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Contents
Afghanistan
 China’s Position Paper on Afghanistan ..................................................................................... 7
 Will Asia Pick up the Pieces in Afghanistan? ........................................................................... 8
 The Avoidable 20-Year Disaster................................................................................................ 10
 Afghanistan: A delicate balancing act ...................................................................................... 12

Book Reviews
 Politics of Federalism in Pakistan ............................................................................................. 14
 The Anthropocene Reviewed .................................................................................................... 16
 Jinnah: A Life ............................................................................................................................... 17

China Affairs
 Modernization in China ............................................................................................................. 21
 Beijing Committed To Opening Up Its Economy In 2023 ..................................................... 22
 China is Coming out of the Shadows to Defend its Oil Interests ......................................... 24

Climate Change
 Fake Climate Solutions ............................................................................................................... 27
 Climate Change, Rising Temperatures and Our Health ....................................................... 28
 Environmental Care.................................................................................................................... 29

Covid-19
 The Pandemic Emergency is Over. COVID-19 Isn’t .............................................................. 33
 Preparing for the Next Pandemic ............................................................................................. 34

CPEC and OBOR

 CPEC and Western Propaganda of Debt Trap........................................................................ 38
 Potential and Challenges Of CPEC .......................................................................................... 40
 CPEC 10 Years ............................................................................................................................. 41
 China’s Manifestation of “Geo-economics” & BRI ................................................................ 43

Domestic Politics
 Exec-Legislature Assault on the Judiciary .............................................................................. 45
 Utilising NFC Efficiently ............................................................................................................ 48
 Democracy and Gender Disparity ............................................................................................ 49
 Pakistan’s Politics of Power ....................................................................................................... 51
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 Squandered Opportunity ........................................................................................................... 56

 The Looming Crisis in Pakistan ................................................................................................ 58

Economy
 Streamlining SOE Privatization ................................................................................................ 60
 IMF projections for 2023-24 ....................................................................................................... 62
 Tackling Inflation with Wrong Instrument ............................................................................. 64
 Navigating the Choppy Waters ................................................................................................ 67
 Pakistan and the World Debt Problem .................................................................................... 69

Education
 Low Employability of Graduates.............................................................................................. 72
 Quality Education in Pakistan .................................................................................................. 74
 Education and Foreign Aid in Pakistan ................................................................................... 75

Energy Crisis
 An Emerging Challenge ............................................................................................................. 78
 Will Devolution fix the Energy Crisis? .................................................................................... 79
 Energy Production Priorities in the Era Of Climate Change ................................................ 81

Essays
 Dangers of AI Concentration..................................................................................................... 83
 The Age of Energy Insecurity .................................................................................................... 86

Foreign Policy and Relations

 Troubled Ties ............................................................................................................................... 95
 Energizing the Indus Waters Treaty ........................................................................................ 97
 Are Pakistan-India Relations Doomed Forever? .................................................................... 99
 Pakistan-UAE Relations ........................................................................................................... 103
 Fencing the Pak-Afghan Border .............................................................................................. 104
 Keeping in Step with a Changing World ............................................................................... 105

Governance
 Building Human Capital .......................................................................................................... 108
 Why Our Graduates are Mass Migrating .............................................................................. 110
 Shaping Humanitarian and Ethical Governance in Pakistan ............................................. 111

History
 First Resolution ......................................................................................................................... 114
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 The Partition of India................................................................................................................ 115

 The Birth of the Pakistan Army .............................................................................................. 120

International Issues
 A Prolonged Global Recession ................................................................................................ 124
 Europe’s Geopolitical Necessity ............................................................................................. 125
 The Debt-Climate Nexus .......................................................................................................... 128
 A World of Unwelcome Replays ............................................................................................ 130
 Artificial Intelligence ............................................................................................................... 131
 Europe’s China Policy In Disarray ......................................................................................... 133
 Great-Power Competition........................................................................................................ 135
 Sino-US Conflict over Taiwan ................................................................................................. 140
 How Dollar Became the World’s Top Global Currency ...................................................... 141
 Asian Century, Coronavirus, and the Game of Thrones ..................................................... 145

International Law
 Promoting Climate Justice through International Law ....................................................... 148
 Sudan and the Laws of War .................................................................................................... 151
 The Limits of International Justice.......................................................................................... 159

International Relations
 When Civilizational Models Collide ...................................................................................... 161
 Is Neoliberalism Promoting Neofascism? ............................................................................. 163
 The Rise of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ ................................................................................................... 164

Interviews
 Faisal Niaz Tirmizi .................................................................................................................... 167
 Jane Connors .............................................................................................................................. 169

Kashmir
 The G20 TWG meeting in Kashmir ........................................................................................ 171
 Debunking Kashmir Myths ..................................................................................................... 172
 A Strategic Competition ........................................................................................................... 173

Law
 Legislative Limitations ............................................................................................................. 175
 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act ...................................................................................... 178
 Constitutionalism ...................................................................................................................... 179
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 A Stand for Freedom of Expression ...................................................................................... 181

Middle East
 What the Saudi-Iran Deal Means for Geopolitics ................................................................. 183
 China Defuses Middle East Powder Keg............................................................................... 188
 Saudi Iranian Détente Potentially Sparks Paradigm Shifts ................................................. 191
 Will Israeli-Palestinian Violence Spin Out of Control? ....................................................... 193
 Honesty Can Advance the Middle East Peace Process........................................................ 195

National
 A Case for Strategic Privatization ........................................................................................... 198
 Blending for Food Security ...................................................................................................... 200
 The Importance of Rule of Law............................................................................................... 201
 Pakistan’s First-ever Digital Census ....................................................................................... 203
 IMF Bailouts ............................................................................................................................... 205
 Investing in Women ................................................................................................................. 206
 How to Empower Women ....................................................................................................... 207
 Transboundary Water Cooperation ....................................................................................... 209
 Peace and Stability in Pakistan................................................................................................ 210
 Pakistan Needs An Intellectual Revolution .......................................................................... 212

Organizations
 Shanghai Spirit .......................................................................................................................... 214
 The World Trade Crisis ............................................................................................................ 215

Population
 Population and Environment .................................................................................................. 219
 Population and Climate ........................................................................................................... 220

Religion
 The Islamic Way Forward........................................................................................................ 223
 Rising Islamophobia ................................................................................................................ 224
 Treaty of Hudaibiyah ............................................................................................................... 226
 Mosques as Emergency Response Centres ............................................................................ 229

South Asia
 Regional Economic Transformation and Pakistan ............................................................... 232
 Combating the Rohingya Refugee Crisis............................................................................... 233
 Modi’s Final Assault on India’s Press Freedom Has Begun ............................................... 235
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 Addressing the Regional Security Risks of Rohingya Camps ............................................ 236

Terrorism
 Pakistan’s Resurgence of Terrorism During Election Year ................................................. 239
 Terrorism and Extremism ........................................................................................................ 241
 Growing Challenges of Terrorism .......................................................................................... 244

Ukraine Crisis
 Beyond Ukraine’s Offensive .................................................................................................... 246
 Why the Conflict over Ukraine will be a Long One ............................................................. 251
 The Ukraine War and European Identity .............................................................................. 252
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Afghanistan
CHINA’S POSITION PAPER ON AFGHANISTAN
Shakeel Ahmad Ramay
If anyone wants to understand Chinese philosophy of peace-building, China’s position
paper on Afghanistan is an excellent document to read and analyze. It helps comprehend the
philosophy behind the Global Security Initiative, which was presented by President Xi Jinping last
year. Whole paper revolves around the importance of dialogue and development by sticking to
principle of non-interference.
The position paper asks the world to join hands to assist Afghanistan avert humanitarian crisis
and engage with it for meaningful dialogue to bring back peace in Afghanistan, region and beyond.
Analysis of the position paper highlights key five messages. First, it gives importance to non-
interference in the internal matters of Afghanistan. It urges all the parties to respect sovereignty and
independent choices of Afghanistan governance. Second, the paper does not waste time on blame
game, rather focused on finding the solutions. Third, it keeps human at the centre of all proposed
actions. Fourth, it emphasises simultaneous deployment of dialogue and development actions. Fifth,
it reiterates the importance of coordination to tackle issues of terrorism, extremism and
development.
It is an excellent proposal to bring back peace and development in Afghanistan. However,
China needs to work at two levels – bilateral and multilateral – to cultivate an environment
conducive to development. On the bilateral level, economy and youths should be top priority.
Economic cooperation will help Afghanistan materialise the dream of peaceful and prosper
Afghanistan.
For that purpose, China should focus on creation of economic and livelihood opportunities.
To achieve this goal, China and Pakistan can join hands to extend CPEC to Afghanistan. It would be
good starting point, which will turn Afghanistan into a hub of regional connectivity. It is also one of
key objectives of position paper.
As stated, China welcomes Afghanistan’s participation in Belt and Road cooperation and
supports its integration into regional economic cooperation and connectivity. That will transform
Afghanistan from a land-locked country to a land-linked country. China reiterated same
commitment in Samarkand.
Second, there should be specialised programmes for the youths. It is extremely important, as
youths have the potential to spearhead construction or destruction of a nation. They have energy to
overcome all challenges to pave the way for their destiny and future of their country.
Thus, China should launch programmes on 1) education and 2) skill development for the
youths. China can establish sub-campus of skill development institutions in Afghanistan. Although,
Afghanistan needs these institutions, rural areas there need the more. Xinjiang education centres can
also play a role in building skills. China and Pakistan can join hands to pilot the programme in
refugee camps in Pakistan as it is home to millions of Afghan refugees.
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The successful execution of programme will help refugees go back and play a constructive
role. Skilled people will further train youths in Afghanistan which will pave the way for inclusion of
Afghanistan in BRI. It will also create huge respect for China among the youths.
Education should be selected as long-term programme. For that purpose, China can start a
programme like 1000 school programme of Iraq.
For higher education, China can help Afghan universities moderniwse and create quality
human capital. Investment in education will help China cultivate a friendly generation. Moreover, it
will help dispel negative propaganda against it on sustainable basis. Besides, there is also a need to
build life skills of Afghan youth.
To achieve the objective, China and Pakistan should join hands to build a tri-lateral forum for
imparting life skill trainings. Inclusion of Pakistan will be helpful, as hundreds of thousands of
young Afghans have been educated in Pakistan. It will empower youths and create a cadre of future
leaders which understand importance of each other. They will also be torchbearer of regional
connectivity.
However, China will have to avoid contracting NGOs for the skill development programmes.
It has been observed that NGOs consume major chunk of resources in the name of administrative
cost. They are also more concerned about their marketing. Thus, it is suggested China should
directly engage with government institutes.
Private sector (business and industry) should be engaged on the following conditions. First, it
must share resources and contribute financially. They should be doing it as part of CSR and must
not make it business opportunity. Second, there should be contracts with companies for the
placement of trained participants. It should be obligatory for them to hire certain number of trained
individuals. Third, private sector should be engaged in groups. It will enhance efficiency of the
programme and create job opportunities for the participants.
On the multilateral level, China should work to mobilise resources to help Afghanistan fight
back extremism, separation and terrorism. For that purpose, it is suggested SCO contact group
should be upgraded to Afghanistan Assistance Centre. Resources should be given to it to build
capacity of Afghanistan. There should be specialised programmes for military, police, security
agencies, legal department and civil bureaucracy on counter-terrorism, control of organised crimes,
drugs etc. All the member countries of SCO should contribute to make the programmes successful.
In conclusion, no political strings should be attached with these interventions. Let the people
of Afghanistan decide their future. It will help China cultivate status of dignified friend not master.
(Source: The News)

WILL ASIA PICK UP THE PIECES IN AFGHANISTAN?

James Durso (Former official of the U.S. Navy for 20 years)
The U.S. and NATO hastily evacuated Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, ending the two-
decade, $2 trillion-dollar effort to turn Afghanistan into Denmark with mountains or, more
truthfully, to reform Pashtun culture to Western standards.
The “mission transition” AKA “retreat” left Afghanistan without the hardware mod cons that,
with the software – an enlightened Afghans populace – would ensure the country would no longer
be a terrorist safe haven, and would become a well-governed, capitalist democracy, a demonstration
to the world of America’s hard and soft power.
Since the retreat, the U.S. froze $9.5 billion in Afghanistan’s central bank reserves,
sanctioned the Taliban government for its treatment of women and girls, and imposed visa
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restrictions on individual Taliban leaders. All well and good, but Washington’s actions aren’t
doing anything to ameliorate the regional dislocation caused by the failed military campaign and
nation-building project.
On 7 March, Russia and six Asian nations bordering Afghanistan (China, Iran, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan to plan what would be
required to bring peace to the war-torn nation, and called for the lifting of the freeze on Afghan
central bank assets. On the same day, France hosted a meeting of Western countries on the Taliban
and the Afghanistan situation; curiously, none of Afghanistan’s neighbors were invited.
August 2021 was the third time U.S. hightailed it out of Afghanistan. The first time was in
1991 when it cut off aid to the Mujahideen as the Cold War ended. Then, in 2003 Washington
turned its focus to Baghdad and lost momentum in Afghanistan as it redeployed troops to invade
Iraq. The pivot to Iraq prefigured Afghanistan’s fate and set the stage for the 2021 retreat, which
just made it official.
Washington still wants to influence events inside Afghanistan and eventually oust the Taliban
government, but it can only apply force selectively (via drone strikes) and must fall back on its all-
purpose tool, economic sanctions, hoping to force policy changes by the Taliban leaders, men who
believe constancy of purpose defeated NATO and who aren’t inclined to flex, no matter how many
Afghans suffer. The Taliban also know that Washington’s bandwidth is limited as it fights a war
with Russia in Ukraine, prepares to fight a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, deals with a weak
economy, and ponders what to do about Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities.
Influencing Afghanistan is a U.S. preference, but a local necessity because the seven
conferees that met in Tashkent know they are “neighbors forever” and must move into the
vacuum created by the U.S. departure to ensure the region makes economic and social progress.
And they need to move quickly to address the deteriorating security situation in Northern
Afghanistan because, as Bruce Pannier points out, “The Taliban are losing control in northern
Afghanistan to the Islamic State” which, in the last week, claimed responsibility for bombing a
cultural center run by the minority Shia Hazaras, and for killing the Taliban governor of
Afghanistan’s Balkh province, which borders Uzbekistan.
The Taliban assured the Central Asian countries Afghan territory would not be used to stage
attacks against them but, in April 2022, IS claimed to have launched a rocket attack on an air base in
Uzbekistan, though it was dismissed by Uzbek authorities as “untrue.” Regardless, the neighbors
feel they need to act now to stabilize the region, but their options are limited to political recognition,
and economic and development efforts as they won’t deploy police or troops outside their borders.
The U.S. Institute of Peace reports the Taliban’s diplomats have been undermined by
hardliners close to the leader, Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada, and that “the crisis of diplomacy in
the Taliban is born of the leadership’s loss of confidence in formal dialogue as an effective political
tool following the failure of the intra-Afghan negotiations and key dialogue channels post-takeover
in August 2021.”
Engaging with the Taliban to stabilize the area will require trust-building best pursued by
neighbors as the U.S. and Europe won’t engage in diplomacy until they successfully conclude the
NATO-Russia war in Ukraine and feel they have the wind at their backs, and the leaders in Kabul
change their policies as the price of entering a diplomatic dialogue with the West.
There are advantages of having the neighbors take up the initial steps of pursing peace in the
region.
First, unlike the U.S. and NATO, they have to live with the consequences of their actions.
Next, they can deliver messages the U.S. can’t because the Taliban will be thinking “We won” while
a U.S. envoy is demanding they do this or that, which will blind Taliban to occasions for
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negotiation. Likewise, U.S. shame and anger over its defeat may blind it to opportunities for deal
making. Both sides are “too close to the problem” so a clear-eyed third party is needed to help guide
Afghanistan to success. Last, the lack of supersized resources (like that $2 Trillion) will force a focus
on the practical rather than the fantastical.
There is a role for the U.S. in this project, and it can help by waiving sanctions when
appropriate, and by not blocking funding by the international financial institutions, such as the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). If the U.S. is uncooperative, Afghanistan’s
neighbors may have to sidestep it by seeking funds from the Gulf Cooperation Council members,
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). In fact, the IDB
may be the best vehicle to engage the Taliban on the status of women and girls as its policy is to
“help achieve gender parity in accordance with the tenants of Islam” and it has more standing than
the U.S., NATO, or the European Union. (Also, the Asians may be able to discreetly promote
“moderate” Taliban; the U.S. can’t as it will put a target (literally) on a candidate’s back.)
The Asians can also recruit experts from Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Iran, India, and Pakistan to help execute projects in Afghanistan. However, if India has
a role, the group will have to work to keep Islamabad from hijacking the forum to use against India,
and Pakistan may insist it address problems caused by the Pakistani Taliban as the country faces “a
perfect storm” of troubles, according to its foreign minister
The group’s future tasks are: 1. Organizing the appropriate forum and considering additional
members, if appropriate.; 2. Setting expectations. This will be important as the “big brothers”: China,
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey may have outsized expectations of their role and influence.; 3. Executing
tasks. Who will monitor tasks and ensure completion? An existing body, such as the ADB or a new,
ad-hoc group?
No progress on the Afghanistan file may suit U.S. and European leaders as they are
preoccupied in Ukraine, and believe “The worse, the better” will suit their interests in Afghanistan.
But “time is money” and Asia loses out the longer Afghanistan is offline as it doesn’t have the
luxury of waiting out the Taliban, though Washington and Brussels may dream that can happen.
If the U.S. is sincere in its support for regional connectivity and all that “women and girls”
stuff isn’t just talk to browbeat the Taliban, it should publicly back the Asian initiative and declare it
will be a positive force for regional connectivity via Afghanistan, but the question is: Will the
Americans be magnanimous in defeat?
(Source: Eurasia Review)

THE AVOIDABLE 20-YEAR DISASTER

Daniel Davis (Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army)
The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a report on
Monday that laid bare many of the reasons for the spectacular collapse in August 2021 of America’s
20-year war in Afghanistan. The 148-page report provides exhaustive evidence of the many and
compounding reasons for our failure, but the one cause that was not mentioned may have been the
most critical: a whole-of-government arrogance in Washington.
It is crucial to understand that the debacle of August 2021, when the Afghan government and
military dissolved before the Taliban’s advance — and our two-decade war of frustration crashed
into inglorious failure — was not merely the result of U.S. President Joe Biden bungling the
withdrawal. Our disaster started within months of the war’s onset and persisted all the way to the
final exit.
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The new SIGAR report, signed by Inspector General John Sopko, continues the exceptional
analysis and reporting of ground truth in Afghanistan that SIGAR began with their first report in
October 2008. In that report, SIGAR’s first Inspector General, Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields, ominously
warned that “the task of reconstruction in Afghanistan is an exceedingly difficult and complex
issue.” That message, which if anything was an understatement, appears to have been vastly
misjudged by every administration from George W. Bush through to Biden.
There are few who argue with Bush’s original decision to use military power in October 2001,
as the Taliban had willingly provided aid and comfort to Osama bin Laden, the self-confessed
architect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Bush’s initial military mission was
appropriate, measured, and achievable: “These carefully targeted actions are designed,” the
president said on Oct. 7, 2001, “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations,
and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.”
That mission was effectively accomplished by the spring of 2002, when the Taliban had been
destroyed as a viable political entity and al-Qaeda was so severely damaged that it never regained
its pre-war power. Bush had a golden opportunity in the summer of 2002 to order an end to the
military mission, withdraw the troops, and transition to a diplomatic and humanitarian mission.
There was no armed or organized opposition. The Afghan people themselves could have formed a
new government of their choosing, in line with their historical and cultural norms.
There was never a better, more secure, or more ideal set of circumstances for a country with
time and international backing to form a new government than what existed that summer. But
here is where Washington’s hubris entered the picture. Instead of trusting these people to do the
hard work necessary to govern themselves, we decided they were not capable and needed our
help to get there.
First, we kept our military force on the ground and directed every aspect of the forming of a
government in Kabul. Americans took the lead in designing the country’s Constitution — one more
in line with American culture than Afghan culture, helping to ensure its eventual failure.
Unfortunately, that was only the first major failure. Others immediately followed.
Many in the Western world wanted to prove that democracy — in line with Western ideals
and values — could be built anywhere and was in fact based on “universal values,” and they were
eager to see their theories proven in Afghanistan. My first combat tour to the country came in 2005-
2006. During that time I observed that the U.S.-led military mission was joined with numerous
civilian agencies, USAID, and international aid groups — but their focus was on helping the Afghan
government, military, and civil society to behave more like a Western democracy.
Apparently aware the effort was foundering, Bush changed the mission a year after my tour
ended. On Feb. 15, 2007, Bush addressed the nation and gave a rousing speech, frequently
interrupted by applause, on the future of Afghanistan. Bush announced he was asking Congress for
$11.8 billion “to help this young democracy survive.” Then he made the fateful decision: “I’ve
ordered an increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan. We’ve extended the stay of 3,200 troops now in
the country, for four months, and we’ll deploy a replacement force that will sustain this increase for
the foreseeable future.”
When I returned for my second combat deployment in Afghanistan in 2010-2011, I was
shocked by how much the country had deteriorated since my previous deployment. It was painfully
clear that our policies had not merely failed to improve the situation, but had made things worse. I
observed then that our military and civilian leaders were being dishonest about conditions, always
promising that with a new strategy or new approach things would be different. They never were.
Arrogance prevented our leaders from acknowledging patent reality, directly laying the
foundation for our military failure.
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In his just-released report, Sopko details the many mistakes made by the Obama, Trump, and
Biden administrations, all of which seemed to build on each other, and I highly recommend reading
that entire report. But the common denominator to all the failures Sopko highlights in the military,
diplomatic, economic, and governance fields, was the hubris of American policymakers and
generals.
Their stubborn refusal to recognize the plans they had made were faulty, the turning of a
blind eye to the reality that their plans weren’t succeeding, and their collective unwillingness to
admit the truth, directly contributed to the 20-year debacle in Afghanistan. If we as a people fail to
learn that lesson, if we fail to hold any military or civilian leader accountable for such avoidable
failure, the chances are high we will see a harmful repeat in the future.
(Source: 1945)

A DELICATE BALANCING ACT

Salman Javed
From global pariahs to unexpected allies, the international standing of the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan has undergone a significant shift. Given that several countries have already recognized
the IEA-led government’s de facto rule in Afghanistan, their newfound diplomatic support is no
longer a complete surprise, although it is still a significant shift from the international community’s
previous stance towards the IEA – Indeed, a stark contrast to the Taliban’s isolation in the 90s, with
only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE acknowledging their rule.
After ruling Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 with little support from the international
community, the IEA returned to power in Kabul nearly two years ago. As the world watched the
IEA reclaim power in Afghanistan after the United States longest war, the focus shifted to what the
future holds for the country. Amidst all the chaos, what remained largely unnoticed was the web of
trade deals and diplomatic relationships the IEA had been building with regional countries since
their rise to power in Afghanistan.
As the IEA tightens its grip on Afghanistan, the world watches in awe as neighboring
countries like Russia, China, and Pakistan rush to strike multi-million dollar deals with the new
regime. China has already secured a 25-year contract to extract oil from the Amu Darya Basin and a
$3 billion deal for Afghanistan’s copper deposits, while Russia has seen exports to Afghanistan
skyrocket to a monthly value of $10.3 million.
Pakistan and Afghanistan may have had their ups and downs, but the longest border between
them remains a bustling trade route, with Afghanistan boasting a $79 million surplus with Pakistan.
Now, with the revival of the annual Pakistan-China Strategic Dialogue and the recent visit of
Afghanistan’s Muttaqi, a new trilateral relationship is set to take shape, paving the way for North,
South, and Central Asian regional connectivity. With discussions likely covering everything from
security and border issues to the levy problem, the meeting is an opportunity to address the
pressing concerns to strengthen the bilateral relationship.
Currently, Afghanistan’s $85/ton tax on coal exports to Pakistan has raised energy and input
costs for vital sectors, such as textiles and cement. Meanwhile, Afghan trucks can freely enter
Pakistan for trade, while Pakistani trucks are unfairly restricted. To unlock the full potential of their
geography and robust economic ties, Pak-Afghan free trade and transit must be restored without
political tensions. This will not only drive economic growth and mutual gains but also foster
regional peace and stability.
As Pakistan and Afghanistan work to restore free trade and transit, other South Asian
countries are also looking to strengthen their economic ties with Afghanistan. India, for instance, has
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registered trade worth $45 million with Afghanistan over the past year, according to the Indian
Commerce Ministry. Meanwhile, Iran remains a key trading partner despite a 40 percent drop in
imports from Afghanistan due to market demand. Nonetheless, Iran still accounts for $1.2 billion in
trade.
In this rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, the question remains: where do the United
States and the West fit in? With the regional economic opportunities growing, it would be unwise to
assume that the IEA will depend on recognition or support from the West. Some voices within the
US are already calling for engagement with the new regime, recognizing that human rights concerns
alone may not be enough to secure US interests in the region. Hence, with the shifting geopolitical
landscape in Afghanistan, the West must adapt its approach to engage with the IEA if it wants to
remain relevant.
Moreover, the conflicting signals surrounding the international community’s policy towards
the IEA in Afghanistan have created confusion and underscored the need for a unified and coherent
approach. This has also been observed as the United Nations Secretary-General has hosted a
meeting in Doha recently on engagement with IEA post-recent bans on Afghan women working
with the UN and other aid organizations.
As the geopolitical landscape shifts, the US and the West may need to reassess their stance on
the IEA and explore avenues for constructive engagement. Relying solely on human rights concerns
as leverage for not recognizing the IEA-led government may prove to be shortsighted in the long
run, as the economic benefits of regional connectivity become increasingly apparent. Therefore, in
navigating the complex and delicate situation in Afghanistan the world must adopt a delicate
balancing act that considers human rights, diplomatic relations, and economic growth.
For this purpose, any engagement with the new regime must take into account the country’s
intricate political, social, cultural, and economic landscape and involve collaboration with local,
regional, and international stakeholders. In addition to the Asians, and Middle Easterns, Europeans
have already shown interest in building ties with Afghanistan, while some voices in the US are
advocating for establishing relations with the IEA government.
Now, it is crucial to identify pathways that align with the needs and priorities of all
stakeholders before any engagement can take place. Additionally, the IEA’s focus on bilateral trade
relationships presents both opportunities and challenges as it seeks to expand its economy and
integrate with the wider world. Only a comprehensive approach that maps outlines of conflict and
reconciliation and identifies the needs of all stakeholders can chart a path towards sustainable
engagement with Afghanistan and contribute to regional stability and the improvement of the lives
of Afghan citizens.
(Source: The Nation)
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Book Reviews
Mehrunnisa Ali’s

POLITICS OF FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi (Dawn’s External Ombudsman and an author)
Politics of Federalism in Pakistan by Mehrunnisa Ali is a critical study of the difficulties this
country had to face in the making of the three constitutions — of 1956, 1962 and 1973 — we have
had.
Yet, as the author points out, one reason why federalism triumphed in each case is because of
a unique asset Pakistan has: its “federal society.” No wonder then that, despite the ethnic, regional
and geographical challenges involved in drafting the basic law, the constitution-makers retained
federalism in all three documents.
Unbelievable as it sounds, federalism had its opponents as late as the last century, with a
scholar such as English political theorist and economist Harold Laski saying that federalism was
unable to cope with the tempo of life developed by modern capitalism. Similarly, British lawyer Ivor
Jennings opined that “nobody would have a federal constitution” if it could be avoided, while
academic and historian James Bryce said federalism was “a transitory step toward governmental
unity.”
Peculiar is the comment by scholar of politics Anthony H. Birch, whose books include The
British System of Government and Nationalism and National Integration. Federalism, he says, “is a
concept which has no fixed meaning; its meaning in any particular study is defined by the student in
a manner [that] is determined by the approach which he wishes to make to his material.”
Yet, contrary to the opinion by the scholars, federalism works successfully in countries such as
the United States and Canada, and many Afro-Asian countries — Comoros, Ethiopia, India,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania — have chosen to go federal. In Pakistan, as early as 1949,
Liaquat Ali Khan, the country’s first prime minister, declared that a federal form of government was
a dictate of Pakistan’s geography.
A federal polity involves, among other things, a division of powers between the federal
government and the constituent units and, in Pakistan’s case, it was not an easy task for the
politicians to develop a consensus.
The makers of the 1956 constitution had to put up with a harsh reality: the most populous
province, East Pakistan, had a small area, whereas the other four provinces situated a thousand
kilometres away had a much larger territory. This meant East Pakistan would always have a
majority in parliament — something the four other provinces conjoined territorially resented
because of their larger territory, greater natural resources and higher contributions to revenue.
Yet, the politicians, many of whom were Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s comrades
during the Pakistan movement and were well versed with law and constitution, came up with a
workable solution. The country would be a federation of two provinces: East Pakistan and the four
provinces in the west merged into one, and both would have equal representation in parliament.
This came to be known as the “parity principle”, which defined the relationship between the two
‘wings’. In the consolidated West Pakistan, Punjab had 57 percent of the population. This created
pressures within West Pakistan.
 15

Full of compromises, the constitution was adopted in 1956 after what Professor Ali, author of
the book under review, calls “much wrangling among the provinces.” This led to political instability,
which finally ended when the country had its first martial law regime in 1958.
The constitution was abrogated, and the strongman, Gen (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan not
only preferred a presidential form of government, but also went for indirect elections to parliament
and the presidency. Yet, despite the phenomenal economic development and the stability provided
by the Ayub regime, popular agitation led to his ouster. This was followed by elections in 1970, the
results of which emphasised the ethnic character of the divide between the two provinces.
Avoiding the details of the 1971 tragedy, let us focus instead on the constitution enacted in
1973. It is federal in character and, despite two military interventions, has shown resilience,
flexibility and workability.
With the prime minister as chief executive, the constitution is parliamentary in character and
has a bicameral legislature, with the upper house giving equal representation to the four provinces.
More significantly, an irritant in any federal scheme — the division of powers — has been
adequately dealt with and several amendments by the parliament have served to address the
constituent units’ grievances.
For instance, the 18th amendment, adopted in 2010, widened the quantum of provincial
autonomy by abolishing the concurrent list, thus giving the provinces greater autonomy in financial
matters. This served to enhance the provinces’ extremely limited taxation sources, though there has
been criticism that the provinces had failed to fully utilise the ‘concessions’ given by the 18th
amendment.
However, as Professor Ali says, even though the three constitutions were federal in character,
they proved to be “non-federal in practice”, because of all federal governments’ tendency to
“centralise the state” by administrative means, which gave Islamabad greater powers in matters of
law and order, especially where Islamabad felt centrifugal forces were gaining strength.
The growth of “centrifugal forces” — a euphemism for separatist tendencies — is a subject to
which the author keeps returning. Because of “the growing development gap between the federating
units”, the author believes the “unifying force of religion and fear of [a] common enemy (India)
became weaker.” Thus, federalism has been “the only feasible device for maintaining equilibrium
between the centripetal and centrifugal forces.”
There were unhealthy traditions from the very beginning. For instance, in 1954, then governor
general Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin’s government without recourse to the
constituent assembly, which too he dissolved early the following year.
Similarly, even when generals such as Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf didn’t abrogate the
constitution, they made amendments with the help of rubber-stamp parliaments. For instance, Gen
Zia added a new clause — 58 2(b) — which authorised the president to dissolve the assembly and
order fresh elections, even if the prime minister enjoyed a parliamentary majority. This clause was
abolished by a subsequent democratic government, but Gen Musharraf restored it.
That a subsequent democratic government abolished this clause again and the constitution
today is parliamentary and democratic in character, is a tribute to the resilience shown by the 1973
document, which was framed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government under most difficult post-1971
circumstances.
Two chapters — ‘Measures Ensuring Federal-Regional Equation’ and ‘Federalism and
Cultural Pluralism’ — summarise the author’s views on the constant tussle between the federal and
provincial governments and suggest a solution. According to her, the tradition of a powerful centre,
established in Pakistan’s formative years, continued during the operation of the 1956 constitution
and remained a basic feature of the 1962 and 1973 documents.
 16

The growing regionalism, Ali notes, could be contained, first, by creating “conditions
conducive to the operation of the federal polity” and second, by “controlling those forces which
have increased provincialism in the country.”
Ali believes officers of the elite Central Superior Services (CSS) are a major source of power in
federal hands because they occupy key positions and are responsible to the federal government. One
solution she has in mind is to have more provincial government officers on committees involved in
development plans.
Ali is the author of a number of books, including the monumental Jinnah on World Affairs:
Selected Documents, 1908-1948 and Facets of Jinnah: Personality and Leadership. The book under
review here, a revised and enlarged second edition, deals in detail with the challenges Pakistan had
to face in finally enacting a constitution that is parliamentary and federal. It is a quotable book.
(Source: EOS)

THE ANTHROPOCENE REVIEWED

Avikal Somvanshi (Consultant, Urban Lab, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi)
“Mongols are the Exception!” was the running gag in a 2012 YouTube series titled Crash
Course World History. It was more ironical than funny because if the writers and producers of the
show had actually understood “world” history they would not have labelled Mongols as an
exception but as continuation of a culture that developed in a markedly different context and
environment than the European empires.
Why bring up this West-centric bias in understanding of the world here? The reason is John
Green, the producer and anchor of the aforementioned well-produced, adequately hilarious,
geopolitically unnuanced YouTube series, who has now labelled his musings about American pop
culture fixtures and privileged way of life as review of the Anthropocene.
The Anthropocene Reviewed is Green’s foray into non-fiction. He is otherwise famous as the
author of the young-adult best-seller novel The fault in our stars. The book is collection of 44
personal essays that cover topics ranging from the mundane (“Sunsets”) to the topical (“Plague”) to
the enigmatic (“Mountain goats”) to the alien, at least to the average Indian (“Diet Dr Pepper”).
One ought to wonder how these do justice to the book’s lofty strapline “essays on a human-
centred planet”. Well, they do not. But they are crafted intelligently to engage the uninformed and
the uninterested to maybe start a dinner conversation about themselves. Or at best, make them
marginally appreciate some inventions like the internet and vaccines that literally altered the human
growth projectile on the planet.
This is achieved by extending tech-obsession with star-rating-scale to human experiences.
People have become addicted to rating products, clients, places on the internet and most make their
decisions just by referring the simplistic star-ratings. These are not scientific ratings, but Green has
cunningly used the online generation’s addiction to star-ratings to tell his story (somewhat unfairly
though).
Green rates each of the subjects on a scale of five stars at the end of the essay and has awarded
a five-star rating to almost 20 per cent of the subjects he has reviewed. All the five-star rated topics
are happy experiences like watching the sunset or sycamore trees.
None of these are really the doing of human actions or have impacted the planet as implied by
the term “Anthropocene”. Only three things in his collection get a one-star rating and all three are
diseases or disease-causing artefacts—Staphylococcus aureus, viral meningitis, and plague. None of
the developing world’s horrors like malaria, hunger, or poverty are under review in the book.
 17

Written during the 2020 pandemic lockdowns, the essays are an outgrowth of the namesake
podcast which Green started in 2018. Green has masterfully weaved encyclopaedic information
about his assortment of human experiences, many a time making provident remarks like in the essay
on “air conditioning”. He notes: “I need to get used to feeling a bit warmer. It’s the only future for
us.”
While reviewing Staphylococcus aureus—a round bacterium that happens to be one of the
most common causes of bacteremia and infective endocarditis—Green digs deep into the history of
antibiotics.
It is a fascinating story on its own, even without Green’s pondering over philosophical
question “why life wants to be”. What stands out is a passing mention that “antibiotic resistance is
not a problem for the future-this year, some fifty thousand people in the U.S. will die of
Staphylococcus aureus infections.”
Now that is something of real concern in the Anthropocene—the ability of the smallest of
organisms to evolve to neuter threats to their survival. Something which the variants of COVID-19
in past two year have effectively demonstrated.
This careless caressing of grave threats to human existence while dancing about first-world
experiences is a constant in all the essays of the book. I am not sure if this was intentional. Still, the
book makes for an interesting read.
In fact it is very easy to miss these dire observations while leisure-reading this well-produced,
adequately hilarious and passive bragging. But for a concerned human there is ample to actually
ponder about, especially the fact that so many of us think of these mundane subjects as defining
feature of humans’ impact on the planet.
While reviewing “Hiroyuki Doi’s circle drawing”, which got a four-star rating, Green writes
“…I was trying to realise some ideal form that I have in my head of what my signature looks like,
and I can never quite achieve it”.
The sentence is a brilliant and succinct review of his own book. Honouring the “brilliant” five-
star-rating-scale theme, I give The Anthropocene Reviewed three-and-a-half stars, which also
happens to be Green’s average rating of things in the book.
(Source: Down to Earth)
Yasser Latif Hamdani’s

JINNAH: A LIFE
Reviewed by: Rizwana Naqvi
A large number of books have been written by both Pakistani and Western writers about
Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The most known among them being Stanley Wolpert’s Jinnah of Pakistan
and Ayesha Jalal’s Sole Spokesman, which present deep insights into the life and politics of this
great man we fondly call Quaid-e-Azam.
An addition to the array of Jinnah’s biographies is Yasser Latif Hamdani’s third book Jinnah:
A Life. Hamdani is a well-known human rights barrister and writer based in Pakistan. His earlier
books are Jinnah: Myth and Reality (2012) and Between Worlds, A Pakistani’s Quest to Forge
Meaning (2016). Hamdani is also a member of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, London, as
was Jinnah.
Tracing the life of the great leader from his birth till his passing away, the book presents many
little known facts as well as clarifications of many assertions wrongly attributed to the Quaid.
 18

Mohammad Ali Jinnah is often regarded as the person who was bent upon the Partition of
India and the tragic events that followed, and a champion of Islam who stood for a new Islamic
renaissance. However, Hamdani’s book shows that this is not true on both counts. According to him,
Jinnah was an ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity and never mentioned that Pakistan was to be an
Islamic state.
So the book sheds light on how eventually came to be regarded as the sole driving force
behind the Partition. “The tragic demise of the old ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity and Jinnah’s
rebirth as the Quaid-e-Azam of Muslim India did not happen overnight,” writes Hamdani.
Throughout the struggle for independence from the British, Jinnah tried to maintain Hindu-Muslim
unity but did not get equal response from Congress leaders, making him look for alternatives.
Hamdani writes: “Jinnah stood with his hands extended towards Congress, Gandhi and
Nehru but, for some reason, the great future founding fathers of independent India were not
forthcoming. Every overture and every attempt by Jinnah to reach out to Nehru was rebuffed by a
measure of arrogance that was quite unbecoming of Nehru.”
During the election campaign Jinnah continued to remind the Congress that Muslim League
was a patriotic, nationalistic, and liberal political party of Muslims “which was ready to cooperate
with Hindus and Sikhs for India’s freedom from colonialism.”
However, after the 1937 elections, rather than form a coalition ministry in UP where Muslim
League had won 29 seats and Congress was wiped out on Muslim seats, winning just one, Congress
got busy in actions, like mass contact movement aimed at Muslims, which seemed to indicate to
Jinnah that “Congress was going to try and absorb the Muslim League in a way so as to completely
bulldoze the objective of having adequate safeguard for Muslims.”
This was the turning point for Jinnah. No longer would he call for Hindu-Muslim unity but
“rather depend on the Muslim nation whose scabbard he now had his hand on.”
The Lucknow session of Muslim League in 1937 turned out to be a landmark in the history of
the subcontinent. As Congress had already declared independence as its goal, the Muslim League,
under Jinnah now, committed itself to ‘the establishment of full independence in the form of a
federation of free democratic state’ with safeguards for Muslims and other minorities. In his
presidential address, Jinnah informed his listeners that “politics was about power, and without
power they would remain hapless.” From now on he would no more trust the Congress and would
only deal with them as a representative of the Muslim community.
He told the Muslim League session that “they could never expect justice and fair play from
Congress which spoke with many tongues.” He was still not the apostle of Muslim separatism and
had certainly abjured his role as the bridge between the Congress and the Muslims. He believed in a
united India that would treat minorities in a manner that would make them feel as equal citizens
without any handicap in a great democratic federation.
In present times, the slogan Pakistan ka matlab kya, La Ilaha il-Allah [What is the meaning of
Pakistan? There is no god except Allah] is being used in a way as if Quaid-e-Azam himself raised the
slogan. It intrigues the common person when they are told that the Quaid was a secular liberal
Muslim. Hamdani, in his book, has given a lot of space to whether the Quaid wanted Pakistan to be
a secular state or a theocratic one.
The Quaid’s stance is quite clear from the following instance. During the first and last meeting
of All Pakistan Muslim League in 1947 under his chairmanship, “A party worker interrupted him
then, saying, ‘… but Quaid-e-Azam, we have been promising people Pakistan ka matlab kya, La
Ilaha il-Allah.’
 19

“Jinnah’s reply was forthright: ‘Neither the Muslim League Working Committee nor I have
ever passed a resolution [called] Pakistan ka matlab kya — you may have used it to catch a few
votes.’”
Hamdani further states: “At no point under his presidency did the Muslim League ever pass a
resolution calling for an Islamic state. This is a significant fact which punctures the idea that
Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam.”
The last two chapters bring sufficient clarity with respect to the way Jinnah envisaged
Pakistan. Sadly, today’s Pakistan is not how Jinnah envisaged it or how it was in his life. Far from
being equal citizens that Jinnah imagined them to be, non-Muslim Pakistanis are, at best, second
class citizens, discriminated against everywhere and “barred from holding the highest offices in the
land and systematically marginalised from the economic and political life of the country.” Under the
1973 Constitution both the offices of the president and the prime minister of Pakistan are reserved
for Muslims.
Well-known landmarks in Jinnah’s life are discussed in detail, such as The Lucknow Pact of
1916 that brought forward Jinnah as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity, is discussed in
considerable detail. We read that Jinnah did not support the Khilafat movement and rather
remained indifferent to it. “While Jinnah had argued in London that, given the Caliphate being at
stake, Muslims had a legitimate communal interests, he wanted to keep the Mullah or the religious
clerics as far away from politics as possible. … Everything about the Khilafatists went against the
grain of his political outlook,” writes Hamdani.
At one point he became so disillusioned with Congress policies that he retreated to London,
with his sister Fatima Jinnah and daughter Dina. However, he did return to India, though not on the
appeal of Dr Iqbal, as is commonly believed. Hamdani writes, “It must have been a letter from Sir
Fazl-e-Hussain that would have convinced Jinnah to return to India. On 15 May, 1934, the grand old
man of Punjab wrote: ‘Muslim India cannot afford to lose you. Men of clear vision, independent
judgement and strength of character are very few.’”
There are extensive accounts of other events such as the Lahore Resolution of 1940, the Direct
Action call, and the proposals and counter proposals of the Cabinet Mission plan and how Jinnah
brilliantly navigates through its constitutional and political traps.
Gandhi and Jinnah disagreed on many points, one of them was non-cooperation. Jinnah
believed that non-cooperation was a revolutionary movement and revolutionary movements are
never peaceful. Instead he advised his followers to participate in civil service and all the affairs of
the country and win Swaraj [self-rule] through parliamentary means. He said that the British were
not in India for the benefit of the Indians, but for their own and that the way to counter that was to
fight it by expressing themselves through the electoral process.
It is not that Jinnah was opposed to non-cooperation — a movement Gandhi is famous for; he
was convinced of non-cooperation as a means to achieve self-rule. “Jinnah’s conception of non-
cooperation was to first enter legislatures and councils and then refuse to cooperate from within.
Gandhi wanted a complete end to all cooperation; no entry into legislatures; refusal to allow
children to study in British schools and for all Indians to quit all jobs in the administration and the
military. To Jinnah this meant educational, economic and social suicide for the Indians.”
Along with Jinnah’s beliefs and actions, the political manoeuvring of various politicians
including leaders like Gandhi, Nehru, etc. as well as how the British exploited and drove a wedge on
communal lines are also discussed.
Conspiracies and political manoeuvrings continued till the end. Hamdani has discussed in
quite detail the conspiracies hatched by Gandhi and the Congress government led by Dr Khan Sahib
(Ghaffar Khan’s brother) in the then North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP which is now Khyber
 20

Pakhtunkhwa) as the referendum of 1946 neared in which the provinces were to decide whether
they wanted to join India or Pakistan. There were attempts to involve Afghanistan, to make NWFP
part of Afghanistan or create a Pathanistan state, illegal use of state powers to distribute arms and
money to propagate for Pathanistan; some ulema led by Haji Mirzali Khan Wazir, popularly known
as Faqir of Ipi, a staunch enemy of Pakistan, considered war against Pakistan as the greatest service
of Islam.
Hamdani’s bold and controversial assertions where he holds Jinnah responsible for the
situation in Kashmir came as a surprise. According to him, because of Jinnah’s failure to mobilise the
army Kashmir could not become part of Pakistan. In his opinion, perhaps Jinnah did not wish to
involve himself in military affairs and, therefore, asked the prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan to get in
touch with the army chief Gen Douglas Gracey.
The best thing about it is that the focus of this book isn’t only on Jinnah’s political career and
his role in the partition of the country, but also on his formative years spent away from his family,
the much talked about relationship with Ruttie Petit, his career as a lawyer— he was the only one
among the many stalwarts who actually practiced as a lawyer and stood up for even those whom he
did not agree with.
Unlike most biographies, this book does not separate his personal life from the political and
delves quite deeply in his early life, even talks about the controversy surrounding his birth place
and date, whether it is October 10, 1875 or December 25, 1876 and whether he was born in Jhirk near
Thatta or Karachi also finds some mention.
His relationship and marriage with Ruttie finds considerable space. While Ruttie converted to
Islam in order to marry Jinnah, he believed that there should be no bar on inter-communal marriage
as can be seen by his support for the Special Marriage Amendment Act in 1912. The law provided
for either conversion by one or renunciation by both. Jinnah was of the view that legislation ought to
allow marriage between people of different faiths. Ruttie’s conversion to Islam was merely a
formality because of the law, than by religious conviction, as his attempts at having the Special
Marriage Act amended to allow marriage without conversion or renunciation.
Though Jinnah’s marriage had gone through several ups and downs, he still loved her. It
seems that Jinnah quite enjoyed her antiques to shock and awe. Though it was bound to create
controversy, especially amongst the Muslim clerics, Jinnah in her case was quite adventurous,
always standing up for his wife where needed. He loved her so much that when after her death
Jinnah buried her he broke down completely.
Overall, Jinnah: A Life is a very well-researched book where arguments and analyses are
backed by multiple sources, with extensive use of quotations from letters, books, and other
documents.
It would not be wrong to say that the book presents Jinnah not just as a leader but as a human
being.
(Source: T-Magazine)
 21

China Affairs
MODERNIZATION IN CHINA
Yang Yundong (Consul General of China in Karachi)
The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has proposed advancing
the progress of the Chinese nation on all fronts through a Chinese path to modernization. In this
context, the people of China embark on a new journey towards building their country into a modern
socialist country in all respects.
The success in Chinese modernization was neither handed down from the heavens nor
emerged by itself. It has been attained step by step through determined, painstaking efforts of
the Chinese people under the leadership of the CPC which has always stayed true to its
founding mission.
After the Opium War in the mid-nineteenth century, China was plunged into the darkness of
domestic turmoil and foreign aggression; its people, ravaged by war, saw their homeland torn apart
and lived in poverty and despair. They were, at that moment, asking: where is our hope and future?
Since its founding more than one hundred years ago, the CPC has righteously taken up the
historical mission of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The party has united
and led China’s people to carry out a hard struggle, and embarked on the great journey of
independently building a modern country.
We have turned China from an impoverished and backward land into the world’s second
largest economy, a top trader in goods, biggest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and the biggest
manufacturer. We have put in place the world’s largest compulsory education system, social
security system, and medical and healthcare system. China has realized, in a span of several
decades, the industrialization that had taken developed countries several centuries. We have caught
up with the times in great stride.
The modernization of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people as a whole will certainly provide a
much stronger impetus for the world economy. Over the past 40-plus years since reform and
opening-up, the Chinese government has lifted over 800 million people out of poverty and enlarged
the middle-income group to over 400 million people. Today, China is the main trading partner of
over 140 countries and regions, making $320 million direct investment around the world each day
and attracting over 3,000 foreign businesses every month. Over the past decade, China has
contributed more to global growth than all the G7 countries combined.
The modernization of China while pursuing common prosperity for all will open up a broader
path to the common development of all countries. Common prosperity for the whole world requires
the development of all countries. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development
Initiative (GDI) are public goods that China offers to the international community. They are also
open platforms for pursuing common development and prosperity. Ten years on since the start of
the BRI, over 3,000 cooperation projects have been launched, involving close to $1 trillion of
investment and creating 420,000 jobs for participating countries. Many nations have thus realized
their dreams of railways, big bridges, and poverty alleviation.
The modernization of China with material and cultural-ethical advancement will lead to
bright prospects for human progress. The ultimate goal of modernization is the free and well-
rounded development of people, which means not only material abundance but also cultural-ethical
enrichment. Some countries, while highly developed in economy, science and technology, have
descended into a capital-centric mode, rampant materialism, cultural impoverishment, moral
 22

degradation, and public disorder. Such a modernization is obviously inconsistent with the goals
pursued by mankind.
The modernization of China with achieving harmony between humanity and nature will
provide a more viable pathway to a clean and beautiful world. China readily takes on its
responsibility of protecting the environment and tackling climate change, and leads the world on
many counts: in terms of afforested area, which accounts for a quarter of the world’s total; in the
development and utilization of renewable energy, with one-third of the world’s installed capacity of
wind and solar power; and in the output and sales of new energy vehicles, with half of the world’s
NEVs running on Chinese roads.
China has made the solemn pledge of achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality and
committed itself to moving from carbon peak to neutrality in just 30 years. That is at least years less
than the United States and 40-plus years less than the European Union. China has taken the
initiative to set up and invest in the Kunming Biodiversity Fund and contributed to the conclusion of
the Paris Agreement.
The modernization of China on the path of peaceful development will bring more certainty to
world peace and stability. Dominance and hegemony is not the aim of China’s development. China
is the only country in the world that has put in its constitution the commitment to a path of peaceful
development. The country is the top contributor of peacekeeping personnel among the permanent
members of the UN Security Council, and the only country among the five Nuclear-Weapon States
that has made the promise of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China advocates consultation and
dialogue and peaceful resolution of international disputes. Recently, through facilitation by China,
Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic relations. On the Ukraine crisis, China holds an impartial
position and actively promotes talks for peace. Modernization is a common cause for all of
humanity. The success in Chinese modernization has proved that there is no fixed model of
modernization. Any country can achieve modernization – as long as the path suits its conditions and
answers the need of its people for development.
China and Pakistan are all-weather strategic cooperative partners, and the two countries are
bound to be natural partners on course towards modernization. This year marks the 10th
anniversary of the launch of the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
CPEC has brought a total of $25.4 billion in direct investment, $17.55 billion in revenue, $2.12 billion
in taxes, and created 192,000 jobs for Pakistan, helping Pakistan to add 6000MW of electricity, 510km
of highway and 886km of the national core transmission network, laying a solid foundation for
Pakistan’s economic and social development. China will continue to work hand in hand with
Pakistan on the road to modernization that meets our respective national conditions and make
unremitting efforts to build a closer China-Pakistan community with a shared future in the new era.
(Source: The News)

BEIJING COMMITTED TO OPENING UP ITS ECONOMY IN 2023

Xirui Li (Research Fellow at the Intellisia Institute, Guangzhou)
The private sector and foreign investors have become increasingly sceptical about doing
business in China since COVID-19. The risks of shutdowns, travel restrictions, disruptions to normal
operation and supply chains, and liquidity shortages resulting from China’s zero-COVID policy
have significantly shaken their confidence.
China has engaged in a multi-pronged regulatory crackdown on a wide range of sectors, from
platform economy to online finance to real estate. The crackdown signals that Beijing values loyalty
from the private sector and financial stability over growth and access to capital. Beijing’s advocation
 23

for ‘common prosperity’ and opposition to ‘unconstrained economic growth’ has only heightened
business concerns regarding China’s aggressive redistribution policies.
The increasing antagonism and decoupling between China and the West as well as China’s
decision to develop ‘self-reliance in technology and science’ have created enormous uncertainties for
business operations and lowered companies’ confidence. Many have questioned whether China is
adopting a state-centric and inward-facing economic development strategy and whether the reform
and opening up era has come to an end.
With the termination of China’s zero-COVID policy at the end of 2022 and the recent
announcement of a new line-up of top government leaders, 2023 is a crucial year for China to restore
business’ confidence. China will need to demonstrate to the world that it still places a premium on
opening up and pro-business policies, particularly for the private sector, in the post-pandemic era.
Chinese leaders have reiterated their determination to open the country up. The 2022 report of
the 20th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party emphasises that China will
remain ‘committed to reform and opening up’, ‘promote high-standard opening up’ and ‘facilitate
the healthy development of the non-public sector’. During the first plenary session of the State
Council’s new term, the new Chinese Premier Li Qiang told his colleagues that advancing opening
up, empowering private sectors and attracting more foreign investment are their top priorities.
Li highlighted the importance of the private sector in upgrading China’s manufacturing by
visiting the facilities of Build Your Dreams, one of the country’s largest electric vehicle makers and a
private company, on his first trip out of Beijing after he became the premier. During this trip, he also
met with a number of heads of big enterprises. Among these heads was the CEO of Xiaomi, one of
China’s largest smartphone manufacturers and a privately held company in China.
During the meeting, Li promised to create a business-friendly environment. In addition to
sending a message to the domestic private sector, the Chinese government has used international
conferences to reassure foreign investors. For instance, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent an
unprecedented congratulatory letter to this year’s China Development Forum, reiterating that
opening up is China’s fundamental national policy.
During the Forum, both Li and Chinese Vice President Han Zheng met with CEOs of
numerous multinational corporations and promised to promote high-quality opening up. Li clearly
stated in his opening remarks at the Boao Forum of Asia’s annual meeting that China will continue
to increase market access with new measures and improve the business climate for state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), private Chinese firms and foreign businesses.
China has taken a whole-of-government approach to addressing the concerns of the private
sector. Xi emphasises that the operation of SOEs must follow the market. This could be interpreted
to mean that SOEs should not enjoy privileges and should compete in the market. The central
government has taken steps to easeup on the regulatory crackdowns on businesses. For instance, it
granted publishing licenses to 44 foreign games for domestic release and approved over one
hundred new video game licenses for domestic companies and Didi chuxing, a domestic ride hailing
company, has been allowed to register new users.
Ministries of the Central government and local governments have taken steps to promote the
development of the domestic private sector and expand opening up. In collaboration with provincial
governments, the Ministry of Commerce has launched ‘The Year of Investment in China’ to attract
more foreign investment through exhibitions and forums.
The provincial governments of Hebei, Shaanxi, Hainan and Hunan have issued policy
measures to support the development of the private economy. Their measures include reducing
government intervention in the operation of the private sector, providing financial and credit
support to private companies through multiple channels and awarding cash to outstanding private
 24

companies. Provincial leaders have also travelled abroad to entice foreign investment and broaden
the opening of their respective provinces. Guangxi Party Secretary Liu Ning, for instance, travelled
to Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia in March and April 2023, signing contracts with a total value of
89.1 billion RMB (US$12.9 billion).
The Chinese government has sent a clear message that it is fully committed to opening up and
improving the business environment, especially for the private sector. In the post-pandemic era, it is
nearly impossible for China to overthrow its opening up and support for the private sector.
It would be unfeasibly expensive for Chinese leaders to retract their support for the private
sector after making statements at high-profile international events. The path-dependence of
China’s outward-looking economy also means that any actions against opening up or the
development of private sectors would have enormous negative effects not only in economics but
also in politics and society.
(Source: East Asia Forum)

CHINA IS COMING OUT OF THE SHADOWS TO DEFEND ITS OIL INTERESTS

Simon Watkins
Given the high stakes geopolitical game in which the world finds itself following Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine last year, it would be naïve to be believe that anything as high-profile as Iran’s
seizure of oil tankers in and around its coastal waters occurred in political isolation. They did not,
and such seizures of vessels and other disruptions to the global oil markets emanating from the
Middle East are set to continue. This is a key element of the new global oil market order as analysed
in my new book on the subject. To recap briefly on these recent events, Thursday 27 April saw forces
of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) seize the oil tanker Advantage Sweet as
it sailed through international waters in the Gulf of Oman. According to maritime shipping sources,
the tanker was carrying an 800,000 barrels of Iraqi Ratawi crude oil cargo for the U.S. oil major
Chevron, loaded at Kuwait’s Mina Saud terminal on 25 April. Just a few days later, on Wednesday 3
May, the same Iranian naval forces seized another oil tanker, the Niovi, after it had left Dubai for the
port of Fujairah, also in the UAE, via the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran alleges that this second
seizure was pursuant to a legal dispute dating back to 2020 and involving Nimr International and
Baslam Nakliyat on the one side and the Marshall Islands-based La Mere Maritime on the other,
both seizures occurred after an earlier incident involving the U.S. This incident was the U.S.’s
redirection of the oil tanker Suez Rajan, which was loaded with a full crude oil cargo destined for
China, despite U.S. sanctions on the Iranian crude oil trade.
It was, then, China that vouched the tacit support to Iran that enabled the IRGCN to seize the
two oil tankers, according to a source who works closely with the European Union’s (EU) energy
security apparatus and another with close ties to Iran’s Petroleum Ministry, both spoken to
exclusively by OilPrice.com last week. “China wants to lay down a clear marker that it will not
tolerate U.S. interference in any of its dealings with its major Middle Eastern allies, and Iran is at the
top of this list, and this includes any U.S. interference in the flows of oil from Iran to China,” said the
Iranian source. “China does not recognise the unipolar geopolitical economic order with
Washington at the centre of it that the U.S. continues to try to impose on other countries, and it
[China] will not tolerate the imposition of this idea against its [China’s] national interests,” he
added. “China has the legal foundation to conduct such [oil] trade under the terms of the 25-year
agreement made with Iran and has the right under the same agreement to protect its interests,
regardless of arbitrary unilateral sanctions [on Iran] imposed by the U.S.,” he concluded.
 25

Under the ‘Iran-China 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement’ first revealed

anywhere in the world in my 3 September 2019 article on the subject, and analysed in full in my new
book on the new global oil market order, China has wide-ranging access to several key elements of
Iran’s energy, economic, and military sectors. Aside from first refusal on the exploration and
development of all oil and gas fields in Iran, and huge discounts for China on the oil and gas
produced from those fields, China also wrote into the Agreement several policies that allowed for
much greater cooperation between the two countries’ militaries. One of these was the yearly
exchange of dozens of senior officers of the two countries’ navies, armies, air forces, and intelligence
units, plus technical personnel attached to special projects. Another was the ‘dual purpose’ –
military and civilian - rights given to China for its navy and air force to utilise Iranian military and
civilian sites for whatever purpose it required.
Although no Chinese military personnel were directly involved on the ground in the recent
seizures of oil tankers, the marker laid down by China through the IRGCN’s oil tanker seizures is
clear enough. It demonstrates that China will not accept any interference from the U.S. in any aspect
of its expansion across the Middle East, or in the oil and gas flows to China that accompany it. It also
demonstrates that China has the capacity, through Iran especially, but also now through Saudi
Arabia – as also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order – to
significantly disrupt the movement of oil across the world. China, as it has made clear with these
two latest oil tanker seizures, now has proxy control of the Strait of Hormuz through Iran. At least
30 percent of the world’s crude oil moves through the Strait at any given time, and often a lot more.
The same 25-year Agreement also gives China a hold over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which
crude oil is shipped upwards through the Red Sea towards the Suez Canal before moving into the
Mediterranean and then westwards. This has been achieved as it lies between Yemen - formerly
heavily controlled by Iran-backed Houthis, but also now subject to the new China-brokered
relationship deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia - and Djibouti, over which China has also
established a stranglehold. What the seizure of the Advantage Sweet also now shows is that the Gulf
of Oman can no longer be regarded as a safe alternative transport route for oil tankers either.
Although these latest seizures by Iran are primarily politically-motivated - aimed by China at
showing that it will no longer tolerate any U.S. interference in its affairs – they also highlight that
China does not see any immediate financial or economic fallout from the potentially higher oil prices
that a higher risk premium would result in over time. In the 25-Year Agreement, China is
guaranteed oil and gas prices from Iran at least 30 percent lower than the relevant oil pricing
benchmarks. However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China has been
demanding an extra discount on Iranian oil to the 30 percent discount at which it can currently also
buy Russian oil, according to the EU energy security source. “On average, the Chinese discount for
Iranian crude oil to the international benchmark over the last 12 months has been around 44
percent,” he said. “But, it is even worse for Iran, as – from 11 November 2022 - China has been
paying Iran in non-convertible Yuan, that is Yuan that can only be used inside China and/or spent
buying Chinese goods,” he added. “Worse still is that whilst Yuan is the key instrument in payment,
China is also using the currencies of Angola, Zambia and Kenya to pay Iran, and China is doing this
as a means to induce Iran to buys goods from these countries so that these countries, in turn, can
service their loans to China,” he concluded.
It is interesting to note finally that China appears to have decided that the time is now right to
come out of the shadows as far as its imports of crude oil from Iran are concerned. Previously, as
 26

also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order, China had disguised its
huge oil imports from Iran in several ways. One of the most tried-and-trusted methods by which
this has been done has been at source, with Iranian oil simply ‘rebranded’ as non- Iraqi oil. This has
been easily done because the two countries share many of the same oil reservoirs. Another has been
done at sea with oil cargoes already on the move, achieved by disabling – literally just flicking a
switch – on the ‘automatic identification system’ on ships that carry Iranian oil. This can be
accompanied by just lying about provenance, destinations or specific cargo types in shipping
documentation. Iran’s own former Petroleum Minister, Bijan Zanganeh, publicly highlighted this
very practice when he said in 2020: “What we export is not under Iran’s name. The documents are
changed over and over, as well as [the] specifications.” On top of these, and very popular for Iranian
oil headed to China in the past, was tankers bound ultimately for China engaging in at-sea or just-
outside-port transfers of Iranian oil onto tankers flying other flags. As also highlighted in December
2018 at the Doha Forum, by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Zarif: “If there is an art that we
have perfected in Iran, [that] we can teach to others for a price, it is the art of evading sanctions.”
China, though, no longer feels the need, or has the desire, to try to placate the U.S.
(Source: Oilprice.com)
 27

Climate Change
FAKE CLIMATE SOLUTIONS
Making climate change worse
“We are ‘greening’ ourselves to extinction,” notes Vijay Kolinjivadi, a post-doctoral fellow at
the Institute of Development Policy at the University of Antwerp, at ‘Al Jazeera’.
There is the fatal confusion between efficiency and ecology.
We are being duped to believe that buying more “energy efficient” or “green” products can
save the planet. Whether it is a new electric car, an “eco-friendly” condo, a paper straw instead of a
plastic straw, or a solar-powered turtle-shaped mega yacht – all are branded as ecological solutions
because they are supposedly more energy or materially efficient than the standard alternative.
What often hides behind these “green” labels is the large carbon footprint their production
generates. Furthermore, “greened” technological solutions often just shift the environmental
damage they do to another sector or a distant location.
For example, the growing electric vehicle industry may help reduce carbon emissions but it
will also cause a massive jump in the demand for lithium and other minerals. Scientists are already
warning about the grave environmental impact the rush for mining lithium may have, including
water pollution and loss, toxic waste spills, biodiversity loss and soil contamination.
The argument that “green” solutions provide jobs also rests on weak foundations, especially if
the quality of work is considered. As the ILO has pointed out, a large share of employment for the
so-called “nature-based solutions” is informal, low-wage, temporary, and exposed to risks, such as
unsafe working conditions, child labour and lack of social security.
Nature conservation has also fallen prey to the “greening” deception. For years now, large
conservation organisations and their corporate sponsors have been pushing the idea that large
swaths of land and forests need to be fenced off so we can protect biodiversity and help mitigate the
effects of climate change.
Like the carbon offset schemes, this policy is just another way to enable big polluters to
continue to pollute by saying: “We are doing something for the planet.”
It also enables some – particularly in the tourism and construction sectors – to benefit from the
so-called “nature” tourism in which the wealthy pay big money to access fenced-off parks and
“experience” pristine nature while staying at luxury real estate projects.
And just like other “greening” strategies, this type of nature conservation results in major
human injustices. Indigenous peoples from around the world have suffered evictions, dispossession
and even killings as they have been forced from their lands to make way for nature conservation
projects.
In the Republic of the Congo, the Indigenous Baka people have been brutally oppressed by the
guards of a conservation project supported by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the EU, the US and logging and palm oil companies. A
UNDP investigation found that members of the community were routinely beaten, some
imprisoned, tortured or raped.
In the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, the guards of a national park funded
by the US and German governments have also engaged in violent attacks on the Indigenous Batwa
people living in its territory. A 2022 report by Minority Rights has produced evidence that at least 20
 28

members of the community have been killed and at least 15 women raped during forced eviction
campaigns.
There are countless horror stories like these ones; according to estimates, some 14 million
people have been evicted in this manner in Africa alone. That is why the news that a new
conservation scheme was approved at the UN conference on biodiversity (COP15) held in Montreal
was met with much dismay by Indigenous people across the world.
The new Global Biodiversity Framework – also called the 30×30 target – aims to turn 30
percent of the planet into protected areas by 2030. In a letter to COP15 participants, Indigenous
peoples stated that the policy “may be the biggest land grab in history and further threaten the
physical and cultural survival of Indigenous people worldwide”.
Given that Indigenous peoples reside on territories that hold 80 percent of the world’s
biodiversity, it is certain that Indigenous-held land will fall within the 30×30 plan. Evicting them
from land they have lived in since time immemorial is hardly an ecological solution.
A much better solution would be addressing the biggest cause of biodiversity loss: industrial-
scale farming. It destroys the soil, increases desertification, releases huge amounts of greenhouse
gases and is linked to deforestation.
Making the “green” choice then leaves us satisfied that we are “doing something” about
climate change. But driving an electric car, putting your organic produce in a tote bag and turning
down your heating or air-conditioner by one degree is not going to save the planet.
Let’s have the courage to face this fact, Vijay Kolinjivadi stresses.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)

CLIMATE CHANGE, RISING TEMPERATURES AND OUR HEALTH

Dr Ali M Mir
According to the World Bank, Pakistan ranks among the top 10 countries most affected by climate
change. Apart from the devastating floods we face periodically, a significant direct consequence of
climate change is rising temperatures and increased heatwaves. According to the world climatological
database, the average temperature recorded in Pakistan between 1980 and 2021 increased by about 0.9
degrees centigrade. The Indo-Pak subcontinent witnessed an unprecedented heatwave in March and
April 2022, majorly attributable to climate change. Increased temperatures impact health and well-being
in several ways. Indirectly, heatwaves adversely affect agricultural productivity and nutritional deficits
by increasing food insecurity. Higher temperatures during growing seasons lead to faster crop
maturation, lowering plant yield and rising food insecurity. An increase in inland water temperatures
also reduces riverine fishery production. The incidence of droughts also rises due to temperature-driven
evapotranspiration. Droughts affect livelihoods, food and water scarcity. Increasing temperature
likewise enhances the salinity of water reservoirs, making them more brackish and conducive for
propagating pathogens that cause gastrointestinal disorders.
Heatwaves result in more fatalities than any other natural catastrophe. The direct link
between exposure to extreme heat and kidney damage, as well as the aggravation of underlying
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, mental health disorders and unfavourable pregnancy
outcomes, has been conclusively demonstrated by empirical research. There is a higher incidence of
preterm deliveries, low birth weight, stillbirths and neonatal stress in hot temperature exposures.
According to the Lancet study on the state of health in Pakistan, between 1990 and 2019, there was a
significant rise in the prevalence of respiratory illnesses, kidney disease and ischemic heart disease.
In 2019, ischemic heart and respiratory diseases were among the top five causes of death, as opposed
to 1990, when the leading five causes were all communicable diseases. After India, we have the
 29

highest number of stillbirths in the region. Unfortunately, it is the poor who suffer the most as they
have fewer resources to shield themselves from the heat. We need accurate epidemiological data and
in-depth research to develop targeted interventions to protect the groups most at risk for heat-
related illnesses.
The temperature of the land’s surface is influenced by the presence of open green spaces and
forest cover, which cools the ground. On the contrary, habitation contributes to a rise in
temperatures. Our rapidly expanding population has substantially impacted deforestation and the
loss of green spaces. From 2001 to 2021, we lost 1% of our tree cover. The rapidly growing
population has caused the intrusion of agricultural land to meet increasing housing needs. From
2017 to 2020, Pakistan’s arable land fell by 3%. The uncontrolled urban sprawl is also a factor in the
rise in city temperatures. For instance, from 2004-2005 to 2019-20, the percentage of households
using air conditioners climbed from 8% to 13.5% in urban areas and from 3.1% to 6.7% in rural ones.
One of the primary sources of producing dry heat is the use of air conditioners.
While we can justly hold the developed world accountable for climate change, we cannot
absolve ourselves of the irresponsible way we have overstrained our environment. We are now
paying the price for how we have degraded and destroyed our biodiversity and upset the ecological
balance by overconsuming our natural resources. For people to be more resilient and better
equipped to adapt to the vicissitudes of climate change, we must lower our fertility rate and bring it
down to sustainable levels. Creating a balance between people and resources is essential to ensuring
the survival, prosperity and well-being of the present and future generations.
(Source: Express Tribune)

ENVIRONMENTAL CARE
Sohail Azmie
Those who have been to Karachi must have seen its sea and coastline. Kemari Jetty is a
popular place for first-timers who want to have some fun at sea. There are plenty of boats and some
old-fashioned ferries, which can take visitors and regular passengers from Kemari to Manora Island
and back.
But apart from the excitement of taking a boat ride, people get to witness some heart-
wrenching scenes at Kemari as soon as they arrive at the place. Kemari Jetty and the boats’ basin
around it present a picture that is torturous for any individual having the slightest regard for
cleanliness and environmental care. Various spots highlight a horrific reality of a society sans any
idea of environment protection.
These scenes make us question who on earth would want to do something this unthinkable to a
place which is supposed to be a gateway for recreation at sea. It may be difficult to accept but such
unkempt places have become our ‘trademark’. Places like Kemari Jetty are mere symptoms of deep-
rooted perennial problems, which need to be addressed to have our environment clean and the seas
healthier.
History tells us that the Akkadian Empire of Mesopotamia was destroyed because its people
did not care about their environment and abused the region’s natural resources. If we keep ignoring
the environment and let the natural habitat decay, we might be in for repeating history.
As per the UN Human Development Index, Pakistan ranks 147 out of 188 countries. This
position is considered ‘low’ on the development index. Pakistan’s mean years of schooling are 5.1,
which suggests a sorry state of our education focus. The World Health Organization puts Pakistan at
122 out of 190 in its performance report. The report on the UN’s health-related Sustainable
 30

Development Goals (SDGs) shows Pakistan on the 149th position out of 188 countries, while sharing
the score of 38 with Bangladesh and Mauritania – six places behind India and way behind Iran.
Pakistan’s 38.8 per cent population suffers from ‘multidimensional poverty’ – no access to
quality education, lack of healthcare and poor living standards. While these are highly
disappointing figures, people may be interested to know why these figures matter in our discussion
on the environment. These issues play an important role in leading to situations like the one we
encounter at Kemari Jetty. The deplorable condition of our seas and rivers is a direct consequence of
lack of transparency, education and healthcare in our society.
According to Numbeo, the world’s largest user-contributed database, Karachi is the world’s
eighth most polluted out of 277 cities surveyed. A 2013 report published by the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) titled ‘The Environment and Climate Change Outlook of
Pakistan’ also highlights disturbing realities in our country which remain ignored. The report
considers Pakistan’s high population growth rate to be the first and foremost factor in
environmental degradation.
akistan’s population grew from a mere 32.50 million in 1947 to 207.74 million in 2017. At this
explosive rate (2.5 million per year), we will be touching 300 million by 2050. Not only is the increase
in overall population alarming, but the associated trend is also quite worrisome. The report says,
“the phenomenon of the rapidly growing population in Pakistan is also being accompanied by
increasing concentration of population in the urban areas. The country’s urban population
multiplied more than ten-fold during [the] 1950-2012 period, compared to this, the total population
increased over five-fold.
“The trend of growing urbanization has also witnessed concentration of urban population in a
few major cities. Karachi, the largest city of the country, has 20 per cent of the total urban
population, followed by Lahore and Faisalabad with another 20 per cent. Rawalpindi, Multan,
Hyderabad, Gujranwala and Peshawar together hold another 14 per cent, while the remaining 46
per cent of the urban population lives in about 400 relatively small towns and cities. The eight
largest cities have been growing at the rate of over 3 per cent per year, and according to projected
trends this growth rate will continue in the next decade”.
The report goes on to point out that “from the environmental standpoint, the phenomenal
increase in the population of Pakistan, whether total or urban, without corresponding expansion in
basic amenities of life and infrastructure has exposed a majority of people to conditions, which are
far from satisfactory. This can deteriorate further in the absence of well-conceived and properly
planned corrective actions in the years to come.”
Policymakers have failed to see this trend and there has been no mechanism, project or a way
forward to ‘deal’ with this population explosion and its fallout on the major cities. New cities should
have been established taking loads off urban cities suffering from endless municipal and
management issues. It does not take much to understand that Karachi’s garbage issues have no
solution unless authorities pay attention to the city’s overpopulation.
I recently visited the Neelum Valley, and I was disappointed to see how the beautiful Neelum
River has now become a sewage and domestic waste dump for people living along its banks. The
colour of the river has changed from blue to grey due to the constant dumping of sewage wastes in
the river. Tourists and the locals have not even spared the majestic Barkati Lake situated at 12,130
feet above sea level at Ratti Galli, Dawarian. Plenty of plastic bags, used plates and loads of trash lay
around the lake.
Muzaffarabad is unsafe for people who care about the environment. They will be utterly
disappointed to see its current state. This does not end here. All along our rivers, both domestic and
industrial waste is thrown, which ends up in the Arabian Sea.
 31

Pakistan has progressively lost nearly 25 million of its agricultural land due to soil erosion –
the contributors being salinity and waterlogging. According to the UN Food and Agricultural
Organization report ‘Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015’, forest cover in Pakistan, which is 1.9
per cent of land (with an additional 2 per cent ‘other wooded land’), is extremely low as opposed to
the required rate of 20-30 per cent of total land.
Pakistan’s forest depleted from 1990 to 2015 at an annual rate of 2.1 per cent. This means that
in 1990 Pakistan’s forest covered 2.527 million hectares of land. By 2015, it was reduced to 1.472
million hectares (one hectare is equal to 0.01 square kilometre). This simply means that forest area in
Pakistan disappeared at a staggering 43,000 hectares per year from 1990 to 2015, and no one did
anything about it.
Pakistan’s forest cover is steadily declining with no action by authorities. Regeneration of
forests and replantation initiatives have been ineffective and disjointed due to abysmal focus by the
government.
The sole notable achievement made by Pakistan in this regard is mangrove restoration. In
2015, Pakistan was able to replant mangroves over an area of 95,000 hectares. Regional Director and
Representative of the United Nations Environment Program Young-Woo Park believes that “these
are alarming rates considering the low level of forest coverage in the country together with high
ecological value of forests in maintaining the life support system.”
Since no serious attempt has been made to preserve forests or replant trees in the country, the
government is likely to face some challenges. In the future, the rising demand of timber (which is
currently about five million cubic metres per year now) will not let the government pragmatically plan
for recovery of lost forests. The sharp imbalance between the demand and supply of timber and the
growing need for more agricultural land logically implies that the rate of forest depletion will increase,
thus exacerbating the effects of climate change and extinction of many species of birds and animals.
The International Union of Conservation of Nature (IUCN), an international organization
working in the field of nature conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, has declared 33
mammals as ‘critically endangered’ on the IUCN Red List of threatened species. This is one
consequence of decreasing forests and increasing pollution.
Also, there are two species of fish and 22 various types of marine animals, which are at serious
risk of being extinct in Pakistan’s rivers and seas. The impact of the disappearance of these species
will critically disturb the ecosystem, subsequently resulting in an environment unfriendly for
human existence.
Kemari Jetty in Karachi presents a true picture of our society, which perhaps does not need
any more elaboration – a society that is unable to figure out what is best for it and what could be
harmful will always wrestle hard to survive. Millions of cubic metres of untreated water is dumped
daily into the Arabian Sea from Karachi. We think we are not financially efficient enough to afford
treatment plants to filter water before it goes into the river or sea; some may say we have problems
far greater than pollution and climate change.
These arguments will soon become regrets when we are struggling for food and water.
Imagine a scenario – though it might not happen in our lifetime – where our seas become so polluted
to keep any fish alive, the subsoil water is dried up, and rain patterns are altered so as to become
harmful for humans. What shape and form the survival might take then is difficult to tell.
Kemari Jetty, which actually compelled me to write this article, does not only present a story
of neglect, but it also highlights deep-rooted troubles in the country. All these issues can be traced
back to rampant corruption, illiteracy and poverty. In an environment of poor transparency, there is
hardly any planning that could help avoid deforestation and plan for effective environment
conservation and poverty alleviation.
 32

When the timber mafia is permitted to cut down trees at will; when land-grabbers are allowed to
clear the trees off mountains and build housing societies; when industrialists pay bribes to get out of the
requirement to treat its waste before dumping it into the sea; when the municipal administration fails to
provide basic facilities to its people to avoid spread of pollution and trash, then a malnourished and a
homeless garbage collector on the shores of the Arabian Sea would care nothing about the environment
and the consequences of his action as he only fights to live another day.
Society and state are responsible for owning the cost of such irresponsible action. But the
authorities concerned – in our case, unfortunately – considerably suffer from lack of vision and are
guilty of inaction. Individually, people who care about the environment and the future of our
children have a ‘moral’ obligation to spread the message to places like Kemari Jetty, which says: we
have set a course for environmental destruction, we need to act now, lest it becomes irretrievable.
The question is what we can do now. First, we have to follow what I call the ‘individual social
responsibility’ – or the ISR – principle. Each one of us is responsible for raising awareness among
our family members, friends and colleagues. The ISR may not be a documented social covenant but
binding on everyone to become part of the collective good.
Teaching our children about the consequences and dangers of pollution must be our first task,
and we should lead by example. We can take them to the neighbourhood for picking up trash and
disposing it off at the designated places or dustbins on a weekly basis. Those living in Karachi can
visit the sea and let the children contribute to environmental conservation by cleaning waste or
clearing pollutants, which are found near shores.
Students from environmental studies departments of various universities can be engaged by
the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) for initiatives like ‘Healthy Seas’, ‘Clean Shores’ or ‘Saving Oceans’ etc,
especially focusing on Karachi Harbour.
The corporate world is also supposed to give back to society in the name of ‘corporate social
responsibility’ or the CSR; private companies can make a huge difference through CSR. Major
industries located in Karachi, especially chemical processing companies, have significantly
contributed towards devastation of Karachi’s marine environment and now they must act to, at
least, stop the trend, if not reversed.
The Pakistan Navy has been actively contributing towards environmental protection, however
it alone cannot negotiate with the Herculean task of getting rid of pollution that has spread wide and
far in Karachi Harbour.
A joint PN-KPT-PMSA ‘marine environment protection’ initiative needs to be launched on an
emergency basis, which may be led by one of the stakeholders. The initiative can propose measures
and procedures for reducing pollution; ways and means to treat the sewage water being dumped
into our seas from Karachi and penalties for people using the seas, benefiting from its riches but
caring less for its sustenance. If it is not done now, we may not have the future worth spending on
the seashores of Karachi.
(Source: The News)
 33

Covid-19
THE PANDEMIC EMERGENCY IS OVER. COVID-19 ISN’T
André Picard (Health columnist for The Globe and Mail)
“With great hope, I declare COVID-19 over as a global health emergency,” Dr. Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director-general of the World Health Organization, declared last week.
In the next breath, he stressed that this doesn’t mean the pandemic is over.
SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus, emerged in late 2019. A global public health emergency
was declared on Jan. 30, 2020, when only 170 people worldwide had died.
Why? Because there was potential for disaster. And it came to pass in ways that no one
imagined, such as the wealthiest country on Earth, the United States, recording 1.1 million deaths as
of May, 2022, and embracing denialism.
To date, there have been close to 7 million deaths officially recorded worldwide, though the
real number is likely two to three times higher.
COVID-19 is still killing about 4,000 people a week worldwide (down from a peak of 100,000
at the height of the pandemic) and sickening who knows how many more. The wily virus continues
to mutate and spit out new variants.
It hasn’t finished ripping a global trail of social, economic and political destruction.
“COVID-19 has left – and continues to leave – deep scars on our world,” Dr. Tedros said.
Symbolically at least, the pandemic is over. Most people and governments have moved on.
But nobody’s celebrating. There won’t be a tickertape parade to celebrate COVID’s demise – because
it lingers. The beginning of the end is more of a moment of exhausted relief than triumph.
So, what now?
First, we have to find a level of peaceful co-existence with the virus, as we have done with
many pathogens before it. Put another way: how many COVID-19 deaths are we willing to accept as
“normal?”
Right now, that “tolerable” number seems to be hovering around 200,000 a year globally. Not
negligible, but that number is lower than deaths from tuberculosis, AIDS, measles, influenza and
many other infectious diseases. (In Canada, we still have about 80 COVID-19 deaths weekly,
roughly the same number of people who die in motor vehicle crashes, or by suicide.)
Secondly, we need to heal the scars, and staunch the bleeding from the not-yet-healed
wounds.
In Canada, the health system is reeling from the pandemic. There are still around 3,000
COVID-19 patients in hospital, about 160 of them in critical condition. That’s a far cry from the days
when the pandemic overwhelmed hospitals, but it’s still a significant burden.
Most people have acquired good levels of immunity, from a combination of vaccination and
infection. Practically, that means we are unlikely to see waves of COVID-19; instead, we will see
isolated outbreaks and a steady number of cases. The many thousands left wounded by long COVID
still need care.
COVID-19 was much more than a health crisis. It triggered economic upheaval, in large part
because our response was too slow and too timid, which allowed the virus to spread rapidly,
prolonging the pandemic.
 34

As Dr. Tedros said: “One of the greatest tragedies of COVID-19 is that it didn’t have to be this
way.”
COVID-19 exacerbated political fault lines within and between countries. Politics trumped
public health.
The responses of public health officials and governments were often polarizing, seen
simultaneously as too little or too much, too late or too soon – and that eroded trust. All of this was
made worse by a torrent of misinformation and disinformation.
So politicized has COVID-19 become that it’s almost impossible to have a rational discussion
about mitigation measures, from vaccines to masks, or their benefits and limitations.
The end of the emergency phase, then, should prompt some reflection on our successes and
failures.
Developing vaccines in less than a year was an unparalleled scientific achievement; getting
13.3 billion doses into people (including 98 million in Canada), was just as impressive.
There were failures as well: The messaging on masking was terrible, especially at the outset of
the pandemic. We were too slow to acknowledge airborne transmission of the virus, and even
slower to respond to the threat of disinformation.
At some point, there will have to be reckonings, too, especially for the massacre of neglect that
occurred in long-term care homes.
But most of all, we have to ensure we will do better when the next pandemic comes along,
because an improved performance isn’t a given.
As Dr. Tedros said, we had the tools and technologies to prepare, detect, respond, and
mitigate the harm of this pandemic. We didn’t use them properly and, as a result, lives were lost
unnecessarily.
“We must promise ourselves and our children and grandchildren that we will never make
those mistakes again.”
(The Globe and Mail)

