UK Air Power JDP 0 30

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30
UK Air Power
Third Edition
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30
UK Air Power
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30 (JDP 0-30) (3rd Edition),
dated September 2022, is promulgated as directed
by the Chiefs of Staff
Head Doctrine
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JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) i

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ii JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Foreword
The last decade has seen dramatic technological change set against a
backdrop of significant geopolitical challenge in a world in which information
and data have transformed the way we interact. Traditional distinctions
between peace and war have become dangerously blurred and the
competitive nature of international relations in this information age requires
us to evaluate rapidly and respond decisively to events. Air power, with its
ability to influence audiences through both hard and soft power, supports that
requirement unequivocally and offers flexible, timely, scalable, and responsive
options to the UK government in support of national security objectives.
It is critical that those charged with employing and directing the use of air
power do so from a position of knowledge and common understanding.
Doctrine provides us with an agreed upon and operationally relevant body of
best practices, principles and beliefs that articulates how we fight today. It is
our collective wisdom drawn at considerable cost from operations, training,
and experimentation. It must not be allowed to become dogma.
The UK maintains highly credible air power but cannot provide the full breadth
of air power capabilities and enablers to generate, coordinate and sustain the
mass required to conduct high-intensity operations alone. For that reason, we
must always be innovative in our development and application of air power,
and the way we integrate it across all operational domains and with our
international allies and partners.
While the enduring principles of air power remain constant, maintaining

relevance in a fast-changing world remains key. Our air power doctrine has to
evolve continually to meet the challenges of the current geopolitical context
and the increasingly complex joint and combined operating environment.
This latest edition of JDP 0-30, UK Air Power, should be considered essential
reading for a wide audience across Defence, and desirable reading for our
partners across government – I commend it to you.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB CBE ADC

Chief of the Air Staff
JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) iii

iv JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)
Preface
Purpose
1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air Power is the UK’s keystone
air domain doctrine publication. Whilst JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine
provides the broad principles and philosophy underpinning the use of UK
Armed Forces, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Allied
Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations
focuses on the application of NATO air power, JDP 0-30 is focused specifically
on UK air power. It brings together higher-level doctrine, government policy
and enduring air power knowledge and experience to provide a basis for
understanding the utility of the air domain. JDP 0-30 highlights the strengths
and discusses the limitations of air power and considers those factors which,
in broad terms, enable the effective employment of air power. It also explores
its relationship with the other operational domains and its interdependence
with the other elements of national and military power, as well as with
multinational and private sector partners.
Context
2. This third edition of JDP 0-30 continues the joint theme that runs
through the previous editions, whilst reflecting the UK’s adoption of an
integrated approach to operations. Previous versions of JDP 0-30 have
encompassed both air power and space power. For this version, due to the
increasing maturity of the space domain enterprise across UK Defence, it
has been decided to split air power and space power into separate doctrine
publications.1
Audience
3. This third edition of JDP 0-30 is a simple and concise explanation of air
power, which seeks to inform a wide audience. It is designed to highlight the
strategic utility of air power and its contribution to national power. JDP 0-30
should be of value to all departments of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), joint
commanders and staffs at all levels, the single Services, the broader defence
community and other government departments, as well as partners and allies
of the UK.
1 For more information on space power, see JDP 0-40, UK Space Power.
JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) v

Structure
4. JDP 0-30 is divided into four chapters with a supporting lexicon. An outline
of what is covered in these chapters is detailed below.
a. Chapter 1 – An introduction to air power. This chapter provides

an overview of the basics of air power and introduces air capabilities. It
discusses influence and power from the air and places air power into a
strategic context.
b. Chapter 2 – The roles of air power. This chapter discusses in detail

the enduring and fundamental roles of air power. It also introduces the
key and critical enablers of electromagnetic warfare and command and
control.
c. Chapter 3 – Command and control. This chapter provides more

detail on the command and control of air power. This includes discussing
the principles of command and control, UK capabilities and the planning
and tasking of air power.
d. Chapter 4 – The employment of air power. This chapter considers

the application of UK air power in the context of joint operations,
cross‑government integration and integrated action. It provides an
overview of air power enablers and outlines air power’s utility.
Linkages
5. JDP 0-30, UK Air Power is the keystone air domain doctrine publication
within the joint doctrine architecture, sitting below JDP 0-01, UK Defence
Doctrine and alongside other joint domain-centric doctrine: JDP 0-10, UK
Maritime Power; JDP 0-20, UK Land Power; JDP 0-40, UK Space Power; and
JDP 0-50, UK Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Doctrine. It reflects current
UK government and MOD policy, in particular the 2021 Global Britain in a
competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development
and Foreign Policy. JDP 0-30 is coherent with AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Air and Space Operations. Whilst reflecting the joint context, it is also coherent
with the Royal Air Force’s capstone doctrine, Air Publication (AP) 3002, Air and
Space Warfare, which provides more detail of air and space power.
vi JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Chapter 1 – An introduction to air power . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 – The roles of air power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 3 – Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Chapter 4 – The employment of air power . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Lexicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) vii

Chapter 1
This chapter provides an overview of UK air power, outlining

its enduring utility in an era of persistent and complex
competition. It introduces the attributes and roles, and
provides a definition of UK air power. The chapter further
provides a brief introduction to air capabilities, discusses
influence and power from the air, and concludes by placing
air power into context.
Section 1 – The basics of air power . . . . . . . . . . 3
Section 2 – Air capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Section 3 – Influence and power from the air . . . . . 14
Section 4 – Air power in context . . . . . . . . . . . 18
JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) 1

An introduction to air power
“
The fundamental purpose of
military air power is achieving
mastery of the air.
”
Air Publication 3002, Air and Space Warfare
2 JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Chapter 1
An introduction to air
power
Section 1 – The basics of air power
1.1. The UK government uses four instruments of power in pursuit of national
policy goals; these are the diplomatic, information, military and economic
1
instruments.1 The military instrument of national power spans the operational
domains2 of maritime, land, air, space, and cyber and electromagnetic.
Since its inception, air power has made a vital contribution to the UK military
instrument, helping to maintain the freedom of the nation and to project
national influence when called upon.
1.2. In the UK, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has the conceptual lead for
warfare across the air domain, thus the structure of the UK Armed Forces
predominantly focuses the generation and employment of air power around
the RAF. However, the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy and the Army Air Corps
and other aviation elements of the British Army also contribute significantly to
the delivery of UK air power.
Air power is defined as: A–Z
The ability to use air capabilities in and from the air, to influence the
behaviour of actors and the course of events.3
1.3. By the end of World War 1, the impact of air power was beginning to
be felt across all forms of warfare. The enduring characteristics of height,
speed and reach had been established and the fundamental roles of air
power codified. By World War 2, no military activity could overlook the
significance of air power; when properly targeted and coordinated, it proved
influential – often decisive – in all theatres of the war. During and after World
1 See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine for a full explanation of
national power, national security, the national interest and national strategy.
2 An operational domain is defined as: a specified sphere of capabilities and activities
that can be applied within an engagement space. NATOTerm.
3 JDP 0-01.1, UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm.

War 2, the technological development of air power accelerated dramatically,

with investment in airframe, engine, sensor and weapon technologies, which
enabled operational and tactical developments across all operational domains.
Air power is now recognised as an extremely responsive and scalable element
of the military instrument of national power.
The characteristics of air power
1.4. At the heart of air power are its characteristics. The hard-earned
experience of over a century of military air power has confirmed these to be:
height, speed and reach.
1
a. Height enables the observation, and delivery, of activities in the land
and maritime environments. Three-dimensional manoeuvre, facilitated by
height, is also an important survivability factor.
b. Speed enables the rapid and responsive projection of power,

which permits missions to be completed quickly, generating tempo and
offering the potential to exploit time. At the tactical level, high speed flight
reduces exposure to hostile fire and increases survivability, whilst the
ability to fly at low speed allows extended loiter time.
c. Reach enables audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies to be

influenced, regardless of their location. Whilst 70% of the world’s surface
is covered by water, 100% of it is covered by air. This provides air power
with unrivalled reach, usually unimpeded by terrain, enabling distant
or isolated targets to be prosecuted and potential restrictions to be
circumvented.
1.5. While height, speed and reach represent fundamental air power
characteristics in their own right, they also act together synergistically to
produce additional characteristics. These additional characteristics are: agility,
ubiquity4 and concentration.
a. Agility. Agility is a blend of responsiveness, adaptability, flexibility

and resilience. Air power is inherently agile, a characteristic amplified
by the multi-role capability of many platforms. Agility permits aircraft
to move quickly and decisively between the strategic, operational
and tactical levels of operations, and to move across and between
4 Ubiquity is defined as: present, appearing, or found everywhere. Concise Oxford

English Dictionary (COED).

operational theatres, sometimes during the same mission, and to act as

a manoeuvre force in its own right.
b. Ubiquity. Height, speed and reach, combined with the agility of

air capabilities, provide air power with ubiquity. This is because threats
can be posed or countered across a wide area, with significantly fewer
constraints than exist in the land and maritime environments.
c. Concentration. Speed, reach and agility allow air power to

concentrate military force in time and space, when and where it is
required. Precision weaponry means that effects can be concentrated
without the requirement for combat mass. The psychological and
1
physical shock imposed by the concentration of effects is often crucial in
achieving successful operational outcomes.
1.6. In combination, air power’s characteristics enable the delivery of

significant combat power. Speed, reach and height, coupled with modern
sensor technology, precision weaponry and, for a number of aircraft, the
ability to remain aloft for extended periods, provide the capability to shape
and influence the operational environment. Moreover, the agility and ubiquity
of air power mean that it can be used to revisit points of interest within short
response times or cover multiple joint operations areas in one sortie, thereby
delivering an additional degree of persistence. Equally, air power can be used
fleetingly and with a very small footprint to offer covertness, discretion and
deniability, should these be required.
Atlas C-1 (A400M) takes off from RAF Akrotiri

1.7. These characteristics mean that air power is ideally suited to create
effects across the entire spectrum of operations. It can, for example:
• enable freedom of movement;

• deliver humanitarian aid;
• deliver deliberate interventions through attack operations;
• reassure allies; and
• deny and/or deter adversary activity.
The air environment
1.8. The air environment is an unforgiving one and, thus, aircraft are designed
1
to meet the challenges of operating at a variety of altitudes, temperature
extremes and speed ranges. The physics and aerodynamic principles
associated with the air environment also complicate the design process for
aircraft.
1.9. Most crewed aircraft are able to withstand or avoid the extreme weather
that can occur in the air, but as the majority of uncrewed aircraft tend,
currently, to be lighter, slower and less robust than their crewed counterparts
they can be more susceptible to such conditions. The laws of physics dictate
that the performance of some aircraft, sensors and weapon systems are
also adversely affected by extremes of poor weather. However, the versatility
offered by an array of sensors across the electromagnetic and acoustic
spectra provides an acceptable level of resilience and enables agility.
Voyager KC Mk2, in VIP livery, refuelling F-35B Lightnings and a Typhoon FGR4

Limitations of air power
1.10. Air power does have its limitations. But, like its strengths, these are
relative rather than absolute and need to be understood in that context. Some
of the limitations are explored below.
a. Impermanence. Aircraft cannot yet stay airborne indefinitely,

although some uncrewed platforms are now capable of long
loiter/mission times. Although the use of air-to-air refuelling can extend
the range and endurance of aircraft, no means have yet been found
to rearm or service an aircraft in flight. To that extent, air power is
an impermanent form of military force; the influence it creates may
1
be transient and activities may have to be repeated to sustain the
desired degree of influence or effect. Whilst multiple aircraft cycling
through the same task can provide a degree of permanence, in certain
circumstances impermanence may be an advantage; for example, it
may avert the potential military and political liabilities that result from an
extended land-based presence in a foreign country.
b. Limited payload. The payloads that can be carried by aircraft may

be limited in comparison with ships or land vehicles. However, air power
trades off load-carrying capability against speed and reach, as well as
the ability to access areas that surface forces cannot physically access.
A small payload delivered quickly may be of far more value in influencing
a critical situation than a larger one deployed much later. Air power
often provides the only means of creating effects at a point of crisis
rapidly enough to meet policy objectives.5
c. Fragility. Structurally, aircraft are highly stressed and built to be

as light as practicable, carrying little or no armour protection; thus,
relatively low levels of battle damage may have a catastrophic effect.
However, structural fragility must not be confused with vulnerability
in the air, where survivability is achieved by the exploitation of speed,
height and manoeuvrability.
d. Cost. Many military aircraft use cutting-edge technology, which,

inevitably, comes at significant financial cost. This cost must be
balanced against the multiple and adaptive capabilities delivered;
indeed, low-cost uncrewed aircraft may offer an expendable capability.
5 These effects could be delivering personnel, equipment or humanitarian aid, or

dropping munitions.

Moreover, air power can, in certain situations, offer alternative policy

options to the large-scale commitment of land forces, with the heavy
financial and human consequences that this frequently entails.
e. Basing and overflight. All forms of military power depend on

basing, support and protection; aircraft are no exception. Air power’s
requirements for access, basing and overflight rights are often cited as
a weakness; however, the UK uses its diplomatic influence to mitigate
this weakness. Consequently, gaining the support of allies, partners and
friendly nations has rarely proved to be a significant problem. The use
of carrier-enabled power projection also mitigates the reliance on land
basing of some air assets.
1
f. Weather. Historically, air power was constrained by night and poor
weather. Poor weather may still create some difficulties, but modern
technology means that the majority of military aircraft can now operate
in all light conditions, day and night, regardless of weather conditions.
Indeed, advanced navigation equipment, sensors, targeting systems
and weaponry mean that night and poor weather may give UK air power
distinct advantages when facing an adversary lacking these capabilities.6
Section 2 – Air capabilities

1.11. Air capabilities naturally centre on aircraft, which the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) defines as: any machine that can derive support
in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the
air against the earth’s surface.7 This definition therefore includes fixed-wing,
rotary wing and tilt-rotor aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed. Whilst the overall
number of UK military aircraft has decreased over the past two decades, the
capabilities of individual aircraft types have developed significantly, notably
in regard to enhanced precision attack capabilities, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, low-observable technology and data link
connectivity. Consequently, more aircraft types are now capable of conducting
multiple air power roles during a sortie, often simultaneously. This enhances
the inherent flexibility of air power and offers the operational commander a
tailored response to evolving circumstances and an array of capabilities that
can rapidly transition between tasks.
6 This paragraph refers to terrestrial weather, for the impact of space weather on air
operations see JDP 0-40, UK Space Power.
7 NATOTerm.

