Evidence Legislation and Rules - PETER KACHAMA
Evidence Legislation and Rules - PETER KACHAMA
Evidence Legislation and Rules - PETER KACHAMA
2023
Recommended Citation
Imwinkelried, Edward J. (2023) "An Essay on Drafting Evidence Legislation and Rules: Challenging
the Conventional Wisdom," Zambian Open University Law Review: Vol. 56: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol56/iss1/1
Peter M.Kachama*
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 2
II. A description of the conventional wisdom: a catalog
approach for privileges and a code approach for other areas
of evidence doctrine ............................................................. 7
A. The Doctrinal Area of Privileges ................................... 7
B. Other Doctrinal Areas in Evidence Law ...................... 11
1. The Model Code of Evidence ................................. 12
2. The Uniform Rules of Evidence ............................. 12
3. The California Evidence Code ............................... 13
4. The Federal Rules of Evidence .............................. 15
III. A critical evaluation of the conventional wisdom: the
developments that raise grave questions about both parts of
the received orthodoxy ....................................................... 19
A. The Doctrinal Area of Privileges ................................... 19
B. Other Doctrinal Areas in Evidence Law ........................ 24
IV. The implications of the weaknesses of the conventional
wisdom: the desirability of convergence ............................ 28
A. Broadening the Wording of the Provisions Governing
Privileges ..................................................................... 28
B. Tightening the Wording of Provisions Governing Other
Doctrinal Areas in Evidence Law ................................ 29
V. Conclusion .......................................................................... 34
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last century has witnessed several major efforts at reforming and
codifying Evidence law in the United States. As Part I of this Essay
explains, those efforts have included the American Law Institute’s Model
Code of Evidence, 1 several iterations of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
originally promulgated in 1953 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2 the California Evidence Code,3
and, of course, the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 For decades, Evidence law
had largely taken the form of common-law decisions, and Dean
Wigmore’s monumental, multi-volume treatise surveying the common
law had held sway in the United States. 5 However, the common law of
Evidence was troubled by numerous splits of appellate authority, and, in
the words of the California Law Reform Commission, reformers believed
that the judicial administration of Evidence law could be vastly improved
by producing “an official handbook of the law of evidence—a kind of
evidence bible for busy trial judges and lawyers.”6
Of course, to reduce the law of Evidence to such a handbook or code,
the drafters would have to make numerous substantive choices resolving
common-law splits of authority: Should the opponent be permitted to
impeach a witness by questioning about untruthful acts that had not
resulted in a conviction?7 For that matter, what types of convictions ought
to be admissible for impeachment purposes?8 Should the scope of cross-
9. Id. § 21.
10. Id. § 271.
11. Id. §§ 326–27.
12. Id. § 344.
13. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 13.
14. See infra notes 162–76 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 169.
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must attempt to assess the case’s settlement value. To do so, the attorney
attempts to predict the evidentiary rulings that a trial judge would make if
the case went to trial. When the relevant evidence statute or rule is worded
too broadly and vaguely, it can become difficult for the attorney to make
that assessment. The United States may be the most litigious society in
the world; we probably have more courtrooms, judges, and attorneys than
any other nation. 16 Nevertheless, our litigation system would be
overwhelmed if we did not settle well more than 95% of the cases that
could potentially necessitate a trial. 17
One countervailing consideration is that phrasing evidence
legislation and rules in too detailed a fashion could preclude the litigation
system from adapting to the fast pace of technological change. 18 The
California Evidence Code took effect on January 1, 1967.19 The effective
date of the Federal Rules of Evidence is January 2, 1975. 20 At that time,
no court had ever confronted an evidentiary issue related to an e-mail, text
message, social media post, 21 digital photograph, 22 or blockchain record.23
Yet, today a huge percentage of communication and recordation takes
those forms. If drafters opted for an inflexible, catalog format that
precluded litigators from introducing evidence based on these useful
technological innovations that emerged later, the courts would become a
laughing stock. 24 Moreover, the rationales for most evidentiary rules rest
on generalizations, and more flexible wording empowers the trial judge to
adapt the application of the rule to do justice on the specific facts of the
case.