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC

Jian Dong (CEO, WuXi Vaccines)
As the CEO of WuXi Vaccines, a global vaccines contract development and manufacturing
organization (CDMO), I have had the unique perspective of being at the forefront of the global fight
against COVID-19. Even though the industry successfully rose to the challenge of providing
multiple vaccines in such a short timeframe, the COVID-19 pandemic also highlighted the
challenges and vulnerabilities of the global vaccine supply chain.
Despite the successes, limited production capacity and logistical issues caused some shortages
and delays in vaccine distribution. The pandemic also highlighted the need for regional raw material
and vaccine product manufacturing and distribution strategies. Historically, CDMOs were not
commonly used for the production and distribution of vaccines. However, as the pandemic has
demonstrated, CDMOs, due to their unique infrastructure, global footprint, expertise, and capacity,
can quickly produce large quantities of vaccines in a timely manner and offer solutions to
proactively prepare us for future pandemics.
Lessons learned from the COVID-19 vaccine supply challenge
We have learned that traditional vaccine development processes, which take years, were not
sufficient to meet the urgent needs during the pandemic. The pandemic spurred significant
 35

innovation, including the development of new technologies (such as novel mRNA and viral vector
modalities). However, we cannot stop here. We must continuously invest in R&D to find faster and
more efficient mechanisms to develop and manufacture vaccines. Doing so will help us build upon
the innovations that emerged during the pandemic.
Need for flexible and scalable manufacturing capacity
Although COVID-19 vaccines were developed and approved at unbelievable speed,
manufacturing capacity and distribution could not meet the initial global demand. To respond more
rapidly to emerging crises, it is essential that we build a more resilient and agile supply chain,
including redundant regional manufacturing, if possible. One way to do this is by using modular
and flexible manufacturing technologies, such as single-use bioprocessing systems. These systems
can be rapidly deployed and scaled up to meet changing demands and easily repurposed for
different vaccine candidates.
The importance of international cooperation and collaboration
The need for global collaboration and partnerships is critical. Pandemics do not respect
national borders, and it is essential that we work together, across the globe, to combat them. Thus,
building strong partnerships between pharmaceutical companies, governments, and other
international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) to share knowledge,
resources, and expertise is paramount.
One CDMO’s solutions for the global vaccine supply challenge
WuXi Vaccines is committed to offering end-to-end solutions for all participants in the vaccine
supply chain, including well-established vaccine companies, big pharma companies, and biotech
startups. We provide solutions, tailored to the challenges each business faces. Over the past couple
of years, our partners have rapidly gained access to manufacturing capacity and capabilities through
our global manufacturing network and utilized our extensive expertise. By utilizing our CDMO
solutions, our customers can focus on their core competencies and more efficiently bring vaccine
products to the market.
The following case studies highlight how WuXi Vaccines enabled its partners, both large and
small, to meet their vaccine development goals now and into the future.
Case study 1: Leading global vaccine company
Solution: Dedicated external manufacturing center
Today, four leading vaccine development companies account for over 80% of the global
market for vaccines. They play a crucial role in the vaccine supply industry.
However, despite their mature vaccine development and manufacturing expertise and
infrastructure, these organizations still face significant challenges in responding to global pandemics
and unmet vaccine needs. These companies’ product teams and manufacturing facilities are
typically fully committed to existing and strategically important projects, and responding to an
emerging health crisis risks misallocating resources at the expense of other critical projects. Thus, to
move faster during a global health crisis, these organizations should engage external resources to
help reduce these misallocation risks and minimize the impact on ongoing projects.
A CDMO provides these companies with rapid access to external resources and expertise.
These resources provided by a CDMO de-risk vaccine development by quickly ramping capabilities
when needed, enabling the organization to respond to volatile demand while continuing to focus on
its core business.
For example, WuXi Vaccines is currently building an external manufacturing center to enable
one leading vaccine company to launch an innovative high-volume vaccine. To ensure that the
external manufacturing center performs as desired, a business relationship was established based on
 36

a long-term flexible collaboration model that allows for external capacity to be available on short
notice to ensure delivery and safeguard time to market.
In this instance, two sites were established. One site will be used to facilitate technology
transfer. (This site will be located close to our partner’s R&D center to maximize efficiency between
the two R&D teams.) The other site will be used for high-volume production. (This site will be
strategically located to optimize manufacturing talent acquisition and efficient global distribution of
the product.)
The aforementioned high-volume production site showcases not just WuXi Vaccines’
astonishing facility construction speed, but also its commitment to high precision and quality, as
demonstrated by the site passing regulatory audits and achieving GMP certification. WuXi Vaccines
benefitted from leveraging the capabilities and expertise of its parent company (WuXi Biologics). We
used off-site fabrication to construct the BSL-2 potency assay laboratory, an innovative strategy that
allowed us to complete the laboratory in only five months.
By providing speed and precision, the external manufacturing center helps this leading
vaccine company focus its efforts solely on vaccine R&D, reducing time to market, building
competitive advantage, and avoiding the delay and expense of building a dedicated production
facility of its own.
Case study 2: Big pharma
Solution: Click-and-run commercial supplier
As big pharma companies enter the vaccine field, they may face several challenges, including
the potential lack of vaccine expertise across all R&D, manufacturing, and quality functions and
insufficient vaccine production facilities. To address these challenges, they may need to invest in
advanced technologies and capabilities, training, and facilities.
Vaccine CDMOs help big pharma companies address these challenges by providing agile and
high-quality vaccine manufacturing services, especially in situations where demand is highly
variable and unpredictable. CDMOs such as WuXi Vaccines have expertise and resources readily
available to allow rapid production scale-up to meet demand quickly and efficiently.
WuXi Vaccines, again, in conjunction with its parent company (WuXi Biologics), offers one of
the largest capacities for single-use bioreactor operations in the industry, as well as a well-
established global network that includes facilities in Europe, North America, and Asia. Compared
with traditional stainless-steel bioreactor facilities, our use of multiple single-use bioreactors offers a
highly flexible, cost-competitive manufacturing strategy, ideally suited to the variable demands of
the vaccine market.
During the pandemic, WuXi Vaccines enabled a top 10 pharma company to bring its first
vaccine product to market in record time. A key benefit of WuXi Vaccines for the client was rapid
access to flexible production capabilities that could scale rapidly while maintaining quality
standards and compliance.
To meet our partner’s requirements, we upgraded a drug substance plant from BSL-1 to BSL-2
in just four months, resulting in a 20-fold increase in production capacity. As a result of our high-
quality control measures and regulatory experience, a WHO Emergency Use Listing was achieved in
a record time of nine months. WuXi Vaccines delivered more than 500 million doses of our partner’s
vaccine, more than any other supplier, to more than 180 countries.
Case study 3: Biotech startups
Solution: Development and manufacturing accelerator
Biotech startups, as smaller, newer companies, are often focused on specific areas of R&D.
These companies are often characterized as having novel vaccine technologies or modalities, as well
 37

as flexibility and agility. However, these firms may lack the financial resources to invest in
production capacity, and they may have limited technical, quality control, and regulatory
knowledge and experience. For example, they may lack experience with current good
manufacturing practice (cGMP) guidelines.
One important way that CDMOs can help biotech startups is by serving as a development and
manufacturing accelerator. CDMOs can also offer enhanced services, such as filing strategies and
GMP consultation, thus helping startups meet the necessary regulatory requirements and quality
standards.
A biotech client of WuXi Vaccines was planning to be a Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization supplier of COVID-19 vaccines but failed the WHO prequalification audit. The
company’s site was deemed noncompliant. WuXi Vaccines helped this biotech startup overcome this
challenge by sending an expert team to train the client’s manufacturing personnel and provide an
upgrade to the operations and quality systems to achieve GMP compliance, while also providing
off-site CDMO services in parallel. Our team, which included experts in quality, manufacturing, and
engineering, helped our client to upgrade its quality system and prepare for National Regulatory
Authority approval.
As a result, the biotech was able to successfully upgrade its quality system and passed the
National Regulatory Authority inspection in 11 months. In parallel, WuXi Vaccines, serving as this
biotech’s CDMO, initiated technology transfer within one month, and proceeded with Process
Performance Qualification runs that led to an eventual filing and European Medicines Agency GMP
certification within seven months. To date, sufficient drug substance has been manufactured to
provide 33 million doses.
Conclusion
Over the past few years, we’ve seen unparalleled innovation and collaboration in the global
fight against COVID-19. The rapid development and rollout of new vaccines, diagnostic tests, and
therapeutics have saved millions of lives. However, these developments have not benefited
everyone equally. Supply chains were slow to respond. To best prepare for the next global health
emergency, we need more resilient supply chains.
WuXi Vaccines, in partnership with global nongovernmental organizations, is committed to
addressing equality of vaccine access by providing high-quality commercial manufacturing services
where they were needed most. To date, we have contributed COVID-19 vaccine supply to more than
180 countries. We will continue advancing the accessibility and affordability of high-quality vaccines
by employing integrated technology platforms that enable our global partners to enhance the well-
being of people worldwide.
(Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News)
 38

CPEC & OBOR

CPEC AND WESTERN PROPAGANDA OF DEBT TRAP
Facts and Fallacies
Dr. Mehmood Ul Hassan Khan
Due to certain socio-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic reasons, the western propaganda
has once again tarnished China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The western so-called pseudo
intellectuals have dubbed the CPEC as a debt trap for Pakistan which is totally untrue and based on
fallacies, not on facts.
Frankly speaking, the loans under the flagship of the CPEC do not have any specific socio-
economic, geopolitical or geostrategic condition. It is open, transparent, inclusive, development,
human and prosperity-oriented which is commendable.
Interestingly, the composition of the Chinese loans are long term with easy conditions of
repayments, rescheduling and restructuring with lowest interest rate which shows its strong
political commitment to rescue Pakistan and its declining economy from recession and stagnation.
On the other hand the loans from the World Bank, IMF and ADB are short term having higher
interest rates with specific administrative and structural conditions which have been critically
harming the viability of its macro-economy, reducing the capacity building of its productive
channels and bar on its people, business and investment policies. Moreover, according to many
published reports of the State Bank of Pakistan, SECP and Finance Ministry Pakistan is not a high
risk to the Chinese loans which clearly negates the false, fake, fictional and fabricated propaganda of
the western media outlets terming it as unproductive creating strains of the overall financial health
and credibility of the country. The undesirable delay in the ongoing IMF loan negotiations have
badly exposed the chronic syndrome of the Western mentality towards developing and under-
developed countries restricting these to remain underperformed and directly under the thumb of its
financial constraints.
The success of the CPEC Phase-I is permanent and paramount which has already reduced
physical and psychological distances through construction of more than 510 KM roads in the
country and thus started a new concept of inter & intra-regional connectivity, economic mobilization
and social channelization. The success of the CPEC Phase-I is also evident from the addition of more
than 6000 MW new energy supplies in the national grid and many hydropower generation projects
are near to completion which would further stabilize Pakistan’s energy sector and would also
produce an environment-friendly and cheap source of energy in the country.
The Government of Pakistan has already requested the Chinese counterpart for the early
initiation, implementation and execution of the CPEC Phase-II in the country which would
revolutionize our social development, massive industrialization, health, tourism, ICT, AI, e-
commerce, digitalization and last but not the least, reactivation and reconstruction of special free
economic zones in the country.
In this regard, most recently Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal met with Li Chunlin, Vice
Chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and discussed
important CPEC projects and minutes of the 11th JCC meeting.
During the said meeting, Pakistan urged China to speed up the implementation of the first
phase of the Mainline-1 (ML-1), which includes a 1,872km railway track and associated facilities
from Karachi to Peshawar. Pakistan requested that China accelerate the Karachi Circular Railway
(KCR) project, both of which were agreed upon by the leadership of both nations in November.
 39

Furthermore, Pakistan requested strong support from NDRC and other relevant Chinese
government institutions to expedite the implementation of important projects like Mainline-1 (ML-
1), Karachi Circular Railway (KRC) and key energy projects in line with the leadership consensus.
Interestingly, both sides expressed satisfaction with the smooth implementation of various
CPEC projects and agreed that all the pending issues will be resolved amicably in the spirit of
traditional cooperation, mutual understanding, complete trust and brotherhood. In this regard,
progress was also made in the four priority SEZs namely Rashakai, Allama Iqbal Industrial City,
Dhabeji, and Bostan. SEZs agreed to further expedite the progress so as to attract the relocation of
high-quality industries. The signing of the Framework Agreement for Industrial Cooperation was
highly appreciated and both sides committed to holding bi-annual meetings to review the
implementation of the framework.
Obviously 2023 marks a decade of CPEC and a strong partnership between Pakistan and
China. Both Pakistan and China are celebrating 10 Years of BRI and CPEC on 5 July 2023 whereby
high-level Chinese delegations are scheduled to visit Pakistan to witness the achievements made
since the inception of CPEC.
In order to make the 10 years celebrations memorable, both sides agreed to sign the 11th JCC
minutes of the meeting before the end of April 2023 so that relevant Technical Joint Working Groups
(JWGs) could then hold their meetings by mid of May 2023 and workout the tangible outcomes for
the 12th JCC Meeting which is planned to be held in the first week of July 2023 at Islamabad.
To conclude, it is suggested that both countries should introduce green energy projects in the
CPEC Phase-II. In this connection, inclusion of blue and green hydrogen power generation
technology and projects would be value addition. Close liaison on the construction of projects of
lithium battery, solar panels, dry batteries and wind energy should be started as soon as possible in
the country. It is also suggested that both countries should cooperate in technological agriculture
production so that the desired goals of agriculture self-reliance should be achieved. New hybrid
varieties of seeds of wheat, rice, chills, green tea and other agricultural cash crops should be
introduced under the flagship project of CPEC Phase-II. AI, e-commerce, ICT, digitalization,
converting deserts into hubs of development and sands into systematic factories of robust
agriculture production should be included and started as soon as possible.
On a conceptual level, lessons must be learnt from the Chinese Model of Eradication of
Poverty, modernization, opening up, industrialization and human development so that true fruits of
CPEC Phase-I and Phase-II may be achieved in the days to come.
On an operational level lessons must be learnt from the Chinese counterpart to expedite the
ongoing projects of CPEC in the country. In this regard, the policymakers of Pakistan should seek
guidance in terms of project management, disaster management, crisis management, Human
Resource Management and last but not the least, the art of smooth clubbing of human values and
policies into the mainstream policies of economy, industrial growth and rapid exports.
On a philosophical level, there is an urgent need to understand the strategic importance of the
Xi Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilizational Initiative and last
but not the least, shared prosperity for the complete transmission and transformation of our national
economy in the days to come.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)
 40

POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF CPEC

Baluchistan’s Economic Transformation through Gwadar Port And Free Zones
Abdul Mussawer Safi
The potential of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the rise of Gwadar Port
are boons for Baluchistan’s economy. The residents of Gwadar are the primary stakeholders in this
port city, and the establishment of the Gwadar Free Zones (North and South) is intended to
transform Pakistan into an export-driven country. Beginning with trading metals such as copper and
gold from Reko Diq, the export effort out of Gwadar Port is projected to strengthen Baluchistan’s
socioeconomic situation significantly. I hope this will provide Baluchistan with a solid economic
basis for future generations to build growth and prosperity.
The recent implementation of the e-Custom System is expected to transform Gwadar Port into
a technically advanced, high-functioning port with cutting-edge facilities. Web-based One Custom
(WeBOC) integration will facilitate commercial activity at the port, speeding up industrialization
and logistical services. The introduction of vocational training programs in various engineering
disciplines seeks to develop technical expertise in precision mechanics, instrument technology, and
die and shape methods, thereby enhancing the trade’s technical side. As Gwadar evolves into an
international metropolis, it will house several communities demanding laws to protect citizens’
political rights. These new initiatives will help Gwadar Port become an even more significant
economic hub for the region’s economy.
The export of gold and copper from Reko Diq through the Gwadar Port has been a long-awaited
development that promises to stimulate Pakistan’s economy. However, Barrick Gold Company’s
engagement in the project raises questions about possible exploitation and profit-making at the expense
of residents and the environment. With $7 billion to be invested in the mine over the next decade, the
company’s proposal to invest $4 billion in the first four years and $3 billion in the subsequent six years
appears optimistic. The Pakistani government is responsible for ensuring that the development is safe for
the environment and that locals benefit pretty from it. Failure to do so could lead to further exploitation
of the region, benefiting investors and harming the Baluchistan people.
Establishing Gwadar Free Zones was a crucial step in transforming Pakistan into an export-
oriented country and enabling it to compete in international trade. To encourage economic
development and attract international investment, free zones provide a duty-free setting where
businesses may produce and export commodities. It should be noted, however, that the free zones
provide the local markets with trade commodities and manufactured goods and function as a hub
for exporting goods.
Therefore, the government must ensure the free zones’ economic advantages spread to the
surrounding areas. Monitoring how manufacturing in the free zones affects the local environment is
also essential. Gwadar’s free zones can boost economic growth and prosperity for the country,
positioning it as a competitive competitor in global trade if properly administered.
The federal government’s efforts to provide Baluchistan’s youth with improved opportunities
through the CPEC initiative are commendable. Investing in cutting-edge education and technological
know-how is essential to the area’s growth. However, the government must ensure these initiatives are
open to Gwadar and other areas in Baluchistan. While it is encouraging that resources have been set
aside to establish technical training centers in Gwadar for precision mechanics and instrument
technology, there must be ongoing work to keep these centers up-to-date and relevant. The government
is also responsible for guaranteeing that people from all walks of life and of all genders have equal access
to the centers’ educational and vocational programs. Baluchistan benefits significantly from these
ongoing initiatives if they are carried out efficiently and successfully.
 41

There appears to be agreement regarding the significance of CPEC for Pakistan’s economic
development and its potential to advance regional connectivity. However, obstacles such as slow
project completion, poor infrastructure, and political instability, among others, constitute an
imminent risk to the initiative’s viability. Stresses the need to address environmental issues and
ensure sustainable growth. Despite these difficulties, Pakistan dramatically benefits from the
initiatives now underway, such as expanding the Gwadar Port and Free Zone, building the Gwadar
International Airport, and creating special economic zones. Foreign investment, increased
commerce, and new job creation are all possible outcomes of these endeavors. To take advantage of
these chances, however, the government must take decisive action to counteract the region’s most
pressing risks and safeguard the area’s long-term prosperity.
Abdul Mussawer Safi is an author on platforms such as International Policy Digest, Modern
Diplomacy, the South Asia journal Eurasia Review, and Kashmir Watch. He is pursuing his
bachelor’s in international relations from the National Defense University Islamabad. He has a
profound interest in World politics, especiallyin the regional dynamics of South Asia. His academic
strengths are critical and SWOT Analysis. He tweets at @MussawerSafi and can be reached at
[email protected]

CPEC 10 YEARS
Grassroots Level Impacts & Improvement on Socioeconomic Status of
General Public in Pakistan
Tahniyat Mobeen ul Haq
The socioeconomic advancement of a society is contingent upon a myriad of factors,
among which infrastructure plays a pivotal role. Infrastructure refers to the fundamental physical
and organizational structures and facilities required for the functioning of a society. In the case of
Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) holds the utmost significance in this
regard. The CPEC is an infrastructure development initiative valued at $62 billion between the
countries of Pakistan and China. This endeavor is widely regarded as a transformative force for the
Pakistani economy and has been anticipated to yield various economic advantages for the nation,
especially with regard to enhancing the socioeconomic welfare of its populace.
One of the salient characteristics of the CPEC is the enhancement of Pakistan's
infrastructure. The modernization of transportation systems, including highways, roads, railways,
and local public transportation, particularly in Lahore, has facilitated movement across the city.
These initiatives have not only made transportation more affordable for the general public but have
also reduced travel time. Notably, the Orange Line, Metro, and Speedo buses have played a
significant role in this regard. The availability of these transportation facilities has encouraged the
use of public transport, resulting in fewer vehicles on the roads, thereby reducing traffic congestion
and air pollution. These affordable local public transports have been a boon for low-income
households and students, who heavily rely on them to reach their destinations and save their money
for other academic pursuits.
One can observe the positive impacts of these public transportation facilities on the lives
of students in their immediate surroundings. For instance, Hira Sajid, a sixth-semester IR student at
Kinnaird College, regularly uses the Speedo Bus to commute from Walton to Kinnaird College and
vice versa. According to Hira, in the absence of the Speedo bus, she would have to spend a
significant amount of money to cover the long distance between her home and university, which
would be a burden, particularly in these economically challenging times. Furthermore, the story of
Kaleem Imam, an engineering student from UET, underscores the importance of the improved
 42

infrastructure under the CPEC. Kaleem Imam joined a three-month fellowship program in January
2023 organized by Amal Academy and funded by Stanford University. The venue of the fellowship
was GC University, which is located at a considerable distance from his university. In this context,
the Orange Line Metro Train played a crucial role in facilitating Kaleem's travel from his university
to GCU faster and cheaper, thereby saving him both time and money. The positive impacts of these
transportation facilities on the lives of students are evident, as exemplified by the experiences of
Hira Sajid and Kaleem Imam.
Moreover, the construction of roads and highways is another beneficial aspect of CPEC
that has revolutionized time and space. these advancements have facilitated the flow of products
and people, resulting in a rise in economic operations. It has also created opportunities for
businesses to grow, resulting in more employment and financial stability for the local populace.
Additionally, improved infrastructure has boosted communication between Pakistan's various
regions, allowing access to formerly isolated places and facilitating the provision of essential
commodities like healthcare and education. In this regard, the highway between Gwadar and Quetta
holds great importance.
According to Senator Anwaar ul Haq Kakar, the construction and enhancement of the
highway linking Quetta and Gwadar has resulted in a significant reduction in travel time from 24-30
hours to 7-8 hours within a decade. This initiative has improved the connectivity between Quetta,
the provincial capital of Balochistan, and Gwadar, which is a strategically important deep-sea port
located on the Arabian Sea. The newly constructed highway has provided a more direct and
expeditious route for both goods and individuals, thus promoting commerce and economic activity
in the region, and subsequently benefiting the underdeveloped areas of Balochistan.
CPEC has created numerous employment opportunities for the public in Pakistan,
particularly in the construction and transportation sectors. In accordance with the contractual
agreements, a significant number of individuals completed their designated terms of service and
subsequently departed. Nonetheless, their engagement with Chinese specialists and technicians
during their employment tenure enabled them to gain familiarity with contemporary skilled
specifications. This new-found professional competitiveness positioned them advantageously to
secure more lucrative employment prospects within Pakistan as well as in foreign job markets.
The implementation of CPEC has resulted in the creation of more than 75,000
employment opportunities across a range of skill levels, encompassing high-skilled, medium-skilled,
and blue-collar positions. In addition, the project has generated numerous indirect employment
opportunities through associated industries. CPEC's role in facilitating job creation has been a
significant factor in shaping the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and China for several
decades. This phenomenon is noteworthy and unprecedented in contemporary history. During the
phase, I and ongoing phase II of CPEC, all Pakistani employees who have been granted employment
have been guaranteed complete job security from 2015 until 2021. The employees have not
witnessed any instances of forced termination during their contractual period.
Even though the Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in significant financial losses and
economic downturns, numerous individuals working on CPEC projects have not experienced any
negative impact on their employment status. They continue to work without any impending threats
or risks to their job security. CPEC produced 75000 employments, according to data recently
released by the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan.
In conclusion, The CPEC has exerted a substantial influence on the socioeconomic status of
the populace in Pakistan. This initiative has led to the amelioration of the infrastructure, the generation of
job opportunities, and the strengthening of trade ties between Pakistan and China. Nevertheless, the
undertaking confronts certain obstacles that require immediate attention to safeguard its enduring
viability and positive effects on the general public. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Government of
 43

Pakistan, in partnership with China, to tackle these impediments comprehensively and ensure that
CPEC engenders sustainable development and prosperity in Pakistan.
(Source: Consulate General of China in Lahore)

CHINA’S MANIFESTATION OF “GEO-ECONOMICS” & BRI

Saher Liaqat
China, in an unprecedented space of time, has emerged as the second largest economy in the
world and is exerting a form of ‘geoeconomics’ influence that is transforming the nature of
international relations in the 21st century. Through this remarkable achievement, China has enticed
so much attention in the world and international actors are curious about what Chinese leadership
intends to do with its growing power and economic leverage.
China’s Belt & Road Initiative is one of the key manifestations of China’s goal to re-establish
the fabled ‘Silk Route’ which historically had an important expression in China’s long-standing
economic significance in Asia. In the context of long-run economic restructuring, an expanding
material geoeconomics influence, and the development of a more self-confident and externally
oriented policy agenda, it is no coincidence that China’s leaders, especially Xi Jinping, have been
talking about this possibility which potentially incorporates direct and indirect sources of influence.
BRI is a transcontinental long-term policy and investment program and a global initiative aimed at
infrastructure development and acceleration of the economic integration of countries along the historic
Silk Road with a prime focus on Asia, Eastern Europe, Eastern Africa, and the Middle East – a region of
great significance in terms of emerging markets. The Belt & Road Initiative was unveiled by Chinese
President Xi Jinping in 2013 and was initially known as One Belt One Road till 2016. According to the
official data, as of March 2022, 146 countries and 32 international organizations have taken part in the
Initiative through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), representing more than a third of the
world`s GDP and two-thirds of the world`s population altogether.
BRI was officially launched to achieve five major goals including policy coordination,
infrastructure, trade, financial integration and people-to-people cooperation. China, via the 21st-
century Maritime Silk Road, is developing an inclusive, mutually open, balanced and valuable
economic cooperation framework aimed at regional integration and connectivity. In the early years
of the BRI, eight whimsical trade routes were central to Beijing’s ambitions of trade connectivity: six
land-based economic corridors encompassing the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and two maritime
trade routes containing the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”. The Chinese government
departments: National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) laid the action plans for
these trade routes of BRI in 2015, in the “Vision and Actions” agenda.
The two principal aspects of the BRI constitute the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) and the
‘Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR). MSR is designed primarily to effectively link and integrate the maritime
states of Southeast and South Asia in particular whereas, SREB, on the contrary, intends to re-establish
and modernize traditional overland connections with Central and South Asia, connecting them to both
China itself and ultimately to Europe. BRI combines new and old projects, covers an extensive
geographic scope and includes efforts to strengthen hard and soft infrastructure, and cultural ties. It
envisagesan integrated network of ports, railways and roads, a development that will help consolidate
China’s place at the centre of economic activity across much of Asia and Europe.
The initial stimulus for BRI was provided by the economic downturn in the face of the Global
Financial crisis of 2008 in the West that provided China with a huge opportunity to come to the front
and play a leading role in global economic development by bringing more countries into its
economic orbit. Therefore, since BRI’s launch in 2013, it has been serving Beijing’s geopolitical and
 44

geoeconomic objectives by expanding China’s influence around the globe. In its early years, Beijing
sought to simply strengthen its ties with the governments abroad and gain a foothold as one of their
key economic partner using the strategy of offering loans, investment and summitry while avoiding
confrontation with the US. Thus, China engaged diplomatically with the countries where the US was
less-invested politically such as countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Latin America
and Sub-Saharan Africa and the economic corridors situated at the heart of BRI mainly traverse
these regions. The economic corridor of Pakistan serves as the best example, signifying this
approach of Beijing.
CPEC, the principal project of BRI in Pakistan, a mega project worth billions of dollars is not
only an economic corridor or transit route for the Chinese market but includes infrastructure and
energy projects, construction of modern transportation networks, industrialization and the
improvement of Gwadar Port which is the most operational port regarding oil and gas shipping
lanes. Moreover, there is a range of proposed special economic zones that runs about 2700 km along
the route from Kashgar, China’s westernmost city, through central Pakistan to Gwadar port on
Pakistan’s southwest coast, with these projects mainly focused on boosting the economic
performance of Pakistan making the country a regional economic hub.
Rationally speaking, BRI has the full potential to achieve considerable economic and political
gains for China and many of them have been explicitly acknowledged in China’s official policy
communiqué, for example, the expansion of China’s export markets, the reduction of trade frictions
such as tariffs and transportation costs and the promotion of the Renminbi (RMB) as an international
currency. China’s growing economic stature has enabled it to transit from a grand strategy that
merely sought its economic goals to one that benefits it to leverage its growing economic power in
achieving unreachable foreign policy goals.
China’s economic rise has also given China’s leaders generally, and Xi, in particular, much greater
potential agency. Chinese leaders are keen to use it to restore their former dominant status at the
forefront of international diplomacy and great power politics and especially in its region which is widely
supported by both the leadership of the PRC and by the population more generally. It cannot be denied
that China’s enhanced geo-economic influence and rising power are giving it an upper hand to pursue
these ambitions much more rapidly that had hardly been possible a decade ago or two.
Though predictable implications and consequences of BRI cannot be fully judged its possible
trajectory is already becoming clear. China has both the state capacity and the practical experience in
making such a project a reality. It has both the material resource and the key agencies, such as the
National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) that have developed detailed plans for the
successful implementation of specific aspects of the BRI. It is therefore important to emphasize that
despite the shift to a more market-oriented economy, Beijing and its developmental agencies
continue to play a major role in the overall coordination of economic development while projecting
soft power in the form of geo-economics.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)
 45

Domestic Politics
EXEC-LEGISLATURE ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY
Qamar Bashir (Former Press Secretary to the President and former press minister to the Embassy of
Pakistan to France)
In all wisdom, the Constitution has bound the government, legislature, and judiciary in their
respective spheres, and none is above or beyond it.
Every law enacted by the parliament is subject to interpretation by the supreme court in light
of the ideals and purposes of the Constitution. It is the prerogative of the legislature to amend the
Constitution and pass laws. It is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether such laws
violate the fundamental structure of the Constitution.
Most countries settled the question of which pillar is superior to the other shortly after their
establishment, but in Pakistan, forced by our vested interest, we bring up the issue whenever and
wherever it suits the authorities. Even though the Constitution has assigned each pillar a distinct
function, jurisdiction, and level of importance, it has not favoured one over the others. Parliament
cannot pass a law that contradicts the fundamental structure of the Constitution until the
Constitution is amended and the amendment is in harmony with the fundamental structure. Once a
law is enacted, it enters the jurisdiction of the supreme court, which has the exclusive and final
authority and is a last resort to evaluate it against the Constitution, The Constitution so zealously
protects the independence of the judiciary that even the parliament cannot amend the constitution to
clip the review powers of the judiciary. The matter was decided in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India in 1980. The Indian Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the government had
the power to amend the Constitution to curtail the power of judicial review. The court held that the
power to amend the Constitution did not include the power to destroy its basic structure, which
included the power of judicial review. The court held that the Constitution was supreme and that no
branch of government, including Parliament, could override its basic structure. In Marbury v
Madison (1803), the US Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a law passed by Congress was
constitutional. The court held that it had the power of judicial review and that it could strike down
laws passed by Congress if they were unconstitutional. The court also held that the Constitution was
supreme and that no branch of government, including Congress, could violate its provisions. In this
sense, the judiciary is seen as a co-equal branch of state with the legislative and executive branches.
In India, there have been several instances where the Supreme Court has overruled decisions
taken by the government or the legislature. For example, in 2016, the court struck down a law
passed by the parliament that allowed convicted lawmakers to continue holding office. The court
held that the law violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers and undermined the
integrity of the political system.
Sadly, even after more than 75 years of this beleaguered nation’s existence, we continue to
struggle to define and redefine the jurisdiction and superiority of the parliament over the judiciary,
or the executive and vice versa, not based on merit, objectivity, national interest, or welfare of the
people, but rather swaying now and then in the direction best suited to the vested interests. When in
power, the parties conveniently pursue one position, but when in opposition, they perform a
complete 180 and develop the exact opposite narrative. This war of imposing superiorities of one
pillar over the other has taken an ugly turn in Pakistan, where the entire opposition sits outside the
assemblies and the legislature has become an extension of the government. They, both motivated by
the similarity and unity of their vested interests, have joined hands to arm-twist the judiciary,
 46

reduce it to a state of irrelevance, and erode its power to the point where it becomes an extension of
the executive parliament incapable of making independent decisions.
Sadly again, Parliament and the Executive have adopted the same tone and tenor when
criticizing the superior judiciary on trivial accounts and matters and questioning every action taken
by the chief justice, including the formation of benches, allocation of business to the judges, and
transfer of cases from one judge to the next, despite the fact that it is the sole prerogative of the chief
justice to allocate business to the judges and run the superior judiciary as he or she deems
appropriate. Perhaps this is only occurring in Pakistan, where we are unable to resolve fundamental
questions about our existence and the purpose of our institutions. In Pakistan and everywhere in the
world, the chief justice has the authority to form court benches to hear and decide cases, determine
the composition and number of judges on each bench, transfer cases from one bench to another and
assemble larger benches to hear cases of great public importance. In the United States, the Chief
Justice has the authority to assign judges to different circuits and panels of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, as well as the power to temporarily assign judges from different circuits to sit on another
circuit when necessary. In India, the Chief Justice has the authority to form Supreme Court benches,
assign cases to these benches, transfer cases between benches, and refer cases to larger benches for
hearings and decisions. In the United Kingdom, the Lord Chief Justice assigns judges to different
cases and circuits in the High Court and Court of Appeal, transfers cases from one court to another,
and establishes new courts or tribunals as needed.
The truncated and opposition-less parliament, which even perhaps lacks the moral authority
or justification to make laws, is hell-bent on reducing the powers of the chief justice and handing
them over to its hand-picked and cultivated judges without considering the grave and far-reaching
consequences of removing the power, which is a crucial aspect of judicial administration around the
world and plays a vital role in ensuring the fairness, efficiency, and independence of the judicial
system. If the Chief Justice loses the authority to form benches and assign cases, there may be delays
in the hearing and resolution of cases leading to confusion and inefficiency in the court system and
resultant delay in the administration of justice for litigants. Without a central authority, benches will
be formed with biases or favouritism based on personal or political affiliations rather than
qualifications and experience.
In all established democracies however, in general, Parliament cannot overturn the decisions
of the courts related to the allocation of funds for organizing elections if it is required by the
constitution. The separation of powers principle, which is a fundamental principle of most
democratic systems, means that the judiciary is an independent branch of the state with the power to
interpret the law and make decisions based on it. Therefore, if a court decision is made in accordance
with the Constitution, the Parliament cannot overturn it through legislative action. However,
Parliament may have the authority to amend the constitution to change the provisions related to the
allocation of funds for organization elections. This would, however, require a vote by a ? majority of
members of Parliament.
The case in hand is the allocation of funds to the Election Commission for holding elections for
the Punjab Assembly which triggered an onslaught of the judiciary by Executive-Legislature. Unlike
the current constitutional deadlock in Pakistan, in such situations in many other countries, the
orders of the courts were obeyed without any reservation. In 2019, the Philippine Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) requested the court to order the government to provide additional funds to
cover the expenses for the May 2019 midterm elections. The request was granted, and the funds
were released in time for the elections. The court’s decision was also endorsed by the legislature. In
2020, the Supreme Court of India directed the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct
elections in the state of Bihar by November 2020. The ECI requested additional funds from the
government to cover the expenses for the elections, and the government immediately released the
 47

funds. The legislative branch also passed a resolution supporting the government’s decision to
provide funds for the elections.
I have not the slightest doubt that the competent legal aids of the executive and legislative
branches are fully aware of the fundamental and unavoidable need to uphold the provisions of the
constitution, which provide the basis and foundation of a civilized society as opposed to the law of
the jungle. Then, what are the stakes that motivate the Executors-legislatures to band together
against the constitution and the judiciary, which is making every effort to uphold the relevant
provision of the constitution?
In an interview that aired today (18 April 2023), the Defence Minister elaborated on what
makes Punjab elections so exceptional and high-stakes. If elections are held, the entire effort to
change the regime will be in vain. According to him, whichever party (in this case, PTI) won the
elections in Punjab, which accounts for 65 per cent of the country’s population, would certainly
sweep the general elections whenever held and may even win a two-thirds majority of the
parliament. This would be a death knell for constituent parties of the PDM, especially PML(N). The
PPP would most likely retain Sindh and PML(N) would be left with nothing in the centre or Punjab
for the next five years. This will even neutralize Nawaz Sharif, who is eagerly awaiting his return to
Pakistan as a celebrity rather than a convict in the hopes of becoming prime minister for a fourth and
likely final time, given his age and failing health. This revelation of the truth by a PMN(L) stalwart is
ample evidence as to why PML(N) with the tacit support of the establishment is fighting tooth and
nail, against every political, administrative, and judicial move which endorses the constitutional
provision to hold elections within 90 days in case assemblies are dissolved prematurely, even
though they know in their hearts that by doing so they would be trampling the constitution and
breaking the law, they are also aware that if they lose this battle, they will lose the opportunity to
govern the country for at least the next five years, which is too big a risk to take, even bigger than
violating the constitution and facing the contempt of court.
In this war of survival of PDM and especially PMN(N), the constitution and the people of
Pakistan are the biggest casualties. This war is not fought on the question of the superiority of one
pillar of the state over the other but on the basis that everything is fair in love and war. It is a
question of the very existence of PML(N), which is facing imminent routing first in Punjab and later
in the centre, if the elections are held as per the dictates of the constitution. They are using all arrows
in their bow to remain in power, buy time, neutralize Imran Khan by hook or by crook and bring
Nawaz Sharif back to prop up PMN(L).
In their desperation, they have pushed the constitution away, knowing full well that
constitutionality is supreme, not the pillars of the state that operate under the constitution’s dictates
or the vested interests. According to the constitution, neither the judiciary nor the legislative or
executive branches may exceed their respective limits. The Judiciary should be free from the
influence of the executive and the legislature to advance the goals of justice. Where the judiciary
protects the rights of the people against the encroachment of the government or any other
organization or person, the superior courts enforce the fundamental rights of the people through the
appropriate writs of Judicial order- of the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo
Warranto, etc. To render the judiciary impotent is akin to abolishing the constitution and law in the
nation, which can only be restored by popular movements.
Now that civil society has awakened once more, we are observing all the necessary signs of civil
movement to uphold the Constitution and protect the judiciary from the combined assault of the
Executive and the legislature. Let us hope and do everything in our individual and collective power to
uphold the country’s constitution and rule of law, which are the foundation of a civilized society.
(Source: Daily Times)
 48

UTILISING NFC EFFICIENTLY

Nasir Jamal
Recently, a World Bank economist brought to the fore that the cash-strapped federal
government continues to annually spend Rs710 billion or nearly 1.3 per cent of the country’s GDP by
retaining 17 devolved ministries and funding development projects in areas that under the
constitution fall in the provincial domain.
This is in spite of the severe financial crunch, resulting in high fiscal deficits (averaging 6.2pc
of GDP for the last 10 years) year after year and the accumulation of a mountain of debt.
Briefing journalists, the World Bank economist Derek Chen, said the government was
spending Rs328bn on the devolved ministries even after 15 years (of the passage of the 18th
amendment). He said the federal government was not only retaining the devolved subjects (to
accommodate politicians and bureaucrats) but also increasing its spending. According to the
lender’s estimates, the federal spending on devolved subjects has gone up from 0.39pc of the GDP in
2009 to 0.59pc in 2022.
Likewise, the federal spending on development projects in areas that fall in the domain of the
province stood at Rs315bn or 0.5pc of the GDP in 2022. On top of it, the federal government spends
Rs70bn to finance higher education despite education being a provincial subject under the
devolution process.
“This is a duplication of the task,” Mr Chen said, adding that the devolution process should
have been completed at the earliest. “Let the provinces invest and develop health, sports, education
and similar other areas so that the federal government could take care of its core responsibilities,” he
argued.
This incomplete devolution has led to spending overlaps between the federal and provincial
governments, which is likely to have led to redundancies, duplication of tasks and costs, and overall
higher-than-optimal expenditures at the federal level.
The huge duplicate spending is contributing to higher fiscal deficits and public debt, besides
keeping many initiatives of the centre underfunded. The cuts in this expenditure can result in large
savings and help the government somewhat address its chronic fiscal deficits.
The World Bank’s analysis of federal spending takes a lot of steam out of the argument against
administrative and fiscal devolution under the landmark 18th amendment to the Constitution and
the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) award that transferred the bulk of tax revenues to the
federating units.
The criticism against the incomplete devolution process is based on three contentions. One, it
has increased the budget deficits incurred by the federal government, something that the World
Bank analysis of duplicate federal spending reveals doesn’t have a leg to stand on.
Two, the transfer of massive resources has disincentivised the provinces from raising their
own revenues. That is partially correct since the provinces, especially Punjab and Sindh, have
focused on and boosted services sales tax but ignored to develop property, agriculture and other
provincial taxes.
The other two provinces, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have underdeveloped
economies and are reeling under militancy, and hence cannot be expected to collect enough taxes.
Three, the availability of the funds under the NFC award has led to an increase in non-
development provincial expenditures like pay and pension. That’s also only partially correct.
Indeed, the provincial salary bill has increased significantly. But the repeated and heavy federal
 49

increase in the salaries of its employees doesn’t leave the federating units with much of a choice to
not follow suit.
At the same time, however, the provincial expense on education, health and other social
sectors has also risen sharply ever since the provincial share from the federal divisible tax pool was
enhanced from 50pc under the previous arrangement to 57.5pc.
Additionally, the provinces have, in the recent past, produced budget surpluses to help the
federation hold down consolidated federal fiscal deficits. Apart from the federal spending on the
devolved subjects and financing of development in provinces to ensure the reelection of the ruling
members of the National Assembly, the other major reason behind the federal financial woes is the
failure to build up tax-to-GDP ratio to 15pc in five years to 2015, the last year of the award, as agreed
under the award.
The 18th Amendment and the NFC Award represent a major shift in the country’s fiscal
architecture as pointed out by the World Bank in its new report released on Friday. The report, the
Pakistan Federal Public Expenditure Review (PER), says that while the provinces together have been
typically running small surpluses over the fiscal years 2010-22, the federal government has been
consistently running large budget deficits.
“The 18th Amendment and 7th NFC Award together have resulted in significant vertical fiscal
asymmetry,” it says. This is the first PER report and also the first one at a federal level since the
implementation of the 18th Constitutional Amend-ment and the 7th National Finance Commission
(NFC) Award in 2010.
The report estimates that Pakistan can save about 4pc of GDP through proper fiscal
management and revenue generation by benefitting from devolution.
While it would be a mistake to reverse the devolution process, the provinces should take it
further down to the district level and align their spending with service delivery targets and
outcomes.
Some kind of mechanism needs to be evolved for a consolidated budgetary framework to set
both current and development expenditure and revenue generation priorities for the provinces and
ensure coordination between the federal government and the provinces on their budgetary
allocations.
The framework can be evolved at the Council of Common Interests. Nonetheless, the process
should start with the federal govt reducing its size consistent with the 18th Amendment and
stopping development spending in the provincial domain.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)

DEMOCRACY AND GENDER DISPARITY

Shiza Nasir (Senior Teaching Fellow at the Lahore School of Economics)
Pakistan has struggled with gender disparity for decades, with women facing numerous
challenges in various aspects of life. However, in a typical Pakistani household, women are not
active participants in political discussions. This is not due to any cognitive limitations on their part,
but rather because they are overshadowed by male members of the household. Women are often
relegated to menial tasks, with little opportunity for thoughtful participation. When it is time to
vote, women tend to follow the direction of their male relatives, just as men are often held captive to
the whims of the more influential individuals.
The situation does not bode well for the prospect of a thriving democracy. The issue of gender
disparity is further compounded by the fact that Pakistan cannot be considered a democracy no
 50

matter how much we try to convince ourselves otherwise. Democracy, by definition, involves an
informed decision-making process where all arguments are carefully considered, leading to
conscious and informed decisions. Unfortunately, much of Pakistan operates on a biradri system
where decisions are made based on personal influence rather than merit. This system cannot be seen
as reflective of a true democracy.
In terms of political representation, extreme disparity is evident in the quota system. The
Provincial and National Assemblies have reserved seats for women. This is an acknowledgment of
the underrepresentation and marginalisation of women in politics. Women hold only a handful of
leadership positions. At one point, only two women were elected to the National Assembly on
general seats at one time, with the rest being appointed against reserved quotas. This could indicate
that political campaigns led by women are weak or fruitless. It is often assumed that women
politicians are not as invested because they have to manage domestic responsibilities, including
raising children, which makes politics a second thought.
It is evident that many women are not very keen on women’s participation in politics. This
could be due to the prevalent notion that politics is better left to men. Even when women do enter
politics, they become the subject of tabloid journalism, with the media focusing more on their
appearance and belongings than on their performance. Hina Rabbani Khar, the former foreign
minister, was an example of such reporting. Such reporting reinforces the idea that women in
politics are not taken seriously, and that their appearance is more important than their competence.
Gender disparity in Pakistan is a long-standing issue in terms of social freedoms. Women are
often restricted, treated as objects of pleasure and discouraged from speaking out. The notion that
boys will be boys has placed a disproportionate burden of responsibility on women as caregivers
and nurturers, while men often shirk their responsibilities.
Economic disparity is also a major problem. Women are often not given the opportunity to
earn or are prevented from spending their earnings as they see fit. Women who work as domestic
workers are particularly vulnerable. They may have no control over their earnings and are often
expected to contribute to running a household.
Legislature designed by men to protect women is problematic in that while they may
sympathise with women they do not always fully understand their experiences. Most men cannot
fully comprehend the sufferings of women. Therefore, laws related to women need women’s input
to ensure rationality and empathy.
Some cultural norms also reinforce stereotypes and promote trivial matters like skin
complexion and body image that can undermine women’s self-worth and hinder provision of equal
opportunities to women. Women are often raised with the expectation of becoming brides,
homemakers and mothers. While there is nothing inherently wrong with these roles, such
expectations are a sign of limited imagination and do not encourage women to embrace their full
potential as people who can make a difference in the world through their ideas and actions. As a
result, nearly half of the population is disempowered and kept away from crucial decision-making.
The biggest challenge in Pakistan towards achieving gender equality is the idea of self-
identity. Women are often treated as objects that belong to someone and are not given a chance to
develop their own personalities. Equality will not be achieved as long as they are seen to be
belonging to their fathers and husbands. Women need to accept themselves as complete human
beings who do not require a male presence to validate their existence.
(Source: TNS)
 51

PAKISTAN’S POLITICS OF POWER

Ejaz Haider (Journalist interested in security and foreign policies)
When a colleague pressed German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg about what
had caused World War I, up until then the most devastating war the world had seen, Hollweg
replied: “Ah, if we only knew.”
Thus begins Graham Allison in his now-famous book, Destined for War: Can America and
China Escape the Thucydides Trap. Hollweg’s answer, Allison tells us, haunted John F Kennedy
nearly 50 years later. Vacationing at Camp Cod in the summer of 1962, Kennedy read Barbara
Tuchman’s Guns of August and absorbed Tuchman’s argument that none of the European leaders
“understood the danger they faced.” None wanted a war and yet they “sleepwalked into the abyss.”
“Kennedy,” Allison says, “pledged that if he ever found himself facing choices that could
make the difference between catastrophic war and peace, he would be able to give history a better
answer than Hollweg’s.” Two months after he had read Tuchman’s book, in October 1962, he was
confronting the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Allison says, “Although he appreciated the dangers of his predicament, Kennedy repeatedly
made choices he knew actually increased the risk of war, including nuclear war.” If any of those
choices had led to World War III and if, perchance, two people had survived it, “Could [Kennedy]
give a better answer to an inquisitor’s question than Hollweg did?”
Lesson: the complexity of causation, as Allison and other scholars have noted, is vexing, not
just in relation to how and why wars happen, but also how states and societies govern themselves
and how many fail in developing the internal balance that, to quote economists Daron Acemoglu
and James Robinson, lies in a “narrow corridor”.
But the important lesson from Thucydides and other historians is that, while immediate or
proximate causes are important as a fillip or sparks — e.g. the fatal shooting of Hapsburg archduke
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo which triggered WWI — it is the structural factors that need to be
understood, “conditions in which otherwise manageable events can escalate with unforeseeable
severity and produce unimaginable consequences.”
Impasse at home
Since the ouster through a vote of no-confidence (VoNC) of former prime minister Imran
Khan, much ink and even more air waves are being wasted on day-to-day commentary about events
and proximate causes.
The discourse for the most part is partisan and reflects the binaries that come to inform
peoples’ views in complex situations, where a number of issues remain unresolved. Physical
sciences defeated ignorance and superstition through experimentation and discoveries. Social
scientists — economists are the worst offenders — despite trying to mathematise the social sphere,
keep running into cul-de-sacs because, as the American theologian and sociologist Reinhold
Niebuhr noted trenchantly in 1932 in his canonical work Moral Man and Immoral Society,
“Complete rational objectivity in a social situation is impossible.”
In most, if not all such cases, economic and power interests of a dominant class or classes
(take, for instance, the idea of elite capture — or extractive elites — which is a genuine concern but,
in the absence of any real analysis, has become just another trope) will create injustices that “cannot
be resolved by moral and rational suasion alone.” When there are no institutions available — or
where the form of such institutions is a mere red-herring — “conflict [will be] inevitable, and in this
conflict power must be challenged by power.”
 52

This is not to say that most people agitating the socio-political and economic disharmony that
we are witnessing here take to the streets after reading Thucydides or Plutarch. Nor should one
confuse the current crop of leaders in this country — civilian and uniformed — as representing
Solon or even Theseus. But there are real structural imbalances which cannot be dealt with through
mere commentary on daily events and which have hobbled this country’s socio-political and
economic spheres for seven decades.
As political scientist Mehran Kamrava noted in his Inside the Arab State, “The essence of
politics boils down to state-society relations. But these relations are far from mechanical. There are
cultural, ideological and normative dimensions to the interactions as well, and such factors as
legitimacy and citizenship are also instrumental in shaping politics.”
The case of Egypt
In a putsch on July 3, 2013, while leading a coalition, Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, a mechanised
infantry officer who had also served as head of Military Intelligence, deposed Egypt’s elected
president Mohamed Morsi and suspended the country’s 2012 constitution.
Sisi had come to relative prominence after the 18-day protests in 2011, which had forced President
Hosni Mubarak to leave office and when he was named a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF). The SCAF ran Egypt as an interim arrangement after Mobarak’s departure.
His position in the system was further entrenched when Morsi, after being elected president
in June 2012, appointed Sisi as commander-in-chief of the military and defence minister in August
that year. This decision, among other things, was to set in motion events in Egypt that would
transform the promise of the Arab Spring into what political scientist Steven Cook famously called
the “false dawn”.
A little-remembered fact of what happened after Morsi’s, and with him the Muslim
Brotherhood’s (MB), rise to power is the role of Egypt’s secular-liberal enclave. To simplify matters
for our purpose, the secular-liberals were deeply unhappy at the prospect of Morsi and MB running
Egypt. The opposition parties and their supporters accused Morsi’s government of poor economic
policy, energy shortages, lack of security and creating diplomatic crises. The last reference was about
Morsi’s favourable approach to foreign intervention in Syria.
Protests broke out by the end of 2012. Observers noted that opposition politicians were in
secret talks with the military, essentially the C-in-C of the military, Sisi. “In the months before the
military ousted President Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s top generals met regularly with senior aides to
opposition leaders, often at the Navy Officers’ Club nestled on the Nile,” reported Wall Street
Journal in a July 19, 2013 report titled ‘In Egypt, the ‘Deep State’ Rises Again.’ The report mentioned
a number of politicians including Mohamed ElBaradei, Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi.
But the distaste for Morsi and MB ran much deeper. Liberals, who had taken active part in the
Tahrir Square demonstrations in 2011 that forced out Mubarak, were now hobnobbing with the
military. The late Egyptian writer and feminist, Nadal El Saadawi, welcomed Morsi’s ouster as a
“historical revolution and not a coup d’état.” According to her, “The revolutionaries turned to the
army and the army responded.”
El Saadawi repeated this to Rachel Cooke at The Observer in an interview in October 2015
when Cooke pointed out that “state killings and the numbers of government opponents languishing
in prison are both dramatically on the rise.” “Not at all,” she says, stubbornly. “There is a world of
difference between Mubarak and Sisi. He has got rid of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that never
happened with Mubarak, or with Sadat before him.”
Similar sentiments were expressed by Esraa Abdel Fattah, activist and journalist who earned
the moniker “Facebook Girl” during the Tahrir Square demonstrations in 2011. “When terrorism is
trying to take hold of Egypt and foreign interference is trying to dig into our domestic affairs, then
 53

it’s inevitable for the great Egyptian people to support its armed forces against the foreign danger.”
In an ironic twist, just like many other dissenters, Fattah spent almost two years in detention after
being arrested in October 2019.
But the irony runs deeper than just the person of Fattah and other secular-liberals, including
liberal politicians, civil society actors, journalists and left-oriented labour leaders. Most of them,
though not all, wanted to get rid of Morsi and MB and struck a Faustian bargain with the military.
The result: Sisi has consolidated personal rule, militarised the Egyptian political system and
attributed the opposition.
Principal contradictions
As I have noted elsewhere, when Mao Zedong penned his essay ‘On Contradiction’ in July
1937, he was tackling a practical problem. The theoretical part of the essay was to provide
philosophical support for the practical problem: the military threat from Japan, which had declared
war against China.
The war became an inflection point for China. Before then, for an entire decade, Chinese
Communists had fought Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalists. The Communists were chased and killed in
a bloody civil war and paid a heavy price. But after Japan invaded China and threatened both
Communists and Nationalists, what were the Communists to do?
The dogmatic wanted to consider the Nationalists as an internal threat while looking at Japan
as an external enemy. That meant fighting two adversaries, an untenable military-strategic position.
This was the practical problem Mao faced. But he needed a theoretical argument to explain what
was at stake.
Mao’s argument, relevant to our purpose, was the premise that, “There is nothing that does
not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist.” But, as he argued, this
concept of “contradiction” is not static; it’s dynamic:
“The fundamental contradiction becomes more and more intensified as it passes from one
stage to another in the lengthy process. In addition, among the numerous major and minor
contradictions which are determined or influenced by the fundamental contradiction, some become
intensified, some are temporarily or partially resolved or mitigated, and some new ones emerge;
hence the process is marked by stages.”
In essence, Mao wanted the Communists to distinguish in a complex situation between what
was a principal contradiction and what [are/were] the aspects of a principal contradiction. Over
time, and given the changing situations, “the principal and non-principal [secondary] aspects of a
contradiction can transform themselves into each other, and the nature of it changes accordingly.”
Contradictions and perceptions
Two points are important here. The principal contradiction and its dynamism is not just a
problem of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, that assessment being just one aspect of it. It’s not
about the Egyptian secular-liberals saying that, since Morsi is an Islamist, let’s side with Sisi and, by
extension, the military. It’s a structural issue, at the core of which lies power. Who has the power to
coerce? Put another way, who can rig the system in ways that would allow that person, party or
institution to not only perpetrate but perpetuate its power?
In some countries, it’s the military. In others it has been — can be, and is — a single
party/ideology. For instance, the Egyptian secular-liberals as a broad category had to figure out
whether the principal contradiction lay between all the civilian actors and the military or between
Morsi’s and MB’s Islamism and secularity. They chose the latter. But in doing that, they forgot the
element of power and the coercion that flows from it.
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Resultantly, after Morsi was ousted and Sisi entrenched himself, he decided to crackdown on
dissent regardless of the ideology of the dissenter. The Grim Reaper, as we know, is indiscriminate.
Niebuhr writes: “The coercive factor is…always present in politics. If economic interests do
not conflict too sharply, if the spirit of accommodation partially resolves them, and if the democratic
process has achieved moral prestige and historic dignity, the coercive factor in politics may become
too covert to be visible to the casual observer.
“Nevertheless, only a romanticist of the purest water could maintain that a national group
ever arrives at a ‘common mind’ or becomes conscious of a ‘general will’ without the use of either
force or the threat of force.”
The ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ approach, sans a careful examination of where power
resides and who exercises it, is destined to fall prey to its own contradiction, namely an initial
acceptance that allying with a powerful force is important to fight the adversary but ignoring how
the powerful force will act when the initial objective has been met.
In other words, it’s the difference between avoiding a two-front situation and preserving one’s
strength versus allying with a force more powerful than one can muster in order to worst the
adversary. The first is strategy; the second, hope.
Pakistan and its contestants
As noted above, Pakistan stands at an impasse, perhaps a Mexican stand-off, described as a
confrontation where no strategy exists that allows any party to achieve victory. Again, the current
situation — partisans notwithstanding — did not develop with the VoNC against Khan. It has been
evolving over decades.
At the core of it is what Kamrava describes as power politics (I will add other interests that
come with the exercise of power), “who wins, who loses, and who is able to outsmart or outmuscle
others in the bid to institutionalise newly-won powers.” The interest of the dominant group or
coalition becomes “the agendas of the state.”
We have four actors in the arena: Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), the
current Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition government, the judiciary, and the army.
People, for the most part, even when aligned with one or the other political actor are largely
irrelevant (that’s another discussion and a system problem but it’s important to flag it.)
In the 2018 elections, the army sided with Khan. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) had
already fallen foul of the army and Nawaz Sharif was disqualified through a verdict that remains
controversial. In 2021, Khan got a taste of the army’s “neutrality” when his weakest link, the PTI allies
were made to develop a “conscience”. Much is now known, given the penchant by both Khan and
former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa for hanging out the dirty laundry for public viewing.
After his ouster, Khan took to the road. His motif in the speeches was (to some extent even now) to
discredit the army’s top brass, especially the former army chief. At the same time, Khan was also
privately reaching out to the army chief, a fact acknowledged, and defended, by leaders of his own party.
This is the point where we return to Mao. PML-N’s elder Sharif and his daughter Maryam
Nawaz Sharif attacked the army when out of power; Khan and his supporters are doing the same
now that they are out of power. When in power, Khan and his ministers would blast the PML-
N/PDM for attacking the army. The PML-N/PDM leaders are now blasting Khan and the PTI for
undermining the army.
Corollary one: even as the army’s image has taken a beating, within the system it still retains
the capability to control events and outcomes. And since there’s a difference between the morals of
groups and individuals, the army, just like any other group (or actor), would do whatever it can to
dominate this national setting.
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Corollary two: for all his rhetoric against some in the brass, Khan still believes that the
principal contradiction lies between him and the political opposition. This, understandably,
precludes any possibility of a political charter between PTI and the rest and, consequently, allows
the army to remain dominant.
In a cover article published in Eos on December 18, 2022, I had made two central observations:
the military’s dominance is not just a coup problem, because militaries just need to control strategic
nodes within the system.
The second observation, flowing from this, was that to think the army “is about to change its
disposition is to live in a fool’s paradise.”
Zero-sum game
The country is now politically unstable, economically near-insolvent and socially divisive.
Khan’s view that he won’t talk to the “imported” government is now reciprocated by the latter. The
federal interior minister, Rana Sanaullah, is on record as having said that “it’s either us or Khan.“
These positions fly in the face of an understanding of politics as a process of aggregating
conflicting and often contradictory interests. Privately, political sources on both sides of the divide
also say, sotto voce, that the army doesn’t want Khan to return to power because its top leadership
does not trust him and fears that he might take steps that could disrupt the organisational
cohesiveness of the army. That cohesiveness, incidentally, has already come under great strain.
This requires engineering because popularity polls and ratings show Khan to be miles ahead
of other leaders. He is pressuring the system through the dissolution of the Punjab and Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa assemblies. The system is fighting back by using semi-legal and illegal ruses. The
Constitution mandates a 90-day period for elections to be held. The Election Commission of Pakistan
is the body required to hold elections. But in the current contested landscape, this clear provision
has become a bone of contention and is now dragging the Supreme Court (SC) through the mud.
The happenings at the SC reflect the partisan divide in this country. Lawyers train hard to
play on technicalities and procedures but, when arguments are spiced by political leanings and
preferences, the focus on technicalities to the exclusion of substance runs the risk of shystering.
While there can be multiple positions and choices, especially where those positions are
informed by partisan leanings, a course of action must be guided by the clarity provided by laws
and the Constitution.
That is unfortunate for two reasons: one, the conversation about SC’s functioning and the
Chief Justice of Pakistan’s place is indeed an important one. But when this conversation happens at
the time it is happening and in the manner in which it is happening, it begins to come across as a
diversion rather than something important in its own right.
Two, in addition to the timing and the manner in which it is being conducted, it is not only
interfering with the substantive issue of elections, it seems to want to shoot it down. Thirdly, but not
least, the mutinous approach to tackling these internal issues has shown the fissures within the SC
and delivered a severe blow both to its role as an arbiter and its ability to do better than other
institutions on whose actions it is supposed to arbitrate.
This is why the current government has “advised” the SC to first put its own house in order, a
perfect example of the pot calling the kettle black.
A state bereft
There are two paths to change: one is gradualness, the other is disruption.
History bears testimony to both. Personally, I am an incrementalist. But that approach implies
aggregation and compromise, where parties in a conflict confer together, “moderate their demands
and arrive at a modus vivendi.”
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But what if that doesn’t happen? What if the disinherited and powerless groups in a society —
or the aspiring urban youth as seems to be the case here — cannot make their voices heard, much
less have the space to confer? Participating in a power and interest balance in a state-society
relationship is after all not really the same as being a corporate shareholder who can sell the stock
and exit, though many are exiting, some even drowning in the process.
How do you reorganise the values where the dominant group or groups are simply not
interested in sharing power and can rig the system in their favour, especially if winning and losing
becomes a zero-sum game?
Many states survive (even increase overall prosperity) despite politico-ideological repression,
China being a good example. But they do so through economic progress and sound developmental
policies, though the issue of political participation can continue to simmer despite overall
prosperity. Pakistan neither has political stability nor economic prospects. And while it is still some
way short of being an entirely authoritarian state, it is steadily moving in that direction.
Finally, to bring the wheel full circle, let me quote Kamrava on Egypt: “Regardless of how the
post-uprising Egyptian state envisions itself, it is neither revolutionary nor democratic. In fact, it is bereft
of most forms of legitimacy, propping itself up almost entirely through its coercive apparatus.”
(Source: EOS)

SQUANDERED OPPORTUNITY
Maleeha Lodhi (Former ambassador to the US, UK & UN)
Recent talks between the coalition government and the opposition took place in an
atmosphere unfortunately vitiated by the exchange of inflammatory rhetoric between the two sides.
PML-N leaders set a more belligerent tone this time, with Defence Minister Khawaja Asif calling the
talks an “exercise in futility”, while Javed Latif declared that negotiations with “a terrorist party”
were impossible.
This prompted PTI leaders to question the government’s seriousness to engage in result-
oriented talks. Moreover, government actions, notably the police raid on former Punjab chief
minister Pervez Elahi’s Lahore residence, made the political atmosphere more tense and hardly
propitious for negotiations.
Nevertheless, at one point in the government-opposition parleys it seemed some headway
was made when the two sides agreed national and provincial elections should be held on the same
day. This resulted from a show of flexibility by Imran Khan’s PTI, whose negotiators led by Shah
Mahmood Qureshi, also agreed to neutral caretaker administrations to oversee the polls.
But the talks broke down on lack of agreement on a common date for elections. Government
representatives didn’t budge from their position of holding elections after parliament completed its
full term in August, which meant not before October.
The PTI side proposed dissolving the Sindh and Balochistan assemblies in May for elections to
be fixed for some time in mid-July. This was rejected by the government. Thus the ‘final’ round of
talks ended inconclusively with no indication that negotiations will resume.
Considering the government only has four months left in its term, offering to hold elections,
say a month or two earlier, could have forged a national consensus to end the political deadlock,
ease political tensions and create a peaceful pathway to the polls. But the ruling coalition
squandered this opportunity by not opting for this course.
Its obduracy on the election date is only explicable by its desire to delay the polls as long as
possible out of fear that the electoral outcome will not be in its favour.
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What kind of difference a few months will make to the political fortunes of coalition parties is
beyond comprehension. If anything, time has been working against them, with PML-N steadily
losing political ground.
Failure to reach an agreement means confrontation between the government and opposition
will intensify with the risk of greater political turmoil ahead. Khan had warned that in the absence
of an accord his party will go back to the Supreme Court and he will direct his followers to agitate in
the streets.
PTI then submitted a letter to the apex court informing it that “a solution within the
Constitution” could not be achieved in talks with the government. It also asked the court to
implement “in letter and spirit” its earlier order to hold elections in Punjab on May 14. For its part,
the SC ‘clarified’ that its order remained “unchanged”.
They went further, offering to help the government, which lacks a two-thirds parliamentary
majority, to secure a one-time constitutional cover to shift the election date beyond the
constitutionally stipulated 90-day period through an amendment.
One of the reasons cited by representatives of the ruling coalition for not conceding on the
election date is that the government has a trade policy to announce and a budget to present.
Whether or not this was an excuse there is no getting away from the fact that the government’s
political distractions, tardy decisions and mismanagement have left the economy teetering on the
brink of a breakdown.
The bailout deal with the IMF remains elusive for several reasons. The last sticking points
include the Fund’s insistence that Pakistan fully fund the external financing gap for the remaining
part of this fiscal year.
The gap is estimated to be around $3 billion after $2bn was apparently committed by Saudi
Arabia and $1bn by UAE. Before concluding the agreement, the Fund also wants to evaluate the
budget plans prepared by the government, with whom it has an obvious trust deficit.
The IMF deal has been delayed since November. This delay is continuing to impose a heavy
cost on the economy. This is reflected in depleting foreign exchange reserves, tumbling exports and
the virtual collapse of business confidence. The economy is, in fact, precariously poised with the fall
in exports, decline in overseas remittances, inflation at a 60-year high and the rupee losing record
value against the dollar.
Further delay in the Fund programme could plunge the precarious economy into a graver
crisis. If anything, the dire economic situation makes elections necessary sooner rather than later, so
that a government with a fresh mandate can deal with Pakistan’s worst economic crisis on a
sustainable basis and not by band-aid measures.
This is especially so as the coalition government, instead of steering the shipwrecked economy
to safer shores, seems to be expending more time and energy on political battles and power tussles.
It has now declared war on the Supreme Court. Ruling coalition ministers have been lashing
out against court orders, exploiting divisions among its judges and characterising their confrontation
with the SC as one designed to assert parliament’s supremacy.
At times their aggressive statements seem to suggest they are deliberately provoking the court
to take action against them. This conduct seems aimed at discrediting the court to justify the
government’s defiance of its order to hold provincial elections in Punjab.
Meanwhile, the Election Commission has filed a petition for a review of the court’s order on
the Punjab polls claiming the SC exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction in fixing a date, which it
lacked the authority to do. These clashes between state institutions have left the governance system
in disarray and on the verge of collapse.
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There may still be a slim chance for government-opposition talks to be revived. Otherwise, the
ruling coalition’s desire to cling to power as long as it can and delay elections will keep the country
in a state of limbo and only kick the can down the road.
Far from ending the ongoing political crisis, it will set the stage for an even bigger one later
with more profound consequences for the country’s economic and political stability.

(Source: Dawn)

THE LOOMING CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

Tim Willasey (Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI)
If the army and government continue to block regional and national elections, they will only
increase the scale of Imran Khan’s eventual victory. Fear of Imran’s brand of careless populism
coincides with low public confidence in the army and with a renewed threat from Afghan-based
terrorist groups. The looming confrontation presents real hazards for a country and people facing
economic distress.
There is little doubt that former Prime Minister Imran Khan is the overwhelming favourite to
win the regional and national elections in Pakistan. That is why the army and the government are
together stretching every legal and constitutional sinew to delay the elections and to disqualify him
from standing.
The irony is that Imran has been lucky. His dismissal by Parliament in April 2022 could not
have come at a better time for his popularity. Since he was removed from office the economy (never
exactly robust) has tanked and prices have risen exponentially. In March 2023, food inflation was
reported as 47.1% for urban areas, leading to an unprecedented cost of living crisis. The
government’s bid for an IMF (International Monetary Fund) bailout has still not succeeded. The IMF
has asked Pakistan to first secure loans from its traditional funders (China, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE), all of which have been slow to come forward with sufficient largesse.
A second irony is that the present government, a coalition between archenemies the Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), would have been the answer to many
prayers in the 1990s and 2000s. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who was always the more talented of
the Sharif brothers, has Benazir Bhutto’s son, Bilawal, as his foreign minister and a good
understanding with the new Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir. This is the sort of unity which
Pakistan has needed for decades, but it has come far too late. Their political methodology, based on
the old formula of feudal loyalties and back-room deals, seems old-fashioned and tired compared
with the new star in the firmament.
And yet there is nothing particularly new about Imran. He is 70 years old and his greatest
cricketing triumph, in the 1992 World Cup, was over 30 years ago – long before most Pakistanis
were born. (The median age of Pakistan’s 220 million population is 22.8). He founded his political
party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), in 1996, but it gained little traction in a two-party system
where the PML and PPP were dominant. He was always seen as a political lightweight, known best
for his good looks, high-profile marriages and reputation as a former London socialite. The Pakistani
elite in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi would routinely poke fun at his intellectual limitations.
Imran’s political fortunes were transformed in 2017 as the army cast around for a political
figure to champion in the 2018 elections. As the dominant institution in the country, the army has
always taken an interest in politics, and has often championed a political party. In 1990 it plucked
Nawaz Sharif (Shehbaz’s older brother) from relative obscurity to lead the PML. Later the army
tolerated the PPP government of Benazir’s widower Asif Zardari (as president) until 2013, when he
 59

left office with record-low popularity levels. Nawaz Sharif returned until he was disqualified from
holding public office following the Panama Papers leaks.
Having run out of options, the army favoured Imran in the 2018 elections, and worked with
him reasonably well for the first few years. However, Imran became increasingly irked by the
army’s control over many areas of policy, particularly its stranglehold on foreign policy towards
India and Afghanistan. In turn, the army was frustrated by Imran’s attempts to influence military
appointments. Things came to a head when Imran alleged that a ‘cipher telegram’ describing a
meeting with a US official in Washington comprised a foreign conspiracy to overthrow his
government. This patently false allegation played well to Imran’s large rallies of supporters.
Imran has a tendency to fall back on anti-Western rhetoric as a reliable means of drumming
up popular support, such as describing Osama bin Laden in June 2020 as ‘a martyr’ and welcoming
the Taliban as having broken ‘the shackles of slavery’ on the NATO departure from Afghanistan in
August 2021. Some of his views (such as his opposition to US drone strikes) are firmly held; others
smack of short-term opportunism. His visit to Moscow (against advice) on the day of the Ukraine
invasion reinforced his reputation for poor judgement.
Neither Imran nor the current government are responsible for the food price crisis, which
largely results from the Ukraine war. However, Imran must shoulder a share of the blame, along
with the army, for having facilitated the return of the Afghan Taliban to power in Kabul. Their
naivety in believing that the Afghan Taliban and its affiliated Haqqani group would arrest and
deport Pakistani Taliban (TTP) terrorists to Pakistan was as bizarre as it was catastrophic. Instead,
the TTP now poses a greater terrorist threat to Pakistan than at any time since the Peshawar school
massacre of 2014. Furthermore, since the NATO exit from Afghanistan, Pakistan no longer enjoys
any leverage over Western foreign policy. China, too, has privately expressed irritation to Pakistan
about the Afghan outcome, as the Afghan Taliban also refuses to hand over Uighur militants.
Meanwhile, the flagship China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) continues to lose momentum
due to Pakistan’s economic crisis.
At present, both the army and Imran are bent on confrontation. Both sides need to reconsider.
The army has its lowest popularity ratings since independence in 1947. While there is no serious
prospect of mutiny, the Corps Commanders need to consider the political loyalties of the jawans
(enlisted soldiers). Furthermore, the army needs to keep Imran safe. It was only 15 years ago that
Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in circumstances the army could probably have prevented. An
attempt was made against Imran in November 2022, but a successful assassination of such a popular
figure could destabilise the country. At the same time, Imran would be wise to avoid direct
confrontation with the army. His criticisms have been unprecedented and not always constructive.
The former army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, acknowledged that the army had to change,
and Imran, as the next prime minister, may have opportunities to assist such changes in a
collaborative manner.
For all that Pakistan’s army has become too powerful since 1947, and for all the need for it to
reduce its political and economic involvement, the prospect of an adversarial relationship between
an occasionally reckless populist leader and an increasingly unpopular army could be disastrous. If
Imran were – wittingly or otherwise – to secure support from extremist groups, he could destabilise
Pakistan’s hard-won territorial integrity and stability.
(Source: RUSI)
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Economy
STREAMLINING SOE PRIVATIZATION
Sardar Ahmad Nawaz Sukhera (A retired civil servant)
In my previous piece in the pages (‘Privatize SOEs, please’, April 1), I had endeavoured to
establish the need to aggressively and urgently privatize SOEs to save over a trillion rupees
annually, besides unlocking their potential, to help an economy on the ventilator. This article
suggests ways to do that – and do it better.
Let me begin by sharing my experience of how international investors view Pakistan. On
multiple roadshows at major global financial centers, one was always asked the following question
right at the beginning: ‘why should we invest in Pakistan and not in any of the more stable
economies of the region?’ This was followed by a discussion on the IMF’s latest review, since we
were in an IMF programme then. It was only afterwards that they would discuss the transaction we
were offering.
Now that the economy is really struggling, and we are not in an IMF programme, it will be an
even bigger challenge to attract long-term, quality investors, perhaps even domestic ones. Assuming
the government would increasingly find it difficult to sustain the losses of the SOEs, there is perhaps
no other realistic option but to think of privatization. But to do that, we need to examine the
privatization ecosystem and fix the weaknesses quickly.
Lets first look at the legal framework provided by the Privatisation Commission (PC)
Ordinance, 2000 as the biggest impediment starts from not following the dictat of this law. The
Privatisation Commission is the sole federal government body designated to privatize government
assets. It is empowered to plan, manage, implement and control the privatization programme. Any
transaction by virtue of which any property, right, interest, concession or management thereof is
transferred to any person from the federal government or any enterprise owned or controlled,
wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, by the federal government, is called ‘privatization’, and is
to be carried out by the Privatisation Commission. However, one regularly notices various ministries
undertaking such activities. In some cases, an SOE is on the privatization programme approved by
the cabinet and yet this goes on. And this is despite the fact that the requisite expertise may not be
available within the ministries. This is not just legally inappropriate but also usually results in
suboptimal outcomes.
The Privatisation Commission is often blamed, unfairly, for a long and tedious process.
However, it is often forgotten that a privatization transaction is often a culmination of several prior
actions. It may include advising the federal government to ensure monopolies are not created in the
process of privatization; preparing the sectoral ecosystem for a deregulated market, through changes
in the policy and regulatory environment, including licensing and tariff rules; proposing and setting
up sector regulators, like Nepra, Ogra and the PTA, and advising the federal government in the
selection and appointment of the head and members of regulatory authorities; corporate
restructuring of the SOEs, which in many cases has to be done through legislation; approve and
decide and perform all acts to implement pre-privatization restructuring; and advise the federal
government on how to improve public-sector units till their privatization. To enable the
Privatisation Commission to play an effective role, the Privatisation Commission Ordinance lays
down that the commission’s directions to any enterprise or management of an SOE on the list of
privatization are legally binding on the SOEs.
It is easy to fathom that the commission is mandated to take all operational decisions on
matters pertaining to privatization. However, it is seldom allowed to exercise these powers as the
 61

ministries usually endeavor to stall privatization efforts. SOEs are treated as ministerial fiefdoms to
extract personal benefits, therefore, it is difficult to let go of them. To change this environment, I
suggest initiating the following three steps in earnest.
First, to enable the Privatisation Commission to effectively play its legally mandated role, it is
essential to build the commission’s capacity to perform the role envisioned for it. It is unfortunate
that in its present shape it is not able to do so. Though the commission has one of the better boards
in the public sector, it is shackled by posting of regular government officers in it, usually with hardly
any sectoral expertise or corporate skills. More importantly, there are very few senior consultants
hired to perform the expected role. They are being used only as transaction managers (or mere
coordinators). Moreover, the Privatisation Commission has to be led by a minister and secretary
who have at least a strong background of finance or economics, preferably with strong corporate
experience. It is imperative that the minister is a strong and senior person, who can cut through the
anti-privatization bias and develop strong political will to support the privatization programme.
Second, the commission is currently only coordinating the hiring of Financial Advisory
Consultants, who do the due diligence on an SOE and recommend options of the privatization
transaction structure, and market the sale, while the concerned ministries keep taking all the
operational decisions. They retain the files and carry the stick and the carrot for SOE management.
This results in the SOEs complying with the ministries’ directions rather than of the Privatisation
Commission. It is recommended that once an SOE is placed on the privatization programme, all
related files and personnel in the ministry should be placed at the disposal of the commission. Only
then will it be able to play any meaningful role.
Third, while one is all for transparency and accountability, investors as well as the
commission’s staff and board are all very wary of subsequent reprisals in the garb of accountability
by the investigation agencies and the parliamentary committees. Investors and commission staff
have to be ensured the comfort provided by the Privatisation Commission Ordinance, which clearly
states that: “The federal government or any of its agencies authorized by it, may…., scrutinize or
investigate any privatisation transaction within one year of the completion of the privatisation. (2)
After the expiry of this period, the Federal Government or any of its agencies shall not be
empowered to carry out any such scrutiny or investigation.”
However, instead of employing provisions of the ordinance for dealing with the alarming
issues of SOEs, the government first set up a public-private authority, by enacting the Public Private
Partnership Authority (Amendment) Act, 2021 “to create an enabling environment for public private
partnership by streamlining the project approval process and providing an effective framework for
policy guidelines”. It then recently enacted an Inter-Governmental Transactions Act, 2022 “to
provide for a mechanism to carry out a commercial transaction under an inter-governmental
framework agreement to promote, attract and encourage foreign states to have economic and
business relations with Pakistan”.
The PPP Act is an understandable initiative as it basically aims at facilitating green-field
projects, while the Privatisation Commission basically deals with brown-field projects. It is less
understandable why the need for the Inter-Governmental Transactions Act was felt. It has been
alleged to have been done to facilitate quick sales of assets like the RLNG plants. It is yet to be seen
how this Act will enable individual ministries to conduct these sales with foreign governments,
when in actual effect it’s commercial entities of foreign governments, which actually are the
potential buyers. Additionally, one wonders why enabling provisions weren’t added into the
Privatisation Commission Ordinance to conduct such transactions, given the comprehensive legal
framework provided by it.
However, one is surprised to see the PPP Act being used to outsource the airports. Even if one
ignores the institutional resistance of the air force for this, as it also uses these for defence purposes,
 62

it would be worth seeing how the Aviation Division manages these transactions. But one is certainly
surprised that the Privatisation Commission, which had strong institutional memory on this issue,
has been kept aside.
Privatization is a time-bound strategy, and should not be an option in perpetuity. Many SOEs
have been on the privatization list for three decades, like the DISCOs. This indecisiveness has seen
most of our SOEs go from profitable enterprises to an in-distress state, where they can’t continue
operations without heavy subsidies. One can think of PIA, PSM and Roosevelt Hotels as examples.
How long can the government continue with this? Will potential investors, or even quality financial
advisers continue to be interested?
To end, in the words of Dr Atif Mian, “Pakistan’s ‘nervous system’ is fundamentally broken –
that combination of administrative and political structures that guarantee a certain level of
confidence in the economy. The country must begin to build a functioning nervous system…
somehow”!
(Source: The News)

IMF PROJECTIONS FOR 2023-24

Dr Hafiz A Pasha (Professor Emeritus at BNU and former Federal Minister)
The World Economic Outlook issue of April 2023 by the IMF contains detailed macroeconomic
[AN1] projections at the individual country level from 2022-23 to 2027-28. The objective of this article
is to analyze the projections for 2023-24. An earlier article had reviewed the IMF projections for 2022-
23. The principal finding was that the GDP growth rate and the rate of inflation estimates were
somewhat on the optimistic side.
The IMF projections for the next three years are of importance because of the likelihood that
given the extremely fragile financial situation, Pakistan will need the umbrella of another IMF
Extended Fund Facility to be able to attract enough new funding to be able to honour its external
debt repayment obligations.
The focus here is on the IMF projections for 2023-24. At this stage, given the considerable
uncertainty about the prospects for the world economy and even more so for the economy of
Pakistan, it is difficult to make projections beyond the next year. IMF projections after 2023-24 must
be seen as generally an extrapolation of trends.
However, if Pakistan goes for another IMF programme, then three-year projections from 2023-
24 to 2025-26 assume importance. These projections will determine the magnitude of the
performance criteria, indicative targets and structural benchmarks in a future programme.
The first key projection by the IMF for 2023-24 is of the GDP growth rate at 3.5%. This is
predicated partly on a low base effect of near zero or even negative growth rate in 2022-23. The
agricultural sector which was badly hit by the floods should show some significant recovery,
especially in the case of output of cotton and rice.
The concern relates to the prospects for growth in the large-scale manufacturing sector.
Already, in February 2023, the QIM has shown a big decline of 11.5% and cumulatively from July
2022 to February 2023 the fall has been 5.5%. One of the major factors contributing to this debacle
has been the severe constraint imposed on the import of raw materials and industrial inputs so as to
strongly restrict the size of the current account deficit. Further, big declines are also likely to be
observed in the construction, transport and wholesale and retail trade sectors.
The fundamental question is whether there will be some revival in these sectors, especially by
industry. The foreign exchange reserves remain currently at a precariously low level of $4.4 billion,
enough to provide import cover for only one month. Therefore, unless the reserves’ position
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improves significantly by end-June 2023, there will continue to be need to strongly curtail imports
and the manufacturing sector will not have the space for significant positive growth.
Therefore, at this point it is difficult to accept the GDP growth rate projection of 3.5% for 2023-
24. It may be significantly lower.
Turning to the rate of inflation projection for 2023-24, the IMF expects it to fall significantly to
21.9% from 27.1% in 2022-23. The latter estimate is already understated and the year, 2022-23, is
likely to close with an average rate of inflation of above 29%. Further, one of the critical
determinants of the rate of inflation is the extent of depreciation in the value of rupee over the year.
This is likely to be close to 38% in 2022-23. Unless there is a significant build-up of foreign exchange
reserves early in 2023-24, there will be the same or even greater pressure on the rupee.
Fortunately, there is one positive factor. Given the slowdown in the global economy and
trade, the IMF rightly expects that international commodity prices will fall significantly in 2023-24.
Overall, considering both the negative and positive factors, it is likely that the rate of inflation will
be close to 25%, somewhat higher than the IMF projection of almost 22%.
The two critical projections with regard to a future IMF programme are the size of the budget
deficit and the current account deficit, respectively. Here we see a truly startling projection of the
former by the IMF in 2023-24. The IMF projects that the budget deficit will rise exponentially from
6.8% of the GDP to the extraordinarily high level of 8.3% of the GDP in 2023-24. However, the
primary deficit is likely to remain at 0.5% of the GDP in 2023-24.
The implication is that there will be a quantum jump in the magnitude of debt servicing. The
IMF projects it to increase from Rs 5407 billion in 2022-23 to as much as Rs 8557 billion in 2023-24, an
unbelievable increase of over 58% in one year. This clearly implies that the IMF expects the SBP
policy rate to remain at a very high level of 21% or even more.
The rise in interest rates is leading to a fundamental worsening in the budgetary position of
the federal government. From 2021-22 to 2023-24, the level of debt servicing is likely to rise
cumulatively by a massive 176%. This has never happened before and if the projection of a budget
deficit of 8.3% of the GDP actually materializes then this will be the largest ever deficit.
There is need also to realize that such a large deficit will be inevitable even if the IMF
projection of a high 30% growth in revenues is achieved, which is also unlikely if the import tax base
remains restricted. If the extremely high level of interest rates continues in the presence of high
inflation, then Pakistan is entering a period of very high budget deficits. Fortunately, the IMF
expects that the budget deficit will fall to 7.1% in 2024-25, implying some moderation in interest
rates.
There are a number of negative implications of the colossal rise in the size of the budget deficit
by 54% in 2023-24. There will inevitably be a, more or less, complete ‘crowding out’ of the access of
the private sector to bank credit. Also, since bulk of the deficit financing will be through domestic
borrowing, this will lead to an acceleration in rate of expansion of money supply and put greater
pressure on the price level. It is not clear if the IMF has factored this in the rate of inflation projection
for 2023-24. Also, the huge budget deficit will inevitably put pressure on the current account deficit.
We come now to the projection of the current account position in 2023-24 by the IMF. The
current account deficit is expected to be 2.4% of the GDP, close to 2.3% of the GDP this year.
One favourable factor is that with the slowdown in the world economy, the growth rate of
world trade could be less than 3% and the all-commodity international price index in dollars could
fall significantly. This will facilitate imports and physical measures to restrict imports will be needed
less. Consequently, the IMF expects that there will be an almost 10% increase in the volume of
imports in 2023-24, as compared to a contraction of 20.8% in 2022-23.
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However, the big problem is the IMF projection of the level of exports in 2023-24. Exports of
goods are expected to show a handsome growth of 18.3%, compared to a fall of 6.5% in 2022-23. The
problem is that with falling international prices and continuing high domestic inflation, exports
from Pakistan are likely to become increasingly less competitive in international markets.
The fundamental question is whether the IMF is anticipating substantial continuing
devaluation of the rupee in 2023-24 to sustain the export competitiveness? If so, then the rate of
inflation projection will be significantly on the low side.
Also, a 2.4% current account deficit, equivalent of almost $8 billion may not be sustainable in
light of the difficulties in meeting the external financing requirements in 2023-24. It may have to be
pitched lower and achieved through even more intensive resort to the instruments of monetary and
fiscal policies.
Overall, the projections by the IMF of the GDP growth rate, rate of inflation and current
account deficit in 2023-23 appear to be somewhat optimistic. However, the anticipated size of the
budget deficit at 8.3% of the GDP is extremely large and unprecedented.
(Source: Business Recorder)

