International Law Benchbook For The Judiciary in Pakistan
International Law Benchbook For The Judiciary in Pakistan
International Law Benchbook For The Judiciary in Pakistan
BENCHBOOK
PAKISTAN
LAW
FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW BENCHBOOK FOR PAKISTAN RSIL
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
BENCHBOOK
FOR
PAKISTAN
Table of Contents
INTERNATIONAL LAW BENCHBOOK FOR PAKISTAN
I. PREFACE
The Benchbook then addresses the concept of the rule of law and the
incorporation of international law within the domestic rule of law. This is
followed by an examination of the role of the domestic judiciary with respect
to international law. The Benchbook then examines the manner in which
international law is incorporated in Pakistan's domestic law. This includes
through legislative and judicial measures, including in relation to a con ict
between domestic and international law. Also addressed is the value of
understanding and interpreting the substance of an international treaty,
particularly one to which Pakistan is a party. Finally, examples of the use of
international law in Pakistan's domestic jurisprudence and the manner and
method by which select other states incorporate domestic law is provided in
the annexes.
1 Diane Marie Amann, Benchbook on International Law, Am. Soc. of Intl. Law (2014) available at:
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/ les/benchbook/ASIL_Benchbook_Complete.pdf [hereinafter ASIL
Benchbook].
I. INTRODUCTION TO BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4) Judicial decisions
The decisions of the ICJ are binding only upon the parties to the case to
the extent of the applicability of the case itself.⁵ The ICJ (along with several
international tribunals) nevertheless frequently references previous ICJ
decisions in decisions.⁶ It is also important to note that judicial decisions
as sources of international law in the ICJ Statute are not limited to
international courts (though international court decisions have greater
authority).⁷ Domestic court decisions represent the practice of a state,
providing evidence for the development of customary international law.⁸
5 Id. at ¶ 5.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at ¶ 7.
the lives, health and dignity of individuals. This is why, while very different in
formulation, the basis of some of their respective rules is similar.
Human Rights Law:
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings. Human rights law
lays down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain
from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.
Humanitarian Law:
Known as the law of armed con ict, humanitarian law is a set of rules
designed to limit the effects of armed con ict. It protects persons who are
not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts means and
methods of warfare. Humanitarian law does not regulate whether a State
may actually use force; this is governed by an important, but distinct, part
of international law set out in the United Nations Charter. It also does not
cover internal tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence.
The law applies only once a con ict has begun, and then equally to all
sides regardless of who started the ghting.
The ICJ identi ed the relationship between these two branches of law in its
case, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, as follows:
Human rights law applies continuously (including during armed con ict as
previously mentioned), but certain rules may be derogated from in situations
of public emergency threatening the life of a nation. This branch of law also
binds state parties to the treaties and not individuals, groups, provinces, etc.
beyond the state level.
10 “WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?” OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.
11 International Committee of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law, ADVISORY SERVICE ON
INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW, available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ les/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
12 Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004.
Humanitarian law on the other hand only applies during an armed con ict
and there is no permitted derogation. Humanitarian law binds parties to the
con ict, which may be states or non-state actors. A number of factors must be
taken into account before characterizing a situation of armed con ict, subject
to the rules of IHL. An armed con ict may either be “international” (between
two or more states) or “non-international” (between government authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State). There
can be instances of international and non-international armed con icts
simultaneously applying in a situation.
13 International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Con icts, 8 (2015), available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/inter national-
humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-con icts.
D. Relevant International Law Instruments
The Rule of Law, as a concept, has deep roots within the socio-political,
democratic legal tradition. Though there is no xed de nition, the Rule of Law
entails numerous obligations on the government and its citizens. The Rule of
Law generally supports the following:
The phrase “Rule of Law” was coined by Albert Venn Dicey (though the
concept itself may be traced back much further) and his theory, reproduced in
large part above, is widely accepted as a dominant expression of its
parameters. Beyond transparency and equality before the law however, Dicey
also rationalized that in the British context, the rule of law is sourced by the
protections offered by the courts and not solely constitutional constructs.
14 Contestedness of the Rule of Law, Rule of Law, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Stephane Beaulac, The Rule of Law in International Law Today, 197, 199 (2009) available at:
https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/3093/International-Rule -Law-
Final.pdf;jsessionid=A2E9E7F48AD3B1D72FE7298CACAF1B70?sequence=1.
Stated another way, Dicey's proposition implies that the outcomes of the
applications of rights of individuals are the source of the Rule of Law as
opposed to a written document alone and thus the role of the courts is critical
in applying the Rule of Law. If there is then a willingness to legally protect
individual's rights in a society, the source of such protections may better occur
through the courts.
These concepts in their totality underpin the notion of what is the Rule of Law,
but they do not limit the particular rights that are accorded to individuals
under that umbrella. This being the case, whether an individual's rights
emanate from the jurisprudence of courts or a written constitution, they are
not limited in their scope or origin. It is only for the government to specify
which rights exist and grant them equally, while fostering their protection
through domestic courts. This being the case, international law is not barred
as a source of rights of individuals, which then comprise the Rule of Law in a
domestic legal framework.
