pdf version of the entry

Practical Reason
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/practical-reason/ Practical Reason
from the Spring 2020 Edition of the First published Mon Oct 13, 2003; substantive revision Tue Jan 14, 2020

Stanford Encyclopedia Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through
reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is
of Philosophy practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter,
insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its
consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly
moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination
raises two sets of philosophical problems. First, there are questions about
how deliberation can succeed in being practical in its issue. What do we
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
need to assume—both about agents and about the processes of reasoning
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor
they engage in—to make sense of the fact that deliberative reflection can
Editorial Board
https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html directly give rise to action? Can we do justice to this dimension of
practical reason while preserving the idea that practical deliberation is
Library of Congress Catalog Data
ISSN: 1095-5054
genuinely a form of reasoning? Second, there are large issues concerning
the content of the standards that are brought to bear in practical reasoning.
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- Which norms for the assessment of action are binding on us as agents? Do
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP these norms provide resources for critical reflection about our ends, or are
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized they exclusively instrumental? Under what conditions do moral norms
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the
yield valid standards for reasoning about action? The first set of issues is
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries,
addressed in sections 1–3 of the present article, while sections 4–5 cover
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ .
the second set of issues.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Copyright c 2020 by the publisher 1. Practical and Theoretical Reason
The Metaphysics Research Lab 2. Naturalism and Normativity
Center for the Study of Language and Information
3. Reasons and Motivation
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
4. Instrumental and Structural Rationality
Practical Reason
c 2020 by the author
Copyright 5. Maximizing Rationality
R. Jay Wallace 6. Consequentialism, Value, and Moral Reason
All rights reserved. Bibliography
Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/

1
 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

Academic Tools In practical reasoning agents attempt to assess and weigh their reasons for
Other Internet Resources action, the considerations that speak for and against alternative courses of
Related Entries action that are open to them. Moreover they do this from a distinctively
first-personal point of view, one that is defined in terms of a practical
predicament in which they find themselves (either individually or
1. Practical and Theoretical Reason collectively—people sometimes reason jointly about what they should do
together).
Practical reason defines a distinctive standpoint of reflection. When agents
deliberate about action, they think about themselves and their situation in There is, however, a different way of understanding the contrast between
characteristic ways. What are some of the salient features of the practical practical and theoretical reason, stressing the parallels rather than the
point of view? differences between the two forms of reflection. According to this
interpretation, theoretical reflection too is concerned with a normative
A natural way to interpret this point of view is to contrast it with the
rather than a factual question, namely with the question of what one ought
standpoint of theoretical reason. The latter standpoint is occupied when we
to believe. It attempts to answer this normative question by assessing and
engage in reasoning that is directed at the resolution of questions that are
weighing reasons for belief, the considerations that speak for and against
in some sense theoretical rather than practical; but how are we to
the particular conclusions one might draw about the way the world is.
understand this opposition between the theoretical and the practical? One
Furthermore, it does this from a standpoint of first-personal reflection: the
possibility is to understand theoretical reflection as reasoning about
stance of theoretical reasoning in this sense is the committed stance of the
questions of explanation and prediction. Looking backward to events that
believer, not the stance of detached contemplation of one’s beliefs
have already taken place, it asks why they have occurred; looking forward,
themselves (Moran 2001). Seen in this way, the contrast between practical
it attempts to determine what is going to happen in the future. In these
and theoretical reason is essentially a contrast between two different
ways, theoretical reflection is concerned with matters of fact and their
systems of norms: those for the regulation of action on the one hand, and
explanation. Furthermore it treats these issues in impersonal terms that are
those for the regulation of belief on the other.
accessible (in principle) to anyone. Theoretical reasoning, understood
along these lines, finds paradigmatic expression in the natural and social Theoretical reason, interpreted along these lines, addresses the
sciences. considerations that recommend accepting particular claims as to what is or
is not the case. That is, it involves reflection with an eye to the truth of
Practical reason, by contrast, takes a distinctively normative question as its
propositions, and the reasons for belief in which it deals are considerations
starting point. It typically asks, of a set of alternatives for action none of
that speak in favor of such propositions’ being true, or worthy of
which has yet been performed, what one ought to do, or what it would be
acceptance. Practical reason, by contrast, is concerned not with the truth of
best to do. It is thus concerned not with matters of fact and their
propositions but with the desirability or value of actions. The reasons in
explanation, but with matters of value, of what it would be desirable to do.
which it deals are considerations that speak in favor of particular actions

