The Emergency in India: Background and Rationale

Author(s): V. P. Dutt
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 12 (Dec., 1976), pp. 1124-1138
Published by: University of California Press
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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA:
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

V. P. Dutt

INDIAN SOCIETY IS A complex and variegated society

whose inner dynamics are rarely understood by outsiders. Like China,
India too has been virtually a universe unto itself, a microcosmic
society which has its own deep-running currents and cross-currents and
is affected only over a very long period by the waves flowing in from
outside.
This society has its own verities, its own constraints, its own com-
pulsions, its own inner dynamics. Indian developments have often
defied any real understanding by a number of scholars abroad, even
by those who have spent a great deal of time studying India, sometimes
even by some Indian scholars (generally residing abroad) because they
go on extending and applying western standards and experiences to
India. The reality of India sometimes eludes them. They still envision
first the pattern in their own countries (as do many Indian scholars
whose only frames of reference are the precepts and practices of the
West) and exercise value judgements that fit that pattern. They
transfer Indian developments to their own milieu and give their
answers and reactions accordingly.

Three Perimeters

Indian developments must be viewed within the framework of

three perimeters. India is a democratic country. It is also a very poor
country, until recently a subjugated country, and still more a developing
country. In addition, it is a country with a vast size and population.
More importantly, India is virtually a continental polity with its vari-
ous regions, language groups, cultural units, minorities, etc.
The three perimeters are: norms of democracy, constraints of a
developing country, and the imperatives of a diverse society. It is not
enough that India is a democracy, it is also a poor, developing, struggling
country with an immense population and untapped and under-
1124

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1125

developed-and in some cases insufficient-resources. Vice-versa, it is

not enough that India is a developing country, it must also remain a
democratic country. Equally it is not enough that India is both a
developing and a democratic country, it is also a country with diverse
religions, language groups, and cultural entities. What is more, we
have to keep in mind the vastness of India's size and population.
These are the perimeters within which India's political system
must evolve and within which developments within India must be
placed and considered. A word about the constraints of a developing
society before we discuss the norms of democracy and the evolving
situation in India. A developing country, particularly one with the size
and population of India, must utilize its financial and human resources
rationally and effectively. It must also exercise rigorous financial
discipline, enforce hard work, and generate appreciable domestic
savings for capital construction. Capital accumulation, as we all know,
provides the critical push for the breakthrough from the gravity pull
of under-development into the outer space of economic development.
Again as we all know, capital accumulation is the consequence of strict
economic discipline-and hard work. A developing country cannot
afford the luxury of being what Myrdal called a "soft society."
But in India in the last two or three years an appalling situation
came to prevail, a situation of utter laxity, alarming flabbiness, near-
complete erosion of the ethos of work and impermissible disregard of
the financial disciplines necessary for a country like India. The most
irresponsible demands were put forward and encouraged by many
political parties and groups-and the slightest resistance led to agita-
tions and demonstrations which often ended in violence, joined in
competitive radicalism by various political parties as well as rump
groups. Everybody was asking for more and more from the national
cake, but only a few were willing to contribute to increasing the size of
the national cake. There were not many who worried publicly about
the constraints of a developing country, resource-short, power-short,
and capital-short. It was a situation which could only have culminated
in disaster and disintegration.
Insurrection and democracy cannot co-exist. One cannot follow
insurrectionary methods, give open calls for uprisings, and yet claim the
privileges of democracy. What was happening in India before the
proclamation of emergency was the rapid build-up of a climate of in-
surrection, large-scale violence and disorder, and civil conflict.
Democracy implies observance of certain norms and constraints
vital to the proper functioning of the system. If some major parties
in the political system decide to abandon those norms and to take
recourse to direct action, democracy becomes a farce. This was what
was tending to happen in India in the last two years.
Democracy involves responsibility. It means a responsible govern-
ment, elected by the will of the people, and the right of those who are

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1126 V. P. DUTT

in opposition to peacefully convert the majority to its point of view.