In any state, the sources of law (conveniently also the sources of rights) are
most commonly derived from central and provincial constitutions and
statutes and the jurisprudence of courts. This list is not exhaustive and in fact
regional laws or foreign laws, cultural or religious norms and international
instruments and customary laws also contribute signi cantly to domestic law
and the recognized rights of individuals.
There is also no strict limitation placed on the superior judiciary during their
oaths of office where they are sworn to perform their duties in accordance
with the Constitution of Pakistan and the “law.”
The use of law carries only the meaning that may be assigned to it in other
portions of the Constitution or codi ed law. The de nition of “existing laws”
may be indicative of what this use of “law” may mean. Nonetheless, it is not
exclusionary and thus, superior judges in discharging their duties may freely
22 This estimation is derived from a combination of multilateral treaties Pakistan participates in as documented by
the United Nations, along with the treaties included in the Pakistan Treaty Series.
23 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 260(1) (1973).
24 Id. at art. 268(7).
25 Id. at Third Schedule (Oaths of Office).
consider international law as a source of law. The Code of Conduct established
for the superior courts reaffirms this expansive interpretation of law:
Like the oath of office, the Code of Conduct does not specify what “law” means
in addition to the Constitution, only that it must be applied for the
maintenance of the Rule of Law. Employing international law in the courts as a
secondary source of rights in line with the Constitution plainly follows this
reasoning.
International law is not alien to Pakistan's domestic law. There are signi cant
portions of domestic law text that replicate international law almost verbatim.
As mentioned above, the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution
of Pakistan echoes many provisions present in the ICCPR. Some of those
provisions are reproduced as follows:
26 Code of Conduct to be Observed by Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and of the High Courts of Pakistan,
SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN (2009) available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=435.
27 Id.
No person who is arrested
shall be detained in custody Anyone who is arrested shall be
without being informed, as informed, at the time of arrest,
soon as may be, of the grounds of the reasons for his arrest and
for such arrest shall be promptly informed of
any charges against him.
Constitution of Pakistan: Art. ICCPR Art. 9(2)
10(1)
Every citizen shall have the right to Everyone shall have the right to freedom
freedom of speech and expression, of expression. The exercise of the rights
and there shall be freedom of the provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
press, subject to any reasonable carries with it special duties and
restrictions imposed by law in the responsibilities. It may therefore be
interest of the glory of Islam or the subject to certain restrictions, but these
integrity, security or defense of shall only be such as are provided by law
Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly and are necessary:
relations with foreign States, public ( a ) Fo r r e s p e c t o f t h e r i g h t s o r
order, decency or morality, or in reputations of others;
relation to contempt of court, (b) For the protection of national
commission of or incitement to an security or of public order (ordre public),
offence. or of public health or morals.
ICCPR Art. 19(2)-(3)
Constitution of Pakistan: Art. 19
Everyone shall have the right to freedom
Subject to law, public order and of thought, conscience and religion. This
morality: every citizen shall right shall include freedom to have or to
have the right to profess, adopt a religion or belief of his choice,
practice and propagate his and freedom, either individually or in
religion community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief
Constitution of Pakistan: Art. in worship, observance, practice and
teaching.
20(a)
ICCPR Art. 18(1)
All citizens are equal before law All persons are equal before the
and are entitled to equal law and are entitled without any
protection of law discrimination to the equal
protection of the law.
Constitution of Pakistan: Art. ICCPR Art. 26
25(1)
United Nations (Security Council) Act, Chapter VII of the United Nations
1948 Charter and all subsequent Security
Council Resolutions
The domestic judiciary, while free in the state, is not free from the state and its
obligations. Internally, the judicial branch of government may be distinct
from the executive and the legislative branches. Judicial decisions externally,
however, represent a subsidiary act of the state as a whole. The judiciary is
under equal obligation with the executive and legislative branches to ful ll its
role in the domestic implementation of international law. As a subset of the
federal government, the judiciary may not evade its responsibilities in
maintaining Pakistan's adherence to international agreements. Tacit
acceptance of international law through application of municipal law is also
not enough. The judiciary should practically demonstrate a proactive
approach to determining the scope and depth of application of international
legal provisions upon Pakistan.
The Supreme Court in the Zewar Khan case, reaffirmed the status of the
Durand Line as a recognized international border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. This position reaffirms the stance of the executive with
regards to the legitimacy of the Durand Line and the Government of
Pakistan is able to proactively employ it in this regard.
The Azad Kashmir Supreme Court found that the Northern Areas, though
part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, is not a part of Azad Kashmir and
thus the government has no need to take administrative control of these
areas. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in 1999, issued the following
ruling in response:
28 Ahmer Bilal Soo , Inextricably Linked, DAWN, May 25, 2014, available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1108468.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Superintendent, Land Customs Torkham (Khyber Agency) v. Zewar Khan (1969) PLD SC. 485.