16. As of 2022, there are 1,352,072 licensed lawyers in the United States, 143,400 lawyers in
the United Kingdom, and 522,500 in the People’s Republic of China. A Google search (last visited
July 21, 2022). See also James Douglas Welch, Settling Criminal Cases, 6 LITIGATION 1, Fall 1979,
at 32.
17. David Balabanian, Concept of “Discovery Abuse” Has Been Oversold, LEGAL TIMES, Nov.
12, 1984, at 14.
18. Peter M.Kachama, The Case Against Evidentiary Admissibility Standards That Attempt to
“Freeze” the State of a Scientific Technique, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (1996).
19. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., California’s “Restatement” of Evidence: Some Reflections on
Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 LOY. U. L. REV. 279, 279 (1971).
20. UNIF. R. EVID., supra note 2, at 1.
21. EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, PAUL GIANNELLI, FRANCIS GILLIGAN, FREDRIC LEDERER &
LIESA RICHTER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 404 (6th ed. 2016).
22. Id. § 410.
23. See supra note 16.
24. Graham, supra note 19, at 307 (quoting Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass’n for Promulgation
of New Fla. R. Civ. Proc., 145 Fla. 223, 230, 199 So. 57, 60 (1940) (Terrell, C.J.) (“It is inconceivable
that litigants of the present who transact business at the press of a button . . ., traverse the continent
overnight by airplane, hop to Europe by Clipper, and spend the weekend in Miami out of New York,
would be content like Balaam to travel the highway of justice on the back of an ass We owe it
to society to hike the administration of justice off the ass ”)).
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judicial disclosure years later in a lawsuit that might never be filed. The
case for bright line phrasing of privilege statutes and rules is weaker than
the orthodox view assumes.
Moreover, as Part II elaborates, in the years since the enactment of
the California Evidence Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
number of cases taken to trial has declined precipitously. As previously
stated, in some jurisdictions, only 1% of cases that find their way to
attorneys’ offices culminate in trial. In the vast majority of cases,
attorneys do not turn to evidence legislation and rules during trial or even
on the eve of trial to prepare to argue such issues. Instead, they put the
legislation and rules to a very different use, namely, making a pretrial
assessment of the case’s settlement value. As the California Law Revision
Commission observed, trial judges and attorneys may indeed be “busy,”
but in the macrocosm, they are busy settling cases, not trying them. A
flexible rule stated in a code format might be desirable to allow a judge to
adjust to an unanticipated development at trial, but the attorney preparing
for pretrial settlement negotiation can be frustrated by the wording of such
a rule. In most cases that will settle short of trial, the attorney would
arguably prefer a statute or rule that provides clearer guidance.
Part III of this Essay synthesizes the analysis in Part II. Part III makes
the case for convergence between the catalog approach reserved for
privilege rules and the code approach typically taken to other areas of
evidence doctrine. If the case for bright line privilege rules is weaker than
it has been made out to be and the case for more specific rules for other
doctrinal areas is stronger than it has been made out to be, perhaps the
approaches taken to the two areas of evidence law should be modified.
The approaches ought to move in the direction of convergence.
35. E.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1, 8–9 (1996); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 402–04 (1976); Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 12, 14 (1934).
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36. See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985).
37. EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, § 2.5 Transition to Modern Privilege Doctrine, in THE NEW
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (4th ed. 2022).
38. Id. § 3.2.2.
39. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,§ 2192, 73 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
40. TWINING, supra note 36, at 99, 108.
41. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC., U.S. JUD. CONF., RULES OF EVIDENCE: A
PRELIMINARY REP. ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIF. RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 43 (1962).
42. Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 40–
41 (1980).
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49. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 185
Cal. Rptr. 3d 842, 850 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, 2 Cal.5th 282, 386 P.3d 773, 212 Cal. Rptr.
3d 107 (2016). See also PAUL RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.2 (2d
ed. 1999).
50. Smith, supra note 42, at 48.
51. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
52. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 402 (1998).
53. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 911–20.
54. Id. at §§ 950–62.
55. Id. at §§ 980–87.
56. Id. at §§ 990–1007.
57. Id. at §§ 1010–1027.
58. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on Privileges, One of the
Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the
Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41 (2006). Representative Hungate chaired the House committee
that listened to one special interest group after another attack the proposed rules as either too broad
or too narrow. He then became the first witness in the subsequent Senate hearings on the proposed
rulings. He warned the Senate committee members that if they attempted to draft provisions on
particular privileges, “the social workers and piano tuners” would line up to demand privileges. Rules
of Evidence, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. At 6 (June 4-5, 1974).
Ironically, the Supreme Court later recognized a psychotherapy privilege extending to
communications with licensed clinical social workers. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
59. Graham, supra note 19, at 290.
60. Id. at 299.
61. Id. at 307.
62. Id. at 299.
63. ROSCOE POUND, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in FIELD CENTENNARY ESSAYS 1
(A.Reppy ed. 1949); ALISON REPPY, The Field Codification Concept, in FIELD CENTENNARY ESSAYS
17 (A.Reppy ed. 1949).
64. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868 (1964). Oregon also adopted some of the provisions of
the Field Code. CARLSON, supra note 5, at 13.
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Rules followed the same basic outline as the Model Code. 76 Moreover,
like the Model Code, several of the Uniform Rules stated relatively “broad
rather than detailed rules.”77 However, the Rules modified or omitted a
number of the most controversial Model Code provisions that enhanced
the trial judge’s power and discretion in evidentiary rulings. 78 The
American Bar Association lent its support to the Uniform Rules. 79
76. WITKIN, supra note 73, at § 3, at 11. In 1974 and 1999, the Uniform Rules were amended
to conform to the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at § 3, at 10-11. The amended section
numbers now are the same as those of the Federal Rules; and like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Rules are divided into 11 subjects. The latest version of the Uniform Rules “is the basis for the
evidence statutes in a majority of states. Id.
77. Id. at § 3, at 11.
78. Id.
79. Graham, supra note 19, at 279. Kansas, New Jersey, Utah, and the Virgin Islands adopted
some of the provisions of the Uniform Rules. Carlson, supra note 5, at 13.
80. Graham, supra note 19, at 179, citing 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 29, 32 (1965).
81. Id. at 291.
82. Id. at 279.
83. 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 29, 33, quoted in Witkin, supra note 73, at 23.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Graham, supra note 19, at 279.
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explicit as the authentication provisions, the same result can obtain when
Code provisions are read in context and in light of the legislative history.
Thus, § 1200(b) announces that “[e]xcept as provided by law, hearsay
evidence is inadmissible.”94 At first blush, this provision might seem to
deny the courts the flexibility to admit demonstrably reliable, necessary
hearsay evidence that does not fall within an enumerated exception.
However, § 160, part of the context of § 1200, reads: “‘Law’ includes . . .
decisional law.”95 In that light, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s revision
of the Comment to § 1200 states: “Under Section 1200, exceptions to the
hearsay rule may be found either in statutes or in decisional law.”96 The
bottom line is that with the exception of the privilege area, the California
drafters rejected the catalog model and moved sharply toward the code
format although not as open-textured a statutory scheme as the Model
Code of Evidence.
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not foreclose the particular theory of logical relevance that the proponent
has advanced. In all these cases, true to the code model, the wording of
the Federal Rule is broad enough to expressly or implicitly confer
discretion on the trial judge. These grants of discretion are generally more
circumscribed than those in the Model Code, but the basic drafting format
is a code, not a creed or a catalog.
121. Michael Saks & Barbara Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law
(2016); Graham, supra note 19, at 286; I. Daniel Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A
Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L.REV. 1; Robert
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research and review some of the common sense doubts raised about
Wigmore’s instrumental paradigm for privileges.