TACKLING INFLATION WITH WRONG INSTRUMENT

Shahid Kardar (Former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan)
The State Bank of Pakistan is trying to check inflation through just one instrument, the interest
rate, based on the theological belief that the issue is demand, ignoring other, more critical factors
fuelling inflation today.
There are both demand pull and cost-push factors influencing inflation, and this instrument is
being expected to achieve multiple objectives.
The sources of demand in the economy are households, the corporate sector and government,
who in turn receive money from different sources. The role of each source and what can be done
about it is somewhat limited, especially because the acts of one can nullify the actions of others, at
times as a result of unanticipated developments.
For example, when the SBP increases the interest rate it expects a change in behaviour of the
borrower. However, if the largest borrower, the government, whose imprudent and reckless fiscal
behaviour has worsened the precariousness of our situation, simply continues borrowing to finance
expenditures which (except on development projects) are politically inelastic in the short to medium
term and are more than its revenues, it negates the objective of raising the interest rate.
Net borrowing cost
And the possibility of a change in behaviour is further diluted, if not rendered irrelevant, if the
net cost of borrowing is a mere 50 to 60 basis points because of the Rs 6 trillion injections by the SBP
(lending to commercial banks which they then on-lend to the federal government).
Then there are inflows of remittances and donor financial assistance which create a demand
for goods and services that render policy instruments for containing demand largely redundant. For
example, annual remittances of close to Rs14 trillion — 20 per cent of GDP (both through the formal
financial sector and through informal channels — moneychangers and migrants bringing cash on
home visits), generate a demand for goods and services.
And these demands are more or less impervious to interest rates, partly because the recipients
are less affluent households, dependent on these flows for meeting their regular basic consumption
needs.
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Credit schemes
Again, SBP’s own sponsored export finance and long-term directed credit schemes (the more
recent one being the TERF) at highly concessional rates of interest (although the rates for some
schemes are now being revised) ‘‘create money’’, diluting the influence of its monetary policy
instruments to control inflation.
And then, not to forget, we have a significantly large informal sector that conducts
transactions mostly in cash (currency in circulation is presently in excess of Rs.8.5 trillion (more than
12.5 per cent of GDP), on which adjustments in interest rates would have a limited impact.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of SBP’s policy to ‘target’ some rate/range of inflation is
constrained by the structural nature of the problems.
This monetary policy instrument has its limitations. For example, an increase in the interest
rate cannot fight imported or food inflation when the latter is high because a) the support price of
wheat is above its international price; b) increases in price of energy and oil raise the cost of farming,
processing and transportation; c) yields per acre of crops continue to be low; and d) of hoarding, and
cartelisation.
Cost-push factors
Similarly, there are cost-push factors affecting large areas of the economy resulting from:
• Rigidities in prices administered by government (e.g. of electricity, gas, petroleum products,
etc.) _ which have been revised sharply in recent weeks;
• Continuing supply chain issues driven more by the somewhat arbitrary import restrictions
imposed by the SBP and price rigidities (despite the easing of supply disruptions post
pandemic), creating opportunities for profiteering;
• A convoluted and badly designed tax structure that is heavily dependent on high rates of
GST and other indirect taxes as revenue collecting instruments and mechanisms;
• d) heightened inflationary expectations owing to eroding business confidence because of
continuing political instability, policy confusion and concerns pertaining to restoration of the
IMF programme;
• significant volumes of informal trade/smuggling under the active patronage of state
functionaries;
• A host of powerful organised cartels manipulating prices- like those of sugar, vegetable oil,
wheat, fertiliser and cement manufacturers;
• poor economic governance adding to costs; and
• continuing poor productivity (failure to get higher output from existing resources) and
government investments in unproductive schemes or projects that have stalled.
Increasing interest rates is not the remedy for revisions in government-administered prices
(unless the inflation target is adjusted for the effect of these prices) or inflation fed by rupee
depreciation and rising food prices. And these prices are not affected by the weakening in demand
for goods and services and the profligacy of government that keeps level of budget deficits high _
whose financing raises the interest rate on borrowings.
No funds for private sector
This worsens the situation, impairing the manufacturing sector, by crowding out the private
sector seeking funds for even working capital, let alone for investment.
In fact, this heavy reliance on high interest rates is merely protecting the incomes of banks and
creditors from the injuries of inflation being suffered by the general populace.
Furthermore, as implied above, simply pursuing singlemindedly the goal of checking inflation
through the instrument of interest rate adversely impacts growth and employment creation.
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By employing such a strategy, the SBP is left without an adequate set of policy instruments in
its armour to stimulate growth, lower the rate of inflation and ensure stability of the exchange rate,
all at the same time. Lest we forget, inflation targeting has not been adopted as the sole objective by
all central banks. The central banks of two economic powerhouses, China and USA, do not merely
target inflation _ both inflation and employment are an integral part of their mandates.
And, in any case, the stubbornness of a high rate of inflation in a relatively depressed
economy translating into a wage-price spiral would be remote if the rate of economic growth is
lower than the rate of increase in the labour force.
Although a variety of import-curbing policies and instruments have been adopted, the rupee
is supposedly ‘free floating’ when it comes to trade in goods and services as well as on the ‘capital
account’ (although ostensibly only for non-residents).
Capital inflows
This means that we need capital inflows and donor support to maintain foreign exchange
reserves in tradable currencies to enable us to face any crisis in financing external obligations.
And any restriction on bringing in, and repatriating, capital will make external investors
reluctant to bring in this money.
But then reliance on inflows of borrowed capital on a continuing basis is clearly not
sustainable, as we found out to our cost when we incentivised short-term foreign portfolio
investments in the government’s debt instruments by jacking up interest rates.
This strategy, apart from temporarily appreciating the exchange rate, worsened the adverse
movement in the domestic business cycle by discouraging domestic investment. This “hot money”
beat a hasty retreat at the first sign of weakness, feeding the already stressed conditions with respect
to external payments.
Solvency issue
Despite the fragile economic environment, we have opted for further raising the interest rate,
partly to again solicit short-term external capital inflows for managing the external crises. This
intervention is more than likely to fail because we are confronted with a solvency issue and not a
financing/liquidity issue.
More borrowings to raise foreign exchange reserves, to discharge existing debt obligations
and to finance our trade deficits will merely lead to a higher level, and more difficult to service debt,
in an economy that is fast shutting down.
Therefore, under the above argued circumstances and identified factors, high and floating
interest rates are the wrong instrument.
So, in the light of the discussion above, what are the options available in the short to medium
term to wrestle with the ravages of inflation?
• It has been shown that several factors make inflation handling difficult. For instance,
addressing food inflation requires a comprehensive policy package comprising policies that
a) incentivise change in cropping patterns and increase in yields and cost efficiencies in
production processes (a medium term strategy);
BUT b) in the near term the first best choice is to open up trade with our neighbours; thereby
also collaring the issue of informal trade/smuggling; and supplement this policy action by i)
withdrawing import duties on solar tube-wells;
ii) lowering the duties and petroleum levy on high speed diesel while raising these charges on
petrol by the same amount; and ii) as argued below, forcing fertiliser manufacturers to reduce the
price of urea.
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• Counter price gouging by cartels by not just opening up trade but also drastically reducing,
if not eliminating, import taxes, thereby forcing cartel formulators to change behaviour.
Big profit margins
Just as illustrations, take the cases of the cement and fertiliser industries.
The cement industry is operating 60 per cent below its capacity and selling cement at a margin
of 26 per cent (because of the eligible depreciation allowances for tax purposes and the cartel
enabling it to raise prices whenever there is a pressure on costs).
Similarly, the fertiliser industry, thanks to a huge gas subsidy, is earning a gross margin of
more than 35 per cent with a net profit margin of more than 23 per cent _ compared with Apple’s 22
per cent, with its market power, productivity and efficiency!
With these levels of returns, essentially because of subsidies, the domestic price of fertiliser
should be subjected to further, more effective, controls by a more vigilant government or the
Competition Commission;
• check government expenditures by a) starting to shrink the size of the federal government
by reducing the number of divisions to one-third (placing personnel in a surplus pool, thus
saving on rents, utilities, cars, etc,) and banning all new recruitments, purchase of motor cars
and new development schemes; b) reviewing the PSDP to identify low-priority projects or
those on which less than 20 per cent expenditure has been incurred and intra-provincial
projects should be transferred to the respective province for them to decide their adoption;
• employ a combination of increased loadshedding and early closure of commercial centres;
• the short-term solution of enhancing the scale of programmes like BISP and Ehsaas, to
provide some relief to those in extreme pain hovering below or on the poverty line, although
required, is clearly not sustainable.
They cannot be an alternative and replacement of a more comprehensive and self-sustaining
growth process;
lower the interest rate (making the real rate negative), bringing it well below the core inflation
rate _ there may even be a need for a two-year suspension on the servicing of both government and
private sector debt;
• the continued servicing of the existing IPP contracts is unsustainable. They need to be
renegotiated speedily (rates of return, capacity charges and currency).
And these efforts need to be complemented by adequate and timely investments to attend to
the technical inefficiencies and governance issues of the transmission and distribution systems; and
• finally, but more importantly, defuse the debilitating effect of political and economic
instability by holding early elections to place in office a government with the legitimacy to
launch, and implement, such actions.
(Source: Dawn)

NAVIGATING THE CHOPPY WATERS

Dr Muhammad Shahid (A PhD in Economics)
Historically, Pakistan has faced several economic crises, and the most recent economic
challenges are not only disturbing but alarming as well.
At the moment, we face several economic issues including very high and volatile inflation,
fiscal deficits, trade imbalances, substantial depreciation of the Pakistani rupee, unemployment,
poverty, and income inequality besides the permanent threats of disasters and natural calamities.
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The turbulent economic situation in the country is caused by both domestic and external
factors. At the domestic front, political instability and the uncertain policy environment are
damaging investment and affecting economic growth. Economic instability, frequent and significant
fluctuations in economic indicators inflation, exchange rate depreciation, increase in unemployment
rates, and surge in poverty incidence are largely exacerbated by the current waves of political
uncertainty. Furthermore, devastating floods in the current fiscal year, higher global commodity and
grain prices, and slowdown in global growth have also hit our economy hard.
Ignoring the fact that the current political unrest is a major obstacle to economic growth and
stability comes with a severe cost. The uncertain policy environment due to political unrest is
creating a negative perception of our country among investors, leading to a decline in foreign
investment. Without addressing political uncertainty, we cannot stop the significant negative
impacts on foreign investment, inflation, unemployment, poverty and economic growth. Therefore,
it is essential for policymakers and people in the power corridors to address the underlying causes
of political unrest and promote political stability to ensure long-term economic development and
prosperity in the country.
The waves of high and volatile inflation have badly affected everyone in the country by
reducing their purchasing power. They have also negatively damaged investors’ sentiments,
businesses and undermined economic stability. Theoretically speaking, the State Bank of Pakistan
can, by raising interest rates, reduce inflation expectations and promote price stability, which can
help restore confidence and support long-term growth.
In this context, the SBP has made several upward adjustments in the interest rate to tackle
inflation but so far its demand management policy has proved ineffective. One of the reasons for the
ineffectiveness of monetary policy is the supply side dynamics of inflation. The disrupted global
supply chains, causing shortages of raw materials, intermediate goods, and finished products led to
higher prices for goods and services.
Focus on supply-side policies is crucial. Without addressing the supply side, any surge in
policy rates would kill our growth by discouraging borrowing and investment. Therefore, reducing
inflation requires a combination of monetary, fiscal, and supply-side policies, tailored to our specific
domestic economic circumstances.
Governments can implement supply-side policies to increase the supply of goods and
services, which can help reduce prices and inflation. This can include measures to increase
productivity, reduce regulations, and encourage investment. It is important for policymakers and
the SBP to strike a balance between controlling inflation and promoting economic growth and
stability.
serious issue is the persistent imbalances at the external front. The continuous trade deficit is a
huge drag on our foreign exchange reserves, causing a substantial depreciation in Pakistani currency
while adding further to our economic woes. Pakistan is a net importer of raw materials used in the
domestic manufacturing sector. A weaker Pakistani currency increases the cost of imported goods
and raw materials, leading to higher inflation and making it more expensive for businesses to
operate in the country. Furthermore, consumer and business confidence in the country has declined
due to the falling rupee as investors seek to move their money to other countries with stronger
currencies.
The growing uncertainty and reduced confidence in the domestic economy are causing delays
in spending and investment decisions. The tighter monetary policy stance of the SBP to control
inflation, arrest the depreciation, stabilize the currency and attract foreign investment is making
borrowing more expensive for businesses and consumers, which can also hamper economic growth.
There is another negative aspect of the exchange rate depreciation. Pakistan is indebted in foreign
denominated currency and any depreciation of the rupee is making debt servicing more expensive.
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Another pressing economic problem is the presence of a fiscal deficit. The fiscal monitor
report of the IMF has revealed that Pakistan will miss the fiscal and debt reduction targets of this
fiscal year. The report further indicated that the situation will become worse in the next fiscal year
with a budget deficit peaking at 8.3 per cent of GDP. Therefore, serious efforts are needed to have
fiscal consolidation to bring the public debt level down to a sustainable level. This is crucial and this
approach requires a coordinated effort at all levels of government.
Our governments can decrease spending by reducing non-essential expenditures, cutting
wasteful programmes, and improving the efficiency of government operations. This requires a
careful balancing act to avoid cutting programmes that are essential for social welfare and economic
growth. Governments can also increase revenue by raising taxes, implementing new taxes, or
improving tax collection. Tax increases should be targeted towards those who can afford it the most.
Careful considerations are needed to impose taxes in a way that minimizes negative impacts on
economic growth.
Economic growth can also help reduce fiscal deficits by increasing government revenue
through higher taxes on income, profits, and sales. In this connection, pro-growth policies are
required that encourage investment, innovation, and entrepreneurship to stimulate economic
growth and reduce fiscal deficits over the long term. Furthermore, effective public debt management
policies are needed to overcome our severe debt crisis. Governments can manage public debt by
refinancing existing debt at lower interest rates, extending maturities, and reducing the cost of
borrowing. This requires a careful balancing act between managing debt and avoiding excessive
borrowing that could lead to higher interest rates and fiscal instability. Adherence to the fiscal
responsibility and debt limitation act is also necessary.
We know that navigating such choppy waters can be a challenging and complex task for the
government, but there are some steps that can be taken to bring the economy back on track. This can
be done with a combination of short-term policies to address immediate concerns and longer-term
structural reforms to promote sustained economic growth and stability. In many cases, economic
crises are caused by structural weaknesses or imbalances in the economy.
Addressing these underlying issues often requires comprehensive reforms. This can include
policies to control inflation, generate employment opportunities, reduce income inequality, promote
trade balance, fiscal discipline, implement exchange rate stability, and measures to build resilience
against external shocks. Furthermore, addressing the current political instability and the uncertain
policy environment in the country will help arrest its wide ranging negative impacts.
(Source: The News)

PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD DEBT PROBLEM

Shahid Javed Burki (Former caretaker finance minister and served as vice-president at the World Bank)
The world debt problem – in particular the burden carried by low income countries – is now
recognised by global economic experts to have become severe. It weighs heavily on the countries
that have borrowed heavily from external sources of finance to the point where servicing the debt –
paying interest on the money borrowed and repaying what is due to the lenders – leaves little to
meet domestic needs for development and providing social services to the citizenry. As I wrote in
the article that appeared in this space last week, this is not the first time in world economic history
that external debt became a big problem. The situation following the end of the Second World War
was one such event. Britain was a major victor of the war. The war that defeated Germany and Italy
was financed largely by the United States which had to find a way of being paid back but also to
rebuild the European mainland that had been left in ruins.
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The victors assembled in the American resort of Bretton Woods in the American state of New
Hampshire adopted a solution that was to work again several times. The victors created what came
to be known as the Bretton Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The latter developed into what is
now the World Bank Group. Large amounts of capital for financing these institutions was promised
by the world’s rich countries. The promised money was divided into two parts – ‘paid in’ and ‘call
up’. Only a small amount was paid in but the callable capital could be drawn in case the lending
institutions had to take care of the defaults by the borrowers. It was the call up capital that made it
possible for the international agencies to tap the capital markets at relatively low interest rates for
the money they needed.
This approach was repeated in the 1980s when the countries in East Asia and Latin America
had to pay large amounts of money to finance oil and gas purchases from the Middle East. The
group that gave itself the name of Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to raise
several-fold the price of their exports. This resulted in heavy debts for the energy importing
countries which they financed by tapping the capital markets. Once again, the capital-rich countries
went the way they had gone after the Second World War. They provided back-up capital which
could be used by the heavily indebted countries to service the debt under which they laboured.
Once again, the world is faced with a similar situation. This time, many countries resorted to
external borrowings to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic and the damage that was done to their
economies. According to the IMF, 60 per cent of word’s low-income countries are in financial
distress or approaching it. Pakistan is one of them. Without a plan to manage debt servicing, their
economies will flounder, sapping global growth. “The impacts of debt crises do not respect
boundaries; they can have cascading effects on the global economy,” said Janet Yellen, the United
States Treasury Secretary while putting pressure on China when the world nations met in
Washington for the IMF-World Bank Group’s annual spring meetings. The Trump administration
also blamed China for designing the projects it funded in ways to gain political influence in the
countries that were receiving financial support from Beijing.
Once again international action is needed. Could this type of solution be adopted once again
to help the heavily indebted countries remain solvent? The answer is yes but this time China rather
than the United States will have to take the lead. China is the principal creditor, having lent billions
of dollars to low-income countries in Asia and Africa. Pakistan is one of the countries that has
borrowed heavily for Beijing which is financing projects included in the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) investment programme. China’s overseas lending carries an average interest rate of
4 per cent, twice the typical for IMF funded programs.
Work is underway on finding a solution to the world debt problem. World leaders acting
through the Group of 20 nations currently headed by India met in November 2020 and established a
debt relief process aimed at benefitting several dozen of the world’s poorest nations. The process
was called the ‘Common Framework’ but it has made little progress. Beijing has blocked agreement
by insisting that the IMF and the World Bank – like private sector banks and government lenders –
take losses on their loans. But that is not the way the international system is structured. Any losses
incurred by the institutions would land in the laps of rich nations because of the provision of
‘callable capital’ that is part of the way these institutions are funded.
Nations that are eligible for the Common Framework must repay about $55 billion for serving
their debt in 2023. However, they were able to raise only $6 billion from selling their bonds this year
which was much less than the $17 billion raised in 2021. Some especially risky near-defaulters such
as Pakistan must offer likely lenders a return that is 12 percentage points higher than what the can
earn by investing in US Treasuries. This is 8 percentage points higher than was the case before the
strike of the pandemic.
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The main reason why China is holding out on activating the Common Framework is its
unhappiness with the lack of a strong voice in the management of institutions such as the IMF and
the World Bank. These institutions are reckoning with the situation that China now is a major
financial power. According to Scott Morros, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a
Washington-based think tank, “whether you’re head of the World Bank or the United States
Treasury Department, you’re stuck with the reality that China is a much bigger bilateral creditor
than anyone else, certainly bigger than the United States.” At this time Pakistan with close relations
with China is on the right side of the global power equation.
There is pressure being exercised by Washington to have Pakistan leave China’s orbit and be
more independent in shaping its foreign affairs. It would be a great mistake if Islamabad succumbs
to that pressure and distances itself from Beijing. Not only that approach would make it difficult to
service the large amount of loans it has secured from China-based institutions, it will also lose the
position it now occupies in developing land-based commerce with the landlocked countries to its
north. CPEC is a way to take advantage of Pakistan’s location.
(Source: Express Tribune)
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Education
LOW EMPLOYABILITY OF GRADUATES
Ajaz Ahmed (Director Research Programmes for Social Protection Resource Centre (SPRC) Islamabad)
Training highly employable individuals is one of the key objectives of Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs). However, holding a HE qualification seems not to be enough anymore to secure
a place in the workforce.
This is primarily because of HEI’s lack of alignment of their degree programmes with the
changing needs of the job market and subsequent failure to cater to the employers’ expectations.
The outcomes include graduates’ low employability, employers’ dissatisfaction with their skill
set, and a general sense of discontentment and disappointment among graduates as well as
employers.
What needs the most in HE is a consideration for updated, market-oriented, and demand-
driven knowledge and skills, which are critical to the modern economy. The lack of market
orientation of the HE has also sabotaged the potential of entrepreneurship, creating job
opportunities as poorly trained youth have lower chances of setting-up successful businesses.
The situation is more complicated and precarious in the Pakistani HE system. A 2022 study by
the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics shows that 31 per cent of university graduates are
unemployed however, the unemployment rate of women with a university qualification is as high as
51pc.
This means that at least one-third of the educated youth in Pakistan is unemployed. This
ongoing crisis of unemployment of educated youth in Pakistan is mainly because of the curriculums
of the degree programmes HEIs offer.
Most of these degree programmes focus on academic knowledge without a clear link with the
job market and impart limited practical skills, which are insufficient for the job market.
In addition to the gaps in specific and field-related skills, there are shortcomings pertaining to
general skills development which is appreciated in the job market. For example, effective
communication and problem-solving skills are highly valued by employers, but graduates often
struggle with these essential skills.
This clearly shows that HEIs in Pakistan have failed to prepare their graduates to live up to
the expectations of employers. Pakistani HEIs’ lack of relevance and alignment with the job market
has not only failed Pakistani youth to realise their dreams but has also resulted in a very low
premium on HE for graduates.
Despite the low premium on HE and poor employability, the enrolment in higher education
programmes is increasing day by day as well as the new programmes which are being launched by
HEIs.
This is because HE in Pakistani society is a mark of social status and distinction, and the
aspiring middle class does not want to be left behind. Hence, despite the atmosphere of uncertainty
and poor prospects, parents try to finance the HE of their children.
As a result, Pakistani universities have become parking places for unemployed youth.
Furthermore, the average age of students in HE programmes is very high because young people
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choose to further their education without thinking about their suitability for these programmes and
expected returns.
However, since HE requires significant investment, which has an opportunity cost, it is very
important for HEIs to ensure better career prospects for those who invest in it. It is also important to
understand that Pakistani HEIs’ output indicators do not include graduate employability.
Furthermore, developing students’ competencies for the job market is not reflected in the
faculty’s and university’s performance matrices either. This means faculty of HEIs have no
incentives or motivation to prepare their students for the job market.
Besides, the practice of rote learning in the Pakistani education system, which has an incentive
in terms of good grades, also discourages real learning and developing competencies. Similarly,
teachers teach a set curriculum and aim to finish the syllabus, which results in the absence of
essential skill development.
Due to this misplaced focus, a vast majority of students in HEIs struggle with effective
communication, creativity, and problem-solving, the skills that employers highly value.
Effective and robust HE is undoubtedly an important driver of a nation’s social and economic
progress. Thus, Pakistani HEIs must prioritise enablement as this will not only empower graduates
to transition to the professional world but will also enable them to become useful members of
society.
HE, with these attributes, would help resolve complex problems in society, generate more
opportunities, and create a social impact. This means the HE sector must be a research-based
modern skill and knowledge hub that could supply trained manpower with market-oriented and
demand-driven knowledge and skills.
This would require revamping and upgrading the HE, including the curricula of all degree
programmes to meet the requirements of the job market.
It is needless to say that the Pakistani job market has the potential to absorb more HE
graduates if their skill development is appropriate and aligned with the requirements of the job
market. Hence, HEIs must shift their focus to the development of competencies of their students.
Competencies such as critical thinking, communication and presentation skills, and
attainment of some practical knowledge could help young people secure a job and HEIs to enhance
the employability of their graduates.
The modern job market demands dynamic employees with a knack for working in physical as
well as virtual environments and are able to excel in the increased complexity of economic systems.
Likewise, there is a growing non-conventional job market of consulting, freelancing, and gig
work. This offers instant start, greater work flexibility, autonomy, exposure, self-learning, and rapid
growth in income.
However, HEIs have hardly taken any concrete steps to tap this opportunity, and graduates
are not very zealous about this either. On the contrary, HEIs, as well as graduates, seem to be
clueless about the skills required for this new and emerging job market.
This could be because this is not a substitute for a pakki nokri, and neither is there a promise
for one in this new job market. But, hey, this is the next-gen — the old time is slowly going down in
flames. So let us brace ourselves for this brave new world and take a fresh start.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)
 74

QUALITY EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

It Requires A Different Approach—and More Investment
Juan Baron (Senior Economist, Education Global Practice, World Bank Group)
May Bend (Senior Consultant, World Bank Group)
Low public spending on education, combined with limited effectiveness at producing positive
student outcomes, such as universal school enrollments and effective learning, limits Pakistan’s
citizens from more actively participating in economic and social activities and contributing to
productivity and economic growth. The challenges –notably the large number of out-of-school
children and high learning poverty–seem complex the costs of addressing them unsurmountable.
Nevertheless, there are actions Pakistan can take to change this trajectory.
Pakistan’s education sector faces critical challenges, which are believed to have been deepened
by COVID-19 and the 2022 Floods. These catastrophes have only added to the world’s second-
highest population of out-of-school children, which was at 20.3 million before them. Even before the
pandemic, Pakistan had 75% Learning Poverty, which means that prior to the floods it started with
already a very high percentage of 10-year-olds that cannot read and understand a simple age-
appropriate text. The most vulnerable are disproportionately affected by the sector’s challenges. For
example, learning poverty is highest for the poorest, and the most impoverished children – mainly
in rural areas – are more likely to be out of school.
A different approach would require using available information to better target education
programs in order to maximize the impact of limited resources.
For example, conversations and analyses tend to group all out-of-school children into a single
category. This severely limits the effectiveness of policy actions to reduce out-of-school children.
Understanding the different characteristics of out-of-school children will help, and here are some of
them:
 The majority are girls. Before the pandemic, 37 percent of girls and 27 percent of boys aged
5–16 were not in school.
 They are more likely to live in rural areas. About 35 percent—or 15 million-- rural children
aged 5 to 16 were out of school, compared with 20 percent –or 4.4 million--of urban children.
This gap has remained constant over the past two decades.
 They tend to be older. More children are out after primary school. During the 2018/19 school
year, 40 percent of secondary school-age children were out of school (40 compared to 25
percent of middle school-age children and 23 percent of primary school–age children.
 The number and share of out-of-school children drastically differs across provinces. About
53 percent of all out-of-school children live in Punjab and 23 percent in Sindh. That is almost
14 million. However, Balochistan and Sindh show the country's highest provincial rates of
out-of-school children.
A different approach not only targets out-of-school children more effectively, but also calls for
a relentless focus on learning in everything the education sector does. The statistics in Pakistan are
telling: 65 percent of students still need to achieve a minimum proficiency level in reading by the
end of primary education (Learning Poverty Brief).
There are several barriers to learning. Research points to outdated teaching practices, lack of
quality and availability of pedagogical material, difficulty transitioning from languages spoken at
home to the language used in schools, and teacher shortages. In addition, poverty, undernutrition,
lack of school readiness, and distance to school make learning more challenging for students.
 75

A different approach and implementing programs for impact would require at least three
elements. First, it requires policies and solutions tailored to the characteristics of distinct groups of
out-of-school children to maximize impact. For example, bringing children who are in the 13-16 age
range and who have never been in school to regular school does not answer their needs.
Alternatively, providing these children with literacy, numeracy, and life skills would support their
needs in life.
Second, it requires focusing on what works. There is plenty of evidence from Pakistan and
elsewhere that highlight the policy options and programs that are the most cost-effective to increase
enrollment and learning, but prioritizing which ones to implement is critical. Third, it will require
increasing the efficiency and level of public expenditure, this can be achieved by targeting funding
every year to where education outcomes are the lowest.
There are several tested and impactful approaches that Pakistan has used successfully and
that can deliver results at a reasonable cost. These can be scaled to expand educational services for
children in Pakistan.
A few examples here can have a real impact. First, public-private partnerships have worked in
Punjab. They can be expanded to cover more children in other levels of the system, particularly
middle school, but be better regulated. Second, public and community schools can be revamped and
improved, ensuring teachers are present – including consideration of double shifts when
appropriate in the public sector. Third, multigrade classrooms should take true multigrade
approaches in terms of funding, planning, and pedagogical execution. Making multigrade more
effective is necessary to make rural education affordable and impactful. Several countries have done
it successfully, including Pakistan, in the past.
Finally, the Human Capital Review provides a back-of-the-envelope estimate of how much
Pakistan would require to keep all children in school – with gains in quality: 5.4 percent of GDP.
This is assuming increases in efficiency in the public sector of 20 percent, for example, by using more
targeted programs, investing in cost-efficient programs, and minimizing the use of high-cost, low-
impact programs such as laptop distribution with no underlying pedagogical strategy.
An increase in expenditure is necessary from the low base of 2.5 percent of GDP Pakistan
currently spends on education. Expanding levels of education should go in parallel with a serious
effort to increase the efficiency of public expenditure in access, quality, and equity. Just bringing
children to school is not enough. They must learn the skills to contribute to their own lives, families,
communities, and country.
(Source: World Bank)

EDUCATION AND FOREIGN AID IN PAKISTAN

Challenges and Way Forward
Ammar Qazi (M.Phil scholar of Political Science at GCU Lahore)
Education is a fundamental right for every individual, and access to quality education is
critical for the growth and development of any nation. Pakistan, being a developing country, has
faced numerous challenges in providing education to its people. The government of Pakistan has
been trying to improve the education system in the country through various policies and initiatives.
However, despite its efforts, the country is still struggling to provide quality education to all its
citizens, especially those in remote areas. One of the solutions to this problem is foreign aid, which
can provide additional resources to the government to improve the education system. In this essay,
we will explore the role of education and foreign aid in Pakistan.
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Education in Pakistan
Education in Pakistan has been a significant issue since the country’s inception. Pakistan has
one of the lowest literacy rates in the world, with only 60% of the population being literate. The
education system in Pakistan is divided into four levels: primary, middle, secondary, and tertiary
education. The primary level covers grades 1-5, the middle level covers grades 6-8, the secondary
level covers grades 9-10, and the tertiary level covers grades 11-12 and higher education. The literacy
rate in Pakistan is significantly lower in rural areas compared to urban areas. Girls’ education is also
a significant issue, with many families not allowing their daughters to attend school due to cultural
and traditional beliefs.
The government of Pakistan has been working to improve the education system in the country
through various policies and initiatives. One such initiative is the National Education Policy, which
was introduced in 2017. The policy aims to provide free and quality education to all children from
primary to higher secondary level. The government has also established the Higher Education
Commission (HEC), which is responsible for overseeing and regulating higher education in the
country. The HEC has been working to improve the quality of education in Pakistan by promoting
research and innovation and providing scholarships to students.
Despite these efforts, the education system in Pakistan is still facing numerous challenges. The
lack of funding is one of the significant challenges facing the education system. The government of
Pakistan spends only 2.2% of its GDP on education, which is significantly lower than the
recommended 4-6% by the United Nations. This lack of funding has resulted in a shortage of
schools, teachers, and basic facilities such as electricity and water in many areas. Moreover,
corruption and mismanagement of funds have further compounded the problems in the education
sector.
Foreign Aid in Pakistan
Foreign aid can be a valuable resource for developing countries such as Pakistan, as it can
provide additional resources to improve the education system. Foreign aid can be in the form of
grants, loans, or technical assistance. The government of Pakistan has received foreign aid from
various countries, including the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, among others. The
aid has been used to improve the education system in the country by providing funding for schools,
teachers’ training, and basic facilities.
The United States has been one of the major donors of foreign aid to Pakistan. The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been working in Pakistan to improve the
education system. USAID has funded several programs aimed at providing education to children,
especially girls, in remote areas. The programs have provided funding for the construction of
schools, teachers’ training, and scholarships for students.
China has also been providing aid to Pakistan in various sectors, including education. China
has provided funding for the construction of schools and universities in Pakistan. The China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project includes the development of educational institutions in
the country. The CPEC project aims to improve the infrastructure and economic development in
Pakistan, and education is one of the key sectors of the project.
The United Kingdom has also been providing aid to Pakistan in the education sector. The UK
Department for International Development (DFID) has funded various programs aimed at
improving the education system in Pakistan. The programs have focused on providing funding for
schools, teacher training, and improving the quality of education. The UK government has also
provided scholarships for Pakistani students to study in the UK.
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The Role of Education and Foreign Aid in Pakistan

Education and foreign aid can play a significant role in the growth and development of
Pakistan. Access to quality education can help reduce poverty and improve the country’s economic
growth. Foreign aid can provide additional resources to the government to improve the education
system in the country. However, to achieve significant progress in the education sector, a
coordinated effort is required from the government, civil society, and international donors.
The government of Pakistan needs to allocate more funds to the education sector to improve
the quality of education. The government should also prioritize the education sector and work
towards addressing corruption and mismanagement of funds. Furthermore, the government should
develop policies and initiatives aimed at promoting girls’ education and reducing the gender gap in
education.
International donors should continue to provide aid to Pakistan to improve the education
system in the country. The aid should be targeted toward the areas with the most significant need,
such as remote areas and areas with low literacy rates. The aid should also focus on improving the
quality of education by providing funding for teacher training, research, and innovation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, education is essential for the growth and development of any nation, and
Pakistan is no exception. The government of Pakistan has been working to improve the education
system in the country, but more needs to be done to provide quality education to all citizens,
especially those in remote areas. Foreign aid can provide additional resources to the government to
improve the education system, but a coordinated effort is required from the government, civil
society, and international donors to achieve significant progress. Improving the education system in
Pakistan is critical for reducing poverty, promoting economic growth, and achieving sustainable
development.
(Source: Academia)
 78

Energy Crisis
AN EMERGING CHALLENGE
Saba Kiran
Pakistan has been struggling for a number of years with a significant energy crisis, and it is
likely that this will continue to be a significant concern for the country. There are several facets to the
energy crisis, such as a scarcity of electricity, gas, and petroleum items; all of these elements have a
significant influence on society, the environment, and the economy. One of the most significant
aspects is that there is a lack of power.
The present problem in the energy sector may be attributed to a wide range of causes,
including a growing global population, increased urbanisation and industry, as well as an aged
infrastructure. Despite the fact that Pakistan’s energy supply is still inadequate, the country’s
demand has been steadily increasing. As a direct consequence of this, there have been several
interruptions in the supply of electricity, load shedding, and pauses in economic activity.
One of the primary contributors to Pakistan’s energy crisis is the country’s heavy dependence
on foreign supplies of oil and gas to meet its domestic need for energy. Pakistan is vulnerable to
fluctuations in the cost of energy on a worldwide scale as a result of the fact that it imports almost all
of the oil and gas it consumes to meet its requirements. During the process of transmission and
distribution, significant amounts of energy have been lost as a direct result of the outdated,
inefficient, and prone to technical faults energy infrastructure that the United States currently
possesses.
Since it slows economic expansion, discourages foreign investment, and raises transaction
costs, Pakistan’s energy problem has significant repercussions for the country’s economy. Businesses
have incurred financial losses as a direct consequence of the frequent power outages and load
shedding, both of which have also led to a rise in their expenditures as a result of the fact that they
have been forced to acquire expensive backup generators.
The energy crisis has a significant effect on the environment as well since it drives up the use
of fossil fuels and leads to an increase in the amount of carbon emissions. In order to create power,
fossil fuels are burned. This contributes to the pollution of the air, which is bad for both the
environment and the health of the general population.
In order to ease the energy crisis, Pakistan has conducted a variety of different activities, such
as beginning new power producing projects, supporting renewable energy sources, and enhancing
energy efficiency. For example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project intends to
build brand-new power plants, transmission lines, and distribution networks all throughout the
country. Additionally, Pakistan is making efforts to broaden its utilisation of renewable energy
sources, particularly solar and wind power.
Nevertheless, a significant amount of additional work is required to find a solution to
Pakistan’s energy crisis. A comprehensive energy strategy that looks out over a long period of time
and takes into consideration the underlying issues has to be developed by the government. It is
recommended that the energy mix be diversified, that energy efficiency be raised, that infrastructure
be modernised, that power theft be minimised, that investment be increased, and that governance be
improved.
Increasing the use of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and hydropower would
contribute to the diversification of the energy mix. This will allow Pakistan to reduce its dependency
on imported fossil fuels while also providing it with a source of energy that is more reliable and
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sustainable. Encouraging the use of industrial processes, structures, and appliances that use less
energy to run also falls within the purview of promoting energy efficiency.
Bringing power plants, transmission networks, and distribution systems into the 21st century
would result in an increase in the energy infrastructure’s reliability while also improving the
system’s overall efficiency. As a direct consequence of this, there would be a reduction in the
amount of energy lost during transmission and distribution.
It is vital to develop severe procedures to prevent power theft and impose fines for those who
do so in order to decrease the amount of electricity that is stolen. This would encourage investment
and help reduce losses in the energy business, both of which would be positive outcomes.
Increasing investment in the energy sector may be facilitated via the establishment of
conditions favourable to that activity as well as through the provision of financial incentives to
investors. The financing of brand-new projects and the improvement of existing infrastructure
would both benefit from this.
By decreasing levels of corruption while simultaneously increasing levels of openness and
accountability would be beneficial to the administration of the energy industry. As a direct
consequence of this, the efficiency of the energy industry and the management of its resources
would both see significant gains.
In conclusion, Pakistan is facing a significant obstacle as a consequence of the energy crisis,
and it is quite probable that this circumstance will continue to exist until significant efforts are made
to resolve the underlying issues. It is necessary for the government, the private sector, and civil
society to collaborate on the development of an all-encompassing and long-term energy strategy that
places an emphasis on diversifying the energy mix, improving energy efficiency, modernising
infrastructure, cutting down on electricity theft, increasing investment, and improving governance.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

WILL DEVOLUTION FIX THE ENERGY CRISIS?

Jawaid Bokhar (Noted economist)
While businesses and domestic consumers have been hit hard by the worsening power crisis
in Sindh, its solar, coal and wind power projects are unable to dispatch their entire output to the
national grid for want of adequate transmission facilities.
The energy crisis has remained unabated though the province is blessed with abundant wind,
solar and coal resources with cost-effective access through air, land and sea routes.
The situation has induced Sindh Cabinet to take what is described as a landmark decision to
initiate power generation, transmission and distribution within the province. The move aims to
provide electricity to consumers at cheaper rates, improve energy equity and eliminate energy
poverty in the province.
Sindh Electric Power Regulatory Authority (Sepra) will be set up to end the province’s
dependence on the centre for fixing tariffs and managing loadshedding as provided under 7(4) of
the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority(Nepra) Act. The draft Sepra law will be presented
in the next session of the Sindh Assembly for enactment.
Sindh had earlier decided to form a provincial transmission and distribution company, and a
transmission licence was obtained from Nepra on November 5, 2019. For unknown reasons, the
initiative remained dormant.
Now the inability to convert rupees into dollars by Sindh Engro Coal Mining and Engineering
Company (SECMC) has reportedly created a backlog of non-payment worth $60 million to a Chinese
 80

mining operator. The company’s output feeds coal power plants in Thar, generating 1,360
megawatts of electricity. China Machinery Engineering Corporation has reportedly cut its output by
half and informed SECMC that it might halt production in a month.
SECMC sources said in 2022, the company had made a profit of Rs8.47 billion and its cash and
other assets — which can be converted into cash within a year — stood at Rs104.4bn, up 38 per cent
from 2021.
Sindh’s move to set up Sepra follows the federal government’s decision to devolve ex-Wapda
distribution companies (Discos) to the provinces. Punjab has already completed feasibility studies of
a power firm — Punjab Provincial Grid Company — and another for managing solar power supply
for district and session courts.
Subject to necessary due diligence by its finance department, Punjab may reportedly consider
giving its consent to the centre’s proposal to take over Discos located in the province only to the
extent of transfer of assets, and not liabilities, along with management control.
The devolution of Discos posting enormous transmission and distribution losses is no less
challenging than the stuck-up strategic privatisation of other loss-making state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) surviving on oxygen tanks.
Almost two-thirds of the power plants are operating at less than 20pc utilisation
Almost two-thirds of the power plants are operating at less than 20pc of the utilisation factor.
A World Bank report has estimated the government’s support to the 14 largest loss-making SoEs at
0.8pc of GDP and support to all SOEs at 1.4pc of GDP for FY21.
It is time for fresh private sector investment to be mobilised for new power generation,
transmission and distribution projects. The professionals and skilled workers in sick units can find
jobs and pursue better careers in new enterprises with a future.
The solution to the poly-crisis lies in a bottom-up approach. What can be best managed at the
provincial level should be outside the ambit of the federal government. Similarly, what can be
managed by district governments should not be in the provincial domain. And the three tiers of
autonomous government must cooperate to promote the common good while being responsible to
each other. This calls for a new charter of rights and responsibilities.
In an article titled ‘Stresses on the Federation, ’ Dr Hafiz Pasha says there is a strong need to
strictly adhere to constitutional provisions in inter-governmental relations to strengthen the
federation.
To quote a World Bank economist, the cash-strapped centre continues to spend every year
Rs710bn or nearly 1.7pc of the country’s GDP by running 17 devolved ministries and financing
development projects in areas that, as provided by the constitution, fall under the provincial
domain.
And the huge duplicate spending is contributing to higher fiscal deficits and public debts
besides keeping many federation initiatives underfunded.
Citing fiscal constraints, the federal government has slashed its Public Sector Development
Programme to Rs600n from Rs800b budgeted for the current fiscal year.
“The socio-political-economic structure is highly concentrated in a tiny elite, where mobility
for the majority is nearly impossible,” states the book ‘Big Capital in an Unequal World: The Micro-
politics of Wealth in Pakistan’ authored by political scientist Rosia Armytage. The tickle-down
mantra has turned out to be fiction.
And one may add that when capital crosses national boundaries, it losses its links with
national social progress. So does centralisation not based on democracy.
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The separation of two aspects of democracy, autonomy and majority, makes democracy
dysfunctional, according to a social scientist. This leaves the governments tinkering at the margins,
with a much-reduced capacity to address the fundamental structural imbalances.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)

ENERGY PRODUCTION PRIORITIES IN

THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Dr. Theodore Karasik (Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Lexington Institute in Washington, DC)
Wind power is a major part of the current energy picture. Its generation — whether on land or
at sea — is growing in scope, and necessity, around the world. It is a good news story and one that
offers some hope in the battle to ease the effects of climate change in the decades ahead.
The history of wind power is extensive and includes research into the comparative challenges
and benefits of onshore and offshore generation. It is the largest and fastest growing source of
renewable power globally, generating nearly 8 percent of all energy last year. When combined with
solar power, this figure increases to 12 percent.
Wind power projects now dot the globe. In studies, researchers have found offshore wind
farms to be an effective option for achieving a low-carbon energy transition. Consequently, efforts to
address the challenges associated with the implementation of offshore wind farms are important.
Authorities in European countries are already taking action. Last week, nine nations pledged
to expand the capacity of their offshore wind farms in the North Sea by a factor of eight —
compared with current levels — by 2050.
Wind power generation is already increasing; last year it supplied nearly a fifth of all
electricity used in the EU area, according to Energy think tank Ember.
European nations want to develop more wind farms, and other green-energy projects, on land
and at sea. For example, the Netherlands and the UK have announced plans for Europe’s biggest
cross-border electricity connection to an offshore wind farm, and the EU and Norway have agreed to
develop infrastructure to capture and store carbon dioxide from depleted North Sea gas fields.
The UK already has 45 offshore wind farms, producing 14 gigawatts of power, with plans to
expand capacity to 50 gigawatts by 2030. Germany has 30 wind farms producing 8 gigawatts, while
the Netherlands generates 2.8 gigawatts, and Denmark and Belgium 2.3 gigawatts each. These
European numbers are impressive and illustrate the potential results of effective policies.
Elsewhere, sea-based wind farms connected to land-based food production in the Baltics are
being expanded. The 62.7 megawatt Jurbarkas II wind farm will be built near the town of the same
name in Lithuania, off the coast of an agricultural region in the southwest of the country, and should
be operational by 2024. Other countries around the Baltic Sea are also expanding their wind power
networks, while remaining mindful of the security requirements for protecting such infrastructure
from state and non-state threats.
In East Asia, wind power is taking off in leaps and bounds as Asia-Pacific states race to
harness its inexhaustible potential. Wind farms are popping up on land and — more crucially —
offshore, providing energy to millions of households. These Asian states are a bigger market for
wind power, given the geographical area, compared with Europe, and so Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan are looking to boost offshore generation.
China is also a major driver of wind power projects. It boasts the largest offshore wind
turbine, which stands more than 250 meters tall. In fact, Chinese turbines are the largest in the
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industry, with 128 meter-long blades that can sweep an area equivalent to the size of about seven
football pitches.
Interestingly, Chinese authorities are looking at a hybrid wind and hydrogen power
generation system that can effectively reduce potential power loss caused by lack of wind, and
further improve the ability of the energy system to accommodate renewable energy.
But there are issues with existing offshore wind power generation models. One problem lies
within the supply chain: Giant offshore wind farms are complicated to install and maintain. They
require very specialized and expensive ships for maintenance, as part of a complex layer of
operational support. High demand for repair ships can therefore hamper maintenance and reduce
capacity.
A recent study of stakeholders in the wind energy sector in Europe found that this type of
green energy does still cause pollution. There are also six issues that are emerging as points of
contention or as concerns about the environmental impact of wind power: Nature preservation;
distributional injustice; property and convenience; proportions; health concerns; and landscape
values and functions.
Significantly, therefore, as new modes of energy generation are increasingly introduced, the
pollution they create, and any other contentious issues, have to be assessed, managed and resolved.
Overall, wind power generation in both the West and East must be scaled up by a factor of
four this decade to help meet the target of restricting the global average temperature rise to less than
1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
Wind power must account for more than 20 percent of global electricity production by 2030 if
net-zero emissions goals are to be achieved. Wind generation equipment is required now to increase
its production rate to meet the growing demand for larger and better blades using high technology
solutions to capture nature’s breath.
(Source: Eurasia Review)
 83

Essays

DANGERS OF AI CONCENTRATION
Can we safeguard against a digital dictatorship?
Abdul Rehman Nawaz (Research assistant at the Institute of Development and Economics Alternatives)
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and chatbots like ChatGPT have shaped human life. From altering
the way, we live and work, to redefining how we communicate, this new technological dawn is
nothing short of extraordinary. However, as the use of AI continues to gain momentum and
infiltrate various industries, apprehensions regarding potential job loss have surfaced. The million-
dollar question looms large ― will AI and chatbots replace jobs in the near future? And if so, what
repercussions will this have on the global economy?
AI and economy
According to the Global Artificial Intelligence Study, the widespread adoption of AI is
projected to result in a staggering $15.7 trillion increase in global GDP by 2030, accounting for a
massive 26% increase. To put this into perspective, this is more significant than the combined GDP
of China and India. This growth will be driven by a 40% increase in productivity and a 60% increase
in consumption.
In line with this, the World Economic Forum estimates that 85 million jobs will be displaced,
but 97 million new jobs will be created across 26 countries by 2025. This means that the net impact of
AI on employment is likely to be negative in the short term. However, the report also suggests that
the long-term impact of AI on employment is uncertain and depends on several factors, such as rate
of adoption, skills of the workforce, and level of investment in education and training.
AI has already replaced several jobs in manufacturing and service industries, such as
assembly line workers, bank tellers, and customer service representatives. However, the recent
advancements in AI technology have enabled machines to perform tasks that previously required
human intelligence, such as natural language processing, pattern recognition, and decision-making.
As AI continues to evolve, it is expected to automate more tasks and replace more high-tech jobs.
Will chatbots replace doctors and lawyers?
What about professional jobs, such as doctors, lawyers, and financial advisors? Can AI and
chatbots replace them? The answer is not straightforward. AI can certainly perform some of the
tasks that these professionals do, such as diagnosing medical conditions, reviewing legal documents,
and analysing financial data. However, these tasks are just a small part of what these professionals
do. They also require human skills, such as empathy, judgment, and creativity, which are difficult
for machines to replicate, at least right now.
Nevertheless, AI and chatbots are already disrupting these professions. For example, AI-
powered medical diagnostic tools are becoming more accurate and reliable than human doctors in
some cases. Legal chatbots are helping individuals and businesses navigate legal issues without the
need for a lawyer and robot-advisors are managing investment portfolios without the need for a
financial advisor.
How will AI affect world economy?
The answer is complex and multifaceted. The adoption of AI and chatbots is likely to increase
productivity and efficiency, which can lead to economic growth. But the displacement of workers
 84

and professionals can lead to unemployment and income inequality, which can have negative social
and economic consequences.
Yuval Noah Harari, the renowned historian and author of Sapiens and Homo Deus, has
argued that the rise of AI could lead to increased income inequality in the future. In his book 21
Lessons for the 21st Century, Harari explains how AI is likely to impact the job market and the
distribution of wealth. It could lead to income inequality by automating jobs that are currently done
by human workers. As AI becomes more advanced, it will be able to perform a wider range of tasks,
including those that require high levels of cognitive and creative abilities. This means that jobs that
are currently considered safe from automation, such as those in the fields of law, medicine, and
journalism, could be at risk.
The displacement of workers by AI could lead to a situation where a small number of people
own the means of production and reap the benefits of increased productivity, while the majority of
people struggle to find meaningful work. This could result in a widening income gap between the
“haves” and the “have-nots”, leading to social and political instability.
The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few could lead to a situation where the rich are
able to use their wealth to influence AI algorithms and shape the direction of technological
development. This could lead to a scenario where AI is used primarily to benefit the wealthy, rather
than to address social and environmental challenges.
Furthermore, the rise of AI could lead to a situation where human labour becomes less
valuable, as machines become more efficient and cost-effective. This could result in a situation
where people are forced to accept lower wages and work longer hours to compete with machines,
further exacerbating income inequality.
Concentration of wealth and power
The rise of AI has the potential to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few
individuals and corporations due to several reasons.
AI can lead to concentration of power through network effects, a phenomenon where the
value of a product or service increases as more people use it. In the context of AI, network effects can
be seen in the relationship between data and AI performance. The more data an AI system has
access to, the better it can learn and perform. This means that larger companies with access to more
data are likely to have more powerful AI systems, giving them a competitive advantage.
For instance, two companies, Company A and Company B are working on developing an AI
system for speech recognition. Company A has access to a vast amount of data, including millions of
hours of audio recordings, while Company B has access to only a small fraction of this data.
Company A is therefore able to train its AI system on a much larger and more diverse dataset, which
allows it to perform better than Company B’s AI system.
As a result, Company A is likely to be more successful in the market for speech recognition
technology, which can lead to further advantages. For example, Company A may be able to attract
more customers, which in turn provides it access to more data. This data can then be used to further
improve its AI system, creating a feedback loop that reinforces its position of power and creates a
barrier to entry for other companies.
Over time, this feedback loop can lead to a concentration of power in the hands of a few large
companies that have access to more data and the most powerful AI systems. This can create a
situation where smaller companies and individuals are unable to compete, leading to a
concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few.
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The scalability of economic growth and intellectual property

Another way that AI can lead to concentration of power is through economies of scale.
Economies of scale refer to the cost advantages that larger companies have over smaller ones due to
their ability to spread fixed costs over a larger output. As AI systems become more advanced, the
cost of developing them increases, making it difficult for smaller companies to afford the investment
required. This gives larger companies with more resources a competitive advantage, allowing them
to dominate entire industries and concentrate power and wealth. As a result, smaller companies and
startups may struggle to compete with larger companies, further reinforcing the concentration of
power in the hands of a few dominant players.
The development of AI often relies on the creation of intellectual property (IP), such as
algorithms and datasets. IP is a key component in the development of AI, as it encompasses the
algorithms, datasets, and other innovations that drive AI advancements. Companies that are able to
create valuable IP in the AI space can benefit from it in the form of profits, creating a source of
wealth and power. However, the development of IP is often expensive and resource-intensive,
which can make it difficult for smaller companies and individuals to compete with larger
corporations that have more resources at their disposal. As a result, larger companies are often able
to accumulate more IP, creating a concentration of power and wealth that can further reinforce their
dominant position in the market.
Control over data is a crucial factor in the development of AI, as AI systems require access to
large amounts of data to learn and improve. Companies that have control over data sources, such as
social media platforms, search engines, and e-commerce sites, are able to use this data to train their
AI systems and gain a competitive advantage. As a result, a few companies that have access to vast
amounts of data can consolidate their power and influence in the market. This concentration of data
and power can create a barrier to entry for smaller companies, as they may not have access to the
same level of data needed to develop competitive AI systems, leading to a further concentration of
power and wealth in the hands of a few dominant players.
The regulatory capture
Finally, there is the risk of regulatory capture which refers to a situation where companies are
able to use their power and influence to shape regulations and policies in their favour. This can
occur when regulators become too closely aligned with the interests of the companies they are
supposed to regulate, leading to a conflict of interest. In the case of AI, companies with significant
power and wealth may be able to use their influence to shape regulations and policies in ways that
benefit them, such as creating barriers to entry for competitors or limiting the ability of regulators to
oversee their activities. This can lead to a situation where regulations are designed to benefit the
largest and most powerful companies, further reinforcing their position of power and wealth, while
smaller companies and startups are left at a disadvantage.
A threat to society
The increasing use of AI to monitor and control individuals and groups could lead to a loss of
privacy and civil liberties. AI systems can be used to track people’s movements, behaviours, and
online activity, which could be exploited to exert control over their lives, ultimately leading to a
digital dictatorship. Secondly, the rise of AI could lead to widespread job displacement and income
inequality, disrupting traditional business models and contributing to the contraction of the
capitalist class. A few companies with access to advanced AI systems could dominate the market,
making it difficult for small businesses and startups to compete, resulting in a less diverse and more
controlled economy.
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Potential risks and challenges

As AI continues to advance, it is essential to consider the potential risks and challenges it
poses to society. It is crucial to develop policies that address these challenges proactively and foster
a more equitable and just society.
Government and private sector must focus on upskilling and reskilling programmes for
workers at risk of losing their jobs to automation. This can help ensure that individuals are equipped
with the necessary skills to transition into new industries and roles that are less likely to be
automated. Similarly, policymakers should consider implementing social safety nets, such as
universal basic income, to provide financial support to those who are or would be displaced by AI. It
is also important to encourage the development and adoption of AI in a way that is inclusive and
equitable, with a focus on reducing biases and ensuring transparency in decision-making processes.
Ultimately, a collaborative effort between policymakers, businesses, and individuals will be
necessary to effectively navigate the challenges and opportunities presented by AI.

THE AGE OF ENERGY INSECURITY

How the Fight for Resources Is Upending Geopolitics
Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan
Introduction
As recently as 18 months ago, many policymakers, academics, and pundits in the United
States and Europe were waxing lyrical about the geopolitical benefits of the coming transition to
cleaner, greener energy. They understood that the move away from a carbon-intensive energy
system that relied on fossil fuels was going to be difficult for some countries. But on the whole, the
conventional wisdom held that the shift to new sources of energy would not only aid the fight
against climate change but also put an end to the troublesome geopolitics of the old energy order.
Such hopes, however, were based on an illusion. The transition to clean energy was bound to
be chaotic in practice, producing new conflicts and risks in the short term. By the fall of 2021, amid
an energy crisis in Europe, skyrocketing natural gas prices, and rising oil prices, even the most
optimistic evangelist of the new energy order had realized that the transition would be rocky at best.
Any remaining romanticism evaporated when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The war
revealed not only the brutal character of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime and the dangers
of an excessive energy dependence on aggressive autocracies but also the risks posed by a jagged,
largely uncoordinated scramble to develop new energy sources and to wean the world off old,
entrenched ones.
One result of this turmoil has been the revival of a term that had come to seem anachronistic
during the past two decades of booming energy supplies and utopian visions of a green future:
energy security. To many Americans, that phrase is redolent of the 1970s, conjuring images of boxy
sedans and wood-paneled station wagons lined up for miles, waiting to fill their tanks with gasoline
at sky-high prices thanks to the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. But
energy security is hardly a thing of the past: it will be crucial to the future.
Energy security has historically been defined as the availability of sufficient supplies at
affordable prices. But that simple definition no longer captures reality; the risks the world now faces
are both more numerous and more complicated than in earlier eras. To handle these new challenges,
policymakers must redefine the concept of energy security and develop new means of ensuring it.
Four broad principles should guide this process: diversification, resilience, integration, and
transparency. Although these principles are familiar, the traditional methods of applying them will
prove insufficient in this new era; policymakers will need new tools. There is no reason to despair
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just yet. After all, the oil crisis of the 1970s sparked a great deal of innovation, including the
development of today’s wind and solar technologies, greater efficiency in vehicles, and new
government and multilateral institutions to make and coordinate energy policy. The policies and
technologies that now seem old and outdated were once shiny and new. Today’s crisis may likewise
lead to novel ideas and techniques, as long as policymakers fully grasp the new realities they face.
The future arrived early
The events of the past year and a half have dramatically revealed the many ways in which the
energy transition and geopolitics are entangled. Dynamics that were once seen as theoretical or
hypothetical are now concrete and evident to even the casual observer.
First, the past 18 months have highlighted the “feast before famine” dynamic facing
traditional producers of oil and gas, whose power and influence will increase before it wanes. In
2021, for example, Russia and other oil and gas producers had a banner year in terms of revenue as
extreme weather and the world’s emergence from pandemic slowdowns boosted demand for
natural gas. Such shocks had outsize impacts in a market with a meager cushion. In previous years,
poor returns, uncertainty about future demand for energy, and pressure to divest from fossil fuels
all contributed to diminished investment in oil and gas, resulting in inadequate supplies. Russia
took advantage of these tight energy markets by draining its European gas storage sites and slashing
spot gas sales even as it met long-term contractual commitments. Average natural gas prices tripled
from the first half to the second half of 2021. Combined with rising oil prices, these developments
granted Russia a feast of annual revenues that were 50 percent higher for oil and gas than the
Kremlin had expected.
The past year and a half also demonstrated that some oil and gas producers were still
prepared to use their energy prowess to ruthlessly advance their political and geostrategic
objectives; hopes that the world had moved beyond such behavior were dashed with the brutal
Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the months that followed, Russia gradually cut its
pipeline gas deliveries to Europe by more than three-quarters, triggering a crisis that led European
governments to spend a staggering 800 billion euros shielding companies and households from
higher energy costs. The world’s dependence on Russia for energy initially weakened the global
response to the invasion: for many months, Russian oil flows were exempt from European sanctions.
To this day, the EU has not sanctioned Russian gas sales; indeed, its members continue to import
significant volumes of Russian liquefied natural gas. Tight energy markets allowed Russian oil and
gas revenues to soar and gave Moscow a potential means of dividing a newly united Europe.
By last year, the mismatch between declining supplies and rising demand had already
tightened the oil market. Prices leaped even further, to a 14-year-high, on market fears that the
delivery of millions of barrels per day of Russian oil would be disrupted even as demand surged. At
the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted that Russian
production would decline by three million barrels per day. Fears of supply shocks drove up oil
prices and boosted both the income and the geopolitical heft of major oil producers, particularly
Saudi Arabia. The United States had thought its days of begging Saudi Arabia to increase oil output
had passed. But in the face of high prices, old patterns reasserted themselves, as Washington
pleaded—mostly in vain—for more output from Saudi Arabia, the only country with any
meaningful spare oil production capacity.
The tremors of the last 18 months also illustrate how the geopolitical environment can affect
the pace and scope of the transition to clean energy. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
European countries and the United States were committed to transforming their economies to
achieve net-zero carbon emissions in the coming decades. The brutality of Russia’s actions and the
knowledge that those actions were funded by fossil fuel receipts reinforced the determination
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among many in Europe and the United States to move away from oil, gas, and coal. In Washington,
one result was landmark climate legislation in the form of the Inflation Reduction Act. Europe also
expedited its green plans, notwithstanding some small near-term increases in coal use.
Many American officials worry, however, that a more accelerated energy transition will
necessarily involve greater dependence on China, given its dominance of clean energy supply
chains. U.S. Senator Joe Manchin, a Democrat from West Virginia, warned that he did not want to
have to wait in line to buy car batteries from China the way he waited in line in the 1970s to buy
gasoline made with oil from the Middle East. Such fears led Congress to create incentives for the
domestic production, refining, and processing of critical minerals now centralized in China. Rather
than praising Washington for finally passing meaningful climate change legislation, however, much
of the world resented these moves as acts of U.S. protectionism, stirring talk of climate-provoked
trade wars.
Finally, the energy crisis of the last 18 months has widened the rift between rich and poor
countries. Many countries in the developing world became more strident in objecting to pressure to
diversify away from fossil fuels, noting the rise in food and energy costs emanating from a European
war. Developing countries have also denounced what they perceived as the hypocrisy inherent in
how the developed world has responded to the crisis: after years of citing climate change as a reason
to avoid funding natural gas infrastructure in lower-income countries, for example, European
countries were suddenly racing to secure new supplies for themselves and building new
infrastructure to accept them. Making matters worse, as Europe bid up the price of gas, demand for
coal spiked in Asia and drove prices to record levels, leaving developing and emerging-market
countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, struggling to afford energy in any form. These tensions
were on full display at the UN climate conference in Egypt in November 2022. Biden arrived to take
a victory lap over the passage of a historic domestic climate law but found that poorer countries
were unimpressed. Instead, they asked why the United States was not doing more to finance
climate-change adaptation and clean energy outside its borders and demanded that their richer
counterparts compensate them for the damage that climate change has already caused to their cities,
agriculture, and ecosystems. The energy crisis may have eased in recent months, but it is still far too
early for complacency. The vast majority of Europe’s reduction in gas demand last year arose from
unusually warm weather and the idling of industrial production, as opposed to intentional
conservation that can be sustained. Moreover, Europe may not be able to rely on much, if any,
Russian gas to refill its storage facilities over the coming year. The flow of piped Russian gas into
Europe throughout 2022, albeit in shrinking volumes, has now halted and seems unlikely to resume;
the Russian liquefied natural gas still flowing to Europe could come under pressure and be curtailed
in the months ahead.
Meanwhile, with growing risks to Russian oil output, global demand is expected to rise nearly
twice as much as supply in 2023, according to the IEA. Washington’s primary tool for cushioning
supply disruptions, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, is vastly diminished. If prices begin to soar
again, Western countries will have few options but to turn once more to Saudi Arabia and to the
United Arab Emirates, which also has some spare capacity. Ironically, by the time the UAE hosts the
next major UN climate conference, at the end of 2023, the world may well also be turning to Abu
Dhabi not just for climate leadership but for more oil.
Sources of stress
Driving the new energy insecurity are three main factors: the return of great-power rivalry in
an increasingly multipolar and fragmented international system, the efforts of many countries to
diversify their supply chains, and the realities of climate change.
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the West offer a striking
example of how the ambitions of a single leader can create energy insecurity for broad swaths of the
world’s population, and the war serves as a reminder that great-power politics never really went
away. The U.S.-Chinese contest, however, may ultimately prove more consequential. The
intensifying desire of the United States and China to not rely too much on each other is remaking
supply chains and reinvigorating industrial policy to a degree not seen in decades. Even with
redoubled efforts to produce more clean energy at home, the United States and others will still
depend on China for critical minerals and other clean energy components and technologies for years
to come, creating vulnerabilities to Chinese-induced shocks. For instance, in recent months, China
has suggested that it may restrict the export of solar energy technologies, materials, and know-how
as a response to restrictions that Washington imposed last year on the export of high-end
semiconductors and machinery to China. If Beijing were to follow through on this threat or curtail
the export of critical minerals or advanced batteries to major economies (just as it cut off rare earth
supplies to Japan in the early 2010s), large segments of the clean energy economy could suffer
setbacks.
Traditional energy heavyweights are also recalibrating their positions in response to the
changing geopolitical landscape in ways that increase energy security risks. Saudi Arabia, for
instance, now sees its global stance differently than it did in the decades that followed the famous
“oil for security” bargain struck by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdulaziz ibn
Saud on Valentine’s Day in 1945. Riyadh is now far less concerned with accommodating
Washington’s requests, overt or implied, to supply oil markets in ways consistent with U.S. interests.
In the face of a perceived or real decrease in U.S. strategic commitment to the Middle East, Riyadh
has concluded it must tend to other relationships—especially its links to China, the single largest
customer for its oil. The kingdom’s acceptance of China as a guarantor of the recent Iranian-Saudi
rapprochement bolsters Beijing’s role in the region and its global status. Relations with Moscow
have also become particularly important to Saudi Arabia. Regardless of the invasion of Ukraine, the
Saudi government believes that Russia remains an essential economic partner and collaborator in
managing oil-market volatility. It will therefore be extremely reluctant to take positions that pit the
Saudi leadership against Putin.
The United States thought its days of begging Saudi Arabia to increase oil output had passed.
The new energy insecurity is also shaped by forceful moves many countries have made to
domesticate and diversify their supply chains since the invasion of Ukraine and the global
pandemic. Such moves are understandable, and even wise, given the now evident risks of excessive
dependence on certain countries, notably China, in this new geopolitical era. Yet an interconnected
global energy system remains the cornerstone of energy security; markets are still the most efficient
way to allocate supplies. Increased self-sufficiency may give countries an increased sense of
resilience but could also make them vulnerable; an interconnected global market can ease
disruptions caused by extreme weather or political instability. More segmented energy markets will
inevitably have fewer options to tap in such circumstances. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and
Europe’s Green Deal industrial plan are intended to accelerate the drive to net-zero emissions, and
they reduce energy insecurity in some ways by curbing dependence on globally traded
hydrocarbons exposed to geopolitical risks. Yet they also increase insecurity, since promoting
domestic industries runs the risk of stoking protectionism and fragmentation, both of which can
make economies less energy secure.
Finally, climate change will be a major threat to energy security in the coming decades, posing
risks to infrastructure old and new. Warmer waters and more severe droughts will make it harder to
cool power plants, transport fuels, and rely on hydropower. In 2022, California lost half its
hydroelectric output because of drought, and Brazil was nearly forced to ration electricity after
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losing much of its hydropower. These kinds of events will become more common as the world
decarbonizes because an energy system less reliant on hydrocarbons will depend more heavily on
electricity; the cheapest way to decarbonize sectors such as transportation and heating will be to use
electricity instead of gasoline engines or natural gas boilers. The IEA estimates that if the world is to
reach the goal of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, 50 percent of global energy consumption will
need to be met by electricity, up from only 20 percent today. And nearly all that electricity will need
to be produced from zero-carbon sources, up from only 38 percent today.
Climate change will place much of the infrastructure for this electricity generation,
transmission, and distribution at greater risk, since fragile grids and overhead wires are often more
vulnerable to extreme weather, wildfires, and other climate-related risks. Climate change can also
have a negative impact on renewable sources of electricity, with the UN Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change projecting that by 2100, average global wind speeds could fall by 10 percent as
climate change reduces the differences in atmospheric temperatures that generate wind.
Diversification dilemmas
One solution to these problems is to diversify supply. Diversification remains as central to
energy security as it was in 1913, when Winston Churchill, then the first lord of the Admiralty,
declared that “in variety, and in variety alone” would the United Kingdom find a solution to
vulnerabilities created by his decision to shift the British navy from a reliance on Newcastle coal to
less secure sources of oil from Persia.
In the long run, the clean energy transition will lead to improved energy security in many
cases by diversifying fuel sources and suppliers. For example, transportation, most of which
currently runs on oil, will be less vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions in a world where roughly
two-thirds of vehicles are electrified, since electricity can be generated from multiple energy sources.
And because most electricity is produced close to where it is consumed, a more electrified world will
also be less subject to import disruptions caused by disputes among countries.
Yet as the transition progresses and consumers diversify away from fossil fuels, new
vulnerabilities and threats to energy security will arise. Even as oil use wanes, geopolitical risks may
increase as global production becomes further concentrated in countries that can produce at low cost
and with low emissions, many of which are in the Persian Gulf. In the IEA scenario in which the
world reaches net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, the share of global oil supply from OPEC
producers rises from around one-third today to roughly one-half. The oil giant BP anticipates an
even greater global dependence on these producers, estimating that by 2050, they will account for
close to two-thirds of global oil supply. In the long run, that will be a large share of a tiny pie, but for
decades, oil demand will remain very high and consequential even if annual demand is falling.
U.S. policymakers may well ask themselves how comfortable they would feel if global oil
production were to be even more heavily concentrated in OPEC countries than it is today. Faced
with that outcome, they might consider a number of options, such as extending the increasingly
popular concept of “friend shoring” to oil by more actively supporting production at home and in
countries such as Norway and Canada, which are perceived as less risky than, say, Iran, Libya, and
Venezuela. Some officials might even advocate penalizing less friendly oil sources through import
taxes or even sanctions.
Taking such measures to subvert the market and bolster oil production in preferred locations
would carry significant risks, however. It would undermine the benefits that come from the ability
to reroute oil supplies in case of disruption. It would also risk backlash and retaliation from major
global oil producers in OPEC, which can send prices higher by restricting output. Subsidizing
domestic supply would also run counter to efforts to encourage consumers to move away from
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fossil fuels. A better approach would be to embrace global markets but boost defenses against
inevitable shocks and volatility with larger, not smaller, strategic oil reserves. Meanwhile,
diversifying the inputs of clean energy will be even more difficult than doing so for fossil fuels. The
sources of the requisite technology and components, notably the critical minerals needed for
batteries and solar panels, are even more heavily concentrated than oil.
The world’s largest supplier of lithium (Australia) accounts for around 50 percent of global
supply, and the leading suppliers of cobalt (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and rare earths
(China) each account for around 70 percent of those resources. In contrast, the world’s largest
producers of crude oil—the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia—each account for just 10 to 15
percent of global supply. The processing and refining of these minerals are even more concentrated,
with China currently performing around 60 to 90 percent of it. Meanwhile, Chinese companies
manufacture more than three-quarters of electric vehicle batteries and a similar proportion of the so-
called wafers and cells used in solar energy technology.
U.S. policymakers have recently awakened to these vulnerabilities and the fact that they will
become more acute as the transition progresses. The Inflation Reduction Act encourages the
production of critical minerals in the United States and elsewhere by providing tax credits and loan
guarantees for domestic producers, among other measures. The Biden administration recently
signed agreements with Congo and Zambia that are intended to increase U.S. imports of their clean-
energy minerals. And the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has pursued
debt transactions to support the development of solar cell manufacturing outside China. But to get
more of the minerals it needs from more of the countries it prefers, Washington will need to strike
many more bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and sharpen instruments such as the U.S.
Export-Import Bank, which can fund overseas mining operations in friendly countries such as
Indonesia. For its part, the U.S. Congress should increase the DFC’s authority and expand its ability
to make investments.
Another area that badly needs more diversification is enriched uranium, which will become
more important as the use of nuclear power increases globally to meet low-carbon electricity needs.
Russia’s role as a dominant supplier of nuclear fuel services to many countries, including the United
States, is a source of great discomfort and vulnerability, given the current geopolitical realities.
Boosting uranium production, conversion, and enrichment in the United States and among its
Western allies and substantially ramping up their fabrication of the fuel assemblies for Russian-
made reactors will be critical to maintaining the existing nuclear fleet and keeping decarbonization
goals within reach.
Building resilience
A secure energy system must be able to withstand and bounce back quickly from unexpected
shocks and disruptions. At the most fundamental level, reliable energy infrastructure is the key to
that sort of resilience. Governments and private companies have long worked to protect energy
infrastructure from dangers of all kinds, from terrorist attacks to hurricanes. As the transition
proceeds, they will need to step up such efforts. Moreover, as the clean energy economy becomes
more digitized and electrified, it will be exposed to a growing threat of cyberattacks. Private
companies and governments will need to coordinate and cooperate to deter and respond to threats
such as the 2015 cyberattack that took out large swaths of the grid in western Ukraine.
Resilience also requires flexibility, which in the energy sector is measured by the ability of
every part of a system to cope with losses in other parts. Because renewable sources such as solar
power and wind are highly variable, the energy they generate needs to be either stored or backed up
by other sources, with delivery systems making minute-by-minute adjustments. That is already a
difficult task, and it will become even harder in a grid with more intermittent sources of energy and
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more variable electricity demand. According to the IEA, the global power system’s need for
flexibility—measured as the amount the rest of the system needs to adjust to handle changes in
demand and in solar and wind output—will more than quadruple by 2050 if all countries fulfill their
climate pledges. Today, plants that run on coal or gas perform most of these adjustments. But as the
transition progresses, the number of such plants—and thus their ability to serve as backstops—will
progressively diminish.
To counteract that dynamic, U.S. policymakers should take steps to make sure that the
increasing share of renewable energy on the grid is matched by adequate balancing resources and
storage capacity. Doing so will require structures such as so-called capacity markets, which pay
generators to be available to meet peak demand even if they are idle much of the time. Such
mechanisms can help ensure that companies whose resources are needed only infrequently
nevertheless stay in business and support a reliable electricity supply even as their utilization rate
falls as the grid decarbonizes.
Energy security will be advanced not through more autonomy but through more integration.
Officials can also make use of new tools to manage demand for energy without massively
inconveniencing consumers or creating political headaches. For instance, digital technology can help
consumers shift energy-intensive activities to low-demand times of the day (such as running
dishwashers and clothes dryers overnight) or prompt them to save energy by lowering thermostats
in unoccupied rooms. Artificial intelligence will also play a growing role— for example, by reducing
the amount of time that energy systems are down for maintenance, by forecasting demand, and by
improving storage. Such tools would have come in handy in December 2022, when grid operators in
Texas badly underestimated how much electricity customers would need and the state barely
avoided widespread blackouts. Finally, officials should avoid the early retirement of fossil-fired
electricity sources that can balance the grid and ensure reliability before alternatives are fully
capable of providing the necessary level of service.
A resilient system must also be able to weather unexpected shocks and supply disruptions.
For decades, policymakers have relied heavily on two types of buffers: the spare capacity of
oilproducing countries (especially Saudi Arabia) and strategic stockpiles, which members of the
IEA are required to hold as part of an agreement forged after the Arab oil embargo in the
1970s. These historical buffers will still matter as the transition unfolds—even more so if, as seems
likely today, declines in energy supply and investment are not synchronized with declines in
demand, leading to less slack in the system to handle unexpected shocks and more volatility.
Moreover, it is clear that Riyadh has become far less willing to dip into its spare capacity whenever
Washington demands it. As coal generation declines in a decarbonizing economy, there will be less
opportunity for power generators to toggle between natural gas and coal, as many do now. This new
reality could result in more volatility in natural gas prices. And recent turmoil in the refining sector
that contributed to skyrocketing gasoline and diesel prices in the United States was a reminder that
limited refining investment can bite consumers before vehicle electrification causes fuel use to drop
sharply. For those reasons, other strategic stocks of all kinds will become more important—not just
those that hold oil but also ones that hold natural gas and oil products such as diesel fuel and
gasoline.
The United States will also need strategic stockpiles of the building blocks of clean energy,
working with its allies to amass critical minerals such as lithium, graphite, rare earths, and nickel.
Such coordination would be enhanced if the IEA had a hand in negotiating agreements, assessing
which countries are best positioned to contribute to which stockpiles, and regularly monitoring
whether the composition of stockpiles fits current needs. The IEA has played this role admirably for
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oil and oil products and could do so again with critical minerals if its members chose to expand its
mandate.
Integration as insurance
A desire for greater security has spurred the decades-long quest for “energy independence” in
the United States and elsewhere. And because of the shale revolution, the United States has become
energy self-sufficient in net terms. Nevertheless, the country continues to be vulnerable to
geopolitical risks because in a global market, supply shocks anywhere affect prices everywhere.
Proponents of the transition to a net-zero carbon system have long heralded the greater insulation
from geopolitics that would likely result from the end of the fossil-fuel era. But at least for the next
few decades, energy security will be advanced not through more autonomy but through more
integration—just as it always has been.
Interconnected and well-functioning energy markets increase energy security by allowing
supply and demand to respond to price signals so the entire system can better handle unexpected
shocks. In 2005, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted much of the U.S. Gulf Coast’s vast
production and refining operations, energy companies were able to avert fuel shortages by quickly
importing supplies from the global market. Similarly, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011,
Japan was able to temporarily shut down its nuclear power sector because it could import other
sources of fuel from the global market.
But maintaining and cultivating interdependence in today’s environment is more difficult
than at any time in recent memory, as countries around the world are embracing industrial policies
that involve increased state intervention in markets. Although those efforts can deliver benefits, such
as minimizing markets’ vulnerability to the whims of geopolitical adversaries, many policymakers
want to go further, promoting such policies as a means to boost domestic jobs and build political
coalitions in support of stronger action on the environment. Indeed, although climate diplomacy has
been premised for years on the assumption that progress depends on transnational cooperation,
some efforts to advance climate action paradoxically risk undermining cooperation by fueling the
forces of fragmentation and protectionism.
The case for energy integration has suffered as a result of Europe’s urgent need to decouple
from Russian energy during the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, although shocks may be felt more
broadly in an integrated system, they are also felt less intensely. Integration is a form of insurance
that spreads the risk of energy supply disruptions among many parties. And even if more autonomy
were preferable to more integration, it would not be possible to expand clean energy at the scale and
speed needed if each country sought to produce and consume only within its own borders.
According to the IEA, the value of global trade in critical minerals will need to triple to achieve net-
zero emissions by 2050. Global trade in low-carbon fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia will also
need to grow exponentially. For the United States, energy security will require fewer trade barriers
and more trade agreements with allies, as well as with other countries that meet certain
environmental standards. Washington should also eliminate tariffs on goods and technologies
related to clean energy and help finalize the Environmental Goods Agreement, which would reduce
tariffs on goods that benefit the environment to lower their costs and increase their trade.
What you don’t know can hurt you
One of the reasons that the United States, Canada, Japan, and several European countries
created the IEA in 1974 was that a lack of accurate, reliable data on prices and supplies had made it
hard for governments to craft policies and respond to crises. The lesson was clear: good data allows
markets to function, prevents panic, and deters the speculation that exacerbates price spikes,
volatility, and shortages. Over the decades, IEA data, along with data assembled by the International
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Energy Forum, has underpinned decision-making about production levels and guided actions such
as coordinated releases of stockpiled oil.
A clean energy economy will need the same kind of transparency. Inadequate data in nascent
markets, such as those for green ammonia and hydrogen, can cause supply disruptions, a lack of
liquidity, and poor availability of spot price assessments, all leading to pronounced price
fluctuations. The energy transition will also depend heavily on the market for critical minerals, such
as nickel. But investors were reminded of how market opacity can trigger extreme volatility when
the price of nickel on the London Metal Exchange almost quadrupled over just two days in early
2022, owing to massive short-selling caused in part by a lack of price transparency.
Currently, some private companies have good information on prices, but no single entity
gathers broad industrywide data and makes it publicly available. The IEA is the clear candidate to
fill that role. Ideally, the agency would ask governments to share consumption and production data
on minerals and make informed inferences about inventory levels. Such data sharing would be
especially important to ensure compliance if governments agreed to create strategic stockpiles, as
they do with oil. For such a system to work, however, the IEA would have to bring in countries that
are not members of the organization but produce or consume significant amounts of those minerals,
which in turn would require a new legal framework for the agency. Meanwhile, to help prevent
market manipulation and speculation, national regulators such as the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission should require greater transparency in the pricing and trading of commodities.
Security and the climate
The importance of energy security never diminished; it had simply been taken for granted in a
world of abundance and integrated, well-functioning global energy markets. Policymakers now
have the opportunity to look at energy security and climate security afresh, to accord appropriate
weight to both, and to appreciate that neither can be achieved in the absence of the other.
This effort requires recognizing that energy security is not a static concept but one that has
evolved a great deal since the crises of the 1970s. Policymakers must grasp the new risks to energy
security and modernize their toolkits to combat them. Doing so is not a distraction from addressing
climate change but central to it; without this shift, energy crises might derail the drive to net-zero
emissions. In the not-so-distant past, officials and experts thought that excessive fears about energy
security might hinder the fight for the climate. Today, the opposite is true: as the transition to a net-
zero world proceeds, the bigger danger to the climate will be insufficient attention to energy
security.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
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Foreign Policy and Relations

TROUBLED TIES
Maleeha Lodhi (Former ambassador to the US, UK & UN)
The outlook for Pakistan-India relations remains troubled. The prolonged diplomatic imp-asse
persists, characterised by new irritants that have added to long-standing disagreements and
disputes. When India, host of this year’s G20 summit, announced holding a G20 tourism working
group meeting in Srinagar in occupied Kashmir, it provoked a sharp response from Islamabad.
A foreign ministry statement denounced the move, calling it “irresponsible” and describing it
as designed “to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir in disregard of UN Security
Council resolutions”. It also objected to Delhi’s scheduling of two other meetings of a consultative
youth affairs forum (Y20) in Leh and Srinagar. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference urged Muslim
countries and China not to attend meetings in the disputed region.
Pakistan’s response was predictable in view of India’s aim to use these meetings to secure
legitimacy for its actions by conveying a sense of normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir, which it illegally
annexed and absorbed into the Indian union in August 2019.
India’s sweeping restrictions, military siege and human rights violations have continued to
make the situation there dire. Delhi has also carried out legal, demographic, and electoral changes in
the past two years to disempower Kashmiri Muslims. Pakistan’s protests have not deterred the BJP
government from pressing ahead.
Formal dialogue and the peace process between the two neighbours were suspended by India
long before its 2019 action. But relations plunged to a new low after August 2019. Pakistan
responded to Delhi’s Kashmir action by halting trade, recalling its high commissioner and
downgrading diplomatic ties.
However, back-channel communication between them led in February 2021 to re-commitment
by both sides to observe a ceasefire on the Line of Control in accordance with a 2003 understanding.
From the dangerous confrontation during the Balakot crisis of February 2019, the two countries
stepped back from the brink to agree on the LoC truce.
The ceasefire has since mostly held. But expectations that this thaw would pave the way for a
formal dialogue did not materialise. The diplomatic deadlock persists with strongly worded
statements exchanged with regularity.
Other than holding the G20 presidency this year, India is also chair of the eight-member
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and will host its annual summit in June. In that capacity it was
obliged to invite Pakistan to the foreign ministers’ meeting in Goa scheduled for May 4-5.
Although Islamabad has yet to take a decision on whether to attend, it has rarely shied away
from participating in multilateral forums even when held in India. As for attending the heads of
government summit in June, that might depend on whether Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Russian President Vladimir Putin attend.
The more consequential development for Pakistan-India relations in recent months has been
over the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. For six decades, this has survived wars, confrontations and
tensions between the two countries. But questions have now arisen over the fate of the treaty that
governs the sharing and management of trans-border rivers.
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On Jan 25, 2023, India notified Pakistan through the Indus Commission of its intention to
modify the Indus Waters Treaty. This reflected a hardening of India’s position and an effort to take
advantage of Pakistan’s preoccupation with its domestic political turmoil and economic crisis.
Pakistan has long disputed the construction of the 330 megawatt Kishanganga hydroelectric
project on the Jhelum river and plans to construct the 850 MW Ratle Hydroelectric Project on the
Chenab river in occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
This dispute has figured for decades in bilateral talks and meetings of the Permanent Indus
Commission. Because a resolution proved elusive, in 2016 Pakistan approached the World Bank,
which brokered the treaty and is also a signatory, to appoint an ad hoc Court of Arbitration to deal
with the dispute, a provision under the treaty.
While India completed the Kishanganga project in 2018, the bank took six years to activate the
court as well as a neutral expert, sought by India. Both dispute settlement methods are sanctioned
by the treaty. Two days before the first court hearing at the Hague on Jan 27, which India boycotted,
Delhi served notice on Islamabad that it would unilaterally amend the treaty citing Pakistan’s
“intransigence in handling disputes”.
This indicated Delhi’s effort to avoid any court process and intent to bar third-party
intervention in disputes by the proposed treaty modification. It asked Islamabad to respond in 30
days to its ‘notice’.
Pakistan rejected India’s call for negotiations on amending the treaty’s dispute mechanism
and accused Delhi of trying to divert attention from arbitration proceedings at the Hague.
But in early April, Pakistan responded to India’s ‘notice for modification’ through a letter
from the Commissioner for Indus Waters. This has not been made public. But officials say the letter
seeks clarification on the ‘notice’, offers to listen to Delhi’s concerns and insists the treaty cannot be
unilaterally amended.
This dispute over an issue of vital importance for water-stressed Pakistan has further vitiated
the atmosphere. Even cricket has not escaped bilateral tensions. In September, it is Pakistan’s turn to
host the Asia Cup, under the Asia Cricket Council. The ACC president is Indian cricket board’s Jay
Shah (son of BJP Home Minister Amit Shah). Without consulting the host country, Pakistan, Shah
unilaterally announced a schedule for the tournament in January. When PCB chairman Najam Sethi
protested at a board meeting in February, Shah conveyed India’s refusal to play in Pakistan.
Sethi said that by the same reciprocal criteria it would be impossible for Pakistan to later play
in the World Cup in India. He offered a hybrid option with matches involving India played in a
neutral venue and the rest in Pakistan, a formula that could later be applied to the World Cup. The
matter is still unresolved.
Pakistan-India relations remain clouded in uncertainty. While working-level diplomatic
engagement continues sporadically on practical issues, chances of any melting of the ice are remote.
The prospect is for the two countries to continue in an uneasy state of no war, no peace. The near-
term goal should be to manage tensions and prevent them from spinning out of control. But still
lacking is any framework for the management of tensions.
(Source: Dawn)
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ENERGIZING THE INDUS WATERS TREATY

Shafqat Kakakhel (Retired ambassador and former UN assistant secretary-general)
Supporters of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), including this writer, hope that their fears
concerning the treaty are likely to dissipate. This would depend on a positive response from New
Delhi to Pakistan’s offer of listening to their concerns.
Advocates of peaceful and cooperative relations between India and Pakistan would like to see
a sincere effort by them to revitalize the IWT by streamlining its dispute settlement process as well
as initiating cooperation on subjects that are not covered by the treaty.
On April 3, the Pakistan Indus commissioner responded to his Indian counterpart’s
communication of January 25 proposing bilateral negotiations on modifying the provisions of the
IWT. He expressed Pakistan’s readiness to ‘listen’ to India’s concerns regarding the treaty. On April
5, India’s Ministry of External Affairs acknowledged the Pakistani message and promised a response
in consultation with relevant stakeholders.
Hopefully, India and Pakistan will not limit their conversation to the dispute settlement
provisions of the IWT but also discuss broader cooperation on water-related subjects that were not
covered by the negotiations during the 1950s. Article 7 of the treaty provides for mutually beneficial
cooperation.
Since 1974, when India began building civil works for the Salal hydropower project on the
Chenab, the only topic handled by the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) is Indian power projects
on the western rivers. Surely, the five-decade history since India embarked on building dozens of
hydropower projects on the western rivers offers a host of lessons which deserve to be considered.
However, given the geographical proximity of the two countries and shared ecological and
socio-economic conditions, there is enormous potential for mutually beneficial cooperation between
them in the framework of integrated water resource management. In fact, under the so-called Track
2 dialogues between the two countries held during the decade of 2010 and sponsored and financed
by friendly third countries dozens of water resources practitioners and experts discussed
cooperation on transboundary rivers beyond the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty. The Track 2
participants were neither mandated to nor dared to negotiate any measures, but they reached a
broad understanding on areas that offered promise of cooperation.
The India-Pakistan discussion should focus on two categories of issues pertaining to the Indus
Basin: (a) streamlining the modalities of the processing of the Indian hydropower projects by the
Indus Commission; and (b) addressing issues that were not covered by the negotiators of the IWT
either because they did not exist, or their salience was not adequately understood more than seven
decades ago.
Pakistan’s complaints and concerns relating to the Indian hydropower projects are well
known. Most of them have been mentioned by Ashfaq Mahmood, former federal secretary for water
and power (2004-07) who had led Pakistan’s teams for talks with India on several water issues.
An ardent supporter of the IWT, Ashfaq has been calling for efforts by India and Pakistan to
implement the treaty in letter and spirit. His book ‘Hydro-Diplomacy: Preventing War Between
Nuclear- Armed Pakistan and India’ (published by the Institute of Policy Studies in 2018) traces the
evolution and salient features of the IWT. It explains the four Indian projects (Salal Dam which was
amicably resolved through foreign secretary level talks; the Baglihar Dam which was referred to a
neutral project; the Kishanganga project which was submitted to a Court of Arbitration, as well as
the Tulbul Navigation Project/ Wullar Barrage which has defied attempts at negotiated resolution
for nearly four decades.)
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Ashfaq Mehmood has also discussed data issues (Article 6), possible cooperation in future in
areas not addressed by the treaty (Article 7). He identifies trust deficit as a major impediment to the
satisfactory implementation of the IWT. Ashfaq has identified measures for preventing conflict and
fostering cooperation between India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s complaints include India’s proclivity to start building dams without prior
information; non- conformity of designs of their projects with the conditions noted in the treaty;
India’s non- implementation of the decisions of third-party arbitration; and failure to provide
complete and reliable data concerning flows of the western rivers as stipulated in Article 6 of the
treaty. Ashfaq has suggested how each one of Pakistan’s grievances can be addressed.
The other, far more important, issues concerning the Indus Basin include subjects missing
from the IWT such as the threats posed by climate change which was unheard of until the 1980s.
Although all climate change impacts adversely affect freshwater resources, especially in the
subcontinent, the two largest countries of the region which are also the main riparians of the Indus
Basin have shied from discussing those effects.
The two main sources of fresh water in India and Pakistan are the melting of the ice and snow
stored by the glaciers and the twice-yearly monsoon winds – both of which are acutely vulnerable to
climate change. The HKH glaciers are among the least monitored and least researched among
glacier systems. One of the consequences of climate change is reduced flows in the Indus rivers. If
there is a substantial decrease in the flows of any one of the western rivers due to climate change
even during the period of abundant supply (June-September), the IWT does not suggest how
reduced supplies to Pakistan are to be addressed, avoiding misunderstanding.
The global climate discourse repeatedly calls for cooperation between neighbouring countries
sharing ecosystems in climate mitigation and adaptation. India and Pakistan have not heeded those
calls.
The IWT mentions the need to prevent pollution of river water by both parties, but it could
not foresee the largescale pollution from the dumping of industrial effluent in the western rivers.
Both Jhelum and Chenab enter Pakistan laden with heavy contaminants from effluent. Remedial
actions are called for.
The IWT does not provide for environmental flows in the eastern rivers to preclude the
adverse ecological effects in the river belts denuded of water. Underground water and aquifers are
an integral part of the hydrology of a river basin. Prudent use of underground water ensures the
sustainability of the aquifer and the streams and wetlands that are part of the basin’s assets. The
IWT is silent about the once rich Indus aquifer whose sustainability is being jeopardized by
unregulated, excessive abstraction of ground water in both countries.
The India-Pakistan Track 2 dialogues of the decade of 2010 identified more than a dozen areas
of cooperation. These include joint studies on the impacts of climate change in collaboration with
friendly third countries; cooperation in managing climate change- induced extreme weather events;
joint monitoring of the HKH glaciers in collaboration with the International Centre for Integrated
Mountain Development (ICIMOD); studies on river water pollution from industrial and agricultural
runoff upstream of the western rivers; and timely exchange of relevant data for flood management.
More areas of cooperation include promoting micro-irrigation methods and technologies for
conservation and optimum utilization of water; promotion of water-use efficiency by non-
agricultural users; joint study on the cumulative environmental effects of cascades of multiple
hydroelectric projects on a single river; exchange of knowledge on monsoon variability trends; study
on the imperative of environmental flows in the eastern rivers; and creation of a web-based data
bank that would serve as a repository of all data links and resources that could be useful for analysis
and research.
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These suggestions deserve consideration by the governments of India and Pakistan and non-
state stakeholders.
(Source: The News)

ARE PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS DOOMED FOREVER?