32 Muhammad Fayyez, Pakistan-Azad Jammu & Kashmir Politico-Legal Con ict, PILDAT, 13 (2011) available at:
http://progress.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Pakistan-AJKPoliticoLegalCon ictSep2011.pdf.
Kashmir… that the people of the Northern Areas are citizens of Pakistan
for all intent and purposes”
The government of Pakistan should ensure that basic human rights and
other political and administrative institutions are provided in the areas
within six months. However, the action should not adversely affect Pakistan's
stand concerning the Kashmir dispute.”
The Supreme Court both in 2015 and 2016 issued judgments in relation to
providing licenses to hunt the houbara bustard. The 2015 case placed a
ban on issuing licenses by either the federal or provincial governments.
The Court also directed the Federal Government to adhere to relevant
treaty obligations as required by law. The provinces were required to
amend wildlife laws in line with international treaty obligations and to
prohibit the hunting of species threatened with extinction or categorized
as vulnerable
Only a few months later, the Court initiated a limited review of its own
judgment, nding that the grant of limited licenses to representatives of
Arab states to hunt the houbara bustard was not in violation of Pakistan's
international treaty obligations. The Court also cited the economic
bene ts of a limited lift on the ban, along with acknowledging the
position of the Government of Pakistan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
that the invitation to Arab dignitaries to hunt was a “cornerstone of foreign
policy” with these states.
33 Id.
34 Foundation for Fundamental Rights v. Federation of Pakistan (2013) PLD SC. 94.
35 Const. Petition No. 12 of 2010 [hereinafter 2015 Military Court Judgment].
36 Civil Petition No. 842 of 2016.
37 2015 Military Court Judgment, supra note 35.
where external aggression is threatened and appears to be imminent but
actual hostilities have not commenced.” The judgment further noted
that Article 245(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan requires that the
situation be categorized as a “threat of war” requiring extraordinary
measures through particular action(s). The actions here included the
summoning of the Armed Forces by the executive to “deal with terrorists”
and the enactment of the 21st Amendment of the Constitution by the
legislative branch. The concurring opinion by Justice Umar Ata Bandial
extensively referenced the Geneva Conventions with regards to the rights
of belligerents in custody.
The Lahore High Court relied upon the expertise of the United Nations
Educational, Scienti c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the
international law relating to preserving cultural and historical heritage
within its judgment. The Court acknowledged that not only was national
law available and applicable, but also international law:
The Court also explicitly states that the Antiquities Act, 1975 was
established pursuant to the rati cation of the Convention. Both
international and national law restrict construction rights in and around
heritage sites, the implications of any judgment associated with these
actions will be felt internationally.
38 Id. at ¶ 139.
39 Id. at ¶ 144.
40 Id.
41 Kamil Khan Mumtaz v. Government of Punjab (2016) PLD Lah. 699.
42 Id. at ¶ 19.
be free to uphold an international obligation in light of domestic law as it sees
t. This is the quintessential task of the judiciary, distinct from the executive
(the separation of their powers is discussed in Section B of the following
chapter).
The judiciary must, in performing its role, execute a balancing test between
national interests and the parameters of justice to determine the most
appropriate procedures and outcomes for cases that address national
security, in particular. This requires an awareness of the fact that public trials,
hearings, tribunals, etc. related to the adjudication of national security issues
are reproduced and referenced in foreign countries and before international
bodies like the United Nations. For example, where there are questions
regarding the nature and existence of a con ict in the Federally and
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, the cases both accepted and decided
by the courts may inadvertently in uence the state's position regarding
whether or not it is considered a non-international armed con ict. Another
example may be the Balochistan law and order case regarding the recovery
of missing persons decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, later circulated
at the United Nation's European headquarters in Geneva.
Not only should international legal systems in uence domestic affairs, but the
inverse as well. The line between what is domestic and what is international
law is slowly blurring. Decisions of domestic courts with regards to
international law should thus be equally in uential in combating new
challenges. An individual accused of terrorism is far more likely to be
prosecuted, for example, by a domestic court rather than an international
tribunal. Additionally, threats to international security are more likely to
originate from non-state actors than from states themselves. The application
by domestic courts of human rights and humanitarian law, weighed against
national security issues, should be approached with greater deference
proportionate to that given to international judicial mechanisms, as they are
the next frontier in developing international law.
45 Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European Way
of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 328 (2006).
parliamentary-style democracies, but between the executive and the
judiciary it remains distinct nonetheless. This separation is also present in
Pakistan's state architecture:
The Court is prohibited from assuming the role of policy maker or of law
maker. The Constitution of Pakistan, in Article 175(3), expressly requires the
separation of the judiciary from the executive. The Preamble and the
Objectives Resolution of the Constitution both state “[T]he independence of
the Judiciary shall be fully secured.” Additional laws promulgated by the
legislature and the jurisprudence of the courts further determine the
parameters of this separation of powers beyond the Constitution.