Puma HC2 formation as part of celebrations marking 50 years of Puma service

with the RAF
Crewed aircraft
1.12. Crewed aircraft continue to provide the bulk of UK air power capabilities.
Whilst uncrewed aircraft technology continues to develop at a rapid pace,
the presence of an on board crew currently remains essential to successfully
execute the majority of core air missions; this is especially the case within a
contested environment where command and control will be limited, high energy
combat manoeuvring may be necessary or close tactical coordination between
a large number of aircraft may be required to achieve the necessary combat
mass. Below the threshold of armed conflict, the use of crewed aircraft in the
air mobility role ensures regulatory requirements concerning passenger safety
are met whilst larger ISR aircraft such as the UK’s RC-135 Joint Rivet carry a
multidiscipline crew able to exploit the information gathered in real time. Whilst
crewed aircraft carry with them an inherent risk to the crew that cannot be
eliminated, particularly within high-threat environments, currently they represent
the most flexible method of delivering decentralised execution of air tasks across
the broadest set of probable scenarios.
1.13. Crewed combat aircraft are generally categorised according to

their ‘generation’, which broadly reflects their capabilities. A generational
shift in combat aircraft occurs when a technological innovation cannot be
incorporated into an existing aircraft through upgrades and retrofits. There are

currently five broadly accepted generations, although most NATO air forces are
now equipped with fourth and fifth generation aircraft.
a. Fourth generation. Fourth generation aircraft are those designed

to bridge the gap between the developments of the 1960s and 1970s
and those entering service after 2000. Key characteristics include: high
manoeuvrability and supersonic dash performance; fly-by-wire controls;
mechanically scanned radar; and a look-down, shoot-down air-to-air
capability. There are over 46 individual types of fourth generation aircraft
in the world, including the RAF’s Typhoon aircraft.8
b. Fifth generation. Fifth generation aircraft combine new

1
developments such as thrust vectoring, composite materials,
supercruise (the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds efficiently),
low‑observable technology, advanced electronically scanned radars
and sensors, and integrated avionics to greatly improve crew situational
awareness. There are only five operational fifth generation aircraft types
in the world, including the UK’s F-35B Lightning II.
Uncrewed aircraft
1.14. There is, after over a century of crewed flight, a broad understanding
of the variety, operation and regulation of crewed aircraft; however, the
past couple of decades have seen an almost exponential increase in the
development, capability and use of uncrewed aircraft. Whilst this publication
seeks to reflect the normalisation of the operation of uncrewed aircraft, there
are some areas in which uncrewed aircraft differ from crewed that merit
inclusion. These areas are classification, terminology and legal aspects, which
are discussed below.
1.15. Due to the lack of a requirement to accommodate a human being,

uncrewed aircraft can be significantly smaller than crewed aircraft, thus
the range of sizes can be greater than that of crewed aircraft. This led to a
requirement to categorise uncrewed aircraft to provide a reference tool for the
procurement, regulation and operation of them. The UK uses both NATO9 and
UK Military Aviation Authority10 classifications of uncrewed aircraft.11
8 Although designed as a fourth generation aircraft, the Typhoon has been enhanced
over recent years with upgrades to avionics and weapons and is now referred to as a
4.5 generation aircraft.
9 AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, Edition B, Version 1,
Figure 4.2.
10 Military Aviation Authority Regulatory Article 1600.
11 NATO uses the terms ‘unmanned aircraft’ and ‘unmanned aircraft system’.

Terminology relating to uncrewed aircraft
The UK uses the following definitions. The UK definitions are new but aligned A–Z
as closely as possible with the NATO Agreed definitions.
uncrewed aircraft
An aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is operated remotely using
varying levels of automated functions.
Notes 1. Uncrewed aircraft can be expendable or recoverable.
2. Uncrewed aircraft may carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.
3. Cruise missiles are not considered uncrewed aircraft.
(Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1)
1
uncrewed aircraft system
A system whose components include the uncrewed aircraft, the supporting
network and all equipment and personnel necessary to control the uncrewed
aircraft. (JDP 0-01.1)
remotely piloted aircraft

An uncrewed aircraft that is controlled from a remote pilot station by a pilot who
has been trained and certified to the same standards as a pilot of a crewed
aircraft. (JDP 0-01.1)
remotely piloted aircraft system

A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required
command and control links and any other components as specified in the type
design. (NATOTerm)
The terms automated and autonomous are often used and discussed in relation to
uncrewed aircraft, therefore it is important to understand these terms and how they
relate to uncrewed aircraft systems. The NATO Agreed definitions are as follows.
automated
Pertaining to a system that, in response to inputs, follows a predetermined set of
rules to provide a predictable outcome. (NATOTerm)
autonomous
Pertaining to a system that decides and acts to accomplish desired goals, within
defined parameters, based on acquired knowledge and an evolving situational
awareness, following an optimal but potentially unpredictable course of action.
(NATOTerm)

1.16. Whilst definitions can vary, the key difference is that an automated
system is capable of carrying out complicated tasks but is incapable of
complex decision-making, whereas an autonomous system is capable of
deciding a course of action without depending on human oversight and
control. There is no doubt that automated systems are becoming more
complex and sophisticated.
1.17. There is much public and academic debate around the definitions
of automated and autonomous when applied to weapons systems. Lethal
autonomous weapons systems are the subject of discussion at the United
Nations (UN) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons;
however, there is no international agreement over the definitions or
1
characteristics of these systems.
1.18. Fully autonomous weapons systems – systems with no human

involvement at all – currently do not exist. Due to the inherent unpredictability
of a fully automated system’s decision-making, it is unlikely that rational
commanders and politicians will want to employ such systems as this
unpredictability could impede and limit their decision-making across the levels
of operations. The growing recognition that narratives and information are of
increasing importance further underlines this reluctance to hand control of
lethal force to fully autonomous systems – no matter how sophisticated they
may become.
1.19. All UK uncrewed aircraft and associated systems are automated

to varying degrees, but none of them are fully autonomous. The UK does
not possess armed autonomous aircraft systems, and has no intention of
developing them. The UK government’s policy is clear that the operation of
UK weapons will always be under human control as an absolute guarantee
of human oversight, authority and accountability. Whilst weapon systems
may operate in automatic modes, there is always a person involved in setting
appropriate parameters.

SkyGuardian (MQ-9B), due to enter RAF service in 2024 as the Protector RG Mk1,
during a visit to its future operating base at RAF Waddington
Legal, moral and ethical aspects of uncrewed aircraft

operations
1.20. Arguments against using uncrewed aircraft are centred on concerns

that they will be misused or used illegally. Such concerns are not unique to
uncrewed air systems. All such systems are subject to the same requirement
for legal review12 before their entry into service and any use of armed force by
such systems will always be consistent with the applicable law; for example,
the law of armed conflict that applies in the context of an armed conflict. All
missions, including attack, are conducted under exactly the same rules of
engagement and legal authority as crewed missions.
1.21. There are frequently voiced concerns about using military uncrewed
aircraft for attack missions, specifically focusing on the morality and ethics of
a human not being present in the platform that is creating a destructive and
potentially lethal effect. These concerns are that the range and relative safety
of the remote operators will in some way reduce their awareness, empathy,
humanity and observance of legal and political constraints. However, it has
been noted that removing the physical and mental challenges of crewed flight,
particularly the high workload associated with single-seat aircraft, increases
the operator’s capacity to make informed decisions. Operators have access to
12 In accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

legal and political advisers during armed missions to ensure that their activities
comply with the law of armed conflict, published rules of engagement and with
policy and political intent.
1.22. Uncrewed aircraft increase the utility of air power. This is because they
expand the range of options available for action due to the reduced risk to
personnel compared to the personnel survivability concerns when employing a
crewed aircraft in a high threat environment.
Section 3 – Influence and power from

1 the air
1.23. Political, military and economic credibility, together with a coherent
diplomatic agenda, play a large part in the UK’s ability to influence.13 Power is
the capacity to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events and it
underpins the ability to influence. The UK applies power across the instruments
of national power to achieve policy goals by using smart power, which is a
blend of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. These are described below.
a. Hard power. Hard power employs military capability and economic

strength to achieve the desired behaviours of states, groups or
individuals, or to directly change the course of events. Those using hard
power seek to coerce opponents to adopt a course of action that they
would not otherwise choose themselves. The military and economic
instruments are important sources of hard power and deterrence,
supported by the diplomatic and information instruments. The difference
between deterrence and coercion is important. Both are aspects of
hard power but deterrence aims to dissuade a course of action whilst
coercion aims to encourage a course of action. An air power contribution
to hard power activity could be the delivery of a precision‑guided
“
weapon by a combat aircraft employed in the attack role.
The key to understanding air power is recognising its ability to influence

a wide variety of audiences, through both hard and soft power.
13 JDP 04, Understanding and Decision-making.

b. Soft power. Soft power is the ability to persuade or encourage

others to adopt an alternative approach primarily through cultural and
ideological means or by encouraging emulation. Soft power is generally
slower and more difficult to employ in a targeted way. Much soft power
lies outside a democratic government’s control, presenting a challenge
to its generation. Therefore, applying soft power demands: investment
over time; clear, consistent communication strategies and measures
of effectiveness; and a developed understanding of the intended
audience and their societal codes, beliefs and cultures. Diplomatic and
informational capabilities underpin the effectiveness of soft power. Soft
power is important to the UK. The UK’s soft power, the size and depth
of its global connections and the trust we enjoy, has a direct impact
1
on our prosperity and security. The military is generally considered the
quintessential instrument of hard power, but it has important soft power
uses, for instance, air power can contribute to soft power activities
through, among other things, delivering training to another nation as
part of Defence engagement or participating in multinational exercises.
1.24. A variety of military options can be used to influence the behaviour

of audiences and the course of events, and although air power can be used
independently, it primarily seeks to create effects and exert an influence in other
operational domains. It is therefore inherently integrated and manoeuvrist14
across all levels of operations, and the desired effects must be synchronised
across the operational domains, not just within the air domain. Similarly,
operations in the maritime, land, space, and cyber and electromagnetic
domains all have the ability to influence events in the air domain.
Political aspects
1.25. Air power offers policymakers an agile, timely and focused capability
that can be highly effective in resolving or averting a developing crisis. It
can also potentially negate the requirement to deploy a larger force over a
broader timescale by land or sea. By minimising or removing the requirement
for land forces, air power can make it easier to commit militarily in politically
challenging circumstances. Its speed, mobility and precision combine to make
it an attractive element of the military instrument of national power. Speed is a
particularly attractive feature because it enables air power to rapidly accomplish
political and military objectives, for example, by striking at an adversary’s
vulnerabilities or by delivering humanitarian aid in support of an ally.
14 The three tenets of UK military doctrine are: integrated action, the manoeuvrist
approach and mission command. JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, 6th Edition.

Air support to humanitarian relief activity – Operation

Ruman
Operation Ruman was the UK’s military contribution to the international

relief effort in the Caribbean Islands, which were left devastated by
Hurricane Irma in 2017. RAF Voyager, C-17 and A-400M aircraft departed
the UK within hours of the incident to provide immediate relief to people
who had seen their homes destroyed. They carried over 300 UK military
personnel, including 200 Royal Marines, engineers and specialist
personnel from all three Services. Urgently needed medical supplies,
emergency shelter kits, rations and clean water were also flown to the
1
area. Puma helicopters were transported to the region to allow hub and
spoke operations to be conducted from the UK joint task force base in
Barbados. In addition, embarked in Royal Fleet Auxiliary Mounts Bay was a
Royal Navy Wildcat helicopter, which was used to conduct reconnaissance
flights of the area and more air power arrived within days, including RAF
Chinooks, on board HMS Ocean. As well as satisfying the humane and
moral requirement to help those in need, Operation Ruman signalled the
UK’s support for the region through a rapid response that was largely
enabled by air power.

1.26. Air power’s agility means the scale and scope of operations can be
rapidly escalated or de-escalated in response to a change in political guidance
or political strategic objectives, from delivering humanitarian aid at one end of
the spectrum to full-scale warfighting at the other.15 It can also be an effective
means of achieving objectives by avoiding the military and political liabilities
that can arise from an extended land-based presence in a foreign country.
Consequently, since the end of the Cold War, air power has played a major
role in state responses to conflict.
Legal aspects
1.27. Each nation state has sovereignty over the airspace above their territory.16
1
Therefore, although the attributes of air power provide it with the theoretical
ability to reach any point on Earth, the permission of sovereign territories is
required to operate within their airspace. Exceptions to this requirement do
exist, for example, if measures involving armed force are permitted by a UN
Security Council resolution or when acting in self-defence in accordance with
Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UK will always operate in accordance with its
legal obligations, including the law of armed conflict when applicable.17
1.28. All UK military aircraft are operated in accordance with domestic and
international law. As detailed above, uncrewed aircraft system missions will be
planned and conducted in accordance with the same rules of engagement
and other legal requirements as applies to crewed aircraft.
Economic aspects
1.29. Freedom of navigation in the air environment enables international trade

and helps to secure international safety. As our national security depends on
our economic security, the ability to influence and shape what happens in the
air environment is of fundamental importance to not only our national security
but also our continued prosperity. As an island nation, the UK relies on its air
lines of communication for this prosperity, just as it does its sea and land lines
of communication. The air environment must therefore be secured to allow
the freedom of movement, which bolsters the economy and supports the
prosperity of the nation.
15 The mere deployment of combat aircraft to a location in close proximity to a potential
adversary can achieve influence, such as deterrence.
16 As recognised under Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) 1944.
17 See Joint Service Publication 383, Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict
and the Attorney General’s speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
11 January 2017.

A Reaper (MQ-9A) prepares for take off
1.30. Although this publication focuses on the military elements of air power,
there are aspects of broader UK air power that bolster the UK economy,
and ultimately reinforce national security. These include, for example: UK
international airports, airlines and freight carriers; the ability to control and
support international air traffic through the existence of the Civil Aviation
Authority and civilian air traffic control; and the domestic aircraft industry.
Section 4 – Air power in context

The strategic context
1.31. The strategic context within which UK air power is employed is

unstable, complex and uncertain. It is characterised by a continuum of
competition between an increasingly wide range of actors, both state and
non‑state, which has blurred the traditional distinctions between war and
peace.

1.32. It is within this uncertain, changeable global socio-economic context

that air power offers flexible, timely, scalable and responsive options to the
UK government in support of national security objectives. It contributes to a
wide variety of tasks, ranging from high-end warfighting, through to deterrence
and Defence engagement. Within these tasks sit a broad range of activities,
including counterterrorism, delivering humanitarian assistance and providing
military aid to the civil authorities.
1.33. The increasing proliferation of commercially available technology has

the potential to increase the capability and effectiveness of our adversaries.
Secure communications, surveillance systems and uncrewed aircraft are now
more affordable and can be easily acquired and adapted to perform a variety
1
of functions, including kinetic attacks.
1.34. Surface-to-air missile technology has advanced rapidly and the

proliferation of such systems is spreading, particularly those developed in
Russia and China. Some have significant lethal engagement ranges and can
travel at hypersonic speeds, and they are therefore able to threaten aircraft
and bases previously viewed as being beyond the range of adversaries. Such
capabilities offer potential adversaries the option to adopt anti-access and
area denial strategies, which could have a significant negative impact on the
ability of the UK and its allies and partners to gain control of the air. We must
continue to develop counters to such threats across all operational domains to
ensure control of the air and freedom of manoeuvre.
1.35. Being agile, adaptable and capable, UK air power has significant utility
as it can offer a tailored response to evolving circumstances and an array of
capabilities that can rapidly transition between tasks. To fulfil these tasks, UK
air capabilities are held at the appropriate readiness to be applied at the right
time and place, both at home and overseas.
1.36. Air power is truly global in nature because it theoretically enables

access to any point on Earth, be it over land or sea. Air power thus has
strategic agility as it can hold multiple regions, theatres and operations at risk
from a single location because of its reach and speed. To maximise the utility
of air power, the key aspects of the air domain, the surrounding context and
the contemporary operating environment must all be clearly understood.

The Red Arrows fly over the Golden Gate Bridge, San Francisco, during their
North American Tour 2019
Global alliances and partnerships
1.37. The globalised nature of international security encourages the UK

to form alliances and partnerships, which help ensure security and protect
national interests. Such relationships are increasingly important because the
complex nature of potential threats often requires a multifaceted response.
Interoperability between air forces also enhances alliances and coalitions
by generating greater combat mass, resilience and access to an array of
capabilities. For the UK, NATO is our principal alliance.
Defence engagement
1.38. The UK’s dependence on multinational cooperation means it must take

every opportunity to promote interoperability and engage with a broad range
of potential partners, regardless of their level of technological sophistication or
capability. As part of an integrated, cross-government approach to Defence
engagement,18 both the RAF and the air arms of the other single Services
regularly conduct multinational training and exercises, and participate in
overseas exchange and Defence attaché programmes.
18 See Joint Doctrine Note 1/15, Defence Engagement for more detail.