2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 3

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

being good, or worthy of performance in some way. This difference in is possible, however, then we must grant that practical reason is not
subject matter corresponds to a further difference between the two forms automatically practical in its issue. A more accurate way to represent the
of reason, in respect of their consequences. Theoretical reflection about consequences of practical reason would be to say that deliberation about
what one ought to believe produces changes in one’s overall set of beliefs, action generates appropriate intentions insofar as an agent is rational
whereas practical reason gives rise to action; as noted above, it is practical (Korsgaard 1996a).
not only in its subject matter, but also in its issue.
Intentions and beliefs are not the only attitudes that are answerable to
Two observations should be made about this way of understanding reasons; emotions too have their reasons, understood as considerations by
practical reason. First, the contrast just drawn might suggest that there is a reference to which they can be justified or criticized. Thus it is appropriate
categorial difference in the consequences of theoretical and practical or fitting for someone who is in the presence of imminent danger to feel
reason, insofar as the former produces changes in our mental states, fear, and by the same token fear is inapt or irrational if it is felt about
whereas the latter gives rise to bodily movements. But it would be something that is not dangerous at all. Though emotions are responsive to
misleading to contrast the two kinds of rational capacity in these terms. reasons, however, we do not typically form or modify them through
Practical reasoning gives rise not to bodily movements per se, but to processes of reflection or deliberation. Reflective modification of our
intentional actions, and these are intelligible as such only to the extent beliefs and intentions, by contrast, is common, and commonly understood
they reflect our mental states. It would thus be more accurate to to involve an exercise of our capacities for theoretical and practical reason.
characterize the issue of both theoretical and practical reason as attitudes;
the difference is that theoretical reasoning leads to modifications of our Reasoning is an inferential process that takes as input some attitudes of a
beliefs, whereas practical reasoning leads to modifications of our subject, and yields as output the formation or modification of other
intentions (Harman 1986, Bratman 1987). attitudes. Inferential processes of this kind are involved in the
paradigmatic cases in which we exercise our capacities for both theoretical
Second, it is important to be clear that in neither case do the characteristic and practical reason. In the practical case, however, there is an interesting
modifications of attitude occur infallibly. There is room for irrationality question about how exactly to understand the new or modified attitudes
both in the theoretical and the practical domain, which in its strongest that are the outputs of our reasoning about what to do. On a broad
form involves a failure to form the attitudes that one acknowledges to be understanding of practical reasoning, it is an inferential process through
called for by the considerations one has reflected on. Thus a person might which new intentions are formed or old ones modified. According to this
end up reading a mystery novel for another hour, while at the same time view, we resolve through reasoning the question of what we are going to
judging that it would be better on the whole to go back to work on their do (Broome 2013, McHugh and Way 2016). A narrower understanding has
paper for the upcoming conference. Practical irrationality of this latter it that reasoning should be understood as an inferential process whereby
kind is known as akrasia, incontinence, or weakness of will, and its nature we modify our beliefs, including our normative beliefs about what we
and even possibility are traditional subjects of philosophical speculation in ought to do. On this interpretation, practical reasoning, strictly speaking, is
their own right. If we assume that this strong kind of practical irrationality an inferential process through which we adjust our beliefs about action,

4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 5

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

including our beliefs about what we have reason to do; but the adjustments respond if one is not irrational). With intentions however things seem
in our intentions that result from such reflection are not themselves crucially different in this respect (Smith 1987). The intention to go
conclusions of reasoning (Raz 2011, chap. 7). Agents who have resolved shopping on Wednesday, for instance, is not a state that would or should
the question of what they ought to do still have a question to settle, about be abandoned upon ascertaining or confirming that one has not (yet) gone
what they are going to do. But proponents of the narrower view would shopping on Wednesday; rather a person with such an intention will
note that this further question is not one that is to be resolved through ordinarily try to bring the world into alignment with the intention, by
reasoning: once one has figured out what one ought to do, there is no going shopping when Wednesday comes around. Intentions are in this way
practical reasoning left to be done. more like an architect’s blueprints than like sketches of an already-
completed structure (Anscombe 1957; compare Velleman 1989).
Proponents of both the broader and the narrower accounts of reasoning
should agree, however, that there are rational constraints on intentions. Reflection on this contrast between belief and intention has led some
The akratic agent, for instance, is a paradigm of irrationality, and this philosophers to ask whether practical reason might not be something of a
means that there is some kind of requirement to intend to do what one misnomer. The difficulty, in a nutshell, is to make sense of the suggestion
believes one ought to do (just as there are rational norms that are violated that a genuinely rational process could by itself generate states with the
when one is afraid of something that one knows to pose no real danger at peculiar function of intentions. Reason seems a capacity for cognitive
all). Our capacity for practical reason must involve some capacity to operations, whereas intentions are distinctively noncognitive states,
modify our intentions in accordance with this requirement, otherwise insofar as they do not aim to reflect independent facts of the matter about
practical reason will be practical only in its subject matter, but not in its the way things happen to be in the world.
issue.
Expressivism represents one line of response to this skeptical worry about
2. Naturalism and Normativity practical reason. Accounts of this kind offer interpretations of the
normative and evaluative language that distinctively figures in practical
The connection of practical reason with intentional action raises large reflection. As was seen in section 1, such reflection addresses an agent’s
questions about its credentials as a capacity for genuine reasoning. As reasons for acting in one way or another; conclusions about such reasons
noted above, intentional action is not mere bodily movement, but reflects a are characteristically couched in evaluative terms, as claims about what it
distinctive attitude of the agent’s, viz., intention. To be in this kind of would be good to do, or as normative conclusions about the actions that
mental state is to have settled on a plan which one seeks to realize through one ought to perform. According to the expressivist, however, evaluative
one’s action. Intention seems in this respect to be strikingly unlike belief. and normative claims of these kinds do not represent genuine cognitive
Propositional attitudes of the latter sort have a representational function; achievements, judgments that are literally capable of being true or false.
they aim to fit the way the world is, so that if one discovers that the world Rather they give expression to desires, sentiments, plans, and other pro-
is not how one previously took it to be, one will acknowledge pressure to attitudes, the sorts of goal-directed noncognitive state that move people to
modify one’s belief in the relevant dimension (pressure to which one will action. The expressivist contends that we can make sense of the capacity