The role of the judiciary is also illuminated within the jurisprudence of the
courts, a sample of which is reproduced below:
This notion of comity vests squarely within the powers of the judiciary in cases
that involve international and foreign law. Comity is neither an absolute rule
under international law nor an absolute requirement. It may even present a
con ict of interest if deference to foreign law con icts with positions taken by
the executive branch on a particular issue. The judiciary, with regards to
comity as a tool has, nevertheless, a great degree of latitude under the law and
must thus perform a balancing test that takes these considerations into
account.
51 Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (2008).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 32.
with regards to issues of national security and international relations to the
judgment of the executive.
One of the core tenets of national security doctrine is that courts play a deeply
modest role in shaping and adjudicating the executive's national security
decisions. In most cases, courts use abstention doctrines and other tools to
decline to hear such cases on the merits. When courts do hear these cases,
they often issue decisions that are highly deferential to executive choices.
Where the executive is aware that the judiciary is more proactive in reviewing
policies, even in con ict situations, the incentive exists to establish policies
the court is inclined to uphold. If the judiciary, especially with regards to issues
of national security, maintains a strong policy of deference, the executive may
take greater liberties in establishing policies that are more precarious. The
knowledge, for example, that the Supreme Court would most likely review its
policies promoted changes in policy by the executive branch of the U.S.
Government:
54 Ashley S. Deeks, Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 829 (2013).
55 See i.e. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty
Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002).
56 David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 NYU ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 497, 522 (2006).
57 Deeks, supra note 54, at 830.
58 Id.
that it do so. […] It has revealed details about the long-classi ed process
by which it determines when and under what conditions it would transfer
security detainees to foreign governments. And it has established more
rigorous procedural hurdles for itself before it will seek to use secret
evidence in deportation cases…
This, again, supports the notion that where judicial review is likely, the
executive will proactively defer to the courts and establish policies that will be
upheld. Where judicial review is unlikely, the executive will be manifestly
concerned with national security and not individual liberties, or upholding
the rule of law or international law.
59 Id. at 834.
60 Id.
tribunals […] Judges in national courts are relatively more independent
than judges in international tribunals, and enjoy broader public support
for their decisions. Their independent source of authority – the domestic
constitutions– serves as the basis of an autonomous legal system, one
that no international norm has the authority to affect.
The most effective way to meld international law and domestic law is to have a
domestic court that declares a provision of international law binding as
domestic law. Domestic courts, in acting as an enforcement mechanism of
international law, may also give effect to international law provisions that do
not traditionally operate as domestic law (i.e. ungrati ed treaties, customary
norms and international interpretations of domestic law provisions).
Domestic courts that openly engage with international law in their
judgments nd fertile ground for the interpretation and evolution of the
state's own law.
The diversity of international law must be taken into account to the extent
that the in uence the domestic judiciary is able to exert on enforcing
international law in the domestic sphere may be more signi cant in certain
instances and limited in others. International law, particularly within this
Benchbook, is not to be perceived as a monolithic legal framework. Thus, the
enforcement of international law may be exerted in several ways:
61 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National courts, domestic democracy, and the evolution of international
law, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 59, 68 (2009).
62 David Sloss & Michael Van Alstine, International Law in Domestic Courts, Handbook on the Politics of
International Law, 5 (2015).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 5-6.
65 Id. at 29-30.
domestic and international legal norms, “Determining the meaning of treaties
leaves considerable discretion for domestic courts in their primary duty 'to say
what the law is.'”
The scope of the power of the Federal Government is de ned within Article 97
of the Constitution, which states:
The subjects with regards to which Parliament may make laws are
enumerated in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution. Perhaps the most
relevant portions of the Fourth Schedule Federal Legislative List are items
three and thirty-two as follows:
Regarding Article 97, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Government
has the power to “exercise executive authority” to ratify a treaty, but not the
power to legislate, a role that remains rmly with the Parliament. Article
142(a) of the Constitution also con rms that Parliament has the exclusive
power to make laws with respect to any matter on the Federal Legislative
66 Id. at 25.
67 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 97 (1973).
68 Items 1, 6, 7, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 58 of the Fourth Schedule are indirectly relevant as well.
69 PAKISTAN CONST. Fourth Schedule, item 3 (1973).
70 Id. at item 32.
71 Societe General De Surveillance S.A. vs. Pakistan (2002) SCMR SC. 1694, ¶ 26.
List. Thus, items three and thirty-two anchor the power of rati cation and
domestic implementation of international instruments with the executive
and legislative branches of the Government of Pakistan. This is relevant to the
extent that the courts perpetually interpret the legal status of a treaty in a
manner in which the rights and obligations arising directly from these
international instruments may not form a legal cause of action in the domestic
courts unless legislatively adopted.
The Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution in fact re ect what has
been provided in same of the Articles of Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Supreme Court, while construing the former, refer to the latter if there
is no inconsistency between the two with the object to place liberal
construction as to extend maximum bene ts to the people and to have
uniformity with the comity of nations.
This holding indicates recognition of the same by the Supreme Court. Where
international law is viewed as consistent with the principles of the
Constitution, it may serve as a source of further interpretation or support for
enforcing fundamental rights.
The de nition of “existing laws” within the Constitution [See Chapter III,
Section B] reinforces this interpretation of the role of international law within
the domestic system. As previously mentioned, “existing laws” are de ned in
the Constitution of Pakistan in accordance with Article 268(7) to mean “all
laws (including Ordinances, Orders-in-Council, Orders, rules, by-laws,
regulations and Letters Patent constituting a High Court, and an noti cations
and other legal instruments having the force of law) in force in Pakistan or any
part thereof, or having extraterritorial validity…” The inclusion of “other legal
instruments having the force of law” and laws “having extraterritorial validity”
in the de nition of existing laws at the very least implies that international
instruments to which Pakistan is a party and accepted customary
international law formulate soft law, which may be considered by courts when
executing judgments. A bolder interpretation would suggest that this
The executive comprised of the Prime Minister, President and the Cabinet
actually exercises a great deal of authority with respect to adopting
international law in Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan is to take all action
in the name of the President as regards the “authentication of orders and
instruments in connection with the representation of Pakistan in foreign
countries or at international conferences and of international agreements and
treaties.” No order is to be issued without the approval of the Prime Minister
when a proposal arises for the implementation of an international agreement
in the provinces. The Cabinet is required to approve all proposals for
entering into any cultural or other agreements with any foreign government
prior to any negotiations. The Federal Rules of Business also extensively
document the areas of work in which the various divisions of the Cabinet
exercise authority:
The following provisions are taken from Schedule II on the Distribution of Business
Among the Divisions under Rule 3(3) of the Federal Rules of Business
Law and Justice Dealings and agreements with other countries and
international organizations in judicial and legal
matters (Sect. 21(4))
These excerpts from the Federal Rules of Business serve to also demonstrate
the lack of exclusive authority the Parliament has over the domestic treatment
of international law. The roles are clearly divided and where they are so heavily
divided between the executive and the legislature, it makes little sense to
exclude the judiciary. It appears inconsistent with the spirit of the separation
of powers for the judiciary to so vehemently attempt to restrict itself to
considering only legislation enacted by the Parliament as domestic law where
the other branches of federal government exercise some authority over
international law.
B. International Law versus Domestic Law: The Traditional Legal
Interpretation
We are not to lose sight of the established legal principal prevalent in our legal
jurisdiction that when international obligations and bilateral commitments
come in con ict with municipal laws, the later are to prevail.
We are inclined to hold that the absence of any provisions in the relevant
[domestic] law, the Pakistani courts are not entitled to take note of the factum
of violation of any provisions of international agreement or law, the Pakistani
courts are bound to give effect to the municipal law as they are.
85 Commander Aziz Khan v. Director General, Ports and Shipping (1991) CLC 362.
86 Presumably any con ict within international law is addressed through declaration during accession or
rati cation, negating any con ict within the international instrument to the extend of the discrepancy with
municipal law.
87 Ahtabar Gul v. State (2014) PLD Pesh. 10.
88 Commander Aziz Khan v. Director General, Ports and Shipping, supra note 85.
89 Indus Automobile v. Central Board of Revenue (1988) PLD Kar. 99.
90 PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 97 & 142(a) (1973).
incorporation of international instruments or provisions the Government of
Pakistan has already accepted as binding.
[W]e must realize that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat
and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience, and not merely in that of what
was said a hundred years ago.
Justice Holmes adamantly expresses his disdain for heavy reliance on rigid or
traditional interpretations of areas of constitutional ambiguity. In the
incorporation of international law into domestic law, the same approach may
be applied. The Constitution of Pakistan does not explicitly prohibit the
judicial branch of government from engaging with international law as a
branch of domestic law and thus this is an area of legal ambiguity.
Where the traditional judicial approach [see Section B of this Chapter] very
rigidly construes the application of international law by courts, there is little to
prohibit a change in interpretation now to re ect changing domestic
perceptions of international law. To this end, the superior courts are neither
explicitly bound nor do they bind themselves through the principle of stare
decisis. The Supreme Court has con rmed as much in numerous judgments,
including the following:
[T]he Courts are not slaves of the doctrine of stare decisis. A Court may change
or modify its view with the passage of time. The development of jurisprudence
is an on-going process.
It is the policy of the Courts to stand by the ratio decidendi, that is, the rule of
law and not to disturb a settled point. This policy of the Courts is conveniently
termed as the doctrine or rule of stare decisis. The rationale behind this policy
is the need to promote certainty, stability, and predictability of the law. This,
however, does not mean that this rule is in exible.
In spite of a Judge's fondness for the written word and his normal inclination
to adhere to prior precedents one cannot fail to recognize that it is equally
important to remember that there is a need for exibility in the application of
this rule, for law cannot stand still nor can courts become mere slaves of
precedents.
The rule of stare decisis does not apply with the same strictness in criminal,
scal and constitutional matters where the liberty of the subject is involved or
some other grave injustice is likely to occur by strict adherence to the rule.
Too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and
also unduly restrict the proper development of the law.
For resolving a con ict of judicial opinion, the Supreme Court noted several
considerations, including obviously that the “Supreme Court is not bound by
the principle of stare decisis,” though any “departure from the precedent
A judge's role is to interpret the law and to correct its mistakes. The twin role of
a developer in law and an earnest interpreter of legislation, though
challenging, is in accord with the role the Supreme Court has in the
constitutional scheme as also consistent with society's perceptions of the role
of judiciary in a liberal democracy.
This concept of a twin role supports the progressive approach towards the
domestic incorporation of international law through the judiciary. The judge,
in performing this role, has enough exibility to recognize that international
law is not a monolithic, rigid or uniform construct. International legal
obligations arising out of treaties or customary law are an additional tool
within the domestic legal framework to enforce the rule of law. It would be
shortsighted to enforce a sweeping rejection of all of international law or
anything that may be classi ed as international law in domestic courts for fear
that individuals may attempt to secure rights under particular international
legal instruments. International law is multi-faceted and dynamic. There are
different kinds of instruments that comprise international law with differing
levels of obligation that a state may undertake.
It is not necessary that the courts must allow for a cause of action to arise
under all international instruments to which Pakistan is a party in order to
uphold its duty in considering international law while enforcing the domestic
rule of law. Nuanced judicial opinions in line with this type of reasoning are
already present in domestic jurisprudence:
We are of the view that nations must march with international community
and the municipal law must respect rules of international law, even as nations
respect international opinion. The comity of nations requires that rules of
96 Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013) SCMR SC. 1707, ¶ 55.
97 M.D. Tahir v. Pakistan (1995) CLC Lah. 1039.
international law may be accommodated in the municipal law even without
express legislative sanction provided they do not run into con ict [with acts of
Parliament].
The Fundamental Rights enshrined in our Constitution in fact re ect what has
been provided in [the] Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It may be
observed that this Court while construing the former may refer to the latter if
there is no inconsistency between the two with the object to place liberal
construction as to extend maximum bene ts to the people and to have
uniformity with the comity of nations.
It is by now settled that International Law, unless in direct con ict with the
municipal law, ought to be applied and respected by municipal courts in
deciding matters arising therefrom.
Indeed we agree with learned counsel for the respondents to the extent that
terrorism is a fast growing phenomena and it is in the wider public interest
that all civilized States should make laws and take appropriate measures
within their Constitutional system to combat it. We also agree […] that
international obligations to the State ought to be duly honoured.
[T]he domestic courts must take account of the consequences that can ow
Whenever these rules are in con ict with an obligation or commitment of the
Federal Government arising out of an international treaty or an agreement
with a State or States, or any international nancial institution the provisions
of such international treaty or agreement shall prevail to the extent of such
con ict.
104 Lakhra Power Generation Company v. Karadeniz Powership Kaya Bey (2014) CLD Kar. 337.
105 Public Procurement Rules, S.R.O. 432(I)/2004, Rule 5.
106 Pakistan Halal Authority Act, Act. No. VIII (2016).
107 Anti-Dumping Duties Act, Act No. XIV (2015).
108 Anti-Dumping Duties Act, supra note 107; Countervailing Duties Act, Act XIII (2015).
109 Torture, Custodial Death and Custodial Rape (Prevention & Punishment) Act, proposed (2014) available at:
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1415360249_881.pdf.
domestic law, the judiciary should also be keen to take a progressive approach
in marshaling international law to enforce the domestic rule of law.
The following case study represents one distinct example of a lack of domestic
recognition towards a term that within international law has a legal connotation,
but in domestic law is used more diversely and without any particular legal
meaning inherited from law. Though Pakistan is a state party to the Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, which de nes “torture,” the obligation assigned thereunder have by
and large failed to trickle down into domestic law. The domestic judiciary has also
largely ignored the legal density of the term “torture” as shall be explained in the
following.
Those in the legal profession are able to appreciate the distinction between
the colloquial use of a term and the legal use of a term. The term “person” is one
such example. A generic, non-legal de nition of person generally refers to a
human being. However, in law, a person may refer to a human being, but also
to a “legal person,” which would include a business entity or public
organization. The term “torture,” legally speaking, refers to a speci c act that is
distinct from its generic de nition. The Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment de nes torture as:
110 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December
1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, art. 1(1).
currently in application that de nes torture. Domestic laws that include the
Constitution of Pakistan, the Police Order, 2002, the Pakistan Prison Rules,
1978, the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
and the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations, 2011 criminalize torture or
acts that amount to torture, but never de ne the parameters of what is
considered torture. Without any de nition within traditional domestic law,
the judiciary is free to exercise its own judgment with regards to what may or
may not amount to torture.