In the case of privileges, quite apart from the relevant empirical
research, there are reasons to be skeptical about Wigmore’s premise. As
Professor Edward Cleary, the Reporter for the original Federal Rules
Advisory Committee observed, it is ridiculous to think that a patient
would withhold necessary information from a physician if the patient
thought that he or she were suffering from a life-threatening disease; if the
patient believes that “life itself [is] in jeopardy,” any rational patient will
disclose even absent a privilege. 122 In 2019, the New Mexico Supreme
Court prospectively abolished the spousal communications privilege in
that jurisdiction. 123 In rejecting an instrumental justification for the
privilege, the court opined that many spouses are probably unaware of the
existence of the privilege and that, in any event, it is unrealistic to assume
that they rely on the privilege in the vast majority of their interactions. 124
During the Congressional hearings on the then-proposed Federal Rules,
Professor J Francis Paschal of Duke University stated that perhaps the
majority of attorney-client communications occur “pre-litigation.”125 In a
classic English case on legal professional privilege, Lord Scott bluntly
stated:
It is obviously true that in very many cases clients would have no
inhibitions in providing their lawyers with all the facts and information
the lawyers might need whether or not there were the absolute assurance
of non-disclosure that the present law of privilege provides.126
There are not only common-sense doubts about the validity of the
essential premise of the instrumental paradigm; there are also empirical
studies that challenge that premise. Some studies relate to the attorney-
client privilege.
The pioneering research was reported in Yale Law Journal in the
early 1960s. 127 The researchers surveyed several groups, including
laypersons, lawyers, and judges. Question no. 6 asked the respondent
laypersons whether the absence of a privilege would make them less likely
to make free, complete disclosure to an attorney. Roughly half answered
in the affirmative. 128 However, the survey instrument did not inquire
further whether the absence of a privilege would have a major, moderate,
or minimal impact on their willingness. Moreover, when asked directly
whether there should be a legal privilege, perhaps surprisingly, fewer than
half answered in the affirmative. 129 The laypersons’ response to question
no. 8 was particularly revealing. Only a third believed that the privilege
allowed an attorney “to refuse to reveal the client’s confidences whenever
ordered to do so by a judge.”130 In other words, most lay respondents were
willing to confide in attorneys even though they mistakenly believed that
any judge could override any privilege.
Professor Fred Zacharias conducted the second study in the late
1980s. 131 He undertook the study in part because the earlier Yale study
called into question the conventional wisdom about the need for an
absolute legal privilege. The Yale study and his research in Tompkins
County, New York convinced him that “strict” privilege rules are
inessential. 132 He asked respondents whether they would still withhold
information if the lawyer promised confidentiality except for specific
types of information specified in advance; in response, only 15.1% stated
that they would withhold. 133 Moreover, the survey responses indicated
that laypersons are willing to confide even though they mistakenly think
that privilege is much narrower than it is and subject to many exceptions.
By way of example, in a series of 12 hypotheticals involving allegations
such as fraud in the sale of a house, 40-60% of the respondents believed
that the attorney could disclose relevant communications without the
client’s consent. 134 Most respondents not only erroneously assumed that
the privilege is riddled with exceptions; fewer than a quarter of the
127. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
Implications for the Privilege Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
128. Id. at 1262.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Fred Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.REV. 351 (1989).
132. Id. at 382.
133. Id. at 386.
134. Id. at 394.
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provisions are worded and the more discretion the trial judge enjoys, the
harder it is for the attorney to predict the evidentiary rulings at a
subsequent trial; and the more difficult it consequently is for the attorney
to assess the settlement value of his or her case. That objection has never
been more potent than it is today.