1.39. Defence engagement also contributes to the prosperity agenda through

support to sales campaigns. Examples of this are the overseas tours by the
RAF Aerobatic Team, the Red Arrows, which have generated significant inward
investment to the UK,19 and the creation of the joint RAF/Qatar Emiri Air Force
Typhoon and Hawk squadrons.
UK Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Strategic Framework
1.40. The Defence contribution to the four overarching objectives of the

Strategic Framework is set out in the 2021 Global Britain in a competitive age:
Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. Air
1
power supports these objectives as follows.
a. Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas. The

core purpose of air power activity is providing military capability in
the air domain to deter and, if required, defeat threats to the UK and
Overseas Territories. The most visible and persistent example of this
is the RAF combat aircraft, air-to-air refuelling aircraft and control and
reporting centres, which provide the permanently available airborne
quick reaction alert capability.20
b. Building resilience at home and overseas. The attributes of

air power make it a valuable tool for supporting resilience activities,
be that rapidly delivering humanitarian aid to the Caribbean in 2017
following a hurricane, supporting activity to prevent the Whaley Bridge
dam collapsing during flooding in the UK in 2019 or rapidly delivering
vaccines and moving patients by air during the response to the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–21.
c. Shaping the open international order of the future. UK air power
acts in support of this objective by demonstrating adherence to the
laws, rules and conventions that underpin the rules-based international
order whilst conducting all activities, and encouraging allies and
partners and other air arms with whom we operate to act in a similar
fashion. Other activities such as mentoring and building the capacity of
friendly or non-aligned nations also assists.
19 The Red Arrows 2017 tour of the Asia Pacific and Middle East regions generated inward
investment of approximately £4.2 billion.
20 Air power activity such as the quick reaction alert can provide a highly effective means
of messaging within information operations activity that forms a part of deterrence.

d. Sustaining strategic advantage through science and

technology. Air power has always been at the cutting edge of
technology and the UK’s continued investment and involvement in the
plethora of technological developments linked to air power continues to
support this objective. The work being done by Team Tempest, linking
national and commercial scientific and technological development
with operational requirements, to develop the RAF’s sixth generation
combat aircraft is a prime example of this.

Key points
• Air power is defined as: the ability to use air capabilities in and from the air,
to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events.
• UK air power is persistently active, domestically and globally, protecting UK

national interests at home and overseas.
• Although air power can be used independently of the other operational

domains, it seeks to create effects and exert influence within them.
1
• Conversely, maritime, land, space and cyber forces all have the ability to
influence events in the air environment.
• Being agile, adaptable and capable, UK air power has significant utility
because it possesses an array of capabilities that can offer a tailored
response to evolving circumstances.
• Air power is truly global in nature because it theoretically enables access to

any point on Earth, be it over land or sea.
• Air power offers policymakers an agile, timely and focused capability that
can be highly effective in resolving or averting a developing crisis.

Chapter 2
This chapter discusses the roles of air power. It also

introduces air command and control as a critical enabler and
electromagnetic warfare as a key enabler.
Section 1 – Control of the air . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Section 2 – Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Section 3 – Intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Section 4 – Air mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Section 5 – Key enablers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

The roles of air power
2
“
For good or for ill, air mastery is
today the supreme expression of
military power and fleets and armies,
however vital and important, must
accept a subordinate rank.
”
Sir Winston Churchill

Chapter 2

2.1. There are four fundamental roles of air power: control of the air; attack;
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and air mobility. These four
roles are shown in Figure 2.1. When conducted in isolation, combined or, more
usually, as part of multi-domain operations within an integrated approach,
these roles contribute to persistent influence and deterrence activities as well
as to the direct task assigned.
2
Control
of the air
Air power roles

Air mobility Attack
Intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance
Figure 2.1 – The roles of air power

Section 1 – Control of the air

2.2. Control of the air underpins all air operations because it secures freedom
of action in the air domain, while limiting or denying its use by an adversary. It
is this role that protects the UK, Overseas Territories and deployed forces from
attack. It also enables freedom of manoeuvre across the maritime and land
domains and safeguards space and cyber fixed infrastructure, enabling forces
to dominate the engagement space21 and seize the initiative. The breakdown of
control of the air is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Control
of the air
2
Air and missile defence

Offensive counter-air missions
(defensive counter-air missions)
Active air and Passive air and

Surface attack
missile defence missile defence
Fighter sweep/escort Detection Detection and warning
Identification Camouflage, concealment

Suppression of enemy air defences
and assessment and deception
Interception Hardening, dispersal

High-value airborne asset attack
and engagement and recuperation
Redundancy
Mobility
Chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear
Figure 2.2 – Breakdown of the control of the air role
2.3. Control of the air is a relative condition and depends on available

resources, an adversary’s capability and will, and the risk that a commander
21 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has agreed that engagement space and
battlespace are synonyms. The UK uses engagement space as it better describes the
contemporary operating environment.

is prepared to accept. Maritime and land operations can be conducted without

achieving control of the air in advance, but the associated risks could be
significant. There are three degrees of control of the air.22
a. Air parity. Air parity exists where no force enjoys decisive control of
the air in either time or space. Consequently, both friendly and adversary
land, maritime and air forces may encounter significant interference by the
opposing force. Parity is not a ‘stand-off’, nor does it mean that air operations
have halted. On the contrary, parity may be typified by high‑intensity air
operations with maximum effort exerted between belligerents to achieve
some level of favourable control. This condition is a major resource drain and
losses due to an adversary’s air power can be anticipated.
b. Air superiority. Air superiority is that degree of dominance in the air battle
of one force over another, which permits the conduct of operations by the
former, and its related maritime, land and air forces, at a given time and place,
2
without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
c. Air supremacy. Air supremacy is the degree of air superiority where the
opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. It is important to note
that even air supremacy cannot guarantee that an adversary will not inflict
some damage or losses, particularly given the extensive proliferation of small
arms weapons and man-portable air defence systems. This is normally the
highest level of control of the air that a joint force can achieve.
2.4. Control of the air is not a permanent state and constant activity is required to
achieve it. To gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air, counter‑air
operations are conducted to disrupt, degrade, deny or destroy an adversary’s
ability to challenge such control. Counter-air operations comprise two key missions:
offensive counter-air (OCA) and defensive counter‑air (DCA) missions.
a. Offensive counter-air missions. OCA missions target enemy air

capabilities as close to their source as possible. They are generally
proactive in nature and seek to dominate an adversary’s airspace to prevent
them launching threats against our forces by affecting them on the ground,
along with their supporting systems. Although primarily conducted by
aircraft, they can also be conducted by naval surface or sub-surface fire,
land artillery or special forces direct action targeted against adversary air
capabilities.23
22 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Air Operations.
23 See Air Publication (AP) 3002, Air and Space Warfare, Edition 4, Chapter 5 for more detail
on individual OCA missions.

2
Somewhere off the UK, a Typhoon FGR4 intercepts and escorts a
Russian Tupolev TU-95 Bear
b. Defensive counter-air missions. DCA missions, otherwise known

as air and missile defence operations, are generally reactive in nature
and seek to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air and missile
threats through active or passive measures. Active measures include
methods of detection, interception and engagement. These measures
are usually achieved via a system of layered defence-in-depth using
reactive air‑to‑air fighters, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and
additional aircraft placed on ground or airborne alert.24 Such a system is
termed an integrated air and missile defence system. Passive measures
for the defence and protection of friendly forces include: early warning;
camouflage, concealment and deception; hardening; recuperation;
redundancy; dispersal; mobility; and the use of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) protective equipment and facilities.25
2.5. Challenges to control of the air. Western air power has dominated

conflicts in which it has been involved over the past 40 years, ensuring a
high degree of control of the air and thereby helping to lower the risk to
operations in other operational domains. However, to achieve a similar
degree of control of the air in future will require focused, tailored, aggressive
24 See AJP-3.3.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Air Operations, for more details.
25 See AP3002, Air and Space Warfare, Edition 4, Chapter 5, for more detail on individual
DCA missions and Allied Tactical Publication-3.3.6, Force Protection for Air Operations and
AP3241, RAF Force Protection for Air Operations for the links between passive DCA and
passive force protection measures.

and innovative counter‑air campaigns. This is due to the threats posed by

increasingly sophisticated anti‑access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities,
including electromagnetic warfare, cyber operations, SAM systems, and ballistic,
hypersonic and counter-carrier missiles. Such capabilities are designed to
prevent deployment to a theatre of operations or deny air operations in theatre.
The emerging threat from hostile uncrewed aircraft also challenges control
of lower airspace, threatening land and maritime forces. We must therefore
continue to develop counter-A2AD and uncrewed aircraft system technologies
to ensure freedom of action in a contested, degraded and operationally limited
domain. The challenge to control of the air may also be increasingly contested
in the home environment. It is likely that this will initially be through cyber
and electromagnetic asymmetric actions, but peer adversaries do have the
capability to challenge our domestic control of the air with capabilities across all
operational domains.
2
Operation Granby versus Operation Corporate
Operation Granby was the UK’s military contribution to the United States‑led
coalition that freed Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991. The Iraqi Army was
the fifth largest in the world and President Saddam Hussein intended to inflict
an unacceptable level of casualties on the coalition. However, the coalition
exploited their comparative advantage – air power – to avoid fighting on his
terms. Control of the air was quickly achieved, enabling coalition air forces to
switch the main effort to counter-land operations against Iraqi ground forces.
This was so successful that the Iraqi Army’s combat capability was vastly
reduced by the time the coalition launched the land offensive and helped
ensure a decisive victory with only a few coalition casualties.
In comparison, it was difficult to secure control of the air with the limited
carrier-borne capabilities available for Operation Corporate, the UK’s 1982
campaign to retake the Falkland Islands. The continuing Argentinean air threat
meant that the carrier group had to remain east of the Islands after landing the
task force at San Carlos. The range to the combat zone also limited the time
that fighters could spend on task. With only partial air cover available, some
Argentinean aircraft penetrated the defensive screen provided by the Royal
Navy’s frigates and destroyers, inflicting significant losses on the task force.
Sufficient control of the air was attained to ensure that the campaign was
successful, but the margins were fine. The Falklands conflict highlights
the potential risks if a campaign is mounted without the assurance of control
of the air.

Section 2 – Attack
2.6. The use of overwhelming force through an attack from the air lies at the
heart of the ability of air power to influence the behaviour of actors and the
course of events. Air attack can deter adversaries, disrupt their activities or
ultimately defeat them by destroying their resources and capabilities. UK air
power is equipped with a broad spectrum of precise weapon technologies,
both lethal and non-lethal, offering the ability to decisively shape the
engagement space, in any weather conditions, day or night. The attack role
consists of three mission types: strategic attack; counter-land operations; and
counter‑maritime operations. Figure 2.3 illustrates this breakdown.
2
Attack
Strategic attack Counter-land operations Counter-maritime operations
Air interdiction Anti-submarine warfare
Close air support Surface warfare
Figure 2.3 – The breakdown of the attack role
2.7. Strategic attack. These operations are aimed at an adversary’s

fundamental ability to wage war by attacking their structures or organisations.
Targets may include centres of gravity, such as national leadership and
command elements, war production resources or critical national infrastructure
and resources. In this context, ‘strategic’ describes the effect, not the location
or distance to the target, or type of weapon system or delivery platform.
It can be at its most effective when a wide array of targets are attacked
simultaneously, causing maximum shock effect and placing significant stress
on an adversary’s processes, thereby limiting their ability to adapt and react.

“
Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior

speed the airplane is the offensive weapon par excellence.
Giulio Douhet
2.8. Counter-land operations. These operations are conducted to defeat

an adversary’s fielded forces, destroy their supporting infrastructure or create
psychological effects to shatter their cohesion or will to fight. Counter-land
operations are also a force multiplier because they enhance the potency of
friendly land forces, allowing them to achieve their objectives while minimising
the risk of casualties. They consist of two broad mission types: air interdiction
and close air support (CAS).
a. Air interdiction. Air interdiction is the activities conducted to disrupt,

degrade, deny or destroy an adversary’s capabilities before they can
2
be used against friendly forces. Air interdiction targets elements such
as enemy personnel, lines of communication, command and control
nodes, logistics and supporting systems at ranges beyond which an
adversary can engage friendly land forces. It can be conducted in
support of friendly land force operations but since it is normally carried
out at significant distance from their location, detailed integration is not
routinely required. However, when air interdiction is conducted between
the forward line of own troops (FLOT)26 and the fire support coordination
line (FSCL),27 in airspace controlled by the land commander and thus
requiring coordination between air and land forces, these missions are
categorised as battlefield air interdiction (BAI).28 There are two main
employment options for air interdiction, which are pre-planned and
immediate. The most efficient option is pre-planned because this allows
planning to take into account the multitude of variables that will affect
the probability of target destruction. Immediate air interdiction, attacking
mobile or short-notice targets, may appear to offer a more flexible
response, but the trade-off may be a reduction in the planning and
26 The forward line of own troops is defined as: a line which indicates the most forward
positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. NATOTerm.
27 The fire support coordination line is defined as: within an assigned area of operations,
a line established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote coordination
requirements for fires by other force elements which may affect the commander’s current
and planned operations. NATOTerm. (See lexicon for full definition.)
28 Increases in the range of land rocket artillery systems means that battlefield air
interdiction is likely to be more prevalent in the future as the distance between the FLOT
and the FSCL is expected to increase.

coordination time, which in turn can reduce the probability of success.

The increasing sophistication and utility of data link communication
between ground units and aircraft does mitigate the impact of reduced
formal planning and coordination time. Where the exact location of the
enemy is unknown, kill box interdiction (KBI), strike coordination and
reconnaissance (SCAR) and armed reconnaissance may be tasked to
attack targets of opportunity.29
b. Close air support. CAS is the action taken to disrupt, degrade, deny
or destroy enemy activity or capabilities that are in close proximity to
friendly land forces. It complements land force ground attack capabilities
with significant firepower to coerce adversary forces. Consequently,
intensive air-land integration and coordination is critical to accurately
identify targets and minimise the risk of fratricide. CAS can be crucial to
the success or survival of land forces, as has been proven during recent
2 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2.9. Counter-maritime operations. Air power can be used to conduct

direct action in the maritime domain or to enable and enhance surface and
sub-surface capabilities. Counter-maritime operations are the employment
of air attack in the maritime domain and consist of two mission types:
anti‑submarine warfare and surface warfare.30
a. Anti-submarine warfare. These are operations which search for,

locate, track and attack submarines and their support assets. Sensors
can be used to detect submarines, including radar, electro-optical
sensors, magnetic anomaly detection devices, and active or passive
acoustic sensors.
b. Surface warfare. These are operations which detect and engage

adversary maritime surface forces. The type of support provided by
aircraft depends on operational requirements and on their capabilities,
but it can include detection, location, identification, tracking and,
ultimately, attack.
29 For more detail see AP3002, Air and Space Warfare, Edition 4, Chapter 6.
30 In maritime doctrine anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare are sub-sets of
underwater warfare and above-water warfare respectively; but for the purposes of
air attack doctrine they are considered in isolation. The term surface warfare is being
incorporated into Royal Navy doctrine, it is also used by the United States Navy, and is
increasingly being adopted across NATO; however, officially, NATO still uses anti-surface
warfare.

Poseidon MRA1 maritime patrol aircraft launches a Mk 54 torpedo 2
2.10. Challenges to attack. The success of an air attack is largely dependent

on the ability of aircraft or weapons to penetrate or counter adversary air
defences, and these have become increasingly capable. There are also
practical limits to the number of weapons that aircraft can carry. However,
this challenge has been mitigated by the development of precision-guided
weapons and electronic attack technology, which has led to the same or
even greater effect being created with a fewer weapons. Poor weather can
also hinder attack operations but the development of a wide range of weapon
guidance options, such as laser, Global Positioning System (GPS) or radar
guidance, have mitigated this challenge and provide significant operational and
tactical flexibility. Air attacks can therefore be conducted by day or night and
in adverse weather conditions, which can provide a distinct advantage if an
adversary lacks such capabilities.
Section 3 – Intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance
2.11. The use of aircraft changed how the battlespace, as it was then termed,
was viewed, as they provided an alternative perspective to that offered by
maritime or land platforms. The ISR role, illustrated in Figure 2.4, develops
situational awareness and enhances understanding, thereby helping shape the
conduct of operations.

and reconnaissance
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
Tasking Visual Traditional
Collection Aural Non-traditional
2 Processing Electronic
Exploitation Photographic
Dissemination
Figure 2.4 – The breakdown of the intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance role
2.12. The synchronisation of information collected from aircraft and the

subsequent processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) identifies trends,
linkages and threats. It supports decision-making by enabling the identification
of an adversary’s dependencies, vulnerabilities and strengths. ISR consists of
three linked ‘inform’ functions.
a. Intelligence. Aircraft do not directly deliver intelligence but

provide timely, accurate and relevant information that is processed
and disseminated, and potentially combined with other sources of
information to provide intelligence. Intelligence informs political and
military decision-making processes and makes a major contribution to
the assessment of when and how specific objectives might be achieved
or an end state attained.
b. Surveillance. Surveillance is the continuing and systematic

observation of a wide area of interest. The area of interest can be in any

one of the air, surface or sub-surface environments, observed by visual,

aural, electronic, photographic or other means. It is not orientated
towards a specific target but designed to provide warning of broad
adversarial initiatives and to detect potential threats.
c. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance complements surveillance

by observing a specific area of interest to gain specific information
about specific activities. Intelligence that is critical to the prosecution
of current operations is often derived from reconnaissance operations,
so it should be evaluated and transmitted with minimum delay to those
elements that need the information.
“
Find the enemy. Don’t let the enemy find you. Reconnaissance!
Reconnaissance! Reconnaissance!
2
Tom Clancy
2.13. Speed and wide area surveillance capabilities make aircraft among the
most responsive of ISR platforms and their reach gives them the ability to fly long
distances and cover vast areas, collecting information from a variety of sensors.
Radar, acoustic, imagery and signals intelligence sensors have varying but
complementary operating characteristics, offering a spread of options. Crews
are trained to recognise and respond to changing conditions by modifying
missions whilst they are in progress, and share information gained from onboard
systems through voice or data links.31 Uncrewed aircraft, whilst not, currently,
being as fast as crewed aircraft, do tend to have greater endurance and can
provide significant persistence when compared with crewed aircraft.
2.14. The effectiveness of individual ISR capabilities can be increased by

networking them into a system. For example, a surveillance sensor on a given
ISR aircraft can observe a wide area before cueing higher resolution sensors
with a narrower field of view to conduct reconnaissance on a specific point of
interest. Secure network systems also enable multiple platforms to benefit from
the ISR capabilities generated and shared by a single aircraft.
2.15. Historically, large ISR aircraft provided the majority of air-enabled

ISR but this role is no longer limited to those aircraft or sensors that were
31 Short-notice modification of missions can be enhanced by near real time processing,

exploitation and dissemination support.

specifically designed for this role. The increasing sophistication of airborne

sensors has resulted in many aircraft being able to conduct ISR, even if it is
not their primary mission. Combat aircraft and helicopters provide significant
input to the ISR enterprise. However, unlike large, multi-crew ISR aircraft,
non‑dedicated ISR aircraft do not always have an associated analytical
capability, or the means to effectively disseminate information.
2.16. Challenges to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The

main challenges to air ISR centre on data volume, impermanence and threat.
These challenges are explored below.
a. Data volume. There are significant PED demands associated

with collecting large volumes of data by a number of multi-spectral
sensors. This presents the challenge of providing decision-makers with
fused intelligence that they can act on, rather than proliferating data
2 from a multitude of systems that may swamp decision-makers with
unactionable information. Some ISR sensors can also be negatively
impacted by poor weather conditions and the use of camouflage
and concealment techniques. However, by using a broad spectrum
of sensors on a variety of aircraft, some of these challenges can be
overcome.
b. Impermanence. The impermanence of air power has historically

and justifiably been recognised as a limitation of air power and it is
one that particularly affects the ISR role. However, although aircraft
are not able to remain airborne indefinitely, despite the benefits of
air-to‑air refuelling, the increased loiter time of uncrewed aircraft has
brought significant benefits as points of interest can, potentially, be
persistently monitored. The Ministry of Defence is expanding airborne
ISR capabilities by harnessing emerging technologies to overcome the
challenge of impermanence, as demonstrated by the acquisition of
high-altitude pseudo satellites, such as Zephyr, and further mitigating
the impermanence of aircraft by enhancing the space-based ISR suite.32
c. Threat. Traditional airborne ISR is increasingly threatened by

long‑range SAMs, air-to-air missiles and targeted jamming. These
threats force ISR aircraft to operate further away from their areas of
interest, thus reducing their effectiveness.
32 More detail on space-based ISR is contained in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-40,
UK Space Power.

Section 4 – Air mobility

2.17. Air mobility provides the ability to deploy, sustain and recover personnel
and equipment, often over significant distance. The speed and reach of air
power offers the ability to create rapid strategic influence in support of UK
national objectives or in support of allies, such as through the insertion of
special forces or delivering humanitarian aid due to a natural disaster. At the
operational and tactical levels, air mobility supports land operations by enabling
manoeuvre when movement on land is particularly difficult due to poor terrain,
poor roads or unacceptable threats to land forces. Air mobility consists of three
mission types: air-to‑air refuelling; airlift; and personnel recovery. These are
illustrated in Figure 2.5.
2
Air mobility
Air-to-air refuelling Airlift Personnel recovery
Hub and spoke Search and rescue operations
Airborne operations Combat recovery
Aeromedical evacuation
Special forces air operations
Figure 2.5 – The breakdown of the air mobility role
2.18. Air-to-air refuelling. Air-to‑air refuelling significantly increases the reach,

endurance and flexibility of air power and is therefore a crucial capability. It
enhances strategic and operational mobility by helping to mitigate access
issues caused by a lack of basing options, overflight limitations or A2AD
threats that may otherwise constrain air operations. It also improves the

persistence, availability and responsiveness of tactical air operations by

maximising the endurance of combat aircraft.33
2.19. Airlift. Airlift is the ability to transport personnel and materiel through the
air; they can be either inter- or intra-theatre and are subdivided into: hub and
spoke operations; airborne operations; aeromedical evacuation; and special
forces air operations.
a. Hub and spoke operations. Hub and spoke operations consist of

inter- and intra-theatre airlift and are the cornerstone of airlift operations
to operational theatres, delivering personnel and/or equipment as
required. Inter-theatre airlift provides the air bridge that links the UK to
airfields in, or near, theatres of operations, known as hubs. It is provided
by air transport aircraft operating in the strategic role, supplemented
by chartered civilian airlift. The hub is the focal point for subsequent
2 intra-theatre airlift to spoke airfields located throughout the theatre
of operations. Intra-theatre airlift is normally fulfilled by fixed‑wing air
transport aircraft operating in the tactical role or support helicopters,
both of which are capable of operating under a wide range of
conditions, including small, remote field operations. It should be noted
that not all airlift tasks will require the use of hub and spoke operations;
routine national or global movement of cargo and passengers frequently
operate directly between military air bases and civil airports with no
requirement for the onward movement of payload by air.
b. Airborne operations. Airborne operations are the transportation of

land forces and their equipment directly to, or close to, their objective
and subsequently sustaining or extracting them, when required. This
can be done by either air-land or air-drop operations. Air-land delivery
is when an aircraft lands directly at its objective to unload, whereas
air‑drop is delivery from an aircraft in flight, using parachutes.
During World War 2 some dogs were trained to parachute alongside

British paratroopers. ‘Para Dogs’ went into action on D-Day, when
a dog, called ‘Bing’, landed in a tree where he remained until his handler
could rescue him the next morning!
33 By increasing the flight time of combat aircraft, they can extend their combat air patrols
in support of a control of the air mission, remain airborne to attack more targets in an air
interdiction mission, provide longer support to land forces in a close air support mission, or
gather time-critical reconnaissance information in the ISR role.

2
Pathfinder personnel practise high altitude low opening insertion from a Globemaster C-17
c. Aeromedical evacuation. Aeromedical evacuation is a specialist

form of airlift that transports injured or seriously ill personnel under
medical supervision. Forward aeromedical evacuation is moving
injured personnel from the battlefield to appropriate medical treatment
facilities. Tactical aeromedical evacuation is moving patients between
medical facilities in, or close to, theatre. Strategic aeromedical
evacuation operations involve repatriating ill or wounded personnel
from in-theatre medical facilities, primarily in specially equipped and
staffed aircraft.34
d. Special forces air operations. Special forces air operations are air
operations conducted by specialist aircraft and personnel that enable
the insertion, sustainment and extraction of special forces. Although
all four air power roles could be used to support special forces
operations, having the ability to rapidly move specialist personnel in
support of high priority political objectives is a critical capability.
2.20. Personnel recovery. Personnel recovery operations frequently use

air mobility capabilities to rescue captured, isolated or missing personnel
during combat or peacetime operations. Personnel recovery is subdivided into
34 For more detail on aeromedical evacuation operations, see AJP-4.10, Allied Joint
Medical Doctrine for Medical Support (with UK national elements) and AP3002, Air and
Space Warfare, Edition 4, Chapter 8.

peacetime recovery and combat recovery.35 Peacetime recovery operations

are undertaken to recover personnel where no threat is posed by hostile
interference, such as search and rescue operations or military assistance to
the civil authorities. A combat recovery operation is the extraction of isolated
personnel from a situation where hostile interference is expected; it is therefore
amongst the most time-sensitive of air operations.
2.21. Challenges to air mobility. There are practical limits to the payload that
aircraft can carry, but this limitation needs to be offset against the advantages
offered by speed and reach. Maritime platforms can move significantly more
personnel and equipment in support of military operations but at significantly
slower speeds. Also, movement on the ground is relatively time consuming
and can be hindered by terrain or contested by a threat. Air mobility therefore
balances the challenge of a limited payload with the military advantages
offered by speed of action. Air mobility aircraft can also be more vulnerable
2 to air and ground launched threats due to their size, relatively slow speed and
limited manoeuvrability. However, by understanding the threats posed before
employing air mobility aircraft, and ensuring that the aircraft are equipped with
appropriate platform protection capabilities, actions can be taken to mitigate
the risk posed.
Section 5 – Key enablers

2.22. Air command and control. The four fundamental roles of air power,
conceptually and doctrinally endorsed and operationally validated throughout
the history of British air power, and mirrored in the doctrine of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and wider allies and partners, do not,
in themselves, fully describe why air power can be so effective. The four
fundamental roles explain what air power can deliver, but there has to be
something that enables the synergy, both across the roles and to integrate
air power with the other operational domains. This critical enabler, driven
by information, is command and control, which provides the where, when,
why, how, what and with what of air power. Without it, air activities would be
incoherent and ineffective. Command and control is not a role in its own right
but, as can be seen in Figure 2.6, it envelops all air activities and, in turn, is
cocooned by the sphere of information, whilst air activities are delivered by
the fundamental roles. The criticality of air command and control has only
35 For more detail on personnel recovery operations, see AJP-3.7, Allied Joint Doctrine
for the Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment, Allied Personnel Recovery
Publication-3.3.7.5, The NATO Survival, Escape/Evasion, Resistance and Extraction
Training Standard and AP3002, Air and Space Warfare, Edition 4, Chapter 8.

increased as air activities are now delivered within multi-domain operations as

part of integrated action. Air command and control is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3.
Information
mand and contro

Com l
Control
of the air
2
Air mobility Attack
and reconnaissance
Figure 2.6 – The air power model
2.23. Electromagnetic warfare. Access to the electromagnetic environment

(EME) is a key enabler across all the roles of air power. Electromagnetic
activities aim to assure freedom of action across the electromagnetic spectrum
whilst denying an adversary such freedoms. It includes: electronic defence to
assure freedom of action for friendly forces; electronic surveillance to enable us
to understand the threat systems, communication and navigation limitations,
or exploitable opportunities throughout the EME; and electronic attack, which
can increase the scope of available strike options, including that of non-kinetic
action. When considered in the context of the pervasiveness of information
and the political risk of collateral damage caused by kinetic weapons,
electronic attack may be more politically acceptable.

Chinook deploying self-protection infrared flares
Summary of the roles of air power
2.24. Although the four roles of air power are treated as being distinct,
there is also overlap. Modern, multi-role aircraft afford a significant degree of
simultaneity, whereby a single aircraft can perform more than one role, even
during the same mission if necessary. For example, a Lightning II can conduct
ISR tasks whilst engaged in a counter-maritime attack mission. As technology
advances and multi-role aircraft continue to be developed, there is potential
for the overlap between roles to increase further. This is a key strength of air
power, as simultaneity bolsters its agility, flexibility and adaptability.
“
I believe that the first and great principle of war is that you must first
win your air battle before you fight your land and sea battle.
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

Key points
• The four core roles of air power are: control of the air; attack; ISR; and air
mobility.
• Control of the air underpins all air operations because it secures freedom
of action in the air domain, while limiting or denying its use by an
adversary.
• The use of overwhelming force through an attack from the air lies at the
heart of the ability of air power to influence the behaviour of actors and
the course of events.
• The speed of aircraft enables highly responsive ISR solutions; their reach
gives them the ability to fly long distances and cover vast areas, collecting
2
information from a variety of sensors.
• Air mobility provides the ability to deploy, sustain and recover personnel
and equipment, often over significant distance.
• Modern, multi-role aircraft afford a significant degree of simultaneity,

whereby a single aircraft can perform more than one role during the same
mission.
• Command and control envelopes all four air power roles and it is critical
for the effective delivery of air power.
• Access to the electromagnetic spectrum is a key enabler for all air

activity; it is required for effective communication and data exchange
across all force elements and is relied upon for platform navigation as well
as numerous attack and defence activities.

Chapter 3
Chapter 3 outlines the principles of air command and control

and provides an overview of the capabilities the UK uses
to deliver air command and control across the continuum
of competition. It also describes in broad terms how air
power is planned and tasked at the operational level and the
associated air operations tasking cycle.
Section 1 – Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Section 2 – UK air command and control capabilities . 57
Section 3 – Planning and tasking . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Command and control
“ An air force commander must

exploit the extreme flexibility,
the high tactical mobility, and
the supreme offensive quality
inherent in air forces, to mystify
3 and mislead his enemy, and
so to threaten his various vital
centres as to compel him to be
dangerously weak at the point
which is really decisive at the time.
”
Marshal of the RAF Sir John C. Slessor

Command and control
Chapter 3
Command and control

3.1. Effective command and control underpins the successful employment of
all elements of the military instrument; it is not unique to air power. However,
air power, by the very nature of its work, can be extremely sensitive to any
misdirection and operational experience has highlighted that air power has
to be underpinned by a fast decision cycle if it is to be employed effectively.
Additionally, air power’s ubiquity means that it can be applied across multiple
theatres, joint operations areas or even globally with competing demands
placed upon limited resources. Consequently, air command and control is
the key enabler without which the four fundamental air power roles cannot be
delivered effectively, irrespective of the size or nature of an operation.
Section 1 – Principles 3
Unity of command
3.2. Unity of command ensures the concentration of effort for every objective
is placed under one responsible commander. This is particularly important
for air operations, irrespective of where on the continuum of competition they
take place. Air assets are highly sought after because they are able to pursue
strategic, operational and tactical objectives simultaneously. However, they
can be limited in numbers or availability, so there is significant potential for
fragmentation of the air effort. A component request for tactical air support
could compete with the allocation of the same air resource for operational or
strategic objectives. Consequently, centralised command of air forces under a
single air commander is a fundamental tenet of air command and control.
3.3. Competing demands must be prioritised and apportioned accordingly;

the enduring principle of centralised control ensures that aircraft are used
as efficiently as possible to achieve military objectives. It prevents them from
being inappropriately tasked by uncoordinated users against impractical
objectives or being divided into small packages of air power that would
inhibit flexibility and hinder any requirement for a rapid concentration of force.
In addition, air operations can take place simultaneously across single or
multiple theatres of operation. However, no single person is likely to have the
level of situational awareness required to manage all concurrent activities.
Decentralised execution delegates execution authority to subordinate or

Command and control
on‑scene commanders, thereby shortening the decision cycle and increasing

speed of action. It is also the only feasible option for complex air campaigns,
especially where communications or data links may be degraded or denied.
3.4. Aligned with the UK and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joint
doctrine philosophy of mission command, the UK’s preferred method for air
command and control is centralised control and decentralised execution. That
said, depending on the operational context, two other options exist that can be
adopted to suit a specific operation or task.
a. Centralised control, centralised execution. Centralised execution

authority may be necessary in certain operational circumstances
where the stakes are particularly high or where the highest-value
assets are being employed. It might also be appropriate when there is
a requirement to closely manage air activities that might have strategic
effects, even though this may adversely affect tactical efficiency. A
potential disadvantage of centralised execution authority is that it
can result in a rigid approach that lacks tactical flexibility and is not
3 responsive enough to local conditions. As a result, it may only be suited
to specific operations for short periods of time.
b. Decentralised control, decentralised execution. The decentralised

control and execution of air power may be allocated to subordinate
commanders for specific periods of time to improve responsiveness.
Nominated air units could integrate as specific task-focused and
organised joint teams for certain operations.
Centralised control, centralised execution – Operation

Enduring Freedom
Centralised control, centralised execution is necessary in certain

circumstances, but it can also increase risk because it reduces operational
tempo. Operation Enduring Freedom was the response by the United
States (US) to global terrorism following the 11 September 2001 attacks in
New York. The following month, the operators of a US uncrewed aircraft
pinpointed the location of the supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah
Muhammad Omar, as he fled Kabul amongst a convoy of cars. As neither
the uncrewed aircraft controllers nor the US Navy Fifth Fleet commander in
Bahrain could authorise a strike, approval had to be sought from US Central
Command in Tampa, Florida. The ensuing delay for strike approval allowed
Mullah Mohammed Omar to escape.

Command and control
E-7 Wedgetail, the RAF’s future airborne early warning and control aircraft, which will
enter service in 2024
Componency
3.5. The organisational command and control framework employed for air
3
operations depends primarily upon the scale, size and complexity of the operating
area. Complex operations are traditionally served by a deployable, or permanent,
in-theatre command and control capability, especially when an operation is
NATO‑led, UK-led within a NATO framework, multinational coalition or US-led.
However, the RAF’s new command and control model based around 11 Group
also allows for the command and control of air operations ‘at range’ from the UK
using robust and secure beyond line of sight voice and data communications.
3.6. At the operational level, the UK and NATO use the concept of component
organisation36 to cohere multi-domain activity under a joint force commander
(JFC), particularly for a deployed joint force. The 2* Standing Joint Force
Headquarters provides this capability for the UK for small- and medium‑sized
operations.
3.7. A JFC may exercise command and control of joint air operations from
their own headquarters, augmented by air component subject matter experts.
However, it is more usual for the JFC to appoint a joint force air component
commander (JFACC),37 chosen from whichever component has the majority of
36 The components are land, maritime, air, special forces and logistics. See Allied Joint
Publication (AJP)-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct Of Operations.
37 NATO use the term commander joint force air component. Where an operation involves a
coalition the term combined force air component commander (CFACC) may be used.

Command and control
air assets and the command and control capabilities required to plan, task and
execute air operations.38
3.8. To efficiently employ the air capabilities available, the JFACC will normally
exercise operational control over their own component’s forces, and tactical
control over other components’ forces made available for tasking by the JFC.
The JFC may also establish support relationships between the JFACC and
other components to facilitate operations. For example, the JFACC will usually
be the supported commander for control of the air operations. Irrespective of
the size of the operation, there are four key responsibilities that normally fall to
the JFACC.
• Develop the overall air operations plan to support the desired

outcomes of the JFC; this is normally referred to as the joint air
operations plan (JAOP).
• Recommend to the JFC how best to assign the overall joint air
capabilities available between the various lines of operation for a
3 period of time; this is termed apportionment.
• Assign and task the joint air capabilities and forces made available
by the Service components based on the JFC’s air apportionment
decision.
• Provide oversight and guidance during the execution phase and

evaluate the subsequent results.
3.9. Within the complex contemporary operating environment, competing

demands for access to airspace from both military and civilian users are
inevitable. To integrate, coordinate or deconflict all airspace user requirements,
an airspace control authority (ACA) can be appointed, who will be responsible
for establishing and operating an appropriate airspace control system
promulgated through an airspace control plan. For operations where an
adversary has an offensive air or missile capability, an air and missile defence
commander (AMDC) will usually be appointed to integrate the air and missile
defence capabilities of all components. Given the interdependence of airspace
control and air and missile defence, ACA and AMDC responsibilities are
normally given to the JFACC.
38 Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts as
an integral and organic part of its own operations.

Command and control
Merlin HM Mk2 airborne surveillance and control helicopters on board HMS Queen Elizabeth
3
3.10. To fulfil their responsibilities, a JFACC is supported by a joint force air
component headquarters (JFAC HQ), usually with an embedded air operations
centre. This provides the critical interface between operational planning and
tactical execution. Whilst the size, internal composition, battle rhythm and
location of the JFAC HQ will vary according to the type and scope of mission,
five elements are common to most. These are:
• a strategy division, which leads on long- and short-term air strategy

and produces the JAOP;
• a combat plans division, which develops detailed execution plans;
• a combat operations division, which monitors and executes daily

operations;
• an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) division,

which provides predictive and actionable intelligence, as well as a
common threat and targeting picture; and
• a combat support division, which coordinates administrative,

communications, logistics, meteorology, information management
and media engagement activities.

Command and control
3.11. Liaison between nations, components and non-military organisations

is a key factor in the success of air operations; without it, air power cannot be
employed effectively in support of multi-domain operations. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.1. Whilst liaison can be conducted remotely via electronic means,
all of the UK’s recent military operations have highlighted the value of personal
contact between senior commanders and the utility of liaison officers in
facilitating that contact. For liaison to work effectively, arrangements must span
the operational and tactical levels. At the highest level, senior liaison officers
must possess the authority to represent their commanders on critical issues;
at lower levels, subject matter experts provide planning, tasking and execution
expertise regarding their component or organisation’s activities.39 Where an
operation is multinational, participating nations will usually send a national
contingent commander to the JFAC HQ to ensure their assigned forces
operate within national rules of engagement.
3 Joint force air

component commander
Joint force air

component
headquarters
command group
Intelligence,
Combat Combat Combat
Strategy surveillance and
plans operations support
reconnaissance
Liaison elements
Figure 3.1 – A typical joint force air component headquarters structure
3.12. Rarely, if ever, will air power be used in isolation as a response to a

crisis or to achieve a national objective; the UK’s approach to employing
the military instrument of national power is by design cross-government
and multi-agency, including working with non-governmental organisations
39 For more detail on liaison arrangements between components see Air Publication
(AP) 3002, Air and Space Warfare, Edition 4, Chapter 2.

Command and control
where appropriate. Consequently, liaison arrangements within the JFAC HQ

must take account of this. In addition, space services provide vital enabling
capabilities for the air component, such as ISR, positioning, navigation and
timing for aircraft and weapons, or voice and data communications. However,
space assets are generally considered strategic in nature and can be national,
military or privately owned and operated. Delegation of their command and
control is unusual. Therefore, the presence of space subject matter experts
within the JFAC HQ is key to ensuring effective air–space integration. To
ensure unity of effort across the whole force, the JFC can appoint a space
coordinating authority (SCA) to prioritise requirements and coordinate access.
SCA responsibilities are usually delegated to the JFACC due to historical
synergies between the air and space domains.
Air command and control system
3.13. Air operations are controlled through an overarching air command and
control structure supported by a robust command, control, communication,
computers and information system (C4IS). Without the latter, the effective
employment of air power can be difficult, if not impossible, which places
3
significant emphasis on defensive cyber support. Operational experience has
shown that whilst the air command and control system used will invariably be
tailored to the task at hand, five broad design considerations need to be met
if air power is to be employed successfully, irrespective of the nature of the
operation. These are:
• flexibility, capable of responding to a changing operational situation

with minimum disruption or delay;
• responsiveness, able to provide the JFACC, or their key

subordinates, with the understanding required to make effective
decisions and to pass subsequent orders quickly;
• survivability, including protection from cyber and traditional threats

as well as redundancy for critical command and control facilities and
C4IS;
• sustainability, capable of conducting continuous operations

throughout all phases of a campaign; and
• interoperability, with joint and coalition command and control

systems to enable unity of command.

Command and control
3.14. In general, the JFAC HQ’s strategy, combat operations and ISR
divisions form the core of the air operations centre, which acts as the senior
element within the overall air command and control system.40 Tactical control
for forces executing air missions is provided by an array of units subordinate
to the air operations centre; these may be surface-based or airborne assets
provided by the air, land and maritime components.
3.15. Surface-based tactical command and control for air power provides a
robust capability that is best suited to a permanent task such as national air
policing or when a deployed presence in a theatre of operations is expected
to be enduring; for example, providing air defence in the Falkland Islands. In
addition, when a joint operations area is geographically large, sectorisation of
the overall area between a number of ground-based command and control
units can make the overall system more responsive, especially with regard to
air and missile defence operations where speed of response to short-notice
threats is critical. Control and reporting centres (CRCs) usually form the
backbone of Western surface-based air command and control systems, a role
performed by naval vessels such as the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyer in the
3 maritime domain.
3.16. Airborne command and control can be either fixed-wing or rotary wing.
Usually tasked with air surveillance and the tactical control of air operations,
they enable the command and control of air assets operating beyond the radar
and communications range of surface-based command and control units.
Key to their effectiveness during combat operations is the placement of their
operating orbits, which must balance the aircraft’s radar and communications
range against the terrain and threat posed by an adversary’s counter-air
capabilities. Coalition operations within the Middle East over the past 20 years
have relied heavily upon aircraft such as the UK’s now retired E-3D Sentry
to provide the deep look, low-level radar capability to support offensive and
defensive air operations – most recently over Syria. Rapidly deployable from
the UK, they provided Defence with the ability to respond quickly to a crisis
or to conduct deterrence activity at range in support of allies. The continued
relevance of this capability has seen the UK procure E-7 Wedgetail to replace
the E-3D Sentry.
40 The air operations centre may be called a joint air operations centre (JAOC) or a
combined air operations centre (CAOC) dependent upon whether the operation is US,
NATO or UK led.

Command and control
RAF air operations personnel engaged in air battlespace management
Section 2 – UK air command and 3

control capabilities
3.17. UK air command and control capabilities are structured to support
the broadest possible range of tasks, from homeland defence and persistent
engagement activities such as the forward basing of air power assets, up to
large-scale combat operations, as part of a NATO Article 5 response. The
Royal Air Force (RAF) provides the core air command and control capability
for Defence, augmented on a case-by-case basis by the other two Services
to enable integration across the traditional warfighting domains. For deployed
operations, these capabilities are usually under the operational command
of the Chief of Joint Operations.41 Otherwise, the operational command and
control of air forces will most likely rest with the RAF’s 3* Deputy Commander
Operations, with delivery centred around 11 Group via either the National Air
and Space Operations Centre (NASOC) or the UK JFAC HQ.
The National Air and Space Operating Centre
3.18. The NASOC is located at Headquarters Air Command and provides

the UK with a permanent 24/7 air command and control capability to support
enduring homeland defence commitments. The Air Officer Commanding
41 For more detail see Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.

Command and control
11 Group acts as the day-to-day 2* air commander. The NASOC has two core
air‑related roles:
• maintaining the integrity of UK airspace; and

• providing support to NATO in the execution of its peacetime air
policing mission.
3.19. To meet its national and NATO air policing responsibilities, the NASOC
uses the UK Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), which is a network
of ground-based military and civilian radars used to monitor, detect and
identify all aircraft in and around UK airspace. The resulting recognised air
picture is compiled by the NASOC’s subordinate CRC at RAF Boulmer,42 which
also exercises tactical control of quick reaction alert fighters and supporting
air‑to‑air refuelling aircraft. Project Guardian is upgrading the ASACS to improve
information exchange and integration with allies.
The UK Joint Force Air Component Headquarters

3 3.20. As part of 11 Group, the UK JFAC HQ provides a full-time permanent,
fixed location air command and control capability collocated with the NASOC to
support global air operations conducted under the responsibility of the Air Officer
Commanding 11 Group.43 The UK JFAC HQ is structured in accordance with the
model outlined within Section 1 of this chapter and comprises a command group
with five subordinate divisions staffed by permanent personnel. The UK JFAC HQ
also provides a high‑readiness deployable air command and control capability
with a permanently assigned 1* JFACC.44
3.21. The UK JFAC HQ can provide a full range of air command and control in
support of UK air operations, including up to medium-scale, within framework
nation status or augmentation of an alliance or multinational headquarters. The
unit is fully scalable and would operate in a configuration dependent upon the
requirements of the operation to be supported. Employment options include
the following.
a. A UK-only operation at component scale where the UK would

provide its own JFACC; all support and logistics functions would be
carried out by UK personnel. For a small-scale national operation, air
42 The CRC also exchanges information via data links with neighbouring NATO partners,
maritime units and airborne surveillance aircraft to generate the recognised air picture.
43 In their role as the standing UK Global Air Component Commander.
44 Within NATO only the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the US have this
national capability.

Command and control
command and control can be provided by the JFAC HQ ‘at range’ from
its fixed location; alternatively, a small air command and control cell could
be deployed to embed within a joint force headquarters.
b. A UK-led coalition in which the UK would provide the JFACC and
elements of the command hierarchy with most key functions being
carried out by UK personnel. The expectation would be that the senior
coalition partner would provide a deputy JFACC. This option requires
the ability to fully embed coalition partners into the UK JFAC HQ
infrastructure and C4IS.
c. Augmentation of a coalition-led deployment, which would ideally

see the UK provide the deputy JFACC and some key elements of the
JFAC HQ structure. There would also be a requirement to deploy a
national coordination team to monitor UK-specific issues under a UK
air contingent commander who may dual-hat as the deputy JFACC.
d. NATO reinforcement, which would see core JFAC HQ personnel

deployed to support or reinforce the NATO air command and control
3
system during times of crisis and conflict. Under current plans,
personnel would either be deployed to NATO Air Command to fill
specified augmentee positions within the NATO Command Structure
JFAC HQ or to a deployed NATO force structure JFAC HQ (which is
provided on a rotational basis by member states). The UK JFAC HQ
is certified for employment as a high readiness command and control
element of the NATO Response Force and as such could deploy in full.
Section 3 – Planning and tasking

3.22. Air planning is usually conducted in parallel with joint, operational‑level
planning.45 Qualified and experienced air planners should engage early in the
development of the joint operational plan to ensure that it is coherent and
workable and that air options are fully considered and integrated from the
start. A sound understanding of the wide variety of aircraft and their associated
capabilities, as well as an understanding of the capabilities or operations that
air power is supporting, is critical to the success of the planning phase. This
section outlines the key steps in the planning and tasking process that are
common to UK, NATO and the US.
45 See AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations (with UK national
elements) for more details.

Command and control
3
Hercules C-130J refuelling from a Voyager KC3 above Ukraine in 2020
Air estimate
3.23. Operational air planning begins when the need for military action
involving air activity is identified. The air estimate is intended to develop
the most effective air operations plan to meet the JFC’s intent and convey
this information to those who will execute it. The process is not dissimilar
to estimates carried out in other operational domains. The process is
command-led and involves the JFAC HQ planning staff exploring the full
range of probable and likely adversary and friendly courses of action before
analysing and comparing friendly air capabilities against the likely threats. The
air estimate is a continuous and iterative process with a number of key steps
involved.46 The final step of most air estimate methodologies, the commander’s
decision, is made by the JFC on which course of action to adopt as the
concept of air operations. The decision is based on the recommendation of
the air commander and the course of action becomes the basis for the JAOP.
46 These steps usually include background analysis, mission analysis, evaluation of

factors, courses of action development, and the commander’s decision. However, the
actual methodology used may vary. For example, the UK JFAC HQ use the process
outlined within NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive. See AJP-5, Allied
Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations (with UK national elements) for more details.

Command and control
Joint air operations plan
3.24. The JAOP is the JFACC’s blueprint for integrating and coordinating
air activities. It provides the necessary link to the JFC’s operational plan and
outlines the phasing of the overall air campaign.47 A typical example of phasing
might start with counter-air operations to gain a degree of control of the air
over a specific area or at a specific time so that friendly forces can operate
without unacceptable risk from adversary attack. This could be followed by a
phase focusing on strategic attack, and then a phase of counter-land activity
featuring concurrent air interdiction to shape the battlefield for friendly ground
forces, and providing close air support. The JAOP will also usually include:
• objectives and tasks by priority, describing in which order they should

be actioned, the desired effects and the weight of effort required;
• the measures or indicators of success that are to be used to

determine whether air operations are meeting assigned objectives;
• detail on what air assets are required to achieve the air objectives,
3
including force availability, deployment timing, basing availability and
sustainment requirements; and
• specific procedures for allocating, tasking, exercising and

transitioning the command and control of air assets.
The JAOP is implemented through the air tasking cycle, which provides
an iterative and cyclical process for planning, apportioning, allocating,
coordinating and tasking air assets.
“
Before anything else, preparation is the key to success.
Alexander Graham Bell
47 A phase will only indicate what the main effort is for the air component at a given time;
however, air assets will almost certainly be conducting all roles of air power throughout a
campaign or operation.