Where the state has agreed to be bound by the Convention and by association
its de nition of torture, the functionaries of the state, including the judiciary,
may also be empowered by what the Convention contains. In those cases
where public officials or persons acting in an official capacity are accused of
committing acts of torture, judicial officials may reinforce their judgment with
a reference to the provisions of the Convention, including the de nition of
torture. This application of international law also coincides with the restrictive
traditional approach to international law, in that the Convention would not
give rise to a cause of action independently, because municipal law already
generically criminalizes torture. What amounts to torture in the judgment,
however, could be in uenced in part by the de nition of torture provided in
the Convention. At the very least, the judiciary may be mindful in their
decisions to refrain from any violation of the Convention or any other
international law obligation.
The above may only be achieved where international law is appreciated as an
entity of domestic law, rather than avoided or dismissed. An appreciation for
the nuances of international law does not hinder the enforcement of
domestic law. Understanding international law empowers domestic judges in
making their decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both under the international law as well as the Municipal Law, the tribal
territories became part and parcel of Pakistan and were duly recognized as
such by the United Kingdom and the member Nations of the South East Asia
Treaty Organization. The Dominion of Pakistan through its Constitutional
Assembly also formally accepted it as such. In the circumstances it was not for
the Municipal Courts to hold otherwise. It is important to remember that in
such matters of a political nature, namely accession or cession of territory it is
not for the Courts to take a different view. The executive authority of the State
has in the exercise of its Sovereign power the right to say as to which territory
it has recognized as a part of its State and the Courts are bound to accept this
position. Indeed this was the principle that was given statutory effect in
section 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 and section 6 of the Governor-
General's Order No. 5 of 1949. If the Courts felt any doubt with regard to the
status of such a territory then it was incumbent upon them to make reference
to the Government and to accept its opinion.
***
111 Superintendent, Land Customs Torkham (Khyber Agency) v. Zewar Khan (1969) PLD SC. 485.
B. Defend the State's Rights through International Law: Drone Attacks
[N]either the Security Council nor the [United Nations] in general at any point
of time has permitted the U.S. Authorities particularly the CIA to carry out
drone attacks within the territory of Pakistan, a sovereign State…
The huge loss to life and property […] is thus, strictly prohibited not only be
the Charter of the UNO but also by the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
[N]either any municipal law nor international law including the [United
Nations] Charter and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions […] permit
these drone strikes […] in the sovereign territory of Pakistan, which is
unlawful and illegal.
Under the international law and conventions of the UNO, no State can choose
and hit its enemy, hiding in another State, unless the latter State consents to it
in writing and with mutual collaboration the same is carried out but strictly
under the sanction of the UN Security Council which is not granted [in this
instance]…
[T]he drone strikes […] are absolutely illegal and blatant violation of the
sovereignty of the State of Pakistan because frequent intrusion is made on its
territory/airspace without its consent rather against its wishes despite of the
protests lodged by the Government of Pakistan…
***
The Peshawar High Court ambitiously employed Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, General Assembly resolutions and
the scholarly works of international academics to support its holding
regarding the international illegality of the drone strikes in Pakistan. The
scope and breadth of the international law referenced within the decision is
tenacious and in some ways amounts to an act of lawfare. The Court not only
aggressively uses international law to declare the acts unlawful, but it also
112 Foundation for Fundamental Rights v. Federation of Pakistan (2013) PLD SC. 94, ¶ 7.
113 Id. at ¶ 11.
114 Id. at ¶ 16.
115 Id. at ¶ 19.
116 Id. at ¶ 22(ii).
strongly recommends international legal steps to be taken to combat the
issue. This case is, at the very least, is symbolic of the potential power of
proactively harnessing international law to reach a just decision.
C . Ap p l i c at i o n o f I nte r n at i o n a l Le g a l Pr i n c i p l e s : E n fo rce d
Disappearances
It is pertinent to note that Pakistan has also not rati ed this [Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances]. The Supreme
Court of Nepal applied the principles of the 2006 Convention in light of the
right to life guaranteed in the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007. Our
Constitution at Article 9 lays down the right to life, which has received an
expansive interpretation from this Court. Moreover, Article 10 provides direct
protection from enforced disappearances. Thus, the crime against humanity
of enforced disappearances is clearly violative of the Constitution of Pakistan.
Therefore, this Court can also apply the principles enshrined in the 2006
Convention in order to achieve the ends of justice. Likewise, there are cases
from international tribunals such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights as well as other national courts […] where the Courts were forced to
issue directions to the concerned authorities for effecting recovery of the
missing persons and also dealing with those persons who are responsible for
their enforced disappearance.
