22.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC
WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH
WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY,
COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK
OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY
OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS,
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O.
GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG,
DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA,
EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND
REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M.
DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

FACTS:
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA
Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs
from several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the
adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five general
areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure
funding for priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local
health systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of
health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP). However, some provisions of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda are challenged on the ground that they violate 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of
Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of
the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to
protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. However, these
provisions are not self-executory.
Petitioners challenged:
First reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,
particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals.
Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued
by
the DOH, dated 5 January 2001, entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the
Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to
Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by
January 2001;"and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled
 "Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical
Professionals in Government Health
Facilities," dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent
Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services.
They also alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms
had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible
to economically disadvantaged Filipinos.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order
No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Depa
rtment of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH
refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a
provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the
devolution of basic services to local government units.

There are certain provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment
of DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local
government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related
functions and responsibilities.

Petitioners contended that:

Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH,
should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function.
They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in
excess of the President’s authority.
Implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not
in
accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved it. They also
maintained that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative
order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
The validity of Executive Order No. 102 will be the reason of losing their
jobs,
and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a
longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had
to relocate to far-flung areas.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which
proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to sign the certification of
non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners failed to show any particularized
interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury sustained or were
in the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme
Court on 15 August 1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time
the reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order,
was not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.

Court of Appeals also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14
of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which
directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s
right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of
the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
rendered on 26 November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
7 March 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO102 is constitutional?

RULING:
YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since It runs counter to
the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They
claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, incomegeneration, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article
III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and
free medical services. This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of
the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from
other constitutional provisions as non-self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from
Article II of the Constitution--specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18—the
provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the afore-
cited case of Tañada v. Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of
how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are
embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of
discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and
consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the
protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions;
to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino
family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper
care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non-self-executory in the
cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they
are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If
unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure
maybe manifested in their votes.

DISPOSITIVE:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No
costs.
 23.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II
HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC.,
and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007

FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition
raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II
Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a
wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a
subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-
cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July
1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects.
Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The
same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of
the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-
President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is
expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares
of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be
built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project
is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual
agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the
Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study
and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a
schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project
involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units
for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the
construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the
dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was
amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional
work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of
temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component
was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-
hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain
necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by
President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby
both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time,
NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing
structures had been turned over by RBI.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to
reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as
claimed by petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR
to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man
4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire
lands of public domain
8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the
SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:

1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for
all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the
President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA
(which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and
undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National
Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim
lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have
granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is
one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs
and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its
power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted
that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.

3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by
President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.

4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no
longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be
“disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
 5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights
and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem
appropriate.

6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to
become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted
that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done
by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a

portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional
requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were transferred to the
NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the
power to sell the same to any qualified person.

8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on
matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of
the 1987 Constitution.

9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue
of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the
passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot
be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time
SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but
did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

24.
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR.,
REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is
not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created
under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation
and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is
their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such
bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body
and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers
of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No.
1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private

suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-
party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters
of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view
of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds

already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked
for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If
at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.

Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for
a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

25.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA)
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL
POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), Respondents.

FACTS:
On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001.

Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,[2] a new National Power Board (NPB) of
Directors was formed. An energy restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was
also created to manage the privatization and the restructuring of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC).

On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule
33[4] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution
No. 2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and
the Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under this Resolution, the services of all NPC
personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to
separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB
Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and implement the
NPC’s Separation Program.

Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their
individual and representative capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain
respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002- 125.

Issue:

The issue was whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were
properly enacted.

The Court’s Ruling:

The Court’s Decision, written by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[5] held that the
Resolutions were invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes for their
adoption.

Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the
affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the National
Power Board of Directors. When applied to public functionaries, discretion refers to a
power or right conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially in certain
circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
 Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the board
of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments
on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to
occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries
cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and
approve board resolutions. Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the
fulfillment of their responsibilities.
There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the
exercise of discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a
delegate. Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents[6]
was misplaced. The Court explicitly stated in that case that, in exercising their own
judgment and discretion, administrative officers were not prevented from using the help
of subordinates as a matter of practical administrative procedure. Officers could seek
such aid, as long as the legally authorized official was the one who would make the final
decision through the use of personal judgment.

In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB

Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the
different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised
judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. This action violates the duty imposed upon
the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in
exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.