The pretrial phase, notably pretrial discovery, has become “the center
of gravity” in modern litigation. 162 Trial is no longer the name of the
litigation game. 163 One commentator was guilty of only slight hyperbole
when he wrote that, especially in civil cases, trials are “approaching
extinction.”164 Marc Galanter has referred to “the Vanishing Trial,”165 and
Professor Robert Burns has gone so far as to proclaim “the Death of the
American Trial.”166 The numbers bear out that proclamation. In 1938,
roughly 20% of the cases filed in federal court led to a trial. 167 By 1962,
that percentage had fallen to 12%. 168 By 2009, even considering both jury
and bench trials, the percentage had plummeted to a bit more than 1%.169
Statistics for state courts indicate that by 2003, the percentage of filed
cases culminating in trial had fallen to less than 3%. 170 Moreover, these
statistics relate to filed actions, and many civil disputes are settled before
suit is ever filed. One commentator was probably close to the mark when
he wrote that at least 97% of the cases that come through attorneys’ offices
settle without a single day of trial. 171 There has been a similar decline in
criminal trials. 172 Approximately 96% of arrestees who are booked plead
162. John W. Cooley, Puncturing Three Myths About Litigation, 70 A.B.A.J. 75, 76 (1984). See
also Edward Imwinkelried, The Need for Truly Systemic Analysis for the Reform of Both Pretrial
Practice and Evidentiary Rules: The Role of the Law of Unintended Consequences in “Litigation”
Reform, 32 REV. LITIGATION 201 (2013).
163. Rebecca Love Kourlis, Overhaul Civil Litigation, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 31, 2011, at 51.
164. Robert Burns, What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes?, 37 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 575
(2011); Charles Maher, Discovery Abuse, 4 CAL. LAW. 44, 45 (1984) (quoting Professor Geoffrey
Hazard, Jr. as stating that “‘[i[n big litigation today, pre-trial is the trial”).
165. Marc Galantner, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004). See also P.L. Refo, The Vanishing
Trial, 30 LITIGATION, Wint. 2004, at 1, 2 (the A.B.A. Litigation Section concluded a project entitled
“The Vanishing Trial”; the project leaders were Dean JoAnne Epps of Temple University, Professor
Steve Landsman of Depaul University, and Professor Bob Sayler of the University of Virginia; the
project collected data from both federal and state courts); Leigh Jones, Coping with Dearth of Jury
Trials, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 4 (the article discusses “The Vanishing Trial”).
166. Robert P. Burns, The Death of the American Trial, NW. FAC. WORKING PAPERS (2009).
167. Burns, supra note 164.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Steven Lubet, Showing Your Hand: A Counter-Intuitive Strategy for Deposition Defense,
29 LITIGATION, Wint. 2003, at 38.
171. Joseph Kelner, Settlement Techniques—Part One, TRIAL, Feb. 1980, at 46.
172. Refo, supra note 165.
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guilty. 173 In 2012 in Lafler v. Cooper, 174 the Supreme Court remarked that
“criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system
of trials.”
Even with our thousands of courtrooms, judges, and attorneys, this
relatively small number of trials strains our judicial system:175
Existing court calendar backlogs and prosecutors’ and public defenders’
caseloads make the social costs of an even larger number of trials
unacceptable, especially in view of the longer delays in civil dockets that
would also inevitably result.176
The Federal Rules already contain provisions calculated to encourage
pretrial civil disposition by settlement and pretrial criminal disposition by
plea: Rule 408 (compromise offers and negotiations) 177 and Rule 410
(pleas, plea discussions, and related statements). 178 However, the majority
of jurisdictions have concluded that even those provisions do not go far
enough in encouraging disposition without trial and removing
disincentives to pretrial settlement. In order to promote alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms, many jurisdictions have adopted statutes
or court rules creating privileges for mediation proceedings179 and
conciliation. 180 Some have gone so far as to create full-fledged privileges
for settlement statements. 181 Rule 408 is a rule of limited admissibility;
while Rule 408(a) prohibits the use of compromise statements “to prove
or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim,”182 in the next
breath, Rule 408(b) allows the proponent to rely on alternative theories of
admissibility “such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice ”183 In
sharp contrast, the jurisdictions that have created true settlement
privileges bar any use of the privileged statements. 184
Of course, we must avoid exaggeration. Even with the currently
worded statutes and rules dealing with evidentiary doctrines other than
privilege, the system succeeds in settling the overwhelming majority of
173. George Beall, Negotiating the Disposition of Criminal Charges, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 46.
174. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
175. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY C OMMITTEE, at 4–10 (Apr.
2, 1990).