***
The fact of recognition of Bangladesh as an independent State has more than one
implication […] Recognition is a political act, which when accorded by the
authorized political department, will be accepted as conclusive by the Courts.
The effect of the law so far discussed is that the acquisition of the properties of
118 Pakistan Services Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Revision) Karachi (1993) SCMR SC. 1406, ¶ 10.
119 Id. at ¶ 13.
120 Id. at ¶ 15.
the assesse will be taken to be compulsory and by the competent authority,
and the cause of action for claiming relief in respect of such properties will
arise not retroactively from the date Bangladesh declared independence […]
but from the date it was recognized by the Government of Pakistan.
***
Judges from around the world cite international legal materials to explain
their decisions as international law primarily relies on domestic legal and
political structures for implementation. The blend of international law in
domestic courts is therefore, becoming a thriving sub eld overlapping
comparative and international law.
In 2012, the Constitution of Mexico was revised to declare that, all persons
shall enjoy the human rights recognized in this Constitution and in
international treaties to which Mexico is a party. Article 1 of the
Constitution requires that norms concerning human rights always be
interpreted in conformity with the constitution and with international treaties
125 Id.
126 Id. at 600.
127 Id. at 607.
128 Id. at 599.
129 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, (1989) 1 S.C.R 1038 (Can.).
130 Sandholtz, supra note 122, at 610.
in the manner that offers the broadest protection. Thus, in Mexico, judges
are obligated to interpret rights in light of international law.
A. United Kingdom
Lord Bingham of the House of Lords observed that international law used to
be seen as an “esoteric preserve” that did not feature signi cantly in the work
of “ordinary practitioners and national courts,” He also provided the
following:
Historically, the courts of the United Kingdom have developed the application
of international law in various decisions, just as long as its incorporation was
not inconsistent with the statutes. Where the provisions of a statute are
unambiguously written with those of an earlier treaty, the courts must apply
the statute in preference to the treaty. However, if the statute is ambiguous,
there is a presumption that the court is required to refer to a treaty to nd the
true meaning and purpose of the statute.
131 Article 1 of the Constitution of Mexico, 1917: The provisions relating to human rights shall be interpreted
according to this Constitution and the international treaties on the subject, working in favor of the broader
protection of people at all times.
132 Sandholtz, supra note 122, at 610.
133 Anthea Roberts, Comparative international law? The role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing
International Law, CAMBRIDGE JOURNALS, [ICLQ vol. 60, January 2011] at 57.
134 Dr. Braham A Agarwal. Enforcement of International Legal Obligations in a National Jurisdiction, LAW
COMMISSION OF INDIA, New Delhi, at 11.
135 (2004) UKHL 56.
One of the most celebrated cases involving the use of international law by the
House of Lords was the Pinochet Case in which the House of Lords found that a
former head of State could not claim immunity for acts of torture.
Where a treaty and a subsequent statute con ict, the “last in time” doctrine
applies. This theory derives from the fact that the Supremacy Clause, by its
wording, affords equal weight to both treaties and federal statues. The
Supreme Court stated in Whitney v. Robertson:
Congress may modify such provisions so far as they bind the United States, or
supersede them altogether. By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no
superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the
same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe then so as to give
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but
if the two are inconsistent, the one last in time will control the other.
The judiciary is required to determine whether a con ict actually exists when
the two provisions are read in their utmost consistent light. Only if the two
cannot be reconciled should the court apply the last in time doctrine.
The role of customary international law in the United States courts has
likewise evolved through federal court decisions. Custom, from the inception
of a body of international law, plays a role in de ning the duties and
obligations of nations. References of the applicability of customary
136 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) [2000] AC 147.
137 Margaret Hartka, The Role of International Law in Domestic Courts: Will the legal Procrastination End? MD. J.
INT'L. 99, 106 (1990).
138 Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution is commonly referred to as the Supremacy Clause. It establishes
that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state
constitutions.
139 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
international law can be traced as far back as 1793 when the Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth,
become amenable to the law of nations; and it was their interest as well as
their duty to provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed; in their
national character and capacity, the United States were responsible to
foreign nations for the conduct of each state, relative to the laws of nations
and the performance of treaties…
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Courts repeatedly indicated that
customary international law was binding upon the federal government. The
limits of its applicability were further explained in The Paquete Habana
case:
C. India
India is also quite familiar with the domestic application of international law.
Under Article 51(c), the Constitution of India incorporates international law as
an integral part of the domestic legal framework.
The State shall endeavor to foster respect for international law and treaty
obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another
144 Chintan Chandrachud, International Humanitarian Law in Indian Courts: Application, Misapplication and Non-
application, In Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies 389-413, TMC
Asser Press (2014).
145 2 SCC 1984 534 (5).
146 Id.
147 Agarwal, supra note 134, at 15.
148 AIR 1976 SC 1207, 1291.
149 Agarwal, supra note 134, at 15.
150 Id. at 15.
151 Id.
152 AIR 1996 SC 2715.