Command and control
The air tasking cycle
3.25. The air tasking cycle allows for changing tactical situations or
commander’s guidance, as well as requests for support from other component
commands at any stage in the cycle. The cycle, outlined in Figure 3.2, matches
specific targets with capabilities made available to the JFACC for a given
tasking period.
Direction, guidance
and objectives
Assessment Target
development
Execution Weaponeering
Air tasking order production

and promulgation
Figure 3.2 – The standard air tasking cycle
3.26. The air tasking cycle is built around a number of finite time phases set
to plan and conduct air operations. The full cycle from JFC guidance to the
completion of the execution period usually takes 72 hours. Detailed planning
normally begins 48 hours in advance of the execution period to enable the
integration of all component requirements. However, when appropriate, the

Command and control
cycle can be compressed although this may come at the expense of achieving
the most efficient use of available assets. Six phases are common and are
outlined below.
a. Phase 1 starts with the JFC’s objectives and strategic direction
based on current operations. The JFACC uses that consultation, and
the JAOP, to produce an air operations directive (AOD)48 to guide the
subsequent planning and execution phases.
b. Phase 2 develops targets through the guidance, apportionment

and targeting (GAT) process, which matches target development to
tasking. Target nominations from the components are screened and
prioritised.
c. Phase 3 sees weapon-to-target matching conducted by targeting

personnel who match weapons capabilities to desired effects against
prioritised targets. The final prioritised targets are given to a master air
operations plan (MAOP) team who meld available air capabilities with
the GAT recommendations to allocate the total number of air sorties for
3
each objective or task.
d. Phase 4 is where the AOD, target worksheets, MAOP, airspace
control plan and the requirements of other components are translated
into detailed operational and tactical direction and promulgated in the
air tasking order (ATO).
e. Phase 5 is the execution of the ATO. The JFAC HQ air operations
centre and subordinate air command and control elements execute the
plan, revising tasking as required, and coordinating or deconflicting any
changes.
f. Phase 6 is the evaluation of the results of air operations. The
subsequent assessment of the effectiveness of air activity is fed back
into the air planning cycle to inform the process.
48 The AOD is effectively a ‘snapshot’ of the JAOP to be enacted during the tasking period
being planned.

Command and control
Multinational air mission planning

3
The air tasking order
3.27. The ATO articulates the tasking for air operations for a specific time
period, normally 24 hours. It enables all mission commanders to understand:
• what their responsibilities are for their missions;

• what tasks they are to conduct;
• where they are to conduct them;
• what support they are to expect or to provide; and
• what additional constraints or freedoms they may be operating under
during the mission.
In accordance with the philosophy of mission command, the ATO only covers the
‘ends’ and the ‘means’ of the mission; the tactical ‘ways’ are the responsibility of
the mission leaders. The ATO also allows other components to conduct their own
planning and operations based on the level of air support being provided.
3.28. At any time, there will be several ATOs in various stages of development:
the ATO being executed; the ATO being written; and the ATO being planned. During
execution, the ATO retains flexibility to respond to changing priorities, including
short-notice dynamic and time-sensitive targeting opportunities. Changes are
made on the authority of the JFACC through the air operations centre.

Command and control
Key points
• Command and control envelopes all four air power roles because it is
essential for the effective delivery of air power.
• Centralised control and decentralised execution is the UK’s preferred

method for air command and control; it enables tactical flexibility whilst
ensuring unity of effort at the operational level.
• Air operations are best delivered under the command of a single air
commander, the JFACC.
• All air operations require a tailored air command and control system,
centred around an air operations centre.
• UK air command and control capabilities are primarily delivered by the RAF
via 11 Group.
3
• The UK JFAC HQ provides the UK with a scalable and deployable
command and control capability for UK, NATO and multinational air
operations.
• Air power is best integrated with the other components of the military
instrument during joint operational-level planning.
• The air tasking cycle is the iterative and cyclical process for planning,
apportioning, allocating, coordinating and tasking air assets.
• The UK, NATO and US use an ATO to provide mission commanders with
the details required to plan and execute their missions.

Chapter 4
Chapter 4 considers the application of UK air power in the

context of an integrated cross-government approach and
highlights how it is integrated with other elements of
military power to conduct multi-domain operations. It
provides an overview of key air power enablers and
outlines air power’s utility.
Section 1 – Cross-government integration and

integrated action . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Section 2 – Joint operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Section 3 – Enabling air power . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

The employment of air power
“ To commit troops to a campaign

in which they cannot be provided
with adequate air support is to
court disaster.
”
Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck

Chapter 4
The employment of air

power
Section 1 – Cross-government
integration and integrated action
4.1. Chapter 3 outlined how air power is planned, commanded and executed
at the operational level within the air component. However, air power is rarely,
if ever, employed on its own in response to a crisis or to achieve a national
security objective. Air power works most effectively when integrated with other
components of military power, benefiting from complementary capabilities
and exploiting synergies between the maritime, land, air, space, and cyber
and electromagnetic domains. This can be further enhanced by military forces
being integrated and synchronised with other government departments,
potentially alongside the use of other instruments of national power –
diplomatic, information and economic – behind a common national goal.
4
4.2. Effective crisis management requires active cross-government and

multi-agency cooperation to develop, employ and sustain a comprehensive
and successful response. The UK’s cross-governmental approach to
national security, similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s)
comprehensive approach,49 deals with a wide variety of challenges by creating
and managing strategies to address complex problems. It employs the
instruments of national power to achieve desired political and strategic
objectives. The coordination and synchronisation of these capabilities
reduces duplication of effort, creates synergies and leads to more effective
use of resources. The UK military contribution, of which air power is a key
component, to pan-governmental activity is delivered through integrated
action.
49 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine for more details on NATO’s
comprehensive approach.

Integrated action
4.3. Integrated action can be described as the audience-centric orchestration

of military activities, across all operational domains, synchronised with
non‑military activities to influence the attitude and behaviour of selected
audiences necessary to achieve successful outcomes.
4.4. Air power contributes to integrated action through the exploitation of its
attributes and roles. Using the freedom of manoeuvre provided by control of
the air, air power can use the attack or air mobility roles to conduct outreach,
kinetic and information activities, creating both lethal and non-lethal air effects.
It can affect an actor’s will, understanding or capabilities in ways informed by
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). In addition, air power’s
ubiquity and agility enable it to be used to exert influence without significant
commitment; in effect, engagement without entanglement to pose or counter
threats at range. Integrated action coordinates and synchronises:
• fires (military power effect through both physical and virtual means);
• information activities (including regional and key leader engagement);
4 • manoeuvre (the ability to remain mobile to gain advantage in time

and space); and
• outreach (including stabilisation, support to governance and capacity

building).
4.5. Although the effects of integrated action are primarily targeted at an

adversary, it also has an impact on a wide range of other actors who need to
be influenced. This can include civilian partners, such as non-governmental
organisations, the UK population, allies and regional audiences. Therefore,
although integrated action implies the sole use of military capabilities, it
invariably requires coordination or integration with the activities of other
government departments.

Joint personnel deploying on operations on board a Globemaster C-17
Section 2 – Joint operations

4.6. Operations in the modern world are rarely, if ever, conducted within
a single operational domain. Historically, maritime, land and air forces have
worked together to achieve agreed objectives.50 This joint approach to
4
operations continues to underpin the UK’s ability to deliver military power
across the continuum of competition. Joint operations conducted correctly are
extremely effective because the various capabilities across the single Services,
allied with non-military capabilities, can complement the strengths and
compensate for the limitations in each, thereby creating powerful synergies.
Air power enhances the scale of options for the joint force; through its flexibility
and the speed with which it can reach the engagement space, it provides vital
projection, sustainment and precision firepower, offering significant military
advantage to the joint commander.
4.7. The emergence of the space, and cyber and electromagnetic domains
as operational domains, rather than simply enablers for the maritime, land and
air domains, has broadened the opportunities for the joint force to converge
effects across multiple domains, thereby presenting an adversary with multiple
dilemmas at a tempo that complicates or negates their response. Air power
is ideally placed to support this multi-domain operations approach due to its
ability to mass quickly, operate at range, target with precision and exploit an
50 This is described as a joint operation where two or more Services operate as a single
military force, under a single command structure, to accomplish a specific mission.

emerging opportunity rapidly. However,

to maximise the effectiveness of air
assets, they need to be efficiently
integrated along, and across, all of the
operational domains.
4.8. Effective multi-domain

operations depend on mutual trust and
understanding, built on well-established
cooperation between the single
Services. This leads the way to genuine,
pan-domain integration, where an
integrated approach becomes intuitive.
The following paragraphs consider
the key aspects of how air currently
integrates with the other operational
domains on a domain‑to‑domain basis.
However, unlike recent operations in
Apache AH1-D at low level over Norway
Afghanistan where the engagement
space necessitated a focus upon
air-land integration, the ability to synchronise air activity and effects across
4 multiple operational domains simultaneously is key to deterring and countering
the threats posed by more capable adversaries.
Air-land integration
4.9. Air-land integration (ALI) maximises the combat power created by

coordinating and synchronising complementary capabilities from the air
and land domains. It encompasses all the processes that plan, coordinate,
control and deconflict the activities of the air and land components within
a given engagement space.51 Air power takes advantage of the strengths
of land forces, such as awareness of the land engagement space, whilst
compensating for their limitations, such as providing additional firepower to
help preserve freedom of action. Effective ALI requires an understanding of the
land domain within which such operations are planned.52
51 See Air Publication (AP) 3002, Air and Space Warfare, Edition 4, for guidance on
air‑land planning considerations.
52 See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-20, UK Land Power for more detail on UK land
power attributes and aspects.

4.10. Whilst control of the air affords

freedom of manoeuvre for land forces,
effective ALI is necessary to assure
timely air support in the ISR, attack
and air mobility roles. Aircraft in these
roles can be allocated to hold varying
degrees of readiness in support of land
forces, either on the ground or in the air
for urgent on‑call tasking. The use of
attack in support of land forces, through
close air support or attack aviation call
for fire, requires a high degree of mutual
trust and understanding, particularly in
dynamic combat situations where there
is no clear delineation between enemy
and friendly land forces. Operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced the
need for suitably qualified air liaison staff
F-35B Lightning launching from HMS Queen Elizabeth
at every level and, more fundamentally,
suitably qualified joint terminal attack
controllers (JTACs) to act as an interface between the land force elements
and aircraft operators. The UK’s Air Support Operations Centre 53 provides the
4
national capability for integrating air power into land and littoral operations at
the tactical level via three core functions: integration and synchronisation of
air activities with joint fires and the land scheme of manoeuvre; allocation of
allocated air assets; and joint battlespace management.
Air-maritime integration
4.11. Air-maritime integration (AMI) is the understanding and combination of

air and maritime procedures, capabilities and limitations to increase operational
effectiveness. It enhances the combat potential of each. The air and maritime
domains have certain similarities, such as scale and strategic scope, and
sea control, like control of the air, is an essential prerequisite for freedom
of manoeuvre. AMI is required for many operations, particularly where the
anti‑access and area denial (A2AD) threats that are faced cannot be countered
in a single operational domain.
53 As part of the broader UK Air Support Operations Squadron.

4.12. Close coordination between ISR and combat air capabilities with
complementary maritime capabilities can lead to significant synergies.54
Maritime air defence capabilities contribute to counter-air or air policing duties
by integrating their anti-air warfare capabilities with land-based aircraft, which
helps to establish and maintain control of the air.55 However, the effectiveness
of such integration depends on the interoperability of individual aircraft and the
overall combat system. Consequently, the ability to network information across
components and between platforms from separate operational domains is
critical to success.
4.13. The successful integration of potent capabilities, such as those

provided by a carrier strike group (CSG), is highly dependent upon the
liaison structure between the two components. A critical element within this
structure for both NATO and the UK is the air operations coordination centre
(maritime) (AOCC(M)), which coordinates the planning and tasking of air assets
allocated in support of maritime operations and monitors their execution.
For UK-led, or national-only operations involving a CSG, the AOCC(M) will
usually be collocated with the maritime component commander as that is
where it can provide the best support to both the air and maritime component
commanders; this could be ashore or afloat.
4 Air-space integration
4.14. Space services provide vital

enabling capabilities for all of the
operational domains, the importance
of which has been reflected by
establishing a separate UK Space
Command. Air-space integration is
critical to successfully employ air
power. The effectiveness and potency
of aircraft operations is closely linked
to the effectiveness of enabling space
capabilities, such as positioning,
navigation and timing for aircraft
and weapons, or voice and data
Ministry of Defence Carbonite-2 imaging satellite communications. Equally, air power is
54 See Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.3.3.1, Air Maritime Coordination Procedures for
more details.
55 Such as between the Royal Navy’s Type 45 Destroyer, through use of its air defence
radar, in support of Royal Air Force (RAF) Typhoon quick reaction alert operations.

critical to space power, for example, by providing air defence of the ground
segment infrastructure.
4.15. Effective air-space integration at the operational planning level can also
provide opportunities to make use of complementary capabilities. For example,
both the air and space domains offer significant ISR capabilities, which, when
effectively coordinated, can ensure a more complete understanding of the
engagement space and mitigate gaps in each other’s coverage. For deployed
operations involving a joint (or multinational) force, the nominated space
coordinating authority is responsible for coordinating, planning and executing
space capabilities in support of the other warfighting domains. The UK Space
Operations Centre located at Royal Air Force (RAF) High Wycombe acts as the
UK’s focal point for space support and integration across Defence.
Air-cyber integration
4.16. Air-cyber integration is the use of air and cyber capabilities to create
effects in the relevant engagement space. Air-cyber integration can involve
cyber operations in support of air operations, or air operations in support
of cyber operations. Air platforms and systems have become increasingly
dependent on cyberspace and the people, processes, technology and data
within it. Without assured access to systems such as command and control,
4
maintenance, mission planning and communications, the ability of the air
component to conduct its operations would be degraded. Commanders at
all levels need to consider their reliance upon cyberspace and proactively
direct measures to increase their resilience. By understanding their cyber
risks, implementing cybersecurity measures and integrating with defensive
cyber operations, commanders can improve their overall mission assurance
on operations. Offensive cyber capabilities are generally considered to be
strategic in nature with permissions for their use held either at a high level
nationally, or outside the military chain of command. In addition, cyber effects
can be highly classified and compartmentalised due to the sensitivity of
techniques used and the nature and complexity of accesses. These factors are
just some of the challenges to integration at the operational level.56
4.17. Offensive cyber operations in support of air operations target adversary

personnel, processes, technology and data through cyberspace to increase
the likelihood of successfully achieving air objectives.57 Data links could be
56 See JDP 0-50, UK Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Doctrine for more detail on UK
cyber power attributes and aspects.
57 The National Cyber Force plans and conducts offensive cyber capabilities for the UK.

attacked to degrade an integrated air defence system, reducing the risk to

otherwise vulnerable aircraft penetrating hostile airspace. Integrating such
cyber effects can help to disrupt and overcome A2AD threats, providing
the freedom to attack targets in enemy territory. However, offensive cyber
capabilities are likely to require tailoring to each specific target, which might not
match the timescales associated with an air power response. The potential use
of a cyber capability to create an effect in support of air power therefore needs
to be considered early in the planning phase with intelligence requirements set
as far in advance as possible.
4.18. Air operations in support of cyber operations can include kinetic

attacks on selected computer nodes to deny an adversary a critical
capability or force them to use networks that can be attacked or exploited
using cyber capabilities. Such activities must be coordinated through a
full spectrum targeting process to ensure unintended consequences are
avoided or managed. For example, a tactical operation by attack aircraft to
destroy a bridge as part of an operational-level air interdiction campaign may
inadvertently undermine a higher-value, strategic cyber operation if the bridge
is carrying fibre optics which support the networks that are being exploited.
Multinational operations
4
4.19. NATO is at the heart of UK Defence and, therefore, a UK national
approach will generally be framed within a broader multinational response that
includes allies. Alliances and coalitions provide a range of options that most
nations could not generate independently, including unique capabilities, as
well as potentially providing the required mass for favourable force ratios in a
contested scenario. Whilst UK air power remains capable of delivering all four
air power roles independently, like most Western air forces the UK has seen
a reduction in front-line aircraft numbers over the past 20 years as the cost
of maintaining a technological edge over potential adversaries has increased.
Interoperability with allies, especially NATO and the United States (US), enables
air power to be massed at the operational level and delivered at the tactical
level via mission-specific packages of aircraft drawn from different nations;
this is a process that is facilitated greatly by the use of NATO air doctrine and
terminology wherever possible.

