all the UN members have now adopted the Rome Statute as
part of their municipal laws. Thus, the Rome Statute itself is generally accepted by the Community of
nations as constituting a body of generally accepted principles of international law. The principles of
law found in the Rome Statute constitute generally accepted principles of international law
enforceable in the Philippines under the Philippine Constitution. The principles of law embodied in
the Rome Statute are binding on the Philippines even if the Statute has yet to be ratified by the
Philippine Senate. In short, the principles of law enunciated in the Rome Statute are now part of
Philippine domestic law pursuant to Section 2 , Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.293 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Chapter VII, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9851 enumerates the applicable sources of international
law that guide its interpretation and implementation:

SECTION 15. Applicability of International Law. — In the application and interpretation of this Act,
Philippine courts shall be guided by the following sources:

(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;

(b) The 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and their
2005 Additional Protocol III;
 (c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, its First Protocol and its 1999 Second Protocol;

(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 optional Protocol on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;

(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;

(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and trbunals;

(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;

(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded to by the
Republic of the Philippines; and

(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries on the
foregoing sources as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law.

As listed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Philippines also remained as state party to these
international conventions and human rights instruments:

(a) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(b) The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights;

(c) The Convention Against Torture;

(d) The Convention on the Discrimination Against Women; an Elimination of Discrimination;

and

(e) The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.294

Thus, petitioner’s concern that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute abjectly and
reversibly subverts our basic human rights appears to be baseless and purely speculative.

All told, the consolidated Petitions are dismissed for failing to demonstrate justiciability. While we
commend the zealousness of petitioners in seeking to ensure that the President acts within the
bounds of the Constitution, they had no standing to file their suits. We cannot grant the reliefs they
seek. The unfolding of events, including the International Criminal Court’s acknowledgment of
withdrawal even before the lapse of one year from initial notice, rendered the Petitions' moot,
removing any potential relief from this Court’s sphere.

Mechanisms that safeguard human rights and protect against the grave offenses sought to be
addressed by the Rome Statute remain formally in place in this jurisdiction. Further, the International
Criminal Court retains jurisdiction over any and all acts committed by government actors until March
17, 2019. Hence, withdrawal from the Rome Statute does not affect the liabilities of individuals
charged before the International Criminal Court for acts committed up to this date.

As guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of foreign policy, the
President enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties which are bona fide deemed contrary
to the Constitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping with the national policy adopted pursuant
to the Constitution and our laws.

However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative involvement
on the manner by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The President cannot
unilaterally withdraw from treaties that were entered into pursuant to the legislative intent manifested
in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed by succeeding laws. Treaties where Senate concurrence for
accession is expressly premised on the same concurrence for withdrawal likewise cannot be the
subject of unilateral withdrawal. The imposition of Senate concurrence as a condition may be made
piecemeal, through individual. Senate resolutions pertaining to specific treaties, or through
encompassing legislative action, such as a law, a joint resolution by Congress, or a comprehensive
Senate resolution.

Ultimately, the exercise of discretion to withdraw from treaties and international agreements is
susceptible to judicial review in cases attended by grave abuse of discretion, as when there is no
clear, definite, or reliable showing of repugnance to the Constitution or our statutes, or in cases of
inordinate unilateral withdrawal violating requisite legislative involvement. Nevertheless, any attempt
to invoke the power of judicial review must conform to the basic requisites of justiciability. Such
attempt can only proceed when attended by incidents demonstrating a properly justiciable
controversy.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954
are DISMISSED for being moot.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting,

Zalameda, M. Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 16, 2021 a Decision copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July
2, 2021 at 10:00 a.m.

Very truly yours,

EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court

By:

(Sgd.) ANNA-LI R. PAPA-GOMBIO

Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc