8/29/23, 12:42 AM G.R. No.

167324

G.R. No. 167324               July 17, 2007

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF
HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT,
NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC.,
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA,
ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P. GALOPE,
REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND
REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,1 promulgated
by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102,
"Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which was issued by then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.

Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a
Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a
series of workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical staff
possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five general areas of reform:
(1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health programs; (3)
promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities
of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).2

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the
collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision under
the HSRA reads:

Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals must be allowed to collect socialized user
fees so they can reduce the dependence on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like
diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be upgraded to effectively exercise fiscal
autonomy. Such investment must be cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks.
Moreover such capacities will allow government hospitals to supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate
institutional arrangement must be introduced such as allowing them autonomy towards converting them into
government corporations without compromising their social responsibilities. As a result, government hospitals are
expected to be more competitive and responsive to health needs.

Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5 January 2001,
entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals
to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001;"3 and Administrative Order No. 172
of the DOH, entitled "Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in
Government Health Facilities,"4  dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who
cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services.5

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Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and
free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void
for being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:6

ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.

ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.

ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being x x x.

ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.

ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:

xxxx

(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

xxxx

ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking
into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from
being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as
a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. The provisions for the streamlining of the DOH
and the deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals read:

Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan. In view of the functional and operational redirection in
the DOH, and to effect efficiency and effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization
and Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis of the intended changes. The RSP shall contain the following:

a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and activities/strategies;

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b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions and activities by organizational unit and
the relationship of each units;

c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and unfilled positions; and

d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline set-up on the agency budgetary
allocation and indicating where possible, savings have been generated.

The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of Budget and Management for approval before the corresponding
shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH Secretary.

Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other personnel on the basis of the approved
RSP shall not result in diminution in rank and compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into account all
pertinent Civil Service laws and rules.

Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall be
taken from funds available in the DOH, provided that the total requirements for the implementation of the revised
staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds for Personnel Services.

Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from the service as a consequence of the
implementation of this Executive Order shall be entitled to the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who
are not covered by existing laws, they shall be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month basic salary for
every year of service or proportionate share thereof in addition to the terminal fee benefits to which he/she is entitled
under existing laws.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No.
7160), which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as
specific health-related functions and responsibilities.7

Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH,
should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102
is void, having been issued in excess of the President’s authority.8

Moreover, petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in
accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative order
to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.9

Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P.
Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuñata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the
validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were
suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other
DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.10

Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP. Certain employees allegedly suffered
diminution of compensation,11  while others were supposedly assigned to positions for which they were neither
qualified nor suited.12 In addition, new employees were purportedly hired by the DOH and appointed to positions for
which they were not qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on
costs.13 It was also averred that DOH employees were deployed or transferred even during the three-month period
before the national and local elections in May 2001,14  in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also
known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."15  Petitioners, however, failed to identify the DOH employees
referred to above, much less include them as parties to the petition.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners
failed to show capacity or authority to sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners
failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury sustained or were in
the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed
out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and 4)
certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was
not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

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In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for
violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the
State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can
only provide guidelines for legislation.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners’ assertion that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the
health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the
development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102, in
accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not implement
Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by the petitioners, as the DOH
issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which created the different committees tasked with the
implementation of the RSP, only after both the DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG)
approved the RSP on 8 July 2000 and 17 July 2000, respectively. 1avvphi1

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on 26 November
2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005.

Hence, the present petition, where the following issues are raised:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT ANY
QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE NOT JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN UPHOLDING

The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the
Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution.17 They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income
generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III;
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future
legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress.18  However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara,19 the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as
non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These principles in
Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by

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the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
of laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,20  this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of
Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,21  the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of
Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions,
which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-
executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.22

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution --
specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-
executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.23

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and
due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of
discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these
constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision
to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.

In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the
adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to
assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non
self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation24 and Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance,25 they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the
electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission26 :

x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent
legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent
legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the
Constitution.

The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners’ bare allegations that it violates the general principles
expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action
to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and the limitations
of judicial power.27

Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in
excess of his authority. They maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of
legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No. 102.28 This line of argument
is without basis.

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct
the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department.29  This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
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reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate offices,
the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as
transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora,30  this Court explained the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority under the
Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the
President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it
must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to
carry out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and
the agencies under it.31 The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II
of the Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.—The agencies under the Office of the President refer to
those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and
program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
(Emphasis provided.)

Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term "agency of the government"
as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau,
office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the Administrative
Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President.32 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency
which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President.
Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued
authority to reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.

The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general appropriations
laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the "General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1993," already contained a provision stating that:

Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive Branch.—The heads of departments,
bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer
essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out, or abolished, subject to civil
service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)

Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the
Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in
their respective organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by this Act.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, "The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999"
(Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and
organizational units in the executive department thus:

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
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organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did
not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative
Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102, particularly the RSP.
However, these contentions are without merit and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.

The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The facts show otherwise. It was only after
the DBM approved the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000,33  and after the
Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July 2000 Memorandum Circular No.
62,34  approving the RSP, that then DOH Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28 July 2000 Department
Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000,35 creating the different committees to implement the RSP.

Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative order to carry out the
streamlining, but that it failed to do so. Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the
DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of the President. The members of the
Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the President since they are merely his alter egos.36 Thus, their
acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President,
presumptively acts of the President.37  Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly authorized by the
President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the
implementation of the RSP.

Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope,
Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuñata, and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of
Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were suffering
from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH
employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.

In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or departments as valid, for so long as
they are pursued in good faith—that is, for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.38 On the
other hand, if the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-motivated political
purposes, any abolition of position would be invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable since none of the
petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH that would
unquestionably result in their dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued in the present case was made in good
faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions of
the Local Government Code on the devolution of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes
the inconvenience suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas, the executive department’s
finding of a need to make health services available to these areas and to make delivery of health services more
efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is well within its
authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners’ contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.

Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including them as parties to the petition, petitioners
went on identifying several errors in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102. First, they alleged that
unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution of compensation by virtue of the provision on Salaries and
Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:

2. Any employee who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG) shall not suffer a reduction in salary
except where his/her current salary is higher than the maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case
he/she shall be paid the salary corresponding to the maximum step of the SG of the new position. RATA shall no
longer be received, if employee was matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.

Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were entitled to receive
RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor was it alleged that they suffered any diminution of compensation.
Secondly, it was claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with unidentified positions for which
they were supposedly neither qualified nor suited. New employees, again unnamed and not included as parties,
were hired by the DOH and appointed to unidentified positions for which they were purportedly not qualified, despite
the fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs. Lastly, unspecified DOH employees

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were deployed or transferred during the three-month period before the national and local elections in May 2001, in
violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."

Petitioners’ allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to pass upon. The persons
involved are not identified, details of their appointments and transfers – such as position, salary grade, and the date
they were appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not specified.

Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate
Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees
concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any
questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative
Order No. 94, series of 2000;39 and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated.
The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not
at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for
abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.40

In a number of cases,41  the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the "transcendental
importance" of the constitutional question justified the granting of relief. In spite of these rulings, the Court, in
Domingo v. Carague,42  dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to show any present substantial
interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of
transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest. Present substantial interest,
which will enable a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.43  It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or
inconsequential interest.44

In the same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,45 ruled
that a citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise
stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a
party’s substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a party’s standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case
or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners’ substantive claims, this Court finds that
the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as
valid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

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