Coalition operations in action – Libya

Operation Unified Protector was NATO’s response to a United
Nations Security Council resolution that authorised the use of ‘all means
necessary’ to protect Libyan civilians from the forces of the country’s
long-time national leader Muammar Gaddafi following a widespread
uprising in 2011. At the time, US air power was heavily engaged on
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and politically the US did not want to
be seen to take a lead role in an intervention in another predominantly
Muslim country. Consequently, a broad coalition was required to ensure
both legitimacy in the eyes of the wider regional audience and provide
the necessary air power capabilities – particularly in the key areas of ISR,
air-to-air refuelling and suppression of enemy air defences, which NATO
traditionally relied upon the US to provide. Within days, a broad coalition
of 16 nations, including three Arab nations (the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Jordan) were conducting air operations across Libya. The UK’s
military contribution was significant and included Typhoon aircraft rapidly
modified to conduct air-to-ground attacks. Whilst the majority of air assets
were provided by the US, UK and France, the contribution of smaller air
forces was key to ensuring the required number of sorties were generated
to meet the joint task force commander’s strategy. For example, the
4
Danish Air Force’s detachment of six F-16s conducted nearly 1,300 sorties,
released 923 precision-guided munitions and cancelled no sorties due to
maintenance issues throughout the campaign. In just over seven months,
the Western‑led air campaign allowed a group of poorly equipped rebels
to bring about the defeat of a well-armed military and the downfall of a
dictatorship that had spanned more than 40 years.
Section 3 – Enabling air power

4.20. The ability to deliver each of the four roles of air power is dependent on
four critical enablers:
• base;
• sustain;
• connect; and
• protect.

Various basing options enable rapid effect to be created across the globe: air
logistics enable the sustainment of operations; command, control, computers
communication and information system (C4IS) capabilities enable connectivity;
and force protection capabilities enable the protection of forces at home and
overseas.
Base
“
A mile of highway will take you a mile. A mile of runway will take you
anywhere.
Anon
4.21. Air power can operate from a range of basing options, providing
maximum agility for operations. Basing options include the UK mainland,
Overseas Territories, allied and partner bases, sea basing and forward land
basing. Each has different access constraints, in terms of staging, overflight,
force protection and sustainment, and each can provide different political
options when projecting power globally.
4
a. UK mainland. UK basing enables air power to protect the UK
mainland and respond to crises almost immediately without the need
for deployed logistic or host-nation support. However, to project air
power outside the UK, permission may be required to overfly sovereign
territories. Even with air-to-air refuelling, the effective operational reach
of current combat air capabilities is limited to Middle Eastern and North
African regions and to project air power to any of these regions, prior
overflight permission from European allies will be required.
b. Overseas Territories. UK Overseas Territories enable air power to

extend its reach to regions of strategic interest without the requirement
for host-nation support. For example, the UK base in Cyprus plays
a pivotal role in the ability to project power in support of national
objectives and this was most recently the case when providing UK
air power for coalition operations over Iraq and Syria against Islamic
terrorists. However, Overseas Territories can be particularly reliant on
force protection and on logistic support to sustain operations. Access
to Overseas Territories can also be reliant on overflight permissions
from other nations.

An RAF air traffic controller at the Royal Air Force of Oman’s Thumrait Air Base
during Exercise Saif Sareea
c. Allies and partners. Maintaining good relations with allies and

partners enables the potential to operate from their sovereign territories
in support of UK national or combined coalition objectives. Using
such bases can significantly expand global reach but is reliant on
4
maintaining good relations with the host nation. History has shown
that allied bases can provide a politically and operationally sustainable
means of enduring air operations.
d. Sea basing. The sea basing of aircraft enables global reach and
the ability to act unilaterally with reduced dependency on staging
or overflight permissions. Ships can be equipped with integrated
command and control facilities, capable of directing limited air
operations. Sea-based aircraft can integrate with land-based aircraft
to maximise their effectiveness. Ships are also able to loiter in areas of
tension, drawing on the maritime attribute of poise to deter adversaries,
react to events or reassure our allies.58
e. Forward land basing. If access can be gained to, or near to, an
adversary’s territory and a basing option secured, it can enhance
speed of response, persistence and concentration of support for land
forces. Forward land basing can also be essential for force extraction.
However, it is dependent on the available infrastructure to support
58 See JDP 0-10, UK Maritime Power for more detail on maritime power attributes.

the aircraft type, force protection and the ability to maintain control
of the air in the vicinity of the base. It may also require a full suite of
deployable enablers to generate and sustain the deployed force.
4.22. Since the end of the Cold War, most UK air operations have been
conducted from well-found facilities, whether main operating bases in the
UK or deployed operating bases such as those used in Afghanistan during
Operation Herrick. Provided the threat to the airbase from an adversary can
be mitigated, well-found bases remain the preferred choice for generating
air power, especially for participation in large, complex, multinational
air operations. However, the resurgence of state-based threats and the
proliferation of A2AD capabilities places a greater emphasis on an agile
basing approach. No single option can assure air power’s ability to achieve
global reach. Maintaining the ability to operate across a spectrum of basing
options, and move seamlessly between them, provides operational flexibility
in the contemporary operating environment. Selecting the most appropriate
operating location will be based on an assessment of the various basing
options available, taking into account the scenario and the overarching
context. This includes at the tactical level where the ability to temporarily
operate aircraft from austere or civilian locations on a mission-by-mission basis
can significantly limit an adversary’s capacity to interfere in our air operations.
4
Sustain
4.23. Sustainability enables air power force elements to deploy to an

area of operations and remain fully mission capable for a variety of roles. It
provides the flexibility to remain on task and operationally capable for as long
as necessary. Sustainability is defined as: the ability of a force to maintain
the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its
objectives.59 Sustainability is:
• one of the principles of war;
• the responsibility of commanders at every level of command;
• an integral part of the planning, preparing and executing of, and

withdrawal and recovery from, every operation; and
• to be fully exercised in peacetime to be effective in war.
59 NATOTerm.

The RAF’s Mobile Catering Squadron provides catering support to

exercises and operations
4.24. Air logistics is the ability to plan and execute the movement,
4
maintenance and sustainment of air power. Providing a variety of logistic
functions is a complex, dynamic and wide-ranging series of disciplines that
can often dictate the operational tempo. It is part of the standard Defence
Support Network, but it has a particular dependency on reachback for the
repair and replacement of high value, complex aircraft. This generates a need
for an efficient supply chain and sufficient stocks for contingency operations,
which links into UK and partner nation industry.
4.25. Air logistics operations are conducted in line with the nine logistics
principles which were adopted from NATO. These principles are:
• authority;
• primacy of operational requirements;
• coordination and cooperation;
• assured provision;
• sufficiency;
• efficiency;
• simplicity;

• flexibility; and
• visibility.60
In general, responsive engineering and supply offsets aircraft fragility, high

levels of equipment availability counters the cost of massing air assets, and
rapid mobility and enabling can offer new basing options and the ability to
rapidly enact air operations at reach. However, air logistics can also form a
vulnerability due to its inherent complexity and the wide-spread supply base
that is susceptible to physical, cyber, commercial and even political disruption.
Connect
4.26. Air C4IS is a key enabler for air power due to the reliance on robust
lines of communication between a multitude of home locations and overseas
operational theatres. Indeed, generating aircraft for air operations invariably
depends upon the collaborative working, in near real time, of geographically
disparate users. Moreover, effective air command and control cannot
be delivered without a robust C4IS solution, irrespective of where the air
commander and their staff are located. Information exchange enabled through
data links at the tactical and operational levels enables force survivability,
shared situational awareness and, ultimately, information advantage; all of
4 these are critical to mission success in any complex, contested engagement
space.
4.27. The successful sharing of information and data gathered on operations

requires a high degree of reliable connectivity and interoperability between
participating units and platforms. Some aircraft systems also require
connectivity to the Internet to operate effectively. The overall C4IS solution
must enable seamless integration of information whilst ensuring only those
who should have access can get access (confidentiality), that the information
is accessible when it is required (availability) and that the data can be
assured to have not been tampered with (integrity). In addition, enabling
C4IS capabilities must be capable of being held at a readiness that matches
the readiness of the air assets, irrespective of the number of aircraft that are
ultimately employed. This drives a requirement for a C4IS capability that is air
transportable, agile 61 and scalable.62
60 See JDP 4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations for more details.
61 Agile – meaning that the information system can be reconfigured to accommodate
unforeseen changes in basing strategy, command and control arrangements, coalition
partners and their requirements, and differing aircraft requirements.
62 Scalable – meaning they can be expanded incrementally as the user community grows.

4.28. The criticality of C4IS to generating and

delivering air power provides an opportunity
for adversaries and other actors to disrupt air
operations via cyberattack. As has been seen
with recent cyberattacks on civilian networks,63
such methods are difficult to attribute 64 and can
be executed by malicious individuals, highly
capable threat organisations or states. The rapid
development of offensive cyber capabilities offers
adversaries the potential of targeting our C4IS
systems, which could have a significant effect on
air power employment. Understanding the threat
to, and vulnerability of, these systems will allow
an evaluation of the associated risks. Identifying
and understanding such capabilities provides
the opportunity to develop means of protection An RAF communications infrastructure
through defensive cyber operations. technician working on an antenna in Cyprus
Protect
4.29. Air power projection relies on the protection of a network of operating

bases, people, aircraft, C4IS networks and logistical nodes in the UK and
4
around the world. Aircraft are scarce, expensive and fragile, and either operate
from relatively large, static bases that are difficult to disguise, or from small,
remote forward operating bases or forward arming and refuelling points. Force
protection is required to ensure the freedom of action to operate from such
bases and to help mitigate the strategic consequences that could arise from
the loss of highly capable aircraft.65
4.30. An early-entry force protection capability at the outset of an operation

secures operating bases and enables the deployment of air power.
Subsequent air operations are protected through coordinated activities and
measures, both on the operating base and within any assigned ground
defence area, established beyond the airbase perimeter. Successful force
protection relies on a detailed understanding of how the airbase operates,
its resident capabilities and the local physical, human and information
63 An example of such a cyberattack was the malware attack on the company computer
network of Maersk in 2017, which severely disrupted their global shipping operations for
two weeks.
64 Thus, perfect for sub-threshold activities.
65 Since air power can be projected directly from the UK, force protection considerations
apply equally to non-deployed capabilities.

terrain that surrounds it.66 Air force protection measures fall into four broad
categories, underpinned by force protection, command and control, and timely
intelligence, which are:
• active defence, which involves measures necessary to deter,

prevent, nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an adversary attack
(both in the air and on the ground);
• passive defence, which involves measures to minimise the effects

of adversary attack, including the hardening of key facilities;
camouflage, concealment and deception; dispersion of key assets;
and counter-chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear activity;
• recuperation, which covers all measures necessary for air

capabilities to recover from the effects of an attack, restore
essential services and enable air operations to continue; and
• security, comprising the organised systems of defensive measures

instituted to ensure that key information, materiel, personnel and
installations are protected against terrorism, espionage, sabotage,
subversion and organised crime. Additionally, the criticality of
4 security is reinforced by the current and future requirements for
secure information access to enable fifth generation platform
operations and further development.
4.31. Due to the likely criticality of

securing an airport of embarkation as part
of a non‑combatant evacuation operation
(NEO), and as NEOs have proved to require
a short‑notice rapid response, air force
protection elements should be kept at an
appropriately high level of readiness as part of
a joint rapid reaction force.
An RAF Police dog handler with his military

working dog in the Falkland Islands
66 See ATP-3.3.6, NATO Force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations for more detail on air
force protection considerations and capabilities.

Force protection in action – Operation Pitting

On 15 August 2021 following a rapid offensive, Afghanistan’s capital,
Kabul, fell to the Taliban. In the days that followed a multinational NEO was
undertaken; the UK’s contribution to which, Operation Pitting, became
the largest such national effort since World War 2. Centred around the
international airport at Kabul and involving approximately 1,000 military
personnel, predominantly from 16 Air Assault Brigade, the UK military
enabled the evacuation of UK nationals, embassy staff and Afghans eligible
for relocation. Within 24 hours an airbridge was established between
the UK and Afghanistan with RAF Voyager, A-400M, C-17 and C-130J
Hercules aircraft conducting evacuation flights. Key to these operations
was the security provided by 16 Air Assault Brigade, with RAF Regiment
and RAF Police personnel providing air force protection specialist
capabilities who, in conjunction with US and allied forces, successfully
took control of the airport. Whilst access to the airport, as well as the city
at large, remained under Taliban control, the presence of a capable force
protection force enabled movement staff to rapidly turnaround and load
aircraft unhindered. Between the start of the operation and the final flight
on 28 August 2021, in excess of 15,000 people were flown out of Kabul by
the RAF; including 436 people on a single C-17 flight, triple the aircraft’s
4
designed capacity and the highest capacity flight in RAF history.
Generating air power
4.32. Organisationally, the UK delivers deployed air power primarily through

the RAF’s expeditionary air wing (EAW) model, aviation task forces provided
by the Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) or via a Royal Navy CSG. These are
discussed in more detail below.
a. Expeditionary air wings. EAWs provide the enabling functions

for a deployed operating base, with or without the assistance of a
host nation. They are scaled to meet the operational requirement,
from a small deployment in support of one force element (potentially
even a single aircraft) through to a large-scale deployment operating
multiple types of aircraft covering all four air power roles. EAWs may be

permanent to provide air power within a long-term theatre,67 or ad hoc

in response to a specific, temporally bounded operational commitment.
b. Aviation task forces. The JHC provides rotary wing combat power
via scalable high readiness aviation task forces (ATFs). These are task
organised to meet the operational requirement with assets drawn from
the most appropriate aviation organisation. To support land operations,
the British Army’s Aviation Brigade Combat Team can generate two
ATFs; the Commando Helicopter Force can provide an ATF to support
littoral operations; and the Support Helicopter Force can provide an
ATF to support air assault, air mobility, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief tasks. ATFs train for worldwide, contested, multi-domain
operations and act as the vanguard of JHC combat forces.
c. Carrier strike group. A CSG is the UK term given to describe the
capability underpinned by the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers.
It is an integrated and sustainable joint capability, interoperable
with NATO allies and other coalition partners. It draws together the
coordinated operation of the aircraft carriers, combat and support
aircraft, and enabling capabilities to conduct the four roles of air
power.68 The Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm, as well as suitably trained and
4 marinised69 RAF and British Army force elements can all operate from
the maritime domain as part of a CSG.70 In addition, key international
and coalition partners, especially other F-35B owning nations can
contribute to CSG operations.
67 Such as 905 Expeditionary Air Wing based at RAF Mount Pleasant in the Falkland
Islands.
68 Within the maritime domain, the terms ‘carrier strike’ and ‘rotary strike’ are used to
describe attacks against land targets using embarked fixed-wing and attack helicopters
respectively. See The Fighting Instructions Book of Reference (digital) (BRd) 4487,
Volume 2.1, Strike Warfare.
69 Marinised refers to the design, redesign or testing of products for use in a marine
environment. Most commonly, it refers to use and long-term survival in harsh, highly
corrosive salt water conditions. It is also taken to refer to the adaption of non-naval
personnel to the requirements of operating at sea.
70 For attack operations the CSG operates F-35B Lightning, Apache and Wildcat aircraft
supported by the multi-role Merlin Mk 2 for ISR support. For littoral manoeuvre and special
forces operations, a mixed air group may be used comprising Chinook and Merlin for air
mobility and Wildcat and Apache for attack.