Touqir Hussain (Former Ambassador and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University)
Pakistan-India ties find themselves in a strange place. The relationship is strained, the
leadership is estranged, and the people are aloof. A state of ominous peace prevails, but neither
country is pushed to do anything about it.
Enmity does not require permission, but friendship is by mutual consent — something that
both India and Pakistan have consistently lacked for the last several decades. The last and longest
search for such a consent was conducted during President Musharraf and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s tenures as chronicled by Ambassador Satish Lambah in his memoirs, In Pursuit
of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations under Six Prime Ministers (2023). The search remained
incomplete, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown little interest in its revival, much less
fulfilment.
With Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari scheduled to travel to Goa for the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Foreign Ministers’ conclave tomorrow, now’s a good
time as any to take stock of the recent history between the two nations and reflect on whether there’s
any hope for a rapprochement in the near future.
The past oppresses the present
Traditionally, there have been a host of factors blocking the road to peace between India and
Pakistan. First, the shadow of history has darkened the neighbours’ view of each other. Both
countries’ objectives and policies collide and their relationship remains marred by lingering
tensions, rooted in religion, culture and identity, and by conflicting versions of history. Pakistan has
desired normalisation but as an equal, and regards Kashmir as the defining issue for peace and
friendship. India, for its part, rejects these assumptions.
Meanwhile, each country has remained an indelible fixture of the other’s domestic politics.
Weak governments on both sides have found it politically difficult to normalise relations. A strong
government in India felt it could talk but only on its terms, while in Pakistan the civil-military power
play prevented the consensus on India.
It is no wonder then that only a strong government in India and a military ruler in Pakistan
found it possible to have any meaningful dialogue. But even that did not succeed. Any other talks
have been a dialogue to nowhere, often ending before they even began.
Enter Modi
Modi clearly had a plan for relations with Pakistan, and it was unlike anything seen before. It
was part of a new paradigm of India’s domestic and foreign policies. His foreign policy fortified the
trend that began around 1991 to enhance engagement with great powers, especially the United
States, to help raise India’s economic weight, military potential, and diplomatic stature. This served
shared interests of both India and the US by advancing India’s hegemony in the region, and by
furthering US policies towards Pakistan and China.
There were, no doubt, important domestic stimuli too at work; the Pakistan policy represented
the historical RSS view of Muslims, Pakistan and Kashmir that provided the ideological
underpinnings of Modi’s mindset. But his support in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went much
beyond his Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — a Hindu nationalist organisation — base.
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Marketing-savvy and skilled in the use of digital tools, Modi has tapped into the party’s traditional
nationalist ideology, and by bundling it with his populist economic agenda and Pakistan policy, not
only broadened his own support base in the BJP, but also that of the party across the country.
Ambassador Lambah had hoped he would continue his back channel role under Prime
Minister Modi. After being kept on hold, he was told thanks, but no thanks. Modi’s plan was not to
talk but to fix Pakistan — and for that, he did not need Lambah, but Ajit Doval.
The plan was put in operation in a piecemeal manner. It began with a charm offensive, as
Modi had come into power with a controversial image internationally — in 2005, Modi who was
then chief minister of India’s Gujarat state had his US visa revoked and was denied permission to
enter the country — and was not sure how he would be received by the US. So he started with good
optics and friendly posturing towards Pakistan, aimed at the international community, India’s
liberal intelligentsia, and non-BJP domestic electorate. He wanted to build wider support for his
Pakistan policy within India, and sufficient tolerance for it internationally.
Knowing well the power of the modern media, Modi began by inviting Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif to his swearing in. The media just ran away with the news, convinced that something new
and exciting was happening that would make a good story. In reality, however, the invitation was
no more than a public relations exercise. All the Saarc leaders had been invited to what was
essentially a ceremonial occasion. Similarly, the air dash to Lahore on Nawaz’s birthday in
December 2015 had no substantive outcome, but had a dramatic impact internationally, especially in
Washington. All this projected Modi as keen for good relations with Pakistan.
The public relations exercise was, no doubt, also targeted at the debate in Pakistan over
relations with India. Modi may have hoped that if Nawaz Sharif could deliver by agreeing to India’s
terms of engagement, well and good. If not, at least it would have advanced the case of those who
favoured normal relations with India. In this particular event, Nawaz Sharif lost the debate — and
his job.
Meanwhile, internationally, Modi had managed to convince many that he had done his best to
normalise relations with Pakistan, but the latter did not respond in kind. And Pakistan, with its lack
of strategy for India, principally because of the civil-military discord over the definition of relations
with India, gave ample opportunities to Modi to paint Pakistan exactly the way it would suit his
plan — to seek US backing and domestic support to his hardline policies.
These opportunities came in the way of the alleged actions of militant groups over which
Pakistan had either lost control or lacked the political will or capacity, or both, to control them. The
terrorist attacks in Pathankot in January 2016 and Uri in September 2016, played right into Modi’s
hands.
By avoiding a military response to these attacks, he skilfully showed Pakistan as the spoiler to
peace with India. The cancellation of talks with Pakistan and sabotage of the Saarc summit brought
the focus on Pakistan’s ‘behaviour’, while earning India praise internationally for its ‘restraint’. The
US’ displeasure over Pakistan’s role in the failing Afghanistan war and with its closeness to Beijing,
Indian policies were now beating to the same rhythm.
Modi’s real intentions and policies were the exact opposite to his theatrics of inviting Nawaz
Sharif and visiting him in Lahore given the fact that he used the flimsiest of excuses, such as the
Pakistan High Commissioner to India’s meeting with Kashmiri leaders in August 2014 to call off the
planned Foreign Secretaries talks. Meanwhile, the terrorism incidents helped him shut the door on
Pakistan completely, which he did not have to do. India and Pakistan could have still talked, but
Modi chose not to, for his own purposes.
At home, the terrorist attacks, exploited by Modi through social media and friendly electronic
media, triggered an enormous emotional response from the Indian citizenry. His non-military
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response made India look like a victim. The terrorism issue helped Modi with the military too as it
broadened the scope of conflict with Pakistan and enlarged the concept of national security,
elevating the military’s national profile. On Pakistan, Modi managed to bring everyone on the same
page.
Here comes Jaishankar
Modi, whose own approach to Pakistan was based on raw power, wielded with the help of an
increasingly assertive military capability and confident bureaucratic institutions of a rising India, got
intellectual underpinning with the arrival of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar as the foreign minister in
May 2019. Jaishankar’s strategic acumen, combined with a correct understanding of the emerging
geopolitics, has enabled India to maximise opportunities and minimise risks. According to C Raja
Mohan, a noted Indian analyst who is close to Jaishankar, “the Modi government has broken out of
… [a] defensive and deferential mindset”.
Jaishankar has pursued “India-First” policies, aimed at making no new enemies and losing no
old friends, while turning the emerging geopolitics greatly to India’s advantage. He has done this by
making use of the great power rivalry without being caught up in it. A rising India is now not only a
vital player in US foreign policy, but also an increasingly attractive partner to others, partly due to
reality and partly due to an illusion — the reality of the economic and strategic opportunities that
India offers, and the illusion of being a “democratic counterweight to China”. Nevertheless, India is
going to host a number of high-profile summits, including the upcoming SCO meet and the G20
summit later this year.
While India’s relations with the rest of the world continue to march forward, the ties with
Pakistan have gone into “virtual dormancy” since 2019 — when isolating Pakistan had run its
course. Modi found from his forward policy in the Pulwama incident that aggression worked as it
helped highlight Pakistan as having provoked the Indian response and thus responsible for
provoking the risk of conflict. It would put the spotlight on Pakistan as a reckless actor, endangering
peace in the region. Modi did not want to do anything more — he did not need to.
It was now time for India to cash in on the achievements of the Pakistan policy. Emboldened
by the fact that he had gotten away with all his overreach so far, at home and abroad, was enough
for Modi to assume that his August 5, 2019, action in occupied Kashmir would not cause any stir in
the international community, both because of India’s rising importance and Pakistan’s diminished
standing.
At the same time, Pakistan had been severely constrained by the FATF, a struggling economy,
a troubled Afghanistan and strained relations with Washington. A focus on combatting external
challenges at the cost of internal order, prolonged neglect of the economy, and an obsession with
geopolitics had weakened Pakistan at home and made it less influential abroad. Finally, by revoking
Indian-occupied Kashmir’s special autonomy, Modi put the dispute beyond Pakistan’s diplomatic
reach.
For India, it was time to move on from trying to isolate Pakistan to ignoring it. By treating
Pakistan as irrelevant, India’s calculus was not to focus too much on the region to avoid a situation
that might distract from its new found global profile. That was partly the reason for the February
2021 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir.
The ceasefire no doubt helped ease tensions along the LOC and helped the Kashmiris on both
sides. At the same time, it enabled India to shift some of its forces to its border with China as well as
draw applause abroad. But any hopes of better relations between India and Pakistan emerging from
the Kashmir ceasefire were overblown. The agreement had promised no such thing.
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Kashmir is now India’s ‘core issue’

India has a foreign policy and it has a Pakistan policy. They do intersect, but largely run
parallel to each other. Factors playing on the foreign policy are not always the same as those that
impact the ‘Pakistan policy’. Hindutava runs the latter. The corporate sector and business interests
are a factor in the foreign policy but not much in the relations with Pakistan, where the
normalisation of India’s control of Kashmir is the priority now. In some strange way, Kashmir may
have become India’s core issue.
India will not talk with Pakistan unless it stops insisting on pre-conditions related to occupied
Kashmir. That is the condition for the talks. Any progress in the talks is also linked to Kashmir.
India’s foremost objective from any form of normalisation will be to make Pakistan accept the new
power realities and the absorption of Kashmir by India — after a decent interval, if not now. In other
words, India will open the door to normalisation by shutting the door to Kashmir. Secondly, India
feels it cannot rise under the threat of destabilisation by non-state actors from across the border, and
Pakistan would have to address that issue as well if it desires friendly relations.
The fact of the matter is that India feels it is not missing anything from a lack of normalisation,
including economic benefits. Pakistan’s real value as an economic partner will not show up until
Afghanistan is stabilised and Pakistan becomes a hub for pipelines and trade with Central Asia.
Such a prospect is years, if not decades, away.
So for India, there is neither the compulsion nor an incentive to normalise relations with
Islamabad in the immediate future. For now, India is quite comfortable with what Mohan has
termed as “minimalism in its relations with Pakistan”. Courting an economic disaster, the
compulsion may now be Pakistan’s to normalise relations with India, or to have some form of
economic cooperation to say the least.
What may change on Pakistan’s side?
In recent years, while India may have thought it did not gain anything from normalisation,
Pakistan felt it did not lose anything from the lack of it. But Pakistan may now be having second
thoughts. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has called for dialogue thrice within his nine months in
office.
Strategic parity alone does not resolve critical nation and state building challenges. It is just
one element of national strength, whose totality consists of security, economic progress and political
stability.
Look at Pakistan’s internal security challenges: Baloch insurgents are getting more active and
the threat from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), emboldened by the return of the Afghan
Taliban to power, has become even more grave. In 2022, terrorism-related deaths in Pakistan rose by
120 per cent to more than 600 in over 100 attacks sponsored and led by the TTP and some separatist
groups — a number slightly higher than that in Afghanistan. Peace with India may undercut the
suspected external support of these groups.
Pakistan could start with the offer to open up economic relations with India, at least in some
select areas. That may not be of much help to Pakistan’s economy as it has structural issues but will
at least not require Pakistan to impose any pre-conditions regarding occupied Kashmir. It will,
however, give Islamabad some leverage. “Regional trade builds peace constituencies,” wrote former
foreign secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry in this publication. That may now be the only way to help
the Kashmiris as any armed leverage of Pakistan over Kashmir has long become a thing of the past
and is no longer an option, if it ever was.
A group of former Indian envoys to Pakistan, at a recent event held in Delhi to discuss
Lambah’s book, has advised India to at least take small steps such as the posting of High
Commissioners, relaxation of visa regime to help people-to-people contact, and resumption of trade
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talks. Speaking at the event, Shiv Shankar Menon, former High Commissioner to Pakistan and
National Security Adviser (2010-2014) gave an important advice to India: “Ultimately, it will be
harder to prosper and grow if the neighbourhood is in chaos.”
Unfortunately, no movement in the current stalemate, whether in economic relations or any
other area, seems possible for at least the foreseeable future. As another former High Commissioner
of India to Pakistan, TCA Raghavan, said at the event, “while India-Pakistan talks are needed, it is
clear that there is little appetite [for it] in India”.
The upcoming elections in Pakistan in 2023 and in India in 2024 will keep the relations in the
current holding pattern. A hardline approach towards Pakistan has helped Modi’s electoral politics
in the past. He may, therefore, like to keep the relations at the current neutral level, where gears can
be changed easily and tensions can be ratcheted up if and when needed.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has to remain on its guard while keeping the hopes alive of a much-
needed improvement in relations after the Indian elections. The interim period should be an
opportunity to set the house in order, without which neither India-Pakistan relations nor Pakistan
itself will get anywhere.
(Source: Prism)

PAKISTAN-UAE RELATIONS
Beyond a transactional relationship
Shazia Anwer Cheema
In the 21st century, diplomacy and international relations are more evolved than ever before,
with states shifting their alignments and re-adjusting their alliances on a much broader continuum.
The range of the spectrum is from economy to culture and everything in between. This paradigm
shift is people-centric and mutual interest dependent. The Middle East is no exception, where old
conflicts are being resolved for the greater good of the people, new relationships are being forged in
order to benefit larger goals, and the prevalence of goodwill is creating ripples of peace and
harmony among shareholders in the region and beyond. Having said this, the Pakistan-UAE
relationship has always been people-centric, and for more than 70 years, the two have fostered a
fortified bond of friendship which is multidimensional and includes trade and commerce, art and
culture, and above all faith and religion.
According to data directly provided to me by Pakistan’s ambassador to the UAE, Faisal Niaz
Tirmizi, the UAE remains Pakistan’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region with an average annual trade of $8 billion. In 2021-22, Pakistan-UAE bilateral trade
increased by 25.40 percent as compared to the previous year, amounting to $10.60 billion. Trade
figures between Pakistan and UAE this year are also very encouraging. For the two months of
January-February 2023, trade figures crossed over $1 billion, with food and textile as major export
items to UAE.
There are more than 1.6 million Pakistanis working in the UAE in diverse fields. They consist
of skilled and unskilled workers, professionals, and entrepreneurs. They are valued and recognized
in the country due to their hard work, dedication, and their positive contribution to the
development of the country.
Pakistan and UAE enjoy strong fraternal relations since the inception of the UAE. The
foundation of strong relations was laid down by His Highness (Late) Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al
Nahyan and further strengthened by close contact and bonds between the people of our two
countries. Strong people-to-people relations are based on common faith and culture, which make the
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ties deeper and stronger. Pakistanis consider UAE their second home and celebrate cultural and
religious events and festivals together. They are familiar with and appreciate each other’s customs,
traditions, and cuisines. Pakistan and UAE have cultural and educational collaborations, exchange
of business delegations, and regular sports and cultural events. These collaborations and events
have provided a platform for people of both countries to learn and know more about each other
resulting in stronger ties.
It’s true that the UAE provides a huge chunk of the Pakistan workforce with a market and
humanitarian support, but the relationship is far more layered than this. Outside of this
transactional relationship, Pakistan has become popular as a country of rich culture and history,
beautiful landscapes, art, popular music and sports. Pakistani cultural and sports events are held
frequently in the UAE with a strong fanbase of Emiratis and expats from all over the world.
Pakistani businesses and professionals have a strong presence in the UAE, and contribute
immensely to its diverse and multicultural society.
This people-centric diplomacy which many people are looking forward to now, has always
been at the very core of the UAE-Pakistan relationship, which is based on mutual respect and
goodwill. The continuum of steady cooperation between both countries will further strengthen their
friendship and provide opportunities to facilitate the people of both countries.
(Source: Arab News)

FENCING THE PAK-AFGHAN BORDER

Asadullah Raisani
Pakistan is often lectured on how to design its foreign policy, particularly towards
Afghanistan. One prominent piece of advice is to not engage with the current Taliban Government.
Afghanis, be it the people who were siding with the Ghani / Karzai administration or the current
setup, have also remained somewhat unsatisfied with Pakistan`s foreign policy toward Afghanistan,
particularly regarding the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan`s National Security Advisor
under Imran Khan`s premiership Dr. Moeed Yusuf gave a befitting reply to the critiques who lecture
Islamabad stating that countries that are thousands of miles away from Afghanistan have the
convenience to lecture us, but being a neighboring country to Afghanistan, Islamabad does not have
the luxury to avoid its [some] 1600 miles border and shared ethnicity, culture & religion with
Afghanistan and go for disengagement. However, this piece defends Pakistan`s legal right to fence
its border with Afghanistan.
According to the UN Security Council’s 13th report (May 2022) by its monitoring team on
Afghanistan, there is a presence of the most lethal terrorist organizations like the self-proclaimed
Islamic State (the Khorasan Chapter), Al-Qaida, and others in Afghanistan. The report calls it a
matter of concern for the neighboring states. It claims that the Taliban (Afghanistan Chapter) are
losing cohesion since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, as they no more have the common cause
of expelling foreign forces from there. It alarms that Al-Qaida is reorganizing itself to continue its
idea of global jihad and Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) or Al-Qaida the sub-continent
chapter, has some 180 to 400 fighters.
Allotting a specific section to Da`esh or the so-called Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), the said
report claims that the Da`esh core made $500,000 in late 2021 alone. In contrast, the Taliban are
struggling for funds causing some financially motivated defections to join the ISK, and there are
reports of Uzbek and Tajik defections among Taliban changing allegiance to ISK. Estimates suggest
that the said organization has 1,500 to 4,000 fighters including the former Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces who have joined ISK for revenge or protection from the Taliban. The report
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acknowledges that “Salafi mosques and madrassahs in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, where
a majority of ISK have their origins,” are the sources of fundraising for the group. And unlike NATO
forces, the Taliban regime has no aerial capability, a marginal conventional edge, to operate against
ISK.
The UNSC Report then talks about Tehreek-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It claims that 17 former
splinter groups have joined TTP between 2020-21, including Jamaat ul Ahrar. It is estimated that it
has 3,000 to 4,000 armed fighters that are located along the east and south-east Pak-Afghan border
areas. On March 30, 2022, the group announced to launch a spring offensive against Pakistan
Security Forces. As per the report, TTP also enjoys support from a Uighur religious extremist
organization – the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP).
Now imagine a country with a struggling economy and political instability sharing a 1640
miles long border with such a country and is threatened by TTP – yes, under discussion is, Pakistan.
The mentioned report itself indirectly urges Islamabad and Kabul to manage their long border for
the safety and security of their people and to ensure peace in the region.
UN Security Council Resolution 1269 also calls upon states to cooperate with each other to
suppress and prevent terrorism. The Taliban regime and Islamabad should comply with this. The
resolution also calls upon all states to, a) prevent and suppress the preparation and financing of any
acts of terrorism through all lawful means in their territories; b) not grant refugee status to any
asylum-seeker before ensuring whether he/she has participated in terrorist acts; and c) “exchange
information in accordance with international and domestic law.”
Moreover, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 calls upon all states to, a) take necessary steps
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; b) “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support
or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens;” c) bring those to justice who are party to financing,
planning, preparation, and perpetration of terrorist acts; and d) “prevent the movement of terrorists
or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel
documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of
identity papers and travel documents.”
In sum, Pakistan has every legal reason and right to fence its border with Afghanistan for the
safety and security of its nationals. UN, as per article 55(1) of its charter, which asks it to promote
economic and social progress and development which is not possible without peaceful borders
should support Pakistan`s decision to manage the Pak-Afghan border through border fencing. Also,
the UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 article 9 solemnly declares that “the UN, relevant
specialized agencies, and intergovernmental organizations, and other relevant bodies must make
every effort with a view to promoting measures to combat and eliminate acts of terrorism and to
strengthening their role in this field.” Hence, UN and relevant agencies should play their role and
support Pakistan`s fencing of its Afghan border.
(Source: The Geopolitics)

KEEPING IN STEP WITH A CHANGING WORLD

Talat Masood (Former federal secretary)
In present trying times, majority of Pakistani people remain deeply preoccupied with their
own personal economic challenges. The media and social discourse too while addressing the
economic issues revolves primarily on the personal characteristics of political leaders and judiciary
as well as deteriorating economic conditions and plight of the people. This is understandable as
these are the issues that dominate our universe and most likely to stay this way for a long time till
we overcome the present multiple challenges.
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But the world is not standing still, it is moving exponentially in several directions and making
phenomenal progress led primarily by countries of the First World. Technology is the key factor that
is leading the transformation through innovation, by increasing production capacities and
generating wealth. A cursory glance of this phenomenon can be observed by the revenues of these
giant technology companies. Microsoft revenue for the recently announced quarter was $53 billion
with approximately $210 billion projected for the year. Pakistan total exports (revenue) for the last
fiscal year is only approximately $31.2 billion, with IT sector contributing $2.6 billion. Meta
(Facebook) recently announced revenue for last quarter alone of approximately $28.6 billion which
was close to Pakistan’s (a country of $230 million people) full year of exports.
Chinese and European companies too are trying to keep pace with this phenomenal progress
that the world has never witnessed before. These are building capabilities to stay ahead with a long-
term view of challenging the supremacy of the US. India too has ambitions of becoming the fourth
economic power in less than a decade. South Korea’s exports keep rising as its automobile and other
industries keep pace with global demand. More significantly, it plans to retain its leading position in
the manufacture of memory chips. What is remarkable about South Korea that the government and
the private sector work in unison.
In Pakistan, however, our reliance has been on CPEC and foreign assistance, because that is
the easiest and most convenient course to pursue. It is like living on borrowed money where
national pride and self-respect are set aside. True, nations do go through difficult financial
circumstances and seek aid from global and regional financial institutions. IMF, World Bank and
regional financial institutions were created to assist developing countries in such circumstances. We
have failed to benefit from these organisations to come out of our financial predicament. We have
also not been able to fully exploit the benefits of investments made in the infrastructure from CPEC,
to improve productivity and quality of products. We have disappointed our Chinese friends as they
were hoping we would maximise the benefits from this national endeavour. Neither do we ensure
making the best use of the occasional assistance offered by our Arab friends.
More significantly, we have grossly neglected development of Balochistan and former tribal
belt which is the key for the economic well-being of its people. It is creating frustration among the
masses.
Other critical areas remain sidelined. Efforts at increasing exports have not been successful
primarily because several of our products do not fully conform to global standards. Most of
Pakistan’s increase in production capacity is therefore allocated only for local market consumption
which adds significantly to the deficit by increasing imports (which last year were over $80 billion),
without significantly impacting exports. Pakistan needs to support export-friendly industries which
rely on educated work force. But this would require Pakistan to invest in technical skills and higher
education, but not as much in high capital investment. Pakistan has lot to gain by promoting its IT
sector and encouraging startups, for example, through university and private-public sector
partnerships to develop products in artificial intelligence, augmented reality and other current
technologies for the global business and consumer markets.
The country that leads in technology will also boost its military power. Advances in AI will
provide greater autonomy. At present America is leading in this race by introducing unmanned
vehicles. According to reports, autonomous surface ships, planes and submarines are being
developed and deployed. China, India and European countries are applying advanced computing
systems to catch up in this field. New technologies are transforming military power. The impact is
equally going to be felt in several other areas affecting ordinary life. The new generation of Pakistan
is the best hope for a prosperous future, and investment in their skills and education is a much-
needed investment. We must not let our leaders and politicians’ preoccupation with survival and
expanding power determine Pakistan’s destiny.
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Pakistan has to attract foreign investment out of sheer economic necessity. In the prevailing
circumstances its economy cannot grow without foreign assistance and investments. But for this the
leadership has to realise that a modicum of political stability is a prerequisite. Internal and external
peace by promoting pluralism and tolerance can contribute a lot to changing the prevailing hostile
political environment. In fact, it is a strategic necessity. Without this correction Pakistan’s stability
and future could be at stake. Our politicians and military leadership have to focus in bringing about
this transformation. The way we are going may not be easy, but is there any other choice? The
sooner we have free and fair national and provincial elections the better for the country so that
governments can tackle these critical issues. With all its weaknesses a normal democratic
government would be more sensitive to people’s uplift and basic needs. There are thousands that
have been seriously affected by extreme poverty.
More critically, where does Pakistan stand in this global competition and what will be the
state of the nation as most of the countries race ahead? Are our leaders, engaged in fighting petty
battles of their own making, even conscious of these fast-changing global environment or they are
living in a world of their own? Do they realise that a deeply polarised political system as ours cannot
produce the responses to the mega challenges the country is facing or the pace at which the world is
moving?
(Source: Express Tribune)
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Governance
BUILDING HUMAN CAPITAL
Idrees Haider
Pakistan is facing an unprecedented economic crisis, with millions of urban middle-class
people being pushed to the brink of poverty due to rocketing inflation and more than 30 percent
devaluation of the rupee in 2022. This has led to more than 800,000 Pakistanis leaving the country in
search of better economic prospects abroad.
With foreign reserves to pay for less than a month of imports, Pakistan is in urgent need of
strong measures to secure its economic future. The current state of affairs can be attributed to the
adoption of misguided policies and decisions spanning several decades.
A potential solution lies in the investment of more resources for the growth and development
of human capital. Although the results may not be immediately apparent, the approach represents
the only viable pathway towards achieving sustainable success and prosperity.
Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills and abilities of individuals that enable them to
be productive members of a society. Investing in human capital means providing opportunities for
education and training, improving health outcomes and creating an environment that allows
individuals to reach their full potential.
Pakistan has long struggled with a significant trade deficit. The country spends more on
imports than it earns through exports. Despite being a major exporter of labour, the remittances sent
back by Pakistani workers abroad are squandered on unproductive ventures. Governments have
failed to invest in key industries and sectors that could produce skilled labour and generate valuable
foreign exchange.
Despite being a major cotton-producing country, Pakistan’s textile sector remains
underdeveloped, lagging behind nations like Bangladesh. While there has been promising activity in
the IT sector, it has yet to blossom into a full-fledged technology boom like that seen in the
neighbouring India.
Pakistan’s population growth rate is among the highest in the world. A third of its 230 million
inhabitants are under the age of 14. This rapid growth puts significant pressure on the country’s
ability to create jobs and keep pace with demand.
Without a concerted effort to develop key industries and sectors, such as textiles and IT, and
to invest in education and training to produce a skilled workforce, Pakistan risks falling further
behind in the global marketplace.
In the near future, CPEC is expected to generate significant avenues of employment for the
domestic labour force, especially after the establishment of the proposed Special Economic Zones
(SEZs). However, as this development takes shape, the job requirements would become more
demanding.
Accordingly, Pakistan needs to focus on improving the level of human capital in the economy
so as to ensure that both the existing and the incoming labour force have the right skills to meet the
growing technical requirements of the evolving nature of work.
Successive governments have provided lavish and unfunded fuel, water and power subsidies
but have not invested in quality education, health provision, alternative energy and a strategy for
population control. The tax base is among the narrowest in the world.
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This lack of investment in human capital is reflected in Pakistan’s Human Capital Investment
Index (HCII), which is a metric used to assess the investment that a country makes in its human
capital, including education and health.
According to the World Bank, Pakistan’s HCII for 2020 was 0.39, indicating a low level of
investment in human capital. The HCII takes into account several factors, including years of
schooling, school quality, health outcomes and survival rates. Pakistan’s low HCII score reflects the
challenges the country faces in investing in human capital, particularly in the areas of education and
health.
One of the biggest challenges in Pakistan’s education sector is access to quality education.
According to the Pakistan Education Statistics Report 2019-20, the literacy rate for Pakistan was 60
percent, with significant disparities between urban and rural areas. In addition, the report highlights
that a significant number of children drop out of school due to poverty, child labour and other socio-
economic factors.
According to the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2019-20,
only 39 percent of children in the fifth grade could read a story in Urdu; only 44 percent could do a
two-digit division problem. These statistics highlight the need for significant improvements in the
quality of education in Pakistan.
In the health sector, Pakistan faces numerous challenges, including a high infant mortality rate
and a low life expectancy. According to the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2017-18, the
infant mortality rate in Pakistan was 62 per 1,000 live births and the life expectancy at birth 67 years.
The survey highlights significant disparities in health outcomes between urban and rural areas and
between different provinces of the country.
Pakistan’s Human Capital Index (HCI) value of 0.41 is low in both absolute and relative terms.
It is lower than the South Asian average of 0.48, Bangladesh’s 0.46 and Nepal’s 0.49.
To improve its HCII score, Pakistan needs to prioritise investments in education and
healthcare. The quality of education and health outcomes needs to be improved and access to
quality education and healthcare made more inclusive.
A strong emphasis should be placed on investing in early childhood development to ensure
that children receive the necessary education and healthcare services from a young age.
Investing in human capital is crucial for the well-being of Pakistan’s citizens and the country’s
economic growth. By investing in human capital, Pakistan can improve the quality of life of its
people, increase productivity and contribute to sustainable development. Investing in health and
education is not only necessary for Pakistan’s development but is also a fundamental human right
enshrined in our constitution. This is also significant because of the SDGs.
The government should increase its budget allocations for education and health sectors and
develop new and innovative policies and programmes to improve the HCII score. The private sector
and international donors should also be encouraged to invest in the education and health sectors to
ensure that Pakistan can achieve its human capital goals. By investing in human capital, Pakistan
can improve the well-being of its citizens, increase economic growth and contribute to sustainable
development.
(Source: TNS)
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WHY OUR GRADUATES ARE MASS MIGRATING

Henna Ahsan (Research economist at the PIDE)
Muhammad Jehangir Khan (An assistant professor at the PIDE)
Pakistan stands third in South Asia (after India and Bangladesh) and sixth in the world in
human capital migration. A 2019 news report observed that Pakistan was losing its brain capital
because of massive migration of the skilled and highly technical professional population.
Before 2005, the migration of highly qualified people was quite low and stagnant (as shown in
the graph). However, after 2005 a massive increase in migration of this highly qualified human
capital was observed. The phenomenon is commonly known as ‘brain drain’. In 2019, due to Covid-
19 restrictions, this movement saw a decline. However, in 2021 again, there was a high surge in this
migration trend. Brain drain is defined as the process in which highly educated and highly-skilled
people leave their country. It is seen as a curse for developing countries, as investment in higher
education and training is lost.
One of the major reasons for this migration of highly qualified individuals during the last two
decades is the massive increase in graduate unemployment. This graduate unemployment saw a
great surge when the University Grant Commission was converted into the Higher Education
Commission in 2002. The purpose was to upgrade universities and make access to higher education
easier. The number of universities increased from 54 to 233, in just two decades. The average growth
rate of higher education observed was 18.5 percent and for primary level, only 3 percent. This
supply of highly educated lot and stagnant labour markets contributed to unemployment among
these graduates.
Moreover, the rapid expansion in higher education over a short span of time also created
heterogeneity of skills in the labour market as most of these newborn universities were not capable
of delivering the level of skills demanded by the labour market. It has been argued (Determinants of
unemployment: Empirical evidences from Pakistan, Pakistan Economic and Social Review, 2013)
that the unemployment rate in South Asian countries is very high due to the lack of market
absorption capacity. It has also been attributed to under-utilisation of resources. Talented people,
therefore, prefer moving from their home country to more developed countries.
High disparity between the education offered and the capacity of the economy to
accommodate these graduates and weak university-industry linkages, meant that graduates being
produced were not what was being demanded by the industry. According to the World Bank,
Pakistan is ranked 63rd out of 163 countries on the university-industry linkages index. It lags behind
India (26th) and Sri Lanka (53rd) on this list. Finally, a shrinking of the economy and
macroeconomic imbalances exaggerated the problem. As per a 2015 British Council report, there is a
huge gap between supply and demand for education in the region, with corresponding issues of
access, equity and quality, particularly with respect to weak curriculum models that lack a strong
connection to employer requirements. In many developing countries, including Pakistan, labour
markets are unable to accommodate the huge number of skilled labour force the countries are
producing.
Industries like cellular telephony and banking sector did absorb the new graduates when
these businesses were being rolled out during Gen Musharraf’s regime. However, after a few years,
especially after 2010, these markets became saturated and started laying off their labour force. Yet,
there was no substantial change in the educational policy.
For the last decade and a half, industrial development in Pakistan has been at a standstill; in
fact, it has witnessed a decline. A few years ago, there were six major telecom operators in the
country including the PTCL; only four are left. Jazz acquired Warid Telecom and Ufone-PTCL are in
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the process of acquiring Telenor. Pakistan also faced an acute shortage of electricity after 2007. This
power shortage caused many power looms and textile factories to shift to Bangladesh, adding to the
unemployment in the sector and migration problem at large.
These alarming stats compel us to analyse the unemployment trend by field of study. The
Labour Force Survey (LFS) does not provide segregation for all graduates’ disciplines. It only
provides information in major categories like engineering, medicine, computer and agriculture.
Nevertheless, this information is useful for comparing the unemployment rate across these
disciplines and over a period of time. Our analysis shows that the unemployment rate for graduates
increased from 14 percent to 16 percent from 2018-19 to 2020-21. However, when we decomposed
the unemployment rate into sub-disciplines, it produced a gloomier picture. The unemployment rate
for engineers has increased from 11 percent to 23.5 percent, doubling in just two years. A similar
situation has been observed for those who graduated in computer science and agriculture.
Graduates in medical sciences face the lowest unemployment when compared to graduates in other
disciplines. However, the unemployment rate within the medical discipline too has increased
drastically – by 68 percent in two years.
Finally, weak education standards in the country are also responsible for this massive
unemployment and subsequent migration. Many educational institutions do not provide quality
education and do not train their students as per job market requirements. The education system
does not train students from the primary level to graduation and only focuses on rote memorisation,
bothering the least about application of what they study.
(Source: EOS)

SHAPING HUMANITARIAN AND ETHICAL GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

Dr Muhammad Babar Chohan (A civil servant holding a PhD)
Pakistan’s ongoing political instability, inter-institutional rivalry and economic failure are
three major factors that are fast changing the role of local state and non-state actors in the country.
On the economic front, according to a recent report of Pakistan Bureau of Statistics , Pakistan is at
the doors of hyperinflation as the annual inflation rate surged to 35.4% in March — the highest in
last five decades. The food inflation in rural areas was over 50%. As a consequence, the central bank
may use the new inflation rate as a base to further increase the interest rate. As the prices of almost
all goods are increasing exponentially, the real value of Pakistani rupee is fast depreciating and
common man is in the grip of worst economic crisis. Pakistan is close to a stage where people may
lose their confidence in local currency altogether and switch to stable foreign currencies. The
situation demands a de novo approach towards shaping the parameters and determinants of
humanitarian and ethical governance in Pakistan.
There is no denying the fact that institutions are long run determinants of economic growth in
a country. However, the working and informal culture of governance in developed and developing
countries is very different. In developed countries, one could hardly see any inter-institutional
confrontation. If it is there, it always has a strong legal and moral basis. But in developing countries,
like Pakistan, some institutions are directly involved in power struggle. The role of institutions and
their domains remain blurred and one can’t see any mechanism or process that could right-align
ethical governance in the country. The inter-institutional rivalry is so ossified that no state actor is
ready to understand that the poor masses are real stakeholders and they are suffering economically.
Pakistan’s economy has historically been dependent on foreign aid. In the beginning the
country received massive aid from the West in the name of socioeconomic uplift. However, the aid
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was not used as initial capital to kickstart the culture of business and entrepreneurship in the
country. It was rather consumed as income with no business and trade planning. As the quantum of
Western aid gradually diminished, the country started to exploit its natural resources like urban
lands. These lands were exploited both individually and institutionally. Some institutions saw a
great opportunity in land development because the demand for housing is very high. These
institutions started developing their own housing societies in almost all big cities of Pakistan. Fertile
lands were ruthlessly transformed into a jungle of concrete structures through over-urbanisation.
The industrialists started to close down their industries and instead invested their capital in housing
societies without realising that the factories they are closing don’t just belong to them. The workers
and their dependent families were also associated with those factories for earning their livelihood.
The overall trend of economic transformation from an agricultural-cum-industrial economy to a
natural resource based economy is very excruciating and that is the root cause of Pakistan’s
economic crisis.
Today, the inter-institutional rivalry is actually a war of winning control over country’s
natural resources. No political party or institution could develop a culture of humanitarian and
ethical governance in the country. The dictatorial approach of the heads of political parties and
institutions actually lacks the element of collective wisdom and long-term understanding about the
country’s future. There is no effective governance framework that could suggest way forward for
the suffering of ordinary citizens who have nothing to do with the ongoing political and institutional
turmoil. They only want a respectable way to meet their both ends meet.
It is, therefore, important to raise the question: why is humanitarian and ethical governance
relevant in the context of Pakistan’s current political and institutional crisis? It is because the lives of
people are endangered, as reflected in the stampede and killing of people at the flour distribution
sites, and they are rendered destitute because of politico-economic collapse, institutional tug-of-war
and the fight of the powerful for control over natural resources. Politico-institutional turbulence in
Pakistan is actually reimagining and reorganising humanitarian governance patterns in the country.
The accountability and advocacy processes are also fast changing because of active involvement of
media and civil society. The ongoing politico-institutional crisis will indeed change the governance
patters in the context of state-society-aid relations. There is, therefore, a need to develop a Pakistan-
based model of alternative humanitarian ethics by reimagining and reorganising human governance
patterns in the ongoing politico-institutional conflict. One of Pakistan’s leading universities could
consider kickstarting a research project on reshaping humanitarian and ethical governance model in
Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan must provide funding for such a project. This is a better way
to avoid identical political crisis in future.
A similar project has recently been launched by the International Institute of Social Studies of
Erasmus University, with the financial support of European Research Council. The project
Humanitarian Governance (Hum-Gov) seeks to develop models of alternative humanitarian ethics,
for example centering on solidarity in addition to humanitarian principles. The Hum-Gov project
raises three basic questions: 1) How is humanitarian governance imagined and organised in the
interplay of different actors? 2) How do accountability and advocacy processes of aid recipients and
civil society actors alter governance relations ‘from below’? 3) How do different patterns of
governance emerge in different types of crisis and contexts of state-society-aid relations? Similar
questions need to be raised in the proposed project in Pakistan’s context. The heads of political
parties and powerful institutions are exercising powers in their respective domains but they are
unable to draw a clear boundary where politico-institutional conflicts occur. The proposed project
must provide the principles defining these blurred lines. That means a greater focus on processes
rather than just framing policy.
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Economic instability and unprecedented inflation in Pakistan is the long-term outcome of the
country’s conventional dependence on foreign aid and natural resources. Unless a new framework
of humanitarian and ethical governance is shaped, the institutions and political parties will continue
to engage in power struggle in future. There has to be an end to this sadistic power struggle so that
economy and business entrepreneurship could be right-aligned. Pakistan will have to ultimately
shun foreign aid and natural resource based development and revert back to industrialisation and
business entrepreneurship as a long-term strategy to attain sustainable economic growth rate.
(Source: Express Tribune)
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History
FIRST RESOLUTION
Muhammad Ali Siddlqi
FOR inexplicable reasons, scholars seem to have completely ignored an important Sindh
Muslim League resolution passed in Karachi two years before the historic Lahore resolution was
adopted in 1940. The Karachi resolution didn`t call for a separate country for the Muslims of India
but it spoke of Hindu and Muslim `nations`. This was for the first time that the word `nations` for
Hindus and Muslims of South Asia was officially mentioned by the Muslim League. The neglect by
historians is astonishing because the conference was presided over by the Quaid-i-Azam.
What forced the Sindh Muslim League to take a leap over the rest of other ML organisations
and come up with what then appeared to be a radical step was the crises Sindh`s Muslims were
passing through, basically because in spite of having a Muslim majority the province didn`t have a
Muslim League ministry. There were Muslim chief ministers, no doubt, but they chose to work in
collusion with Congress parliamentarians or other groups to keep the Muslim League out of power.
Among those who realised the gravity of the situation and the need for reorganising the
Muslim League was Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, who was ably assisted by Bahadur Yar Jang, a
brilliant scholar and orator from Hyderabad Deccan, who was greatly valued by Jinnah for his
services to the Muslim cause.
Even though Jinnah or any Muslim League leader had till then not officially spoken of
Pakistan as the Muslim goal, the word `Pakistan` had wide currency, having been coined by
Chaudhri Rahmat Ali in 1933. As Haroon and Bahadur Yar Jang worked ceaselessly for giving a new
life to the Sindh Muslim League, two top Congress leaders, Sardar Patel and Abul Kalam Azad,
chose to tour Sindh. Even though their mission was about something else, the very fact that top
Congress leaders chose to visit Sindh made Haroon and his colleagues realise it was time to act.
On Oct 8, 1938, a meeting of the Sindh Muslim League was held in Karachi presided over by
Jinnah, who in his speech dwelt on the political situation in the subcontinent, especially the hostility
shown by the Congress party to the idea of a separate country for Muslims.
The conference adopted many resolutions, the most important being number 5.
It said: `This conference considers it absolutely essential in the interest of an abiding peace of
[the] vast Indian subcontinent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the
economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations known asHindus
and Muslims to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire question
of what should be the suitable constitution of India.` The resolution was drafted by Abdullah
Haroon, Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi and Abdul Majid.
Two years later the Pakistan resolution was passed, and Haroon was among those who
drafted it. Haroon didn`t live to see Pakistan become a reality, for he died on April 27, 1942.
Once the resolution was passed, Haroon went into virtual retirement and appeared quite
philosophical about it. Interviewed by Rashdi in the April 30, 1935 issue of Muslim Voice, Haroon
gave reasons why he didn`t wish to live any longer.
`God has enabled me,` he said, `to enjoy everything. That is the gift of this world. He has been
extremely generous and bounteous towards me. I served at a cycle repairer`s shop when He took
pity on me. For a long time, I could not but affordonly pieces of dry bread which constituted my
daily meals.
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`I have risen from that position a position I have never forgotten in the best days of opulence
and abundance.
He has given me wealth, a dutiful and wise wife,many children, a palace to live in, a robust
health, and honour, and respect. And, what is more valuable than everything else a sincere feeling
for my community. I have held all these pleasures for over 50 years.
What more do I need? What for should I be anxious to live longer? Believe me, mankind
would have been forced to take to suicide on an organised basis if the possibility of natural death
had not existed. Endless life would have become a tedious experience, a full-fledged calamity.
According to Rashdi he was `full of emotions` and was sincere in what he was saying. A
cough, a fresh cigarette lit and the speech went on. `Not knowing what is left of my life, I want to
put this [Pakistan] scheme through at all costs and with all speed. I must leave behind something
substantial. It is now a matter of almost personal concern where I am concerned.
When Rashdi said he would like to know what exactly he was talking about, Haroon said his
goal was Pakistan.
(Source: The News)

THE PARTITION OF INDIA

A unique feature of Indian history is that over thousands of years people of different
nationalities had entered India in large numbers. This has not happened anywhere else. These
outsiders had attacked India and looted valuables, but they did not return to their home country.
They continued to live in India. But there were only three exceptions — Alexander of Greece,
Mahmud of Ghazni and Nadir Shah from Iran. Despite a few exceptions, however, it can be said
that these foreign attackers did not come with the intention of looting and returning to their
countries. They came from Central Asia and other regions to settle permanently in India and
remained here in large numbers. In ancient times, the Aryans attacked India and settled here. These
outsiders subsequently played a significant role in molding the culture and civilization of India.
One cannot conceive Hindu religion and culture without the Aryans. After the Aryans, the Sakas,
Huns, Turkish, Pathans and Moghuls came and stayed back in India.
After the discovery of North and South America, Europeans went forth to conquer those
countries and began to live there too. But that situation was very different from outsiders who came
to attack India and settled here. The Europeans killed numerous Native Americans, threatening to
make them extinct and trapping them in forced isolation. They could not contribute in any way to
the governance or culture of the New World. The Aryans destroyed the Mohenjo-daro and Harappa
civilizations that were far superior to their own. The Aryans were involved mainly in animal
husbandry, and their culture mingled with the culture of ancient India. This blend resulted in the
Aryan culture transforming Indian culture. In a way, it can be said that Aryan culture had made pre-
Aryan Indian culture its own in many ways. What is known as Indian Hindu culture today was
actually influenced by the foreign Aryans.
After the Aryans, the Sakas, Huns, Arabs, Iranians, Turkish, Pathans and Mughals attacked and
conquered India and settled in this land. In Rabindranath's words, they had all merged into one body.
These outsiders did not look at the Indians as enemies and did not try to disassociate from them.
Rather, they sought to be at one with the Indians and strengthen their own position in this land. They
did not try to create divisions, but tried to maintain unity for their own safety and well-being.
The Arabs, Turkish, Pathans and Mughals who came and ruled over India were different from
former conquerors in one significant way. They stayed in India and adopted Indian customs, but
did not forego their religion like those who had entered India before them. These peoples were
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followers of Islam and maintained their religious beliefs. However, though Islam and Hinduism
remained independent of each other, they influenced each other. This was most strongly evident in
the spheres of culture.
Though belonging to a separate religious belief, the Muslim rulers strove to maintain cordial
relations between Hindus and Muslims as a way of fortifying their reign. This strategy was pursued
throughout the reigns of the Sultans and the Mughals and the Pathans. Alauddin Khilji and later
Akbar distanced themselves from fervent religiosity and tried to unite the Hindus and the Muslims.
Even Aurangzeb, who was anti-Hindu and razed some Hindu temples, gave financial aid to many
Hindu temples and recruited Hindus to administrative posts and also in his army. Aurangzeb never
tried to create a rift between the Muslims and the Hindus. This policy was in place until the end of
the Mughal rule.
Since the seventeenth century when European trade began to expand, European traders
started coming to India, especially to regions around the Pacific Ocean for business purposes. By the
eighteenth century, they had established their strong presence in India. Among them, the English
traders were in the majority and to facilitate their commerce, they employed defense troops in
southern and eastern parts of India. This need for a security force was also triggered by the
competition and hostility among the European countries. The English and French were at the
forefront of these measures.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the English fortified their security in Bengal and
Madras and continued to expand their business interests. In the process, they collided with the
ruling Nawabs of Bengal and their relations deteriorated. There were armed clashes and eventually,
the English defeated the independent ruling Nawab, and put subservient Nawabs in position who
would do their biddings. This resulted in the East India Company taking administrative control in
Bengal, and later in some other regions. This control remained steady until the 1857 sepoy mutiny.
After the mutiny, the government of England disbanded the company's rule and directly began to
rule India.
The outsiders who had attacked India before the British had come with the intention of
settling here and had done so. But the Europeans had come to India with a different purpose. They
had come for commercial profiteering. When the British usurped power in Bengal, it was the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England. Soon, Bengal and other regions of India became a
market for the manufactured goods of England. Thus began widespread plundering, which resulted
in enormous financial gains that made a great contribution to the industrial growth and prosperity
of England.
After grabbing power in Bengal in 1757, the British went about administrative reforms within
their jurisdiction. They initiated land reform and established a new, permanent structure. This new
system not only affected the economy but had far-reaching consequences in the social and political
spheres of the region. In the nineteenth century, a new middle class came into being under this
system. Later, becoming more influential, they played a vital role in defining the politics of Bengal
and other regions. For purposes of administration, the British modernized the education system.
Until 1835, Persian was the administrative language, but by the early nineteenth century, more
importance was being given to the study of the English language.
During the reign of the East India Company, Hindus took full advantage of all facilities such
as education and other offerings. Muslims, on the other hand, believed that the rule of the Mughals
was their own, and the British were an alien force. They were not inclined to accept the
opportunities created by the British, not even the chance to learn the English language. Before the
British took power, many elite Muslims and others held senior positions in the administration and
the army. These jobs became the basis of class divisions. The elimination of these jobs, along with the
fact that even during the Mughal and Nawabi periods, they could not acquire the status of a
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landowner or zamindar, threw these Muslims into a financial crisis. Poverty entered the lives of
thousands. Their circumstances became dire because they had refused to learn the English language
and avail other opportunities offered by the British. They remained far behind the Hindus in
education and in socio-political and economic status.
After the sepoy mutiny of 1857, the Muslims realized that they had made a big blunder by not
availing themselves of the resources offered by the British and were thus lagging behind for a
hundred years. Now they took the initiative to rectify that mistake. By this time, the rule of the East
India Company was over, and the British monarchy was now ruling directly. The issue of improving
education for the Muslims was given attention, and some other benefits were also extended to them.
Some job opportunities were also provided for the Muslims.
Until then, the Hindus had absolute access to all the services offered by the British authorities.
Now that the Muslims had entered the game, they became competitors. The Hindus began to feel
that part of what was originally theirs was now being given to the Muslims; they were being forced
to enter into a competition and were deprived of their monopoly.
Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a conflict arose between the Hindus and the
Muslims. This was the beginning of Hindu nationalism. In the eighteen sixties, under the
leadership of Nabagopal Mitra and Rajnarayan Basu, an assembly was arranged where it was
proclaimed that the Hindus were a separate nation. This announcement of nationhood was given
with the purpose of creating a division between the Hindus and the Muslims. Later Bankim
Chandra became a strong spokesman of this nationhood. At that time, Abdul Latif and Syed Ameer
Ali in Bengal and Sir Syed Ahmed in Uttar Pradesh emerged as leaders of the Muslim community.
They initiated various efforts for the development of Muslims and even lobbied with the British
government for additional resources. However, they never presented Muslims as a separate nation
or made an announcement to that effect. It was not until 1940 when Muslim League's Lahore
Resolution was passed that the concept of a separate nationhood for Muslims came into being.
In the nineteenth century, the word 'communalism' was not in vogue. In the twentieth
century, the British were the first to call the Hindu-Muslim conflict as 'communalism.' But even
without the idea of communalism, the competition between the Hindus and the Muslims in the
latter half of the nineteenth century had sown the seed of communalism. Later in the early twentieth
century, this discord and unpleasant competition triggered a hostility that had a powerful effect on
the political situation in the thirties and forties. Not only that, but it became a decisive factor in the
turn of events.
The British government had deliberately contrived to create this situation. When, after the
sepoy mutiny in 1857, they offered educational facilities and other opportunities for Muslims, their
main purpose was to create tensions and make Hindus and Muslims fellow-contenders and engage
in bitterness. They adopted this policy of creating divisiveness in order to secure their own power
and ensure a smooth reign for themselves. They also began to influence the study of history.
Renowned scholar and historian James Mill in his famous book, The History of British India, traced
the history of India in three periods— Hindu, Muslim and British. He named the first two periods
on the basis of religion, but did not refer to the third period as Christian, rather he called it British.
Never before had the pre-British historical periods been referred to on the basis of religions. By
doing this, James Mill, an imperialist historian, had pioneered the concept of communalism and laid
the foundation for its growth in the future. He was indeed successful in doing this. During the
British reign, the history that Indians studied was molded on the ideas propagated by James Mill
and this helped to further disseminate the notion of communalism.
The difference in the status of Hindus and Muslims in the nineteenth century triggered a crisis
in the politics of the twentieth century. That is why it is impossible to understand the politics of the
twentieth century without a thorough discussion and deliberation about the situation in the
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nineteenth century. The strife between Hindus and Muslims vying for secure jobs that occurred in
the nineteenth century had escalated in the twentieth century to contest and contention among
capitalists seeking power. The consequence of this was the partition of India.
With the growth of capitalism, the interests of different capitalist countries collided. This
collision created warlike hostilities and led to war. England and France engaged in war for a very
long time. The first and second world wars were fought among different capitalist countries. But
within one country the different components of capitalism did not cause any friction. In India,
however, the capital of Hindus and Muslims became divided. There was an unhealthy contention
and discord between them. As a result of this, the battle of capital took the shape of communal riots.
Different countries were fighting wars, but within India communal riots took place. The role of
communal riots in the politics of India was an important one.
The independence movement in India was delayed. Before 1927, the political parties did not
ask for independence. When the movement did start, it did not identify the British as enemies and
did not proceed to castigate them. The movement was to put pressure on the British to hand over
the reins of the government to the Indians. Their strategy was to request and seek approval from the
British. Maulana Mohammad Ali called this a 'Begging and Praying Politics.'
There was no unity in the Indian struggle for independence. Since the thirties a divisiveness
formed. As a result, the level of Hindu-Muslim hostility was far greater than the opposition towards
the British. This animosity, in fact, led to the partition of India. Hindu, Muslim, Congress, League
all contributed to the break-up of India.
Because the independence movement was meant to put pressure and leaned towards
compromise, neither the Congress nor the Muslim League harbored strong aversions towards the
British. "Movement" and discussions about compromise went hand-in-hand as the independence
movement progressed. To avoid direct confrontation, Gandhi promoted non-violence, which
became the mainstay of their politics. The Muslim League also did not have any hostility or armed
conflict with the British. In the 1940s, they chanted the slogan "We will fight to win Pakistan," but
their fight was not against the British, but against the Congress and the Hindus.
It is to be noted that Gandhi's non-violence was applicable only to Indians. The basic tenet of
this philosophy of non-violence was that Indians should not engage in any violence during their
independence movement, but there was no mention of violence committed by the British. Gandhi
was against people's violence in Chauri Chaura, but he was completely silent about the Jallianwala
Bagh massacre, and his lack of protest drew a negative reaction even from Rabindranath Tagore.
Gandhi also criticized the Indian forces who, in demonstrating their patriotic protest to the British,
refused to shoot at the public in the Qissa Khwani Bazaar in Peshawar. Gandhi was against the
actions of Bhagat Singh, and when the British hanged him, Gandhi did not raise his voice and
remained mute.
The independence movement against British was mainly constitutional. Both Jinnah and
Gandhi, because of their class, wanted to limit the movement within the framework of the
parliament. In fact, Muslim League was never engaged in any active opposition or agitation against
the ruling power. Under Gandhi's leadership, the Congress would lead a non-violent movement
and try to keep it within the framework of the constitution. If ever the situation became violent or
threatened to become so, Gandhi would intervene and stop its escalation.
During the independence movement, the Congress and Muslim League constantly kept in
touch with the ruling British authorities in India and held discussions with them. These discussions
played a guiding role in the forties. Arrangements for the transfer of power ultimately took place
after talks with the Viceroy, the dialogue at the Shimla convention, and discussions with Cabinet
Mission, and with Mountbatten.
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In the forties, the Congress-League independence movement focused predominantly on the

division of power and apportioning shares. In 1944, the long talks between Jinnah and Gandhi that
lasted for several days and ended without any agreement could only be called a scandalous affair.
The independence movement did not focus on the actual enemy, the British government in India.
The way this movement emphasized the Congress-League relations was very different from
freedom movements in other countries and can be called a rare and exceptional event.
In this conflict of dividing and sharing, the main enemy, the British government, played the
role of a mediator. The ruling British, the Congress, and Muslim League sat at one table and
finalized discussions about the handing over of power. This was a conspiracy against the people of
India. They pulled the wool over the eyes of the people and betrayed them as they partitioned India.
The Hindu-Muslim or Congress-League antagonism would not have resulted in the partition,
nor would there be communal riots and clashes and deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent
people if the freedom struggle had been allowed to follow its own course and the policy of non-
violence had not been adopted. Gandhi announced and followed his philosophy of non-violence,
and Jinnah with his silent support of non-violence did not allow the freedom struggle against the
British to gain momentum. Thus, the passion and turbulence created did not target the British but
actually victimized the Indians. Its extreme form was revealed in communal riots and their
atrocities.
In any movement, struggle, or war, it is crucial to recognize the real enemy. The independence
of India was not possible without the abolition of British rule in India, but the politicians of India did
not pinpoint this truth as they progressed. They did not view the British as an enemy, rather sought
to make compromises with them, and it was this perspective that led to the events that followed. In
the thirties and again in the forties, instead of zeroing in on the British as their prime enemy, the
Hindus and Muslims became each other's foes, and the Congress and Muslim League were at
loggerheads. Because of the efficacy of their diplomats in this situation, the British evolved from
being an enemy to becoming a mediator.
Even the communists did not stand up against the British; rather, within the framework of
constitutional politics, they made efforts to unify the Congress and Muslim League and asked them
to resolve their differences. In 1944, when the Gandhi-Jinnah talks ended in futility, the Communist
leader P.C. Joshi wrote his book titled They Shall Meet Again. The communists did not fight for
independence on their own but chose to remain within the orbit of Congress and League.
Due to the exploitation and oppression of the British, the general public had started to feel a
resentment and resistance that grew into a vital force. But because of the ineffective movement, the
British never became the prime target of the struggle. There was no consolidated or unified
struggle; only the seeds of divisiveness were sown into it.
The middle class that actively took part in the independence movement and provided
leadership was the product of the land reforms and job opportunities given by the British. Another
important factor was that the capitalists who influenced the Congress and League had reached that
position after being patronized by the British and continued to be dependent on their goodwill.
They maintained a compromising relationship with the imperialists. Stalin, in 1925, had commented
that India's local capital had surrendered to the imperial capital. Because of these class distinctions,
those who played a vital role in the Indian struggle for freedom were spineless and deferential.
Those who led the Indian independence movement did not actually represent the masses.
They represented landowners, zamindars and capitalists. The far-reaching ambit and command of
Birla over Gandhi, Nehru and Patel was not hidden from anyone. In submission to the demand and
interests of Birla, Tata, et al, Congress divided India and Bengal. Jinnah liked landowning nawabs,
knights, the Adamjees and Ispahanis. The Muslim League represented the weaker sections of
Muslim landowners, zamindars, and capitalists and demanded Pakistan for them.
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India's compromising political leadership, unlike the leadership in China's war of freedom,
did not allow the freedom struggle in India to follow its own pace and reach its potential. A
turbulent and persistent resistance against an enemy creates its own solidarity. Otherwise, grounds
for differences emerge to the fore. This is what happened in India. The Congress and Muslim
League negotiated and compromised with the British, remained within the parliamentarian
framework, and launched their so-called independence movement. This led to the growth of
communalism and gave the British the scope and opportunity to devise the handover of power
according to their own terms and conditions. The division of India and Bengal was the inevitable
consequence.
(Source: daily Star Bangladesh)

THE BIRTH OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY

Dr Muhammad Ali Shaikh (Former vice-chancellor of Sindh Madressatul Islam University, Karachi)
"There are armies which guard their nation’s borders, there are armies which are concerned
with protecting their own position in society, and there are armies which defend a cause or an idea.
The Pakistan Army does all three,” writes Stephen P. Cohen in his article, Pakistan: Army, Society
and Security.
Though presently ranked as the ‘seventh most powerful army in the world’ by the Military
Strength Rankings 2023, the Pakistan Army had an extremely humble beginning. The very idea of
the creation of a Pakistan Army went through sheer opposition from both British colonial rulers as
well as the native army officers.
Once the idea was accepted, its implementation too witnessed a series of obstacles. Still, the
will of the concerned people made it possible to surmount all those impediments and give birth to
an army that was destined to attain world ranking. This article recounts the roots, challenges and the
genesis of the Pakistan Army during its formative phase.
British Indian army roots
The roots of Pakistan’s army are in the British Indian Army (BIA). Three hallmarks of the BIA
were unity and discipline in the rank and file, the highest degrees of professional competence
acquired through the world class training, and unwavering respect for the chain of command.
The British had developed the Indian army as a ‘monolith’ unit in an otherwise highly
fragmented Indian society. They did it by creating an isolated and controlled environment of
cantonments.
“The British Indian cantonments or military camps were self-contained units with everything
the army needed: shops, housing, barracks and even brothels,” writes Shuja Nawaz in his book
Crossed Swords. This saved the soldiers from unsavoury influences of divisions based on caste and
creed.
The Indian soldiers, on their part, proved to be a great asset for the British empire during both
the world wars. In the Second World War, the British mobilised around 2.5 million Indian soldiers to
fight on their side at various fronts all over the world, with a significantly large number of soldiers
hailing from the regions comprising present-day Pakistan.
After the end of the six-year long Second World War, an economically weakened Britain
agreed to grant “self-government” to India by June 30, 1948. Subsequently, the date was advanced to
August 15, 1947, when the two “dominions” of Pakistan and India were to attain “autonomy and
sovereignty.” Nevertheless, the British desired to retain the command of the joint army in the
aftermath of the partition, “like jealous parents, reluctant to let go of the reins of power,” remarks
Nawaz.
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British reluctance
Emotionally and intellectually still engrossed in their past rivalry with Russia and the Soviet
Union and fearing inroads of communism and Soviet influence in South Asia, the British ardently
advocated a joint army for Pakistan and India, under their command. However, there were not
many takers for their position among both sides of the Indian political leadership.
In that situation, the British at least wanted to delay the handing over of commands for a
couple of years. In his brief, the British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck
told Viceroy Lord Mountbatten that it would take “from five to 10 years to satisfactorily divide the
Indian Army” quotes Ishtiaq Ahmed in his book Pakistan: The Garrison State.
Auchinleck was not alone in his aversion to the bifurcation of the Indian army into Pakistani
and Indian parts. Mountbatten’s chief of staff, Lord Hastings Ismay, went to convince the Quaid-i-
Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to favour the idea of the British retaining the joint command and
control structure. But Jinnah remained unmoved.
According to Ahmed in The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Liaquat Ali Khan conveyed a message
to the viceroy in unequivocal terms: “He [Liaquat Ali Khan] and Mr Jinnah were resolved that they
would not take over the reins of government in Pakistan unless they had an army on the spot, and
under their control.”
In the final outcome, it was agreed by all that most of the division of army would take place
before the partition but that it would continue till the completion of the transfer of assets. Till that
time, the administrative control of both the armies would remain with a joint headquarters under
command of the British commander-in-chief, who would be designated as the Supreme Commander
of both the armies. It was also decided that British officers would be retained in both the armies till
the division was complete.
Dissent within the ranks
Initially, many native officers too were against the division of the British Indian Army. For
instance, the senior-most native officer, KM Cariappa, who later rose to the position of the Indian army
chief in 1949, told Lord Ismay that the Indian army “should take over power” after the British left.
In response, Ismay told him that, “[the] proposal was not only wholly impractical, but highly
dangerous, and that, throughout history, the rule of the army had always proved tyrannical and
incompetent and that the army must always be servants and not masters,” Nawaz quotes from the
letter Ismay wrote to Mountbatten.
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, who served as India’s finance secretary, also recalled a similar
conversation in his book The Emergence of Pakistan, when Cariappa and a Muslim army officer
approached him voicing their disagreement with the military’s division plans. Instead, they
favoured a jointly controlled army, arguing that, “It was better for the army to take charge of both
the dominions than be divided.”
Perhaps the most notable opponent of the army’s division from present-day Pakistan was
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, then a major who later rose to be Pakistan’s army chief and
president.
At the “break-up” party organised at the Staff College Quetta, where Khan served then, he
asked his senior, Col SD Verma: “Sir, what are we celebrating? This should be a day of mourning.
As a united country we could have been a strong and powerful nation. Now, we will be fighting one
another.”
However, political events overpowered these sentiments and the division of the army became
certain. In the closing days of the partition, Hindu and Sikh army officers arranged a farewell in
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Delhi in honour of their departing Muslim colleagues. Gen Cariappa, on behalf of the hosts,
presented a silver trophy to the departing colleagues.
In his speech, he expressed his sentiments, saying, “We shall meet each other frequently as the
best of friends and in the same spirit of good comradeship that we have had the good fortune to
enjoy all these years.”
Just three days later, four Muslim officers, who had attended that farewell, were killed along
with their families by Sikh rioters on their way to Pakistan.
Division blues
One of the most hotly debated issues among the political and military leadership of British
India then was Pakistan’s share in the combined military assets of the BIA. Auchinleck suggested
that the division of assets might take place “either on the present Muslim and non-Muslim ratio in
the armed forces or in proportion to the total population of Pakistan areas as compared to
Hindustan.”
This was further elaborated by Mountbatten in his report, published on August 1, 1947.
He wrote: “I should explain that we have been working on the basis of communal proportions
in dividing the fighting services, the smaller partner by far being, of course, Pakistan. In the case of
the Army this was the obvious method of dividing the actual soldiers…, and it worked out at a
rough proportion of 70:30. In the case of the Navy it worked out at about 60:40, but as India have a
far bigger coastline with more harbours and a far greater proportion of the trade to guard, the actual
ships were divided in the proportion of 70:30.”
Elucidating the situation in the case of the air force, he wrote: “When it came to the Air, the
communal proportions worked out at 80:20. As there were ten squadrons to divide (2 transport and
8 fighters) the India representatives claimed 8… [but the] “Committee recommended that on the
analogy of the naval partition, the proportions should be 70:30, since Pakistan had the North-West
Frontier to guard.”
Under the division formulae, it was decided that the Muslim soldiers domiciled in the areas
constituting Pakistan would become part of the Pakistan Army, while all the non-Muslim soldiers
domiciled in the rest of India would become part of the Indian Army. In the case of Muslims from
India, or non-Muslims from Pakistan, they were given the option to serve in either state, subject to
the opted state’s concurrence. Deviation from this principle was to result in the soldier’s discharge
from service.
Pakistan was the most disadvantaged in the case of fixed military assets, such as training
institutes, military production factories and facilities, as well as workshops. For instance, out of 46
training institutes, only seven came in Pakistan’s share.
In the case of repair and maintenance workshops, the three most important ones, dealing with
armoured fighting vehicles, radars and crystal-cutting were located in India. In the case of ordnance
factories, Pakistan got only three from a total of 17 while, in the case of ordnance depots, Pakistan
got only five smaller ones, as all the major ones were located in India.
Then, while India inherited a fully functional army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Delhi,
Pakistan had to transform the erstwhile headquarters of BIA’s northern command in Rawalpindi
into its GHQ. It was very disadvantageous, as Pakistan’s political capital Karachi and its military
capital Rawalpindi were separated by a long distance, while India had both these power centres
located in Delhi, facilitating decision-making.
Sabotage and subterfuge
As most of the moveable assets of the BIA, such as arms, ammunition, transport and
equipment were stored in the facilities located in India, it required Pakistan’s share to be transported
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to it. But every move in that direction on the part of the British authorities was vehemently opposed
by the Indians, compelling Auchinleck to complain of their “intolerable” behaviour, wrongly
desiring the British officers to “do down Pakistan at all costs during the partition of the armed
forces.”
With the passage of time, the situation only worsened, prompting Auchinleck to write another
note on September 28, 1947 stating: “I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present
Indian cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the
dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis.”
Elaborating further, he wrote: “Since 15th August... the situation has steadily deteriorated and
the Indian leaders, cabinet ministers, civil officials and others have persistently tried to obstruct the
work of the partition of the armed forces.”
After the dispute arose on Kashmir, India cast off even the semblance of fair play in honouring
the division of BIA assets. In this regard, Indian army officer (later Lt Gen) S.P.P. Thorat wrote in his
autobiography, From Reveille to Retreat, that as “We were sending trainloads... to Pakistan, each
one of us was painfully conscious that we were indirectly helping Pakistan to kill our own men.”
Thorat admitted that he tried his best to convince the British high command to stop or at least
slow down the supply to Pakistan, but in vain. He then approached Deputy Prime Minister Sardar
Patel who advised him not to be “too prompt in doing your duty.”
“From then onwards, there was a sharp decline in the quantities of arms and ammunition sent
to Pakistan, but a corresponding increase in innocuous items to make up the tonnage,” Nawaz
quotes Thorat.
Attaining the Character
All these difficulties notwithstanding, the Pakistan Army formally came into being in August
1947 with British Gen Frank Messervy taking over as the first army chief. In due course of time, the
Army selected the number 786 as its identity, which numerically represented the Quran’s opening
verse. This number was “emblazoned on all gate posts and vehicles, as a reminder that this was the
army of a Muslim country,” notes Nawaz.
Since then, there has been no looking back. Building upon the legacy of the BIA in the areas of
discipline, professional competence and chain of command, and adding to them the element of faith,
its earliest leadership, having the experience of fighting two world wars, led the Pakistan Army
from strength to strength.
It proverbially rose from the ashes to claim its position in the world’s top-ranked armies,
giving the nation a force it could be proud of.
(Source: EOS)
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International Issues
A PROLONGED GLOBAL RECESSION
Andrew Sheng (Distinguished fellow at the Asia Global Institute at the University of Hong Kong)
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank held their Spring Meetings in
Washington last month amid growing fears of a prolonged worldwide recession and following a
series of reports predicting that global economic growth will continue to slow.
Earlier in April, a World Bank book estimated that global gross domestic product growth will
fall below 2% this year and increase to 3% in 2024, before weakening to 2.2% by 2030, down sharply
from the 3.5% average rate in the 2000s. The Bank foresees a “prolonged period of weakness” for the
global economy following further declines in investment and productivity.
The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook also warned of historically low growth, increased
financial risks and a “rocky recovery” ahead. The current wave of monetary tightening has slowed
inflation but also popped several asset bubbles, triggering an interest-rate risk shock that wounded
borrowers and fragile financial institutions. In one extreme (but plausible) scenario examined by the
authors, higher interest rates and credit-supply shocks will pull down global growth to 1% this year.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s predictions are slightly more
pessimistic than the IMF’s, projecting that the world economy will grow by 2.6% this year and 2.9%
in 2024, largely thanks to post-pandemic recoveries in China and India offsetting slower growth in
the United States, Europe and Japan. Given the escalating Sino-American rivalry, former US
treasury secretary Lawrence Summers puts the chances of a recession in the US at 70%.
When the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank began hiking interest rates last
year, developing economies worried about the adverse effects of monetary tightening and a
strengthening dollar on the global economy. The current economic slowdown, together with the
looming bifurcation of global supply chains, has compounded those concerns. In March, however,
following months of quantitative tightening (QT), the Fed injected US$300 billion in liquidity into
cash-strapped banks to shore up confidence in the financial system following the collapse of Silicon
Valley Bank. The move led capital markets to speculate that the Fed may soon revert to quantitative
easing (QE) and loosen monetary policy in order to maintain domestic financial stability.
But QE is a double-edged sword. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the G7 countries’ loose
monetary and fiscal policies have led to more than a decade of relative stability for the world’s
advanced economies. But they have also led to near-negative nominal interest rates and higher debt
levels, fuelled speculative asset bubbles, and encouraged investors to forsake long-term investments
in favour of chasing short-term yields.
In addition to these trends, the massive monetary expansion that followed the 2008 crisis led
to structural changes in the global financial system. First, it changed the composition of assets and
liabilities on the balance sheets of central banks, commercial banks, and non-bank financial
intermediaries (NBFIs) such as pension funds. According to the Financial Stability Board, the G7
countries’ share of global financial assets fell from 75% in 2008 to 62% in 2020, reflecting the rapid
growth of the G20 other members (the so-called G13).
Second, the QE decade dramatically expanded central banks’ balance sheets. G7 central banks’
assets more than tripled, rising from US$5.7 trillion in 2008 to US$23.5 trillion in 2020. By contrast,
G13 central banks, which could not launch their own versions of QE because their currencies do not
have global reserve status, expanded their balance sheets from US$6.7 trillion to US$16.2 trillion
over the same period, mostly due to their growing foreign exchange reserves.
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Third, post-2008 financial reforms encouraged banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage. As a

result, the share of total G20 financial assets held by lightly-regulated NBFIs increased from 42% in
2008 to 47% in 2020.
Fourth, America’s net international investment position (NIIP) – the difference
between foreign assets owned by US residents and US assets owned by non-residents and foreign
entities – deteriorated. By 2020, Americans owed US$14.7 trillion more to the rest of the
world than the world owed the US, up from US$4 trillion in 2008. Meanwhile, rich countries
increasingly borrowed from non-G7 countries. Consequently, the G7’s NIIP deficit widened sharply,
from US$1.7 trillion to US$9 trillion.
The result is an unbalanced financial system in which the G7 still manages global monetary
policy despite being deeply indebted to the rest of the world and controlling a declining share of
international finance. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of
Ukraine have effectively weaponized the reserve currencies of G7 countries, spurring other
countries to seek ways to boost their resilience through de-dollarization and alternative trading and
payment regimes.
The Covid-19 pandemic, together with the war in Ukraine, has further exacerbated the
fragmentation of the global financial system. Similarly, governments’ efforts to achieve economic
security through self-sufficiency have accelerated deglobalization in energy, food, and technology
markets, with the unintended effect of hampering international efforts to fight climate change.
The difference between today’s financial contagion and that of 2008 is that back then, the G20
stepped up to lift the world out of crisis. China, for example, launched a 4-trillion-yuan ($586.7
billion) stimulus package – then the world’s largest – amounting to 12.5% of its GDP.
But the Chinese government is not expected to repeat that this time, given that the 2008 programme
led to a debt binge, with local governments borrowing as much as 14 trillion yuan by 2010 and
creating huge imbalances that took nearly a decade to unwind. Moreover, any G20 agreement to
revive the global economy would be conditional on finding a satisfactory resolution to the US-China
conflict.
In the absence of multilateral cooperation and global coordination on fiscal and monetary
policies, the world economy could sleepwalk into a recession that would likely trigger more debt
and financial crises, as well as proxy wars. The current situation is reminiscent of the run-up to the
global recession of the 1930s, which also led to increased military expenditures and set the stage for
World War II. With so much at stake, the world’s largest economies have only one good option.
Source: The Japan Times)

EUROPE’S GEOPOLITICAL NECESSITY

Sébastien Lumet (Co-founder of the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics)
Elie Perot (Program director at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy)
In recent years, a growing chorus of European Union and national leaders have stressed the
need for Europe to step up its geopolitical profile. At the same time, there has been no shortage of
criticism levelled against this aspiration. Some have highlighted the uncertain ends pursued under
the calls for a “more geopolitical Europe,” pointing to the ambiguity—or as Hans Kundnani called it
in a recent IPQ article, “confusion”—behind this label. Others have criticized the ways in which this
idea has been publicly pushed forward, such as Josep Borrell’s clumsy metaphor depicting Europe
as a “garden” to be defended against the “jungle” that the rest of the world would represent.
The greatest point of contention, however, concerns something more essential: whether the
EU, founded as a democratic, inward-looking, and somewhat utopian peace project, is in danger of
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losing itself in a newly proclaimed quest for power. We argue that such anxiety is misguided. What
a more geopolitical Europe requires is not to trade its morality for power, but to aim at a better
balance between the two.
Political Modernity and Power
As a construct meant to transform the nature of relations between European states through
democratic and liberal means, European integration has often been cast in direct opposition to the
notion of power. From this perspective, a focus on power could seem to carry the risk of bringing
the European continent back to the mindset that led to its past conflicts and divisions. Yet, it should
not be forgotten that one of the key tenets of political modernity and democracy is not the negation
of power, but rather its recognition and domestication.
Acknowledging that power constitutes an inescapable feature of social and political life
represented a fundamental break in the history of political thought. In contrast with their medieval
predecessors, modern theorists stepped away from preaching that the only path toward a
prosperous, secure, and well-governed political community was through the infallible practice of
(Christian) virtue. Most famously, Niccolò Machiavelli undertook instead to discuss “the real truth
of the matter [rather] than the imagination of it.” This novel and realistic attitude led him to stress
the necessity for rulers to resolutely apply power, in particular in times of great danger, and, in
doing so, to make compromises with morality on occasion. In other terms, Machiavelli's originality
was to conceive of politics as an autonomous field of human activity which, without ignoring
morality, could not be reduced to it.
While Machiavelli was characteristically concerned with the acquisition of power and its
preservation in the hands of the prince, this focus on power remained nonetheless a constant
preoccupation for thinkers of modern democracy. Indeed, as Montesquieu famously highlighted in
The Spirit of the Laws, a “constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt
to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go.” He thus concluded that “to prevent this
abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power.” In
other words, what Montesquieu theorized was the separation and channeling of power, not its
abolition—thereby providing a key foundation for all democratic political systems established in the
modern era, from the United States’ constitution to the institutional architecture of the EU itself.
Power and the European Union
In this sense one could already say that it is misleading to describe the EU as being forged in
opposition to the notion of power. Through the subtle equilibriums that its founding treaties have
instituted between the national and the supranational level as well as between and within its
institutions, the EU actually represents a highly sophisticated way to take power seriously.
It is true, however, that this channeling of power is also undergirded by the implicit norm that
its ultimate expression—the use of force and threat thereof—clearly remains off-limits in relations
between EU member states. This taboo is, thankfully, deeply entrenched in European minds today,
but it does not exist to the same extent outside the EU. There, tragedy remains, if not a certainty, at
least a possibility, as the Russian aggression against Ukraine dreadfully reminds us. Thus, despite
the United Nations or regional collective security organizations like the OSCE, international
relations still take place, as French philosopher Raymond Aron put it, “under the shadow of war.”
As a result, while a major achievement of European integration has been to dramatically
mitigate the effects of anarchy among EU member states, the EU has always struggled with figuring
out how to deal with external actors whose behavior may not follow a similar code.
For a long time, the EU has enjoyed the luxury of circumventing this problem via its policy of
enlargement, combined with the benevolent protection of the United States through NATO.
Enlargement amounted to absorbing the external world rather than having to deal with it as an
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“other” to be engaged with on an equal footing. Today, however, this approach is reaching its limits.
If they occur at all, the accession of Western Balkans countries, Ukraine, Moldova, and potentially
Georgia will mark the final geographical extent of the EU. As for NATO, its umbrella remains solid,
the war in Ukraine having acted as an electroshock. But this does not preclude a strategic
reorientation of the United States toward the Pacific and, possibly, toward its own domestic
challenges, likely reducing Washington’s willingness to devote “blood and treasure” to the defense
of Europe.
Thus, the EU can no longer entertain the idea that it could escape power politics in the same
way that its own member states have done among themselves. It now needs to take the question of
power more seriously when dealing with the outside world. European power must balance the
power of others.
To be sure, the EU is not entirely new to this endeavor. Since the early days of European
integration, the power of the single market has been essential to obtain concessions when
negotiating trade agreements or to nudge industries into adopting EU norms and standards. Over
the last few years, the EU has also started to pull its weight more assertively in other domains than
commercial and economic matters. In 2016, Europeans used their financial power to prevent a
fracturing of the EU, reaching a deal with Turkey to stem unprecedented flows of refugees.
Europeans have exerted their collective power even more forcefully over the past few months as
they imposed unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia in reaction to its aggression against
Ukraine, while providing significant military support to Kyiv.
Europe as a Normal Power
To some, the geopolitical narrative that has taken shape in Brussels and certain EU capitals
may amount to systematically downplay moral considerations. Yet, the fact that discussions
revolving around power now dominate the EU discourse must be seen within a historical
perspective. It is in fact a welcome counterpoint to the background of the more traditional self-
understanding of the EU as a distinct and “morally superior” kind of actor on the international
scene, because its actions would be strictly based upon rules and norms.
As highlighted by the two geopolitical moments mentioned above vis-à-vis Turkey and
Ukraine, the relationship between morality and power is complex. Sometimes, both can be at
loggerheads, as was the case with the Turkey agreement—which was essential to preserve the unity
of Europeans but raised moral questions. On other occasions, morality and power are better aligned,
as is the case with Ukraine today, with the EU assertively using multiple levers of power to help
defend the territorial and political integrity of an independent nation.
Because the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility are in constant tension, there is
no universal maxim or overriding principle that one could follow to always strike the right balance
between power and morality. In each situation that the EU may face, it will be the responsibility of
Europeans to consciously decide where to strike this balance. In this sense, Europe’s geopolitical
awakening is a moment when Europeans must learn to make choices among what Isaiah Berlin
would call a plurality of values. This is and will inevitably remain a source of controversy and,
oftentimes, a messy process. But this is, after all, the essence of politics.
It should therefore be clear that the ultimate goal of a more geopolitical Europe should not be
to make the EU more powerful only for the sake of power. Power is the ability to exercise one’s will
over others—as per Max Weber’s classic definition—but it is also about withstanding attempts by
others to impose their will on oneself. Making Europe a normal power will help shelter Europeans
against the tragedies of international politics—a condition for the survival and self-fulfillment of the
EU’s democratic model.
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In that sense, today’s aspiration for a more geopolitical Europe may well be truer to the
original vision that gave birth to the EU rather than if it were to remain a morally pure, but largely
powerless, ideal.
(Source: Internationale Politik Quarterly)

THE DEBT-CLIMATE NEXUS

María Fernanda Espinosa (Former president of the UN General Assembly)
Ulrich Volz ((Professor of Economics and Director of the SOAS Centre for Sustainable Finance
at SOAS, University of London)
Yuefen Li (Senior Adviser on South-South Cooperation and Development Finance at South
Centre)
As central banks tighten monetary policy, dozens of climate-vulnerable, highly-indebted
countries teeter on the edge of a financial abyss. To address the confluence of economic and
environmental disasters ravaging the Global South, the international community must provide
immediate debt relief in exchange for green investments.
November was a busy month of climate-change politicking. As policymakers tried to make
progress at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt,
world leaders convened in Bali, Indonesia, for the G20 summit. While neither summit focused on the
confluence of environmental and debt crises currently ravaging much of the Global South, both
achieved some progress toward providing developing countries with the financial support they
need to weather the current storm.
In Bali, the leaders of the world’s biggest economies mostly reiterated their previous positions
on the debt crisis, with only minor adjustments. But at COP27, smaller countries were able to make
their voices heard and underscore the need for international action on debt relief. Barbadian Prime
Minister Mia Mottley, for example, pleaded with the international community to assist climate-
vulnerable countries. Her “Bridgetown Agenda” proposes a three-step plan to address the
developing world’s crisis, including emergency liquidity injections by the International Monetary
Fund, enhanced lending by multilateral development banks and new financing mechanisms.
Mottley was not alone in making a case for addressing the growing liquidity crunch.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro, for his part, proposed that the IMF initiate a debt-for-
investment swap program that could help accelerate climate adaptation and mitigation projects in
developing countries. With the support of the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa, Egypt
launched a sustainable debt coalition. And civil-society groups affiliated with the Debt for Climate
movement called for canceling the debts of the world’s poorest countries. But, ultimately, the biggest
breakthrough of COP27 was the decision to create a loss-and-damage fund that aims to help
developing countries mitigate the worst effects of climate change.
But how did debt become the most talked-about problem at a conference on fighting climate
change? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted energy and food markets, fueling a surge in
prices around the world. But while developed countries have struggled with the effects of high
inflation, energy-importing developing countries have been hit the hardest. Their foreign-exchange
reserves have been depleted rapidly, stretching public finances – already battered by two and a half
years of COVID-19 – to the breaking point. Rising energy costs have made electricity rationing and
blackouts increasingly common, worsening lower-income countries’ economic plight.
Compounding these countries’ problems further, the US Federal Reserve’s aggressive interest-
rate hikes have strengthened the dollar and forced other leading central banks to follow suit. For
struggling developing countries, managing the fallout of climate-related environmental disasters
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such as floods, droughts, and severe storms has never been more difficult, and much of the
economic and social progress of the past few decades is being reversed.
Through no fault of their own, lower-income countries are teetering on the edge of an
economic abyss. According to the IMF, more than a quarter of emerging economies have either
defaulted or had bonds trading at distressed levels. Among low-income countries, over 60% are in
or at high risk of debt distress. Governments’ failure to invest in climate adaptation and resilience
measures has also worsened sovereign risk and driven up the cost of capital, creating a vicious cycle
that will further cripple public finances and debt sustainability.
The G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment, which aims to provide debt relief to
struggling countries, has not delivered effective and timely action. Moreover, it excludes middle-
income countries and lacks a mechanism to ensure private-creditor involvement. Of the three
countries that have applied for debt treatment – Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia – only Chad has
reached an agreement with its creditors, and only after a grueling two-year negotiation and without
receiving any write-off. The experience of these three countries will likely discourage other
distressed countries from seeking debt restructuring.
Much of the debate about climate change and debt focuses on debt-for-climate (also known as
debt-for-nature) swaps, which enable countries to erase some of their debt in exchange for funding
domestic climate projects. While such arrangements represent a welcome funding source for critical
conservation efforts, their high transaction costs and limited volume make them unsuitable for
addressing a debt crisis of systemic proportions.
Placing vulnerable countries on a path to climate resilience and green development would
benefit debtors and creditors alike. That is why the international community, and the G20 countries
in particular, must agree on a comprehensive debt-relief initiative that would enable distressed
countries to fund green projects in exchange for partial debt forgiveness.
Now that it has formally assumed the G20 presidency, India should establish an independent
review of the G20 debt agenda and make recommendations for reform. Highly-indebted countries,
which typically have no voice at G20 summits, must be part of the process, too. At the end of 2021,
the V20 Group, which represents finance ministers from 58 climate-vulnerable countries with a
combined population of 1.5 billion people, proposed a debt-restructuring scheme that features
practical solutions for funding low-carbon projects. The world’s wealthiest countries should
seriously consider supporting it.
Another compelling suggestion, supported by French President Emmanuel Macron at COP27,
is to convene a high-level panel of experts to grapple with how to ensure longer-term debt
sustainability and enable debtor countries to mobilize investments.
The international community must avoid repeating the mistakes of previous debt crises.
Doing too little too late would result in cascading crises across dozens of developing countries,
threatening social and political stability and further derailing the international climate agenda. To
ensure an equitable, climate-resilient future, we must first avert the looming debt disaster.
Shamshad Akhtar, a former under-secretary-general of the United Nations; Anzetse Were,
Senior Economist at Financial Sector Deepening Kenya; Kevin P. Gallagher, Director of the Global
Development Policy Center at Boston University; and Jörg Haas, Head of International Politics at the
Heinrich Böll Foundation,also contributed to this commentary.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
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A WORLD OF UNWELCOME REPLAYS