176. James Douglas Welch, Settling Criminal Cases, 6 LITIGATION 1, Fall 1979, at 32.
177. FED. R. EVID. 408.
178. FED. R. EVID. 410.
179. THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, at § 1.3.12.a.
180. Id. § 1.3.12.c.
181. Id. § 1.3.12.b.
182. FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
183. FED. R. EVID. 408(b).
184. THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, at § 1.3.12.b.
185. .EDWARD IMWINKELRIED & THEODORE BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: STRATEGY AND
TACTICS (2021-2022 ed. 2021). (Before entering teaching, Blumoff, practiced with a large litigation
firm. On several occasions he told me that his firm sometimes found itself in this situation: The firm
has a case involving a huge amount of money, and there was uncertainty about a pivotal trial
evidentiary ruling. The firm sometimes advised its client to settle rather than gambling on a favorable
ruling at trial.)
186. Balabanian, supra note 17, at 14.
187. 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REPS. 34 (1965).
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197. 2 EDWARD. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE App. I (2022 ed. 2021).
198. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 195, § 2:38, at 357-58.
199. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
200. .Edward Imwinkelried, A Brief Essay Defending the Doctrine of Chances as a Valid Theory
for Introducing Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 50 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (2020).
201. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert..denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
202. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 195, § 4:1.
203. Suppose that a defendant is lawfully stopped and the police find illegal drugs secreted in
the automobile that the defendant is driving. Analogizing to Woods, a prosecutor can argue that the
trial judge should admit evidence that on two other occasions when the defendant was stopped, illegal
drugs were found in the defendant’s car. Again, the thrust of the argument is that it would be an
extraordinary coincidence for an innocent person to be found driving a car containing contraban d
drugs so many times. The objective improbability of that coincidence would furnish some evidence
of mens rea.
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alleged victim has fabricated the charge. 204 Several courts have asserted
that “most” jurisdictions now embrace the doctrine. 205 Yet, while not
repudiating the doctrine, other courts have found error in admitting
uncharged misconduct evidence under the doctrine when the defendant
did not expressly claim accident. 206 Even if a trial judge would otherwise
be inclined to rely on the doctrine as a basis for admitting uncharged
misconduct evidence, the uncertain, conflicting appellate guidance and
the risk of reversal can give a trial judge pause before doing so. Likewise,
that uncertainty might make litigants reluctant to enter into a disposition
agreement when uncharged misconduct evidence is crucial, but the state
of the 404(b) jurisprudence in the jurisdiction is unclear. Of course, a
motion in limine is a possibility, but in most instances, the trial judge has
discretion whether to reach the merits of the motion before trial,207 and at
trial, the judge has the power to change the in limine ruling even absent a
request by a party. 208 Without abandoning the flexibility of the language
“such as,” a drafter can remove the uncertainty by proposing an
amendment endorsing a sound, novel theory or at least indicating approval
in an accompanying Note or Comment. Doing so would clear the way for
both sides to make a more informed decision on whether to enter into a
settlement or plea agreement to obviate the need for trial.
Like the area of uncharged misconduct, the doctrinal area of
authentication illustrates the utility of tightening the wording of
provisions relating to doctrinal areas other than privilege. Just as many
rules of admissibility, such as Rule 404(b), do not limit the proponent to
approved theories expressly mentioned in the Rule, Rule 901 does not
restrict the proponent to the traditionally accepted foundations. Again,
Rule 901(a) announces the general standard for authentication, Rules
901(b)(1)-(10) enumerates several acceptable foundations, but the
introductory language in 901(b) expressly states that the enumerated
foundations “are examples only—not a complete list ”209 On the one
204. Edward Imwinkelried, The Evidentiary Issue Crystallized by the Cosby and Weinstein
Scandals: The Propriety of Admitting Testimony About an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct Under
the Doctrine of Objective Chances, 48 SW. L. REV. 1 (2019).
205. Miller v. Baldwin, 723 Fed. Appx. 408, 411 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2018), cert.denied, 138 S.Ct.
2000 (2018); State v. Atkins, 304 Ga. 413 (2018).