You cannot have an irresponsible government and a responsible oppo-
sition, but equally you cannot have a responsible government but an
irresponsible opposition. In a democracy the minority cannot decide to
paralyze the majority and prevent the majority from functioning, just
as the majority party must allow the minority opposition to function.
These are the imperatives of democracy and no democracy can survive
if these imperatives are freely transgressed and virtually disowned.
One step leading to another, some of the opposition parties decided
to abandon the path of democracy, refused to abide by the rules of the
democratic system and tried to find a short-cut to power, not by
winning elections, but by capturing the seat of power through direct
action. It was not a case of a few people alienated from the system
advocating its forcible liquidation and the substitution of another
that they would regard as a more just system. There are such people
in every democatic country and it is not unusual to tolerate them
provided they do not actually engage in force and violence. But in
India it was a case of the opposition parties, which claimed to provide
an alternative to the ruling government within the democratic system,
themselves attempting to bring about a situation of anarchy in which
they could seize power. This was done so brazenly and openly that the
only wonder was that some people and newspapers who otherwise
swore by democracy, either turned a blind eye towards the developing
situation or gave comfort to these forces.
The first step in this strategy for confusion and chaos was the
attempt to forcibly dissolve elected legislatures or to prevent duly
elected legislators from performing their duties. The process began in
January 1974 in Gujarat, when a students' committee was formed to
lead the agitation. The agitation soon merged into a movement of the
political parties. Extensive violence took place in Ahmedabad and
elsewhere in Gujarat. Tactics of intimidation and coercion were used
on a large scale to compel legislators to resign from the Assembly. The
houses of legislators were raided and they were threatened with dire
consequences if they did not resign. Finally, Morarji Desai, leader of the
Congress went on a hunger strike in support of the demand for disso-
lution of the assembly. In order to save Morarji Desai's life, the
Gujarat Assembly was dissolved. For the Opposition, this opened the
flood gates. A similar battle cry was taken up in Bihar and various
other places.

Call to Paralyze Government

The prophet of "lost causes," Shri Jayaprakash Narayan, jumped

into the fray at this stage and gave a call for "total revolution." Open
declarations were made by him and many other opposition leaders
that the agitation to paralyze the legislatures and the governments

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1127

would be spread to all the States and the Center as well. In a speech
on September 9, 1974, while announcing the plans for the Bihar
agitation, Jayaprakash Narayan said:

From this date [October 3-5], there would be no trains running through
Bihar, buses would be off the road, work in government offices, including
the Secretariat would be paralysed and shops will remain closed....
A week's paralysis would be enough to end the government in Bihar.,

Jayaprakash Narayan himself was quite clear that this fight was really
directed at the Center, and he went on to make it explicit in the same
speech: "It is now an open confrontation with the Center and not
merely the Bihar Government. The State Government has neither
status nor stamina."
The movement for "total revolution" was on. A motley group of
opposition parties jumped on the band wagon and embraced the
movement and its program. Jayaprakash Narayan himself outlined the
following program for his movement: (1.) boycott of schools and col-
leges and examinations for one year by the students; (2.) "gherao"
(pressurization through obstruction of movement) of Members of the
Legislative Assembly to force them to resign from membership in the
Assembly; (3.) social boycott of MLAs; (4.) formation of a parallel
Assembly; (5.) paralyzing work in government offices; (6.) no-tax
campaigns; (7.) boycott of courts; (8.) establishment of parallel govern-
ments and parallel courts; and (9.) appeal to armed forces, police, and
government servants for support of the movement.
The program outlined in Bihar was held to be applicable to the
entire country. Can anyone genuinely believing in democracy seriously
contend that this kind of direct action and resort to extra-constitutional
methods could possibly be reconciled with the normal functioning of a
democratic system? What kind of parliamentary democracy would it be
where there were parallel governments and parallel assemblies-that
is, parallel to the duly elected assemblies and duly constituted govern-
ments? Could the democratic system tolerate this and still survive?
Some of the opposition parties, subsequently using a Court decision
in a case involving the Prime Minister, made much of the sanctity of
the judiciary. But they were the very people who gave the call for the
establishment of parallel courts, thus bringing the entire judiciary of
India under suspicion and ridicule in the country.
It was thus becoming clear that many of the opposition parties,
in their frustration at their inability to capture power at the pools,
had opted for anarchy and disruption in order to seize power. In line
with this new strategy was the call for a railway strike in May 1974.
The objective was not the amelioration of the working conditions of the
railwaymen but undoubtedly the overthrow of the Central Govern-

1 The Statesman (New Delhi), September 10, 1974.

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1128 V. P. DUTT

ment. George Fernandes, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party and
of the Railwaymen's Union, said in a speech in October 1973:

The railwaymen should not be a sleeping giant now and should organize
themselves into one indivisible union and if they succeed in this, they
can change the whole history of India and bring down the Indira
Gandhi Government at any time by paralysing the railway transport
to a dead stop.