Michael J. Boskin (Professor of Economics at Stanford University)
Watch any sport nowadays, and you will be treated to instant replays that give you a detailed
– often slow-motion – view of important moments. Watch the news, and you may find yourself
feeling like you are similarly watching the past on playback. But these replays – of high inflation,
soaring public debt, a brutal ground war in Europe, a new cold war, and the rise of potentially
destructive technologies – are far from instant, and the stakes are much higher.
Readers might recall that I predicted rising inflation and slower growth as early as spring
2021. Former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers did so even earlier. Yet today’s inflation – the
worst since the early 1980s – caught most people by surprise.
Supply-chain snarls, including energy-market and food-system disruptions linked to Russia’s
war on Ukraine, contributed to the initial surge in prices. But the main driver of today’s inflation has
been profligate monetary and fiscal policies, which were upheld despite quicker-than-expected
recoveries from pandemic lockdowns.
For example, US President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, implemented in
March 2021, was nearly three times larger than the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of the
GDP gap that still needed to be closed for the economy to reach its potential. One cannot but notice
the echoes of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s use of debt to finance the Vietnam War and the “war on
poverty” in the late 1960s.
Meanwhile, the US Federal Reserve kept its target interest rate close to zero for too long, and
started to unwind its balance sheet too late – an approach that recalls the monetary-policy mistakes
it made under Chair Arthur Burns in the 1970s. Central bankers thought that it would not hurt to let
inflation run above the 2% target for a while before bringing it back down, because they had
undershot the target previously.
There are short-term benefits to running the economy “hot.” Just before the pandemic, US
unemployment was low, minority groups had the lowest poverty rate in history, and wages were
rising fastest at the bottom of the distribution. For the first time in decades, inequality was declining.
But the economic and political price has come due. Core inflation (which excludes food and
energy prices) in the US has averaged 5.6% for the last 12 months. While it is now down a bit from
its peak, it has rotated to stickier services prices, and remains almost three times the Fed’s target. The
central-bank creed is that the short-run interest rate must run above inflation for some time before
inflation – after a “long and variable lag” – falls toward the target rate.
Wages have not kept pace with inflation, and most households – especially those which
expansionary policies were supposed to help – have been experiencing a decline in real income for
two years. Though unemployment remains very low, and the US economy has outperformed much
of the rest of the world, almost half of the US population thinks it is already in a recession, and most
Americans expect their children and grandchildren to be worse off than them. This perceived
demise of the “American Dream” has left the public – and politics – deeply unsettled.
Another replay that caught most of the world by surprise is the ferocious ground war in
Europe. America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 weakened deterrence. But
Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly telegraphed his plans for Ukraine. Beyond lamenting in
2005 that the Soviet Union’s demise was the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century – worse than
World War II, apparently, when 20 million Russians died – he seized part of Georgia in 2008, and
annexed Crimea in 2014.
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Third, despite all the global economic integration of recent decades, the world seems to be on
the brink of a new cold war. China’s increasing economic, diplomatic, and military assertiveness,
together with its deepening ties with Russia, has raised fears about a realignment in international
relations, and even a new clash of systems of political-economy.
The original Cold War pitted totalitarian regimes with centrally planned economies against
mixed-capitalist democracies, led by an economically and militarily dominant US. This time, it is
autocratic state capitalism versus social-welfare democracies, and America’s resolve and capabilities
are in doubt.
Particularly worrisome, nonaligned actors are hedging their bets – and the US appears to be
asleep at the wheel. The China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran – a sponsor
of terrorism and a supplier of advanced military drones to Russia – stands out. Does this mark a
return to traditional balance-of-power geopolitics, or is it a prelude to conflict between the US and
China over Taiwan?
Finally, technological advances are disrupting economies and upending expectations about
the future. Technology has been transforming economies and displacing workers since well before
we had a term – Schumpeterian creative destruction – for the phenomenon. But economies have
generally adjusted: computers, for example, did not end up causing massive structural
unemployment, because the workforce was redeployed to other jobs. In any case, standards of living
rose.
Will this be the case for artificial intelligence? A group of tech leaders, including Elon Musk,
are not so sure. In a recent open letter, they called for a six-month (or longer) pause on advanced AI
development to gain a better understanding of the risks the technology poses and devise ways to
mitigate them. Musk thinks those risks include the very destruction of human civilization, and
claims that Google co-founder Larry Page once called him a “speciesist” for wanting to safeguard
humanity from AI.
Ultimately, AI is a tool. It can be used for good – for example, to develop new drugs and
diagnostics. But it can also be used to do great harm, such as to abet repression in China. I remain
cautiously optimistic that we can overcome – or at least sufficiently manage – this challenge, as well
as the others mentioned here. But, given widespread nuclear proliferation, the costs of failure could
bring the most unwelcome replay of all.
(Source: Project Syndicate)

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Why it matters
Devyani Pande (Ph.D. candidate at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of
Singapore)
The use of Artificial intelligence (AI) has been the turning point of industry 4.0 that will have
social and economic ramifications for society. While the definition of AI is still being debated, AI
applications can be thought of as a collection of novel technologies that mimic human intelligence to
execute tasks and achieve goals. Chatbots that we encounter on websites, algorithms that helped in
predicting possible outbreaks of COVID-19 and even diagnosing diseases, driverless cars, healthcare
robots, and AI applications for trading in financial markets are all examples of AI-based applications
in use.
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AI has huge potential for applications in the transport, healthcare, retail, banking, and finance
sectors. It is beneficial for executing tasks quickly, saving time and effort, especially for longer
periods when it is not feasible for human beings to work. However, adopting AI applications is
costly, and requires adequate infrastructure and capability. The issue of jobs being taken away due
to the introduction of AI has been a contentious issue. According to ‘The future of jobs report 2020’
by the World Economic Forum, AI will replace 85 million jobs in the world by 2025. Jobs such as
those of customer executives, receptionists, data entry assistants, and vehicle drivers are a few of
them. In addition, the laws and regulations have not kept pace with the introduction of such
technologies leading to ethical and legal dilemmas in their operation. A recent example of an AI
chatbot being developed by an engineer at Google becoming ‘sentient’ whereby it started thinking
like a human being and asserting the right to personhood gives us a glimpse into the difficulties that
society will face in the adoption of AI applications. Similarly, in San Francisco, the surprising
encounter of a driverless car with a police officer when it was on the road without headlights being
switched on, led to discussions about attribution of responsibility in case of accidents involving such
cars.
High-income countries have already started adopting AI in different sectors and have made
strides in deliberating on regulations—the United States has promulgated the National AI Initiative
Act of 2020 to accelerate the use of AI in the economy, and the United Kingdom published the
National AI Strategy- AI Action Plan to support AI-related innovation and capitalise on its benefits,
and the European Commission has proposed the Artificial Intelligence Act which provides a legal
framework for trustworthy AI. These regulations indicate the significance of AI in their economies
and their intent to use it for its benefits. However, the developing countries are yet to catch up with
them.
AI has the potential to solve problems plaguing developing countries by providing quality
education, clean water and sanitation, and the provision of clean energy. A study in ‘Nature
Communications on the role of AI in achieving sustainable development goals highlights that 134
targets out of the total 169 targets can be achieved with the help of AI. How can developing
countries prepare themselves to capitalise on AI? In light of recent developments, they can focus on
the three ‘Cs’ to embrace AI: create capacity, collaborate, and create awareness.
Building capacity: The infrastructure required for AI comprises data storage, computing and
networking devices, and security enhancements. Apart from the infrastructure, building the capacity
to formulate policies is an essential component of adopting AI. Policymaking for AI would require
the integration of actors from different disciplines like Computer Science, Philosophy, Psychology,
Sociology, Law, and Administration. Along with developing the software for AI applications, inputs
from and feedback of experts would be required on ethics, communication, management, and
regulation. The feedback would be constructive in the stages when the AI technologies undergo
testing.
Collaborate: Increased government collaboration with start-ups, private companies investing
in new technologies, and institutes of higher education will enable the adoption of novel AI
applications to meet the present needs of the developing economies. The government can act as a
link between home-based agencies and private companies or start-ups in high-income countries to
accelerate the development of AI applications. The government can hold a supervisory role by
imposing provisional standards to ensure the safety of AI applications and providing the space and
resources for the testing of applications.
Create awareness: Since the public is going to be the main user of AI applications, it is crucial
to generate awareness about AI technologies before or while adopting them. This would include
technical but user-friendly information about their adoption, the nature of tasks done by the
applications and the impact on job prospects, and guidelines to interact with and operate AI
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applications. Information regarding AI can be disseminated through credible government sources

on social media and by organizing information campaigns. This will help the public in
understanding the benefits of AI and in smoother adoption of AI technologies.
The three ‘Cs’ are just the foundations for preparing and capitalizing on AI efficiently. The use
of AI applications has benefits and drawbacks. While they can complete tasks much faster than
human beings, their adoption is costly and they have still not reached the levels of social and
emotional connectedness and exhibiting creativity. As they are being introduced and evolving
overtime, their benefits, and risks are also being identified contemporaneously. While developing
countries would not like to miss out on the race for AI adoption, they need to prioritize the use of AI
applications based on their risks and demands to solve the developmental challenges.
(Source: Mero Tribune)

EUROPE’S CHINA POLICY IN DISARRAY

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (Former Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS))
French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der
Leyen sent quite contradictory messages on China when they visited earlier this month,
demonstrating that Europe is yet to develop a shared sophisticated shared approach toward China.
Macron made a three-day visit to China, and Ursula von der Leyen accompanied Macron for part of
the visit.
Von der Leyen had set out her views clearly even before her trip. On March 30, while
delivering a keynote address to the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the European
Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, von der Leyen remarked that Europe’s relations with China remain
“one of the most intricate and important anywhere in the world,” and how the region manages it
“will be a determining factor for our future economic prosperity and national security.” Adding that
there has been a “a very deliberate hardening of China’s overall strategic posture” in recent times,
she noted that the relationship between Europe and China has also “become more distant and more
difficult in the last few years.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia also figured prominently in her speech, in
addition to highlighting China’s increasingly assertive actions in its neighborhood. The speech
prominently noted the Chinese “show of military force in the South China Sea and East China Sea,
and at the border with India,” that affect Europe’s partners and “their legitimate interests” as well as
other critical issues such as the “grave human rights violations” against Uyghur Muslims in
Xinjiang. She noted that all of the “escalatory actions” demonstrate a China that is “becoming more
repressive at home and more assertive abroad,” and argued for both diplomatic and economic de-
risking, not decoupling.
Contrast this speech with Macron’s remarks after his three-day trip to China, in which he said
being “caught up in crises that are not ours” is “the great risk” that Europe faces. Europe should not
merely follow the United States into its crises and conflicts, the French president stressed. The worst
thing, he said, “would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take
our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” This statement speaks to France’s pet
theme of strategic autonomy, a theme that resonates well in countries like India.
That Macron asked these questions even as China is breathing down on Taiwan with an
enhanced number of risky military maneuvers speaks volumes about the effectiveness of Xi’s charm
offensive and the red carpet welcome that Macron received in China. On Taiwan at least, Xi clearly
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stated that “The Chinese government and the Chinese people will never stand for anyone trying to
take advantage of the question. If anyone expects China to compromise and concede on the Taiwan
question, they are having a pipe dream and would shoot themselves in the foot.”
Macron and von der Leyen were not the only European leaders in China this month. German
Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock also visited, and her line was closer to von der Leyen’s than
Macron’s. During a joint press conference with her Chinese counterpart Qin Gang in Beijing, she
warned against use of force on Taiwan, saying that “a military escalation in the Taiwan Strait …
would be a worst-case scenario globally and affect us as one of the biggest industrial nations in
particular… Fifty percent of global trade passes through the Taiwan Strait, 70 percent of
semiconductors pass through the Taiwan Strait, so the free passage is in our economic interest as
well.” The minister added a clear warning that “conflicts can only be resolved peacefully. A
unilateral and violent change in the status quo would not be acceptable to us as Europeans.”
Other German ministers have called Macron’s call for strategic autonomy “naïve,” adding that
“security on European soil without the strategic nuclear potential of the United States at least is
unthinkable.”
The remarks from Germany’s ministers demonstrate that Berlin is not in alignment with
Macron’s view questioning the need to come to Taiwan’s aid along with the United States. The EU’s
foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, who was set to travel to Beijing last week but had to cancel as he
tested positive for COVID-19, also made a similar call asking China to exercise restraint on Taiwan.
He said in a recent speech that “any attempt to change the status quo by force would be
unacceptable.”
Macron and Xi issued a 51-point joint statement, and many points in the joint statement are
troubling, including references to strengthening political and military dialogue, wherein the
Southern Theater of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (primarily responsible for South China Sea)
and the Asia-Pacific Command of the French will “deepen dialogue.” Xi stated China’s “readiness to
maintain close strategic communication with Macron and to elevate the China-France
comprehensive strategic partnership to a new height,” while Macron “expressed readiness to
continue to maintain close strategic communication with President Xi Jinping.” Macron also
reportedly used the Chinese language of a “multipolar” world, that is free of “blocs,” free from the
“Cold War mentality,” all of which would have been pleasing to the Chinese leadership.
It was Macron’s subsequent interview that further rattled and confused many on where
France stood regarding China and the broader security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. China, of
course, welcomed it, with the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, saying “Some
countries do not want to see other nations become independent and self-reliant, and instead always
want to coerce other countries into obeying their will.”
France’s call for strategic autonomy is understandable, but it needs to be tempered with
realism. Macron’s push to make Europe a significant geopolitical actor under French leadership may
not find too many takers. Equally, his ability to influence and deliver on serious geopolitical
developments – whether his dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin days before the
invasion, a fruitless attempt to dissuade him from the war, or his meeting with Xi seeking China’s
help in restraining the Russian military offensive in Ukraine – is questionable. Instead, his efforts at
appeasing the Chinese leadership have only created more trouble for him.
It is possible his gambit was all about moving beyond the present domestic anger and protests
in France and certainly driven by economic necessity. He had a delegation of more than 50 business
leaders who signed a number of deals including civil nuclear cooperation, and construction of a
water desalination plant while France has entered into deals for selling more aircraft, financial
products and pork to China. Experts argue that these could result in more jobs and thus “mollify
some of the anger at home.”
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Parts of Europe appear to be more realistic about the China threat and the need for deterrence
even as they continue to engage China, but Macron’s embrace of China may give pause to many
Indo-Pacific countries. Japan, which is holding the G-7 presidency, could have concerns about G-7
unity at the upcoming summit in Hiroshima. Whether France can be a trusted partner in managing
China is a question that many have asked after the fiasco of Macron’s visit.
(Source: The Diplomatic)
Navigating the New Age of

GREAT-POWER COMPETITION
Bilahari Kausikan
Russian aggression in Ukraine and competition between China and the United States have
made the world more uncertain and dangerous. The Ukraine war is likely to be prolonged, and the
U.S.-Chinese rivalry seems set to become the defining feature of international relations in the
twenty-first century. Policymakers and analysts worry that the future will be riven with divisions,
with countries separated into hostile, competitive blocs and geopolitics becoming a zero-sum game.
But as officials around the world grapple with these complex developments, it is crucial that
they keep them in proper perspective. States have competed as long as there have been states. They
have collaborated, too, but the harsh reality is that competition all too often turns into conflict. The
last century was punctuated by periodic spasms of major interstate violence: World War I, World
War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, several wars between Israel and Arab states, China’s
invasions of India and Vietnam, and numerous wars in the global South. During the Cold War, the
risk of nuclear destruction made direct confrontation between Moscow and Washington too
dangerous, but their rivalry sparked many hot conflicts in proxy wars around the world. Even the
so-called unipolar moment, when the United States reigned supreme, was not free of conflict;
vicious genocidal wars erupted in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the United States
invaded Iraq and Afghanistan.
The dangers of these times are real but hardly novel. Arguably, the world is returning to its
natural state. The war in Ukraine and U.S.-Chinese rivalry conform to established patterns of state
behavior. The uncertainties and risks they pose—the possibility of accidents getting out of hand and
nuclear escalation, among others—are what U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld termed
“known unknowns.” Most countries successfully navigated previous phases of great-power
competition, and many of them even grew and prospered under those harsh conditions. If they
remain calm and exercise reasonable prudence, there is no reason they cannot do so again.
Get your priorities straight
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is without question an egregious violation of the
fundamental norms of international relations that cannot go unchallenged. But it is hardly
exceptional. Ukraine’s suffering is striking only because it is the first war in Europe since the Balkan
wars of the 1990s. Similar tragedies have been a daily reality for decades for many people in the
global South. For the most part, these conflagrations—for instance, the Iran-Iraq War during the
1980s and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the late 1990s—went unchallenged or were only
weakly challenged by those powers, notably the United States and European countries that now fret
over threats to the so-called rules-based order. The West even initiated several wars (think of the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003) or backed actors in civil wars (think of Western support for anti-regime
forces in Syria over the last decade), even though such behavior violated some of the most
fundamental norms of international relations: the respect of sovereignty and noninterference in the
internal affairs of states.
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Obviously, not all violations of the rules-based order have been regarded as unacceptable or
treated with equal seriousness. Race and color are seldom discussed in international relations, but it
has not escaped the attention of many in the global South that in Ukraine, for the first time since the
Balkan wars of the 1990s, white people are killing other white people with the support of other
white people instead of white people killing nonwhite people or nonwhite people killing one
another, sometimes with the support and encouragement of white people. This may not be the most
important factor affecting attitudes toward the Ukraine war in the global South, but it is a factor.
No country can pursue a completely consistent foreign policy. But this particular double
standard also explains why support for Ukraine in many countries in the global South is tenuous, as
French President Emmanuel Macron warned at the Munich Security Conference in February. The
global South may never have much of a battlefield role in Ukraine. But as the war drags on, if the
global South’s political and diplomatic support for Ukraine erodes, it may become harder for
Western countries to keep Russia isolated.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, its war with Russia is, in truth, a sideshow for the United States.
Washington has made clear that it will not get directly involved in the conflict since such an
intervention might lead to a dangerous nuclear escalation. But it may also have stayed out of the
fight for another reason. Russia’s invasion is certainly an existential threat to Ukraine. It is a serious
threat to EU members on the eastern fringes of Europe. But it is not really a threat at all to the United
States.
Ukraine is a second-order issue for the United States. The first-order issue is China. U.S.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has candidly said the United States wants to use Ukraine to
weaken Russia so the Kremlin can never invade another country. Left unsaid, however, was the U.S.
desire to make strong support for Ukraine an object lesson for Beijing. After all, the Russian invasion
came only weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in
Beijing and declared that their partnership was one with “no limits” or “forbidden areas.” Although
it was certainly not planned that way, the war has made Ukraine an unwitting proxy in U.S.-Chinese
rivalry, perhaps the first proxy of the current phase of great-power competition and conflict.
The forest and the trees
This period of great-power competition is not simply a rerun of previous epochs. One of the
most intellectually lazy tropes used to describe the U.S.-Chinese rivalry is “a new Cold War.” This
characterization fundamentally misrepresents the nature of the competition because it evokes a
historical analogy that is only superficially plausible and, in fact, altogether inappropriate.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union led two separate systems that
were only minimally connected at their margins. Although the prospect of mutual destruction
tempered their rivalry and eventually led to détente, both countries fundamentally sought to replace
the other’s system with their own. It was an existential struggle between capitalism and
communism. In 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev promised a group of Western ambassadors
that “we will bury you.” As history played out, it was the Soviet Union that was buried, and today,
China is only one of five ostensibly communist systems that survive (the others being Cuba, Laos,
North Korea, and Vietnam). No one can any longer seriously hope or fear that communism will
defeat capitalism.
Unlike the Cold War adversaries, today’s superpower rivals exist within a single system. Ever
since Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping instituted economic reforms beginning in the late 1970s, China
and the United States have been progressively and intimately enmeshed with each other and the rest
of the world through supply chains of a density and complexity never before seen in history. The
very metaphor of a chain understates the complexity because a chain is a simple, linear structure. A
more appropriate metaphor is perhaps the root system of a tree leading to its trunk, branches, twigs,
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and leaves, with the global system comprising a thick forest of trees intertwined with one another
across continents.
That forest was planted and cultivated during the short post–Cold War period of
unchallenged American dominance, but it has outlived that era. China and the United States are
concerned about how exposed they are to each other. Both countries have tried to temper the
vulnerabilities that come with this exposure. Americans and their allies have tried to enhance the
resilience of key sectors by diversifying supply chains to reduce dependence on China. For its part,
China has tried to become more self-reliant in key technologies and place more emphasis on
domestic household consumption (as opposed to exports) to drive its economic growth.
Neither China nor the United States will succeed in these endeavors, at least not to the extent
they may hope. Diversifying supply chains and achieving self-reliance are both easier said than done
and will take a long time to have any significant effect. Partial bifurcation of the system has already
occurred, and there will be further bifurcation, particularly in those areas of technology that have
major security implications, such as semiconductors. But apocalyptic scenarios of an exceptionally
complex global system dividing cleanly across all sectors into two separate systems (as existed
during the Cold War) will not come to pass. The costs to the two great powers and to other countries
would simply be too high. Competition between the great powers will certainly contribute to the
slowing down of globalization but not its reversal.
Even the closest U.S. ally is never going to cut itself off from China politically or economically.
Few if any Western companies are ever going to entirely forswear investing in the Chinese market
even if they will be more cautious about transferring technology there. The total volume of U.S.-
Chinese trade was more than $690 billion in 2022. This staggering sum does not suggest any
significant decoupling despite all the tensions of recent years. For the foreseeable future, China has
no real alternative but the West for critical technologies and access to important markets. The
countries of the global South are not an adequate substitute. Russia is an albatross around China’s
neck, but Beijing has no other partner anywhere in the world of Moscow’s strategic weight that
shares its distrust of the West.
Like it or not, China and the United States must accept the risks and vulnerabilities of
remaining connected to each other. China and the United States will compete and do so robustly,
but they will compete within the single system of which they are both vital parts. The dynamics of
competition within a system are fundamentally more complex than those of a binary competition
between systems as existed during the Cold War.
A policy of nuance
The geopolitics of high-end semiconductors is an illustration. All the most critical nodes in the
semiconductor supply chain are held by the United States and its allies and friends, such as Japan,
the Netherlands, South Korea, and Taiwan. But China consumes around 40 percent of all chips made
around the world. It is hard, perhaps impossible, to completely cut off your own companies and
those of your friends and allies from 40 percent of a market without doing them serious damage.
Framed by the imperatives and constraints of this complex interdependence, the current era of
competition requires policies created with careful judgment rather than binary decisions. In August
2022, The Wall Street Journal reported that, up to that point, the United States had granted
exemptions to most companies that applied to be excluded from U.S. bans on exports of technology
to China. The CHIPS and Science Act, which Congress passed that month and which seeks to further
restrict technology transfers to China, is unlikely to substantively change the need for a nuanced
approach.
Most crucial, competition within a single system is not existential by definition because it is
not about one system destroying or replacing another. Instead, competition within a system is about
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using interdependence as a tool of competition: positioning yourself to continue to benefit from

interdependence and mitigating your own vulnerabilities while exploiting your rival’s
vulnerabilities.
Interdependence does not erase the possibility of war. But this new kind of complex
interdependence considerably raises the costs of conflict and, coupled with nuclear deterrence,
reduces the probability of war wielded as an instrument of policy. The prospect of mutually assured
destruction kept the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union; mutually assured
destruction—now not just nuclear but also economic—will in all probability also keep the peace
between the United States and China. The great risk is not war by design but an accident getting out
of control, fanned by nationalist narratives into outright war. That risk is highest in a potential
conflict over Taiwan.
Still, that risk does not detract from the fact that the United States faces no existential threat
anywhere in the world. Russia is a very dangerous adversary, but even before the Ukraine war, it
was on a downward long-term trajectory for economic and demographic reasons, and Putin’s
miscalculation in Ukraine has only hastened his country’s decline. Nor is terrorism, whether state
sponsored or by nonstate actors, an existential threat to any well-constituted state and certainly not
to the United States. China is a formidable peer competitor. Its economy is far more viable than the
Soviet economy ever was and far stronger than the post-Soviet Russian economy at its peak. But it,
too, should not be considered an existential threat.
Setting aside the question of whether China even has the capacity to replace the existing
system with its own, it is hardly in its interest to do so. China is a—possibly the—major beneficiary
of the post–Cold War global economy. Beijing may want to displace the United States from the
center of the global economy, but that is a different matter from wanting to kick over the table
altogether. China’s behavior in the East China and South China Seas and in the Himalayas, where its
military has provocatively staked claims to territory, is certainly aggressive and revanchist in its
territorial obsessions. But to call China a revisionist power seeking to completely upend
international order is to greatly overstate the case.
Equally overstated is the notion that Washington’s rivalry with Beijing and the current war in
Ukraine are part of a larger contest between democracy and authoritarianism. U.S. officials often
invoke such rhetoric, exhibiting a tendency to focus on the epiphenomenal rather than the essential.
This simplistic binary is both inappropriate and ineffective.
It is inappropriate because both democracy and autocracy are protean terms. There are many
variants of democracy and many variants of autocracy, and the distinction between them is not as
clear-cut as the United States pretends—as a glance at the controversial list of invitees to the Biden
administration’s 2021 Summit for Democracy reveals. It is ineffective because not every aspect of
every Western variant of democracy attracts unqualified admiration, nor does everyone regard
every aspect of every variant of autocracy with total abhorrence. Framing the contest in this way
may rally the already converted in the West, but it limits support in the rest of the world.
Scratch my back
Without an existential threat, there is no longer any reason for Americans to bear any burden
or pay any price to uphold international order. The key priorities of every post–Cold War U.S.
administration have been domestic, with the George W. Bush administration an exception forced by
the 9/11 attacks, which led his administration into ill-advised adventures in the Middle East. Since
then, every president has tried to rectify Bush’s mistakes by disengaging from Middle Eastern
entanglements, with limited success until President Joe Biden finally cut through the Gordian Knot
in Afghanistan in 2021.
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That ruthless move and the domestic focus of all post–Cold War administrations has often
been misrepresented as the United States retreating from the world. But it is more accurately
understood as the United States redefining the terms of its engagement with the world. Again, this is
not entirely new.
Half a century ago, the United States corrected the mistake it had made in Vietnam by
withdrawing from direct intervention on the mainland of Southeast Asia, choosing instead to
maintain stability throughout the region by assuming the role of an offshore balancer relying
primarily on naval and air power. It has been remarkably consistent in that role in East Asia ever
since. A shift to an analogous role is now occurring in the Middle East, where the United States is
very unlikely to again intervene with large-scale ground forces. But the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is still
in Bahrain, and the U.S. Air Force is still in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Sooner or later, a
similar shift will occur in Europe, too, perhaps delayed but not diverted by the war in Ukraine.
An offshore balancer is not in retreat but demands more of its allies, partners, and friends to
maintain regional equilibrium. In different ways, recent U.S. presidents have all maintained a
similar policy. Under Barack Obama, this policy took the form of an emphasis on multilateralism,
which is another way of sharing burdens. Donald Trump made crudely transactional, unilateral
demands. Biden is more consultative, but he does not consult allies and partners merely for the
pleasure of their company. He is doing so to ascertain what they are prepared to do to meet the
United States’ concerns.
For those countries that meet U.S. expectations, Biden seems willing to go further than any of
his predecessors to provide them with the tools to further common aims. The trilateral security
partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) has enabled
Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, the first time in more than 60 years that the
United States has shared such technology. In this sense, Biden’s consultative approach is a more
polite form of Trump’s crude transactionalism. If you do not meet expectations, the Biden
administration will probably still be polite, but you should not expect to be taken too seriously, as
some countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, and more broadly the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations as an organization, are beginning to realize.
Return to the norm
In this new phase of great-power competition, all countries are confronted with two sets of
realities. First, there are few (if any) countries that do not have concerns about some aspects of both
U.S. and Chinese behavior. The concerns are not the same for the United States and China, and not
every country holds them with the same degree of intensity, but they exist.
Second, China and the United States are geopolitical facts that no country can ignore, and
precisely because of their rivalry, dealing with both simultaneously is the necessary condition for
dealing with either effectively. Without the United States, dealing with China will take place in an
unbalanced environment that will certainly disadvantage any country; without China, the risk of the
United States brushing aside a country’s interests or taking the relationship for granted rises
considerably.
Faced with these realities, most countries are going to try to maximize their autonomy within
the constraints of their specific circumstances. No country will want to align all their interests across
all domains in one direction or another. They will try to align different interests in different domains
in the most advantageous direction, and their choices are not necessarily going to be confined to
only the two great powers, leading them to seek out coalitions and partnerships with a range of
actors.
The complexity of twenty-first-century competition provides sovereign states more space to
maneuver than did the binary of U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War. Of course, states
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must have the intelligence, agility, and courage to recognize the opportunities to use their agency. In
rising to this challenge, they will do well to remember that even if the landscape of modern
international relations looks daunting, it fundamentally represents a return to the historical norm.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
The Real and acute Threat of a

SINO-US CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN

Elbridge Colby (Author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict)
The prospects of an attack by China on Taiwan and thus a war with the US and its allied
forces are not mere speculation, but a real danger. Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised his
personal investment in resolving the Taiwan issue in Beijing’s favour — and he is not immortal.
There is an acute danger of a Sino-US war over Taiwan in this decade.
To be sure, no one knows what Xi Jinping or his successors will decide to do, but the factors
and evidence pointing toward the possibility of China attacking Taiwan are very concerning.
Beijing’s efforts to use economic leverage to pursue its grand ambitions of regional hegemony and
global preeminence have thus far found limited success. The trouble is that it has another, quite
possibly more effective, option: The use of military force against Taiwan. Success in such an assault
would help break apart the aborning coalition forming to check Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions and
markedly strengthen China’s military advantages in the region.
If Beijing does decide to try to seize Taiwan, Russia’s experience in Ukraine shows that
Beijing’s best strategy is to use overwhelming, direct force to compel Taiwan to surrender. As
Napoleon put it: If you want to take Vienna, take Vienna.
Unfortunately, this is not mere speculation. Rather, China is visibly building and exercising a
military to do just this, and to take on the US and its allies as part and parcel of doing so.
Furthermore, Beijing has reason to think its opportunity to act may be time-limited. Beijing
can see that there is a coalition forming to check its overweening ambitions. Beijing feels the growing
constraints America and others are placing on China’s further growth; these may well convince
Beijing that waiting will result in it being contained.
Beijing also has military reasons that might militate against waiting. China has been preparing
for a Taiwan fight for the last quarter-century, and its investments are now paying off with its
staggering military build-up. The US, on the other hand, did not wake up to the China threat until
recently, its necessary shift toward Asia has been uneven and halting, and its defence investments
will take until the 2030s to really pay off. Japan and Taiwan are finally raising defence spending, but
their efforts, too, will take time to mature. If China waits too long, it may face far more capable US
and allied militaries by the 2030s, meaning it has a potent incentive to move before any such
window closes. Finally, Xi has repeatedly emphasised his personal investment in resolving the
Taiwan issue in Beijing’s favour — and he is not immortal.
For these reasons, while there are serious questions about whether Beijing believes itself to be
adequately prepared for such a momentous conflict yet, the US security establishment — not merely
hawkish analysts — is increasingly alarmed about the possibility of Chinese action this decade, with
estimates commonly clustering around or after 2027. No one knows for sure what China will do, but
the threat is real and urgent, and if a war occurs, American victory cannot be taken for granted.
Such a war — and especially an American defeat — would have the most direct and grave
implications for India.
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First, a conflict over Taiwan is likely to stretch far beyond the island. China probably now
assumes the US will come to Taiwan’s aid. This means that, if Beijing leaves US forces alone, they
will be able to come to the island’s assistance unhindered. Beijing is unlikely to do that, since it
would lead to failure. Instead, Beijing is visibly preparing to strike the US and quite possibly
Japanese and Australian forces early, across the region and beyond. Therefore, a Taiwan war could
very well be a regional war. And a regional war means Indian interests are far more likely to be
impinged upon.
But it is an American defeat over Taiwan that would be the most perilous for India’s interests. The
reverberations of a Chinese defeat of the US in a large war in Asia would be enormous. A weakened US
would likely be pushed back to the defence of Japan, the Pacific islands, and Australia. An ascendant
China would presumably secure control of the South China Sea as many countries in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and elsewhere in Asia would move to accommodate Beijing, enabling
its military to project power and its deeper economic control of the region. China would thereby solve its
“Malacca Dilemma,” gaining uninhibited access to the Indian Ocean. Beijing is already building a blue
ocean fleet, a long-range air force, and a massive space architecture while securing or exploring basing in
places from Cambodia through Pakistan to Africa. Once China secured its dominance in the Western
Pacific and gained a freer hand, Beijing would likely turbocharge its military presence and
aggressiveness in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
In this context, Beijing would very likely press to isolate and diminish powerful India, the
strongest remaining challenger to its dominance of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. And with a
freer hand because of its victory in the Western Pacific, China would be far better positioned to do
so, not only in the Indian Ocean but directly along its shared border with India. Meanwhile, the US
would be weakened and ill-equipped to help India. Smaller countries, intimidated by China, would
be hesitant to join New Delhi in checking Beijing’s ambitions; others would seek to join with Beijing
to take advantage of India’s predicament. India’s prospects in this world would be grim.
This is not to say that India must join directly in defence of Taiwan. India has plenty to deal
with, addressing China along its northern border, Pakistan in the west, and other security threats.
And for its part, Washington should look for every possible way to strengthen New Delhi against
China and Pakistan and to promote India’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean area. But it
also means that India should take very seriously the potential for a war over Taiwan and its
consequences, especially if America loses. It has a profound interest in avoiding that catastrophic
outcome, and should act accordingly.
(Source: Hindustan Times)

HOW DOLLAR BECAME THE WORLD’S TOP GLOBAL CURRENCY

Ryan McMaken (Executive Editor at the Mises Institute)
In March 2009, in the midst of recession, then Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner was pressed to
respond on the question of whether or not another currency—possibly the IMF’s special drawing rights
(SDRs)—might displace the US dollar as the dominant global reserve currency. Geithner responded that
he’s open to more use of SDRs but then felt the need to clarify with “The dollar remains the world’s
dominant reserve currency and I think that’s likely to continue for a long period of time.”
It’s not a coincidence that this occurred in the context of financial crises, recession, and some
big changes in the global economy. Crises have a tendency to bring out questions about the dollar’s
reserve-currency status. Similar discussions occurred in the late 1970s as the United States was
experiencing stagflation. Policy makers and central bankers began discussing the possible benefits of
“diversifying” away from the dollar in the global economy. It is true that during the 1970s the
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dollar’s reserve-currency status suffered somewhat to the benefitof the deutsche mark and Japanese
yen. Nonetheless, decades later, the dollar remains the undisputed favorite.
Yet no global reserve currency retains its place forever. History is a graveyard for currencies
that were once considered essential to global commerce, from the Spanish silver dollar in the
sixteenth century to the Dutch guilder and French franc of later times.
The last time we saw a dominant global currency give way to its successor was in the first half of
the twentieth century, when British pound sterling lost its position as the preferred global reserve
currency and was replaced by the US dollar. History never quite repeats itself, but the story behind the
fall of sterling and the rise of the dollar contains many familiar events such as war, inflation, and
government spending. Many observers of the global currency scene continue to regard the dollar as
untouchable, but their predecessors said the same thing about sterling. Indeed, the decline of Britain’s
once exalted currency is a powerful cautionary tale about how global currencies lose their power.
The Rise of Pound Sterling
In its day, sterling was immensely important and central to global commerce. Since at least the
early eighteenth century, sterling was among the most frequently traded and most trusted national
currencies, and this helped establish London as an international financial center. Even after the
Napoleonic Wars—period during which sterling was temporarily delinked from gold—the
currency’s relatively swift return to gold ensured sterling would dominate international finance by
the late nineteenth century. This dominance was greatly enhanced by the fact the British economy
was among the most industrialized and strongest in the world. On top of this, the British state was
thought to intervene in its monetary system less than other states and also believed to be more likely
to make good on promises to convert banknotes into gold.
As Bo Karlstroem notes, during the late nineteenth century:
The overwhelming predominance of Great Britain in world trade . . . reflected the particular
economic strength of Great Britain as the first country to reap the benefits of the industrial
revolution. British industrial goods were in demand the world over, while Britain had a great
appetite for raw materials and foodstuffs; it has been estimated that in 1860 the British market was
absorbing over 30 per cent of the exports of all the other countries in the world. The share fell as
other countries, notably Germany and France, reached the point of “take-off” into industrial growth,
but in the 1890’s the percentage was still over 20. The trading in goods was accompanied by a wide
range of exports of services, such as shipping and insurance, from Great Britain.
This was about more than the mere size of the British economy, however. After all, the
American economy had surpassed the British economy in size in the 1870s. By 1900, the German
economy was larger than the British economy as well. Yet until the First World War, sterling’s role
in international reserves, trade, and investment remained disproportionately large.
For example, according to Barry Eichengreen, the sterling market was especially “deep and
liquid” owing partly to the size of London’s global networks with the rest of the British Empire. Yet
also key was the British regime’s reluctance to meddle in the gold mechanism, Eichengreen noted:
“While the Bank of England occasionally resorted to the gold devices, modifying the effective price
of gold, it never seriously interfered with the freedom of nonresidents to export gold. Few if any
other financial centers could claim all these attributes.” At this time, both the Bank of France and the
German Reichsbank engaged in various policies to make it more difficult for market participants to
export gold. Meanwhile, the US dollar remained in the race to become a global reserve currency.
Jeffrey Frankel explains that prior to 1913, the dollar’s main problem was not size (the first criterion
for an international currency) since the U.S. economy had surpassed the UK economy, at least as
measured by national output, in 1872. Rather, the country lacked financial markets that were deep,
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liquid, dependable, and open. Indeed, it even lacked a central bank, which was considered a
prerequisite for the development of markets in instruments such as bankers’ acceptances.
Then as now, regimes and their friends in the financial sector viewed central banks as the best
insurers of liquidity and of uniformity in a currency. It is no coincidence, for example, that sterling’s
rise to power in Europe came in the decades following the British “financial revolution” and the
creation of the Bank of England. Because the Americans lacked the institutional framework
preferred by global investors and bankers, sterling reigned supreme throughout the nineteenth
century and into the early twentieth century.
World War One Changed Everything
Sterling’s undisputed reign came to an end with the First World War. The British state’s
massive war debts and its abandonment of the classical gold standard crippled sterling’s ability to
attract the same level of trust and investment it had before the war. Sterling’s competitors—except
for the dollar—were sidelined as well. Karlstroem writes:
Many European countries introduced various kinds of controls on foreign exchange
transactions during World War I, mainly in order to conserve their holdings of dollars; and
European central banks stopped converting their currencies into gold on demand, thereby turning
away from the gold standard. The United States, however, continued to follow its policy of
convertibility. At the end of the war, there was a large pent-up demand from Europe for U.S. goods,
and this demand was backed by rather substantial holdings of dollars. The United States was, of
course, willing to supply these goods and it was also capable of doing so, not having suffered from
the destruction of production facilities caused by the war as other countries had done.
The world’s central banks embraced both the dollar and the US’s new central bank, investing
in dollars as reserves while private-sector bankers and importers in Europe demanded dollars to
buy American goods.
Competition among Global Currencies
Yet sterling did not totally abandon the field to the dollar. When exactly the dollar overtook
sterling as the most preferred currency is still a matter of debate, and it is an empirical question. In
any case, there is good reason to believe that the dollar’s position against sterling improved
substantially after sterling went off the gold standard in 1931. That was not the end of the story,
however, because dollar itself went off the gold standard two years later. According to Eichengreen
and Marc Flandreau, the dollar eclipsed sterling as early as “the mid-1920s and . . . then widened its
lead in the second half of the decade,” but “With the devaluation of the dollar in 1933, sterling
regained its place as the leading reserve currency. Contrary to much of the literature on reserve
currency status, it does not appear that dominance, once lost, is gone forever.”
Indeed, it looks like the interwar years were characterized by a heated competition among
major global currencies, with both sterling and the dollar near the top at various times. Eichengreen
and Flandreau continue:
Our findings challenge the very notion that there necessarily exists a dominant reserve
currency. They throw into question the idea that network effects and external scale economies leave
room for only one significant international currency. A reasonable reading of the evidence is that
sterling and the dollar shared reserve-currency status in the interwar period. Both New York and
London were liquid financial markets. Neither the U.S. nor the UK had significant capital controls.
Both were attractive places to hold reserves. As a group, central banks split their reserves between
them, not wishing to put all their eggs in one basket.
What had been an “oligopoly” of global currencies dominated by sterling, the mark, the
French franc was replaced after the war by a contest between the dollar and sterling. This could have
gone on indefinitely had not the Second World War dealt another heavy blow to sterling. The war
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would prove to be even more devastating than the Great War for Britain in terms of human lives,
infrastructure, finances, and fiscal stability. The coming ascendance of the dollar was so obvious by
1944 that Europe embraced the Bretton Woods system, which placed the dollar at the center of a new
gold-exchange standard in which only the dollar was linked to gold.
Sterling was further wounded by mounting public debt and inflation in Britain. In 1949, the
British state deliberately devalued sterling against the dollar—and therefore also against gold.
Meanwhile, many of the world’s largest economies embraced capital controls. European regimes
embraced even more intervention in the marketplace, increasing foreign exchange risk for those
holding sterling or francs after the war. (The German, economy, of course, had been utterly
destroyed in the war.) All of this further enhanced the dollar’s position. (Sterling was devalued a
second time in 1967.) Meanwhile, American productive capacity continued to grow, further boosting
international demand for dollars.
At this point, the dollar began an upward trend in global demand that would peak in the
1970s. The dollar reached levels of dominance rarely experienced by any currency. In 1955, sterling
and the dollar were nearly equal in that both currencies made up about 45 percent of foreign
reserves. Thirty years later, the dollar had surged to over 75 percent of all reserves and sterling had
plummeted to under 10 percent.
Even after the US abandoned the remnants of the gold standard in 1971—thus ending the
Bretton Woods system—no currency rivaled the dollar. This was partly due to the fact that even the
end of Bretton Woods could not erase the fact that the dollar continued to be the most accessible and
reliable currency in market terms. After the Second World War, Eichengreen and Flandreau note,
“American economic and financial dominance was overwhelming, New York was the only truly
deep and liquid financial market, and the U.S. was [the] only country to shun capital controls—and .
. . the dollar, therefore, dominated the reserve holdings of central banks.”
Lessons from Sterling’s Fall
In many ways, the decline of sterling as a global currency resulted from self-inflicted wounds.
The British state chose to needlessly enter the First World War, incurring enormous war debts. It
then attempted to apply wartime central planning to the domestic economy permanently, further
hampering economic growth. Even worse, British participation in the First World War helped pave
the way for an aggressive German state in the 1930s. The Second World War essentially bankrupted
the United Kingdom, and the resulting inflation made the decline of sterling inevitable. Throughout
most of the twentieth century, sterling inflation outpaced dollar inflation. Repeated devaluations
sealed sterling’s fate. The dollar thus inherited a position that had been to a large extent unilaterally
abandoned by sterling.
It remains to be seen how long the dollar will retain this position. So far, however, there are
few signs of an imminent collapse on a level that would rival what happened to sterling after the
Second World War.
Yes, the dollar has certainly retreated from its unparalleled highs in the mid-1970s, when it
made up nearly 80 percent of global reserves. Yet the dollar is still clearly the most favored currency,
with a role in the global economy well exceeding that of its closest rival, the euro. More than 55
percent of global reserves are in dollars, and only around 20 percent are in euros.
As British policy makers doomed sterling with their own policy choices, American policy
makers can still do the same. Eichengreen warns:
Whether the dollar retains its reserve currency role depends, first and foremost, on America’s
own policies. Serious economic mismanagement would lead to the substitution of other reserve
currencies for the dollar. In this context, serious mismanagement means policies that allow
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unsustainably large current account deficits to persist, lead to the accumulation of large external
debts, and result in a high rate of U.S. inflation and dollar depreciation.
However, recent experience suggests that “serious economic mismanagement” is here to stay.
Were US policy makers to rein in deficits and allow interest rates to rise, all while keeping price
inflation below that experienced in Japan and Europe, we could say the dollar faces no likely rivals.
Yet it is extremely unlikely such reforms will actually happen.
This heightens the odds that the dollar will again face competition from other currencies as
investors, central banks, and savers seek to avoid keeping all their eggs in the increasingly risky
dollar basket.
Unlike the situation that existed after the First World War, however, there is no other
economy or currency that stands ready to truly replace today’s favored currency. A more likely
outcome is currency diversification such as existed in the interwar period, when dollars and sterling
became essentially peer currencies and francs served a significant but supporting role.
The degree to which other currencies may look attractive compared to the dollar is up to
American policy makers themselves. As Daniel Lacalle recently noted, no currency is poised to
easily replace the dollar. But American policy makers could still cause the dollar to self-destruct by
embracing even more reckless debt, spending, and monetary inflation.
(Source: The Mises Institute)

ASIAN CENTURY, CORONAVIRUS, AND THE GAME OF THRONES

Waliur Rahman (Author and researcher)
About a century ago, the Spanish flu infected over millions of people roughly between January
1918 and December 1920. Over 50 million people are known to have died, mostly in Europe and the
United States. It was a difficult time. The allied powers were fighting against the Axis Powers.
What was the explanation of this high mortality? Scientists took over 90 years to offer an
analysis in 2007 that the viral infection was no more aggressive than previous influenza strains.
Instead, malnourishment, overcrowded medical camps and hospitals, and poor hygiene promoted
bacterial superinfection. This superinfection killed most of the victims, typically after a somewhat
prolonged death bed.
Other epidemics like HIV, SARS, Ebola have come and gone. The first outbreak of the
coronavirus in China came all too suddenly. China, the 21st century technological superpower, has
taken all necessary measures to identify the genes/ DNA and contain the spread of the disease.
China, the forerunner in AI and 5G, has overcome the crisis.
During the Spanish flu pandemic, communications were not stopped between and amongst
the countries fighting the war afflicted by it. No country is known to have shut down
communications with each other.
In the case of the coronavirus, many feel disconcerted. President Xi Jinping is dismayed at the
negative response from the Western powers. President Xi has had telephone communications with
US Presidents. The unspoken feeling is: "Here is an opportunity to chain in the Asian superpower!"
An unexpected opponent
Many of us feel sick to read what Walter Russell Mead et al called "China is the real sick man of
Asia" published in the Wall Street Journal. Chang Jun of the China Daily rightly drew attention of the
international community -- "the expression in WSJ is also resented by the Chinese, whose country has
suffered from past foreign invasions. Worse, the sarcasm, prejudice, and bias expressed are exorbitant."
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As Shashi Tharoor has said "how the US has started a Trade War harming the entire world."
The main focus is on how to stop China -- the Asian superpower challenging the West.
The West does not have the capital and technology to spare -- China has. Professor Rehman
Sobhan rightly said, "with both India and Japan as full partners in the BRI, such a pan-Asian
grouping could once again recreate a bipolar global order which remains essential to the peace and
prosperity of the 21st century."
But the West is not convinced; they want to push back China. This is because China, an Asian
country, is developing faster than the West. It is the colonial mindset that cannot accept Chinese
development.
What the West did in the centuries past still tickles their romantic nostalgia. They used their
colonial tools to benefit them. As the British brutally suppressed the first war of Independence of
India in 1857, they also invaded China in the 1840s. The Opium Wars no doubt wounded China, but
the British could not defeat them.
India was looted by the British through various means: Desecration of the Queen of Oudh,
massacres of Jallianwala Bagh, inhuman torture on the Bengali peasants, murdering them, cutting
their fingers to force indigo plantation, growing of indigo under duress, to be exported to China.
And last but not the least, by artificial creation of famines in 1770, 1780, and 1943 -- in Bengal -- so
much for their hatred against the recalcitrant Bengalese! That kept the huge colony in thralldom.
John Strachey, War Minister in the British Labour government, gave an example, while citing
on corruption, how the colonial power impoverished the Indian subcontinent. In his book The End
of Empire in 1959 he said about Bengal: "Lord Clive, in an effort to lessen the rampant corruption of
the East India Company officials, legalized their right to private trade even though they were paid
servants. Every officer got his share strictly according to seniority -- a colonel got £7,000 a year, a
major £2,000 (about £90,000 and £40,000 in present day value). Drawing on nearly two centuries of
detailed data on tax and trade, Utsa Patnaik in his book A Theory of Imperialism calculated that
Britain drained a total of nearly $45 trillion from India during the period 1765 to 1938. It's a
staggering sum. For perspective, $45 trillion is 17 times more than the total annual gross domestic
product of the United Kingdom today."
The British also put its long hand on China -- two opium wars and an unequal Treaty.
History has decidedly a sense of paradox, albeit of a different kind: The British exported the
opium to China grown in Bengal.
The US imposed Monroe doctrine. South America was the US backyard. Africa was occupied
by France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, and Italy, and the Philippines by the US. The nostalgia of
those crimson days are still haunting them -- they are not yet ready to admit their inhuman
exploitation of the colonies.
There was no United Nations, nor were there any modern tools in the hands of the Colonies,
be it India, China, Africa, or Latin America. The colonial powers had hay days.
Growing risks
In real GDP terms, Asia's share was 34% in 2017, and is expected to hit 46% by 2040. The GDP
of China in 2019 estimated at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was $27.309 trillion, while that of the
US is $21.439 trillion. China is a major driver there. India is catching up as a major power.
India is the present day success story. She has overtaken British economy -- thus India is
number five in the world. By 2031, India's GDP is likely to be 11 trillion. BRICS have the potential for
becoming G7 in the future.
The slowing trend of Chinese economy will severely impact the development of Asian
countries -- the ultimate goal of the West; coronavirus is just a pretense. The West also will suffer.
China is the workshop of the planet. The West is already in a crunch because of shortage of spares.
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The pretense of the crisis is being used as an argument by the West for shifting supply lines
from China to elsewhere. This is contradictory with International Law. The International Law rather
asks for support and cooperation in case of human crisis and health emergency.
According to the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) of World Health Organization
(WHO), countries should work together (a) to save lives and livelihoods endangered by the
international spread of diseases and other health risks, and (b) to avoid unnecessary interference
with international trade and travel. In the situation that Chinese authorities declared as "major test
of China's system and capacity for governance" and WHO defined as “global health emergency” of
our new era, the big powers should not show their apathy towards the crisis.
A friend in need
On January 30 in Geneva, WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus addressed
the global media on the outbreak after returning from China, where he met with Chinese leaders. He
said, "China deserves the international community's gratitude and respect for having taken very
serious measures to contain the new coronavirus outbreak and prevent its spread overseas."
"China has been completely committed to transparency, both internally and externally, and
has agreed to work with other countries that need support," Tedros said. "I will praise China again
and again, because its actions actually helped in reducing the spread of the novel coronavirus to
other countries … We shall tell the truth, and that's the truth."
China will overcome the crisis. The viral DNA signature is being determined and published in
record time. Health officials are racing to develop treatments and testing methods for the virus.
Meanwhile, Wuhan launched an emergency test laboratory. The Huo Yan Laboratory is designed to
handle 10,000 samples each day to detect the virus.
Former German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said, "the open, transparent, and cooperative
manner and the forceful and effective measures the Chinese government has adopted are
admirable." Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said, "China's anti-epidemic efforts will
soon take effect and I am confident in China's ability to win the battle against the epidemic."
China needs global support for quick recovery. The Asian countries should be the forerunners
in extending their helping hand to China, as they will be the first victim next to China.
Malaysia has sent a medical team to China. Like Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, Japan sent a
medical team and other support system to China. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited
Wuhan to show solidarity with the people of China. Turkey sent a big supply of medical goods. It
should be followed by others.
Bangladesh and China have an excellent relationship. Look at the Padma Bridge. While the World
Bank folded up, China extended her helping hand. Last but not the least, China provided the much
needed boulders for strengthening the base of the bridge. The Bangladesh contractor failed to supply
boulders: they could only get the Bhutanese boulders, which were too small. China got it from
Kalimantan.
Today, the dream of Padma bridge, the dream of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has come true. It
is now a reality. A friend in need is a friend indeed. Bangladesh should stand by the people of China. To
a cognoscenti, the Western overreaction to coronavirus is more dangerous than the virus itself.
(Source: Dhaka Tribune)

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International Law
PROMOTING CLIMATE JUSTICE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Aditi Shetye (Researcher in Climate Change Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law)
On 29th March 2023, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution
A/RES/77/276 which requests an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on
the matter of State Responsibility for addressing the Climate Change crisis. The Resolution was
adopted by consensus, reflecting broad agreement amongst States that climate change is one of the
most pressing shared problems that the international community is facing and that interpretation of
existing international law on this matter would strengthen the mitigation and adaptation processes
of all States.
Following this historic moment of adoption of a UNGA resolution by consensus, this blog
post builds on BIICL's webinar series 'Rising Sea Level: Promoting Climate Justice through
International Law' hosted by BIICL in May 2021 and the webinar hosted in February 2023
'Promoting Climate Justice through International Law: Climate Litigation and Advisory Opinions'.
These events reflected on Vanuatu's leadership with the support of 18 core group States and 132 co-
sponsors and two youth-led campaigns that believe opening a judicial advisory proceeding on this
matter would help bolster climate action globally, regionally, and nationally.
What does the Resolution Ask the ICJ?
When seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ, the process of formulating the question in the
resolution is a crucial and strategic one. In the current case, the questions are built on legal and
factual foundations laid out in the operative text of the document. The operative text emphasises
international covenants and treaties such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child , the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Paris Agreement, and the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. These instruments lay the legal
foundation of the questions in this resolution. Secondly, it puts forth a compelling reason for the ICJ
to give an advisory opinion on a factual and existential issue, which is the need to clarify the
obligations of States to mitigate and adapt to climate change. It also clarifies that the General
Assembly intends to seek legal guidance from the ICJ on matters relating to equity, sustainable
development, and the protection of climate systems, the marine environment, and human rights
from adverse effects of climate change.
Based on this, the UNGA has asked two questions to the ICJ, of which, the first asks the Court
to identify the legal obligations of States (...); the second asks the Court to specify the legal
consequences of breach(es) of these legal obligations by acts or omissions that cause significant harm
to the environment (...). The second question is subdivided which further narrows down the scope.
The questions read as follows:
a. What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the
climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases for States and for present and future generations;
b. What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts
and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the
environment, with respect to:
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(i) States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their
geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?
(ii) Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse
effects of climate change?
Thus, the resolution aims to ask the Court to clarify the scope of legal obligations of States and
the legal consequences States would face in case of violations. In answering these questions, it is
hoped that the Court will clarify principles of international law and customary law, such as
transboundary harm, the duty to cooperate, equity with a focus on inter-generational and intra-
generational equity, common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, and the
duty of due diligence, among others, all in the context of climate adaption and mitigation.
What can the International Court of Justice do?
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It can adjudicate two types of
proceedings: i) Contentious proceedings, i.e. a dispute between two or more States, and ii) Advisory
Proceedings, i.e. the Court can give an opinion on legal questions at the request of whatever body
that may be authorised in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 96(1) of the UN
Charter and Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute provide the conditions which need to be satisfied for the
ICJ to give an advisory opinion. Although the ICJ has discretion in deciding whether to entertain a
request for an advisory opinion, it cannot refuse to give an advisory opinion unless there are
'compelling reasons' for such a refusal, especially when the statutory conditions (as under Article
96(1) of the UN Charter and Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute) have been met. In the Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion),
Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, observed that the Court would be 'discharging its
duty of clarifying and developing the law' by giving the advisory opinion. It can, therefore, be
argued that the ICJ's discretion is not absolute, but is circumscribed by the overriding principle of
the Court's duty. Moreover, advisory opinions are ultimately 'pronouncements' by the Court
regarding the law applicable to specific issues, which the Court has authority to give as part of its
judicial function.
In the present case, the legal basis of the questions has been set out in the operative text of the
resolution, as discussed above. Moreover, the questions also delve into the existence and scope of
legal obligations of States as enshrined in international law through covenants, treaties, and
agreements. In response to the first question, the Court is asked to clearly set out States' obligations
with respect to the protection of climate systems and the marine environment. In response to the
second question, the Court is asked to set out the legal consequences for States that breach these
obligations, with respect to the protection of human rights (including from the perspective of
intergenerational equity) and climate vulnerable States.
Since its establishment in 1946, the ICJ has given 28 advisory opinions. These, along with the
Court's judgments in contentious cases, have played a major role in clarifying and developing
international law. With respect to the environment, the Court has developed extensive
jurisprudence. In the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the Court observed that there was 'a
general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe
environmental damage.' Similarly, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case , the Court held that
the norms of environmental law are relevant to the implementation of a treaty between the two
countries. In the Pulp Mills case, the Court emphasised environmental impact assessment as a
principle of customary international law. In the Whaling in the Antarctic case , the Court examined
in depth the adverse impacts of whaling, while taking into consideration the scientific evidence on
marine environment protection. In the case of Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, the Court ordered
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Nicaragua to compensate and pay damages to Costa Rica for injury to wetlands and rainforests in
the territory of Costa Rica. In the case of Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala,
the Court held that in certain circumstances, when 'there is a risk of significant transboundary harm'
an obligation to notify and consult other riparian States concerned is applicable as it is held to be
part of customary international law. Given this track record it could be argued that the ICJ is a
friendly yet authoritative avenue through which States' obligations for controlling their greenhouse
gas emissions can be determined.
Although advisory opinions are not binding, and some States are not easily influenced even
by the binding decisions of the ICJ, many States would consider the enumeration of obligations and
consequences in this advisory opinion as a mandate for implementing climate policies at national
and regional levels. Acknowledging that the Court may not render a helpful advisory opinion, the
potential positive outcomes outweigh the risks of a regressive answer from the Court. One positive
outcome among others is that it would be an erudite interpretation of the existing international
environmental law in the specific context of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Another
benefit would be its impression on domestic and regional courts, which would view this advisory
opinion as a leading authority. It could help these courts to frame their decisions, especially when
confronted with issues that may not be governed by their respective national legislation or policy.
For example, the advisory opinions requesting the International Status of West Africa and the Legal
Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) had a
significant role to play in the abolishment of apartheid and in framing international treaties and
national legislation against discrimination based on race. Similarly, in the advisory opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ
found that the wall being built by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, was contrary to international law. This issue arose again in the case of
Mara'abe and Ord v. Prime Minister of Israel before the Supreme Court of Israel. It was held that the
ICJ's pronouncement was not 'res judicata'; instead, the Court recognised that 'the opinion of the
International Court of Justice is an interpretation of international law, performed by the highest
judicial body in international law...and it should be given its full appropriate weight'. Thus, the
influence of such opinions on States reiterates that advisory opinions carry legal weight and
emphasises the importance of the advisory jurisdiction.
Independent of this advisory opinion from the ICJ, there have been parallel requests for
advisory opinions on climate change before other international courts. For instance, Chile and
Colombia have moved the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) for an advisory opinion
on the integration of climate change law and human rights law. Another advisory request from the
Commission of Small Island States has been submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS) on matters related to climate change and law of the sea. These advisory opinions not
only support the ICJ advisory request but also affirm the demand of the international community for
judicial interpretation of issues related to climate change and the law of the sea. In light of these
multiple requests, it is important to note the risk of fragmentation of law. However, none of the
international tribunals have dealt with the issue of climate change before. It can therefore be argued
that whichever court issues an advisory opinion first, could serve as a reference point for the others.
It is important to note that the questions asked to all these courts reflect on the sustainable use of the
planet's shared resources. In giving their opinion, the IACtHR and the ITLOS are bound by their
jurisdictional limits, while the ICJ has a broader jurisdiction which can elaborate on the application
and interpretation of the range of applicable international standards including treaty law, customary
international law as well as general principles. This could perhaps reduce the risk of fragmentation.
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Who planted the Seeds?

In 2011, the Pacific island States of Palau and the Marshall Islands were the first to move the
UNGA to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on issues related to climate change. Standing on the
shoulders of this effort, 27 students from the University of the South Pacific built a campaign
(PISFCC) to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on climate change law and human rights law. In
2019, they persuaded the leaders of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) to take the issues related to
climate change and human rights to the International Court of Justice. Recognising the global nature
of the campaign, and after gaining support from civil society, in 2020, the group of young people
from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe organised themselves as the World's Youth for
Climate Justice (WYCJ) to amplify the need for this advisory opinion from the ICJ. The youth
advocated to ask the question 'what are the legal obligations of the State to protect the rights of the
present and future generations from the adverse effects of climate change?'. In September 2021, the
Government of Vanuatu officially declared that it would pursue the UNGA route to seek the
advisory opinion from the ICJ. In support of this, and to amplify public demand, the civil society
movement grew exponentially in 2022 and formed an Alliance for a Climate Justice Advisory
Opinion. This Alliance represents more than 1600 separate organisations, from numerous grassroots
associations to large non-governmental organisations.
Building upon these momentous efforts since 2019, March 29th 2023 marks a victory for the
youth and civil society, along with excellent leadership from Vanuatu. In spite of inefficiency in
collective State actions to lower greenhouse gas emissions to maintain temperature below 1.5
degrees Celsius, there seems to be light at the end of the tunnel due to the 'power of the people'.

SUDAN AND THE LAWS OF WAR

Questions and Answers
On April 15, 2023, fighting broke out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between the Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both official military forces in the country at the
time. The fighting rapidly spread to other cities and towns throughout the country, including to
Darfur in Sudan’s western region and to eastern Sudan.
The SAF is led by Gen. Abdelfattah al-Burhan, and the RSF by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan
Dagalo, known as “Hemedti.” The two men had jointly carried out a coup against the country’s
short-lived transitional government, a military-civilian government, on October 25, 2021.
Both forces have a long history of serious violations of international humanitarian and human
rights law, notably in the context of brutal counterinsurgency operations in Darfur, as well as during
crackdowns against protesters in Khartoum and elsewhere over the last decade.
Beginning in 2003 in Darfur, the Sudanese government and allied militias known as the
“Janjaweed” – which government forces armed, supported, and fought alongside – committed
crimes against humanity and war crimes, including summary executions, sexual violence, and
torture, as part of counterinsurgency operations. In 2011, in the states of Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile, the SAF conducted a campaign of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and ground
attacks in which these forces deliberately killed and forcibly displaced civilians and destroyed
civilian property.
The RSF, created in 2013 with many troops recruited from among the Janjaweed, committed
grave abuses in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan. Increasingly deployed to Khartoum from
2019 onwards, RSF forces led an attack on protesters in June 2019 that killed 120 protesters and
injured 900.
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Following the October 2021 coup, Sudan’s security forces clamped down on popular protests,
killing at least 125 people while injuring and arbitrarily detaining hundreds.
Relations between Hemedti and Burhan deteriorated throughout 2022, and the United
Nations reported significant recruitment in Darfur by both forces. In December, tensions rose
following the signing of a new framework agreement between the Forces of Freedom and Change,
the civilian component of the former transitional government; the military leadership; and other
political parties.
The framework agreement laid out basic principles and government structures but deferred
five key contentious issues, including transitional justice and security sector reform, to a second
phase of talks. These issues were discussed in the first months of 2023. When the military initiated
discussions around security sector reforms, tensions between Burhan and Hemedti escalated sharply
over the timeframe of the integration of the RSF into the army and the leadership of this integrated
force. Both sides began to stockpile weaponry at key locations, including Khartoum, in the days
preceding the outbreak of fighting.
The following Questions and Answers (Q&A) addresses aspects of international humanitarian
law (the laws of war) governing the armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF, as well as various
non-state armed groups and militias. The aim is to summarize the main international humanitarian
law, international human rights law, and international criminal law issues arising from the fighting.
It focuses on the protection of civilians during armed conflict. The Q&A does not address the
justifications or the legitimacy of resorting to armed force by any party.
1. How does international law categorize the fighting in Sudan?
International humanitarian law, or the laws of war, distinguishes between “international” and
“non-international” armed conflicts. Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the laws concerning
international conflicts apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more states. Hostilities
involving one or more non-state armed groups are considered to be non-international armed
conflicts.
The Geneva Conventions themselves do not provide guidance as to what constitutes a “high
contracting party,” that is, the government of the state. Because the SAF and the RSF cannot both be
the government of the state of Sudan, the conflict between them is a non-international armed
conflict.
Not all hostilities involving non-state armed groups, such as internal disturbances, tensions,
riots, or isolated and sporadic acts of violence, amount to an armed conflict. It is widely
acknowledged that armed violence rises to the level of a non-international armed conflict when the
parties are sufficiently organized and the fighting reaches a certain intensity. Adequate organization
typically requires a responsible command and a capacity to sustain military operations that meet the
requirements of international humanitarian law (even if not done in practice). The requirement for
intensity can be met by the use of military weapons in serious armed clashes.
In Sudan, the criteria for a non-international armed conflict was met after serious armed
clashes broke out between the SAF and the RSF in Khartoum and other areas on April 15, 2023.
As a practical matter, international humanitarian law on the means and methods of warfare is
largely the same whether an international or non-international armed conflict. A key difference is
that during an international armed conflict, captured soldiers from national armed forces and
associated militias must be given the full protections afforded prisoners-of-war. Prisoners of war
may also not be prosecuted merely for participating in the armed conflict.
2. Who is bound by international humanitarian law?
All parties to an armed conflict, both states and non-state armed groups, are responsible for
complying with the requirements of international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war.
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Each party must respect and ensure respect for the laws of war by its armed forces and other
persons or groups acting on its orders or under its direction or control. This obligation does not
depend on reciprocity – parties to a conflict must respect the requirements whether or not the
opposing side abides by it. It also does not depend on the reason for which the respective parties go
to war, whether by a state or an armed group. And all parties to an armed conflict are held to the
same standards, regardless of any disparity in the harm caused by opposing forces.
While thus far, the fighting has been confined to the SAF and RSF, other non-state armed
groups could join the warring parties. For instance, former rebel groups that signed the 2020 Juba
Peace Agreement continue to have an armed presence in Darfur and Khartoum, as do armed Arab
militias that have repeatedly attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure in West Darfur since 2019.
3. What law applies to the fighting in Sudan?
As noted above, the fighting in Sudan amounts to a non-international (internal) armed conflict
under international law. The applicable law includes Common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which sets forth minimum standards for the proper treatment of persons
under a warring party's control, namely civilians and wounded and captured combatants; Protocol
II to the Geneva Conventions on non-international armed conflicts; and customary laws of war,
primarily concerning the methods and means of warfare. Other applicable laws include the 1997
Mine Ban Treaty and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
4. Does international human rights law still apply in Sudan?
International human rights law is applicable at all times during armed conflict situations in
which the laws of war apply. Sudan is a party to a number of human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These treaties outline
guarantees for fundamental rights, many of which correspond to the protections to which civilians
are entitled under international humanitarian law (e.g., the prohibition on torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment, nondiscrimination, right to a fair trial).
While the ICCPR permits some restrictions on certain rights during an officially proclaimed
public emergency that “threatens the life of the nation,” any derogation of rights during a public
emergency must be of an exceptional and temporary nature, and must be “limited to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” Certain fundamental rights – such as the right to
life and the right to be secure from torture and other ill-treatment, the prohibition on
unacknowledged detention, the duty to ensure judicial review of the lawfulness of detention, and
rights to a fair trial – must always be respected, even during a public emergency.
5. What are the basic principles of the laws of war?
The laws of war seek to minimize unnecessary pain and suffering during wartime,
particularly by protecting civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed conflict.
They address the conduct of hostilities – the means and methods of warfare – by all sides to a
conflict. A fundamental principle is that parties must distinguish between combatants and civilians
at all times. Civilians and civilian objects may never be the deliberate object of attacks. Warring
parties are required to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects,
and may not conduct attacks that would disproportionately harm civilians or fail to discriminate
between combatants and civilians.
International humanitarian law also provides a number of fundamental protections for
noncombatants, such as civilians, captured or surrendered combatants, and those who are unable to
fight because of wounds or illness. It prohibits violence against such persons – particularly murder,
cruel treatment, and torture – as well as outrages against their personal dignity and degrading or
humiliating treatment.
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6. What are lawful targets of military attack?

The laws of war limit attacks to “military objectives.” Military objectives are personnel and
objects that are making an effective contribution to military action and their destruction, capture, or
neutralization offers a definite military advantage. This would include enemy fighters, weapons and
ammunition, and objects being used for military purposes, such as houses and stores in which
soldiers are deployed. While humanitarian law recognizes that some civilian casualties are
inevitable during armed conflict, it imposes a duty on warring parties to distinguish between
combatants and civilians at all times, and to target only combatants and other military objectives.
Civilians lose their immunity from attack during the time they are “directly participating in the
hostilities.”
The laws of war also protect civilian objects, which are defined as anything not considered a
military objective. Prohibited are direct attacks against civilian objects, such as hospitals, schools,
houses and apartments, businesses, places of worship, and cultural monuments – unless they are
being used for military purposes and thus become military objectives. This would include the
deployment of military forces in what are normally civilian objects. Where there is doubt about the
nature of an object, it must be presumed to be civilian.
7. What kinds of attacks are prohibited?
Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, as discussed above, are prohibited.
The laws of war also prohibit indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are of a nature to
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Examples of
indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at a specific military objective or that use
weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective. Prohibited indiscriminate attacks
include area bombardment, which are attacks by artillery or other means that treat as a single
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in an area
containing a concentration of civilians and civilian objects.
Military commanders must choose the means of attack that can be directed at military targets
and will minimize incidental harm to civilians. If the weapons used are so inaccurate that they
cannot be directed at military targets without imposing a substantial risk of civilian harm, then they
should not be deployed.
Also prohibited are attacks that violate the principle of proportionality. Disproportionate
attacks are those that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian
objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
from the attack.
Anti-personnel landmines are prohibited by the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, to which Sudan is a
party, and should never be used because of their inherently indiscriminate nature.
8. What are the obligations of warring parties regarding fighting in populated areas?
International humanitarian law does not prohibit fighting in urban areas, although the
presence of many civilians places greater obligations on warring parties to take steps to minimize
harm to civilians.
The laws of war require that the parties to a conflict take constant care during military
operations to spare the civilian population and to “take all feasible precautions” to avoid or
minimize the incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects. These precautions include
doing everything feasible to verify that the objects of attack are military objectives and not civilians
or civilian objects, and giving “effective advance warning” of attacks when circumstances permit.
Forces deployed in populated areas must avoid locating military objectives near densely
populated areas, and endeavor to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives. They are
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prohibited from using civilians to shield military objectives or operations from attack. “Shielding”
refers to purposefully using the presence of civilians to render military forces or areas immune from
attack.
At the same time, the attacking party is not relieved from its obligation to take the risk to
civilians into account simply because it considers the defending party responsible for having located
legitimate military targets within or near populated areas.
The use of heavy artillery and unspotted indirect-fire weapons against military objectives in
populated areas raises especial concerns about indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.
9. What restrictions exist on explosive weapons in populated areas?
The use of explosive weapons in populated areas heightens concerns of unlawful
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. Heavy artillery and aerial bombs (weapons with a wide
blast radius) and other indirect-fire artillery without adequate spotting (weapons for which the
target is wholly unseen) against military objectives in populated areas are among the gravest threats
to civilians in contemporary armed conflict.
The bombing and shelling of cities, towns, and villages kill and injure large numbers of
civilians and inflict psychological harm. Reverberating, or long-term, effects include damage to
civilian buildings and critical infrastructure, including electricity and water infrastructure,
interference with services such as health care and education, and displacement of the local
population. The humanitarian risks are exacerbated when explosive weapons have wide area effects
due to inaccuracy, a large blast radius, or the delivery of multiple munitions at the same time.
Human Rights Watch has called for parties to armed conflict to avoid the use of explosive weapons
with wide area effects in populated areas.
10. What are the legal protections for hospitals, medical personnel, and ambulances?
Medical units are civilian objects that have special protections under the laws of war. They
include hospitals, clinics, medical centers, and similar facilities, whether military or civilian. While
other presumptively civilian structures become military objectives if they are being used for a
military purpose, hospitals lose their protection from attack only if they are being used, outside their
humanitarian function, to commit “acts harmful to the enemy.”
Several types of acts do not constitute “acts harmful to the enemy,” such as the presence of
armed guards, or when small arms from the wounded are found in a hospital. Even if military forces
misuse a hospital to store weapons or shelter able-bodied combatants, the attacking force must issue
a warning to cease this misuse, setting a reasonable time limit for it to end, and attacking only after
such a warning has gone unheeded.
Under the laws of war, doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel must be permitted to do
their work and be protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection only if they commit,
outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy, such as initiating military attacks
against opposing forces.
Likewise, ambulances and other medical transportation must be allowed to function and be
protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection only if they are being used to commit acts
harmful to the enemy, such as transporting ammunition or healthy fighters.
11. Are warring parties permitted to target infrastructure such as airports, roads, and bridges?
Civil airports, roads, and bridges are civilian objects that become military objectives subject to
attack if they are actually used for military purposes or military objectives are located on or within
them. Even then, the rule of proportionality applies, requiring the parties to the conflict to weigh the
short and long-term harm on civilians against the military advantage served; they must consider all
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ways of minimizing the impact on civilians; and they should not undertake attacks if the expected
civilian harm outweighs the definite military advantage.
12. What obligations do warring parties have to property, against pillaging?
During armed conflicts, parties are prohibited from destroying or confiscating private or
public property unless absolutely necessary for military operations. In areas they control, a party
may requisition property to cover the immediate needs of its forces by paying for it. However, in
non-international armed conflicts, property including food, relief, and medical supplies cannot be
requisitioned if it would deprive the population of goods and objects needed for their survival.
International law does not prohibit parties in non-international armed conflicts from seizing military
weapons and equipment belonging to the adversary.
Pillage – the looting, plunder, or theft of property for either personal or a warring party’s
benefit – is prohibited and amounts to a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and customary international law. Both civilians and combatants can be held liable
for carrying out pillage. Deliberate attacks on cultural property, including historical monuments and
buildings dedicated to art and religion, are also war crimes, unless being used for military purposes.
13. What obligations do warring parties have to populations in need?
Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate the rapid
and unimpeded passage of impartially distributed humanitarian aid to the population in need. The
belligerent parties must consent to allowing relief operations to take place and may not refuse such
consent on arbitrary grounds. They can take steps to control the content and delivery of
humanitarian aid, such as to ensure that consignments do not include weapons. However,
deliberately impeding relief supplies is prohibited.
In addition, international humanitarian law requires that belligerent parties ensure the
freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions.
This movement can be restricted only temporarily for reasons of imperative military necessity.
14. Are internet and phone shutdowns in conflict areas lawful?
Shutting down the internet during an armed conflict, including mobile data, which is
regularly used for both civilian and military purposes, would need to take into account the basic
principles of the laws of war, including of necessity and proportionality. The principle of necessity
permits measures that accomplish a legitimate military objective that are not otherwise prohibited
by international humanitarian law. Shutting down the internet may serve a legitimate military
purpose, such as denying belligerent forces a means of communicating with one another and
carrying out attacks. However, the principle of proportionality prohibits actions in which the
expected civilian harm is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.
Internet and phone shutdowns can cause considerable harm to the civilian population,
including leading to possible injury and death by preventing civilians from communicating with
each other about safety considerations, access to medical facilities, and sources of food and shelter.
They also hinder the work of journalists and human rights monitors who can provide information
on the situation on the ground, including the reporting of possible laws-of-war violations.
Importantly, the restrictions hamper the ability of humanitarian agencies to assess and provide
assistance to populations at risk. The lack of information regarding the conditions and circumstances
facing the affected population may also increase the likelihood of injury and death.
A complete shutdown of internet and phone communications to large areas would cause
various degrees of harm to the population affected. This could amount to a form of collective
punishment by imposing penalties on people without a clear lawful basis.
Similarly, under international human rights law, governments have an obligation to ensure
that internet-based restrictions are provided by law and are a necessary and proportionate response
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to a specific security concern. General shutdowns violate multiple rights, including the rights to
freedom of expression and information, and hinder others, including the right to free assembly. In
their 2015 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations, United
Nations experts and rapporteurs declared that, even in times of conflict, “using communications ‘kill
switches’ (i.e. shutting down entire parts of communications systems) can never be justified under
human rights law.”
15. How must persons in custody be treated under international law?
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, applicable during non-
international armed conflicts, requires that all persons in custody, including captured combatants
and civilians, be protected against “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment.” No sentences may be handed down except by a “regularly
constituted court” meeting international fair trial standards.
The ban against torture and other ill-treatment is one of the most fundamental prohibitions in
international human rights law. No exceptional circumstances can justify torture. Sudan is a party to
key international treaties that ban torture under all circumstances, even during recognized states of
emergency, and require investigation and prosecution of those responsible for torture.
All persons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate food, water, clothing,
shelter, and medical attention. Women detained must be held in quarters separate from those of
men. Children deprived of their liberty, unless with their families, must have quarters separate from
adults.
Under fundamental human rights law that applies even during a publicly declared
emergency, detainees are entitled to judicial review of the legality of their detention, and to all the
rights to a fair trial, including that only a court of law can try and convict them for a criminal
offense. Secret or unacknowledged detention is prohibited at all times.
16. Are radio and television stations prohibited targets?
Attacks on broadcast facilities used for military communications are legitimate targets under
the laws of war. Civilian television and radio stations are legitimate targets only if they meet the
criteria for a legitimate military objective; that is, if they are used in a way that makes an “effective
contribution to military action” and their destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time offers “a
definite military advantage.” Specifically, Sudan government broadcast facilities could become
military targets if, for example, they are used to send military orders or otherwise concretely used to
advance Sudanese military operations. However, civilian broadcasting facilities are not rendered
legitimate military targets simply because they broadcast pro-government propaganda. It is
unlawful to attack facilities that solely shape public opinion – it does not directly contribute to
military operations.
Should stations become legitimate military objectives because of their use to transmit military
communications, the principle of proportionality in attack must still be respected. This means that
attacking forces should always verify that the risks to the civilian population in undertaking any
such attack do not outweigh the anticipated military benefit. They should take special precautions in
relation to buildings located in urban areas, including giving advance warning of an attack
whenever possible.
17. Who can be held responsible for violations of international humanitarian law?
Serious violations of international humanitarian law that are committed with criminal intent –
that is, deliberately or recklessly – are war crimes. War crimes, listed in the “grave breaches”
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and as customary law in the International Criminal Court
(ICC) statute and other sources, include a wide array of offenses, including deliberate,
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indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks harming civilians, hostage taking, using human shields,
and imposing collective punishments, among others. Individuals also may be held criminally liable
for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in, facilitating, aiding, or abetting a war
crime.
Responsibility also may fall on persons planning or instigating the commission of a war crime.
Commanders and civilian leaders may be prosecuted for war crimes as a matter of command
responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes and took
insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.
18. Can war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sudan be tried before the
International Criminal Court?
The ICC is a permanent international court with a mandate to investigate, charge, and try
persons suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed after July 1,
2002. However, it can only exercise jurisdiction over these crimes if:
The crimes occurred in the territory of a state that is a party to the ICC treaty;
The person accused of the crimes is a citizen of a state that is a party to the ICC treaty;
A state that is not a party to the ICC treaty accepts the court’s authority for the crimes in
question by submitting a formal declaration to the court; or
The United Nations Security Council refers the situation to the ICC prosecutor.
The ICC opened an investigation into crimes committed in Darfur in 2005, after the UN
Security Council referred the situation to the ICC under Resolution 1593. Five Sudanese individuals
face ICC charges for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide in Darfur, including former
president Omar al-Bashir. Three of these individuals, including al-Bashir, have been in Sudanese
government custody since around the time of al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019. One of the five, a Janjaweed
militia leader, Ali Kosheib, or Kushayb, is currently on trial at the ICC, charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
ICC judges have previously held that the extent to which an existing mandate applies to
crimes committed as part of particular incidents or hostilities depends on whether they are
“sufficiently linked to the situation of crisis which was ongoing at the time of the referral.” Many of
the same individuals involved earlier in Darfur are now taking part in the current hostilities, and
some of the fighting is unfolding in the Darfur region. Notably, domestic authorities retain primary
responsibility for ensuring that grave crimes in violation of international law are investigated and
appropriately prosecuted.
19. Can judicial authorities in other countries investigate and prosecute international crimes
committed in Sudan?
Certain categories of grave crimes in violation of international law, such as war crimes and
torture, are subject to “universal jurisdiction,” which refers to the ability of the domestic judicial
system of a state to investigate and prosecute certain crimes, even if they were not committed on its
territory, by one of its nationals, or against one of its nationals. Certain treaties, such as the Geneva
Conventions and the Convention against Torture, obligate states to extradite or prosecute suspected
offenders who are within that state’s territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction. Under customary
international law, it is also generally agreed that states are allowed to try those responsible for other
crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity, wherever these crimes took place.
(Source: Human Rights Watch)
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THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

Nur-Mohammad Sheikh
Josep Borell, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, in a speech on October 13, 2022 at the European Diplomatic Academy in Bruges, said:
“Europe is a garden. We have built a garden … the rest of the world … is not exactly a garden. Most
of the rest of the world is a jungle.”
Perhaps this explains why the humanitarian problems of the rest of the world have not
received proper attention. The 2022 “Stand Up for Ukraine” global pledging campaign raised $8.9
billion, the UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric stated, “this is among the fastest and most generous
responses a humanitarian flash appeal has ever received.” But an “aid void” is increasing for
Myanmar, Yemen, the Sahel, Ethiopia, Gaza, and Afghanistan.
The Rohingya genocide, recognized as the fastest and largest refugee influx since the 1994
Rwandan genocide, has also been sidelined over the years. In 2017 the military of Myanmar
launched a merciless onslaught against the Rohingya communities dispersed throughout the
western region of the country's Rakhine State. The head of the UN agency for human rights later
referred to the military's conduct as "acts of horrific barbarity," potential "acts of genocide," and "a
textbook example of ethnic cleansing." More than 10,000 Rohingya were killed and around a million
were forced to flee into neighbouring Bangladesh.
Under the direction of Gen Min Aung Hlaing, junta security forces have committed crimes
against humanity with regards to protesters, journalists, lawyers, medical personnel, and members
of the political opposition by engaging in mass executions, torture, sexual assault, arbitrary arrests,
and other abuses.
The nature of the security force crackdown -- methodical, widespread, and systematic --
reflects the junta's country-wide policy of suppressing the opposition. But still, world leaders'
responses remain paper-based only, quite opposite to what has been done for Ukraine for example.
Along with Rohingya genocide, National Unity Government (NUG) -- a Myanmar
government in exile -- claims that the regime has committed 64 massacres across five states and
regions, killing at least 766 people since the 2021 coup. The NUG listed nine massacres in 2021, 44 in
2022 and 11 this year. The massacres mostly took place in anti-regime strongholds like Sagaing and
Magwe regions and Kayah State.
On November 11, 2019 the West African country Gambia -- far from being a Western
“civilized” society -- initiated a case against Myanmar at the ICJ accusing the military of
perpetrating genocide against the Rohingya people in Rakhine State. Later on, in 2022, the UN
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) found evidence of crimes against
humanity committed by the Myanmar military. The Commission for International Justice and
Accountability, CIJA revealed their collected documents proving systematic purge of Rohingya.
But still responses remain on sanction or any attempts at resolving the crisis.
The UN special rapporteur and rights groups have condemned the international community
for its failure to take effective action over the past two years, which has emboldened the Myanmar
military junta to double down on its brutal tactics against the population. Speaking at the United
Nations General Assembly on March 16, the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer said
the impact of the military rule in its third year has been “devastating.” Clear evidence for this lack of
action can be seen in the junta's recent massacres, indiscriminate aerial bombardments and artillery
strikes, mass arson attacks, and fresh horrors in the forms of beheadings and dismemberment of
detained resistance members and civilians.
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But the call to stop such acts of barbarity are being all but ignored.
After Russia's expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the ICC prosecutor announced
an ICC investigation into alleged crimes in Ukraine in March, a month after the attack. The ICC
prosecutor was also quick to issue a clear warning against committing crimes in Ukraine. No
similarly strong ICC public statements have been forthcoming concerning Myanmar. Nor has there
been the same level of public support for prosecutions from other states.
This is a concern, particularly since there is a view that prosecutions, arrest warrants, and
statements from the ICC prosecutor could have a deterring and preventive impact, especially during
an active conflict.
On the contrary, a report by The Irrawaddy says, between February 24 and 25, high ranking
soldiers and intelligence officers from Myanmar's Military Operations Command in Buthidaung,
Rakhine State met with several Rohingya residents and warned the villagers to admit that “they set
fire in their own houses and fled away during 2017 incident.”
If they testify that the villagers were killed and the houses were burned down by the military,
they will be arrested and/or executed. This comes as an intention of the Myanmar military to shed
accountability for its role in atrocities against Rohingya people.
At one point world leaders need to stop for a moment and ask themselves: Just how much
more blood in Myanmar would it take to shake them out of their inaction?
(Source: Dhaka Tribune)
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International Relations
WHEN CIVILIZATIONAL MODELS COLLIDE
Janine R. Wedel (Social anthropology professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George
Mason University)
The war in Ukraine is a theater for two competing development paths: Russia’s oligarchic
capitalism and Ukraine’s burgeoning civil society. Western countries should mark this distinction,
because oligarchic capitalism has increasingly taken root within their own systems of economic and
political governance.
Meanwhile, Ukrainians have offered an alternative: people working together democratically
to fashion a better collective future.
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, oligarchic capitalism flourished in Russia and
Ukraine. In the 1990s, informal power networks took hold in both countries, and some of these
“clans,” as local analysts called them, mobilized to control key sectors such as internal security,
energy and natural resources.
The keepers of these assets — the oligarchs — then became millionaires, or even billionaires,
almost overnight, owing to the era’s corrupt privatization schemes. The clans ran their own
kleptocratic resource-extraction and offshoring operations, while competing for control.
These webs of political-business-criminal relationships also ensnared Western leaders, helping
to spread oligarchic capitalism globally. Consider former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder,
whose mutually beneficial relationship with Gazprom, a Kremlin-controlled natural gas
conglomerate, began before he even left office.
Ukraine-Russia split
From similar starting points, however, Russia and Ukraine have taken different paths. For its
part, Russia pursued a strategic state vision (in which Gazprom played a big part) that was heavily
dependent on infiltrating and corrupting Western institutions.
Since 2012, when Vladimir Putin began his third term as Russian president, the country’s
clans and oligarchs have been firmly in his grip, helping cultivate political corruption abroad. While
Gazprom operatives weaponized oil and gas, and corrupted Western politicians and parties to
achieve dominance in European energy markets and distribution networks, “Kremligarchs” served
as handmaidens of Putin’s foreign policy.
Meanwhile at home, Putin was slowly suffocating the independent media companies and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) established in the 1990s, leaving the security and
intelligence organs (from which he hails) holding all the real power.
Whereas Russian informal power networks came to serve the state, Ukraine had no
comparable arrangement, and it has remained a democracy (albeit a weak one) since gaining
independence in 1991. In the absence of a “strongman ruler,” its competing clans and oligarchs
enfeebled the state while promoting their own interests, as did the Kremlin through channels
ranging from propaganda and cyberwarfare to corrupting Ukrainian officials.
Nonetheless, this weakening of the Ukrainian state created an opening for civil society and
collaborative organizing. Owing to this space for mobilization from below, the Ukrainian state was
newly empowered after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into eastern Ukraine in 2014.
Since then, it has been able to impose some limits on the power of oligarchs, including those serving
Kremlin interests.
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Ukrainian civil society that has emerged over the past two decades embodies a collective
commitment to national survival. Since last year’s invasion, Ukrainians have mobilized themselves
repeatedly: to repair damaged homes, shelter internally displaced persons, and sustain the war
effort as volunteer cooks, drivers and fundraisers. Since the war began, efforts organized mainly at
the municipal level and coordinated with Kyiv have helped evacuate almost 7 million women and
children to neighboring countries. Ukrainians are not only defending their homeland, they are also
showcasing a sustainable and scalable political project.
The Ukrainian example is especially relevant to Western democracies, where a trend toward
oligarchic capitalism has compromised the integrity of political, financial and educational
institutions. The world’s financial centers, notably in Europe and North America, are awash in dirty
money that is laundered and then channeled toward lobbying and political action.
Again, Schroeder exemplifies this corruption. After leaving office, he made millions from
Russian energy interests, while Germany came to rely on Russia for more than half of its natural gas
in the years leading up to the invasion.
Western version
The structures of oligarchic capitalism in the West are mostly homegrown. They are the
creation of the hedge fund managers, lawyers and tax attorneys who deal in ill-gotten cash; the
professionals who help inflate real-estate prices; and the public relations firms and universities that
burnish kleptocrats’ images.
The rise of oligarchic capitalism in the West has perverted capitalism and eroded democracy.
Wealth inequality has surged, trust in institutions has plummeted and anti-system movements have
flourished.
Ukrainians can teach the West a lot about how to confront these challenges. While a (war-
weakened) oligarchic capitalism persists there, the country’s civil society is pushing back more
effectively than almost anywhere else. Even while under fire, Ukrainians continue to fight
corruption through grassroots group-led efforts and state anti-corruption institutions.
Since 2015, the Ukrainian government has used online platforms to provide greater
transparency regarding public procurement, and state officials’ assets and incomes. Following
important financial-sector reforms, the National Bank of Ukraine has been able to nationalize or
shutter several oligarch-owned banks.
However, the endurance of Ukraine’s reforms will largely depend on how oligarchic
capitalism plays out in the West. For years, Ukrainian anti-corruption experts have pleaded with
Western policymakers to dismantle the financial structures, practices and policies that sustain
oligarchic capitalism around the world.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has further underscored the urgency of this task.
That is why Ukrainian civil society leaders have stepped up their campaigning over the past year,
meeting frequently with representatives of European and North American governments, NGOs and
the media.
To be sure, Western civil society has also tried to shine a spotlight on the problem, although it
has not yet benefited from the groundswell of civic attention and activism — or even the lukewarm
elite backing — that can be seen in Ukraine.
However, make no mistake: The conflict between the two civilizational models — oligarchic
capitalism and civil society — is as much about our own future as it is about theirs. The civil society
for which the Ukrainians are fighting and dying must win on the battlefield — and then in our
institutions.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
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IS NEOLIBERALISM PROMOTING NEOFASCISM?