6 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 7

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

of practical reason to generate states with the peculiar structure and of rationality that distinguish authentic cognitive discourse in the literal
function of intentions only if evaluative and normative assertions are sense; otherwise the contention that normative discourse is expressive
understood along these lines. rather than cognitive will lack any significant content. But the contrast
between theoretical and practical reflection required for this purpose
Expressivism in this form suggests a naturalistic interpretation of practical seems elusive. As we saw in section 1 above, theoretical reasoning
reason, one that may seem appropriate to the enlightened commitments of appears to be no less a normative enterprise than practical reasoning. It is
the modern scientific world view. It is naturalistic metaphysically, insofar plausibly understood to concern itself with reasons for belief, the evidence
as it makes no commitment to the objective existence in the world of such and other considerations that speak for and against particular conclusions
allegedly questionable entities as values, norms, or reasons for action. If about the way things are in the world. To the extent this is the case,
normative and evaluative claims do not represent genuine cognitive theoretical and practical reasoning would both seem equally problematic
achievements, then their legitimacy does not depend on our postulating a from the naturalistic perspective—assuming, that is, that it leaves no place
realm of normative or evaluative facts to which those claims must be for such normative considerations as reasons. But if naturalism calls into
capable of corresponding. It is also naturalistic psychologically, insofar as question the credentials of theoretical reason, it thereby undermines the
it yields explanations of intentional human behavior that are basically contrast between genuine reasoning and noncognitive forms of normative
continuous with explanations of the behavior of non-rational animals. In and evaluative discourse on which expressivists themselves rely.
both the human and the non-human case, behavior is understood as the
causal product of noncognitive attitudes, operating in conjunction with a A different ground for concern about expressionism has to do with the
creature’s factual representation of how things are in its environment. The distinction between normative judgment and intention. Expressivism
special sophistication of human agency may be traced to the fact that makes sense of the fact that practical reason is practical in its issue by
humans have much more sophisticated linguistic methods for giving voice collapsing this distinction altogether. Normative reflection can bring about
to their motivating noncognitive attitudes. Indeed, many contemporary adjustments in our intentions because it just is a set of operations on our
expressivists would contend that these expressive resources are intentions (or intention-like practical states). Compliance with what we
sufficiently powerful that we can explain by means of them the features of ordinarily think of as a rational requirement, to bring our intentions into
practical deliberation that initially give it the appearance of a genuine form alignment with our normative beliefs, is thus secured through a kind of
of reasoning (Blackburn 1998, Gibbard 1990, Gibbard 2003). conceptual fiat. The result is that there is no room, on this position, for the
paradigmatic form of irrationality in practice represented by akrasia,
Other philosophers remain unimpressed with this naturalistic approach to whereby agents fail to do what they themselves believe they ought to do.
practical reason. One ground for dissatisfaction with it is the following.
The expressivist strategy relies on an initial contrast between practical Many of those who reject expressivist accounts would endorse some
reflection on the one hand, and the genuine forms of cognitive activity variety of realism about the subject matter of practical reason. The basic
characteristic of theoretical reasoning on the other. There has to be some commitment of realism in this domain is the idea that there are facts of the
important sense in which practical discourse does not satisfy the standards matter about what we have reason to do that are prior to and independent

8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 9

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

of our deliberations, to which those deliberations are ultimately cf. Finlay 2009). According to this influential position, a given agent s can
answerable. Realists picture practical reason as a capacity for reflection have reason to do x only if x-ing would speak to or advance some element
about an objective body of normative truths regarding action (Skorupski in s’s ‘subjective motivational set’. There must be some rational
2010, Parfit 2011, Scanlon 2014). An alternative approach—different both connection between s’s x-ing and the subjective motivations to which s is
from realism and from the kind of expressivism sketched above—is actually already subject; otherwise the claim that s has reason to x must be
constructivism (Korsgaard 1997, Street 2008, Street 2010). This approach rejected, as false or incoherent. Behind this internalist position lies the
denies that practical reason is a capacity for reflection about an objective idea that practical reason is practical in its issue. Internalists contend that
domain of independent normative facts; but it equally rejects the we can make sense of the generation of new intentions through reasoning
expressivist’s naturalistic suspicion of normativity. According to the only if we assume that such reasoning is conditioned by motivational
constructivist, practical reason is governed by genuine normative resources that are already to hand. Practical reason, on the internalist
constraints, but what makes these constraints normative is precisely their account, is the capacity to work out the implications of the commitments
relation to the will of the agents whose decisions they govern. The contained in one’s existing subjective motivational set; the upshot is that
principles of practical reason are constitutive principles of rational agency, motivation is prior to practical reason, and constrains it.
binding on us insofar as we necessarily commit ourselves to complying
with them in willing anything at all. The realm of the normative, on this Externalists reject this picture, contending that one can have reasons for
approach, is not pictured as a body of truths or facts that are prior to and action that are independent of one’s prior motivations. They typically
independent of the will; rather, it is taken to be ‘constructed’ by agents agree that practical reasoning is capable of generating new motivations
through their own volitional activity. and actions. They agree, in other words, that if agent s has reason to do x,
it must be possible for s to acquire the motivation to x through reflection
3. Reasons and Motivation on the relevant reasons. But they deny that such reasoning must in any
significant way be constrained by s’s subjective motivations prior to the
The capacity of practical reason to give rise to intentional action divides episode of reasoning. On this approach, practical reason is not conceived
even those philosophers who agree in rejecting the expressivist strategy merely as a capacity for working out the implications of one’s existing
discussed above. Such philosophers are prepared to grant that there are desires and commitments; it equally involves the capacity to reason about
normative and evaluative facts and truths, and to accept the cognitive what it would objectively be good to do, and to act on the basis of this
credentials of discourse about this distinctive domain of facts and truths. kind of evaluative reflection. Normative reflection is thus taken to be
But they differ in their accounts of the truth conditions of the normative independent of one’s prior motivations, and capable of opening up new
and evaluative claims that figure in such discourse. We may distinguish motivational possibilities (Parfit 1997).
the following two approaches.
This disagreement is conventionally understood to be driven by diverging
The first of these, often referred to as internalism, holds that reasons for approaches to the explanation of intentional action. Internalists are
action must be grounded in an agent’s prior motivations (Williams 1981; impressed by the differences between intentions and the cognitive states

