Mindanao State University-Main Campus

College of Law
Marawi City

CASE BRIEF:
BELGICA v. OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

Submitted to:
Atty. Jeanan Ashya M. Gubat, CPA
Legal Writing 3M Professor

Submitted by:
Panontongan, Princess Sittie Norpayda P.

December 6, 2022
 BELGICA v. OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

PERLAS–BERNABE, J.:

Procedural History:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. To recount, the
relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:

Petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice

Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M.
Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr. from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever
name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. The
Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

Then, Petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al. filed an Urgent Petition
For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System,"
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void
for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue
a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad)
and Rosalia V. De Leon for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who
have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013” and (b) "the use of
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR from 2003 to 2013”. Belgica
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.

Lastly, Petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition seeking

that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued

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restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development
Councils in consultation with the executive departments. The Nepomuceno Petition was
docketed as UDK-14951.

Statement of Facts:
In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump–sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, as will be later discussed,
its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines goes by many names through the years. In
1922-1972, the earliest form of it was the Public Works Act of 1922. During Martial law,
the General Appropriation Act (GAA) introduced the “Support for Local Development
Projects” under the article on “National Aid to Local Government Units”. After the EDSA
People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
“Congressional Pork Barrel” was revived in the form of the “Mindanao Development
Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund”, and later prompted the creation of the
“Countrywide Development Fund”. In 1999, the CDF was removed in the GAA and
replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the “Food Security Program Fund,”
the “Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,” and the “Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund,” all of which contained a special provision requiring “prior
consultation” with the Members of Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 2000 that the “Priority Development Assistance Fund” (PDAF)
appeared in the GAA. Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with
respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. There are
also Presidential Pork Barrel funds such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that
“the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six (6) whistle–blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing
for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.

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 The whistle–blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles’ private
accounts. Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery,
and Violation of the Anti–Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the
Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking
that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or
in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance
purposes, of the Court’s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions
be dismissed for lack of merit. On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of
even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment. Petitioners, with the exception
of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the
Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of
seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

Issues:
 Procedural Issues
o Whether or not:
a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy;
b) he issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not
subject to judicial review;
c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and
d) the Court’s Decision Philconsa Case and another Decision entitled
“Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management” (LAMP) bar the re– litigation of the issue of constitutionality
of the “Pork Barrel System” under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis.

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  Substantive Issues
o Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate
the principles of/constitutional provisions on:
a) separation of powers;
b) non–delegability of legislative power;
c) checks and balances;
d) accountability;
e) political dynasties; and
f) local autonomy
o Whether or not the phrases:
a) "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the
Malampaya Funds,
b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power
Answers:
Procedural Issues
a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The applicability of
the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia,
the principles of separation of powers, non–delegability of legislative power,
checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

b) The Court must deny respondents’ submission. It is a Judicial review and not
matters of policy. Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not
present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve.

c) Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the
Philippines.

d) The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez because
the Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,

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 specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority
to Members of Congress. The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
vs. Secretary of Budget and Management does not also bar judgment on the
present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and hence
no controlling doctrine was rendered.

Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

a) The Court rules in favor of petitioners in addressing the violation on separation of
power. Legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether
through formal measures written into the law or informal practices
institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be
deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

b) In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post–enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates
the principle of non–delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa –
is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

c) The Court agrees with petitioners that there is a violation on principle of Check
and balances. The legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of
the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. The system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which
may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. He,
willingly or unwillingly, had to approve the first option.

d) The Court agrees in part regarding the Public Accountability. The concept of
post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government, because it renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office. The Court, however, cannot
completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual

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 legislator ‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office.

e) In any event, the Court finds the submits that the Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, on this score to be largely speculative since it
has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able
to propagate political dynasties.

f) The Court agrees with petitioners. In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that
the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.

Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

a) The Court disagrees that the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and
specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury.

b) The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions that Section 8 of PD 910

constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be
used."

Reasonings:
Procedural Issues

a) By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.”

According to COA, the exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government. Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the

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 existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court
deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient. The case is not moot
as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have
constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.

b) A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.

c) Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-
taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of
the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing
to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes
they pay have been and continue to be utilized.

As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public
funds. As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

d) It is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation

of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present
cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the
CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork
Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release
and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses

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 herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing
reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In
fine, stare decisis would not apply.

Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

a) The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of
the three fundamental powers of government. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power
to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

The Court declared the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators
have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be
deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such
informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed
throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.

b) Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all

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 other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

c) In these cases, petitioners claim that in the current system where the PDAF is a
lump–sum appropriation, the legislator’s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on.
Accordingly, they submit that the “item veto power of the President mandates
that appropriations bills adopt line–item budgeting” and that “Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting [which] effectively renders the constitutionally–given
power of the President useless.”

d) The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of
the appropriation law. It must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally

appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project

implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

e) Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this
respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable

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 constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive
action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
from ruling on this issue.

f) This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already
legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction
of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts
within its territorial jurisdiction." Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy
caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put
by petitioners in the following wise.

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council
and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution.
Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts
of the government."

Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

a) "An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a
determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a
particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and
purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means
"to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned
from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.

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 There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by
past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as
by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may
be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization
may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in
special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees.

b) Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the

Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second
indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority
to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in infrastructure
development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure"
is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the
underlying framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such
as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support
commerce as well as economic and residential development." In fine, the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken
down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under
Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard
of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Holdings:
The petitions are partly granted.

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