Syed Mohammad Ali
Seeing the far-right PMs of India, Israel and Italy extolling the virtues of democracy at the
second ‘Summit of Democracy’ recently organised by the Biden administration was teetering on the
edge of absurdity. The principle of creating governance structures which can reflect the aspirations
of ordinary people remains a noble pursuit. Yet, the lofty ideal of striving to achieve democracy
keeps being derailed, manipulated and distorted in the world today.
Prominent politicians eloquently extoll the virtues of democracy and freedom while presiding
over states which have thrived by enabling slavery, genocide of indigenous populations and
imperialism. Many so-called democratic nations continue to exclude and marginalise vulnerable
segments of society, including women and different religious or ethnic minorities.
While more drastic forms of exclusion such as the enslaving of people or preventing women
from exercising the right to vote may no longer seem tenable, a powerful country like the US, which
portrays itself the promoter of democracy around the world, continues to struggle with racial and
ethnic discrimination. Populist leaders in many other countries which call themselves democracies
also readily use overtly xenophobic or exclusionary tactics to grab and retain power. PM Modi, for
example, considers India to be the “mother of democracy” because the country has always elected
its governments by holding elections.
Yet, the BJP under Modi has perfected the art of majoritarian rule enabled by ratcheting up
persecution of minorities. The way the Israeli state treats Arab Israelis and Palestinians in its
occupied territories is patently undemocratic. Yet, Israel has no qualms projecting itself as the only
democracy in the Middle East.
It is important to note how the disconcerting corruption of democratic ideals has been taking
place alongside increasing emphasis on economic liberalisation, and an almost fundamentalist faith
in market mechanisms. Such neoliberal values are promoted not only by powerful nations such as
the US, but also by prominent international entities like WTO, IMF and World Bank.
Neoliberal proponents aim to boost economic productivity, claiming that such measures will
help alleviate poverty. Yet, in the past four decades or so since the effort to enhance globalisation via
propagation of neoliberal reforms has picked up speed, the world has experienced immense
economic growth coinciding with increasingly stark levels of inequality.
Drastic cuts to public spending and growing reliance on the private sector to provide social
services have not been able to effectively cater to the most basic needs of the citizenry. The growing
disgruntlement and anxieties of ordinary people remain unaddressed. These anxieties are instead
manipulated by opportunistic leaders to blame migrants and other domestic minorities, by
promoting ultra-nationalism.
Prabhat Patnaik, Professor Emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University, has pointed in his varied
writings to neoliberalism’s growing collusion with neo-fascist and autocratic leaders. Such trends
are evident not only in India but in other autocratic countries such as Turkey under Erdogan, and,
until recently, in Brazil under the leadership of Bolsonaro.
Patnaik argues that the failure of trickle-down economics has led neoliberalism to increasingly
rely on an alliance between globally integrated capitalists and neo-fascist, autocratic and
authoritarian rulers. Such unrepresentative and repressive rulers can deflect frustrations caused by
the uneven nature of top-heavy economic growth by demonising the “other” – be it the Indian
Muslim minority, or migrant communities in the US or across Europe.
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Problematic leaders like Modi continue to push for further liberalising agriculture,
privatisation of remaining public enterprises and assertive promotion of big business interests.
Exposes about the Modi government’s close ties to the controversial tycoon, Gautam Adani, provide
one example of the evident linkages between divisive leaders and major capitalists. Tiptoeing
around India’s dismal human rights record to forge closer economic ties with its burgeoning
economy is illustrative of the collusion between despotic rulers and western nations which remain
primary beneficiaries of neoliberal agendas.
Scholars like Patnaik, who emphasise links between neo-fascism and neoliberalism, would
probably not deny other factors at play in shaping our world order. The realpolitik agendas of
nations maneuvering for geopolitical power, for instance, also exert major influence on the alliances
that these nations form, and on the choice of human rights concerns they want to champion.
Nonetheless, paying attention to the interlinkages between neoliberal and neo-fascist tendencies
provides a compelling lens to understand the seeming contradictions prevalent within world politics
today.
(Source: Express Tribune)

THE RISE OF THE ‘INDO-PACIFIC’

Has the ‘Asia-Pacific’ Faded Away?
Sanchari Ghosh
Geopolitical imaginations are mental maps in which there is no one way of framing the world.
Mental geographies keep on changing, often directed by power contestations. The ‘Asia-Pacific’ and
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ are two such constructs that define the geopolitics of the 21st century. While the
‘Asia-Pacific’ and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ have some overlap in their geographical coverage, both have
emerged under different circumstances. Asia-Pacific emerged as the dominant conception of Asia’s
role in the Pacific Ocean in the 1960s and was later institutionalised through the formation of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the 1980s. However, this term was not inclusive of
other important countries in the region like India and neither did it take into account the growing
importance of the Indian Ocean for the world’s maritime trade. It was Japan which surmised the
need to accommodate both these shortcomings. This move, with support from Australia and the
USA, coalesced into the formation of the concept of the Indo-Pacific.
With the rise of the Indo-Pacific as a single maritime zone and its embrace by various
countries in the region, scholars suggest that Asia-Pacific has been replaced by the Indo-Pacific as
the preeminent geopolitical construct in the region. However, the 2023 joint statement between
China and Russia has revived the question of the relevance of Asia-Pacific as an area of interest for
the big powers. This article argues that even with the Indo-Pacific’s increasing popularity, the Asia-
Pacific concept has not only held its ground but is here to stay. This is primarily for three reasons.
First, the flux in the current world order; second, ASEAN’s concern regarding its position as a
central actor in the region; and third, the strong and time-tested economic dimension of the Asia-
Pacific which the Indo-Pacific has yet to replicate.
The dynamics of the world order are constantly evolving, influenced by changes in the
balance of power, shifting alliances and partnerships. Therefore, determining the nature of polarity
is complex and highly debatable. Scholars are divided with regard to the explanation of the current
global international system which is defined sometimes either as unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or bi-
multipolar. During the pandemic, with the US taking a backseat and China being perceived
sceptically by the international community, the geopolitical situation hinted towards multipolarity.
It was argued that a ‘multiplex world’ was upon us. However, for many scholars, the war in Ukraine
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has brought bipolarity back with China and the US being the two major poles. Thus, in the current
geopolitical environment, where the world is fragmented by war, economic insecurities and global
tensions, it is interesting to see how the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific have become the
manifestation of the great power rivalry between the US and China.
In the recent strategic agreement between China and Russia, both states promised to build an
open and inclusive security system centred around the Asia Pacific. While beginning a new chapter
of cooperation, both countries agreed that the Indo-Pacific has a negative impact on peace and
stability, and instead pitched for an open and inclusive ‘Asia-Pacific security system’. This was not
the first time that China countered US’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Last year too, during the visit of
President Joe Biden to attend a summit of the leaders of the Quad, the Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi asserted that the Indo-Pacific strategy is a ploy to encircle China and create divisions. In
place of the Indo-Pacific, he argued, the Asia-Pacific should be promoted as a high ground for
peaceful development.
There have been numerous instances in the past when both China and Russia expressed their
individual indignation against the Indo-Pacific strategy. But this is the first time that both parties
jointly opposed the Indo-Pacific concept. It hints towards China’s efforts to forge an alternative bloc
against the idea of Indo-Pacific. In this regard, Asia-Pacific is a suitable alternate conception which
China will look to cultivate in the foreseeable future.
ASEAN envisions the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as a closely integrated space with
ASEAN playing a central role: a vision encapsulated by the term ‘ASEAN centrality’. But thanks to
the steady rise of the Indo-Pacific, the notion of ASEAN centrality has been constantly challenged.
For instance, the emergence of QUAD has raised suspicion among the ASEAN states that it could
disrupt the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) from its position of centrality in the region’s security
order. Despite reassurances from the Quad members that they are not paying mere lip service to
ASEAN’s centrality, the ASEAN members do not prefer substantial engagement with any grouping
premised on exclusive cooperation. Additionally, the formation of the AUKUS (a grouping that
strategically left out ASEAN) exposed the fissures among the ASEAN members which is evident
from their divided response regarding the (de)stabilising effects of a formal military alliance in their
backyard.
Moreover, increasing disunity within the ASEAN on issues like South China Sea disputes and
the ongoing crisis in Myanmar reflects the ineffectiveness of its decision-making mechanisms. Due
to such limitations, coupled with its preference for maintaining equidistance from major poles of
influence, ASEAN does not prefer to be drawn into a great power rivalry between the US and China.
For ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific represent two complementary zones and it is not
ready to commit entirely to one in place of the other.
Notwithstanding the efforts being made by the US to strengthen economic partnerships
among the member countries of the Indo-Pacific region, one of the most fundamental differences
between the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific is that the former is primarily an economic conception,
whereas the latter encompasses broader strategic and geopolitical considerations. There are three
reasons why the economic dimension of the Asia-Pacific has not yet been replicated by the Indo-
Pacific. One, frameworks like the APEC and The Regional Cooperative Economic Partnership
(RCEP), which were primarily based on the principle of ASEAN centrality, helped their respective
member states increase their access to new markets by promoting economic integration and playing
a key role in reducing tariffs. On the other hand, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) lacks
concrete commitments from the US to provide greater access to its market. Two, while the APEC is a
good example of open regionalism, the IPEF involves closed regionalism based on the logic of bloc
diplomacy and exclusivity. And three, since the IPEF is not a conventional Free Trade Agreement, it
has limitations in enticing its partners and securing binding commitments from them.
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Thus the economic framework centred around the Indo-Pacific imagination is not only
exclusive but also insufficient. It goes without saying that the Indo-Pacific region is rapidly
emerging as a critical global geopolitical and economic zone. As a result of its growing importance,
the region is increasingly being seen as a key driver of the global economy. At the heart of the Indo-
Pacific’s rise is the vision of a free, open, and inclusive region that fosters cooperation, trade, and
investment while upholding the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
However, to become an effective bloc, it is important that its economic frameworks reflect these
values by embracing inclusivity rather than being directed against any major power. To sum up,
against the backdrop of the current geopolitical circumstances, there is a tendency to view both the
Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific through a competitive lens, with dominant powers promoting their
preferred conception and downplaying the rival conception. This underscores the point that as long
as the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean continue to be theatres of strategic contests, this
imagination and re-imagination of the region will persist, and one imagination is unlikely to be
overhauled by another.
(Source: E-IR)
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Interviews
FAISAL NIAZ TIRMIZI
Pakistan’s Envoy to the UAE
In the process of interviewing Faisal Niaz Tirmizi, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan to the United Arab Emirates, I was reminded of the importance of diplomacy and bilateral
engagement on a state level. What it also highlighted was the undeniable significance of bonds that
withstand time and transient misperceptions.
Utterly remarkable is Pakistan’s deep bond with the United Arab Emirates. For millions of
Pakistanis, Dubai is the face of that bond. Existing on myriad spectra — personal, professional,
business and tourism — this mutual affection is decades old, restrengthening each time a Pakistani
citizen experiences the uniqueness of Dubai. The same is true of Pakistanis visiting, residing, and
working in Abu Dhabi, the truly impressive capital of the UAE, and its other wonderful states —
Sharjah, Umm Al Qaiwain, Fujairah, Ajman, and Ras Al Khaimah.
In the backdrop of my three decades of visiting the UAE as a tourist, I think of it as a mini
subcontinent. It is a place like no other — its fascinating culture and ethos and its incomparable
amalgamation of the positive aspects of different races, faiths, nationalities, and ideologies by
encouraging people from almost every part of the world to make the UAE their work, business,
tourism, and shopping destination and their long-term or permanent residence, while remaining a
quintessentially middle eastern country.
In the context of the UAE’s wholeness, I believe the viewpoint of a high-level diplomat always
carries a distinct substance. Going beyond the gloss and the façade, our ambassadors understand the
country they are working in with a special personalness and a comprehensive objectivity that is all-
encompassing, and beyond the constraints of political, economic, social, and other sensibilities of Pakistan.
Ambassador Tirmizi has earlier served as Pakistan’s envoy to the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek,
2018-2019, and as Consul General of Pakistan in Chicago, USA. He has also served in Ashgabat,
Turkmenistan, 1996-1999, UN headquarters Geneva, Switzerland, 2003-2007, and as Counsellor in
Abu Dhabi, 2007-2010.
Question: Pakistan holds the royal family of the United Arab Emirates in high esteem, going
back to the days of the great Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. How do we ensure that the
scope of our bilateral ties commensurate with our mutual affection?
Answer: Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates have historically enjoyed fraternal relations
that date back to even before December 1971. The foundation of our strong relations was laid by the
late His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan. In 1971, after the union, Pakistan became the
first country to recognise the UAE. As a good will gesture and diplomatic support to our brotherly
country, Pakistan sent its first ambassador six months before the formation of the UAE. Ambassador
Jamiluddin Hassan came to the UAE in June 1971. Since then, Pakistan has played a pivotal role in
laying institutional foundations of the UAE
In return, Pakistan has benefited from development assistance and investment from the UAE,
along with the employment of 1.6 million Pakistanis in the UAE.
These relations, characterised by mutual respect, trust and solidarity, are being nurtured by
the successive leaderships of both the countries and have been translated into support in multiple
arenas. Over the years, Pakistan and the UAE have expanded their cooperation in various fields,
including trade, investment, defence, and energy. The two countries have supported each other in
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regional and international fora, signed numerous agreements and held regular high-level visits to
enhance strategic partnerships.
Pakistan and the UAE share deep cultural, historical, and strategic ties, which have stood the
test of time, and the two countries have strengthened their bilateral relations over the years.
Question: What is the strength of the Pakistani diaspora in the UAE? What measures have the
successive Pakistan governments taken for their facilitation?
Answer: The Pakistani diaspora in the UAE is over 1.6 million, making it the second largest
expatriate community in the UAE. The Pakistani community in the UAE is diverse, consisting of
skilled and unskilled workers, professionals, entrepreneurs, and students. They are valued and
recognised in the country due to their hard work and dedication and their positive role in the
development of the country.
Pakistan Embassy in Abu Dhabi and Consulate General in Dubai are well connected and
accessible to all our community members. We ensure provision of speedy consular services, easy
access and legal guidance and engage with our community members through awareness
programmes and other community engagements planned for their welfare.
While we work for their welfare, it is also important to highlight their achievements and give
them due recognition. In my four months in the UAE, I have remained actively engaged with such
individuals, encouraged their work, be it cultural, literary, in the fields of trade and business or
media. Their hard work and dedication have earned them good place and reputation in the UAE
and need to be recognized.
The Pakistani missions in the UAE are committed to facilitating the welfare and interests of its
diaspora in the UAE and recognising their contribution to the economic, social and cultural
development of both countries.
Question: What is the volume of the remittances from the UAE to Pakistan? How would you
assess the response of the Pakistani diaspora to the Roshan Digital Account?
Answer: The UAE is one of the top sources of remittances for Pakistan, with a significant
number of Pakistani expatriates working in the country and sending money back home. According
to the State Bank of Pakistan, remittances from the UAE to Pakistan in the last financial year, 2021-
22, amounted to US$5.7 billion, which is second largest in the Gulf region.
The government of Pakistan launched the Roshan Digital Account (RDA) initiative in 2020 to
facilitate remittances from overseas Pakistanis through digital channels. The response of the
Pakistani diaspora to the RDA in the UAE has been positive, with many expatriates using the
platform to send money to their families and invest in various sectors in Pakistan. The Pakistani
diaspora in the UAE has found the RDA convenient, secure, and attractive. The response of the
Pakistani diaspora to the RDA initiative has been encouraging, and it is expected to further boost the
volume of remittances from the UAE.
Question: Are there any problems peculiar to the Pakistani blue-collar workers in the UAE? What
are the steps that can be taken to make their lives easier?
Answer: A significant number of Pakistani workers in the UAE are employed in blue collar
jobs. Their well-being and welfare remain our top priority. They are contributing towards
development of both countries, by their hard work in the host country and by sending remittances
back home. We engage with them on a regular basis through different outreach and awareness
programmes. We try to educate them on legal and regulatory framework of the UAE, their legal
rights, visas, and labour laws, and how to obtain legal assistance in case of any violation. We also
remain engaged with the host government for their welfare and betterment.
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Question: Historically, Pakistan and the UAE have always maintained strong defence ties. How
would you describe Pakistan military’s role in the training missions of the UAE armed forces?
Answer: You are right to point to the historic relations that our two militaries have enjoyed since
the unification of the UAE. From helping set up the UAE armed forces to helping train the next
generation of UAE’s armed forces, Pakistanis have left their indelible mark on the ever-ready armed
forces of the UAE. Not only do we have a large number of serving officers seconded to the UAE armed
forces for training the young men and women of the UAE, a number of retired Pakistani officers are also
serving here to make UAE’s defence stronger. We are proud that the strong military ethos of our
professional soldiers, sailors and airmen are helping our brothers in arms here in the UAE.
At the same time, we are also regularly conducting bilateral and multilateral exercises with the
UAE armed forces. From what we have seen, we are proud of our brotherly UAE armed forces, which
are holding their flag high by matching their professionalism with the best militaries around the world.
Pakistan and the UAE have maintained strong defence ties since the beginning. Pakistan played a
significant role in helping the UAE in establishing its military and security forces, by providing technical
support, training, and trained manpower. Pakistani personnel have held prominent positions as advisers
and trainers in the UAE Air Force. The first Chief of Air Staff of the UAE, appointed by Sheikh Zayed,
was Air Commodore Ayaz Ahmed Khan, followed by Ghulam Haider, Jamal A Khan and Feroz A
Khan, all of whom were Pakistan Air Force officers. Pakistan Army has also established the UAE Armor
Training School and imparted training to commando battalions as well.
Pakistan’s Armed Forces also invited UAE officers at training institutions in Pakistan. High
level military delegates from both sides visit from time to time, conduct joint exercises and
participate in defence exhibitions in both countries.
The defence cooperation between Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates is long standing and
has grown stronger over the years.
(Source: T-Magazine)

JANE CONNORS
The UN’s first Victims’ Rights Advocate
Critics have said justice takes too long, and perpetrators are not always held accountable in
cases of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN personnel. Appointed by the Secretary-
General in 2017, Jane Connors, the UN’s first Victims’ Rights Advocate, is tasked with getting a
victim-centred approach installed across the system’s more than 35 entities.
Question: How would you assess progress made to date?
Answer: There has been good progress in getting people to understand from a policy point of
view that the victim and their rights and dignity are extremely important. The challenge is to get
that translated into reality on the ground.
We’ve had very good progress where we have victims’ rights advocates on the ground, in
Central African Republic, DR Congo, Haiti, and South Sudan.
Sexual exploitation or abuse often results in a pregnancy, and the men almost always abandon the
women because they have another family elsewhere. More reports have come forward, and more has
been done in supporting victims and, in particular, pursuing paternity child support claims.
One of the big challenges is underrating the impact of sexual exploitation and the notion that there
is consent. Just because you are able to use your power to exploit somebody and get them to apparently
consent doesn’t mean they consent. Realizing accountability to victims should be our priority.
Accountability from a victim’s perspective will be very different to what others might think.
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Question: Are States doing enough to make real progress?

Answer: The paternity cases we know about pertain to personnel working in United Nations
peace or special political missions, predominantly uniformed military or police. In terms of
identifying the victims, the missions are a long way ahead.
I went to several countries to gain trust and urge them to use their good offices to get the men
who fathered children and have been positively identified through DNA matching, to do what
they’re supposed to do.
It’s a joint responsibility of the Member States and the UN to make sure that the rights of
children are realized. They have the right to know their father and be supported by him. It’s also the
parental responsibility of the father.
Question: UN News: Can projects supported by the UN Victims’ Assistance Fund make a real
difference in the lives of victims?
Answer: I think it does make a difference. Currently, we have projects in DR Congo and
Liberia, we’ve had one in Haiti, and soon will be in the Central African Republic. We need to do
much more with prevention, as prevention and response are inextricably linked; you can’t have one
without the other.
You need to have the victim element to make people think about the consequences of their
conduct. They victimize not only the individual, but also their community and their own family.
When we’re talking about abuse, by and large, we are talking about very serious sexual misconduct
with children under age 18.
I’d like to see much more focus on behaviour change. It takes a lot of work, sustained
resources, and huge leadership to make something unacceptable. Remember when driving when
drunk was fine, and now it is regarded as deeply unacceptable. It’s a long, long game.
Question: Are investigations being carried out fast enough?
Answer: More work needs to be done with investigators coming out of a law enforcement
background. They need their minds to shift. They need to know that delay is very bad, that they
need to be polite and compassionate, and they need to keep the victim informed. Giving victims
information and follow up is not very good, and really has to improve.
Question:Are there common messages that you’re hearing from the victims?
Answer: These are extremely difficult conversations. I will meet with anybody who wants to
talk about this issue. I remember one country I visited some years ago where there are a lot of
women with children born of sexual exploitation and or abuse, and they were very dissatisfied, had
received no support, no assistance; the children were not going to school because they didn’t have
money to pay for fees, and they didn’t know what was happening with the paternity claims.
One of them said, ‘People like you, we see you all the time. You come you talk to us, you go, we
never hear anything’. I said to them, ‘Look, I’m not a very powerful person, but I will do what I can’.
I had some very good colleagues in the country concerned who raised about $40,000, so those
children could go to school. That made an enormous difference. At the end of that year, they met
with the women, who said ‘At least she did what she said she would do’.
Question:: You’ve met with victims in several countries. What is your message to them?
Answer: I am amazed at their tolerance for the UN, their patience, their resilience, and I’m
also extremely impressed by those who are able to move forward. In terms of ongoing projects, there
have been women who have been able to move on to have businesses. This is something we do
together.
(Source: UN News)
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Kashmir
THE G20 TWG MEETING IN KASHMIR
The camouflage of oppression by the Normalcy Mantra
Mehr un Nisa
Under India’s presidency, the third meeting of the G20 tourism working group is slated to occur
from May 21 to 23, 2023, in Indian Illegally occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IIOJK), which is recognized as a
disputed territory by the United Nations. This decision has raised considerable concerns, given that
IIOJK has been embroiled in political tensions and human rights violations for several decades.
India’s stated objective behind this move is to promote its “normalcy mantra” and showcase
an image of stability and development in IIOJK. This move can be seen as a form of political
signaling aimed at communicating India’s intentions to the international community. By hosting a
high-profile international meeting in IIoJK, India seeks to dem-onstrate its control over the region
and assert its sovereignty in the face of Pakistan’s claims.
The G20 summit is an annual meeting where the world’s leading economies come together. By
2027, the GDP of G20 nations is projected to make up 44.64% of the global GDP, showing a 2.2%
increase from 2021. The decisions and policies made at the summit can have far-reaching
consequences beyond their own borders, influencing the agenda of other international organizations
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
G20’s influence derives from its role as a forum for global economic cooperation and its members’
significant economic power.
However, India’s decision to host the third meeting of G20 TWG in IIOJK has sparked debate and
condemnation from the international community. The cosmetic changes made to “Naya Kashmir”, a
development plan initiated by the Indian government to promote economic development in the region,
have failed to address the real concerns and grievances of the Kashmiri people.
Jammu and Kashmir has been illegally occupied and under military control by India since
1947, with over 900,000 troops stationed in the IIoJK perpetu-ating human rights violations and
using excessive force against civilians. The Indian government’s attempt to project the situation as
“normal” is an attempt to whitewash crimes against humanity and to deflect attention from the
human rights abuses being committed there. The situation in IIoJK is marked by a high degree of
human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and violence against
women. Since August 5th, 2019, more than 800 civilians have been killed following the abrogation of
Article 370. Over 18,811 civilians have been arrested, and more than 2,354 people have been injured
by the occupying forces.
In 2018, and 2019, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) released reports stating that there were credible reports of widespread and serious
human rights violations in IIoJK, including excessive use of force, arbitrary detention, and torture.
The hosting of such a high-profile international event in a region that is under lockdown and where
there are restrictions on freedom of movement and expression is a cause for concern.
The lack of political representation and a trans-parent and accountable governance structure
has left the Kashmiri people feeling marginalized and dis-empowered. By hosting the TWG meeting
in a dis-puted territory, India is legitimizing its illegal occu-pation of IIOJK and sending a message
that it is willing to flout international law and disregard the human rights of the region’s residents.
The hosting of the third meeting of G20 TWG in IIoJK is a sym-bol of India’s growing global
influence and its emergence as a major player in international politics and economics. However, it
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could also exacerbate the already volatile situation in the region and increase the risk of conflict
between the two countries.
Indian opposition parties have also condemned and criticized the ruling Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) for using the TWG meeting as a political tool to further its agenda of Hindu nationalism.
Even in India, the move is seen as an attempt to shore up support in the upcoming state elections in
IIoJK, where the BJP has faced significant opposition from separatist groups.
Furthermore, hosting the third meeting of G20 TWG in IIOJK could have wider implications
for international relations, potentially seen as a violation of international norms and a challenge to
the global order. This could lead to diplomatic backlash from other countries and damage India’s
reputation on the global stage. The projection of a false image of normalcy in the region could have
long-term geopolitical consequences given the strategic impor-tance of the region, bordering China,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Any instability in the region could potentially have far-reaching
consequences for the entire region, including potential implications for global security and stability.
As a collective, the G20 has the power to influ-ence India’s actions by exerting diplomatic
pressure and supporting multilateral efforts to resolve the Kashmir conflict. Failure to hold India
accountable could have serious consequences not only for the people of IIoJK but for regional and
global stability as well. Therefore, it is essential for the G20 to pri-oritize this issue and work towards
a peaceful and just resolution for all parties involved.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)

DEBUNKING KASHMIR MYTHS

Rimsha Malik
Alastair Lamb, a British diplomatic historian, passed away at the age of 93. He was well-
known for his expertise in modern Kashmir and his extensive research on the events leading up to
the conflict in 1947-8. Lamb was born in China in 1930 while his father was working for the British
diplomatic service. During World War II, his parents were interned by the Japanese while he was in
the care of his grandfather in Britain. Lamb was a meticulous researcher who generously shared his
knowledge with other historians.
The Kashmir conflict has been a contentious issue between India and Pakistan for decades. Amidst
the complex history and politics surrounding the conflict, there are various myths and misconceptions
that have become prevalent over time. However, Alastair Lamb’s research on Kashmir aims to challenge
these myths and provide a more accurate understanding of the issue. Lamb’s research primarily focuses
on dispelling myths related to the accession of Kashmir and aggression towards it. The accession of
Kashmir to India in 1947 is a key event in the conflict’s history, and there are various myths surrounding
it. One such myth is that the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, willingly acceded to India. However,
Lamb’s research shows that this was not the case. In reality, the Maharaja was hesitant about choosing
between India and Pakistan and initially wanted to remain independent. India’s leaders, however,
pressured him into acceding to India. Lamb’s research thus challenges the commonly held belief that the
accession was a voluntary act by the Maharaja.
Another myth that Lamb challenges is that Pakistan has been the aggressor in the Kashmir
conflict. While Pakistan has supported separatist movements in the region, Lamb argues that India
has also played a role in the violence and aggression towards Kashmiris. He notes that Indian forces
have committed human rights abuses in the region, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and
enforced disappearances. Lamb’s research emphasizes the need to address both India’s and
Pakistan’s roles in the conflict to find a lasting solution. India’s narrative about the disputed region
of Kashmir is based on myths, such as Pakistan’s aggression through Army regulars and Maharaja
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Hari Singh’s signing of the treaty of accession with India in 1947. However, according to Alastair
Lamb, India’s march into Kashmir without the Maharaja’s permission was a blatant act of
aggression. Lamb notes that Mountbatten had advised India to not intervene militarily without first
obtaining the “instrument of accession” from the Maharaja, but India did not follow this advice. The
timing of the alleged instrument of accession affected its legitimacy, and it could be argued that it
was either done under Indian duress or to regularize an Indian fait accompli. These points are
covered in Lamb’s book ‘Incomplete Partition’ and Bhasin’s ‘India and Pakistan: Neighbours at
Odds’, which is a 10-volume study of India-Pakistan relations containing 3649 official documents.
The ‘Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru’ is another useful resource book on this topic.
Lamb claims that the Instrument of Accession supposedly signed by the Maharajah of
Kashmir on October 26, 1947, was fraudulent. He argues that the Maharajah was on the run for his
life and traveling to Jammu at the time, making it unlikely that he could have signed the instrument.
There is no evidence of any contact between him and the Indian emissaries on that day. Lamb also
notes that Indian troops had already arrived and secured Srinagar airfield by mid-October, and a
further airlift of troops took place on October 26. The Instrument of Accession, if it was signed at all,
was likely signed by the Maharajah after Indian troops had assumed control of Srinagar.
The United Nations has outlawed the so-called accession of Kashmir, and the resolutions
passed by the occupied Kashmir’s constituent assembly are void. The UN has passed two
resolutions, Resolution No. 9 of March 30, 1951, and Resolution No. 122 of March 24, 1957, to
forestall any attempts to legitimize the accession. The Instrument of Accession is not registered with
the United Nations. India took the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948 under Chapter VI, not VII, and
Nehru disowned the accession. The book “Kashmir: A disputed legacy 1846-1990” by Alastair Lamb
documents Nehru’s changing positions on the issue of Kashmir. Despite post-Nehru equivocal
rhetoric, the Kashmir Question remains on the General Assembly’s agenda, with the UN Military
Observers’ Military Group on duty. The legal basis of India’s position on Kashmir rests on the
mythical ‘instrument of accession’ and its endorsement by the disputed state’s assembly, which is
not recognized by the UN. Therefore, the legal debates in India’s Supreme Court about the status of
Kashmir are irrelevant. The UN charter and the right to self-determination are paramount. India’s
repression and terror in Kashmir are attempts to suppress the truth.
Sindh Abadgar Ittehad denounces violation of Indus Water Treaty by Indian govt
Alastair Lamb’s research on Kashmir sheds light on the complexity of the conflict and the
need to challenge myths and misconceptions surrounding it. By providing a more accurate
understanding of the issue, Lamb’s work can help in finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict that
considers the perspectives of all stakeholders involved.

A STRATEGIC COMPETITION
Shahzadi Irrum (Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network)
Kashmir is one of the most unstable regions on the planet Earth. For seven decades, it is a
battleground between Pakistan and India because of its strategic importance. India has so far
committed aggression against Pakistan more than three times over Kashmir. Since both nations are
nuclear powers, the conflict poses a severe threat to world security and has drawn considerable
attention on a worldwide scale. Every attempt at resolving the violent conflict in Kashmir has failed
for three-quarters of a century. Although Colonial Powers are to be blamed for creating the issue, the
major powers like the USA have not shown any interest in resolving it either.
The importance of Kashmir in terms of national security, geography, and resources is the
fundamental cause of this ongoing territorial dispute between the two nations. To comprehend the
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Kashmir issue, we must first consider Kashmir’s geographic significance. Kashmir is one of the most
strategically important locations in the world as this region is placed between Pakistan, India, and China,
three countries with nuclear weapons. It is important to note that Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons in
1998 helped to stabilize relations between India and Pakistan by restoring balance of power.
Regarding Kashmir’s strategic location, the valley spans an area of 86,772 square miles
between some of the Karakoram’s and the Himalayas’ tallest peaks. Kashmir also shares its border
with Afghanistan, a country that connects South Asia with Central Asia, while Central Asia serves
as a physical link between Europe and the rest of Asia. Also, the vital Indus River, which is crucial
for Pakistani agriculture, starts from Kashmir. In addition, Kashmir is crucial to China’s interests,
particularly considering the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. For
all these reasons, Kashmir is in a vital geopolitical position, with each nation claiming the entire area
but only controlling a portion of it.
Kashmir has vital geostrategic relevance for Pakistan as the water supply comes from this
Himalayan region. The Indus River, which flows through the country, is substantially responsible
for its survival. The Indus River starts from Kashmir; thus, Pakistan relies heavily on water coming
from the Kashmir region. Agriculture is the nation’s main industry and the backbone of its economy
and it is the only river system supporting the country. It also provides most of the Pakistan’s supply
of potable water and sustains numerous heavy industries. If Pakistan loses its battle with India over
Kashmir, then Pakistan will face severe water shortages, which will have a negative impact on the
country’s agriculture sector, put the nation’s food supply at mortal risk, increase the likelihood of
protracted energy shortages, and result in sluggish economic growth.
Kashmir is strategically significant to India as well. Annexation of Kashmir would give India a
tremendous edge via which India could easily establish a strategic foothold in Central Asia, a region
that is abundant in natural resources with massive oil, gas, and cheap hydel reserves. This has
attracted the attention of various countries, including India. That is why India is attempting to
establish a link via land with Afghanistan to get more access to Central Asia via a shorter route
through Kashmir.
China has a strategic interest in Kashmir since it governs the eastern portion of the region, known
as the Aksai Chin, a large territory abutting Ladakh. China constructed National Highway 219, a route
that runs through this region and links the isolated provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. So, losing it would
result in the cut-off of that national roadway. The road also makes it easier to gather forces to put an end
to any rebellion and if it falls into Indian hands, China will be left open to hostile moves by India.
Therefore, China will not cede Aksai Chin to safeguard its sovereignty. Also, it has a significant stake in
Gilgit-Baltistan because it is where China’s main Belt and Road project, CPEC runs through. At Gwadar
port, it will connect China to the warm seas of the Arabian Sea.
In the end, Kashmir has turned into a war zone because of Indian intransigence, and it could
flare up at any time like a volcano and inevitably swallow up the entire world. Majority of
Kashmiris have revolted against India while Pakistan considers itself to be the region’s lawful and
legitimate heir. China has no objection to Pakistan’s claim, but the major Western powers believe
that if this land is given to Pakistan, it will open the door for their steadfast ally China to travel
anyplace from there and all other powerful nations would become irrelevant.
(Source; The Geopolitics)
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Law
LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS
Osman A Hadi (Former Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan)
“Wherein independence of judiciary shall be fully secured” – Constitution of Pakistan, 1973
(Preamble). This mantra forms the backbone of our constitution, which has been repeatedly
validated by the superior courts and championed by politicos in their hour of need. The recent
‘Supreme Court (Practice & Procedure) Bill, 2023’ (‘SCPPB 2023’) moved by parliament has led to a
constitutional division amongst commentators, with some observers feeling it encroached upon the
independence of the judiciary through restricting authority held by the chief justice of Pakistan in
exercising discretionary suo-motu powers and forming benches to hear cases. The Bill proposes to
shift the power to a committee of the top three judges of the court to decide fixation of Benches and
whether a suo-motu matter should be taken up or not.
Article 175 of the constitution establishes the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and Article 184(3)
provides the SC with what is colloquially known as suo-motu jurisdiction – to hear matters of
fundamental rights and public importance in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The power
of suo motu has been used by the top court in several matters of national importance, such as
disqualifications of prime ministers, no-confidence motions against the government and so forth.
The suo-motu jurisdiction is currently procedurally governed under the Supreme Court Rules,
1980 – enacted under powers granted in Article 191 of the constitution which mandates the SC itself
to make rules regarding its practice and procedure. Pursuant to Article 191, the SC Rules, 1980 were
established giving the CJP complete right to form benches hearing all matters (including suo motu).
These suo-motu powers held by the CJP have been repeatedly acknowledged and upheld by
the SC, even as recently as 2021 where a five-member bench of the Supreme Court in SM Case No
4/2021 (Press Association Case) unequivocally held that all suo-motu powers (in deciding the bench
and which matters were to be heard) rested exclusively with the CJP, and none other. In fact, several
prior SC judgments have even referred to the CJP as the ‘pater familias’ – head of the judiciary,
acknowledging these administrative powers held by him.
A five-member SC Bench in the Baz Mohamad Kakar case maintained that judicial review and
suo-motu jurisdiction was to be regulated by the SC itself, and the judgement even went further to
clarify that the Supreme Court has the power to examine the constitutionality of executive and
legislative actions. The same bench also held no person has the right to try and get the CJP to
abdicate his responsibilities nor does anyone hold the right to demand a bench of their choosing, as
otherwise it would be tantamount to the executive issuing orders for benches of their choice hearing
particular matters (perhaps a foresight on the current day legislative glitch). The bench further
enunciated that the SC Rules were framed under powers granted vide Article 191 of the constitution
and the legislature cannot take them away. In my opinion, the SCPPB 2023, stood void at the outset
as it is beyond the legislative competence of parliament, but let’s examine the situation further.
For a layperson to understand, Article 70 of the constitution provides the mechanism for passing a
law: A Bill (a proposed law) is introduced and approved through parliament, and then sent to the
president for his assent. If the assent is granted, it is promulgated into statute and becomes law. If the Bill
is refused, it is referred back to parliament by the president (within 10 days) for reconsideration by
parliament who can then resend it back to the president (whether or not they take into account the
president’s recommendation) for assent. The president then must grant assent or else the assent will be
deemed to be granted after 10 days have elapsed, and the said Bill becomes a statute.
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The SCPPB 2023 was returned by the president to parliament, which then resent it to the
president for assent. Meanwhile, this matter came before the Supreme Court in suo-motu
proceedings; the court passed an anticipatory injunction order dated April 13, 2023 stating whenever
the 10 days pass and even if the Bill is deemed to become a statute, it shall not be given any effect
(until further conclusion of the case).
A legal argument ensued questioning whether the Supreme Court holds power to grant such
an anticipatory injunction before the Bill converts to a statute. Before discussing the proposition, it
must be reiterated that the constitution of Pakistan is based on the trichotomy of powers as a
fundamental guiding principle. This concept was founded by 18th Century French jurist
Montesquieu who spoke of separation of powers: that the executive (government), legislative
(parliament) and judicial (courts) branches of government must remain independent of each other
and our constitution and SC judgments uphold this principle. Though some experts cite foreign
jurisdictions on the matter, I am limiting this article solely to our constitution which is all-
encompassing for the present purposes.
A five-member SC Bench in the Wuqla Mahaz case (P 1998 SC 1263) held that the Supreme
Court is to decide its own jurisdiction, and that right of speech in parliament is not an absolute right.
The bench further held that the SC could strike down any action or order if it was mala fide, coram
non judice or without jurisdiction. The SC in a 17-member full bench reiterated these principles in
the Mobashar Hasan case (P 2010 SC 265), maintaining there can be no legislation on anything
impermissible against the courts and cited that the substance of legislative action must be
considered, not the form; and the legislature cannot act to set aside judgments of the court.
The court also held that intervention against the independence of the judiciary would be
unconstitutional. The SCPPB 2023 at least prima facie appears to violate the above principles. The
Bill is also directly contrary to Article 191 – and the SC Rules, 1980 and parliament are not
empowered to legislate on this matter because it would be legislative overreach, as the subject falls
within the constitutional domain of the judicial branch.
Another concern regarding SCPPB 2023 is that the Bill provides a retroactive approach
enabling an appeal against any persons aggrieved by a suo-motu matter, even prior to the enactment
of the said Bill / Act coming into effect.
This means that every single suo-motu case in the past can now be appealed, regardless of the
nature / judgment etc. Similar action was already condemned by a full-member bench in the Mubahsar
Hasan case (supra) where the Supreme Court specifically stated the legislature cannot enact a statute
against the conviction and disqualification of a holder of public office, which SCPPB 2023 is now
attempting to potentially do. In law, that which cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.
In addition to encroaching upon the powers of the judicial branch, SCPPB 2023 is also contrary
to Article 8(2) of the constitution, a safeguard that says the state shall not make any law taking away
or abridging rights, which is what the Bill is attempting to do.
It needs to be remembered that the suo-motu jurisdiction is a constitutional power granted to
the Supreme Court under Article 184(3), and any law / bill attempting to alter it would be void on
two main principles: i) the legislature does not hold jurisdiction (without first amending the
constitution itself); and ii) the SC itself holds power to decide its jurisdiction.
To restrain the Bill, the Supreme Court is further empowered under Article 187 of the
constitution which provides them the power to issue any direction or order to do justice in any
matter pending before it. Should the order dated April 13, 2023 not have been passed and
enforcement of the Bill not restrained, it would have led to oddities creating perhaps irreparable
harm to the country and constitution.
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For example, if the Bill was enacted into law, the legislators at such point would almost
certainly refuse to accept a challenge to the vires of the SCPPB 2023 by any bench constituted by the
CJP under the current existing rules. They would have insisted the mechanism in the SCPPB be
followed. If this notion was rejected by the judiciary on the grounds the SCPPB was under challenge
and appeared unconstitutional, there may become a chaotic stalemate between the judicial and
legislative branches, with the legislators unwilling to accept any other outcome from the court. This
potential crisis has (at least for now) been averted.
Looking at the doctrine of separation of powers along with the mentioned precedents of the
Supreme Court and constitution, parliament can only legislate on subject matters under which it is
empowered vide the fourth legislative list of the constitution, which does not include power to
amend suo-motu jurisdiction and governance held by the Supreme Court.
The intent of the executive and legislature must also be kept in mind. Their sudden interest in
powers pertaining to the jurisdiction and formation of benches of the Supreme Court only emerged
when they appeared unhappy with a potentially anticipated decision of the court. Were these not
the same persons who happily accepted previous decisions of a CJP-constituted (non-full) bench(es)
in suo-motu matters – such as the decision against the NA speaker from holding a no-confidence
vote in April 2022 of from disqualifying a former prime minister in 2012 or from suspending a
proclamation of emergency on November 3, 2007 to name a few?
During their previous tenures over the last 35 years these parliamentarians oversaw several
constitutional amendments. Why did they never think to raise this issue at such a time also through a
constitutional amendment? Actions are based on intentions, and I leave it to the reader to draw their own
conclusions as to why parliamentary interference in Supreme Court jurisdiction has arisen at this
juncture.
I appreciate a counter-argument taken by some, particularly referring to the Aitzaz Ahsan case
(1988) which held a statute must be considered valid unless a decision to the contrary is passed; or
perhaps the less quoted but more relevant case of Navid Malik (1998) in which a five-member bench
held a writ cannot be issued against a Bill or restraining the president or parliament from passing a Bill.
However, a distinction could be made as in the latter case an injunction was sought
restraining the president from issuing assent to the Bill (with an observation the president could
return the Bill to parliament), whereas in the instant matter the SCPP Bill was already returned. In
the former case, the matter upheld an existing statute, whereas the instant Bill has not yet evolved
into law. More recent principles enunciated in SC judgments (cited above) would also support the
stance that the Supreme Court holds the requisite power to pass appropriate orders in given
circumstances.
The legislators must remember they are elected creatures created by the constitution which
provides both their powers and limitations, neither of which can be curtailed nor exceeded.
Parliament seems to be playing a dangerous game, whose ill effects will see long-term repercussions.
The government/parliamentarians like all others are duty bound to obey court orders and this
unconstitutional defiance needs to be immediately halted by keeping intact the separation of the
three separate branches prescribed under the constitution. These safeguards protect an envisaged
democratic state of the people and prevent personal fiefdoms from rising.
While currently the Supreme Court itself governs and regulates their procedure which they
collectively may choose to alter, it certainly appears beyond the legislative competence of the legislators.
(Source: The News)
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PREVENTION OF ELECTRONIC CRIMES ACT

M Umer Rafique (Lawyer)
Since the country’s founding in 1947, Pakistan has had a lengthy history of controversial laws.
Soon after independence, the country’s first constitution, which established a parliamentary form of
government, was drafted. However, the democratic system was short-lived, as the country’s military
intervened in 1958, imposing martial law and suspending the constitution. Over the next four
decades, Pakistan saw periods of military rule alternated with brief civilian regimes. During both
military and civilian governments, several authoritarian laws were enacted, including the Defense of
Pakistan Rules, which gave the military broad powers to arrest and detain individuals without trial,
and the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, which criminalized peaceful protest and assembly.
While discussing authoritarian laws, one cannot forget the Hudood Ordinances, which introduced
harsh punishments for “moral crimes.”
Even in today’s world, when there is a strong emphasis on the protection of fundamental
rights, Pakistan has not shied away from enacting such legislation. The Prevention of Electronic
Crimes Act (PECA) is a cybercrime legislation passed in Pakistan in 2016. While the goal of the law
was to deter illegal activity online, the law’s execution has raised several concerns about its impact
on fundamental rights.
One of the most noteworthy advantages of the PECA is that it criminalizes previously
unpunished electronic crimes such as hacking, identity theft, and cyberstalking. This gives law
enforcement agencies the legal authority to investigate and prosecute such violations. PECA also
requires internet service providers and other intermediaries to collaborate with law enforcement
agencies in the detection and prevention of cybercrime. Another beneficial aspect of PECA is that it
safeguards important information infrastructure, which is essential for national security. Regardless
of what has been discussed above, there are numerous concerns with the legislation, the most
pressing of which is that it contains measures that impair free expression and the right to privacy.
Further, it contains ambiguous and broad provisions that can be easily misinterpreted and abused.
Section 34 of the law, for example, criminalizes “glorification of an offence or a person convicted of a
crime,” which is overbroad and can be used to target journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens who
express their thoughts online. This provision also encourages self-censorship and prohibits people
from speaking out on issues of public concern, which is a violation of free expression. The provision
corresponds to Section 66A of India’s Information Technology Act, which was struck down by the
Indian Supreme Court in 2015 for being unconstitutional.
Another flaw of PECA is its lack of transparency and accountability. The law gives law
enforcement authorities broad powers to investigate and prosecute electronic crimes, with little
oversight. As a result, countless individuals have allegedly been wrongfully charged and punished.
It was seen in recent days that PECA has been abused to allegedly register fake cases against
workers of political parties as a tool for silencing opposition. Furthermore, sections in PECA violate
international human rights norms such as the right to privacy and due process. Section 37 of the
PECA, for example, permits the government to prohibit access to any internet content it deems
undesirable, with no judicial review. This provision violates the right to freedom of expression and
information, as well as the principle of proportionality.
In addition to the impediments provided above, another grave concern in the implementation
of the law is the insufficiency of law enforcement personnel designated for the task. The Cyber
Crime Wing of FIA was tasked with the implementation of PECA, which doesn’t have adequate
human resources for catering for the 231 million population of Pakistan. When the population of the
country is compared to the number of employees of the FIA’s CCW, an employee of the CCW is
responsible for more than 550,000 people.
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To summarize, PECA is a step in the right direction for combating cybercrime in Pakistan;
nevertheless, additional efforts can be taken to improve PECA’s implementation. To start with, the law
should be amended to eliminate unclear and overbroad provisions that can be abused. This will make
the law more clear and more certain, lowering the risk of violations of free expression and speech.
Secondly, the execution of PECA should be made more transparent and accountable. Law enforcement
authorities should be compelled to comply with due process and provide reasons for their actions, which
will serve to reduce the possibility of wrongful accusations and penalties. Thirdly, there should be
increased cybercrime awareness and training for law enforcement and the general public. This will aid in
the detection and prevention of cybercrime, as well as the effective enforcement of the law. Fourthly, as
envisioned in the law, special training should be conducted for Presiding Officers of courts along with
the prosecutors to enable them to handle such cases. Pakistan can also learn from India’s experience in
implementing similar legislation and take a more nuanced approach to ensure that fundamental rights
and freedoms are protected while ensuring national security.
(Source: Daily Times)

CONSTITUTIONALISM
The missing links
Hussain H Zaidi (An Islamabad-based columnist)
This April marked the golden jubilee of the adoption of the 1973 constitution. The last 50 years
have been a bumpy ride for the basic law of the land. Three times it was subverted (1977, 1999,
2007), and on quite a few occasions it was defaced through amendments that had the effect of
emaciating the parliamentary system that it puts in place.
Notwithstanding all such obstacles, the constitution has shown remarkable resilience in its
journey.
Not only does a constitution provide for distribution of powers between different state organs
(legislature, executive, judiciary) and tiers (central and local) of the government, it also, as Aristotle
once said, represents a way of life for a political society. It is the constitution which defines whether
the government is to be carried out in the interest of one (tyranny), a few (oligarchy), or many
(democracy); whether the government is based on the will and consent of the people; or whether the
citizens are merely passive spectators of the game of politics.
The constitution may also be seen as a compact between the governors and the governed in which
the powers of the former are defined and thus limited. These limitations take the form of civil and
political rights of the citizens. The legitimacy of the government is contingent upon observing these
limitations.
Not only that, by defining the scope and limits of the powers of different institutions and
providing a method for conflict resolution, the constitution provides for stability and predictability,
which is vital to the orderly economic life of a country.
The golden jubilee celebrations are meant to reiterate the great significance of
constitutionalism for the society, polity, and economy of Pakistan, and to pledge all-out efforts for
the supremacy of the basic law of the land. At the same time, the golden jubilee provides a sombre
occasion for reflecting on why, despite the passage of 50 years, the constitution remains vulnerable
to shocks and even susceptible to a sudden death.
As recent events unmistakably point out, this vulnerability is becoming more, rather than less,
pronounced. Are there any missing links owing to which constitutionalism still remains at best an
aspiration?
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The gravest threat constitutionalism faces anywhere in the world is the possible chasm
between what a constitution is on paper and how it actually works, between the interests it is meant
to serve and those it ends up serving. What prevents the government (all the three organs taken
together) – being the framer, custodian and enforcer of the constitution – from arrogating to itself
more powers at the expense of the citizens or otherwise acting arbitrarily in exercise of the powers it
already has? Likewise, what may prevent one of the organs or institutions from riding roughshod
over others or drawing upon the space of others?
The wider the chasm between a constitution in theory and in practice, the greater are the
prospects that the social contract that it represents will fall apart.
Constitutional provisions may themselves serve as a bulwark against deviation from the
constitution, but not always. At times, the text may be ambiguous and thus liable to divergent
interpretations. At times, two or more provisions may be mutually conflicting. At times, a
stakeholder may be on a firmer ground in principle but weaker in fact. At times, politics may stump
the law, making for a deliberately faulty reading or application of the constitution. Cases such as
these put constitutionalism at risk.
According to English jurist Dicey, the author of one of the best-known treatises on
constitutional law, behind the written provisions of the constitution stand constitutional
conventions. It is these conventions which underwrite that constitutionalism will be upheld even in
the absence of legal limits on the powers of the government.
These conventions represent social norms arising out of the practices of the given political
society. Though these norms do not have the force of law – and therefore aren’t justiciable – they are
invariably followed as if they expressed the collective conscience of society.
For instance, in the United Kingdom, conventions, and not the law, stipulate that the monarch
may not turn down a bill passed by parliament and that he may not sack the popularly elected
House of Commons, which may be dissolved only on the advice of the prime minister. The
underlying notion is that the king is only a figurehead and the real powers rest with the cabinet
representing the will of the people.
In Pakistan, the most obvious of the missing links is lack of constitutional conventions
corresponding to the written provisions of the constitution. To cite an example, let’s go back no
more than one year. In April 2022, a no-confidence motion was tabled against the then prime
minister, Imran Khan. The motion was consistent with both the letter and spirit of the constitution,
which prescribes that at all times the PM must enjoy the confidence of the majority of the members
of the National Assembly.
As most of his coalition partners parted ways with him, it was evident that Khan no longer
commanded the support of the majority. But instead of the PM facing the National Assembly or
resigning in a dignified manner, the ruling party got the no-confidence motion declared
unconstitutional by the speaker, whose office is supposed to be bipartisan, knowing well that his
ruling is final – no remedy is available against it within the house.
Although the Supreme Court intervened to have the motion voted upon – and that too after a
nerve-shattering drama in the house – the matter should not have landed in the court. Instead, the
speaker should have allowed the motion to run its course. However, absence of conventions
nullified the relevant unequivocal constitutional provisions.
The failure to evolve healthy constitutional conventions brings us to two other missing links,
viz public ethics and culture. Political structure including the constitution is one part of the political
system; the other is political culture. It is the political culture which largely defines how the political
system will actually work. Political culture is a subculture within the broader culture. Hence, most
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of the ills that afflict a given culture also bear upon its political subculture. Here three of those
interconnected ills with reference to our society may be mentioned.
The first is the cult of the personality – whether of a spiritual or worldly leader or of a hybrid
one. A cult leader is regarded by the followers as an epitome of virtue and wisdom and thus a
complete stranger to the intellectual or moral lapses which the ordinary mortals are subject to.
His words and deeds become the criteria for judging right and wrong, good and evil, and in a
more technical sense, constitutional and unconstitutional. Nothing is as lethal to the growth of
institutions as a powerful personality cult. Not only that, cults preclude a fundamental consensus on
what is appropriate political behavior, for they don’t allow such definitions to be standardized.
Two, society is becoming increasingly sanctimonious. The cult-inspired self-righteous start
with the assumption – which in their case is an axiom – that ethically they are supreme. While others
may be actuated by egoistical motivations, they are guided solely by altruistic considerations. While
others may be mired in corruption, they are clean as a whistle. The assumption leads to the
conclusion that others should be presumed to be guilty, sinners and culprits, without giving them a
fair chance to speak for themselves or even when they’re proved otherwise. When it gains
considerable currency, such a mode of thinking becomes a narrative.
A sanctimonious society has little room – as well as use – for dialogue, debate, logic and
argumentation for addressing public issues. Such methods are dismissed as a sign of moral
weakness. Instead, it relies on sanctions, force and coercion in dealing with disagreement and
dissent. In such a society constitutionalism will remain at best on sufferance.
(Source: The News)

A STAND FOR FREEDOm OF EXPRESSION

Mahmood Ahmed (An advocate of the High Court and a PhD scholar)
The Constitution of Pakistan is the highest law of the land.It guarantees certain fundamental
rights for all citizens, including the right to freedom of expression. Article 19 of the constitution
stipulates that “every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there
shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of
the glory of Islam or the integrity, security, or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly
relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
commission of or incitement to an offence.”
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of expression, Section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal
Code (PPC) criminalises sedition, which refers to the act of “bringing or attempting to bring into hatred
or contempt, or exciting or attempting to excite disaffection towards the government established by law
in Pakistan.” The law has been used frequently by the authorities to stifle dissent and silence critics.
Recourse to sedition laws to restrict free speech is not an occurrence exclusive to Pakistan.
Many countries worldwide have similar laws, enforced frequently to silence the opposition and
suppress political dissent. The interpretation and enforcement of these laws differ significantly from
one country to another, and they are often challenged legally and subjected to public scrutiny.
One of the primary concerns with the implementation of sedition laws is the ambiguous and
excessively broad language employed in the statute. The definition of sedition is often formulated in
expansive terms, making it difficult to determine what actions qualify as seditious. This lack of clarity
can result in the abuse and misuse of the law, as it can be interpreted to encompass a vast array of
activities that may not necessarily aim to incite hatred or disaffection towards the government.
The enforcement of sedition laws can adversely affect exercise of human rights and enjoyment
of civil liberties. When individuals fear voicing their opinions against the government or its policies,
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they may be more susceptible to accepting abuses of power and violations of their rights. This can
result in the erosion of the rule of law and a culture of impunity for those in positions of authority.
Section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, is unconstitutional and ultra vires of the
constitution as it blatantly contravenes Article 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 19 and 19-A. Since 1947, the sedition
law (Section 124-A of the PPC) has been recklessly employed as a tool to exploit and restrict the right
to free speech and expression, which is guaranteed under Article 19 of the constitution.
The sedition law, inherited from the subcontinent’s colonial rulers, is identical in both India
and Pakistan. This provision was extensively used to suppress political dissent during India’s anti-
colonial struggle. In May 2022, a three-judge bench led by a former chief justice of India in
SGVombatkerevs Union of India directed the Centre and the States to suspend all pending trials,
appeals and proceedings related to charges framed under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC), which pertains to the offenxe of sedition. This was to be done until the central government
completes the promised exercise of reconsidering and re-examining the provision.
In 2019, a group of students from a university in the Punjab was charged under Section 124-A
for organising a protest against the increasing cost of education. In 2018, a former senator faced
charges under Section 124-A for delivering a speech in which he advocated for the independence of
the Balochistan province. In 2020, a journalist was charged under the same section for reporting on
the alleged corruption of a government official. These cases represent only a few of the numerous
instances where this law has been exploited to suppress valid criticism of the government.
Lahore High Court declared the sedition law ultra vires of the constitution and struck down
Section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, stating that it is unconstitutional and violates the
fundamental rights of citizens. The court held that the Sedition Law is a relic of the colonial era and
has no place in a modern democratic society. It further stated that the law is vague and open to
abuse and has been used to suppress the right to freedom of speech and expression. Additionally,
the court noted that the Sedition Law is inconsistent with other provisions of the constitution, such
as the right to equality and protection of the law.
Recently Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf leader Shahbaz Gillwas prosecuted under sedition charges.
Other lawmakers, including MNAs MohsinDawar and AliWazir, are also facing prosecution on
similar charges. JournalistsArshad Sharif, KhawarGhumman, Adeel Raja, and Sadaf Abdul Jabbar
have also faced prosecution on sedition charges. MakhdoomJaved Hashmi, a former federal
minister, was sentenced to 23 years in prison on sedition charges earlier.
The sedition law had long been under criticism for its incompatibility with modern democratic
values. Many countries, such as the United Kingdom and India, have repealed or significantly restricted
their sedition laws due to their incompatibility with democratic principles. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has also called for the abolition of sedition laws, citing their restriction of freedom of
expression and incompatibility with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Additionally, the law has been criticised for its inconsistency with other provisions of the constitution.
Article 4 guarantees the right to the protection of the law, while Article 25 guarantees equal rights to all
citizens regardless of religion, race, caste or sex. The sedition law discriminates against those who
express dissentand subjects them to unfair treatment by law enforcement.
The ruling striking down Pakistan’s sedition law is expected to have significant implications
for other laws that have been used to stifle opposition in the country. This decision sends a clear
message that the government cannot use law to silence dissent or suppress critical voices. The
effectiveness of the ruling will depend on its implementation and whether other laws are used to fill
the void left by the sedition law. It is worth noting that the ruling could face opposition from those
who benefit from the law’s existence. Nevertheless, the court’s decision to invalidate the sedition
law is a step towards strengthening democracy and protecting human rights in Pakistan.
(Source: TNS)
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Middle East
WHAT THE SAUDI-IRAN DEAL MEANS FOR GEOPOLITICS
Qasim A. Moini
In terms of its impact on global geopolitics, the détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia,
brokered by the People’s Republic of China, is nothing short of seismic.
In March, high-ranking security officials from both countries met in Beijing under Chinese
auspices and, to the utter shock of most followers of global politics, announced that they were re-
establishing diplomatic relations that had been severed after a series of unfortunate events in 2016.
The deal was sealed when the foreign ministers of both states met again in Beijing, earlier this
month.
There are three major takeaways from the Saudi-Iranian thaw: firstly, that the decline of
American power in the Middle East is well underway; secondly, that Chinese diplomacy is growing
and making its presence felt in unexpected places; and thirdly, that there are opportunities in the
détente between Riyadh and Tehran that Pakistan can benefit from, should it play its cards right and
put its own chaotic house in order.
But before we discuss these takeaways, a brief overview of the Saudi-Iranian relationship over
the past few decades is in order.
Toxic history, blurred lines
The reason for the global surprise at the announcement of the re-establishment of relations
between Riyadh and Tehran has much to do with the absolutely toxic nature of ties between Saudi
Arabia and Iran in the run-up to the meeting in Beijing. While many in the Western mainstream
media, and some in Western academia, frame the Saudi-Iranian confrontation as a ‘cosmic’ Shia-
Sunni or Arab-Ajam battle raging since the dawn of time, the reality is a bit more complex.
While it is true that sect/ethnicity have a part to play in the rivalry, and that will be discussed
particularly in the Pakistan context, the discord between Iran and Saudi Arabia is, arguably, mostly
geopolitical. Up till now, Saudi Arabia was firmly in the American camp, while Iran left the US-led
bloc after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. From 1979 onwards, the two major Gulf powers have been
on diametrically opposed geopolitical trajectories, clashing through proxies across the region.
But to illustrate how sectarian/ethnic lines blur in this conflict, we should note how
Palestinian resistance group Hamas, a Sunni outfit, is in the Iranian camp. In fact, the most vocal and
organised pro-Palestine demonstrations are held worldwide under Iranian auspices every Ramazan,
specifically on Jumma-tul-Wida [the last Friday of Ramazan], in the shape of Yaum Al-Quds [Al
Quds Day], which dates back to the era of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — the spiritual father of
Iran’s revolution — himself.
On the other hand, Shia-majority Azerbaijan, close to Israel and by extension the US, has testy
if not outrightly hostile relations with Iran. Furthermore, Persian Iran came to the aid of Arab Syria
when protests, backed by the West and the Arab states, broke out against Bashar Al Assad’s regime
during the Arab Spring. Suffice to say, Assad would most likely not have survived the revolt were it
not for Iranian and Russian military help.
Coming back to Saudi-Iran relations, the major rupture was witnessed in 2016, after Riyadh
executed Saudi Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. The late cleric was a vocal critic of the House
of Saud and was politically active in the oil-rich Shia-majority east of the kingdom. The reaction to
the execution in Iran was considerable, as mobs attacked Saudi missions in Tehran as well as in the
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holy city of Mashhad. Though ties were not exactly cordial before the execution, relations nosedived
very quickly after these events.
For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the actual power behind the
Saudi throne, compared Iran’s Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei to Hitler
in 2017 and talked of taking “the battle” into Iran. Reacting to the Hitler jibe, the Iranian foreign
ministry termed MBS “immature” and asked him to ponder over the fate of other Middle Eastern
strongmen.
Considering the aforementioned toxicity, the change of tone and cautious smiles on Saudi and
Iranian lips in Beijing signals a major shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. This begs the question: just
what changed so dramatically that, two states that had up till very recently been at daggers drawn,
were now talking about peace and Islamic brotherhood?
Perhaps one impetus behind the détente, particularly for the Saudis, was the feeling that Pax
Americana, at least in the region if not globally, was in decline, and the states of the Mideast would
have to sort out their problems on their own.
Decline of Pax Americana?
Perhaps a major wake-up call in Riyadh came in the shape of the 2019 drone attacks targeting
Aramco’s oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The attacks, hitting critical oil infrastructure, were a
gut punch for the Saudis. Though the pro-Iran Houthi militia of Yemen claimed responsibility for
the attacks, there was widespread speculation that the operation was more likely the handiwork of
Iran-backed militias in Iraq.
Regardless of the geographical origins of the attacks, the consensus in Washington and Riyadh
was that this was Iran’s handiwork. Yet the US, which maintains a web of military bases in the
region, did nothing under President Donald Trump’s watch to confront Iran.
This, and Trump’s earlier boast that the Saudi king would not last “two weeks” without the
protection of the American military machine, most likely got those who matter in Riyadh to rethink
their dependence on Uncle Sam.
Under Joe Biden, things have been no different. The US president, when still a candidate for
the White House, promised to make Saudi Arabia a pariah in the wake of the brutal murder in
Turkey of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Though Biden didn’t exactly follow up on his threat, his
visit to the kingdom in August last year was no spectacular success.
The US leader was not exactly given the red-carpet welcome usually reserved by the Saudis
for visiting American presidents. Moreover, the Saudis have refused to toe the American line on the
Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Saudi foreign minister was in Moscow last month and, by all accounts,
the visit appeared to be a cordial one. Furthermore, the decision earlier this month by Opec+ to cut
back on oil production and raise prices was termed by the US as “inadvisable”.
Of course, this is not to suggest the Saudis and other states that have enjoyed long defence and
political relations with the US are making a clean break from Washington. However, it can be said
with a fair degree of certainty that Riyadh and others in the Gulf are hedging their bets and
preparing for a scenario where America isn’t the only game in town.
Enter China
Another noteworthy aspect of the Saudi-Iran peace deal was the fact that China had helped
broker it. In the modern era, China has mostly been a bit player in the Middle East. So, getting two
of the region’s most bitter rivals to make peace was seen as a major diplomatic victory for Beijing.
Writing in The Cradle, Brazilian journalist and author Pepe Escobar termed the breakthrough a
“Chinese win-win”.
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The apparent Chinese interest in brokering the deal seems to be influenced by Beijing’s desire
to see stability in key Gulf energy markets, as well as to help bring to fruition Chinese President Xi
Jinping’s dream of China-led Eurasian integration under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative,
of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is also part.
Of course making America, China’s major geopolitical rival, look bad in the process is an
added bonus.
It is also true that China comes to the table without any colonial/imperial baggage, at least
where the Middle East is concerned, which is why it must have gained the trust of both Riyadh and
Tehran. Unlike the US, China has not attempted regime change in the region and has not encircled
Iran with a ring of military bases.
The fact is, the US could never have been an unbiased broker in the Saudi-Iran dispute, just as
it has never been a neutral player in the Arab-Israeli peace process (or whatever remains of that
doomed experiment). The post-1979 US-Iran relationship has been one of open confrontation, and
the Trump administration’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, as the Iran nuclear deal is known, convinced those who matter in Tehran that the US cannot
be trusted.
Where China’s growing role in the region is concerned, it appears it has caught the Americans
off guard. As reported by The Wall Street Journal, the CIA chief apparently told MBS that the US
had been “blindsided” by the Saudi rapprochement with Iran and Syria.
A changing international order
This reflects a larger tectonic shift in the international order where, as mentioned above,
American unipolarity is on the wane and a new multipolar order, led by Russia and China, and
supported by the BRICS states [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa], is being born.
In fact, the Russian invasion of Ukraine last year was the first major sign that the
US/European post-World War II ‘rules-based order’ was crumbling. Though the Russian invasion of
a sovereign state was unsavoury, Moscow felt it was being encircled by Nato [the US-led North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation], and that the Cold War-era alliance was knocking at the gates. And
most of the Global South, though sympathising with Ukraine, refused to buy the Western line that
this was an existential war between democracy and autocracy.
China’s intervention in Middle Eastern diplomacy is another major sign that the West-led
international order is on life support. What is more, the decision by major energy producers to
consider trade in the Chinese yuan spells a mortal danger to the petrodollar. According to Escobar,
“The high-speed de-dollarisation train has already left the station” and Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s
decision to cut energy deals in the Chinese currency means that the era of the petroyuan is upon us.
Interestingly, Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, during a recent trip to China, agreed
to trade in the Brazilian and Chinese currencies, pointedly asking: “Why should every country have
to be tied to the dollar for trade?”
Can Pakistan benefit?
Naturally, the question for Pakistan arises whether it can benefit from the Saudi-Iranian
rapprochement?
This is all the more important as Pakistan’s relations with two of the protagonists in this joint
production — Saudi Arabia and China — are deep and strategic, and while Iran is a neighbour,
Pakistan has been unable to fully develop bilateral ties with Tehran for fear of running afoul of the
Saudis and Americans.
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But before we discuss the obstacles standing in the way of better relations, and the
possibilities a Saudi-Iranian peace deal brings, let us briefly examine the impact of the Riyadh-
Tehran rivalry on Pakistan.
Many have theorised, somewhat simplistically, that Pakistan is a mere battlefield in the Saudi-
Iranian sectarian proxy war. This is only partially true because, as argued above, the Saudi-Iran
rivalry is mostly geopolitical, though there is no escaping the sectarian angle, and what happens in
the Middle East has a definite impact on this country.
But why is Pakistan particularly influenced by the Saudi-Iran rivalry more so than, say,
Indonesia or Mali?
Emotional connections
Perhaps the answer lies in demographics, ideology and geography. Because Saudi Arabia
hosts Islam’s two holiest cities in the Hejaz, there is an emotional and spiritual attachment most
Pakistanis have for the kingdom. This is why any criticism of the Saudi state is construed as criticism
of the custodians of the holy places, even though there are doctrinal differences between the schools
of thought followed in the kingdom and in Pakistan.
Though both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are Sunni-majority states, the majority in the
kingdom adheres to the Hanbali/Salafi and Shafi’i schools, whereas most Pakistani Sunnis adhere to
the Deobandi and Barelvi sub-sects of the Hanafi school.
On the other hand, Pakistan has one of the biggest Shia Isna Ashari populations in the world,
who share the official school of thought of the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is why, though many
Pakistani Shias may not subscribe to the theory of wilayat-i-faqih (the foundational ideology of
revolutionary Iran as espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini) and may not follow Ayatollah Khamenei as
their marja-i-taqleed [object of emulation], Iran is still seen as a ‘defender’ of Shias and Shia causes.
Considering the above-mentioned reasons, political developments in both states resonate with
Pakistanis of different persuasions. For example, when the National Assembly passed a resolution
against participating in the Saudi-led invasion of Yemen targeting the Houthis (who are Zaydi
Shias) in 2015, the reaction from religious parties was entirely negative. Worthies attending a ‘Difa-i-
Harmain’ conference in Islamabad urged the state to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia and protect
it from real or imagined Houthi threats.
Similarly, when the US assassinated senior Iranian military commander Gen Qassem
Soleimani in a 2020 drone strike in Iraq, a massive procession of men, women and children marched
up to the US consulate in Karachi to condemn the killing. The general was seen as a mudafi-i-haram
[defender of the sacred], leading the effort to protect the holy places in Iraq and Syria from the self-
styled Islamic State and other terrorist groups.
Considering the influence Saudi Arabia and Iran command on Pakistan’s Sunni and Shia
communities, the rapprochement between the two regional powers could have a calming effect on
communal relations in the country. At least, it is hoped that peace across the Gulf would take the
wind out of the sails of murderous sectarian groups that up till very recently operated with relative
ease in this country.
Economic benefits
Apart from matters of faith, Pakistan can also stand to gain economically if the Saudi-Iran
détente develops further.
One of the major projects that could benefit is the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran has
built its portion of the pipeline, Pakistan has yet to do the needful and, unless the pipeline is built by
next year, this country faces a hefty $18 billion penalty.
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Work has been stalled on our side apparently out of fear of angering the Saudis, and attracting
American sanctions. As far as the Saudis are concerned, Pakistan should be able to convince them,
now that Riyadh is itself talking about improving commercial ties with Iran.
As for American sanctions, Pakistan must make a robust case that, if other states in the region
(read India) can trade with a sanctioned Russia, Pakistan must be free to trade with Iran. Pakistan is
hungry for affordable hydrocarbons and, if the price is right, Iranian gas could help address
crippling shortages that have already begun to hit the domestic consumer.
Another project that can be pursued is the Gwadar oil refinery that the Saudis have expressed
interest in. Though the Iranians may be wary of a Saudi facility within a hundred kilometres of their
border with Pakistan, in the changed geopolitical circumstances, Islamabad can make the case that
there is no threat to Tehran from the project. Moreover, China will be eager to link up its trade and
energy corridors — the new Silk Roads — with the Gulf, and Pakistan, thanks to its geography, can
play a vital role in these linkages.
But for Pakistan to reap the fruits of Saudi-Iranian détente and Chinese commercial ambitions,
it must address its internal discord and ensure that all pillars of the state — the treasury, the
opposition and the establishment — are on one page where pursuing proactive geo-economic and
geopolitical relations in the region are concerned.
Major foreign policy initiatives should not change with changes in government, while this
country’s rulers must resist foreign pressure and work to keep Pakistan’s interests first.
Dividends and threats
The Saudi-Iran peace deal holds tremendous potential for both states, the larger Middle East,
as well as the greater Eurasian region. However, decades of hostility between Riyadh and Tehran is
unlikely to disappear overnight. The peace process will be slow but steady should China maintain
its efforts to keep both parties on board.
Yet, there will be spoilers aplenty. For example, the US is definitely not pleased and has been
publicly sulking and raising doubts about China’s role in bringing the cross-Gulf rivals together.
Israel is also quite unhappy about the developments in the region. The Saudi-Iran peace deal has, for
the time being, scuttled Israeli efforts to coax the Arabs into encircling and, one day, attacking Iran.
Knowing Tel Aviv’s expertise in and propensity for cloak and dagger games, it would not be
wrong to suggest that Israel will try its best to sabotage the deal signed in Beijing. This is something
both the Saudis and Iranians must be wary of.
However, should normalisation proceed apace, it will bring peace to a shattered, war-scarred
region. Yemen, for example, which has been devastated by years of war, may begin the journey of
recovery. Saudi officials have already met representatives of the Houthis, and hopefully a
permanent ceasefire and peace plan involving all Yemeni factions can materialise soon, with the
blessings of Riyadh and Tehran.
Iraq and Syria are also states that have been devastated by Western-led wars of occupation
and regime change operations, respectively, while also being theatres of Saudi-Iran hostility. The
Syrian foreign minister was recently in Jeddah, which indicates that the rehabilitation of Damascus
within the Arab fold has begun, while Iraq reportedly played a central part in hosting Saudi-Iranian
talks before the breakthrough in Beijing. Lebanon and Bahrain can also benefit if Saudi Arabia and
Iran highlight the message of intra-Muslim unity.
Ever since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has been wracked by colonial
intrigue, internecine power struggles and a near-constant lack of stability. After a century or so of
instability, the region now has a chance to exorcise the ghosts of the past and work for a common,
prosperous future.
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This will not be easy, since major questions — such as that of the freedom of Palestine —
remain unresolved. But perhaps the Saudi-Iran détente, with a little help from their Chinese friends,
can be the harbinger of better things to come for the region, and for the Eurasian region in general.
(Source: Prism)

CHINA DEFUSES MIDDLE EAST POWDER KEG

China has pulled off a spectacular diplomatic surprise at a time when the United States and its
NATO allies are sleepwalking into a third world war over Ukraine. Beijing brokered an unexpected
rapprochement between the two Middle Eastern heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and Iran, who have
long been engaged in proxy wars to undercut each other’s efforts for hegemony in a region fraught
with a bruising turf war.
They have now agreed to restore full diplomatic relations broken off by Saudi Arabia
following the ransacking of its embassy in Tehran by a vigilante mob over the execution of a
dissident Shiite cleric Nimr el-Nimr in January 2016. The deal, officially named ‘Joint Trilateral
Statement’, binds each side to “respect the principles of sovereignty and non-interference” in the
other’s internal affairs. It also seeks to revive a moribund 2001 security cooperation accord, as well
as a 1998 pact on trade, economy, and investment between them.
In a quick follow-up to the Beijing breakthrough, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz invited
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Riyadh which, according to Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein
Amir-Abdollahian, he has accepted.
Why it is significant?
The Gulf states, oil behemoths but military minnows, had scaled back relations with Tehran to
appease their Arab big brother in 2016, though some of them have recently mended the ties. All of
these monarchies, especially the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, have greeted the Saudi-
Iran détente with optimism, as did Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey.
More importantly, the deal has been hailed by the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah
in Lebanon, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Apparently, the Middle East is having an epiphany that
war and conflict would only perpetuate instability in the region already wrecked by decades of
turbulence spawned by the American imperialist approach.
The Iran-Saudi relationship has long been troubled by mutual distrust and acrimony as both
vied for the leadership of the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia, a leading Sunni Muslim power, looks at
Iran, a Shiite theocracy, as revisionist that sows chaos through the non-state proxies it controls in
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and seeks to export its ‘revolution’ to other Muslim states. Iran, on
the other hand, considers Riyadh as a rival which has for decades sided with the United States and
other Western powers hostile towards the Islamic Republic. For this reason, the two states have
always found themselves in opposite camps in many of the region’s wars, especially the ongoing
conflicts in Yemen and Syria.
What’s in it for Iran?
The China-negotiated deal offers a win-win for all.
If the détente truly holds, it could ease Iran’s diplomatic isolation triggered by the unilateral
pullout by former US President Donald Trump from the 2015 nuclear accord and the reluctance of
his successor, Joe Biden, to revive it and reengage with the Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia could
offer the much-needed cash injection into the Iranian economy whacked by years of debilitating
Western sanctions.
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Riyadh could also dial down criticism of the Iranian regime on the London-based Persian TV
channel, Iran International, which it secretly funds and has become popular among liberal Iranian
viewers worldwide. Moreover, the Saudis could disengage from the US-led proxy war to topple the
Bashar Al-Asad regime in Syria and normalise the relationship with Damascus as its regional ally
UAE has already done. Such de-escalation could also frustrate the US effort to cobble up an Israel-
led security alliance of the regional countries against Iran.
What’s in it for the Saudis?
For Saudi Arabia, the single biggest gain from Iran rapprochement is possible extrication from
the Yemen war which has become a ‘strategic failure’ and continues to drain the kingdom’s
resources at a time when the reformist young would-be monarch Mohammed bin Salman is seeking
to diversify the economy, reduce dependence on oil exports, and liberalise society as part of his
‘Vision 2030’ to make Saudi Arabia a regional financial hub for global businesses and tourism.
The brazen Houthis drone and missile strikes on targets deep inside the kingdom, including
one on a Saudi Aramco refinery in Riyadh, in March 2022, highlighted the challenge to the Crown
Prince’s ambitions. The success of ‘Vision 2030’ largely depends on an end to the expensive war in
Yemen which, according to some estimates, has cost the Saudis $265 billion over the past seven
years. Riyadh knows Iran can help. Tehran may nudge the Houthis into negotiating a peace deal
with the Saudis to end the grueling war. The Saudis could also seek security guarantees from Iran
that it would rein in its proxies and prevent them from stoking tensions in the volatile region.
But let’s be pragmatic. This deal would not solve the visceral mistrust between the two
regional rivals overnight, but the fact that they have agreed to lower temperatures and solve their
stubborn geopolitical problems step by step is a watershed development. And the mediator is also
cognizant of this. “Make no mistake. One dialogue cannot solve all problems,” says Wang Di, the
director-general at the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs in the Chinese Foreign
Ministry. “We have noted that the [two] sides have expressed their willingness to improve their
relations through dialogue and consultation,” he adds.
How China pulled off the feat?
The Saudi-Iran breakthrough is not entirely out of the blue. It followed much preparatory
work. The Gulf monarchies have been increasingly chafed at America’s condescending diplomacy
and whimsical Middle East policy, going from one extreme of Barack Obama’s ‘disengagement’ to
the other of Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran. These military minnows fretted that if the
Saudi-Iran rivalry escalated into a full-blown regional conflict, they would be the most vulnerable to
the military wrath of the Islamic Republic.
Perhaps it was this fear that prompted Iraq and Oman to mediate a Tehran-Riyadh icebreaker
in April 2021. It was followed by several rounds of talks between intelligence, security, and
diplomatic officials from the two states over the next two years. The process continued in fits and
starts but yielded nothing tangible. Subsequent regional tensions stalled the process until China
stepped in.
In early Dec 2022, President Xi Jinping travelled to Riyadh for the first-ever Chinese-Arab
summit where Beijing reportedly offered its good offices to defuse tensions between the two
regional powers. Saudi-Iranian contacts soon resumed as their foreign ministers exchanged niceties
at the Baghdad Conference in Jordan, followed by more substantive conversations at the
inauguration of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in early January. A month later, China also
discussed its plan to host a Riyadh-Tehran dialogue with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during his
state visit to Beijing, the first by an Iranian leader in more than two decades.
What made China the ideal peacemaker was its equally excellent relationship with both Iran
and Saudi Arabia. Beijing has been Iran’s largest trade partner for more than a decade with their
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bilateral trade reaching almost $16 billion in 2022. The two countries have also signed a 25-year
strategic agreement to strengthen economic and security cooperation. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and
China signed a bonanza of agreements, including a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement,
during President Xi’s visit to the kingdom in Dec 2022. Beijing is also Riyadh’s largest trading
partner, with bilateral trade worth a whopping $87.3 billion in 2021. Chinese exports to the kingdom
reached $30.3 billion, while imports from Saudi Arabia totalled $57 billion.
The Chinese mediation is perfectly in line with President Xi’s ‘Global Security Initiative (GSI)’
which, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, aims to “eliminate the root causes of international
conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more
stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development
in the world.” The core concepts of this vision include a commitment to respecting the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all countries, taking their legitimate security concerns seriously, and
peacefully resolving disputes between countries through dialogue.
President Xi’s vision of peace through development by enhancing ‘shared security
perceptions’ is in sharp contrast to the American ‘traditional security perception’ that focuses on
forming exclusive military alliances to pursue security by defeating the enemy which leaves little
room for non-alignment and sovereign decision-making as it coerces nations into taking sides in its
divisive ‘Us vs Them’ approach. The US has developed a hegemonic playbook that it uses to stage
regime changes, stoke regional disputes, and even directly launch wars under the guise of
promoting democracy, freedom, and human rights, according to a report ‘US hegemony and its
perils’ released by China’s Foreign Ministry in February. The US is obsessed with war because its
‘war economy’ survives and thrives on conflict while imperiling world peace.
What’s in it for China?
The United States has welcomed this proverbial game changer and expressed no overt
concerns over China’s role in fence-mending between the two old foes. “…it is something that we
worked on through our own effective combination of deterrence and diplomacy,” said White House
national security spokesperson John Kirby in his knee-jerk reaction. Notwithstanding the guarded
optimism, the US could be reading it as a sign of China’s growing influence in a region where
Washington has for decades been an undisputed ‘guarantor of security’ for the oil-rich monarchies.
The US policymakers would construe the China-mandated deal as a message that Beijing is
pursuing power projection in the Middle East as part of its global ambitions to challenge America’s
so-called ‘rule-based world order’. They may also interpret it as a threat to the waning American
influence in a region where China has always avoided taking sides in geopolitical and strategic
conflicts despite its massive economic and financial interests. But Wang Di has sought to quash
speculation that ‘selfish geopolitical interests’ pushed China to mediate between Tehran and Riyadh.
“We do not seek any selfish interests or aim to fulfil the so-called vacuum,” he says.
The extraordinary diplomatic feat would reflect China’s role as a responsible ‘great power’
and Beijing may flaunt it as perfect manifestation of President Xi’s vision of “a community with a
shared future of mankind.” The foreign minister, Wang Yi, has rightly described it as a “victory for
dialogue and peace” as he said that Beijing would continue to “play a constructive role in
addressing tough global issues”. Days later President Xi, on his visit to Moscow, unfurled a plan for
a negotiated end to the Ukraine war, but sadly the US-led NATO warmongers would not listen to
any voice of reason as they are obsessed with inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia no matter if it
costs global peace.
The Saudi-Iran reconciliation is a truly transformational development that would not only
help ease regional strain but would also contribute to global peace. This prestigious accomplishment
of China warrants acknowledgement. If the longest-serving American war president, Barack Obama,
could paradoxically be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, President Xi deserves it the most to enter the
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pantheon of laureates for potentially defusing a smoldering powder keg that could pulverise the
entire Middle East.
(Source: T-Magazine)

SAUDI IRANIAN DÉTENTE POTENTIALLY SPARKS PARADIGM SHIFTS

James M. Dorsey (award-winning journalist and scholar, a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore's Middle East Institute)
Chinese mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran potentially signals paradigm shifts in
Middle Eastern diplomacy and alliances.
The mediation suggests a more productive approach than that of the United States by seeking
to manage rather than resolve conflicts based on principles enunciated by China in 2021.
The successful mediation between the Middle East’s foremost archrivals also indicates it could
lead to a broader regional détente.
Sources in Bahrain said the Shiite-majority Gulf state ruled by a Sunni Muslim minority might
be on the verge of restoring diplomatic relations with Iran. The sources said Bahrain and Iran were
already exchanging messages.
Long at the forefront of disputes between Iran and various Gulf states, Bahrain would be the
only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member without formal relations with the Islamic republic
when Riyadh and Tehran exchange ambassadors in accordance with the agreement negotiated by
China.
GCC groups Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman.
In what looks like a possible second wave of détente in the Middle East, Egypt, Morocco, and
Jordan could be next in line.
In the first wave, Saudi Arabia and the UAE buried their hatchets with Qatar and Turkey; the
UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco established diplomatic relations with Israel; and Israel and Turkey
patched up their differences.
To be sure, the dialing down of tensions without parties making major political concessions
and the revival of economic ties meant countries were no longer showing their fangs. Instead, they
put their differences on ice.
Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to be travelling down the same road.
The two countries agreed to no longer show their fangs, with the kingdom allegedly
promising to stop funding media and groups opposed to the regime in Tehran.
In return, Iran reportedly pledged to help end the eight-year-long war in Yemen and prevent
Houthi rebels from striking at targets in Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denied that
Yemen had been discussed in Beijing.
At the same time, the agreement appears to have potentially put a monkey wrench in
geopolitical maneuvering by Israel and various Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. It also may
spark new cleavages and exasperate existing ones.
The agreement has dampened Israeli and US hopes of a united Saudi-Emirati-Israeli front
against Iran that could risk a military confrontation.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia will likely have been fortified in its resolve to establish formal
relations with the Jewish state only when there is a solution to the Palestinian problem.
In a sign of the times, Saudi Arabia this week prevented Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen
from attending a UN World Tourism Organisation conference in the kingdom by refusing to discuss
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security arrangements for the visit. Mr. Cohen’s attendance would have been a Cabinet-level Israeli
official’s first public visit to the kingdom.
While the timing may have been coincidental, the agreement put a reported Emirati decision
to stop purchasing Israeli military equipment in a larger context.
Israeli media reports said the decision had been prompted by Israel’s domestic political crisis,
which raised doubts about Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s ability to control his far-right,
ultra-nationalist, and ultra-religious coalition partners.
The UAE has forged close economic and security ties with Israel since establishing diplomatic
relations with the Jewish state, together with Bahrain and Morocco.
Last month, Israel and the UAE unveiled a jointly developed unmanned surveillance,
reconnaissance, and mine-detecting vessel.
Ali Shamkani, the Iranian national security official who negotiated the deal with Saudi Arabia
in Beijing, was in the UAE this week to meet President Mohammed bin Zayed. The Emirates has
been out front in reaching out to Iran in recent years.
The Saudi and Emirati moves prompted Efraim Halevy, the former head of Mossad, the Israeli
intelligence agency and a long-time dove, to wonder aloud whether Israel, too, should reach out to
Iran.
“This should be the moment for Israel to analyze the situation and, inter alia, to determine
whether this is an opportune moment to launch a very careful positive probe in the direction of
Tehran,” Mr. Halevy opined in an article in Haaretz, Israel’s foremost liberal newspaper.
In a twist of irony, the UAE halt to Israeli arms acquisitions makes a Saudi recognition of
Israel any time soon even less likely.
Even so, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement appears to have energized an emerging cleavage
between the kingdom and the UAE, onetime allies who increasingly are becoming economic and
political competitors.
The cleavage has prompted the UAE to suddenly speed up the gradual normalisation of
relations with Qatar, two years after the lifting in 2021 of the Emirati-Saudi-led diplomatic and
economic boycott of the Gulf state because of its alleged ties to Islamists, including the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Together with Bahrain, the UAE has, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, been slow in injecting
warmth into the normalisation.
That appears to have changed.
In the last week, the UAE reportedly withdrew its bid to host the 2026 World Bank and
International Monetary Fund meeting and said it would support Qatar as a potential host instead.
The UAE also unblocked Qatari news websites it had blocked during the boycott. These
include the Al Jazeera television network, the London-based The New Arab newspaper, and the
state-run Qatar News Agency.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia, which like the UAE, has designated the Brotherhood as a
terrorist organisation, appears to be cautiously reviving ties to figures allegedly associated with the
Brotherhood.
Saudi Arabia has long been more ambivalent towards the Brotherhood, a particular bete noir
of the UAE.
Prominent British Muslims, whom conservative members of the Muslim community and
other conservative groups accuse of having links to Islamist organisations, including the
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Brotherhood, earlier this month were invited to a two-day conference in London hosted by
Mohammed al-Issa, the secretary general of the Muslim World League.
The conservative critics took exception to an allegedly prominent role given at the conference
for British and European Muslim leaders to the Muslim Council of Britain, an organisation that has
been blacklisted for much of the past 14 years by successive British governments.
The government refuses to engage with the Council because its then deputy director-general
called in 2009 for violence against Israel and condoned attacks on the Royal Navy if it tried to
intercept arms for Hamas, the Islamist group controlling Gaza, from being smuggled into the Strip.
A widely respected British academic described the blacklisting as “a political decision from
the rightwing” that lacked evidence. He said the allegations of Islamist connections were “off the
mark” and that “the current Secretary General is a wholly different generation than that of the past.”
The intellectual further noted that the government had reengaged with the Council for a
period before again blackballing the group.
“The current secretary-general was basically a child when all of this happened but is still
being clobbered over the head with it. It’s a double standard, no such rigour of past connections
exists around other representative groups,” the academic said.
Since coming to office, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has converted the Muslim
World League into the propagator of his autocratic form of Islam that is socially more liberal,
politically repressive, and demands absolute obedience to the ruler.
Once a Brotherhood stronghold, the League was a major global funder of erstwhile Saudi
religious ultra-conservatism for more than 60 years since its founding in 1962.
Notwithstanding Mr. Bin Salman’s repositioning, sources privy to the League’s inner
workings suggest members of the Brotherhood remain influential and on the organisation’s payroll.
“The old guard is still very much present,” one source said.
“There is a bit of a schism in Saudi, and some of the younger anti-Brotherhood guard can’t
believe how the Muslim World League is operating,” added another who follows the group closely.
Saudi Arabia’s state-aligned Al Arabiya television network reported from Cairo days before
the London conference that exiled offspring of prominent Egyptian Muslim Brothers were
restructuring the group in Europe and the United States.
An article on the network’s website critical of the Brotherhood warned the activists were
recruiting among Arabs in the West. It asserted that they also sought to “infiltrate’ human rights
groups.
A third source with close ties to the kingdom argued that “the question is whether the Muslim
World League only restructured to meet the new Muslim Brotherhood generation in the West. They
seem to say one thing to some people and something different to others.”
(Source: Eurasia Review)

WILL ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE SPIN OUT OF CONTROL?