10 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 11

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

that figure in paradigmatic examples of theoretical reasoning. Pointing to 4. Instrumental and Structural Rationality
these differences, they ask how practical reason can succeed in producing
new intentions if it is not based in something of the same basic Among the substantive norms of practical reason, those of instrumental
psychological type: a motivation or desire that is already part of the rationality have seemed least controversial to philosophers. Instrumental
agent’s subjective motivational equipment. Many externalists find this rationality, in its most basic form, instructs agents to take those means that
contrast between intentions and cognitive states overdrawn. They observe are necessary in relation to their given ends. In the modern era, this form
that we need to postulate basic dispositions of normative responsiveness to of rationality has widely been viewed as the single unproblematic
account for the capacity of theoretical reflection about reasons to affect our requirement of practical reason. The instrumental principle makes no
beliefs, and question why these same dispositions cannot explain the fact assumptions about the prospects for rational scrutiny of peoples’ ends.
that practical reasoning is practical in its consequences. Cognitive or not, Rational criticism of this kind apparently presupposes that there are
intentions belong to the broad class of attitudes that are sensitive to objective reasons and values, providing standards for assessment of ends
judgments, and this may account for the capacity of practical reflection to that are independent from psychological facts about what people happen to
generate new intentions (Scanlon 1998, chap. 1). A third possibility is that be motivated to pursue. In line with the naturalistic attitude sketched in
intentions result from dispositions or capacities distinct from the psychic section 2, however, it may be doubted whether such independent standards
mechanisms that render theoretical rationality possible. Depending on how can be reconciled with the metaphysical commitments of contemporary
it is developed, this approach may offer a different way of accounting for scientific practice. A world that is shorn of objective values or norms
the practical consequences of practical reflection, without assuming that leaves no room for rational criticism of peoples’ ends, but only for
reasons for action are grounded in an agent’s subjective motivations Weberian Zweckrationalität: the rational determination of means to the
(Velleman 2000, chap. 8, Wallace 1999). realization of ends that are taken to be given, as a matter of human
psychological fact.
More recently, it has been maintained that the Humean approach has its
basis not in a philosophical account of motivation, but rather in our This line of thought can be traced back to the philosophy of David Hume,
understanding of what explains peoples’ reasons for action (Schroeder who famously asserted that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of
2007). There are cases in which features of a person’s psychology make an the passions’ (Hume 1978, 415). Those attracted to the Humean approach
obvious difference to what the person has reason to do. Some people like should bear in mind, however, that instrumental rationality is itself the
to dance, others detest this activity, and this difference in their “desires” expression of an objective normative commitment. The instrumental
appears to determine a corresponding difference in their reasons. Even in principle says that we are rationally required to take the means that are
cases of this kind, however, it is far from obvious that differences in the necessary to achieve our ends; if the principle represents a binding norm
agent’s “desires” are what ultimately explain their differing reasons of practical reason, then we are open to rational criticism to the extent we
(Scanlon 2014). Moreover, the fact that psychological factors might fail to exhibit this kind of instrumental consistency, regardless of whether
sometimes be relevant to the explanation of a person’s reasons does not we want to comply with the principle or not. If naturalism really entails
entail that they always have explanatory relevance. that there can be no objective norms or values, it may be wondered how an

12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 13

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

exception can possibly be made for the instrumental requirement. A more Rational requirements of this kind have recently become a subject of
consistently naturalistic position would be to reject even Zweckrationalität lively philosophical debate. The idea that there are structural requirements
in favor of a skeptical attitude towards practical reason in all its forms on our attitudes appears to be common ground among philosophers who
(Hampton 1998)—an attitude that may well correspond to the intentions of differ significantly in their views about the nature and scope of practical
the historical Hume (compare Dreier 1997, Millgram 1995). Further reason. It is accepted by most Humeans, for instance, who believe that
questions can be raised about the plausibility of the suggestion that the there is no scope for the rational criticism of individual ends, and also by
instrumental norm exhausts the requirements of practical reason. The Kantians, who think that the requirements of reason ultimately constrain
norm says that one should take the means that are necessary relative to us to choose in accordance with the moral law. From the perspective of
one’s psychologically-given ends. But how can the fact that a given means practical and theoretical deliberation, we commonly grant the force of
exhibits this kind of necessity give a person reason to choose the means, if these structural requirements, acknowledging a kind of rational pressure to
the end is not itself something it would be valuable to achieve in some bring our beliefs and intentions into compliance with the instrumental
way? The instrumental principle seems to function as a binding norm of principle and other standards of consistency and coherence.
practical reason only if it is taken for granted that there are additional,
independent standards for the assessment of our ends (Korsgaard 1997; Many philosophers take such structural requirements at face value,
Quinn 1993). granting that practical reason is rightly governed by and responsive to
these wide-scope demands. Indeed, it has influentially been argued that
Many proponents of the instrumental principle would agree that it does not standards of good reasoning, in both the practical and the theoretical
generate reasons for action. The fact that a given means is necessary, domain, derive exclusively from structural requirements of rationality of
relative to one’s given ends, is not a reason to take the means. The this kind (Broome 2013). But questions arise about this approach. For one
instrumental principle functions, rather, as a structural requirement on thing, reasoning has a kind of directionality that is hard to make sense of
one’s attitudes (Broome 1999, Broome 2004). Thus, suppose one intends solely in terms of the ideal of compliance with wide-scope requirements.
end E, and believes (truly) that E can be achieved only if one intends to do Thus it isn’t good reasoning to give up the intention to achieve end E
M. It appears that there are two ways in which one could revise one’s solely because one lacks the intention to take the necessary means M, even
attitudes in response to these considerations, compatibly with the though, as we have seen, revising one’s attitudes in this way brings about
instrumental principle: one could form the intention to M, or one could compliance with the wide-scope requirement.
abandon one’s original intention to E. The instrumental principle,
considered in itself, is indifferent as between these two possibilities; it How, more generally, should we understand the relation between structural
should be understood as a wide-scope requirement, governing requirements and our reasons for action and belief? One view, held in
combinations of attitudes, rather than a source of detachable normative common by Humeans and by some Kantian constructivists (see sec. 2
conclusions about what one has reason to do. (Modus ponens represents a above), is that reasons are fundamentally derivative from rational
similar rational requirement in the domain of theoretical reason, governing requirements. What one has reason to do, on this view, is what one would
combinations of beliefs.) desire or intend to do if one was fully rational (i.e. fully in compliance