206. Edward Imwinkelried, Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct Under
the Doctrine of Chances: Before a Judge May Consider Evidence of an Uncharged Incident to Decide
Whether There Has Been a Suspicious Coincidence, Must the Accused Claim That the Incident Was
an Accident?, 99 DENV. L. REV. 1 (2021) (discussing the Oregon case law).
207. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 21, § 103.
208. Id.
209. FED. R. EVID. 901.
hand, the wording of the flexible principle, Rule 901(a), should not be
changed. It ought to retain open-ended code language.
On the other hand, one of the repeating patterns in the history of
American Evidence law has been a judicial reluctance to apply the broad
authentication principle to new types of exhibits spawned by innovative
technology. For example, due to a fear of manipulation, at common law
courts were initially skeptical of movies and demanded elaborate
foundations. 210 Some of the same skepticism has carried over into the
Federal Rules era. Thus, rather than applying the standard set out in Rule
901(a), initially, several courts applied heightened standards for web
pages, 211 social media posts, 212 and other forms of digital evidence.213
Even today, some courts go beyond Rule 901(b) and demand
unnecessarily strict foundations for audio recordings. 214
As previously stated, broadly worded authentication standards have
the advantage that, in principle, the courts can readily adapt them to novel
types of evidence produced by advancing technology. However, as the
prior judicial experience with movies, audio recordings, and various types
of digital evidence demonstrates, many courts are still hesitant to receive
cutting-edge types of evidence even when the proponent can marshal
enough foundational testimony to satisfy Rule 901(a)’s standard.
Consequently, if the drafters conclude that a particular type of exhibit,
albeit cutting-edge, complies with Rule 901(a), it can be advisable to
supplement code format language with more detailed, catalog-like
language permitting the receipt of that type of evidence. Rule 901(a)-(b)
210. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, GEORGE E. DIX, PETER M.KACHAMA, DAVID H. KAYE &
ELEANOR SWIFT, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 216, at 37–38 n. 4 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed.
2020), citing McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458 (1940).
211. M. Anderson Berry & David Kiernan, Authenticating Web Pages as Evidence,
https://www.law.com/ (Jan. 21, 2010) [https://perma.cc/G4KR-XJJZ] (describing three schools of
judicial thought, one school demanded testimony that the information was posted by the individual to
whom the information is attributed. The courts insisted on a “statement or affidavit from . . . [the
website’s] Web master or someone else with personal knowledge”; the courts refused to permit the
proponent to rely on other forms of circumstantial evidence that would satisfy Rule 901(a)).
212. Paul Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M. O’Toole-Loureiro, Authentication of
Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 435, 441, 443, 455 (2013) (“an unnecessarily high
bar”); Breanne M. Democko, Social Media and the Rules on Authentication, 43 TOL. L. REV. 367,
369, 371, 388, 391, 405 (2012) (“an extraordinarily high standard of authentication”).
213. St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F.Supp.2d 773, 774–75 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
214. The traditional approach was a seven-element foundation, but there is now significant
movement away from that rigid view. See, e.g., United States v. Lebeau, 867 F.3d 960, 977 (8th Cir.
2017); United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 501 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d
1056, 1064 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Tartaglione, 228 F.Supp.3d 402, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2017); United States v. Credico, 217 F.Supp.3d 825,
829 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 718 Fed.App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2017), cert.denied, 139 S.Ct. 273 (2018).
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Imwinkelried: Evidence Legislation and Rules
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps, in the best of all possible worlds, lawyers and judges could
work with two sets of evidentiary rules – a pretrial set with bright line
wording to facilitate settlement and a trial set with more flexible wording
to accord the trial judge greater discretion. Developing those two sets may
not be as daunting as it might as it at first seems. To a degree, there are
already differing sets of evidentiary rules—one for different types of trials
and another for different stages of litigation. To begin with, today many
jurisdictions apply different rules to appeals from evidentiary rulings in
bench and jury trials. 220 Moreover, some evidentiary rules are already
applied differently in the pretrial and trial settings. By way of example, as
a practical matter, the courts apply the Rule 103(a)(1)(B) 221 procedural
requirement for a “specific” objection differently in the pretrial and trial
settings; the courts demand greater specificity in pretrial than at trial
where the issue may arise unexpectedly. 222 In addition, many courts apply
the substantive Rule 702223 requirements for expert testimony more laxly
at the pretrial class certification and summary judgment stages. 224
Of course, the reader might think that this inquiry is much adieu
about nothing because various forces, including inertia, might dissuade
decision-makings such as legislatures and courts from undertaking to
revise their evidence provisions. However, that seems highly unlikely.