Jon B. Alterman (Director of the Middle East Program at CSIS)
Recently, a Palestinian gunman killed two Israeli settlers outside the West Bank town of
Huwara, just days after an Israeli army raid in Nablus left 11 Palestinians dead. Sunday night, more
than 100 Israeli settlers rioted in Huwara, setting fire to buildings and vehicles, killing one
Palestinian and leaving hundreds more injured. Since then, intermittent acts of violence across the
West Bank have left several Israelis and Palestinians dead, including one U.S.-Israeli dual national.
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Q1: Why is the UN Security Council holding an emergency meeting today about Israeli-
Palestinian violence?
A1: The tempo and level of Israeli-Palestinian violence has been rising in recent weeks.
Simultaneously, increasingly visible strains in Israeli and Palestinian politics are emerging, only
partly in response to rising violence. There is concern that violence and politics could feed on each
other in ways that create deep instability. Also, looking forward, there is concern that the confluence
of major Muslim and Jewish holidays in the coming weeks could spiral tensions upward. The
month-long Ramadan holiday starts March 22, and the week-long Passover holiday starts April 5. In
the past, holidays have been associated with increased violence, as they have made each community
feel more violated when attacks have occurred, and those carrying out provocative acts have argued
for the heightened sanctity of their actions.
Q2: What is happening in Palestinian politics?
A2: First, you have an unpopular leader who is aging and seemingly less in control.
Mahmoud Abbas is 87 years old, and he is 14 years past the expiry of his elected term. Few think he
should lead the Palestinian community, and few think he is doing so successfully. He has no clear
successor, and there is no clear process to select a successor. While people speculate how a power
struggle will evolve and who will help shape it, no one has any certainty how it will unfold.
In addition, the split between Gaza and the West Bank that began in 2006 shows no signs of
healing. Hamas, which controls Gaza, has a strengthening foothold in the West Bank. That makes
many in the Palestinian Authority even more wary of opening up politics.
Finally, there is a rising debate within the Palestinian community about the utility and the
wisdom of cooperating with Israel on security issues. New armed groups are forming, such as the
Lion’s Den based out of Nablus. Mahmoud Abbas has generally been accommodating of Israeli
efforts to crack down on new groups, partly because many of Israel’s enemies are his enemies as
well. But if he seems like he supports Israel’s suppression of Palestinians, especially when Israeli
politicians are making noise about being harsher in response to Palestinian violence, it might
weaken him further.
Q3: What is happening in Israeli politics?
A3: Israeli politics are in motion. According to a recent poll, 60 percent of Israelis believe that
Netanyahu’s initiatives to reform the judiciary and give more unchecked power to parliamentary
majorities do not reflect the public will. While the pro- and anti-Netanyahu vote was evenly split in
the November 2022 Knesset elections, pro-Netanyahu forces have an eight-vote majority in the 120-
seat body. The reason is that more than 400,000 votes for 30 parties—almost 9 percent of votes cast—
dropped out of the equation when their parties polled below the electoral threshold. Many of those
voters were anti-Netanyahu. Tens of thousands of Israelis are regularly taking to the streets to
protest the legal changes Netanyahu and his allies are pushing through.
Unrelated to the overall partisan split in Israel, many of the ministers in the Netanyahu
cabinet come from right-wing backgrounds and are testing the limits of Netanyahu’s coalition
government, especially on issues involving settlement activity and the treatment of Arabs.
Netanyahu will struggle to manage members of his own coalition. He has his own electoral
calculations, as he simultaneously seeks to use his Knesset majority to invalidate corruption charges
against him while securing his role as the center of gravity of Israeli politics. Many of his ministers
have electoral strategies that involve catering to right-wing constituencies and not the center, and
their interests may not align with Netanyahu’s. Netanyahu argues that he is the final word, but his
ministers are arguing that they have authority over the enforcing—and not enforcing—of laws
under their purview.
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Q4: What are the odds that Israel and Palestine are on the brink of a major change in the status
quo?
A4: The odds are much stronger than they were a month ago. Mahmoud Abbas’s future is
unclear, and it could change quickly, not least because of a health episode. If violence were to
escalate, it could either heal or deepen the rift between Netanyahu and his coalition over tactics.
Rising violence could completely discredit Abbas. One could imagine a scenario in which
Netanyahu’s political allies would seek to push him rightward to further their own political
ambitions, or in which Netanyahu would seek to tack to the center and create a national unity
government and reformulate his coalition with a more centrist cast. Presumably, though, his current
antagonists would exact a high price for his doing so.
Rising violence would scramble the politics on both sides. While some left-wing Israelis
would likely argue that Israel’s right-wing coalition was the cause, violence would probably initially
reward people who thought it was time to fight rather than reconcile. The same is likely true on the
Palestinian side. Over time, a different political environment might emerge.
Q5: How should the United States think about engagement?
A5: There are existential issues involved for both sides, so it will be hard for an outside power
to move them significantly. The February 26 meeting in Aqaba, which brought the Israelis and
Palestinians together with U.S., Jordanian, and Egyptian backing, strained to keep things from
slipping further. But if this is considered in terms of shifting tectonic plates, the United States and its
allies and partners may have significant opportunities in the coming months to weigh in and take
advantage of new openings that are created. It is hard to imagine that a negotiation process can
make dramatic progress between Israelis and Palestinians in the current environment, no matter
how enthusiastically it is pursued. But is increasingly easy to see how current events might lead to
unanticipated opportunities in the not-too-distant future due to potential changes on both the Israeli
and Palestinian sides. It is worth thinking about them now.
(Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies)

HONESTY CAN ADVANCE THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Josep Borrell (Vice President of the European Commission for a Stronger Europe in the World.)
While indiscriminate terrorist violence is targeting Israelis, violence on the part of Israeli
settlers in the West Bank is increasingly threatening Palestinian lives and livelihoods. The situation
demands a renewed international effort to help both sides think through their options.
Too many people are dying every week in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, and
millions are living in fear and hopelessness. The world’s response has been characterized by too
many statements and too little action. That must change. We in the European Union and the wider
international community need to do more. We know that people around the world expect us to
work for peace, justice, and international law everywhere. But to act successfully, we first must be
honest with each other and ourselves.
Being honest means acknowledging that extremism is rising on both sides. Indiscriminate
attacks and violence are taking many Israeli lives. Violence on the part of Israeli settlers in the West
Bank is increasingly threatening Palestinian lives and livelihoods – almost always with impunity.
Moreover, Israeli military operations frequently cause civilian Palestinian deaths, often without
effective accountability; illegal settlements are expanding on occupied land; and the delicate status
quo concerning Holy Sites is eroding. While Israelis can rely on a strong state and army, Palestinians
have no such recourse. This vast inequality in the ability to control one’s destiny is visible at every
roadside checkpoint. All these facts are obstacles to peace.
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To be sure, different actors within Europe often react differently to events in the region. But
this does not prevent the EU from acting. We have all been alarmed by recent developments, and we
all share the same ultimate goal: to see a safe, secure, globally recognized state of Israel live in peace
alongside a safe, secure, globally recognized state of Palestine. This solution would allow both sides
to enjoy freedom, prosperity, and peaceful relations with their neighbors.
Our own interests are also at stake. We want peace because ending the conflict would be
much better for international security. We want peace because we acknowledge the right of both
Israel and Palestine to exist, and because we stand for the principle of international law everywhere.
We want peace because we share ties with all peoples in the Holy Land, and because it would
benefit regional stability and prosperity. And we want peace because terrorism is a threat
everywhere.
But while the EU, the Palestinian Authority, and a sizable part of the Israeli public support the
two-state solution, Hamas does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, and the current Israeli
government’s coalition agreement denies the Palestinians’ right to their own state. Indeed, the Israeli
right increasingly denies that the occupation even exists.
Clearly, neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian side is ready for peace. On the Palestinian side,
there is a lack of unity, as well as insufficient democratic legitimacy. All Palestinian factions will
need to renounce terrorism and overcome their political divisions. On the Israeli side, the top
priorities must be to stop settlement building and settler violence, and to offer to negotiate an
independent Palestinian state.
In recent years, the international community has failed to pursue substantive peace efforts
between the parties. Our American friends have long tried to help bring the parties together, and the
recent normalization agreements (the Abraham Accords) between Israel and some of its Arab
neighbors did make an important contribution to regional stability. But they did not bring Israeli-
Palestinian peace any closer. While the United States remains essential for the process, we can no
longer leave most of the hard work to American diplomats. Rather, we need a genuinely collective
effort that includes Arab states, Europe, the US, and others.
With this honest airing of the facts, what should we do next? Above all, we need more
intensive international efforts to create a new peace dynamic. While we cannot force the parties to
the negotiating table, we can prepare the way and help them get ready.
In 2013, the EU offered an “unprecedented package of security, economic, and political
support” if the parties were to reach a peace agreement. With this in mind, I instructed EU Special
Representative Sven Koopmans to work with the European Commission and EU member states to
flesh out such a proposal. I also asked him to develop (together with our partners) concrete
proposals for a comprehensive regional process to achieve peace both between Israel and Palestine
and between Israel and all its Arab neighbors.
Then, in February, I met with Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-
Saud, and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who agreed to revive and build on
the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and add the European peace package to it. In this effort, we will be
working closely with other Arab and international partners.
This process is about sketching out how Israel and Palestine will be integrated in the region if
they make peace. We need to consider the kinds of security, political, and economic cooperation that
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peace would make possible, and how all parties can address common challenges relating to water,
energy, infrastructure, and climate change.
This is a moment for exploring what we can all contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peace once it
comes. Obviously, neither Europe’s nor anyone else’s contributions would be implemented unless
there is an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and we should not assume that our promises of
support will be sufficient to bring about that outcome. Still, something is needed to stop the current
downward cycle of violence, and we can play a crucial role in helping the parties to think through
their options.
To be clear, I am not announcing a European peace initiative. At this stage, we are simply
reaching out to others and considering how we can prepare for the day when Israelis and
Palestinians are ready. We can bring that day closer by painting a clearer picture of what regional
peace would look like. Honesty requires seeing that we cannot afford to wait any longer.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
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National
A CASE FOR STRATEGIC PRIVATIZATION
Hussain H Zaidi
Whenever the economy is in hot waters, selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is seen as a
key ingredient of the recipe for economic recovery. The IMF, the lender of last resort, also
encourages sale of SOEs as part of its neoliberal paradigm. How credible an answer does
privatization represent to Pakistan’s economic woes?
Privatization may be actuated by multiple goals, but one common stated objective is to rack
up efficiency, which has two aspects: reaching the highest possible level of output by putting the
available resources to optimal use (productive efficiency); and producing goods and services on a
scale that matches their demand (allocative efficiency). For instance, if an economy has an increasing
demand for food but instead it sees a rising supply of automobiles because it offers higher profits,
the resources are being misallocated. Hence, a fundamental question is whether efficiency can be
best achieved by selling SOEs or by some other means.
In Pakistan, the privatization programme was announced in 1990 by the second PPP
government, which in its earlier stint in power had nationalized major industries and banks. The
programme was started as part of the IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programme, which also
saw a massive cut in import duties. Per official statistics, so far some 178 privatization transactions
have yielded about Rs649 billion. These transactions have taken two major forms: transfer of
ownership through majority or 100 per cent shares, and sale of minority stocks in the capital market.
The perennial debate between socialism and liberalism aside, privatization is neither
inherently good nor bad. The efficacy of privatization, like those of other economic policies, is
contingent upon its impact on the ultimate stakeholders – the people. Privatization is useful if it
increases both productive and allocative efficiency, resulting in provision of the goods the
consumers need at competitive prices. This is possible only if privatization breaks monopolies and
fosters competition among firms. However, the same purpose may better be achieved not by selling
SOEs but by dissolving the barriers to entry and exit in the given industry.
Where such barriers exist, privatization will not promote competition, rather there will only be
a change of ownership from the state to the private sector. A state monopoly will be replaced by a
private sector one. Efficiency is thus enhanced not by privatization per se but by competition. For
instance, telecommunication services in Pakistan have markedly improved not because of
privatization but because of the entry of several firms in the sector, which have given the consumers
greater choice. On the other hand, the privatization of KESC – now K-Electric – has not stopped
power outages in Karachi, as a public sector monopoly gave way to a private sector one.
Besides, in the absence of competition, what would prevent profit-maximizing private
enterprises from diverting their resources to producing luxury or premium goods or services at the
expense of necessities or ordinary products most needed, thus perking up allocative inefficiency?
According to the Pakistan Federal Public Expenditure Review 2023, a recent World Bank
publication, Pakistan’s SOEs are the worst performers in Asia in terms of profitability; their
aggregate profits having gone down from 0.8 per cent of the GDP in FY14 to a loss of 0.4 per cent of
the GDP in FY20. The major contributing factor to the poor profitability is low revenues relative to
the costs. The financial support to the underperforming SOEs accounted for 18 per cent of the fiscal
deficit in FY22, thus constituting a substantial strain on already scarce public resources.
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Figures such as these make a potent argument for privatization of the SOEs eating away
public money. Such an argument, however, has a flip side as well in that the market price is not
always the right price. Provision of basic services like health, education, and transport needs to be
subsidized, otherwise those at the lower end of the social stratum are not likely to have adequate
access to them.
The short-term benefits that may be obtained through privatization of basic services may
make the vulnerable segments of society worse off. A disregard of the vital social needs of such
segments means that society will be deprived of a potentially useful large human capital, not only
leading to an inefficient outcome but also breeding social discontent, which is not conducive to the
optimal working of the economy.
There can be a case for privatizing chronically unprofitable SOEs, which are not providing
basic or strategic services. All else equal, there is a stronger case for privatizing PIA, whose services
are consumed by the affluent section of society, than for selling the Railways, which is the preferred
means of transport for low-income commuters. But even in that case, it needs to be assessed what
ails an enterprise like PIA and whether selling it can set it right. Is it inefficient because it’s over-
staffed? Is it because the carrier is running an aging fleet, making for high maintenance cost as well
as abrupt cancellation of flights, thus impairing its credibility? Or is the passenger traffic low
because, for security reasons, tourists and business travellers shy away from flying to Pakistan?
Privatization can be used to attract domestic and foreign investment and thus to accelerate
economic activity and create jobs. However, that can be served only if the new management has the
capacity and the intention to make their newly acquired assets work. In quite a few cases, the firms
which bought privatized units were interested only in their land, which they got at lower-than-
market price and used them as real estate more than to produce the goods or services they were
meant for. Such rent-seeking inhibits rather than shores up efficiency. Besides, without improving
the overall investment climate, not least the security situation, it will be arduous to find credible
buyers from abroad.
This brings us to the question of whether inefficient SOEs had better be restructured or sold
out. Restructuring an enterprise is like reforming a bad person, while selling may be compared to
condemning them as incorrigible. Restructuring entails delving deep into the causes undergirding
an underperforming SOE. It requires a specialized bureaucracy backed by strong political will to
devise and implement a plan for retooling an inefficient enterprise irrespective of the short-term
political cost.
Be that as it may, we’re markedly deficient in both. The edifice of the civil service rests on the
principle of administrative ‘efficiency.’ In essence, the principle stipulates that governance is
essentially a matter of general administrative skills, rather than of specialized knowledge. Every
problem is seen as fundamentally administrative, which can be sorted out by quick-fix solutions,
like shaking up the hierarchy or scaling up or slashing the budget. A bureaucracy with such a
mindset is incapable of running or reforming a mega SOE and may prefer to have it disposed of. As
for politicians, they tend to oscillate between extreme positions: allowing sale of SOEs ‘over our
dead bodies,’ and just selling them out to the first bidder.
Amid the present hard economic squeeze, privatization can serve as a cash cow to generate
the much-needed revenue. That said, selling SOEs in itself is not a sound way to overcome capital
deficiency, which is the result of systemic macro-economic problems. Besides, the sale of enterprises
when the market has gone down may not yield the desired capital.
It’s better to sell SOEs as part of a long-term economic reform strategy – strategic privatization
as it’s called – aimed at shoring up the competitiveness of the economy, improving the climate for
productive as opposed to speculative investment, strengthening the institutions of economic
governance, and building the capacity of those who run them.
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A vibrant economy will also allow the government to generate sufficient surplus to subsidize
the basic services. Privatization should aim not at selling the enterprises just because they can’t be
run but at enhancing competition in the industry, ushering in provision of quality and a wide range
of goods to consumers at competitive prices.
(Source: The News)

BLENDING FOR FOOD SECURITY

Khalid Saeed Wattoo (A development professional)
The present wheat crisis, combined with a significant increase in twin deficits (fiscal and
current account), indicates that the measures taken by past governments have proved inadequate to
provide a sustainable solution to the food security issue currently being faced by Pakistan.
Until now, our governments have relied on measures like subsidising the agricultural sector at
various levels to encourage wheat production, offering social safety net programmes to protect the
consumption of the poor, and importing wheat to augment its availability in domestic markets.
Across the world, wheat, rice, and maise (corn) are the three most consumed cereals as human
food. They account for 94 per cent of all cereal consumption and supply over 50pc of the world’s
calorie intake. Nevertheless, in Pakistan, wheat is the largest staple food, providing 72pc of
Pakistan’s daily caloric needs, with annual consumption standing at 124 kg per person, one of the
highest in the world.
The experience of other countries indicates that as per capita income grows, people tend to
diversify their diets and consume more high-value foods such as meat and dairy products. Such a
change in consumption behaviour leads to a decline in the consumption of wheat, rice, and maize.
Unfortunately, Pakistan has not yet experienced much of this transition, given its weak
economic growth over the last few decades, and therefore our extreme dependency on wheat is still
too strong.
On the other hand, it seems that Pakistan will not be able to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat
in the coming years, despite efforts, as expanding the wheat area is no longer an option due to rapid
changes in cropping practices, water scarcity, and top it off, the rapid growth of housing colonies
that are eating up fertile agricultural land.
As a result, Pakistan relies on enhancing crop yields as the only viable alternative to increase
wheat production to feed its ever-growing population. However, lack of investment in the sector
and climate change are the real challenges to achieving this goal.
Historically, Pakistan’s food security has been heavily dependent upon wheat and every time
there is a shortage of it, the food crisis deepens. To address the food security challenge, one possible
strategic option is to diversify people’s diet in such a way that wheat consumption could partly be
replaced by rice, maize, or some other affordable minor staple crops (barley, millet, sorghum).
To this end, blending just 10pc maize flour with wheat flour seems to be a viable option,
considering maize’s vast crop area in Pakistan, large surplus production, and its low national and
international prices vis-à-vis wheat. However, there are some debatable issues related to its taste,
nutritional values, and consumers’ personal choices.
Maize is cultivated in a wide array of agro-ecologies and soil types and it matures in 90 to 120
days. In 2020–21, Pakistan produced 27.46 million tonnes of wheat from 9.17m hectares, with a 3
tonnes/hectare yield, whereas maize production stood at 8.94m tonnes from 1.418m hectares, with
an average yield of 6.3 tons/hectare.
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Maize’s higher yield in comparison to other cereals makes it an attractive option for countries
challenged by land scarcity and high population pressure.
Without governmental intervention and subsidy, maize production has almost doubled from
4.92 to 8.94m tonnes in just five years (2016–2021), and production in FY22 stood at 10.635m tonnes
which is likely to increase up to 13m tonnes in the next few years.
Exportable surpluses of maize are available, which will further increase in future. Already,
Pakistan has been exporting maize in significant quantities. On the contrary, Pakistan has been
importing around 2.5m tonnes of wheat annually for the last few years — about 10pc of the
country’s total wheat requirement.
By blending just 10pc maize with wheat, such wheat imports can be reduced significantly,
thereby improving the balance of payment.
Maize has the additional advantage of being priced lower than wheat in both national and
international markets. As of the last week of March 2023, wheat is priced 50pc higher than maize in
local markets. Hence, blending maize with wheat will not only improve the supply of wheat flour
but will also lead to a reduction in flour prices.
There are several countries across the world that have strong maize-based dietary traditions,
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and a few Asian countries, where maize is
consumed as a major cereal (staple food). In Pakistan, maize is also used for human consumption in
substantial quantities in several geographic pockets.
From a nutritional point of view, maize contains 72pc starch, 4pc fat, 2.7pc fibre, 66pc
carbohydrate, 1.5pc minerals (calcium, phosphorous, iron), vitamins (A, B, E) and supplies dietary
energy density of 365 calories/100 gram which is equivalent to 23m calories per hectare in Pakistan,
fairly high vis-à-vis wheat (10.5m).
Maize contains 10pc protein, lower than wheat (13%) but higher than rice (8pc). Maize
provides many essential minerals and B vitamins but lacks vitamin B12 and C and, in general, also
lacks calcium and iron. Therefore, in several countries, fortified maize flour and cornmeal are used
to enhance the intake of iron and micronutrients.
But it applies equally to wheat flour, as Pakistan initiated a “wheat flour fortification
program” in 2016. It is important to note that biofortified (nutritionally enhanced) varieties like
“Quality Protein Maize”, which have a greater value of major and micro nutrients, have been
developed using advanced biotechnology techniques. These varieties are currently grown on around
9m acres worldwide.
To conclude, Pakistan has historically over-emphasised wheat production and therefore, it
presently occupies around 40pc of Pakistan’s total cultivated land. Consequently, we are left with
inadequate land for oilseed crops, which is typically grown alongside wheat.
As a result, Pakistan has to import edible oil/oilseed worth billions of dollars every year. The
situation necessitates crop switching as a strategy to enhance productivity in the agriculture sector,
with a priority on crops that offer better yields and higher value.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)

THE IMPORTANCE OF RULE OF LAW

Tahir Kamran (Professor in the faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore)
Rule of law is no more than the notion that governments should work through general
legislation that applies to the governors as well and not through irregular decrees and ad hominem
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proclamations. Rule of law allows people to accurately foresee the legal consequences of their
actions. Citizens are thus not subject to ‘surprises’ whether or not those take the form of legislation.
The laws may also contain or at least not violate certain substantive principles and rights. Rule
of law, defended by an independent judiciary, has a crucial function in ensuring that civil and
political rights and civil liberties are safe. It also ensures that the equality and dignity of citizens is
secure.
Rule of law serves as a safeguard against tyranny in that fair, just and impartial laws ensure
that rulers do not become corrupt or despotic. Such laws protect individuals from the government,
organisations and other individuals.
The establishment of a welfare state is a cherished goal. Rule of law sustains it. Rule of law
implies a durable system of laws, institutions, norms and community commitments that delivers
accountability. Both the government and private actors are accountable under the laws that are clear,
publicised, stable, and applied evenly.
Rule of law is closely linked to the ideals of democracy. A democratic state is one where
citizens elect their leaders and the government is bound by the law.
Every individual is entitled to enjoy their human rights without any form of distinction or
discrimination. Equality is paramount for rule of law. Everyone must be treated the same; there
should be no discrimination whatsoever.
The right to equal protection of law is a fundamental principle in a democratic society. It
guarantees that regardless of an individual’s economic status, ethnicity, religion or political
affiliation, they are entitled to the same protection.
The concept comprises three fundamental principles. First, no individual should be punished
or interfered with by authorities unless they have violated the law. Second, the law applies to
everyone, regardless of their status; no one is above it. Third, a bill of rights is unnecessary because
judicial decisions determine the general principles of the constitution and the rights of private
individuals.
The International Commission of Jurists, in a conference held in Lagos in 1961, defined the
rule of law as adherence to essential institutions and procedures that have been developed in
various countries through experience and tradition to protect individuals from arbitrary government
and enable them to enjoy the dignity of human rights.
This definition highlights the importance of the rule of law in a democracy. Without it, a
democratic society cannot exist. All members of society, including those in authority, must be
subject to the law. The rule of law is essential in treating all individuals equally as full members of
the community, without discrimination. The order maintained by the rule of law promotes
communal good, which allows the private good of individuals to be realised.
The rule of law has two fundamental aspects. First, the law must rule the people and the
people must obey the law. Second, the law must be capable of being obeyed and guiding people’s
behaviour. Both these aspects are indispensable for a well-functioning society. The first aspect
prevents legalism where citizens become slaves to the law, forgetting the spirit behind it. The second
aspect avoids presumption that one can break the law without consequences.
In any democratic society, it is imperative to inculcate the rule of law through education, good
examples and consistent application. It is a sine qua non for the realisation of communal and
individual values.
In developing societies, the absence of rule of law manifests itself in various forms. These
include disregard and manipulation of the constitution and elections; abuse of political power; legal
and judicial perversions; and low regard for the electorates.
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As Kofi Busia noted in his paper, Democracy and One Party System, effective checks on rulers
are necessary in every democratic community. Democracy rejects the notion that the leaders and
those around them always seek the interests of the people or embody the will of all. Human
fallibility necessitates the right of the people to oppose and change their leaders, which political
institutions must provide democratic outlets for.
This is not the case in many developing societies, especially in Asia and Africa where
electorates are frequently forced to succumb to the whims of the “selected” few due to arbitrary
disobedience to judicial proceedings by the executives. In practice, the judiciary is not independent
and autonomous. It is instead subject to the whims and caprice of those in power.
Rule of law must guarantee security of tenure - a fundamental safeguard against arbitrary
removal of judicial officers, which should only occur under exceptional circumstances and after
lawful consideration by a judicial commission.
Rule of law is a valuable asset to democracy. It promotes responsibility, reciprocity and trust.
As Hayek wrote in The Constitution of Liberty, the belief in individual responsibility has always
been strong when people firmly believed in individual freedom. Democracy must guarantee
individual freedom and collective fraternity and responsibility must be an effect of such liberty
accorded to the people.
Accountability is essential. It connotes managerial responsibility, efficiency and economy of
operation as well as managerial responsibility for effectiveness. For responsibility to be a value in a
democratic system, the leaders must be accountable and transparent.
Reciprocity is a value that rule of law promotes to attain good governance. This allows
individuals to perform their duties to the state, such as paying necessary taxes and abiding by the
rules and regulations. In response, those at the helms of affairs provide necessary amenities and
resources for the progress, growth and development of the state.
Respect for shared values, norms, rules, laws and regulations are a matter of reciprocity. The
rule of law ensures that all, including the leaders, respect the laws of the land.
Trust is necessary for the rule of law to be effective. Rule of law must be properly
implemented and functional to gain the trust of the ruled. Separation of powers, judicial precedent
and prospective legislation cannot guarantee citizens’ trust unless the system is functional.
In countries where the electorates lack trust in their rulers, even when there is a constitution to
follow, the quest for good governance is jeopardised. Trust can only come when leaders are guided
by a functional rule of law in the spirit of ensuring good governance.
Political institutions must provide democratic outlets for the exercise of rights and guarantee
accountability and transparency of the leaders.
Respect for shared values and norms are essential for promoting reciprocity in the society.
(Source: The News)

PAKISTAN’S FIRST-EVER DIGITAL CENSUS

A step in the right direction
Khurram Zia Khan (Media manager of Asiatic Public Relations)
The 2023 digital census is a step in the right direction. The purpose of the census is to provide
data for informed policy planning for the people living in particular areas so that required resources
can be provided for the provision of basic necessities such as schools, hospitals, roads etc. If this data
is collected manually, there is a high probability that the data will have ambiguities.
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Whether the census is conducted manually or digitally, we in Pakistan always distrust and
question its outcome. These dissecting voices, unfortunately, make the whole exercise uncertain. In
2017, the sixth population census in the country was held after a gap of over two decades due to the
fear that census results may create disharmony in the country. It is good to know that the
government decided to organise the seventh census as per schedule. It is interesting to know that the
digital census conducted in Pakistan is the largest digital census in the whole of South Asia.
The first-ever digital census of Pakistan is being conducted using 126,000 android-based smart
devices equipped with House Listing and Enumeration Applications synchronised with Global
Positioning System (GPS) and Geographic Information System (GIS) to facilitate collection,
compilation, analysis, evaluation, publishing and dissemination of statistical data regarding the
population and housing along with their geographical location. This ensures the utmost accuracy,
transparency and credibility of the exercise. The latest digital technology used in this census
includes geo-tagging, which helps in counting and provides accurate data on schools, hospitals,
mosques, universities and other economic establishments, along with demographic variables for
evidence-based decision-making. This digitisation exercise is of unique nature, and its success can be
gauged from the fact that data of almost 10 million nationals is collected daily from all parts of the
country and synced to secure servers.
The Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), the organisation responsible for conducting the
census, worked hard and upgraded itself in a short span of time in order to digitally transform itself
and the census system.
The world we are living in is changing fast. A lot of the work and tasks that were done
manually are now automated and performed by machines, be it construction, record-keeping,
disbursement of information and others. To remain at par with global players, Pakistan also needs to
move towards the path of digitisation and shun manual work. If we look around, we find that
Dubai, a city of over three million people, has completely shifted to digitisation. Emirate's Crown
Prince, Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum pointed out that this step allows
saving $350 million and 14 million work hours.
Dubai is the world's first capital to go 100% paperless, and many other countries in Europe
and America are also following suit. Digitisation, in my view, is an efficient and reliable option, and
it is the path to embrace the future.
Pakistan is also making an effort to move towards digitisation in various aspects, however the
pace is painstakingly slow. One reason for this is that we as a nation are hesitant and, at times, also
suspicious towards technology and prefer to remain stuck in decades-old practices. People from
different walks of life raise their concerns waywardly without identifying the actual issue with the
latest technology. In this scenario, I am delighted and excited to observe that the PBS made a move
by making the seventh census of Pakistan the first-ever digitally-conducted census of Pakistan.
The PBS first opened a digital portal where citizens were able to fill in their information from
the convenience of their homes. This data is then verified by the PBS staff going door to door to
collect and corroborate data. In my view, the PBS was unable to give proper knowledge about self-
enumeration, and for this reason, the majority failed to take advantage of this facility. As the digital
census moves forward and reaches the final stage, we will get more clarity about its success or
failure. Irrespective of the result, I would prefer that in the future, we continue on this path and
gradually move towards a paperless census.
I strongly believe that for the future of Pakistan and its population, a digital census will go a
long way in collecting error-free data, which will then be used in letter and spirit to bring prosperity
to the people of Pakistan.
(Source: Express tribune)
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IMF BAILOUTS
Recipes for disaster?
Danish Hanif (Research Associate, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute)
THE International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1944 with the aim to provide
financial assistance to countries in economic distress. IMF, a lender of last resort, was a linchpin of
the post-war international financial order established at Bretton Woods Conference. Since then, this
financial firefighter has been providing bailout packages to the crisis-ridden countries across the
world. It was supposed to foster international cooperation, promote liberalization of trade, induce
financial stability and alleviate poverty in the long run.This monetary body since its creation has
furnished short-term loans to numerous war-torn countries to address their balance of payment
crisis and sustain dwindling reserves in their central bank.Although there are certain model states
which after acquiring loans from IMF overcame their fundamental economic issues and ultimately
embarked on the path of progress and economic autarky, the stiff medicine doled out by IMF has
remained a subject of much controversy. Agroup of economic experts is of the view that IMF
program and associated structural adjustment policies have made the situation of countries in
economic crisis worse. These experts opine that the Extended Fund Facility of IMF require states to
promulgate certain structural economic reforms that often prove to be counterproductive in the
immediate run.
Although, initial years of IMF are marked by some success stories in offsetting economic
distress; there are certain case studies that delineate that these bailout packages and attached
conditions are detrimental to countries’ economy in the long run. IMF, in the backdropof Latin
American financial crunch in 1990s, introduced Washington Consensus under which Structural
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were promulgated. These policies enhanced the role of market forces in
economic policies. In addition to it, lending states were required to implements reforms that include
but are not limited to cutting-off government subsidies, free-floating currency, free trade, higher
taxes, privatization of state-owned enterprises and reduction in government spending. These
adjustment policies put forth such stern conditions that countries cannot implement making them
more and more dependent on IMF.
There are certain loopholes in IMF bailout program and the conditionalities attached to it that
ultimately prove to be recipes of disaster. The first and foremost lacunae is ‘one size fits all’
approach of IMF policymakers. IMF applies strict conditions to all the lending countries irrespective
of their domestic socio-cultural background and economic status. What is suitable for economic
reforms in Latin American countries can and should never be applied in the other region of the
world but IMF completely ignores the rule while doling out its loans. Joseph Stiglitz, a renowned
economist, criticizes this approach and considers it ridiculous to blindly apply such conditions to
countries across different regions of the world. There are scores of examples that indicate the
problematic approach of IMF revolving around ‘one size fits all’ phenomenon. For example, Bordo
and Schwartz (2000) examined the overall economic performance of 11 Latin American and 13 Asian
countries during the period of 1973-1988, and found that the economic health of these countries
became worse in the aftermath of IMF program.
Another flawed aspect of IMF bailout packages is that it requires stiff conditions like austerity
measures to be implemented within short span of time. These measures include reduced
government expenditures by reducing development sector spending, eliminating subsidies, and
privatizing PSEs.
These measures add insult to injury as they result in deepened economic meltdown increasing
inflation, layoffs and pushing masses further below the poverty line, as the overall purchasing
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power of masses gets seriously affected. During Asian Financial crisis of 1990s IMF treated this
emergency situation in an ordinary way, and required states to implement structural adjustment
policies in return for loans. As a result, inflation skyrocketed and unemployment reached at its
tipping point in these countries. IMF, so-called rescuer of countries in economic meltdown, through
its reforms package fuels instability which often results in regime change and socio-political chaos in
respective countries. The structural adjustment policies more often than not enjoin stern and
unpopular economic measures that incite public sentiments against the regime of time. The
opposition forces use this foreign-induced crisis as a breeding ground to excel their activities aimed
at toppling the existing regimes. This creates a vicious cycle of uncertainty and instability that adds
fuel to the fire of already debilitating economy. If government under pressure pursues popular
measures to sustain its foundations it also harms economy in the long run.
It’s high time that countries looked outside for their economic rescue should reorient their
strategies for the salvation of their economic crisis. These bail-out packages create a dependency
syndrome whereby countries resist structural reforms which are indispensable for sustainable
economic growth. IMF bail-out packages and the associated conditionalities in their existing form
further magnify the crisis making these bailouts recipes for disaster. Thus, unless IMF provides
breathing space to these countries for implementation of these reforms, bailouts will remain recipes
for disaster.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)

INVESTING IN WOMEN
Huma Yusuf (Political and integrity risk analyst)
Could there be a more heartbreaking tale than that of Shahida Raza? A former national hockey
player forced to pursue illegal emigration, only to lose her life along with dozens of other refugees in
the tragic boat crash off Italian shores last month.
Her story will resonate with most Pakistani women. She dared to dream and make the most of
her talents but was stymied by the lack of opportunity. As a single mother without a job, she
struggled with financial insecurity. Faced with her young child’s ill health, she had no social safety
net to fall back on. If these conditions won’t breed desperation, what will?
Raza’s trajectory is an indictment of Pakistan’s sports ecosystem, its social welfare and
healthcare systems, its economy with an incapacity to absorb labour and talent — indeed, of the
country itself. But it also highlights the reality that Pakistani women are direct participants in our
dysfunctional society, not merely appendages to it. As such, the society must be reshaped to cater to
their needs and aspirations.
The typical framing of women in Pakistani public discourse as daughters, sisters, wives and
mothers implies that they are secondary — the supporting cast hovering around men, who are the
central characters on our sociopolitical stage. We pretend that women in their own right — women
such as Raza — do not exist.
This oversight leads to the challenge that women, when they are considered, are perceived by
both the state and society as inconvenient or problematic — quite literally, a public order problem.
That explains why the Lahore deputy commissioner rejected permission for the Aurat March
to proceed on International Women’s Day, citing concerns about ‘controversial’ banners and the
likelihood of these provoking clashes with those who privilege haya over gender inclusion and
equality.
That also explains why the most robust state response to the horrific rape in an Islamabad
park last month was a directive by Pemra banning any coverage of the incident.
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These are just recent examples of what are daily, egregious attempts to erase women from our
social fabric.
But women are not going away. And Pakistan only ignores them to its detriment. At present,
the main concern is potential economic collapse. The men running the economy have made a hash of
it. In all their recent machinations, have they even considered the gains to be had from unleashing
Pakistani women’s potential?
In a recent article on ‘Empowering Women in Pakistan’s Economy’, Noorulain Naseem and
Hadiqa Sohail highlight that “despite making up 49 per cent of the total population, women have a
remarkably low participation rate of only 21pc in the current workforce — with only 25pc of women
with a university degree working.” Naseem and Sohail argue that if the female labour force were to
become equal to the male working population, Pakistan’s GDP could increase by 60pc by 2025. Let
that number sink in for a minute.
But this labour force participation cannot be conjured out of nowhere. Pakistan needs to invest
in its women before they can reinvest in the country. Sadly, our country currently ranks 145 out of
146 countries in the 2022 Global Gender Gap Index (only Afghanistan ranks worse). In Balochistan,
Raza’s home province, the female literacy rate of 24pc is the lowest among all of Pakistan’s
provinces and female labour force participation is a shockingly low 4.9pc.
In the ‘Health and Survival’ sub index of the gender gap assessment, which considers access
to healthcare, Pakistan ranks 143rd. This is a doubly painful reality in a country where, according to
a 2019 report, 85,000 women have completed a medical degree but are not part of the medical
system — presumably due to cultural and societal constraints on women working.
If we cannot educate or employ our women, or preserve their health, then both they and the
country at large suffers. Perhaps instead of banning women’s marches, our government should
reflect this week on how they can better serve Pakistan’s female population. The theme of this year’s
International Women’s Day is #EmbraceEquity. It is highlighting the distinction between gender
equality — which the World Economic Forum describes as the “end goal” — and equity, which is
the path you take to get there.
Embracing equity means recognising that different people and groups require different
resources, support and opportunities in order to attain equal outcomes. For Pakistani women, that
means gender-specific policies, including a concerted effort to improve educational, employment
and health outcomes while recognising — but not pandering to — our misogynistic cultural context.
This is essential to ensure that in future women like Raza believe they can thrive in our country
rather than desperately seek salvation across perilous waters.
(Source: Dawn)

HOW TO EMPOWER WOMEN

Anum Mufti (Lecturer, NED University, Karachi)
Buzz words such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘equality’ are often part of the development
discourse regarding women in today’s world – although there is no general consensus on what these
terms truly mean.
And, since their meaning is vague, so are the actions taken that come in the form of
development initiative for women. Often, these initiatives forget the very fact that these
interventions are meant to challenge the current status quo, instead of reinforcing the prevalent
injustices.
One such example is the idea of empowering women by making them part of productive
labour. Inherently, the thought is not flawed in itself. But if one has the eye to see beyond the
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apparent, the materiality of working women is not different from women who are not part of paid
labour. If anything, it is worse. The underlying reason is that women are not seen as equal to men –
neither within their homes nor outside. These interventions fail to challenge the pervasive nature of
unequal gender-relations in Pakistani society.
The gravity of the situation is better understood when we see that development initiatives
focused on women are more concentrated on welfare in relation to reproductive labour and not
equally as much for productive labour. And where we do intervene to enhance women’s capabilities
by providing them education, the planning agencies are unable to align them with the opportunities
open to them. This results in labour surplus, making way for wage exploitation. Not to forget that
women are seen as secondary breadwinners, and therefore their take-home salary is treated as
supplementary and not equal to their male counterparts.
It is also crucial to take into account that, according to the World Bank, about 12.5 per cent of
Pakistani households are female -headed. The real numbers may be higher, since families generally
do not want to reveal that they are headed by females due to cultural reasons. This point is the best
to explain wage inequality and the scant number of opportunities available to women, not to forget
several social norms working against them.
Lack of government security makes their condition unimaginably hard as well. An example of
such inequality can be seen in the calculation of EOBI funds. It is also important to keep in mind that
most women work in the informal sector, which means that EOBI is not an option for them anyway.
Moreover, a majority of women are unable to save money since the wages they earn are meagre, and
there are also high levels of lack of financial awareness among women. It is also true that most
women seldom have agency over their earnings, and their income is mostly managed by male
members of the family.
Along with their inability to save for the rainy days, women are also unable to have the
security of owning any property. Since they mostly do not have access to loan facilities and do not
possess the ability to purchase a home with their meagre income, they fail to own a house. In rare
cases, where one is lucky enough to gather a sum to purchase a piece of land or a house, they are
incapable of buying any property directly under their name. The reason lies again in the culture of
male dominance and lack of agency.
It is also worth considering that women lack the right social capital, primarily due to their
limited mobility and the fact that they cannot operate at their own will. Men, however, have the
freedom to build connections, explore new avenues and possess the ability to make decisions
without any external interference and therefore have more opportunities open to them.
Moreover, the way our culture is designed, women tend to seek continuous validation for
who they are, who they should be and what they do. It makes it all the more menacing for them to
survive. If a woman works, she has to justify her work. And, if she earns more than the man of the
house, then as the feminist sociologist, Fran Ansley, puts it, she has to act as a sponge and absorb the
man’s anger.
If she decides to have children and continue working, she is labelled as ‘not a good mother’ or
has to prove herself as a ‘supermom’ by having to perfectly balance work inside and outside the
house. It is interesting to note that even though the income that women are bringing to the table has
changed enough, a shift towards more equal gender roles is not seen as a change that is worth
considering. This is because their participation in productive labour is not an end in itself but a
means to a patriarchal end.
Women have come a long way in their struggles to fight these injustices and they still have a
long way to go. But as we celebrate increased women’s participation in productive labour, it
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becomes crucial to address and challenge the ubiquitous unequal gender relations existing in
society.
Government initiatives geared towards helping to improve women’s position without
challenging the underlying issue of unequal gender relations tend to have an adverse effect. Instead
of empowering them, they further weaken women’s position. If we really wish to enhance women’s
position in society, we have to start by bringing structural changes in the patriarchal mindset and
treating them as equal humans.
If we can really bring that change, women’s quality of life will be made better. The
government needs to assure that while it is enhancing the capabilities of women through
development interventions, the culture of inequality needs to be challenged through open discourse
and by creating awareness around gender sensitivity. Otherwise true women’s empowerment will
never be achieved.
(Source: The News)

TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION

Bilal Aslam (Researcher at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies)
The UN Water Conference 2023 was held from March 22 to 24 at UN Headquarters in New
York. The conference was co-hosted by the Netherlands and Tajikistan and brought together over
2,000 government representatives, scientists, academics, civil society groups, private sector
representatives, and youth delegates to address future water-related challenges. The conference’s
overarching themes included water for health, sustainable development, cooperation, climate
resilience, and the “water action decade”, which aimed to strengthen and accelerate action in key
water areas and address current water-related challenges. Pakistan was represented by a four-
member delegation, including Mr Hassan Nasir Jamy, Federal Secretary for the Ministry of Water
Resources.
The UN water conference reported that two billion people (26 per cent of the world’s
population) do not have access to clean drinking water, and 3.6 billion people (46 per cent of the
world’s population) do not have access to adequately managed sanitation. The sustainable
development goals (SGDs) highlight the significance of water in developing healthy ecosystems,
producing food and energy, promoting gender equality, and reducing poverty. Since water and
climate are closely linked, the effects of climate change on the water can be seen and felt more
quickly. For example, floods, heavy rains, and droughts are all getting worse due to climate change.
These effects threaten both sustainable development and biodiversity.
In 2022, the world bank reported that the heavy rainfalls and floods in Pakistan resulted in the
loss of 1700 precious lives and the displacement of more than 2 million people. Pakistan is one of the
ten most vulnerable countries to climate change, and with the growing water scarcity, future water
challenges tend to become more severe. In this context, the UN’s Water Conference presented an
opportunity for Pakistan to highlight the need for transboundary cooperation. Pakistan’s delegation
citing the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan, highlighted the significance of
effective mechanisms to deal with issues related to shared water resources. Mr Hassan Nasir Jamy,
Pakistan’s chief delegate, drew attention to precedents and principles on upper and lower riparian
rights and obligations arising from bilateral and multilateral agreements.
The world bank brokered the water-sharing arrangement between Pakistan and India,
resulting in the signing of the IWT by the respective governments of Pakistan and India. IWT
divided the Indus Basin between the two neighbouring states, giving access to three Eastern Rivers,
including Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, to India and three Western Rivers, including Indus, Jhelum and
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Chenab, to Pakistan. However, India has a history of disrespecting international norms and treaties,
including the UN resolutions. In July 2018, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, while chairing a
“review meeting” on IWT, bluntly stated that India would “exploit to the maximum” the water of
the rivers belonging to Pakistan, including Jhelum. As reported by the Washington Post, India’s
rhetoric about water is because of the intense public pressure and may escalate tensions further and
result in future ‘water wars.’
The growing water scarcity in the South Asian region demands a collaborative approach, but
India has chosen an inward-looking, myopic approach that is exacerbating its transboundary water
relations with all neighbouring states, including Pakistan. On January 25, 2023, India issued a notice
to Pakistan seeking modifications to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in an unprecedented and
belligerent move. Legally, the unilateral modification is impermissible under IWT as Article XII of
the Treaty, dealing with termination and modification, clearly states that neither modification nor
termination can take place without the consent of both Pakistan and India. Article XII(3) of the IWT
states that “the provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty
concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.”
The Indian notice is based on the August 2021 report of India’s parliamentary standing
committee on water resources on flood management and international water treaties, particularly
regarding Pakistan, China, and Bhutan. The committee was headed by Sanjay Jaiswal, a
parliamentarian from Bihar and a former president of the BJP, so it is evident that the domestic
political factors and the ruling BJP provoked India to demand the renegotiation of IWT. This move
provided Pakistan with diplomatic space to brief them, the World Bank, and other countries and
institutions on its position and the threats to regional security that a dysfunctional water treaty can
pose. Hassan Nasir Jamy, Pakistan’s chief delegate at UN Water Conference, while talking about
IWT, emphasised that “The concerned Parties must fully respect these norms.” He added that the
unilateral actions could spiral into threats to regional stability and peace and must be avoided.
In the South Asian region, water cooperation has become more crucial due to population
growth, rising water demand, impacts of climate change, and environmental degradation. The
region would not be able to develop cooperative solutions unless India shows flexibility, as the
limited perspective on this matter may cause millions to live in poverty. India needs to cooperate
with Pakistan and the international community to build a climate-smart response. In addition, India
must abide by international norms and treaties in letter and spirit to create a conducive environment
to address future challenges related to water scarcity.
(Source: Daily Times)

PEACE AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN

Ashraf Mumtaz (Senior and veteran journalist)
Pakistan's political situation got further complicated on Tuesday as the federal government's
anti-graft watchdog arrested opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) Chairman and former
prime minister Imran Khan in one of many pending cases against him. This led to a strong wave of
protests in major cities across Pakistan, with internet and social media largely blacked out.
The arrest was made only a day after the armed forces' media wing, Inter-Services Public
Relations (ISPR), came up with a strong reaction against Khan's accusations against a senior and
sitting army officer who he alleges planned to assassinate him. Refuting the allegation, the ISPR told
the PTI chief to prove the allegation or the military establishment had the right to take legal action
against him.
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The PTI chief has stuck to his position and is not willing to take back the allegation. The arrest
of the player-turned-politician establishes that the army is fully behind the 13-party ruling coalition
of Pakistan.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has taken serious notice of the high-profile arrest of
Imran Khan and summoned important officials to seek their explanation.
Khan is scheduled to be produced before an accountability court on Wednesday. Interior
Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan claims the government has irrefutable proof of Khan's corruption.
During the last few days, the conflict between the parliament and judiciary has intensified
with both sides claiming their supremacy. Since the army appears to be supporting the parliament,
the consequences are expected to be disastrous for the country.
The raging war manifests that either no effort was made at the state or individual level to keep
the two institutions within their limits, or if behind-the-scenes any such effort was made, it failed to
produce results.
The parliament-judiciary confrontation came into the open when Defense Minister Khwaja
Muhammad Asif, who is very close to PML-N supremo and former prime minister Nawaz Sharif,
launched a scathing attack on the Supreme Court in a session of the National Assembly last
Tuesday.
He addressed the apex court like he was speaking against his enemies, something
unbecoming both of the minister as well as the addressee. He urged the National Assembly Speaker
not to provide the record of the legislature sought by the top court regarding a recent law that
clipped the powers of the Chief Justice of Pakistan.
The CJP has already stayed any action on the bill, but the government passed it into a law and
duly notified it. His order about the stay is still in the field.
Fuming in anger, the defence minister said in his speech he was ready to face the
consequences of his disobedience to the court.
“Enough is enough. If they want a war, then there will be a war. The parliament will not
surrender.”
In his offensive against the top court, the defense minister said judges who gave
unconstitutional decisions should be tried even if they’ve died. He did not say anything against the
politicians who joined hands with dictators in the past to get important positions in the then setup.
Unfortunately, no member on the treasury benches told the minister to address the judges
respectfully. Instead, they thumped their desks as he concluded.
PPP Chairman and Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari said the very same day that
Supreme Court judges should be summoned by the parliament’s privilege committee on the charge
of committing what he called contempt of parliament.
The consistent criticism of judiciary by parliamentarians appears to be a calculated move
aimed at attaining certain targets.
Observers say that if the court punishes any legislator on the charge of contempt-- a possibility
that cannot be ruled out-- the parliamentarians will call the sentence biased, prejudiced because of
the court’s furious attitude.
Then, PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif is expected to return to Pakistan in the near future after
four years of self-exile in London. Ostensibly, he will have to face the courts on account of violating
his pledge that he will return home in a few weeks. In case the court takes action against him, PDM
parties will reject the order as vindictive and revengeful.
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Pressure is being mounted on the top court, especially the chief justice and like-minded
judges, to give favorable decisions on Sharif’s return or such verdicts will be rejected.
It may also be a coincidence that the Supreme Court's decisions on all PML-N’s petitions are
unfavorable.
On the other hand, talks between the ruling coalition and the PTI have failed to make any
headway. The reason: The government has vitiated the environment by arresting, harassing a large
number of PTI leaders. The raids on the Lahore and Gujrat residences of Chaudhry Parvez Elahi,
who is the central president of the party, is one such example.
Imran Khan has been implicated in over 100 cases and everyday he is required to appear in
various courts. Some former federal ministers belonging to the PTI are also being hounded.
Had the government really been interested in making the talks a success, they would have
adopted a friendly strategy and avoided such actions as appear to be vindictive.
The PTI is determined not to accept any elections without Imran Khan while the PDM parties
regard the PTI chairman as a security threat to the country.
Amid the uncertainty, one thing is certain: Peace and stability in Pakistan will remain a pipe
dream in the foreseeable future.
(Source: Arab News)

PAKISTAN NEEDS AN INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

Irfan Mahar (PhD Scholar at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad)
Intellectualism refers to the culture of learning, education, and critical thinking. It is a crucial
element for the growth and development of any society. The intellectual revolution is a crucial
concept that needs to be understood by less developed countries to help them develop and grow.
Less developed countries (LDCs) continue to lag behind in terms of economic growth and
development compared to their more developed counterparts. While some may attribute this to a
lack of resources or unfavorable global economic conditions, others argue that the issue lies in the
lack of intellectualism within these societies. In this regard, LDCs need an intellectual revolution to
drive their development and growth. Similarly, Pakistan is one of the developing countries that has
been struggling with political instability, economic challenges, and social issues for several decades.
To overcome these obstacles and advance towards progress, Pakistan needs an intellectual
revolution.
Pakistan is facing several challenges that have hindered the development of intellectualism in
the country. The factors include political instability, low literacy rates, inadequate resources, and
social issues such as poverty, ethnic clashes, corruption, greed, among others. Political instability has
been a significant issue in Pakistan since its inception, with frequent coups and changes in
government. This instability has hindered the growth of intellectualism by disrupting educational
institutions and discouraging critical thinking. Low literacy rates are another significant factor that
hinders intellectualism in Pakistan. According to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Pakistan’s
literacy rate was only 62.3% in 2018, which is significantly lower than other developing countries.
This low literacy rate is due to inadequate resources, lack of access to education, and cultural norms
that prioritize male education over female education. Education is a fundamental tool for enhancing
intellectualism and creativity, which are essential for development. However, Pakistan has limited
access to education, with low literacy rates, inadequate resources, and poor infrastructure.
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Social issues such as poverty and corruption also hinder intellectualism in Pakistan. Poverty
limits access to education and creates a culture of survival rather than learning. Corruption in
Pakistan is widespread, and it impedes progress by hindering economic growth, undermining social
development, and eroding public trust in government institutions. Corruption is a major
impediment to intellectualism because it creates an environment where intellectualism is
discouraged, and mediocrity is rewarded. Furthermore, the country’s contemporary social climate
has instilled avarice and self-interest in the majority of its citizens. Greed and self-interest have
grown ingrained in Pakistani culture. People have narrowed their thinking to individual, family,
group, and party interests rather than the communal benefits of the country. Individuals and
various groups have fought for personal benefits in social, economic, political, and religious
contexts. Most people do not comprehend communal and national interests, which make any nation
strong, developed, affluent, and advanced, ultimately benefiting all citizens. To address these
difficulties, Pakistan requires an intellectual revolution.
An intellectual revolution in Pakistan would entail a radical shift in the way people think and
view the world. It would involve embracing a culture of learning, innovation, and critical thinking.
This would require a concerted effort to address the challenges that hinder intellectualism in
Pakistan. One way to promote intellectualism in Pakistan is by investing in education. The
government needs to allocate more resources to education, create policies that promote
intellectualism, and prioritize education over other areas. In this regard, Pakistan’s government
requires to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry, its whole
character and structure, so that it takes up its proper task of promoting wisdom rather than just
acquiring knowledge. Furthermore, the government needs to ensure that education is accessible to
all, regardless of gender, social status, or geographic location. Moreover, another way to promote
intellectualism in Pakistan is by encouraging the exchange of ideas and knowledge across borders.
Intellectualism thrives in environments where there is an exchange of ideas and knowledge.
Pakistan can benefit from the expertise and knowledge of other countries by collaborating on
research projects and engaging in academic exchange programs.
Pakistan needs an intellectual revolution to overcome the challenges that have hindered its
growth and development. Intellectualism is essential for driving innovation, technological
advancements, and critical thinking, which are all necessary for development. The promotion of
intellectualism in Pakistan will require a concerted effort by the government, civil society, and
individuals to create a culture of learning, innovation, and critical thinking. Government of Pakistan
needs to invest in education, research, and development, and create policies that promote
intellectualism. Pakistan can move forward and overcome its issues by investing in education,
supporting the flow of ideas, and promoting an intellectual culture.
(Source: Eurasia Review)
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Organizations
SHANGHAI SPIRIT
Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry (A former foreign secretary of Pakistan)
India has assumed the chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) for 2023, and
has planned a series of meetings, including the forthcoming defence ministerial in New Delhi and
the meeting of foreign ministers in Goa.
The SCO is emerging as an important regional organisation in Eurasia given that its
membership (China, Russia, India, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics) represents more than
40 per cent of the world population and nearly a quarter of the global GDP.
In its early years, it focused on security issues and was guided by the ‘Shanghai spirit’,
encapsulating the principles of mutual trust, equality, respect for cultural diversity and the pursuit
of common development.
Of late, the SCO has begun to put more emphasis on tangible initiatives of regional economic
cooperation.
Its future ambitions were revealed recently at the Samarkand meeting of SCO heads of states
last September. The leaders agreed to create efficient economic and transport corridors and work
jointly on climate change, food security, energy security and reliable supply chains, and to accelerate
the pace of informatisation and digitisation.
The theme chosen by India as chair also echoes these priorities: ‘For a SECURE SCO’, which
stands for security, economic connectivity, unity and respect for the environment.
The SCO states have ruled out ideologised and confrontational approaches and have
committed themselves to building a “new type of international relations” in the spirit of mutual
respect, justice, equality and mutual benefit. The SCO’s appeal is certainly growing in the region.
Iran is completing the accession process to join it this year. Turkiye is a dialogue partner. And many
states participate as special guests.
Some analysts are beginning to brand the SCO as an ‘anti-West’ alliance. It may be too early to
reach this conclusion. Firstly, there is no clarity about and discussion on the “new type of
international relations”. Secondly, SCO countries have forged deep economic and financial linkages
with the US and European countries. The organisation’s own financial institutions, like the SCO
Development Bank and SCO Development Fund, have yet to be established.
Despite this, there could be one aspect the US will find disconcerting. The Samarkand summit
called for a gradual increase in the share of national currencies in mutual settlements between the
SCO member states. If this goes through, the US dollar could lose its monetary hegemony.
How far India wishes to stand with the region is also yet to be seen. After all, it is a preferred
partner of the US in the latter’s Indo-Pacific strategy and a key member of the QUAD (comprising
US, India, Australia and Japan), an alliance largely perceived as an instrument to contain China’s
rise. For now, India seems to be running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.
India will also have to decide how it would accommodate its differences with Pakistan and
China within the SCO, particularly as the chair. Will it honour the ‘Comprehensive Action Plan
(2023-2027) for Implementation of Long-Term Good Neighb-ourliness, Friendship, and Coop-eration
among the SCO Members’ that was adopted in Samarkand to attain alignment in common areas of
interest?
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India recently denied Pakistan’s participation in a seminar on ‘SCO armed forces contribution
in medicine, healthcare, and pandemics’ owing to differences over showing Kashmir as occupied
territory on the map. If this is the shape of things to come, it would not be presumptuous to suggest
that India could use its position in the SCO to politicise the organisation.
India also wants to project its tourism potential. It hosted the SCO tourism ministers meeting
in March in Kashi (Var-anasi), designated as the first cultural capital of SCO, and is planning a G20
tourism working group meeting in Srin-agar in May. Pakistan has expr-e-ssed strong reservations
over India’s decision to host meetings in the internationally recognised disputed territory.
India has extended an invitation to the Pakistani foreign minister to attend the May meeting of
SCO foreign ministers in Goa. Pakistan has recently confirmed that the foreign minister will attend
the meeting. This indicates Pakistan’s commitment to the SCO and the country’s relationship with
the organisation’s two anchors, China and Russia. On the sidelines of the meeting, however,
Pakistan need not make any effort for bilateral contact unless India itself takes the initiative.
Regional harmony is critical for India’s own geopolitical interests. Much will depend on how
India conducts itself as chair in the current year. If India does not inject its bilateral differences with
China and Pakistan into the SCO ambit, then the organisation has the potential to deliver tangible
regional economic cooperation in sync with the Shanghai Spirit.
(Source: Dawn)

THE WORLD TRADE CRISIS

Claudia Schmucker (Head of the Geoeconomics program at the German Council on Foreign
Relations)
World trade has stalled. In its October 2022 forecast, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
expects a significant contraction, with only 1 percent growth in 2023, compared to an estimated 3.5
percent in 2022. By comparison, world trade grew by an average of around 8 percent in the early
2000s until the global financial crisis.
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were signs that differentiated supply chains,
which now account for roughly half of total trade, were no longer functioning smoothly. The main
reasons for this were a series of external crises: With the global financial crisis and, the inauguration
of Donald Trump as US president, the conviction in the United States and other countries was
waning that an open trading system would benefit everyone. As a result, the US created numerous
tariff and trade barriers in the context of the emerging geoeconomic rivalry with China, , which also
had a negative impact on other trading partners such as the European Union. In 2020, the COVID-19
pandemic caused further disruption for global trade. Although supply chains remained
comparatively robust, the pandemic increased demand for specific goods while restricting their
production and transportation at the same time.
Most recently, the impact of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has shown how quickly a
political shock can send commodity prices soaring and bring a market to a standstill. The war has
also highlighted the geopolitical risks of dependence on an autocracy with aggressive ambitions.
This has heightened concerns about future trade relations with China, an autocracy that is
increasingly repressive.
The current slowdown in global trade reinforces the negative global economic outlook, as
trade is an important means of absorbing shocks. Under the heading “Countering the Cost of Living
Crisis,” the International Monetary Fund in its October 2022 World Economic Outlook cut the global
growth outlook from 6 percent (2021) to 3.2 percent (2022) and 2.7 percent in 2023. This is the
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weakest growth outlook since 2001, excluding the global financial crisis and the acute phase of the
pandemic.
The Troubled WTO
Despite the recurring commitment to the importance of the multilateral WTO in promoting
world trade and mitigating existing supply crises, concepts such as “reshoring” or “friendshoring”
are appearing with increasing frequency. These strategies aim to reduce the global division of labor
in order to avert the danger of a weaponization of existing dependencies. This geoeconomic
environment leads to increasingly unilateral measures to secure supply chains. As a consequence,
international organizations such as the WTO, which rely on multilateral rules and the principle of
non-discrimination, are losing their relevance.
WTO reform is the top priority for the EU, as the global institution is able to facilitate
international trade and resolve conflicts between different states and economic systems. However,
the US has been critical for some time, because the WTO has failed to integrate China —with its non-
transparent and state-controlled economy—into its rulebook.
This negative attitude toward multilateral institutions such as the WTO has changed under
Joe Biden's presidency. Biden is an avowed multilateralist, and US Trade Representative Katherine
Tai has repeatedly declared her support for a reform of the WTO. However, de facto, US trade policy
has not changed much: The US continues to criticize the current design of the dispute settlement
mechanism and the insufficient rules to combat unfair trade actions by China. In order to modernize
the WTO, much greater US leadership is needed than has been the case to date.
A positive impetus for the WTO was the successful conclusion of the 12th Ministerial
Conference (MC12) in June 2022, which gave the organization new momentum. The main outcome
was the fact that all 164 WTO member states were able to reach an agreement, thus saving the
organization from the looming irrelevance. The MC12 adopted a multilateral agreement on fisheries
subsidies, the first multilateral agreement to have the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) at its core. It came two years late (the target was 2020), but its importance cannot be
overstated. The MC12 also brought a temporary extension of the e-commerce moratorium (no tariffs
on digital trade) and a tentative agreement on food exports as well as a “waiver” of patent rights for
vaccines.
These agreements are only the beginning; the ongoing negotiations about the details will
probably lead to frictions between WTO member states: There is no work program for agricultural
trade, which is particularly important for developing and emerging countries. At the same time,
there are still no answers to current global problems: How to facilitate trade in health products?
How to promote digital trade by means of global trade rules? And how can to combat climate
change through trade? There is no sign of multilateral or plurilateral agreements on these issues.
The EU in the Leadership Position
Progress is possible through plurilateral agreements (so-called coalitions of the willing), and
here the EU must take a leading role. No other global player is currently willing to do so.
General commitments to multilateralism are no longer enough. WTO members must find
ways to establish trust again in order to achieve progress among the diverse WTO membership. To
this end, members must agree on how to resolve trade disputes in the future, and how to create and
implement modern trade rules,.
Here, the EU must do more to engage the US and also China in the WTO reform process. It
should also use existing coalitions to push for further modernization. Here the “Ottawa Group”
comes to mind, which includes not only the EU but also a diverse group of industrialized and
emerging countries such as Australia, Canada, Brazil, Chile, Japan, and Kenya. This group should
push for more trade initiatives in the WTO.
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The Significance of Free Trade Agreements

Progress within the WTO remains important, but the existing rules no longer meet the
requirements of modern trade. As a result, WTO member states have increasingly turned to regional
and bilateral trade agreements. As of March 2022, there were 354 preferential trade agreements in
force, according to the WTO. This represents 577 notifications from WTO members, counting goods,
services, and also new accessions separately.
These so-called preferential agreements promote prosperity, enhance market access to global
centers of growth, and help shape globalization by establishing modern trade rules.
The EU has been focusing on bilateral and regional agreements for 15 years (with the “Global
Europe” strategy of 2007). In total, the EU has concluded over 40 trade agreements with more than
70 countries; these include free trade, economic partnership, and association agreements. However,
with the failure of the ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which was
accompanied by protests across Europe, the support for an active trade policy decreased.
However, in the current geoeconomic environment and against the backdrop of Russia's war
of aggression, trade agreements were recognized as a way to forge alliances with like-minded
partners that go beyond economic issues. Trade agreements were also seen as a way for
diversification to reduce dependencies on autocracies such as China. The EU is therefore pursuing
the negotiations for trade agreements with Chile, Mexico, Australia, Indonesia, and possibly
Mercosur with renewed vigor.
The US has concluded free trade agreements with 20 countries. The most important agreement
is the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), the successor to NAFTA. The USMCA in
particular illustrates the way the US uses its market power and the economic dependency of its
trading partners Canada and Mexico to force both countries to make numerous concessions (some of
which are contrary to WTO rules). While trade agreements were used strategically under former US
President Barack Obama to also push back China’s influence (especially with the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, TPP), the US under President Biden has focused solely on dialogue formats. The Trade
and Technology Council (TTC) with the EU and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in
Asia are central to this. The US pushes for topics such as sustainable supply chains, green
transformation, and digital rules, while market access—contrary to the interests of the partner
countries—plays no role in the discussions.
Asia as a Global Trade Hub
Asia has become the dynamic center of trade liberalization. After relying on multilateral trade
rules for a long time, the region has now turned to new mega-agreements, which are setting new
standards in global trade. One example is the TTP successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), an agreement of 11 countries that was successfully concluded
under the leadership of Japan and Australia despite the US withdrawal under President Trump.
This agreement sets new standards on a number of issues, including subsidies and state-owned
enterprises, corruption, and digital trade.
This makes the CPTTP, which is also open to new members, very attractive. Thus far, the
United Kingdom, South Korea, China, and Taiwan have indicated their desire to join. Because
progress at the WTO is so slow, the EU is often encouraged to join the agreement as a “substitute
WTO with modern rules.” To date, the EU remains opposed, because of the lower level of ambition
in individual chapters compared to EU agreements. In addition, the trade chapters are often heavily
influenced by the US; and do not meet current EU standards.
The second mega-deal is the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
which was negotiated between the 10 ASEAN states plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
New Zealand and came into force in January 2022. Even though some the tariff reductions are not
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overly ambitious, including long transition periods, the agreement has one decisive advantage: The
15 RCEP member states are treated as one economic region. As long as an RCEP member uses goods
from other RCEP countries, they are considered as originating in the processing country. These
cumulative rules of origin facilitate the application of the agreement, especially for small and
medium-sized companies. The EU should consider applying similar rules in its trade agreements in
the long term.
Today, world trade is increasingly viewed from a geoeconomic and security perspective. A
global division of labor is no longer seen as an advantage, but sometimes as a weakness. Under
these circumstances, international organizations such as the WTO and global world trade are
suffering. Following Russia's war of aggression, the EU is once again more inclined to conclude new
trade agreements with like-minded trading partners, also as a way of building alliances. This is the
right way forward.
But the WTO must also be recognized once again by the international community as an
important forum in which countries with different economic systems work together to promote
global and rules-based trade. Here, the EU must exert greater influence on the US and China to
enhance their participation in the reform process.
(Source: Internationale Politik Quarterly)
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Population
POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT
Zeba Sattar (Country Director, Population Council, Islamabad)
Pakistan’s booming population is at odds with its natural endowments. Environmental stress
caused by an imbalance between rapid population growth and limited natural resources is one of
the most frightening, but least discussed realities we face. Our already teetering economy — one
which can barely generate the three million additional jobs it requires annually for new entrants into
the labour force — faces the added threat of water and land shortages. It is a perfect storm waiting to
happen — or have the clouds already burst?
Rises in temperatures associated with climate change, and a decline in rainfall, grab public
attention and tend to overshadow the underlying and growing threat of the erosion of the projected
size of the natural resource base, which informs Pakistan’s National Conservation Strategy,
approved in 1992. Even though tackling a rapidly growing population was part of the strategy,
policymakers did not foresee that population growth rates would continue at their high levels and
that we would add another 120 million to the population between 1981 and 2017. We are expected to
add at least another 120m by 2050.
The first alarm bell is the shrinking water base. One direct manifestation of the nature-
population imbalance can be seen in the stark decline in per capita water availability from 2,150
cubic metres, or CM, to 860CM between 1980 and 2017. A few simple calculations confirm this trend
will continue: the total availability of water resources in Pakistan is currently estimated at 178 billion
cubic metres (BCM). At the current growth rate, our population will expand to 242m by 2025 and
290m by 2035. Unless we improve our ability to store and conserve water, per capita water
availability will fall to further scarcity levels of 730CM in 2025 and 600CM in 2035.
The second glaring imbalance is in the shrinking land base for agriculture and increasing need
for food production. Rural areas have been hit hardest by water shortages and there has been a
decline in cultivated land per capita from 0.5 acres in 1980 to 0.2 in 2017. Another striking trend is
that while 62 per cent of those working in agriculture owned land in 2005, the equivalent proportion
was down to 49pc in 2020. These changes alone directly impact livelihoods, evidenced by the
shrinking size of agriculture as a source of income.
Rural to urban migration is an immediate outcome of rural stress caused by dwindling natural
resources, shrinking economic opportunities and a sharp increase in the numbers seeking work.
Migration induced by decreasing agricultural opportunities and the attraction of selling rural land in
response to population pressures is an adaptation strategy. However, carefully deliberated policy is
required to reduce the stress on cities and towns that were not originally planned for this level of
population increase. Improved public service delivery in smaller cities to reduce migratory stress on
large urban centres is most definitely required.
There has been greater urban population growth than rural, which is increasing
environmental challenges and causing shortages in urban areas. Rapid urban growth was a result of
high urban fertility rates and rapid rural-to-urban migration until the late 1980s, when urban fertility
rates finally began to decline. As a result, the rates of urban growth in 1951–1972 were close to 5pc
per annum at their peak, compared to rural rates of 3.5pc. Urban growth rates have fallen since 1981,
but continue to be more than 1pc to 2pc higher than rural areas due to internal migration. The urban
population has already risen from 24m to 76m between 1980 and 2017 and will surpass the rural
population by 2045.
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Population growth is leading to massive overcrowding, high population densities and

shortage of land to build upon because of the pressures of additional demand for housing. The
number of housing units in urban areas has gone up from 3.6m to 12m units between 1980 and 2017.
The quadrupling of housing demand is leading to steep rises in real estate costs and conversion of
rural and zoned areas to housing projects.
Projecting forward to 2050, we expect 100m more Pakistanis to be living in urban areas even if
there is a moderate decline in family size in the cities. But high population densities and pressures
on already overstretched city municipal limits will continue to overload limited facilities, especially
water for domestic use and sanitation.
Across Pakistan, climate and population pressures will eventually lead to shortages in food
due to the negative impact on our ecology and biodiversity, and possibly also livelihoods, thereby
exacerbating inequalities. Already better off regions like the irrigated plains of Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa will build resilience against climate vagaries, while poorer desert and rain-fed regions
in rural Sindh and Balochistan will succumb to pressures. Rising inequalities can lead to huge
regional frictions based on the ever-increasing competition for largely limited resources and
livelihood opportunities. The prospect of escalating water disputes is inevitable.
Can Pakistan break this cycle, following the example of several other countries in this region
where breakthroughs of science, adaptation in agriculture, energy usage and governance, and
economic adaptation took over? Importantly, most, if not all of them, did not also have to contend
with the pernicious effect of high population growth rates. The lowering of population growth rates,
which is a glaringly neglected national priority, would greatly relieve these pressures and mitigate
economic and political threats.
The issue requires immediate policy attention and financing for the implementation of the
2018 Council of Common Interests-endorsed Plan of Action to tackle rapid population growth. The
new national narrative on population, which has been approved by religious, political, and civil
society leaders, supports maintaining a balance between resources and population numbers. What
can be more critical than the need to emphasise the deleterious effects of a large, uncontrollably
growing population, which is completely at odds with the natural resources we have?
(Source: Dawn)

POPULATION AND CLIMATE

Ali Tauqeer Sheikh (Expert on climate change and development)
Growing inequality and pervasive poverty further lock countries into the cycle of higher
population growth rates and increasing climate vulnerabilities. Some recent studies have inverted
this proposition: without reducing social and economic inequalities, the population growth rate
cannot be slowed down nor can climate vulnerabilities be reduced. Climate justice, therefore, rests
on inclusion and equity in order to manage the population growth rate, demographic trends, and
the sustainability of economic growth — besides achieving net zero emissions.
Dennis Meadows’ The Limits to Growth, released in 1972 by the Club of Rome, instantly
became a controversial and influential book in environmentalism. Based on systems thinking, it
drew attention to population and economic growth as the twin global challenges to sustainability.
By integrating five elements — population, consumption of non-renewable natural resources, food
production, industrialisation and pollution — the book argued that humankind was exceeding
Earth’s carrying capacity. It espoused a neo-Malthusian agenda of limiting population growth and
promoting sustainable economic development for life on the planet beyond 2100.
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Since then, per capita GDP and population growth have remained the strongest drivers of
carbon emissions. The Sixth Assessment Report of IPCC, released in 2022, has specifically identified
high population growth as a “key impediment” to reaching the critical target of limiting global
warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Research examining the effects of
different population projections on economic growth and energy use shows that reining in
population growth and reducing reliance on fossil fuels can significantly decrease greenhouse gas
emissions. Incorporating various population projections in climate models shows that higher
population growth rates lead to higher carbon emissions.
It has been projected that slower population growth could lower emissions from 2.5 billion
tons to 1.6 billion tons per year by 2050. It has also been argued that by 2100, these reductions could
possibly reduce emissions by 37-41 per cent; it would also cost considerably less than the
technological investments required to combat climate change.
Yet, it must also be recognised that the population growth rate is only one of multiple drivers:
reducing the growth rate alone will not solve the climate problem. Multiple factors contribute to
climatic changes, and multiple actions are needed to address them. In other words, even if Pakistan
were to become a net-zero emitter, it would not become climate-secure unless twinned with
regenerating ecosystems. Population planning can help boost resilience and the effectiveness of
other interventions. Above all, a robust population policy can empower people, especially women,
and help improve lives that can make other actions far more effective.
Further, temperature rises will adversely impact everyone, as every additional person
increases carbon emissions — albeit the rich far more than the poor. It will also increase the number
of climate change victims, with the poor far exceeding the rich. A recent Oxfam study based on a
survey of 125 billionaires has found that each billionaire was responsible for the annual emission of
about three million metric tons of CO2; ie, over a million times the amount emitted by 90 per cent of
the people. The report also estimated that 50pc-70pc of their emissions stemmed from their
investments in 183 corporations, with a combined corporate equity value of $2.4 trillion. The study
posits that “extreme inequality and wealth concentration undermine the ability of humanity to stop
climate breakdown”.
Building on the legacy of Limits to Growth, the Club of Rome and several European think
tanks have developed an intricate model, ‘Earth4All’, to explore two possible scenarios this century.
These combine environmental, economic and social factors, including food production, income,
taxes, energy and inequality. First, there is the ‘too little too late’ scenario that represents the current
incremental changes. Second is the ‘giant leap’ scenario, indicating a global population drop to 6bn
from the UN-projected 11.2bn if sustained investments are made in education and healthcare, along
with transformative policy changes in food and energy security, inequality and gender equity.
With China, India and Bangladesh effectively curbing their population curves, attention is
shifting towards Pakistan, a country of an estimated 487m by 2100. As Afghanistan and Pakistan are
holding the world hostage on polio, Pakistan may become the ultimate road-blocker on curbing the
global population growth rate.
Fifty years after Limits to Growth was printed, Pakistan has emerged as a textbook case on all
five elements that were at the heart of the study. The population has increased four times from 62m
in 1972 to 234m today. The rate of return on agricultural inputs has been declining, making several
crops less viable. Plateauing soil productivity, loss of nutritional yield value and depletion of
groundwater, forests and other resources have adversely affected the physical environment, eroded
the carrying capacity of ecosystems and increased exposure to climate-induced disasters. It has also
accelerated outward migration to cities, making Pakistan the most urbanised country in South Asia.
Finally, urbanisation and migration are the key drivers of Pakistan’s population dynamics and
are central to discussions on climate risks, especially in the context of migration to urban and peri-
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urban areas. People migrate to unwelcoming and ill-prepared urban centres like Karachi, where they
can only afford low-lying, flood-prone and marginal land, thus increasing their exposure to urban
climate change risks. It is estimated that in Karachi, 64pc of the population lives in informal
settlements.
The deficient provision of basic services weakens their capacity to adapt to climate change,
resulting in victim-blaming of the poor since internally displaced migrants have a higher carbon
footprint in an urban setting than they had in the rural areas before they migrated. Once in cities,
their resilience level diminishes as they have fewer resources to cope with the adverse impacts of
climate-induced hazards.
The ‘giant leap’ scenario of ‘Earth4All’ has lent support to voices from the Global South calling
for cancellation of debt, reducing world inequality by raising carbon taxes on richer people and
corporations, and decreasing hunger and poverty by respecting the carrying capacity of our
ecosystems. The first step, as always, is preparing for equitable local governance.
(Source: Dawn)
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Religion
THE ISLAMIC WAY FORWARD
Ahmed Ali Siddiqui (Director, Centre for Excellence in Islamic Finance, IBA)
Samia Tahir Jawad (Research Associate at Centre for Excellence in Islamic Finance, IBA)
During the last 40 years, Islamic finance has emerged as an effective alternative to
conventional financing around the world. Islamic Financial products are directly linked with real
assets and the real economy and mostly involve trade, rental or profit and loss sharing contracts
while interest in any form is prohibited.
The emergence of Islamic finance across global markets has gained the attention of several
international financial institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
Asian Development Bank (ADB). They now acknowledge Islamic finance for its sustainable and
ethically responsible nature. These organisations have realised that Islamic finance has the potential
to help in issues like poverty elimination and boosting prosperity in developing countries.
The global Islamic finance industry showed resilience during the pandemic. According to the
Islamic Corporation for the Development of Private Sector (ICD) of the Islamic Development Bank
Group Refinitive Islamic finance development report 2022, the total Islamic finance assets boosted to
$4 trillion with a 17 per cent annual growth rate. The global Islamic banking sector grew by 17pc to
$$2.8tr.
Sukuk, the second largest sector by assets, grew by 14pc in 2021 to $713 billion in Sukuk
outstanding. New issuance rose by 9pc to a record $202.1bn. The issuance of environmental, social
and governance (ESG) Sukuk in 2021 reached a new high of $5.3bn. Islamic funds, the third biggest
sector, saw standout growth of 34pc to $238bn worth of assets under management in 2021. The
takaful industry grew by $73bn in 2021, with growth of 17pc during the year.
World bank has been directly involved with Islamic finance since early 2005 and continuously
supports the sector. The World Bank established its Global Islamic Finance Deve-lopment centre in
2013 in partnership with the government of Turkiye to serve as a knowledge hub for the
development of Islamic finance globally.
Its main role is to conduct research and training and to provide technical assistance and
advisory services to World Bank Group client countries interested in developing Islamic financial
institutions and markets.
Every year the World Bank and the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic
Financial Institutions, Bahrain, jointly organise an International conference in Bahrain in which
representatives from the World Bank’s Islamic Finance department participate and present their
views and efforts on Islamic Finance.
The World Bank also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with The General
Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions in July 2015. Since then, World Bank has been
using Shariah-compliant products to help eliminate poverty and foster shared prosperity.
The World Bank Group has financed and supported several projects through Islamic financing
during the last two decades, which includes $250 million, a line of credit to TSKB, a private
Development and Investment bank in Turkiye and the financing for Jordan’s small and medium
enterprises sector.
The World Bank Group had also entered the Islamic capital market as an issuer of Sukuk with
two issues of Sukuk in 2005 by the World Bank Treasury and the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), respectively, in Malaysia. IFC has also issued its first $100m Sukuk in Dubai and Bahrain.
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In 2017, the IMF’s executive board held its first formal discussion on Islamic finance and
adopted a set of proposals for its role in this area. IMF played a vital role in establishing the Islamic
Finance Service Board (IFSB) to provide regulatory guidelines for central banks on Islamic finance.
The IMF executive board has also endorsed a proposal on the use of the core principles for
Islamic Finance Regulation in 2018, which were developed by the Islamic Financial Services Board
(IFSB) with the participation of the Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
IMF formed an Interdepartmental Working Group to build an institutional view of the
industry and train people to build in-house expertise in Islamic Finance and make policies to better
coordinate with the stakeholders in the industry. This working group focuses on analytical work in
the key areas of Islamic finance, including Islamic banking regulations and supervision, macro-
prudential policy, financial inclusion, consumer protection, monetary policy, Sukuk markets, public
financial management, and tax policy.
IMF has also established an External Advisory Group, comprised of standard-setters for
Islamic finance and leading international experts, to assist in identifying policy issues and enhance
coordination with stakeholders interested in Islamic finance.
IMF is now actively engaged in regulation activities in countries where Islamic finance is now
deemed systemically important and focuses on enhancing the consistency in applying shariah rules
across all shariah-compliant products to ensure smoother growth and financial stability.
The ADB, as a policy, supports Islamic finance to ensure sustainable development and reduce
poverty across its member countries. ADB has 14 member countries with Muslim-majority
populations, including five countries with the biggest Muslim population globally.
After realising Asia’s vast investment needs, ADB recognised the potential of Islamic finance
to promote sustainable development in the region and offer funds and financing for infrastructure
and green and ethical investment in the member countries.
Most importantly, ADB is working with developing countries for financial innovation and
inclusion and helping them to strengthen their Islamic Financial sector and address the challenges
related to this particular sector.
The World Bank, IMF and ADB’s involvement in Islamic finance during the last 17 years has
increased due to its unique profit and risk-sharing nature and ethical features. These institutions
now appreciate the role of Islamic finance globally for sustainable growth.
The growing demand for Shariah-compliant products will boost the share of Islamic assets
globally. The growth of Islamic finance also presents an opportunity to expand financial markets,
strengthen financial inclusion and create new funding sources.
It is evident that IMF, World Bank and ADB have accepted Islamic finance as a viable financial
system and promote it as a tool for shared prosperity. This also presents an opportunity for Pakistan
to explore options with the IMF, World Bank and ADB to provide financing on Shariah-compliant
modes that can help Pakistan convert the country’s external debt to Islamic financing modes.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)