14 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 15

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

with the wide-scope structural requirements that govern one’s attitudes in Practical reason, it might be suggested, is a holistic enterprise, properly
combination). concerned not merely with identifying means to the realization of
individual ends, but with the coordinated achievement of the totality of an
For those who do not share this reductionist view, however, the status of agent’s ends.
rational requirements becomes more puzzling. One might hold that
practical reason is ultimately answerable to two different kinds of Many philosophers take this holistic approach to be the most promising
constraints: to rational requirements on the one hand, and to independent way of thinking about the tasks of practical reason. It defines an important
facts about what one has reason to do on the other hand. But this position and difficult problem for practical reason to address, without departing
is potentially unstable. Once the independence of structural requirements from the metaphysically modest assumption that there is no court of
from normative reasons is made clear, it is no longer obvious why we appeal for the rational criticism of an agent’s ends that is independent of
should care about whether our attitudes do or do not comply with the those ends themselves. The holistic approach finds its most sophisticated
structural requirements. On this view, there is nothing wrong with failing and influential expression in the maximizing conception of practical
to take the necessary means to your end, unless the end itself is one that rationality. According to the maximizing conception, the fundamental task
you have compelling reason to pursue (Raz 2005). More generally, it has of practical reason is to determine which course of action would optimally
been argued that there are no independent requirements of structural advance the agent’s complete set of ends. Thus it is widely accepted that
rationality at all, and that the appearance of such requirements within the the rational action for a given agent to take is the one whose subjective
deliberative point of view can be explained by substantive features of the expected utility—reflecting both the utility of possible outcomes, from the
reasons to which both practical and theoretical reason are ultimately and agent’s point of view, and the agent’s beliefs about the probability of those
properly responsive (Kolodny 2005). outcomes—is the highest.

5. Maximizing Rationality The maximizing conception of practical rationality has been influentially
developed in decision theory and in the theory of rational choice (as
Humean proponents of structural approaches to practical reason have studied, for instance, in modern economics). These disciplines articulate
attempted to accommodate the rational criticism of individual ends, with mathematical precision the basic idea that practical rationality is a
without departing from the spirit of Zweckrationalität, by expanding their matter of consistency in action: people act rationally to the extent they do
view to encompass the totality of an agent’s ends. Thus, even if there are what is likely to bring about the best state of affairs, given both their
no reasons or values that are ultimately independent of an agent’s given preferences over the outcomes that may be brought about through their
ends, the possibility remains that we could criticize particular intrinsic agency and their beliefs about the probability of those outcomes.
desires by reference to others in an agent’s subjective motivational set. An Proponents of these theories sometimes claim for them the additional
agent’s desire for leisure, for instance, might be subordinated insofar as its advantage of empirical adequacy, arguing that they are flexible enough to
satisfaction would frustrate the realization of other goals that are accommodate the full range of behaviors that human agents engage in,
subjectively more important to the agent, such as professional success. both within the marketplace and outside of it. Especially if one operates

16 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 17

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

with the notion of ‘revealed preferences’—preferences, that is, that are Further questions arise about the plausibility of the normative requirement
ascribed to agents solely on the basis of actual behavior—then virtually to maximize expected utility. Doubts have been expressed, for instance, in
anything an agent might choose to do could be interpreted as an attempt to regard to the assumption that it is necessarily irrational to fail to select that
maximize expected utility. Decision theory, on the resulting interpretation action that would be optimal, relative to one’s preferences and beliefs.
of it, becomes an all-encompassing framework for understanding free Perfectly rational agents often appear to be content with states of affairs
human behavior, according to which all agents who act freely are striving that are ‘good enough’, from the perspective of their aims and desires,
to produce outcomes that would be optimal, relative to their current even when they know that alternatives are available that promise a higher
preferences and beliefs. return; they ‘satisfice’, rather than seeking to maximize the value of the
outcomes achievable through their actions (Slote 1989). They also treat
If decision theory is interpreted in this way, however, then its relevance to their past intentions and plans as defeasibly fixed constraints on
the understanding of practical reason may appear correspondingly tenuous deliberation, rather than attempting to maximize subjective utility anew in
(compare Pettit and Smith 1997). The maximization of subjective utility is every situation they confront (Bratman 1987). Finally, they can adopt
supposed to represent a normative ideal, one by appeal to which we can different attitudes toward risk, attaching greater importance to avoiding
assess critically the deliberations of agents. In this guise, the attraction of bad outcomes than to maximizing expected utility, as classically conceived
the maximizing model lies in the idea that there can be rational (Buchak 2013). Defenders of the maximizing model contend that it is
requirements on action, stemming from the totality of an agent’s flexible enough to accommodate alleged counterexamples of these kinds
preferences and beliefs, even if we do not assume that there are (Pettit 1984). If not, however, there may be grounds for doubting that it
independent, substantive standards for the critical assessment of individual represents a basic norm or practical reason.
ends. But this normative interpretation of maximizing rationality is tenable
only if it is at least conceivable that individual agents might sometimes fail A different issue about maximizing rationality concerns the set of desires
to satisfy its requirements—an‘ought’that it is not so much as possible to or aims that is taken as fixed for purposes of applying the requirement of
flout is not really an ‘ought’ at all (Lavin 2004). Thus the axioms of maximization. We may distinguish two basic approaches. The first and
decision theory include constraints on an agent’s overall preferences (such perhaps most common of these takes the subjective utility of alternative
as completeness and transitivity) that might be violated even by agents actions to be determined by the agent’s preferences at the time of
who are striving to satisfy their currently strongest desires. Such agents deliberation. According to this interpretation of the maximization model,
will be criticizable by the lights of decision theory insofar there is no we are rational to the extent we do that which best promotes the totality of
consistent utility function that can be ascribed to them on the basis of their our present aims. A second and quite different interpretation results if we
actual choices and behavior. The normative credentials of decision theory expand the set of desires that determine the subjective utilities of
rest, then, on the plausibility of the axioms that are taken to define an outcomes to include the totality of the agent’s preferences over time.
individual utility function—axioms that may not be quite as innocent or According to this model, rational agents aim to maximize the satisfaction
uncontroversial as they appear (compare Mandler 2001). of all of their anticipated desires, accepting frustration of present
preferences for the sake of greater satisfaction at later times. This