Consider the history reviewed in this brief Essay: the Model Code in 1942,
the original Uniform Rules in the 1950s, the California Evidence Code in
1967, the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, and the adoption of codes
or rules patterned after the Rules in 44 states. There have been no fewer
than 30 substantive amendments to the Federal Rules since their
enactment, 225 and there are currently pending amendments to the Rules.226
Judge Calabresi was surely correct when he proclaimed that this is an age
220. 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, GEORGE E. DIX, PETER M.KACHAMA, DAVID H. KAYE &
ELEANOR SWIFT, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 60 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020).
221. FED. R. EVID. 103.
222. Edward Imwinkelried, The Pretrial Importance and Adaptation of the “Trial” Evidence
Rules, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965 (1992). To begin with, it is more feasible to demand greater
specificity pretrial. The setting is often a hearing on an in limine motion, which both sides have had
days or weeks to prepare for. The issue has not arisen on the spur of the moment. Moreover, it is fairer
to demand greater specificity before trial. At trial, the exchange is usually oral; and if the objection is
sustained, the proponent can reframe on the spot. Before trial, the submissions are frequently written;
and the written form of the submissions may make it difficult or impossible for the proponent to adapt
on the spot.
223. FED. R. EVID. 702.
224. KENNETH S. BROUN, GEORGE E. DIX, PETER M.KACHAMA, DAVID H. KAYE &
ELEANOR SWIFT, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., Supp. 2022) (collecting
cases).
225. G. Alexander Nunn, The Living Rules of Evidence, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 940–41 (2022).
226. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES (May 6, 2022) (Federal Rules of Evidence
2022-2023 Edition pp. 26–27 (the proposed amendment to Rule 106), pp. 149–51 (the proposed
amendment to Rule 615), and pp. 161–63 (the proposed amendment to Rule 702)).
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Imwinkelried: Evidence Legislation and Rules
of statutes. 227 That is certainly true in the area of Evidence law. Today, for
the most part an attorney does not turn to a judicial decision or a
constitution to find a governing rule of law; rather, he or she looks for a
statute codifying the rule.
For the foreseeable future, most jurisdictions are likely to have a
single set of statutory provisions, such as the Federal Rules or the
Evidence Code, which purports to apply to both pretrial and trial
proceedings, and occasions will almost undoubtedly arise to revise those
provisions. Those occasions will pose the same question that Professor
Morgan asked American litigators sixty years ago: a creed, a code, or a
catalog. For the most part, American litigators are not spending most of
their time trying cases; instead, their time is consumed settling cases. In
most instances, litigators consult evidence statutes and code primarily to
help them determine the settlement value of their case. And the number
of potential cases is so staggering that it is imperative that the system
encourage settlement. The system can certainly do so by strengthening
substantive rules of limited admissibility such as Rules 408228 and 410229
and considering the adoption of a full-fledged settlement privilege.230
However, the system should also do so by considering the format of its
evidentiary statutes and rules. In one way or another the contemporary
American litigator spends the vast majority of his or her time preparing
for and engaging in settlement negotiations to obviate the need for trial.
The legislatures and courts ought to frankly confront that reality; they
should provide litigators with tools, including evidence statutes and rules,
predominantly designed and suited for that use.
227. GUIDO CALABRESI, A C OMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OR STATUTES (1985).
228. FED. R. EVID. 408 (civil settlement negotiation).
229. FED. R. EVID. 410 (criminal plea bargaining).
230. THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 1.3.12.c.