RISING ISLAMOPHOBIA
The way forward
Naghmana A Hashmi (Former Ambassador)
ALLAMA Iqbal said: “Pray, fast and perform the pilgrimage and feel that we have discharged
our obligation to Islam. That is the easy part. Doing all those things is only a starting point for a
much larger obligation: to keep advancing in knowledge of things’ ultimate nature. We should
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never ignore this larger goal.” The commonly held perception is that 9/11 destroyed the Muslim
image. It was a major contributing factor to painting all Muslims with a broad brush as terrorists,
there were other factors shaping the negative image of Muslims much before 9/11. Today most
Muslims, as members of minority communities, grow up against a background of everyday
Islamophobia, which in the last two decades, has become mainstream in the West.
In recent years, Islamophobia has been fuelled by public anxiety over immigration of Muslim
minorities into majority Christian cultures particularly in Europe. The influx of a large number of
refugees from war-torn Muslim countries like Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen further
aggravated the situation. Since 2001, terrorist acts by jihadists in New York, London, Paris, Brussels
and Barcelona have increased anxiety in the West perceiving Islam as a threat and fundamentalism
as the problematic heart of Islam and fearing Muslims as the enemy. In a climate of rapidly
expanding diversity in the West, Muslim minorities are portrayed as non-belonging and wanting to
separate themselves from the rest of society.
Adoption of a resolution sponsored by 57 OIC countries plus eight more including China and
Russia by the UN General Assembly proclaiming 15 March as the International Day to Combat
Islamophobia is a welcome development. Marking the International Day to Combat Islamophobia
will raise international awareness about the growing phenomenon and anti-Muslim hatred and send
a strong message of respect for human dignity, and reiterate common commitment to unity in
diversity.
This was an important beginning but a lot more needs to be done particularly by the Muslim
countries and communities themselves in order to change the narrative about Islam and Muslims.
Combating Islamophobia will not be possible by just focusing on what the Western world needs to
do to integrate the Muslim communities and ensure equal status and human rights to them. A deep
introspection is required by the Muslims themselves to identify deficiencies and rectify them. The
Muslim Ummah should rise from over five centuries of slumber and start preparing our youth to
excel in science and technology. Some recommendations are as follows;
 The OIC should undertake an objective analysis of the shortfalls in the Ummah and our
orientation to the world.
 Islam prioritizes education as indicated by the Quranic commands and our Prophet’s Dua to
Allah SWT (Rabbi ZidniIlmi), asking Him to increase our knowledge.
 In the world of Cloud, Artificial Intelligence and unlimited, unimaginable future advances,
unless we update our knowledge, we will further fall behind.
 A number of online universities worldwide are teaching young Muslims Fiqh and Shariah
laws. It would help to open online schools where the Muslim youth could simultaneously
learn STEM subjects.
 Bold and courageous steps in the acquisition of knowledge are required. Without
understanding how the universe works and how we relate to it, it is not possible to
understand Islam. We must emphasize that religion and science are integral parts of human
life.
 Islam is a religion for all times, In order for it to keep pace with the changing realities and
demands of changing times, thus the concept of Ijtihad in Islam. Lack of Ijtihad and scholarly
discourse on issues is plaguing the Ummah and hampering development and needs urgent
attention.
 Muslims are developing harsh and fundamentalist attitudes, particularly with regard to the
rights of women and minorities. Islam advocates moderation, a concept which is neither
propagated nor understood by the majority of Muslims these days. Scholarly discourse on
the concept of moderations needs to be encouraged for the Muslims to understand the true
spirit of Islam and its universality.
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 Islam advocates democracy in all aspects including in choosing the leader of the state and
the one to lead the prayers. Authoritarian and dictatorial rule has no place in Islam.
Unfortunately lack of democracy in the Muslim world is a reality which started much earlier
in Islamic history
 The West has utilized it extremely well to their advantage. All leading media houses are in
the Western world. There is no indigenous media house in the Muslim world large and
powerful enough to build and promote a counter narrative. There is therefore an urgent
need for the Ummah to focus on the media.
 OIC should encourage and put in place effective mechanisms for investments by rich
Muslim countries, first and foremost in their brotherly Muslim Countries to lift them out of
poverty and put them on the road to economic development.
 The Islamic Development Bank has to date only invested 8 billion US $ in the OIC member
states. Whereas member states have invested trillions in the developed world. IDB needs to
focus more and invest in the socio-economic development of poorer members of OIC.
 The Ummah, unfortunately, is divided not only in terms of religious ideologies and sects but
also in terms of regional and world politics. This has pitched individual Muslim countries
and regional blocks against each other. The attention and focus of the Ummah instead of
ameliorating and improving the condition of the Muslim world is on fighting each other and
wasting precious resources.
 OIC should focus on the Muslims living in non-Muslim countries and reach out to them to
educate them on the spirit of Islam and encourage them to educate their children, respect the
society and culture and religion of the countries they live in.
 Urge them to reach out to their host communities and build bridges through projecting the
peaceful, tolerant and progressive image of Islam.
In short, what is lacking is an account of Muslims’ self-introspection, an examination of their
self-inflicted failures, causing an undesirable image of 2 billion followers of Islam. It is time that all
Muslim nations invest in modern rationalistic education. Without socio-economic development,
backed by a strong intellectual and stable political environment, any efforts to combat Islamophobia
will only be cosmetic and temporary. There is a need to change mindsets and basic approach.
“People’s condition will not be changed until they change what is in themselves” (Quran 13:11).
(Source: Pakistan Observer)

TREATY OF HUDAIBIYAH
A turning point in the history of Islam
Abu Tariq Hijazi
The incident of Hudaibiyah reserves in history a significant phase of Islam when Muslims got
an opportunity to unexpectedly notch gains from the jaws of an apparent defeat.
It was the sixth year of Hijrah since the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his supporters had
left the beloved city of Makkah. They were eager to visit the holy Kaaba and perform tawaf
(circumambulation).
The pagans of Makkah had meanwhile confronted Muslims three times in the Battle of Badr,
Battle of Uhud, and the Battle of Trench. And despite winning in at least two of the battles (in Uhud,
they had to retreat), Muslims were still not strong enough to dare counter attack on the large force of
the Makkan pagans.
The Hudaibiyah encounter occurred meanwhile that not only gave Muslims courage to go
ahead with the mission, but it also tested their courage and faith in Islam.
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Six years after Hijrah, in 628 CE, the holy Prophet (peace be upon him) dreamt that he and his
followers were entering Makkah and performing tawaf. It was a good sign and hence he declared
his plan to visit Makkah to perform Umrah.
Over 1,400 Muslims donned ihram with him from Madinah. They took 70 camels with them
for sacrifice. As per the established practice, the Makkans were bound to allow pilgrims coming —
but without arms — to perform Umrah. But, alarmed by the huge Muslim presence, the Quraish
leaders decided not to allow them from entering the city and sent Khaled Bin Walid with 200
fighters to stop them defying the centuries-old Arab tradition.
The holy Prophet (peace be upon him) changed the route of Taneem to avoid confrontation
and came to a lesser-known place called Hudaibiyah on the western edge of the city.
Determined not to allow Muslims enter the city, Makkans sent Urwah bin Masud to negotiate
with the Prophet. Highly impressed with the scenes of Prophet’s love among his followers, Urwah
said, “I have visited the royal courts of the Persians, Roman and Ethiopian kingdoms, but I have
never seen the kind of respect and high esteem as the followers of Mohammad have for him. They
have come only for worship. Let them enter the holy city.” But the Makkan leaders were bent upon
preventing the Muslims.
The holy Prophet (peace be upon him) later sent Uthman bin Affan who had good contacts in
Makkah but they detained him and spread a rumor to upset the Muslims that Uthman has been
killed. This was a great challenge. Though 400 km away from his city and having no proper arms to
fight, he prepared for a war like situation and called his followers to prepare for fight unto death.
The people rushed to take an oath of allegiance on his pious hand and within short time the news
reached Makkah that 1400 volunteers were ready to fight unto death. This broke their morale and
Makkans agreed to discuss terms of peace with him.
They released Uthman and sent Sohayl bin Amr Al-Thaqafi to negotiate the terms of peace
with the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Sohayl (later embraced Islam) was very tough in
dealings. He reached the following terms:
In the name of Almighty Allah.
These are the conditions of peace between Muhammad, son of Abdullah, and Suhayl Ibn Amr
the envoy of Makkah:
1. There will be an armistice between the two parties and no fighting for the next 10 years.
2. Any person or tribe who wishes to join Muhammad and to enter into any agreement with
him is free to do so. Likewise any person or tribe who wishes to join the Quraish and to enter into
any agreement with them is free to do so.
3. If any Makkan went to Madinah, then Muslims would return him to Makkah, but if any
Muslim from Madinah went to Makkah, he would not be returned.
4. If any young man, or one whose father is alive, goes to Muhammad without permission
from his father or guardian, will be returned to his father or guardian. But if anyone goes to the
Quraish of Makkah, will not be returned.
5. This year the Muslims will go back without entering Makkah. But next year Muhammad
and his followers can enter Makkah, spend three days and perform the Umrah.
Apparently, it was an agreement that went against the wishes of the Muslims, but later it
turned out to be a great victory for Muslims.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) showed extreme patience by accepting all these terms as
dictated. This treaty is known as the Treaty of Hudaibiyah. It was one of the most outstanding
events and proved to be a turning point in the Islamic history.
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Few of those present there could visualize the victory of the treaty based on the Prophet’s
farsightedness. The first gain of the Treaty was that hostile Makkan leadership recognized Prophet
Mohammed (peace be upon him) as a leader of the Madinah state. Secondly, the Treaty terminated
the hostile behavior of Quraish against Muslims. Now they were allowed to move freely and talk
openly about Islam. Thirdly, Muslims were equally allowed to make alliances with other tribes.
Fourthly, 10 years armistice with Quraish provided a unique opportunity to preach Islam and to
deal with their rivals in other parts of the peninsula. Very soon they conquered the Jewish
stronghold of Khyber.
The most irritating conditions of the treaty were the clause Nos. 3 & 5; but the Prophet (peace
be upon him) simplified them by saying that if a Muslim flees from us to Makkah we don’t need him
and if a Makkan Muslim comes to us in Madinah we shall return him and he will preach Islam there.
Regarding performing Umrah this year, Muslims received a written guarantee to perform it next
year peacefully. The holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was determined to avoid bloodshed in the
holy city and he succeeded fully in establishing it. Commenters have viewed the treaty as a
masterpiece of his wisdom and farsightedness.
It was really a great triumph of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him). After the peaceful
armistice at Hudaibiyah, Islam increased in leap and bounds. Muslims had full liberty to preach
Islam. Three battles of Quraish against Muslims were lost.
The people realized the eventual triumph of Islam. They entered the fold of Islam in
thousands. The following year when the holy Prophet returned to perform Umrah, there were 2,000
pilgrims with him instead of 1400 earlier.
When the Prophet returned from Hudaibiya, he received the Divine revelation that Almighty
Allah had put a seal of honor on this treaty and called it "Fatah Al-Mubeen" (Manifest Victory) in the
Qur'an. (48:01) He also rewarded His pleasure to those who took oath of allegiance under a tree,
which is called Bait Ridwan and termed that Allah’s protection was upon the hand of the Prophet
(peace be upon him).
After concluding the treaty, the holy Prophet told the followers to slaughter sacrificial animals
at the same place and get their head shaved to come out of ihram. But the people were so dejected
that they delayed the compliance. The Prophet (peace be upon him) felt it and entered the tent and
told his accompanying wife, Umm Salma, about people’s reluctance.
She politely advised, “The people are in shock to lose their Umrah and entry to the holy city.
You do as planned. They will follow you.” The Prophet (peace be upon him) came out, slaughtered
his camels and got his head shaved. Subsequently, the people followed him and they all set out
towards Madinah. Thus the wisdom of Ummul Momenin, Umm Salma, solved a tedious problem.
When Sohail was signing the treaty, a young Muslim in chains appeared in the Muslim camp
and cried for help and his release. Sohail recognized him. It was his own son known as Abu Jandal.
Sohail cried, “Here is the test of this treaty you cannot take this man as per clause no. 4. You have to
return it to me.” The holy Prophet agreed and consoled Abu Jandal, “We have just concluded a
treaty with Quraish in the name of Allah and we honor it. Be patient and resign yourself to the will
of Allah. He will provide you relief.” Abu Jandal was handed over to his father but he escaped from
Makkah and after some time and stayed in desert.
Another Muslim, Utba, known as Abul Baseer, fled from Makkah and made his hiding in the
Red Sea coast. Abu Jandal and many other runaways joined him and posed a threat to the passing
trade caravans of the Quraish.
Ultimately the Quraish requested the Prophet (peace be upon him) to abrogate this clause and
call these brave Muslims back to Madinah. The Prophet sent a letter to Abul Baseer, who was much
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delighted to receive it but he was on death bed and died there. However Abu Jandal and other 70
mujahedeen returned to Madinah praying for Abul Baseer who had provided a shelter to them.
The Hudaibiyah Treaty proved to be a prelude to the Conquest of Makkah. As per the
agreement, Banu Bakr tribe joined Al-Quraish and Banu Khaza’a entered into alliance with the
Prophet. But they both had long history of enmity between them. Just after 20 months, Banu Bakr
attacked Banu Khaza’a in Sha'ban, 8AH. They killed many persons and their chief, Nofel, did not
spare them even inside the holy city. The Quraish also supported them with men and arms. Amr bin
Salem of Banu Khaza’a with 20 men rushed to Madinah and advised the holy Prophet with real
situation. The Prophet (peace be upon him) again rose high to the challenge.
He sent a word to Quraish, pay ransom for the persons killed or terminate your alliance with
Banu Bakr or treat the Hudaibiyah Treaty as abrogated. The Quraish arrogantly replied we shall
neither pay ransom nor terminate our alliance with Banu Bakr but are ready to abrogate the treaty
with you. The holy Prophet stood to the challenge. But he wanted to avoid bloodshed in Harem
territory at every cost. He made a secret plan to surround Makkah in surprise with a large force so
that Makkans could surrender without a fight. It was a super strategy. He declared war preparations
without naming the destination. Muslim tribes rushed to Madinahh in Ramadhan (8AH). Various
northern tribes had entered the fold of Islam in these 20 months after the conquest of Khyber and
Taima. Muslim volunteers came in thousands. The famous tribes of Aslam, Sulaim, Ghifar, Muzaina,
Ashjaa, and Juhaina joined the Islamic force. Muslim forces marched towards Makkah and camped
at Marr Zahran. They surrounded the holy city on 7 Ramadhan. The Quraish were perplexed with
this sudden attack. Muslims also sealed all the routes of escape. The holy Prophet declared a general
amnesty and the whole city surrendered to him on 10 Ramadhan (6AH) without bloodshed (except a
few by Khalid bin Waleed) This was a great gift of Hudaibiyah Treaty.
It was also a matter of great significance that great warriors and arch enemies of Islam realized
the situation and embraced Islam after Hudaibiyah treaty and before the conquest of Makkah. These
included Prophet's uncle Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib; Abu Sufyan the CNC of Quraish; Khalid bin
Waleed, the great conqueror; and Amr ibn al Aas, the later conqueror of Egypt. Later, Ikrema bin
Abu Jehal, Uteba bin Abi Lahab, Safwan bin Umayyah, Kaab bin Zuhair, Sohail bin Amr, Hakim bin
Hizam, Wahshi the killer of Hamza and Hindah bint Rabia, the cruel lady embraced Islam.
Practically there remained no enemy of Islam in Makkah. The Makkan leadership which banned his
entry to the city in 6 AH welcomed him as their head within 22 months. This was a great
achievement of Hudaibiyah.
Thus were the important events connected with an unknown place called Hudaibiyah near
Makkah Al-Mukarramah. Later people visited this historical place and a mosque was erected at the
place where holy Prophet (peace be upon him) offered prayers during his stay. This mosque near
Shumaisi lies about 20 km away from Makkah on the old road leading to Jeddah. When you visit
this place, think about the people who took an oath under an acacia tree to sacrifice their lives for the
sake of Islam and pray for them.
(Source: Arab News)

MOSQUES AS EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTRES

Farrukh Mahmood Mian
Climate change is a major threat to mankind, and Pakistan is among the top 10 countries most
vulnerable to its effects. Some of the destruction caused due to global warming has become visible in
the last few years in the form of severe heat waves (for example, Karachi in 2015) and heavy floods
(2010 and 2022).
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Mitigation and adaptation are the two parallel ways to address this issue globally. Given its
high vulnerability to such disasters, Pakistan needs to take action to prepare for and become resilient
to the destruction caused by these severe weather events, which are predicted to increase in intensity
and frequency in the coming years.
Can mosques play a supporting role during such calamities by providing shelter and
managing the urgent food, water and hygiene needs of its adjoining population? It is indeed
possible to do so, provided a concerted effort is made to reorientate mosques to act as first
responders during extreme climate events.
The ubiquitous nature of mosques in Pakistani society makes them an ideal resource for
disaster management. According to the 2017 Census, there are over 100,000 mosques in the country.
Nearly all of them are built on a self-help basis by the residents of the locality, and generous
donations are made by the people both in building them and in their maintenance and upkeeping.
Usually, they have a covered area which is sufficient to provide standing room for residents of
the locality during the Friday prayer congregation. Many of them have building structures with two
levels and, in some cases, an additional level in the basement.
The first responders during large-scale catastrophes are usually government agencies and
voluntary organisations that are spread throughout the country. However, it takes them substantial
time to mobilise their workers to the disaster sites and, more importantly, to arrange food and other
supplies for the disaster victims, while many of the victims may be dying.
On the other hand, mosques have the potential to provide the same service in a much shorter
time as they are present in every locality of Pakistan. While mosques are viewed exclusively as
places of worship, they have the potential to also serve as community centres in times of crisis
through minimum alteration in their setups.
A large number of mosques have reliable water and gas supply arrangements, as well as
adequate electricity and even solar panel installations. The country could leverage this existing
infrastructure to help during climate-related and other calamities.
However, at a minimum, there would be a plan in place to look after the disaster-affected
population within the neighbourhoods. Due to the well-knit fabric of the residents of our mohallahs
and streets, it can be expected that a spirit of love and cooperation will greatly ease the burden by
providing mutual comfort to one another.
There are several ways in which mosques can be repurposed as emergency response centres.
For new ones that are yet to be built, the federal or provincial government must first develop
climate-resilient designs and building regulations that consider the community’s emergency needs.
Some of the design provisions to be considered are: mosques should be built on a raised
platform to give protection in case of floods. In addition, the building structure should be robust
enough to withstand high-intensity earthquakes. And an energy-efficient interior cooling system
should be installed, which can reduce the impact of debilitating heat waves.
For the pre-existing mosques, a database may be developed to identify those that have the
capacity and adequacy to serve as emergency centres. It is highly likely that only about 10 per cent
of the masajid will qualify to take on a revised, community-based role. However, if 10,000 buildings
can be retrofitted to provide shelter to affected populations, it is still a considerable number. They
could become centres that save precious human lives by urgently providing supplies and first-aid to
the affected populations.
A reorientation programme would need to be devised and implemented to familiarise the
management committees of mosques with the desired features of such centres and how they can
support the nearby community during times of crisis. To do this, it would be necessary that mosques
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partner with philanthropic organisations that have experience in providing post-disaster support to
communities.
These organisations are well-versed in laying down emergency plans and procedures and
mobilising the resources that can be activated quickly in case of a calamity. By partnering with
philanthropic organisations, it is possible that in a matter of a couple of years, the management of
the mosque would gain enough knowledge to be in a position to take on the role of first responders
without any external help.
A typical Pakistani masjid is opened five times a day for about one hour each, adding up to
five hours in the entire 24-hour day and for the remaining duration, it remains closed to the public.
Despite the available facility, it is odd that in the event of natural disasters, the public rarely sees the
mosque as the first place for taking refuge or where they can receive provisions such as food, water
and basic medicines.
(Source: Dawn)
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South Asia
REGIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND PAKISTAN
Mansoor Khan (Former Ambassador)
The forces of economic transformation are in motion in the wider region around Pakistan.
Phenomenal progress is underway in the Middle East/Arab world and its economic engagement
with other regions/countries. States in West/Central Asia are exploring opportunities for providing
corridors of connectivity from China to Turkiye and Europe. Pakistan as the natural hub of
connectivity of these regions with South Asia requires a focus on internal stability and economic
fundamentals to fully capitalize on available opportunities for economic growth and prosperity.
For many years, Arab and Gulf countries have been sending positive vibes for regional
economic integration. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman’s ‘Vision 2030’ for Saudi Arabia,
reaching its mid-point this year, is making remarkable progress and despite criticism, is likely to
accomplish its final targets in 2030. It has already surpassed some of its targets, such as women’s
participation in the economy and development. To support its agenda of non-oil dependent
economic progress, Saudi Arabia has taken substantive measures for creating a conciliatory
environment in and around it, constructively addressing areas of divergence with key regional
countries including Qatar, Turkiye, Iran and others.
A momentous development indeed has been the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in collaboration
with China. Apart from its positive impact on regional political stability, this development is
expected to give a significant boost to investments in infra-structure projects through a renewed
post-COVID 19 push to the Chinese Belt and Road (BRI) initiative. Economists anticipate that the
melting of the ice between these two leading oil-based economies will stimulate regional economic
dynamics in an unprecedented manner.
These developments signify that the direction of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region
is to be the new fulcrum of economic integration and global connectivity. The economy of the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also shown resilient growth despite a global slowdown in recent
years caused by COVID-19 and the consequent global commodity crisis. Qatar is also taking big
strides on the international economic scene by hosting major international events like the football
World Cup. Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman are also on the path of sustained economic recovery. These
petroleum driven economies in the Gulf are also benefitting from the increase in global demand and
prices caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The other region showing economic vibrancy and the urge for connectivity is Central and
Western Asia. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have emerged as stable
economies/societies located at the confluence of Russian, Chinese and European land masses with
interest in trade, transit and energy corridors. Deepening uncertainty in Afghanistan remains a weak
link in realizing the tide of sub-regional and cross-regional connectivity.
Pakistan by virtue of its geographic location and religious and cultural significance is
strategically located and as a leading Muslim country with a long border with Afghanistan and
tremendous commonalities with Gulf countries and Iran, can make contributions toward
synchronizing connectivity initiatives. Following crucial developments related to the withdrawal of
US/NATO troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan seems to be shying away from its
natural role as a linchpin for a transition in Afghanistan and for promoting regional connectivity
with the Gulf and West Asia. The domestic crisis is crippling Pakistan’s crucial abilities in this
context.
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The way forward for Pakistan is an effective transformation in governance and framework,
focusing on economic fundamentals, domestically and in regional/ international engagement. At the
domestic level, it’s imperative to undertake comprehensive reform for promoting economic growth
generating employment opportunities for the youth in agriculture, manufacturing and services.
Special attention is required to employ scientific and technological innovations in emerging fields
such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and modern digital tools.
On the external front, it’s important for Pakistan to have engagement with Afghanistan to seek
understanding on security and counter-terrorism (including the TTP issue) as well as exploring the
way forward on human rights (girls education) and inclusivity in Afghanistan. Afghan stability is
key for wider regional connectivity. Therefore, the Gulf and Central/West Asia regions may be
associated in this engagement to create mutual stakes in the regional economy/ connectivity. In case
the Afghan Taliban continue to ignore welfare and mainstreaming of their people in the regional
and international equation, they will be facing internal as well as external pressures. Bilaterally,
Pakistan may enhance the facilitation of trade, transit and economic interaction for the benefit of the
two peoples. Without such an outright approach, it would be difficult to prevent Afghanistan from
sliding into deeper chaos, instability and isolation, with serious implications for Pakistan.
Apart from Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to work out an independent approach to strengthen
economic interaction with GCC countries and Iran targeting regional connectivity projects including
linking ports of Gwadar and Chabahar with other regional ports, as well as projects in infrastructure
and energy. The emerging economic momentum in the region is likely to attract investments both
from the Western World including the US, Europe and China.
The bottom line is that economic transformation is the most optimal solution for Pakistan to
find a way out of its current economic and social difficulties. The window of regional economic
integration and connectivity is asking for a grab.
(Source: Arab News)

COMBATING THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS

Haseeb Irfanullah
In the first quarter of the past five years, humanitarian agencies and the Bangladesh
government together have been launching the annual Joint Response Plan (JRP) to address the on-
going Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh. As a "Nature-based Solutions" (NbS) enthusiast
myself, I am in a dilemma seeing NbS in 2023's JRP, like last year – should I be happy, or worried?
Environment and ecosystem rehabilitation has always been a cross-cutting issue in the JRPs. It
is indeed exciting for environmentalists to see NbS finding its place in the world's largest refugee
camp sheltering about a million of Myanmar's Muslim minority. NbS basically means protecting,
restoring, creating, or managing terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems to tackle different challenges of our
society. Over the last few years, NbS has been widely discussed in addressing ecological
degradation, water and food insecurity, natural calamities, and climate crisis, for example. To me,
the most unique aspect of NbS is, from one NbS action, we get two types of benefits, simultaneously
– human well-being and improved biodiversity.
On August 25, 2020, I wrote a piece in this column showing how different interventions
implemented in the Rohingya refugee camps could be branded as NbS – be it restoring hilly stream
banks to ensure easy passing of flood waters, creating water reservoir to reduce devastation of
flooding, stabilising hilly slopes with terraces covered with grasses and trees to stop landslide, and,
of course, expanding the green cover within and outside the camps to improve the landscape.
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Like the JRP 2022, the new JRP 2023 aims to promote NbS as the agencies continue developing
the camp infrastructure, including slope stabilisation and drainage systems. It also envisages
climate-sensitive food production by practising climate-smart agriculture, opportunities for resilient
income, land and water restoration activities, and sustainable water resource management as a
means of adapting to climate change. Since 2018, as many as 3,200 hectares of degraded land have
been reforested, and reforestation remains an integral part of the JRP 2023.
Despite these positive developments and future plans, my main concern is if we will see a full
adoption of NbS principles and standards in the refugee camps of Cox's Bazar-Teknaf Peninsula. If
we want to implement a true NbS, first we need to understand the local problems and design a
suitable NbS intervention accordingly. Once an NbS is implemented, we need to periodically
measure if it is increasing the local biodiversity, while giving benefits to humans. We also need to
calculate the economic feasibility of the NbS action. Both of these are doable, if we can allocate
sufficient resources to bring in necessary expertise. But, two other important features of NbS are: a)
engaging local communities in NbS planning and execution; and b) negotiating and agreeing with
them on the temporary losses and the long-term gains from an NbS. In other parts of Bangladesh,
although challenging, such community participation is possible. We saw that in Hakaluki Haor over
the last almost 25 years, in Tanguar Haor since 2006, and in the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary, just
outside the refugee camps, and other protected forests over the past two decades.
But things are different in Rohingya refugee camps. Six years on, the Bangladesh government
still officially identifies these people as the "Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs)," not
as refugees. Nevertheless, Rohingyas can be a part of the workforce to implement NbS interventions
inside the camps and earn a wage while doing so – as they have been extensively doing it under
numerous activities since 2018. But they cannot be a true part of the governance system, although
the NbS standards strongly expect stakeholders to own the decisions they make and hold the system
accountable for executing those decisions. Also, a core principle of NbS envisages that NbS
interventions should be implemented with "the full engagement and consent of Indigenous Peoples
and local communities in a way that respects their cultural and ecological rights", which is not
possible with the Rohingyas in the absence of such rights. Another challenge in the camps is
installing an adaptive management of NbS as these interventions are long-term ventures. Such a
system needs regular collection of evidence to guide NbS management, which is not quite possible
in the refugee camps, since we are not supposed to think of anything long-term for this settlement.
I believe contextualisation is the word we should be focusing on to address the above
challenges. First, humanitarian and government agencies working in the refugee camps, especially
in the environment space, should discuss how to contextualise NbS principles and standards in this
refugee crisis, which is already burdened with uncertainties and is far away from any resolution.
The Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) Secretariat should facilitate this process as it has been
superbly doing so for the environment and energy sector. Second, there should be a "Community of
Practice" to bring together agencies of Rohingya refugee camps, experts with knowledge on
Bangladesh's NbS, and experts already working in the conservation-refugee crisis space around the
globe. This will help to exchange ideas and expertise, and give the humanitarian leadership in
Bangladesh to make NbS effective in Cox's Bazar, especially on how to bring refugees into the NbS
process, without jeopardising the host government's stand on the crisis and vision towards a
resolution.
Finally, a small working group is needed within the ISCG to oversee NbS interventions inside
and outside the camps. This group can be a subset of the individuals already within the above-
mentioned Community of Practice. This group is crucial to avoid misuse of the NbS concept, which
may lead to "greenwashing" – where we brand something as NbS or pro-nature, but in reality, these
are damaging nature in shorter and longer terms. By adopting the above actions to mainstream NbS
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into responding to a grave refugee crisis like the ongoing one, Bangladesh could be a pioneer in the
world.
(Source: Daily Star Bangladesh)

MODI’S FINAL ASSAULT ON INDIA’S PRESS FREEDOM HAS BEGUN

Anuradha Bhasin (Executive editor of The Kashmir Times)
On the evening of Oct. 19, 2020, as reporters and photographers for The Kashmir Times
rushed to meet deadlines, government officials and the police swept into the newspaper’s offices in
the city of Srinagar, chased out the staff and put a lock on the door that remains to this day.
To me, the raid was punishment for daring to question the policies of Prime Minister
Narendra Modi of India. The newspaper, for which I am the executive editor, has been an
independent voice in the state of Jammu and Kashmir since it was founded by my father in 1954,
weathering several tumultuous decades of war and military occupation. But it may not survive Mr.
Modi. His repressive media policies are destroying Kashmiri journalism, intimidating media outlets
into serving as government mouthpieces and creating an information vacuum in our region of about
13 million people.
Now Mr. Modi is taking steps that could replicate this disturbing model on a national scale.
His Hindu-chauvinist movement, which has normalized intolerance and violence against Indian
Muslims, has already put severe pressure on India’s once-rambunctious press, with journalists
surveilled and jailed, and the government using strong-arm tactics against media outlets to ensure
favorable coverage. But in January, draft amendments to digital media guidelines were introduced
that would essentially allow the government to block any content it doesn’t like.
In other words, the rest of India may end up looking a lot like Kashmir.
In 2019, Mr. Modi’s government abruptly revoked Kashmir’s autonomous status without
public input from the territory’s people, sent in thousands of troops and shut down internet access.
The shutdown lasted nearly six months, forcing hundreds of journalists to line up for hours to file
their stories via a single designated site that had internet access. Each had 15 minutes to do so.
Internet speeds have been excruciatingly slow since.
The next year new rules were introduced that empowered officials to label media content in
Kashmir as “fake news, plagiarism and unethical or anti-national” and to punish journalists and
publications. The rules stated — ironically — that the goal was to “promote the highest standard of
journalism.”
Journalists are routinely summoned by the police, interrogated and threatened with charges
such as income tax violations or terrorism or separatism. Several prominent journalists have been
detained or sentenced to jail terms.
We work under a cloud of fear. In late 2021, I spoke to a young journalist, Sajad Gul, who was
being harassed for his reporting. Fearing arrest, he told me that he slept fully dressed each night and
kept his shoes at his bedside — unusual in Kashmir, where shoes are customarily removed before
entering a home — in case he had to make a quick getaway. He was arrested in January of last year
and remains in custody. Many journalists self-censor or have simply quit. Fearing arrest, some have
fled into exile overseas. The Indian government has put at least 20 others on no-fly lists to prevent
them from leaving the country.
Journalism has always been hazardous in Kashmir. India and Pakistan both claim the
mountainous region, which has been plagued by war and a separatist insurgency for decades.
Journalists have been caught in the middle, threatened and intimidated by Indian security forces
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and militants, both of whom have wanted to control how the story is being told. At least 19
journalists were killed in Kashmir between 1990 and 2018.
Still, Kashmiri journalism flowered. Newspapers and news websites proliferated, and a new
generation of talented young investigative journalists brought a fresh eye to Kashmir’s problems
with well-researched public-interest reporting that often boldly took on the government.
All of that has disappeared under Mr. Modi, whose government aims to silence any separatist
voices or those advocating conciliation or a negotiated settlement in Kashmir. Kashmiri newspapers
are heavily reliant on government advertising and media subsidies, and the government uses that
leverage to ensure that those newspapers tell the officially approved version of the truth. Today, few
Kashmir news outlets dare to question official policy, and many have become blatant government
mouthpieces just to stay in business.
My own newspaper is barely surviving. In 2019, I filed a lawsuit challenging the internet
shutdown. In apparent retaliation, the government sealed our Srinagar office. Many of our
journalists have left and our operations have been crippled. Today, when I suggest that we report
aggressively on public issues, I encounter resistance from my wary, skeletal staff.
An information vacuum hangs over Kashmir, with the public under-informed — or
misinformed — about what’s going on in the region. Important news is suppressed, downplayed or
twisted to suit government ends.
When Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a towering figure in the separatist movement, died in 2021, the
news was either blacked out in Kashmir or mentioned only briefly. Last month, the government
began a drive to bulldoze thousands of homes that authorities said were illegally built on state land.
A leading Kashmir outlet portrayed it as a bold stroke against unnamed “influential land-grabbers.”
There was no word about the poor Kashmiris suddenly left homeless or residents who claim to have
valid documents proving ownership.
An ignorant public and a government free of scrutiny and accountability are threats to
democracy. But Mr. Modi appears intent on replicating this across India. The proposed amendments
to national guidelines for digital media that were unveiled in January are strikingly similar to those
imposed on Kashmir, empowering government fact-checkers to label online content as “fake or
false.” Days after those changes were announced, the government ordered online platforms to block
links to “India: The Modi Question,” a BBC documentary critical of the prime minister. Indian tax
agents later raided the British broadcaster’s offices in India. Such raids have been used repeatedly to
pressure critical voices in the media.
Since he took power in 2014, Mr. Modi has systematically debased India’s democratic ideals,
bending courts and other government machinery to his will.
The media stands as one of the last remaining institutions capable of preventing India’s
descent into authoritarianism. But if Mr. Modi succeeds in introducing the Kashmir model of
information control to the rest of the country, it won’t be just press freedom that is at risk, but Indian
democracy itself.
(New York Times)

ADDRESSING THE REGIONAL SECURITY RISKS OF ROHINGYA CAMPS

Shafi Md Mostofa (security studies scholar)
On April 14th, there was an incident in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar, where the Police engaged in a
firefight with members of The Arakan Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed group from Myanmar.
During the altercation, a passerby named Noor Haba was shot by ARSA, and a member of ARSA
was shot dead by the police. Two policemen were injured, and one person was arrested with a
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weapon in connection to the incident. ARSA also came into the spotlight on March 7th, 2023, when a
commander of ARSA was killed in a Rohingya camp in Ukhiya upazila by unknown assailants.
ARSA gained global attention last year when Mohibullah, a prominent Rohingya leader, was
killed in one of the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. Mohibullah’s brother Habibullah claimed that
ARSA might have been responsible, as they were angered by his advocacy of a peaceful non-violent
approach to resolving the Rohingya crisis, although ARSA denied any involvement in the killing. It
seems that ARSA has been active in the camps.
Originally known as Harakah al-Yaqin, meaning Faith Movement in Arabic, and later as the
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, the latest militant group among the Rohingya people is
commonly referred to as ARSA. ARSA is led by Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, also known as Ata
Ullah, believed to be a Rohingya born in Pakistan who spent much of his life in Saudi Arabia. Ata
Ullah became politically active due to media reports of ongoing human rights abuses against the
Rohingya community and the mass detention of Rohingya people in concentration camps after the
2012 violence. The early financiers of ARSA are not well known, but the International Crisis Group
suggests that funding may come from a committee of supporters in Mecca and Medina, although
their identities remain unclear.
While ARSA’s direct affiliation with any Islamist militant organizations remains unconfirmed,
various local and transnational Islamist organizations have attempted to exploit their grievances.
The extent to which Rohingyas have responded to these calls is still uncertain. However, there are
indications that Rohingyas may pose a potential threat not only to the peace and security of
Bangladesh but also to South Asia as a whole.
First and foremost, the camps have seen the active presence of ARSA, as they have been
involved in various operations. However, this has led to incidents where members of ARSA have
been killed by security forces. Such active presence of ARSA in the camps is highly detrimental to
the overall situation.
Moreover, there have been arrests of members belonging to a newly emerged Islamist militant
organization, Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya in the Rohingya camps. These individuals have
been found to have affiliations with Al Qaeda, which indicates that not only are online provocations
taking place, but also physical contacts are being established by Al Qaeda within the camps. It is
evident that AQ has been inciting the Rohingya population for some time, and they have a specific
ideology for the South Asian region known as Gazwatul Hind (Conquest of India). This shows that
AQ’s influence and activities in the camps go beyond mere online provocations.
Additionally, there are increasing concerns about the vulnerability of Rohingyas being
exploited for criminal activities, including smuggling, drug trafficking, murder, and other small
crimes. A special report compares crime statistics from 2021 and 2022 in and around the Rohingya
camps. The report reveals that there were 77 reported incidents of theft in 2021, slightly decreasing
to 75 in 2022. Similarly, the number of shootings decreased from 51 in 2021 to 18 in 2022. The report
also highlights a decrease in kidnappings, with 173 cases in 2021 compared to 86 in 2022. However,
inter-conflicts increased from 11 incidents in 2021 to one in 2022. Drug-related cases remained high,
with 268 cases in 2021 and 249 in 2022. Most concerning is the significant increase in murders, with
22 reported cases in 2021 and a sharp rise to 42 in 2022. Additionally, there were 567 other crimes
reported in 2021, slightly decreasing to 553 in 2022.
Furthermore, there has been a growing trend of Rohingya refugees engaging in the small-
arms trade. Law enforcement agencies in Cox’s Bazar have arrested several Rohingya arms traders
since 2017. It’s worth noting that the illegal arms trade in Cox’s Bazar and the adjacent region of
Chittagong predates the arrival of Rohingya refugees and persists beyond the confines of the refugee
camps. Cox’s Bazar has become a strategic route for arms smugglers to reach potential buyers in
India and Nepal, as it offers a more direct route compared to navigating through the challenging
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mountainous terrain of northern Myanmar. This easy access to weapons raises concerns about the
potential for fostering Rohingya militancy in the region.
Finally, the complex geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific have further complicated the
issue of Rohingya repatriation, making it expensive. China is urging Bangladesh to adopt a neutral
stance and join its Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI), while
the U.S. and India are encouraging Bangladesh to join the Quad. There are indications of close links
between China and the Myanmar junta, and the recent tensions along the Bangladesh border may be
a signal of China’s ability to create trouble for Bangladesh via Myanmar. At the same time, the U.S.
is expanding its diplomatic efforts in South Asia, shifting focus from Pakistan and India to countries
like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, as evidenced by the Burma Act which supports democracy
activists, humanitarian assistance, and reconciliation efforts in the region. These geopolitical tensions
are likely to further delay the repatriation process, and international actors may also leverage
grievances to pursue their own goals.
The situation in the Rohingya camps is complex and multi-faceted, with various factors
contributing to the potential threat that Rohingyas may pose to the peace and security of Bangladesh
and South Asia. The presence of militant organizations, the involvement of extremist groups, the
vulnerability to criminal exploitation, the small-arms trade, and the geopolitical tensions in the
region are all factors that need to be addressed comprehensively to mitigate the potential security
risks associated with the Rohingya crisis. It is essential for all stakeholders to work towards finding
sustainable solutions that address the grievances of Rohingyas and ensure their safety, security, and
well-being, while also addressing the security concerns and challenges posed by the situation in the
camps.
(Source: E-IR)
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Terrorism
PAKISTAN’S RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM DURING ELECTION YEAR
Qamar Cheema
Pakistan is facing a poly-crises of political instability, economic volatility, and a resurgence of
terrorism. In November 2022, after the change of command in the Pakistani military, the Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ended their ostensible ceasefire with the Pakistani state. The TTP escalated
violence, increasing attacks on law enforcement agencies. January 2023 marked the deadliest month
since July 2018. While a visit to Kabul by senior political and military leadership garnered fresh
commitments from Afghan Taliban to tackle the TTP threat, this relative calm over recent weeks is
not permanent.
Meanwhile, citing security and economic challenges, the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) delayed provincial elections from April 30 to October 8, 2023. The Supreme Court of Pakistan
rejected this delay, ordering the ECP to hold elections on May 14 while ordering the State Bank of
Pakistan to release money for elections; the government, through parliament, did not release funds
earlier.
While conducting elections is expensive and risks an influx in violence, other political
considerations appear at play. For example, delaying the vote could create a level playing field for
all political actors who faced political victimization from state institutions. Despite the Supreme
Court’s orders that diminished the ECP’s cited security and financial threats, there are currently no
public assurances that provincial and federal elections will be held on schedule.
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Revived
The TTP is a globally designated terrorist organization that operates in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. According to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), there were 262 terror
attacks in Pakistan in 2022, including 89 attacks from the TTP, primarily against law enforcement
agencies—constituting a 27 percent increase from 2021. Pakistan recorded the largest increase in
terror-related deaths worldwide in 2022, with the toll rising to 980 fatalities—15 percent more than
in 2021. January 2023 was the deadliest month since July 2018; 123 people lost their lives to at least
44 militant attacks. If current and past trends hold, the TTP may launch a resurgent Spring Offensive
against Pakistan, similar to 2022, making 2023 a bloodier year than record-breaking 2022.
The TTP has ideological, organizational, and personal ties with the Afghan Taliban. The
United Nations Security Council has said that the Afghan Taliban’s return to power strengthened
the TTP. After the Afghan Taliban assumed control of Kabul on August 15, 2021, jailbreaks in
Bagram and Pul-e-Charkhi freed thousands of militants from several groups targeting Pakistan,
including the TTP and ISKP. Additionally, almost seven militant groups merged with the TTP.
The Afghan Taliban holds leverage over the TTP. The Afghan Taliban mediated negotiations
between Pakistan and TTP and TTP fighters enjoy safe haven in Afghanistan. Pakistan continues to
remind the Afghan Taliban of their responsibility of containing terrorism emanating from their soil
in bilateral and multilateral forums.
Pakistan’s Terror Threat During Election Year
Elections are set to occur this year. Citing security and economic reasons, Pakistan’s Election
Commission delayed provincial elections from April to October 2023—despite seeming clarity in the
constitution stipulating that elections shall be held within 90 days of the dissolution of assemblies.
Security challenges are considered weak logic to delay this year’s elections. Despite horrific recent
attacks, Pakistan’s overall security situation has improved since 2013 and 2018—previous election
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years. State authorities will come under pressure, and with rising inflation, the ruling coalition may
face electoral defeat.
With rising threats from non-state actors and a balance of power deadlock between the
executive, judiciary, and parliament, the state’s ability to address current challenges is being called
into question. Every institution is trying to overstep the powers of other institutions in the name of
upholding the Constitution. Interpreting the constitution to delay elections, the National Assembly
passed a resolution “urging” the Prime Minister to not follow the Supreme Court’s order to conduct
provincial elections on May 14. Simultaneously, the federal government passed a bill to limit the
powers of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, exerting pressure on the primary institution tasked with
upholding the Constitution.
Apart from legislative challenges to holding elections, there is an added possibility of violence
in the coming provincial and national assembly elections. The army has declined to provide security
for elections. The role of provincially controlled law enforcement agencies, such as the police, will be
controversial without a caretaker government. This year could be a year of violence as TTP and
other militant outfits have started targeting politicians and law enforcement agencies, a fact the
Election Commission highlighted in their order to initially delay elections. Delaying elections by
citing security risks can undermine democratic forces and can reduce electoral participation by
increasing public fear.
Pakistan prioritizes its security landscape, especially when militants target the public and law
enforcement agencies, otherwise state and society forget how grim the challenge of militancy is. That
is among the reasons that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism gains from 2015 to 2020 have been wasted.
Pakistan seems to be at square one, but may not start a high intensity campaign against TTP because
of worsening economic conditions.
There are civil-military fissures within Pakistan’s fight against terrorism. Pakistan’s society
and political class outsourced the war against terrorism to the military’s kinetic operations and did
not work on deradicalization. Joint civil-military initiatives in the war on terrorism have yet to bear
fruit. Recently, Pakistan’s Defense Minister and Director General ISI led a delegation to Afghanistan.
In contrast to previous visits, the civilian defense minister—not military leadership—met with
Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minster to address the TTP’s safe haven in Afghanistan, highlighting
the 2020 Doha Agreement, which the Taliban have failed to adhere to in Pakistan’s case.
No Seeming End To Pakistan’s Security Challenges
Simultaneously, Pakistan’s political crisis is deepening due to instability and polarization. The
political landscape is polarized to the extent that Imran Khan’s party declined to join an all-parties
conference in February to discuss the resurgence of terrorism. Instability looms due to a lack of
clarity over elections. Opposition leader Imran Khan demands immediate elections after dissolving
PTI-held provincial assemblies, whereas the ruling Pakistan Democratic Movement coalition desires
that all elections take place after the dissolution of the National Assembly in October 2023.
Parliament is largely an ineffective forum to create a consensus against terrorism. Despite
garnering 16.9 million votes, the PTI has not participated in critical parliamentary decision-making
because they resigned following the vote of no confidence in April 2022. While they were in power,
the party was busy with accountability drives, to which they failed, wasting five years on political
victimization. Pakistan’s political discourse has little to offer to a resurgence of terrorism. The media
and political class continue to be enmeshed in discussions over elections, accountability cases, and
the role of the establishment in politics.
Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy is failing to improve and secure lives and livelihoods.
Political stability can come with the support of all political actors on national issues, such as
terrorism. For this, all political parties need to unite on a common minimum agenda against the
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rising threat from TTP and other militant organizations because when society reacts together
militants come under pressure.
(Source: Stimson Center)

TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM

Implications for Pakistan’s Security
Nabel Akram (Former Teacher Assistant UMT LahoreYOU)
After the September 11 attacks, terrorism became global. Terrorism and extremism culminated
in Pakistan after 9/11 and a catastrophic security situation (Malik 2005, 23).in a fear based oppressor
assault, a huge number of individuals kicked the bucket and numerous others were harmed. The
circumstance in this nation is awful, however in FATA and KPK, the savagery proceeds. Pakistan
needs participation and solidarity in the nation in these troublesome conditions. By and large, the
security circumstance in Pakistan is decaying each day and steps must be taken to address this issue.
The Bush routine gave budgetary help to the Pakistani armed force to dispatch psychological
oppressor tasks in the ancestral zone. Security in Pakistan has been shaken and security issues have
emerged. To battle the spooky powers that undermine Pakistan’s national security, Pakistan has
turned into an accomplice in the battle against psychological oppression. Security in Pakistan
presently has an extensive rundown of security challenges, including the death of Osama container
Laden, the Raymond Davis scene, Pakistan’s doubt of the United States and worldwide forces, the
talk about the nation. “Do it once more “enrolled by the Indians in Balochistan and the atomic fear
monger compromises Pakistan? That is the reason Pakistan, an atomic nation, has been ousted by
the war against psychological oppression. Pakistan has not had the option to perceive the transitory
penance it has made to the United States in the battle against fear mongering and has dependably
been the objective of US analysis.
In addition, in South Asia, India has been declared a strategic partner, not Pakistan. Suicide
bombings have increased in Pakistan when terrorism suspects are kidnapped at the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border and there is no safe place. While Pakistan is more volatile than before during the
first decade of the war on terrorism. More than 500 blows were killed and Pakistani security was
destroyed. More than 35,000 have died. The growing threat to Pakistan’s national security must be
eliminated in the current situation. This weakens Pakistan’s roots and also damages its national and
international image. Pakistan has highlighted its costs as a partner in the fight against terrorism on
the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the tenth anniversary. Wall Street newspapers reported
missing important information in the United States, which showed that Pakistan was facing serious
security problems (21,672 civilians and 2,750 soldiers and 8,571 wounded). For Pakistan, this is a
serious problem and this security problem has not been resolved. This not only destroys Pakistan’s
internal security infrastructure, it also damages them economically. While Pakistan is a war partner,
US leaders and their region have always considered it a safe haven for terrorism. Pakistan is
considered in India and Afghanistan as a terrorist base and supports terrorism in that country. Due
to the high death rate in Pakistan, drone attacks are responsible. External attacks on Pakistani civil
society and sovereignty were ignored for the first time in their history. Tensions have also increased
between Washington and Islamabad. This attack with drones kills civilians in tribal areas instead of
terrorists. . This isn’t just an infringement of human rights, yet in addition an infringement of
Pakistan’s power. The Arial assault increments ancestral male radicalism and produces
antimicrobials. Specifically, in the United States and the West, blow-back has expanded. The
Pakistani money related division assesses the $ 2.1 billion of the war on fear based oppression that
influences the Pakistani economy. Notwithstanding lessening FDI, a vile security circumstance
negatively affects fares and generation. The State Bank of Pakistan said that FDI was decreased by
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54.6 percent in 2010, causing lost $ 1.18 billion. Due to internal security, unstable policies and the
terrorist threat. Our government cannot enter into new agreements with foreign stakeholders in the
current scenario. Due to suicide bombings and the government’s stable security policies, the
deterioration of the security situation in the country is creating fear and chaos for the population.
The exchange has fallen. Due to Pakistan’s geostrategic position, Pakistan’s job in overcoming
the Taliban and discovering shelter on the Afghan outskirt is significant. Relations between the
Taliban and Al Qaeda in the innate zones of Pakistan are compelled to act. In 2003, under the
Musharraf routine, Pakistan propelled a counterinsurgency task driven by FATA. The
commencement was an extraordinary calamity, not awful after the beginning of the activity.
Pakistan has been blamed for episodes at the outskirt crossing, in spite of the war against US
delegates in the area. After the war against fear based oppression, numerous Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Yughiers and Chechens came to Pakistan and attempted, with the Taliban alliance in the nation, to
destabilize Pakistan. These incorporate medications, the supply of complex weapons, kidnappings
of individuals for their activities against security powers and assaults on innate security powers, a
noteworthy danger to Pakistan’s security. This is only a bad dream for Pakistan since its
commitment has set Pakistan in a security situation as opposed to killing current dangers.
Destitution is expanding in the FATA in Pakistan, prompting fanaticism and frail open request. The
Taliban and Al Qaeda are utilizing this circumstance. Impeded young people were procured and
utilized to serve the state, which undermined state security. Education in Pakistan is also influenced
by the war on terror. The operations of the Taliban and Al Qaeda burned and destroyed more than
190 schools in Pakistan. Pakistan has the highest level of illiteracy. The Taliban have banned the
education of women in tribal areas. In addition, 42% of children’s schools were destroyed. Almost
150,000 people are unemployed and 8,000 are employed. Absence of education is additionally a
security issue for Pakistan. This has lamentable ramifications for the strength of the legislature and
the fate of instruction.
Pakistan and its people continue to face worldwide economic limitations because of their
geostrategic position and their current political condition. The nation currently faces the following
strategic constraints.
The motivating change in the Indo-U.S relations has left flow results on Pakistan amongst the
1990s. It was period of seclusion for Pakistan. US showed astonishing strategy of troubles over the
atomic undertaking of Pakistan and strength to crop Pakistan to move back its atomic structure.
Around the end of 1990s, America’s tilt towards India shows up a point of view change in the
relations of both the appealing bigger part lead councils of the connected with common
governments after chilly war.
Implications of Changing Geo-Strategic Environment in the Region
Different investigators have that point of view that 21st century is for the Asians. The South
Asian zone is has on a different zone or you can say on different perspective .The nations like India
and china are making money linked mammoths. The events shifting in the kind have flow proposals
on the world general and Pakistan especially as a significance of closeness with China and India.
Events like Afghan occupation by the Russian and the 9/11 have made Pakistan important for the
US interests.
“Pakistan is” The U.S game-plan in the locale is to create triangle of China, India and
Pakistan. China is seen as the enemy in the range, India is seen as the key straightforwardness and
Pakistan as an elaboration in the War on Terror. U.S slant towards India has key thing to contain
China in the territory. Irrespective, China has become low profile, and game-plan of quiet
organization in the area, and the world allowed moving around freely. “In 1990s U.S gave due
thought on three basic examinations. One the atomic effects were enabled of both India and
Pakistan. The Kargil in 1999 that in this manner military supernatural happening was happened in
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Pakistan in October 1999. The visit of American President to South Asia recognized remarkable
change of course of action towards South Asia.”
After the Cold War; U.S has become two dimensional method towards South Asia strategy.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union does not have vital criticalness in the U.S. System towards South
Asia; rather, Subcontinent is seen by America from a typical point of view and in this way, controls
India and Pakistan substitute. Second, U.S. interests and risks to those interests are from inside
rather than from outside the area. Cash related liberalization, non-expansion and larger part control
government movement changed into the chief US course of action focuses in South Asia.
The motivating change in the Indo-U.S relations has left flow results on Pakistan amongst the
1990s. It was period of seclusion for Pakistan. U.S showed astonishing strategy of troubles over the
atomic undertaking of Pakistan and strength to crop Pakistan to move back its atomic structure.
Around the end of 1990s, America’s tilt towards India shows up a point of view change in the
relations of both the appealing bigger part lead councils of the connected with common
governments after chilly war.
The rising vitality of America in India can be found in the running with activities. Firstly,
America creates regulated correspondence with India including boundless, areas money related
relations political procedure military sharing. Second on Kashmir America adjusted as to love the
line of control, the condition was, in light of present situations, in the support of India. Third India’s
giganticness in the south Asian is seen by America and it’s in all cases part and plane to cooperate
with New Delhi in general issues Fourth India seems to have FY 2000 come to $ 170 million that is
second most projecting total in the South Asian and it is 45 times more noteworthy to Pakistan’s
particular $ 3.78 million.”
The occasion of 9/11 got U-turn the arrangement of US and Pakistan by the day’s end
changed into the flow edge state in U.S drove war against terrorism. In any case, U.S has
corresponding its relationship with India the “fundamental atomic arrangement” is remarkable
affectability toward the entire field. As exhibited by the military overseers the game-plan will release
new atomic race in the locale and will exaggerate the night out of force in the South Asian zone. As
displayed by the new U.S National security strategy; “For setting up night out of force which
upgrade opportunity, is impelled that all countries finish the vocation of dependable status. Those
plasticity admiring nations must battle on anxiety. Those countries who need overall setting must
attempt to help with the control of weapon of mass walloping.” Since America is hurting the
measures of its own methodology in the south Asian region just to get its critical endpoints in the
South Asian reach. It is seen that the post 9/11 has turn out badly the security scene of the South
Asian district .The nations in the range expected that would join the U.S drove war on worry to get
their clever reasons for interest. India indicated uncommon offer to strengthen in the war because of
get its position in the South Asia. Pakistan has its own particular sort of interests by joining the war
case: to secure its key resources and ensuring its Kashmir approach.
Globalization an Emerging Threat to Foreign Policy of Pakistan
Globalization is test rather than open gateway for under make nations like Pakistan. As
showed by the academics of globalization just those nations which are financially solid and
politically sensible can make due in this fundamental world. “Each country has its guideline as per
its surroundings that sticks nation to set up and execute its remote approach to manage securing its
national vitality for inconveniences and opportunities that a general achieve gives it.”
Incredible game-plan of augmentation in world economy is making of inclusive instruments
and standards as the central reason of all economies. In fact, there are rules of financial procedure,
cash related straightforwardness approval and bit structure, and retreats, communal, link and the
whole draw up of different fields. It surmises a taking a look at of game-plans of individual nations
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by joining in the limitation of business division and strategy manager need to drive forward in like
manner of predicting their methods to manage worldwide by superb straightforwardness.
Keeping in connection the above confirmations of globalization, Pakistan needs to change its
political framework, to flourish its cash related performance, and to set out the key sections like
extraordinary suggestion and keep up standard of law to stay instructed concerning the new test of
globalization. In south Asian point of view, where India is a threat not in setting of arm race but
rather moreover with respect to monetary rivalry in the range and the world allowed to move
around willingly. India is a making budgetary giant with china in the South Asia. It similarly and
steeply affects the approach matters of Pakistan; in light of the path that in the globalized world cash
related rewards of nations are before trade premiums.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)

GROWING CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM

Nawazish Ali (Retired Pakistan army officer)
Pakistan is no stranger to terrorism with global implications for decades. After the success of
Afghan mujahedeen in driving out the Soviets forces with US support during the 1980s, Pakistan
mobilised parallel ideologically motivated groups to try to force India out of long-disputed IHK,
hypothesising that Kashmiri mujahedeen will succeed in breaking the deadlock. Simultaneously,
Pakistan expected an encouraging posture from the Taliban the previous allies forming the
government in Kabul. The strategy did not succeed and instead made Pakistan a battleground of
competing proxies and interpretations of fanatical theories and philosophies. This inconsistent
approach to terrorism contributed to the rise of divergent extremist groups, which posed a threat to
the inclusive security of the region leading to criticism from the international community. One of the
main challenges facing Pakistan today is ‘hanging in balance’ for determining diplomatic and
strategic options for its counterterrorism efforts. Pakistan has probably focused on targeting specific
groups, rather than addressing the root causes of terrorism as of today.
When the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan considered the new
regime as a potential close ally. But as of now, the Afghan Taliban has proven to be less responsive
than what Islamabad expected. Simultaneously, Pakistan is facing fierce violence from Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP); an alliance of militant networks formed in 2007 to unify opposition against
the Pakistani military. TTP is an offshoot ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban drawing
leadership from Pakistan. Much of the TTP’s political leadership and capability is based in
Afghanistan but has regained some territorial influence in southern districts of KPK, like South
Waziristan, North Waziristan, Tank, Bannu, and Lakki Marwat. The TTP has claimed responsibility
for numerous terrorist attacks and seeks to create an “Islamic Emirate in Pakistan” describing the
conflict as Ghazwa-e-Hind (Battle of India).
Pakistan’s nuanced approach to the TTP and other militant groups has repeatedly proven that
compromise with armed and violent radical Islamist groups is incredible and impossible. The TTP
defends its terrorism in the name of Islam and Sharia just as Afghan Taliban hard-liners explain
their failure to moderate as a function of their religious faith. Considering some militants as
instruments of regional influence while fighting others in the past has had disastrous consequences
for Pakistan. The case in point is; more than 8,000 members of security forces and 80,000 civilians of
Pakistan have lost their lives in terrorist-related incidents since the beginning of GWOT.
Periodic negotiations between the government and militant groups in recent years have only
swayed the militants that the authorities lack the resolve for a sustained contest against terrorists.
Defining some jihadi groups as Pakistan’s allies against India’s control of Jammu and Kashmir has
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generated sympathy for a specific group of Jihadies, but helps more dangerous groups evade
scrutiny even as they launch attacks against Pakistani citizens. This sympathy also helps the militant
groups in recruitment, interferes with intelligence gathering, and forces the government to make
more concessions during peace talks with the groups. Pakistan would certainly do better to abandon
its ‘two steps forward and one step back’ approach to fight against domestic terrorism.
The perpetual troop deployment along the Afghan borders has heavily burdened the defence
budget of Pakistan for last so many years. Falling foreign direct investment, sanctions over terrorist
financing, and money laundering have taken a heavy toll on the poor economy of Pakistan. To make
matters worse, Pakistan is continuously mired in an economic crisis. Its foreign reserves are at a
nine-year low, inflation is at a 48-year high, and the Pakistani rupee lost 22 per cent of its value
during the last year.
Adding insult to injury, the United States, a key ally of Pakistan during GWOT, has always
been selectively critical of the country’s sincerity in fighting against the selected terrorist groups. The
US occasionally identified Pakistan as a haven for terrorists and has put pressure to take action
against these groups. This has led to a strained relationship with the US withholding aid and
imposing occasional sanctions on Pakistan. Contrarily, China, another key ally of Pakistan has
always been vocal and supportive of Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts.
The violent and radical Islamist individuals are not just unhappy people who can be easily
satisfied with a political compromise. They have strong beliefs and a sense of destiny, and they have
faith that violence is the only way to achieve their dogmatic objectives. The militants always take
advantage of the country’s political chaos and economic fragility. Pakistan’s political leaders/parties
have mostly been uncertain about their respective policies on terrorism for years, and need to
recognize the seriousness of this problem before it’s too late. This uncertainty needs to end.
Terrorism must be delinked from religion as no religious doctrine advocates or promotes acts
of terrorism. Saying no to terrorism includes determined efforts to strengthen law enforcement and
judicial credentials, deepen global information sharing, expand border security, prevent terrorist
financing, improve crisis response, and preempt violent extremism. International
cooperation/intelligence sharing is essential in implementing a more operative counterterrorism
strategy. The international community also needs in their respective interest to “do more” in
supporting Pakistan’s efforts. This can include providing financial and technical assistance to
enhance Pakistan’s efforts to combat extremist ideologies.
(Source: Daily Times)
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Ukraine Crisis
BEYOND UKRAINE’S OFFENSIVE
Michael Kofman and Rob Lee
As the Russian winter offensive reaches its culmination, Ukraine is poised to seize the
initiative. In the coming weeks, it plans to conduct an offensive operation, or series of offensives,
that may prove decisive in this phase of the conflict. This is not Ukraine’s only remaining
opportunity to liberate a substantial amount of territory, and inflict a major defeat on Russian forces,
but the upcoming offensive may be the moment when available Western military equipment,
training, and ammunition best intersect with the forces set aside by Ukraine for this operation.
Ukraine is also eager to demonstrate that, despite months of brutal fighting, its military is not
exhausted and remains able to break through Russian lines.
Policymakers, however, have placed an undue emphasis on the upcoming offensive without
providing sufficient consideration of what will come afterward and whether Ukraine is well
positioned for the next phase. It is critical that Ukraine’s Western partners develop a long-term
theory of victory for Ukraine, since even in the best-case scenario, this upcoming offensive is
unlikely to end the conflict. Indeed, what follows this operation could be another period of
indeterminate fighting and attrition, but with reduced ammunition deliveries to Ukraine. This is
already a long war, and it is likely to become protracted. History is an imperfect guide, but it
suggests wars that endure for more than a year are likely to go on for at least several more and are
exceedingly difficult to end. A Western theory of success must therefore prevent a situation in which
the war drags on, but where Western countries are unable to provide Ukraine with a decisive
advantage.
Ukraine may well achieve battlefield success, but it will take time to translate military
victories into political outcomes. The West must also prepare for the prospect that this offensive may
not achieve the kinds of gains seen during Ukraine’s successful operations in Kharkiv and Kherson.
By placing too many bets on the outcome of this offensive, Western countries have not effectively
signaled their commitment to a prolonged effort. If this operation proves to be the high point of
Western assistance to Kyiv, then Moscow could assume that time is still on its side and that
bedraggled Russian forces can eventually wear down the Ukrainian military. Whether Ukraine’s
next operation is successful or not, Russia’s leader may have few incentives to negotiate. For
Ukraine to sustain momentum—and pressure—Western states must make a set of commitments and
plans for what follows this operation, rather than maintain a wait-and-see approach. Otherwise, the
West risks creating a situation whereby Russian forces are able to recover, stabilize their lines, and
try to retake the initiative.
A brutal winter
After successive defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian military was vulnerable heading
into the winter. But the Ukrainian armed forces also sustained losses and expended ammunition in
those operations, which forced them to focus on their own reconstitution. Despite earlier optimism
that Ukraine could press its advantage into the winter, the Ukrainian military was not in a strong
position to sustain its offensive and achieve further battlefield gains. Mobilization and the successful
withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson helped Russia stabilize its lines, build a reserve, and
develop a more sustainable rotation for units off the frontline. The Russian military also began
building more sophisticated defenses across the frontline in Ukraine with minefields, antitank
obstacles, and trenches. By shortening the front and upping the number of personnel deployed, the
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Russian military also increased the force density relative to the terrain it was defending. What
followed was a period of grinding attrition where neither side had a significant advantage.
Fortunately for Ukraine, Russia’s political leadership proved impatient, abandoning a
defensive strategy and replacing the more competent General Sergey Surovikin with Valery
Gerasimov, the Russian chief of general staff, as the commander of its forces in Ukraine. Gerasimov
launched an ill-conceived and ill-timed offensive across the Donbas starting in late January. The
Russian military, still recovering, was in no position to conduct offensive operations given its
deficits in force quality, equipment, and ammunition. Moscow had mobilized more than 300,000
personnel, which it quickly used to replenish the Russian forces, but it could not restore sufficient
offensive potential. Quantity matters, but a military cannot rebuild its quality in just a few months.
In practice, then, Russia’s winter offensive was dependent on a small percentage of its
military, primarily naval infantry and airborne units, which had taken heavy losses throughout the
war and were increasingly relying on mobilized personnel as replacements. At Bakhmut, most of the
fighting was done by the state-affiliated Wagner paramilitary organization instead of the regular
armed forces, which largely played a supporting role. In general, the Russian military demonstrated
that it was no longer capable of large-scale combat operations. Instead, it conducted localized attacks
with smaller formations and assault detachments.
The Russian military nonetheless attempted to attack along six axes—Avdiivka, Bakhmut,
Bilohorivka, Kreminna-Lyman, Marinka, and Vuhledar—hoping to strain Ukrainian armed forces
across a broad front. But compared with the battle of the Donbas in 2022, Russia had a weaker
advantage in artillery during these campaigns, and this deficiency further limited its offensive
potential. Russian forces did regain the initiative through these assaults and fixed Ukrainian forces
in place, but despite thousands of casualties, the Russian military gained little territory and the
offensive did not result in a significant breakthrough. Instead, Russia’s offensive further weakened
its military by expending manpower, materiel, and ammunition. These losses will give Ukraine its
best opportunity to launch a counteroffensive. Russia’s attempts to seize the Donbas this year also
illustrated that Moscow’s strategy continues to suffer from a mismatch between political aims and
military means.
The battle for Bakhmut
Yet in the battle for Bakhmut, over time, Ukraine’s position became precarious. The Ukrainian
armed forces have been partially enveloped since February, and they no longer enjoy as favorable an
attrition ratio as they once did. Bakhmut is surrounded by high ground, which gave Russian forces
an advantage once they seized the southern and northern flanks in January and February,
respectively. The situation looked dire in early March. Although Ukraine stabilized the flanks by
committing additional forces, allowing it to secure the remaining main supply route into the city,
Russian forces have now captured most of the city. Moscow did not have the forces required to
encircle Bakhmut, which could have led to a significant victory, so it instead focused on the more
symbolic win of taking the city itself.
Compared with the battle of Vuhledar and other parts of the front during Russia’s winter
offensive, Ukraine’s attrition ratio in Bakhmut is less favorable, and a smaller share of Russia’s
casualties are from elite units. Elements from Russia’s 106th Guards Airborne Division and other
Russian military units are operating along the Bakhmut front, but Wagner is leading the fight,
particularly in the city itself. The majority of Russian casualties sustained in Bakhmut are from
Wagner, and the majority of Wagner’s losses have been from minimally trained convicts. Those
losses matter, but losing convicts affects Russia’s overall war effort much less than losing regular
soldiers or mobilized personnel, especially outside settings like Bakhmut. Wagner convicts represent
a minimal investment and are not individuals taken out of the economy, and so their losses lack
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political ramifications. Given Wagner’s heavy reliance on convicts, it is not clear that approach
would have proven effective outside an urban setting like Bakhmut.
During Ukraine’s previous offensives, the backstop for the Russian military was its airborne
and naval infantry, not Wagner forces. For Russia, then, it may turn out that the heavy losses
sustained among elite units in Vuhledar, such as the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade, were more strategically important than the relative losses in Bakhmut. The losses
in Vuhledar could make it difficult for Russian forces to defend against Ukraine’s upcoming
offensive. But Ukraine may also find that the forces and ammunition it expended to defend
Bakhmut, in relatively unfavorable terrain, will impose a constraint on operations later this year.
Furthermore, Wagner’s assaults fixed a significant number of Ukrainian forces over the winter,
giving the Russian military time to stabilize their lines and entrench.
Bakhmut is mostly significant for political and symbolic reasons. Strategically, it is a gateway
to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but Ukraine continues to hold better defensive terrain west of the city.
Capturing it does little to help Russian forces further advance and they may be hard pressed to
defend it afterward. But in the end, military strategy is political, as it bridges military operations
with political objectives. Ukraine’s leadership is keen to avoid giving Russia any kind of victory
which might bolster Russian morale, and it has chosen to continue defending Bakhmut.
It is therefore too early to judge the effect of the battle for Bakhmut on this war. The result will
be clearer in hindsight. Ukrainian forces avoided encirclement and managed to inflict high costs on
the Russian military, even if most of the losses appear to be among Wagner units. Long term, the
significance of the resources both sides expended in the battle will likely be the most important
factor. Whether Ukraine could have pursued a better approach in this instance will be a subject for
historians to debate.
Grappling with uncertainty
Ukraine has sought to build a force capable of conducting an offensive on top of its currently
deployed formations. Kyiv has assembled three corps comprised of mechanized (or motorized)
infantry brigades. These new units include roughly nine maneuver brigades armed largely with
Western-provided equipment and at least three generated by Ukraine. These brigades will likely
consist of newly mobilized personnel, perhaps with a core of experienced soldiers. The units will be
backed by several assault brigades, as part of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior effort to stand up an
‘Offensive Guard” force in support. But as the offensive draws near, it is not clear what percentage of
these units will be completed for the operation, or if the supporting brigades will be assembled in time.
The challenge Ukraine faces is that, despite an influx of Western equipment, its force is largely
mobilized, uneven in quality, and training on a compressed schedule. And over the course of the
past year, the Ukrainian military has taken significant casualties. Many junior officers,
noncommissioned officers, veteran soldiers, and troops previously trained by NATO have been lost
in the fighting. This is a very short amount of time for newly mobilized soldiers to master new
equipment and conduct combined-arms training as a unit. In general, Ukraine’s advantage has been
that as a force it has proven more adaptable, much better motivated, and more rewarding of
initiative than the Russian military.
Ukraine has fought the war its own way, with a mixture of mission command at junior levels
and at times Soviet-style centralized command at the top. It has placed a strong emphasis on
artillery and attrition over maneuver in warfare, while also integrating Western precision and
intelligence for long-range strikes. The Western approach has been to train Ukrainian forces in
combined-arms maneuver in an effort to have them fight more like a NATO military would, similar
to what the West has taught in past train-and-assist programs. The challenge with this approach is
that NATO militaries are unaccustomed to fighting without air superiority, especially air superiority
established and maintained by American airpower, or at least with the logistics and enabling
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capabilities that the United States typically brings to the fight. As a result, Ukrainian soldiers must
tackle Russia’s prepared defenses without the kind of air support and logistics that their Western
instructors have long been accustomed to.
Russia’s defenses are not impenetrable, but they could be strong enough to attrit Ukrainian
forces over multiple defensive lines, while buying time so reinforcements can arrive. Their defense-
in-depth is designed to prevent a tactical breakthrough from achieving strategic effects- in
particular, to stop a Ukrainian breakthrough from generating momentum. The upcoming offensive
will therefore test the current theory of success in Kyiv and across contributing Western capitals:
that Ukrainian forces, trained and equipped with Western systems, can fight more effectively and
break through fortified Russian lines.
Both the new Ukrainian formations and the Russian defensive preparations will be largely
untested at the start of the offensive, making the course of the coming battles difficult to predict.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the West has provided sufficient enabling capabilities for Ukraine’s
offensive, such as breaching equipment, mine-clearing machines, and bridging gear. Despite the
commonplace focus on big-ticket items like tanks or fighter jets, it is enablers, logistics, and training
that often have the largest effect over time.
Russia’s sizable, mobilized force proved to be ineffective at conducting offensive operations
over the winter, but it is easier for poorly trained units to defend than to attack. It is unclear what
effect attrition in elite Russian units and ammunition expenditure during Russia’s winter offensive
will have on Ukraine’s upcoming offensive. Although the Russian military is preparing for
Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Russia has misspent valuable resources, and Russian morale may be
low—leaving its forces vulnerable. Soft factors and intangibles, which are difficult to measure, are
likely in Ukraine’s favor. Nonetheless, the situation is less propitious for Ukrainian forces than it
was in Kharkiv in September. Ukraine’s task is daunting. It must not only succeed, but must also
avoid overextension.
The long road ahead
The challenge with the upcoming offensive is that, despite being saddled with high
expectations, it appears to be a one-shot affair. Ukraine is likely to receive a substantial injection of
artillery ammunition ahead of this operation, but this package will offer a window of opportunity
rather than a sustained advantage. Western efforts to support Ukraine suffer from short-term
thinking, delivering capabilities just in time, or as a surge for the offensive operation, but with little
clarity on what will follow.
Whether successful or not, Ukraine may witness another period of indeterminate fighting after
this offensive, comparable to what followed its successes in Kharkiv and Kherson. The reason for
this is twofold: Western countries made key investments in production capacity late into this war,
and much of the West’s support appears to be focused on the short term—then seeing what happens
next. The gap between Western efforts is filled by Russian efforts to stabilize the lines and
reconstitute, along with prolonged periods of attrition. Indeed, Ukraine may be forced to fight with
less artillery or air defense ammunition late this year than it was expending during the Russian
winter offensive.
Yet what has remained constant is that analysts and policymakers who believe that the next
weapon system sent to Ukraine would prove to be a game-changer have consistently been
disappointed. Conventional wars on this scale require large numbers of equipment and munitions
and scaled-up training programs. Capability matters, but there are no silver bullets. Ukraine will
likely retake territory in its upcoming offensive and may significantly breach Russia’s lines. But even
if Ukraine attains a military victory, or a series of victories, this does not mean that the war would
end at that point. It is up to the loser to decide when a war is over, and this conflict is just as likely to
continue as a war across the Russian-Ukrainian border.
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At this point, there is little evidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin will willingly end
the conflict, even if the Russian military is facing defeat. He may seek to continue it as a war of
attrition, no matter the prospects for Russian forces on the battlefield. Putin may assume that this
offensive represents the high point of Western assistance and that, over time, Russia may still
exhaust the Ukrainian military, perhaps in the third or fourth year of the conflict. These assumptions
may be objectively false, but as long as Moscow believes that the next offensive is a one-off affair, it
may reason that time is still on Russia’s side. Similarly, if Ukraine is successful, then neither its society
nor its political leadership will be keen to settle for anything other than total victory. In short, it is
unlikely that the coming offensive will create good prospects for negotiations.
That said, Russia does not seem well positioned for a forever war. Russia’s ability to repair and
restore equipment from storage appears so constrained that the country is increasingly reliant on
Soviet gear from the 1950s and 1960s to fill out mobilized regiments. As Ukraine acquires better
Western equipment, the Russian military has increasingly come to resemble an early Cold War–period
museum. There are also growing signs of strain on the Russian economy, where energy sale revenues
are becoming constrained by sanctions and Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas. Even if Moscow
can keep mobilizing manpower and bringing old military equipment onto the battlefield, Russia will
face growing economic pressures and shortages of skilled labor.
Russian forces in Ukraine still face a structural manpower problem, and despite a national
recruitment campaign, Moscow will likely need to mobilize again to sustain the war. It is desperate to
avoid doing so. If the West can sustain Ukraine’s war effort, then despite its resilience and
mobilization reserves, Russia may find its disadvantage growing over time. In recent months,
European countries have begun making the necessary investments in artillery production and issuing
procurement contracts, although some of these decisions are coming more than a year into the war.
Some may hope that a successful offensive may soon thereafter lead to a negotiated armistice,
but this must be balanced against the prospect that a cease-fire will simply yield a rearmament period,
after which Moscow will likely seek to renew the war. Whether an armistice favors Russia or Ukraine
is debatable. Russia will certainly seek to rearm, but the extent of continuing Western military
assistance to Ukraine is uncertain. Consequently, the way this war ends could lead to a follow-on war.
After all, the current conflict is a continuation of the original 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Among Western countries, there are competing visions for how the war might end. A defeat for
Moscow is not the same as victory for Kyiv, and one does not have to travel widely in Europe to
discover that not everyone defines a Ukrainian victory in the same way. Some see the present situation
as already a strategic defeat for Moscow; for others, this outcome remains indeterminate. As it stands,
what follows the coming offensive will reveal whether Western countries are arming Ukraine to help
Kyiv fully restore territorial control or just to put it in a better position for negotiations.
Although the coming Ukrainian offensive will do much to set expectations for the future
trajectory of this war, the real challenge is thinking through what comes after. The offensive has
consumed planning, but a sober-minded approach would recognize that supporting Ukraine will be a
long-term effort. It is time, then, for the West to start planning more actively for the future, beyond the
coming offensive. History shows that wars are difficult to end and often go on well beyond the
decisive phases of fighting, including as negotiations continue. For Ukraine and its Western backers,
a working theory of victory must be premised on endurance, addressing Ukraine’s long-term force
quality, capability, and sustainment needs. The United States and Europe must make the necessary
investments to support the war effort well beyond 2023, develop plans for successive operations —
and avoid pinning their hopes on any single offensive effort.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
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WHY THE CONFLICT OVER UKRAINE WILL BE A LONG ONE

Barry Buzan (Professor Emeritus in International Relations at the LSE)
When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, the mainstream view was that
it would be over quickly. But then Russian incompetence and Ukrainian fortitude, both unexpected,
combined to generate a more balanced conflict. Western arms and money gave Ukraine a fighting
chance in a protracted war. The fighting settled into a version of 1914-18 plus drones: trenches,
artillery duels, limited gains, high casualties. Bakhmut played Verdun, as the anvil on which a war
of attrition would be hammered out.
Both sides are deeply dug in. As the war has unfolded, identity politics has come increasingly
into play. For Ukraine, the issue is existential in two senses: its right and capability to exist as a self-
governing nation; and its civilisational preference to be part of a democratic Europe. Putin
succeeded in creating the very thing he wanted to destroy – a strong sense of Ukrainian nationalism.
For Russia, the issue is about its standing as a great power, and as a Eurasian civilisation.
Retaining great power standing is peculiarly important to Russian identity. Without Ukraine, its
material power would be dented. Its geostrategic position would be further weakened if Ukraine
joined NATO. But its claim to be the core and protector of a Slavic, Orthodox civilisation that stands
between Asia and Europe would be shattered. Russia’s identity remains profoundly split on the
question of whether it is part of Europe, or a separate and freestanding civilisation. The Putin regime
strongly promotes the latter view. It cannot but see the war in existential terms for its vision of Russia.
For Europe, as for Russia, the issue is about status and security, not the right to an
independent existence. The obvious issue is whether a Russia victorious in Ukraine, and still
imperially minded, would threaten the EU? The move of Finland and Sweden into NATO, and the
hardening of military and economic frontiers with Russia, are strong evidence that Putin has created
fear of Russia in Europe. Less obvious, but of more durable significance, is the importance of
Ukraine to Europe’s, and the West’s, sense of status.
China and Russia continuously assert and celebrate the relative decline of the West. Many in
the Global South cheer them on. In this context, Ukraine becomes a major symbol. It wants to
become part of Europe and the West, and by doing so offers a strong rebuke to their image of
decline. If Europe and the West fail to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, that would hugely
reinforce the idea that they are in decline. Although this logic is strongest for Europe, it also applies
to Japan, Australia, and, for now, the US.
Looked at in this light, the Ukraine war is not just about territory and resources, though those
play a part. It is mainly about the identity politics of all the parties involved. The location of the
civilisational boundary between Russia and Europe has once again become fluid.
That makes it is much easier to see how this war could drag on, than to see how it might end.
Defeat has huge, long-term costs for all the parties involved. Ukraine would be obliterated, and its
people pushed into a political and societal meat-grinder. Russia would find its pretensions to be a
civilisational core in pieces, and face growing dependence on an overweening China. It is hard to
imagine that domestic political upheaval would not follow its defeat. Europe would be shown as
weak, and face continuous pressure from an emboldened Russia. It would have to provide much
more of its own defence. Given the depth of what is at stake, compromise solutions do not look
durable. Compromise becomes more difficult as the sunk costs of the war rise.
The big question about all this comes in 2024: will the US elect a Trumpian president who
wants to withdraw American support from Ukraine? At this point, the odds on that look 50-50. If it
does, will Europe and Japan continue to back Ukraine in a long war? Or will they sue for a
compromise peace that will be interpreted as a Russian win? Is Europe willing to resume full
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responsibility for its own defence as it has not done since 1941? Is the US prepared to signal the end
of the Atlantic alliance, and probably the breakup of the West?
China will let the war drag on, certainly until 2024. It cares little about the outcome for
Ukraine. It is happy to see the West drained and distracted, and it gains whether Russia is
strengthened or weakened. Given its strategic partnership with Russia, it is not a plausible mediator.
The war in Ukraine might look like a local affair. It is not. The nature of the post-Western world
order substantially hangs on its outcome.
(Source: London School of Economics)

THE UKRAINE WAR AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Mark Leonard (Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations)
The European Parliament elections are still a year away, but political parties across the
European Union have already shifted to campaign mode. While the election will undoubtedly
feature a wide range of views on climate change, immigration, and religion, there is one issue that
seems to unite politicians of all stripes: the war in Ukraine. More than a year after Russian President
Vladimir Putin started a war on Ukraine, all mainstream European parties are still singing from the
same hymn sheet when it comes to supporting the Ukrainian cause. But the appearance of unity
masks a brewing conflict over the soul of Europe: its conception of freedom. While it is widely
acknowledged that Ukraine’s fight represents a fight for democracy and European values, it is also
increasingly clear that victory would require Europe to abandon some of the key elements of its own
freedom project. This is the paradox of freedom in Europe. Over the past half-century, European
countries have developed a concept of freedom that relies on universalism, the repudiation of
military force, economic interdependence, pooled sovereignty, and the idea of Europe as a singular
entity founded on a set of common institutions. This vision is what distinguishes the EU from other
regions and even from its member states. But the war in Ukraine has called into question the bloc’s
basic tenets – and opened the way for skeptical national leaders to challenge them. While Europeans
previously viewed their project as post-national, they now acknowledge that the EU model is
exceptional rather than universal. Over the past year, European policymakers have become
increasingly fixated on fortifying the EU’s borders against other political projects to the East and the
South. Consequently, European integration, originally pursued to ensure peace on the continent, has
been transformed – if not quite into a “war” project, then at least into an armed pacification-cum-
security project. Europe’s institutions, which once relied on soft power, now provide military
equipment to Ukraine and endorse the continent’s rearmament, and the European Commission has
weaponized the EU economy through sanctions and accelerated the transition to a war economy,
complete with rationing and energy-price controls. But the most dramatic shift in European political
thinking has been the reconsideration of interdependence. European integration was based on the
belief that deepening economic ties between countries could transform former adversaries into
allies. But, as Putin has demonstrated, interdependence can also be exploited as a tool for extortion.
For decades, the main goal of the European project was to tame nationalism by pooling sovereignty.
But now, Europeans recognise that sovereignty must be protected before it can be pooled. The EU’s
transnational legal system cannot serve as a universal blueprint for the entire continent, let alone the
world. In the early stages of the war, the tension between the EU’s liberal values and its wartime
mobilisation was less pronounced. The technocratic European Commission supported the war effort
by advocating measures to arm and morally bolster Ukraine in its struggle against Russian war. The
decision to grant Ukraine candidate status represented an exceptional step for the bloc – a marriage
between geopolitical imperatives and the tools of process-oriented bureaucracy. Meanwhile, both
the left and the right have had to adjust their positions to find common ground on Ukraine.
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European liberals have become less resistant to nationalism and more attuned to the necessity of
using force against Russia, and the right has been forced to reassess its stance on the EU’s role as a
strategic actor.The 2008 global financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis catapulted the far right to
the forefront of the political debate. But the failure of Brexit, together with the Covid-19 pandemic,
led to a decline in Euroskepticism, with mainstream parties benefiting from the public’s desire for
stability. Polling by the European Council on Foreign Relations has shown that during these crises,
many right-leaning voters recognised that sovereignty could be reclaimed only through collective
action, and many formerly Euroskeptic parties abandoned their pledges to leave the EU or abandon
the euro. Voters across the bloc have undergone a similar shift. ECFR’s latest opinion poll shows a
blurring of the traditional left-right divide on geopolitical matters and a growing fusion of
nationalism and cosmopolitanism under the European idea of freedom. This change, spurred by the
war in Ukraine, goes to the heart of what the European project is really about, and in the long run
will lead to a struggle over Europe’s identity. In that regard, the upcoming European elections could
serve as a bellwether. Although European parties are currently trying to outdo each other in
showing support for Ukraine, thorny issues such as the conduct of the war, the treatment of
refugees, and how a post-war Ukraine would be integrated into the EU could once again divide
Europe. If fatigue from the war, the refugee crisis, and the high cost of living sets in, the 2024
European elections could become a new battleground.
(Source: Project Syndicate)