18 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 19

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

interpretation of the maximizing model gives expression to the common Some philosophers respond to the cases that invite desire-laundering by
idea that a certain prudential regard for one’s own future well-being is a distinguishing between subjective and objective dimensions of practical
requirement of practical reason (Nagel 1978, chaps 5–8). But if we take it reason. Our corrected desires, such philosophers maintain, are relevant to
to be a comprehensive account of rationality in action, the prudential determining what it would be objectively rational for us to do, or what we
interpretation can also appear to be an unstable compromise: if practical objectively have reason to do. But we are often not in a position to grasp
reason demands of us impartiality as between our present and future that our factual beliefs are false. When this is the case, we can hardly be
desires, should it not equally demand impartial consideration of the desires faulted for failing to do what we objectively have most reason to do. In
of other agents who may be affected by what we do? Why should we take situations of this kind, it may be subjectively rational for us to strive to
the distinction between persons to be significant for the theory of practical satisfy our actual desires, even if some of those desires would not survive
reason, once we have denied such significance to the distinction between correction of our mistaken but blameless factual beliefs.
different times in the life of a single agent (Parfit 1984; compare section 5
below)? 6. Consequentialism, Value, and Moral Reason
However we define the class of desires that is subject to the requirement of If maximizing rationality is not the unproblematic requirement of practical
maximization, we do not need to take those desires exactly as they are reason that it initially seemed to be, what are the alternatives to it? Let us
given. Many proponents of the maximizing approach suggest that an begin with the assumption that critical assessment of an agent’s individual
agent’s actual desires should be laundered somewhat before the demand to ends is off-limits. This apparent truism has been questioned by some
maximize is applied. For instance, if my desire for X is contingent on a philosophers, who point out that many of our basic aims in life are rather
false factual belief about the nature of X, then it is not obvious that inchoate; people want, for instance, to be successful in their careers, and
practical reason requires that the desire be taken into account in loyal to their friends, without being clear about what exactly these ends
determining what it is rational for me to do. A popular form of laundering require of them. To the extent one’s ends are indeterminate in this way,
would rule out desires of this kind, by subjecting to the requirement of they will not provide effective starting points for instrumental,
maximization only those desires that would survive if the agent were maximizing, or even satisficing reflection. We need to specify such ends
factually well-informed about the objects of desire and the circumstances more precisely before we can begin to think about which means they
of action, and deliberating in a calm and focused frame of mind. Indeed, require us to pursue, or to generate from them a rank-ordering of possible
once we are in the business of laundering desires we can go still further, outcomes. Here is a possible task for practical reason that does not fit
excluding from consideration desires that are substantively objectionable, neatly into the categories of instrumental or maximizing reflection,
even if they would survive the filter of corrected factual belief. To move however broadly construed (Kolnai 2001,Wiggins 1987, Richardson
into this territory, however, would clearly be to abandon the Humean 1994).
framework of the original maximizing approach, assuming resources for
the rational criticism of ends that are independent of the agent’s actual Practical deliberation about ends is not an easy or well-defined activity.
dispositions. There are no straightforward criteria for success in this kind of reflection,