A Typhoon FGR4 intercepts and escorts a Russian SU-30 over the Baltic Sea as part
of the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission
Section 4 – Employing air power

4
4.33. In an operating environment defined by complexity and uncertainty, our

air forces are capable of exerting air power for strategic effect across a range
of tasks, whether deterring adversaries, delivering aid rapidly around the globe,
building partnerships through multinational exercise participation or delivering
decisive actions in combat. Defence is required to operate on a campaign
basis to counter persistent sub-threshold competition, whilst retaining the
ability to conduct combat operations above the threshold of armed conflict.71
Whilst not a doctrinal framework, the Integrated Operating Concept72 functions
of operate (protect, engage, constrain) and warfight provide a useful structure
through which the employment of UK air power can be viewed.
Protect
4.34. One of the principal purposes of Defence is to contribute to the security

and resilience of the home base. A secure home base acts as the first tier of
71 As outlined within Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of

Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021.
72 For more information see the Integrated Operating Concept, August 2021.

deterrence by denial.73 UK air power

plays a critical role in supporting the
defence of the homeland and Overseas
Territories by maintaining the integrity of
sovereign airspace and ensuring freedom
of manoeuvre. Typhoon aircraft are on
permanent standby in the UK and the
Falkland Islands to provide national
defence and security and to assure
control of the air through combat air patrol
or quick reaction alert. A robust system
of command and control is a critical
A Chinook placing sandbags on Toddbrook Reservoir element of this, as are our allies, who help
in 2019 in support of local authority operations to provide the necessary early warning. The
protect the town of Whaley Bridge UK’s ability to rapidly reinforce the home
base air policing posture in the event of
a specific threat or increased security risk provides operational flexibility and a
clear demonstration of capability to potential adversaries.74
4.35. The ultimate guarantee to the UK’s safety is provided by the nuclear
continuous at sea deterrent. Although details are classified, air power provides
4 a key enabling role to provide sustainment, protection and intelligence. Royal
Navy rotary wing aircraft are employed in this capacity, as are the RAF’s
P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which conduct specialist military data
gathering in support of maritime operations to deliver the nuclear deterrent.
4.36. Air power can also be employed to enhance resilience within the UK
via support to civil authorities, usually in response to natural disasters, such as
flooding, or to terrorist attacks. Air mobility (both rotary wing and fixed‑wing)
and ISR aircraft are of most utility and can be employed to provide niche
capabilities that civilian agencies may lack; most recently this capability was
used during the COVID-19 pandemic with specialist aeromedical airlift being
used to move patients around the UK. ISR aircraft have also been used to
provide imagery of disaster hit areas and help look for missing persons, both
on land and in coastal waters.75
73 In this context, the home base, including its airspace, territorial waters or exclusive
economic zone, is the UK homeland, Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies,
permanent joint operating bases, and key lines of communication.
74 For example, deploying six Typhoon aircraft to RAF Akrotiri in 2013 to protect the base
from the threat of attack from Syrian aircraft. The aircraft were operational in Cyprus within
72 hours of being tasked in the UK.
75 See JDP 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience for more detail on
air power’s role in support to the UK civil authorities.

The Red Arrows perform above Expo 2020 Dubai
Engage
4.37. The purpose of engage is prevent conflict, build stability and gain
influence. Engage is founded on a forward deployed and persistent posture
that is integrated with other government departments and is engaged
4
internationally with our networks of allies. Air power is well placed to provide
influence and understanding through a variety of means. Forward deployment
of air assets, whether temporary or permanent, is not a new concept; speed
and reach allows the UK to deploy air power globally, either episodically in
response to a specific situation or permanently as part of a bilateral security
approach with another nation. For example, permanent EAWs within the
Middle East provide mutual assurance to the hosting nations as well as
strategic airbases from which to project UK air power.
4.38. The reputation and professionalism earned by the RAF, Fleet Air Arm
and Army Air Corps through performance on operations means that UK
air power is held in high regard by both allies and potential partners. The
subsequent demand for visits, collaborative training, exercise participation,
both in the UK and abroad, and exchange officer programmes provides the
opportunity to exert influence and gain understanding. Such engagement not
only improves the capacity of host nations to handle their own internal security
challenges and establishes enduring relationships with regional military and
political leaders but also represents a commitment that demonstrates the
UK’s resolve. Air power can also be employed through engagement to fly the

flag for broader UK government activities. Display teams such as the RAF
Aerobatic Team, the Red Arrows, through participation in international displays
around the world support defence export programmes and provide a visible
demonstration of UK air power excellence to a broad audience.
4.39. Air power’s speed of response in support of disasters, such as

earthquakes, flood or famine, can also generate a spirit of goodwill or
alleviate previously held grievances, thereby promoting security and stability.
Consequently, this task contributes to gaining and preserving access and
freedom of action by building alliances and partnerships, which is vital for air
power projection.
Constrain
4.40. The purpose of constrain is to compel an adversary towards a course

of action or to severely restrict the scope of their ambition or activity. Activities
in the constrain function form an important element of deterrence; they
demonstrate resolve and capability, as well as imposing costs on an adversary.
Activities with the purpose of constraining allow the UK to shape the strategic
environment in our national interest. Constrain can include the application of
hard power in a state of armed conflict, but also below the threshold of armed
4 conflict, to achieve strategic objectives when the threat demands it.
4.41. Air power can be used to signal clear political intent through a range
of measures, such as the overt deployment of combat aircraft to a particular
region or intensified peacetime training exercises. It can contribute to
stabilising a crisis situation through the airborne insertion of personnel into
a region where conflict threatens to spill over into neighbouring states. It
can provide implicit deterrence by deploying ISR aircraft to warn a potential
aggressor that their actions are being watched and could provoke a response.
Ultimately, it can also deliver strategic attack deep into an adversary’s territory
to deny an adversary the assurance that their homeland can be kept safe.
UK air power’s reach via air-to-air refuelling, airlift capacity and advanced
combat air capabilities provided by the F-35B Lightning II may be employed
to conduct, or facilitate, ‘strategic raiding’, whether as part of a joint force or
as a stand-alone air operation. Where constrain activities escalate to broader
combat operations, control of the air will need to be established or assured in
a threat environment where near-peer adversaries and third parties could be
operating air threats ranging from small uncrewed aircraft systems through to
advanced fighters and surface-to-air missile systems.

Countering Russian aggression in Ukraine
On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the

Russo–Ukrainian conflict that began in 2014 with the annexation of the
Crimea and the seizure of parts of south-eastern Ukraine by Russian-backed
separatists. The UK and its NATO allies responded quickly to enhance
Ukraine’s defence capability whilst simultaneously strengthening collective
defence measures in Eastern Europe. Air power was at the vanguard of
the response. The rapid delivery of defensive lethal aid by air, especially
shoulder‑fired anti-armour weaponry, proved critical to halting Russian
armoured columns attempting to encircle and seize the Ukrainian capital
Kyiv, thereby denying Russia a quick strategic victory. Enhanced air policing
activity to secure NATO airspace and reassure member states in Eastern
Europe was enacted within 24 hours of the invasion commencing, providing
a clear deterrence message to Russia. The UK’s contribution centred around
fully armed Typhoon aircraft operating from the UK and Cyprus which,
supported by Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft, helped patrol the NATO
airspace over Poland and Romania. In addition, the UK’s intention to robustly
defend NATO territory and airspace against any Russian aggression was
further demonstrated through the temporary deployment of F-35B Lightning II
aircraft to Estonia and providing Wildcat helicopter air support to the UK‑led
4
NATO multinational battlegroup based within the country. UK air power
participation in multinational exercises within the region was also increased,
such as on Exercise Swift Response, which brought together 40 aircraft,
including UK Typhoons and Apaches to overtly practise close air support
missions, thereby sending a clear message regarding NATO’s capability to
employ overwhelming force from the air if necessary.
Warfight
4.42. A transition to a warfighting campaign is an escalation from constrain

and is a tool of last resort. The purpose of a warfighting campaign is the
delivery of lethal violence focused in such a manner that it compels an enemy
to acquiesce to the UK’s or its coalition’s will. The ability and willingness
to commit capability to fighting wars is the foundation of our influence and
deterrence. In this scenario, the key role of air power is to defeat an adversary’s
air forces to gain and maintain an acceptable degree of control of the air;
without this, warfighting at scale against a peer, or near-peer, adversary is

unwinnable. The proliferation of advanced A2AD systems mean that the UK,
and NATO, cannot take for granted the freedom to operate in the air domain as
has been the case during all operations since the first Gulf War. Air power also
provides the ability to mass firepower quickly in response to an adversary’s
attack, often while land and maritime forces marshal and deploy.
“
Invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of
victory in the attack.
Sun Tzu

Key points
• Although air power is capable of independently achieving desired political

objectives, it works most effectively when used with the other components
of military power through integrated action.
• Through air power’s flexibility, and the speed with which it can reach the
engagement space, it provides vital projection and sustainment, thus
offering significant military advantage.
• Effective cross-domain integration depends on mutual trust and

understanding, built on well-established cooperation between the single
Services.
• The ability to deliver each of the four air power roles is dependent on four
critical enablers: base, sustain, connect and protect.
• Air power can be employed across the functions of protect, engage,

constrain and, in extremis, warfight.

Notes

Lexicon
Lexicon
Section 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations
A2AD anti-access and area denial
AAR air-to-air refuelling
ACA airspace control authority
AJP Allied joint publication
ALI air-land integration
AMDC air and missile defence commander
AMI air-maritime integration
AOCC (M) air operations coordination centre (maritime)
AOD air operations directive
AP Air Publication
ASACS air surveillance and control system
ATF aviation task force
ATO air tasking order
ATP Allied Tactical Publication
BAI battlefield air interdiction

BRd Book of Reference (digital)
C4IS command, control, communication, computers and

information system
CAOC combined air operations centre
CAS close air support
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CFACC combined force air component commander
COED Concise Oxford English Dictionary
CRC control and reporting centre
CSG carrier strike group
DCA defensive counter-air

DCDC Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
EAW expeditionary air wing

EME electromagnetic environment

Lexicon
FLOT forward line of own troops

FSCL fire support coordination line
GAT guidance, apportionment and targeting

GPS Global Positioning System
ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JAOC joint air operations centre

JAOP joint air operations plan
JDP joint doctrine publication
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFAC HQ joint force air component headquarters
JFC joint force commander
JHC Joint Helicopter Command
JTAC joint terminal attack controller
KBI kill box interdiction
MAOP master air operations plan

MOD Ministry of Defence
NASOC National Air and Space Operations Centre

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO non-combatant evacuation operation
OCA offensive counter-air
PED processing, exploitation and dissemination
RAF Royal Air Force
SAM surface-to-air missile

SCA space coordinating authority
SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance
UN United Nations
US United States

Lexicon
Section 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into two parts. First, we list new definitions that will be
added to JDP 0-01.1, UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm followed by
already endorsed terms and definitions.
New definitions
remotely piloted aircraft

An uncrewed aircraft that is controlled from a remote pilot station by a pilot
who has been trained and certified to the same standards as a pilot of a
crewed aircraft. (JDP 0-30, 3rd Edition)
uncrewed aircraft
An aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is operated remotely
using varying levels of automated functions.
Notes: 1. Uncrewed aircraft can be expendable or recoverable.
2. Uncrewed aircraft may carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.
3. Cruise missiles are not considered uncrewed aircraft.
(JDP 0-30, 3rd Edition)
uncrewed aircraft system

A system whose components include the uncrewed aircraft, the supporting
network and all equipment and personnel necessary to control the uncrewed
aircraft. (JDP 0-30, 3rd Edition)
Endorsed definitions
aircraft
Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions
of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.
(NATOTerm)
air mobility
A fundamental role of air power which enables movement, manoeuvre and
sustainment. (AP3002, 4th Edition)
air power
The ability to use air capabilities in and from the air, to influence the behaviour
of actors and the course of events. (JDP 0-01.1)

Lexicon
attack
A fundamental role of air power which can coerce and influence actors into
changing or maintaining behaviour. (AP3002, 4th Edition)
automated
Pertaining to a system that, in response to inputs, follows a predetermined set
of rules to provide a predictable outcome. (NATOTerm)
autonomous
Pertaining to a system that decides and acts to accomplish desired goals,
within defined parameters, based on acquired knowledge and an evolving
situational awareness, following an optimal but potentially unpredictable course
of action. (NATOTerm)
command
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction,
coordination, and control of military forces. (NATOTerm)
control
The authority exercise by a commander over part of the activities of
subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under their
command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or
directives. (NATOTerm)
control of the air

A fundamental role of air power which secures our freedom of action within the
air environment. (AP3002, 4th Edition)
Defence engagement
The use of our people and assets to prevent conflict, build stability and gain
influence. (JDP 0-01.1)
fire support coordination line

Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or
amphibious force commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by
other force elements which may affect the commander’s current and planned
operations. The fire support coordination line applies to fires of air, ground or
sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets.
The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated
with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against
surface or ground targets short of the fire support coordination line must be

Lexicon
conducted under the positive control or procedural clearance of the associated

land or amphibious force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances,
commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the fire support coordination
line must coordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide
and to harmonize joint objectives.
Notes: in the context of this definition the term “surface targets” applies to
those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations.
(NATOTerm)
forward line of own troops

Positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time.
(NATOTerm)
intelligence
The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of
information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of
actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by
decision-makers. (NATOTerm)
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

A fundamental role of air power, which informs the development of
understanding across all environments. (AP3002, 4th Edition)
Note: For coherence of terminology the next edition of AP3002 will replace
environments with domains.
interoperability
The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied
tactical, operational and strategic objectives. (NATOTerm)
joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which
elements of at least two services participate. (NATOTerm)
joint action
The use of a combination of manoeuvre, fires, information and civil-military
cooperation to create physical, virtual and cognitive effects.
Notes: Joint action is directed by command and control, informed by
intelligence and supported by force protection and sustainment. (NATOTerm)

Lexicon
multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which
forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (NATOTerm)
operational domain
A specified sphere of capabilities and activities that can be applied within an
engagement space. (NATOTerm)
remotely piloted aircraft system

A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required
command and control links and any other components as specified in the type
design. (NATOTerm)
space power
Exerting influence in, from or through space. (JDP 0-01.1)
sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the
duration required to achieve its objectives. (NATOTerm)

Lexicon

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JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) i

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ii JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

While the enduring principles of air power remain constant, maintaining

Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB CBE ADC

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) iii

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) v

a. Chapter 1 – An introduction to air power. This chapter provides

b. Chapter 2 – The roles of air power. This chapter discusses in detail

c. Chapter 3 – Command and control. This chapter provides more

d. Chapter 4 – The employment of air power. This chapter considers

vi JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Chapter 1 – An introduction to air power . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2 – The roles of air power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chapter 3 – Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Chapter 4 – The employment of air power . . . . . . . . . . . 67

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) vii

This chapter provides an overview of UK air power, outlining

Section 1 – The basics of air power . . . . . . . . . . 3

Section 2 – Air capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Section 3 – Influence and power from the air . . . . . 14

Section 4 – Air power in context . . . . . . . . . . . 18

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) 1

2 JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Air power is defined as: A–Z

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) 3

War 2, the technological development of air power accelerated dramatically,

The characteristics of air power

b. Speed enables the rapid and responsive projection of power,

c. Reach enables audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies to be

a. Agility. Agility is a blend of responsiveness, adaptability, flexibility

4 Ubiquity is defined as: present, appearing, or found everywhere. Concise Oxford

4 JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

operational theatres, sometimes during the same mission, and to act as

b. Ubiquity. Height, speed and reach, combined with the agility of

c. Concentration. Speed, reach and agility allow air power to

1.6. In combination, air power’s characteristics enable the delivery of

Atlas C-1 (A400M) takes off from RAF Akrotiri

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) 5

• enable freedom of movement;

The air environment

6 JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Limitations of air power

a. Impermanence. Aircraft cannot yet stay airborne indefinitely,

b. Limited payload. The payloads that can be carried by aircraft may

c. Fragility. Structurally, aircraft are highly stressed and built to be

d. Cost. Many military aircraft use cutting-edge technology, which,

5 These effects could be delivering personnel, equipment or humanitarian aid, or

JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition) 7

Moreover, air power can, in certain situations, offer alternative policy

e. Basing and overflight. All forms of military power depend on

Section 2 – Air capabilities

8 JDP 0-30 (3rd Edition)

Puma HC2 formation as part of celebrations marking 50 years of Puma service