20 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 21

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

and it is often unclear when it has been brought to a satisfactory consequentialist assumption that value attaches in the first instance to
conclusion. These considerations encourage the Humean assumption— states of affairs. Thus it may seem to distort our understanding of
especially widespread in the social sciences—that there is no reasoning friendship, for instance, to maintain that what friends value fundamentally
about final ends. On the other hand, how is one supposed to clarify one’s are states of affairs (involving, say, joint activities with the friend); what
largest and most important ends, if not by reasoning about them in some people value as friends are rather concrete particulars or relations, such as
way? Rather than exclude such reflection because it does not conform to a the persons with whom they are befriended or their relationships with
narrowly scientific paradigm of reason, perhaps we should expand our those persons. Building on this idea in the theory of value, it has been
conception of practical reason to make room for clarificatory reflection proposed that actions are rational insofar as they succeed in expressing the
about the ends of action. To do so would be to acknowledge that practical attitudes that it is rational to adopt toward the true bearers of intrinsic
reason has an essentially heuristic dimension, one that is connected to the value: people, animals, and things (Anderson 1993).
project of self-understanding. By working out the meaning and
implications of such antecedent commitments as loyalty or success, for A supposed advantage of this approach is its ability to explain the
instance, we also help to get clear the values that define who we really are rationality of behaviors that seem intuitively sensible, but that are hard to
(Taylor 1985). fit into the consequentialist scheme (such as commitments deriving from
one’s past involvement in an activity or project, which can look like an
Humean models of practical reason rest on a basically consequentialist irrational weighting of ‘sunk costs’ to the consequentialist; compare
account of the relation of action to value. According to this account, value Nozick 1993). But defenders of the consequentialist model contend that
inheres ultimately in states of affairs, insofar as it is these that are the we can account in terms of it for rational actions that appear to resist
objects of subjective preference rankings. Actions are then judged rational treatment in consequentialist terms. For instance, if friends have special,
to the extent they bring about states of affairs that are valuable in this way. ‘agent-relative’ reasons to attend to the interests of each other—and not
It is a matter of controversy, however, whether this is the most plausible merely reasons to promote the neutral value of friendship wherever it may
way of thinking about the rationality of action. Defenders of satisficing be instantiated—this can be expressed in consequentialist terms by
models, for example, think that a given action can be rational even when it introducing person-indexed value functions, which rank possible states of
is acknowledged by the agent that an alternative action would bring about affairs in terms of their desirability from the agent’s point of view (Sen
a more valuable state of affairs. Alternatively, it might be maintained that 2000).
we can judge an action rational without being able to arrive at any clear
independent ranking of the state of affairs produced by it, as better or Whether or not we accept a consequentialist framework, questions in the
worse than the alternatives. Perhaps our judgments of the value of actions theory of value would seem to be an important focus for practical
are ultimately parasitic on our convictions about the what there is reason reflection. Many philosophers are attracted to the idea that reasons for
to do or to admire; in that case, we will not be able to derive conclusions action are ultimately provided by the values that can be realized through
about reasons from antecedent premises in the theory of value (Scanlon action (Raz 1999). If this is right, and if we assume as well a realist or at
1998, chap. 2). Related questions have been raised about the basic least non-subjectivist conception of value, then a different way of thinking

22 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 23

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

about the task of practical reason comes into view. This may be thought of imposes constraints on the direct pursuit of individual utility, these
not primarily as a matter of maximizing the satisfaction of the agent’s constraints can be justified in the terms of ordinary economic rationality;
given ends, nor of specifying ends that are still inchoate, but rather as the the strategy of morally-constrained maximization is recommended on
task of mapping the landscape of value. This task in turn admits of a grounds of enlightened self-interest, and this in turn accounts for the
number of different interpretations. In the spirit of G. E. Moore, we might authority of moral considerations to govern the practical reflection of
understand the evaluative reflection relevant to deliberation in individuals (Gauthier 1986). Other philosophers have tried to make sense
consequentialist terms, as reflection about a non-natural property of of morality as a set of rational norms by assimilating it more directly to the
goodness that is instantiated by states of the world; but this is not a very maximizing conception. Consider utilitarianism and other consequentialist
popular approach today. An influential alternative to it, inspired by approaches to the normative structure of morality, which interpret moral
Aristotle, holds that the proper focus of practical reflection is the question rightness in terms of the value of the consequences (of actions, policies,
of what it would be to act well (Lawrence 1995, Foot 2001). According to institutions, or other objects of moral assessment). These theories derive at
this view, the values that are relevant to determining what an agent ought least some of their appeal from the fact that they apply to the moral
to do are those that are specifically connected to human agency, specifying domain the maximizing model of rationality that seems both familiar and
what it would be to be good (or at least non-defective) as a human agent appealing outside of moral contexts. Thus one way to argue for ethical
(Thompson 2008, Thomson 2008). Those attracted to pluralistic consequentialism is to observe that it is the theory that results when we
conceptions of the good take a more expansive view, suggesting that any combine the requirement of maximization with a distinctively moral
concrete dimension of value that might be affected by action falls within constraint of impartiality, applying the requirement to a set of preferences
the purview of practical deliberation (Raz 1999, Raz 2011). that includes those of all the persons (or other sentient creatures)
potentially affected by our actions (Harsanyi 1982).
Morality has provided an especially fertile source of examples and
problems for the theory of practical reason. A defining question of moral Opponents of this kind of ethical consequentialism stress the
philosophy is the question of the rational authority of moral norms: to discontinuities between moral and non-moral patterns of reasoning. They
what extent, and under what conditions, do people have compelling argue that morality is a source of demands (such as prohibitions on murder
reasons to comply with the demands of conventional morality? and deception) that cannot be represented accurately within the framework
(Alternatively: to what extent, and under what conditions, are people of maximizing rationality (for example, Scanlon 1998, chap. 5). If this is
rationally required to comply with those demands?) Reflection on this correct, then we will be able to make sense of moral requirements, as
question has produced some of the most significant and illuminating norms that appropriately govern the reflections of individual agents, only
philosophical work in the theory of practical reason. Two divergent if we expand our conception of the forms and possibilities of practical
tendencies within this body of work can be singled out. Some accounts of reason.
moral reasoning proceed by relating it to patterns of reflection appropriate
to other, non-moral domains, particularly the maximizing patterns There are two connected features of moral norms that seem particularly
canvassed in the section 5. Thus it has been argued that, though morality significant in this connection. First, they are intuitively understood to

24 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 25

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

represent agent-relative reasons for action (Nagel 1978). Thus, if I have agent-centered obligations. They have in common, however, a
promised that I will take you to the airport tomorrow afternoon, this commitment to the idea that reflection on the nature of morality can bring
consideration has a significance for me that it does not necessarily have for to light structures of practical reason that would not otherwise be salient.
other agents. In particular, the importance to me of keeping my promise
seems to be independent from the impersonal end of promissory fidelity. Bibliography
This shows itself in the fact that my reason to keep the promise I have
made would be unaffected if I found myself in a scenario in which Anderson, E., 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, Mass.:
breaking my promise would lead five other agents to keep promises they Harvard University Press.
would otherwise have flouted. Second, these agent-relative considerations Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
have a distinctive function within practical deliberation. They are not Blackburn, S., 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
merely considerations that speak in favor of the actions they recommend, Bratman, M., 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge,
but operate rather as practical requirements that presumptively constrain Mass.: Harvard University Press.
the agent’s activities. The fact that I have promised to take you to the Broome, J., 1999, ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio 12: 398–419.
airport tomorrow, for instance, is ordinarily a decisive basis for concluding –––, 2004, ‘Reasons’, in Reason and Value, R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, M.
that that is to be done. I do not need to weigh this consideration against Smith, and S. Scheffler (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
other values that might be pursued under the circumstances; rather, the –––, 2013, Rationality through Reasoning, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
promissory commitment enters the deliberative field from the start in the Buchak, L., 2013, Risk and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
deontic guise of an obligation. Darwall, S., 2009, The Second-Person Standpoint, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
There are divergent approaches that have been taken within ethical theory Dreier, J., 1997, ‘Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of
for making sense of these salient features of moral reason. Kantians for Morality’, in Ethics and Practical Reason, G. Cullity and B. Gaut
instance, take rational agents to impose the moral law on themselves when (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
they act, where the law in question functions as a limiting condition on Finlay, S., 2009, ‘The Obscurity of Internal Reasons’, Philosophers’
their pursuit of their ends (Korsgaard 1996b, O’Neill 1989). Proponents of Imprint 9:
virtue theory take it that compliance with some agent-centered Foot, P., 2001, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
requirements is partly constitutive of being a good human being (Foot Gauthier, D., 1986, Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2001). A still different class of approaches understands moral norms in Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, Mass.:
essentially interpersonal terms: either as demands that are imposed by Harvard University Press.
agents on each other (Darwall 2009), or as relational requirements that –––, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
define what we owe to each other, and that make possible relations of Press.
mutual recognition or regard (Scanlon 1998, Wallace 2019). These are Hampton, J., 1998, The Authority of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge
very disparate ways of conceptualizing morality as a sui genesis domain of

26 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 27

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

University Press. University Press.

Harman, G., 1986, Change in View, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Nagel, T., 1978, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton
Harsanyi, J. C., 1982, ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior’, in University Press.
Utilitarianism and Beyond, A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Nozick, R., 1993, The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. University Press.
Hume, D., 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition, L. A. Selby- O’Neill, O., 1989, ‘Consistency in Action’, in her Constructions of
Bigge and P. H. Niditch (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kolnai, A., 2001, ‘Deliberation is of Ends’, in Varieties of Practical Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reasoning, E. Millgram (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. –––, 1997, ‘Reasons and Motivation’, The Aristotelian Society
Kolodny, N., 2005, ‘Why be Rational?’, Mind 114: 509–63. (Supplementary Volume), 77: 99–130.
Korsgaard, C., 1996a, ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, in her –––, 2011, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pettit P., 1984, ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’, The Aristotelian Society
Press. (Supplementary Volume): 58: 165–76.
–––, 1996b, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge Pettit P. and M. Smith, 1997, ‘Parfit’s P’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.),
University Press. Oxford: Blackwell.
–––, 1997, ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, in Ethics and Quinn, W., 1993, ‘Putting Rationality in its Place’, in his Morality and
Practical Reason, G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Press. Raz, J., 1999, Engaging Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lavin, D., 2004, ‘Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error’, Ethics, –––, 2005, ‘The Myth of Instrumental Reason’, Journal of Ethics and
114: 424–57. Social Philosophy, 1 (1) [available online].
Lawrence, G., 1995, ‘The Rationality of Morality’, in Virtues and –––, 2011, From Normativity to Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University
Reasons, R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (eds.), Oxford: Press.
Clarendon Press. Richardson, H. S., 1994, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends,
McHugh, C, and Way, J., 2018, ‘What is Good Reasoning?’, Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
and Phenomenological Research, 96: 153–74. Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.:
Mandler, M., 2001, ‘A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Harvard University Press.
Implies Completeness or Transitivity but not Both’, in Varieties of –––, 2014, Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University
Practical Reasoning, E. Millgram (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Press. Schroeder, M., 2007, Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University
Millgram, E., 1995, ‘Was Hume a Humean?’, Hume Studies, 21: 75–93. Press.
Moran, R., 2001, Authority and Estrangement, Princeton: Princeton Sen, A., 2000, ‘Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason’, Journal

28 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 29

 Practical Reason R. Jay Wallace

of Philosophy, 97: 477–502. Project (InPhO).

Skorupski, J., 2010, The Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links
Press. to its database.
Slote, M., 1989, Beyond Optimizing, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press. Other Internet Resources
Smith, M., 1987, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, Mind, 96: 36–61.
[Please contact the author with suggestions.]
Street, S., 2008, ‘Constructivism about Reasons’, Oxford Studies in
Metaethics, 3: 207–45.
–––, 2010, ‘What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?’,
Related Entries
Philosophy Compass, 5: 363–84.
agency | cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, moral | consequentialism |
Taylor, C., 1985. ‘What is Human Agency’, in his Human Agency and
decision theory: causal | morality: and practical reason | moral
Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
particularism | reasoning: moral | reasons for action: agent-neutral vs.
Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
agent-relative
University Press.
Thomson, J. J., 2008, Normativity, Chicago: Open Court. Copyright © 2020 by the author
Velleman, J. D., 2000, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: R. Jay Wallace
Clarendon Press.
–––, 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wallace, R. J., 1999, ‘Three Conceptions of Rational Agency’, Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice, 2: 217–42.
–––, 2019, The Moral Nexus, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wiggins, D., 1987, ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’, in his Needs,
Values, Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.
Williams, B., 1981, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in his Moral Luck,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Academic Tools
How to cite this entry.
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP
Society.
Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology

30 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2020 Edition 31