He repeated the same theme in Madras on March 29, 1974:

Realise the strength which you possess. Seven days' strike of the Indian
Railways-every thermal station in the country would close down. Ten
days' strike on the Indian Railways-every steel mill in India would
close down, and the industry in the country would come to a halt for
the next 12 months. If once the steel mill furnace is switched off, it
takes nine months to re-fire. A 15-days' strike in the Indian Railways-
the country will starve.2

While he was organizing support for the strike, George Fernandes

declared that "railwaymen could unseat the present Central Govern-
ment through a general strike." The Railway strike was, therefore, a
device for paralyzing the country and bringing it to a dead halt,
thereby overthrowing the Government.

Bid to Strike at the Roots of Democracy

During the course of the unfolding of these events, a nondescript

coalition of seven parties with little in common had come into being
to seize power. They ranged from extreme Marxists to rightwing
religious chauvinists and neo-fascists. Of course, if the opposition
parties wanted to bring about an unprincipled alliance, it was their
own lookout. And if they thought that in this manner they could come
closer to power in a democratic structure, they were welcome to do so.
The objection was not to their coming together, or even to the rampant
opportunism that was displayed, but to the fact that they were striking
at the roots of democracy and abandoning the democratic system in
their quest for power. That they had scant faith now in democracy
was clear from the innumerable pronouncements that many of their
leaders made. One of the protagonists of the so-called coalition, the
erstwhile leader of the now-merged Swatantra Party, Minoo Masani,
who in the past often acted as the high priest of anti-communism in
order to defend democracy, said in a speech:

We are now entering a revolutionary stage. For a time extra-

constitutional forces will take over. I would prefer temporarily a

2 The Hindu (Madras), March 30, 1974.

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1129

patriotic army which takes a pragmatic economic line, gives the people
a good life and stops population growth. When the army calls in
politicians, they would call in some prominent people. Suppose they
call me or Jayaprakash Narayan and people of that kind.3

Jayaprakash Narayan himself made speeches in a similar vein

whose only purpose could be to encourage violent methods in place of
constitutional ones. According to newspaper reports, Jayaprakash
Narayan said in Allahabad on June 22, 1974, that while "he himself
would not take part in any armed insurrection or rebellion, he could
not restrain the revolutionaries from taking to the gun."4 Again, he
was reported to have said on June 25, 1974 that: "Though he himself
believed in non-violent methods, he would follow the violent method
if any opposition party was capable of toppling the government
violently."5
Similar statements were made by many other leaders of the
opposition. They left no doubt in anyone's mind that they were not
wedded to the democratic system and the democratic structure of India,
but only to seizing power, no matter what methods or means they
would have to adopt in the process.
One of the most reprehensible aspects of the situation was that
Jayaprakash Narayan and some of the opposition parties gave res-
pectability to those forces which had all along spread prejudice and
hatred against the various minority communities inhabiting India and
which symbolized the Indian variety of fascism. The leadership of the
movement passed into the hands of the R.S.S. and the Jan Sangh,
which provided the organizational muscle to the movement. Neither
Jayaprakash Narayan nor the other opposition parties in this new
combination had any well-knit organization or cadres to carry out their
strategy. This role was played by the R.S.S. and the Jan Sangh.
The R.S.S. not only represented those forces responsible for the
murder of Mahatma Gandhi, but was the Indian prototype of fascism
from which Europe suffered so grievously in the last World War. All
the components of fascism, as we have come to know it historically,
were present in the R.S.S. movement: belief in total control over the
political system and structure of the State and the establishment of a
fully authoritarian regime; racial chauvinism and the advocacy of the
"master race" concept; utilization of the discontent of the lower middle
class in order to capture power; shouting radical slogans but actually
denigrating all the socialist elements and features; and use of the
politics of the "big lie" which found its most effective expression in
rumormongering and character assassination.

3 Quoted by the Prime Minister in her speech in the Lok Sabha on July 22,
1975.
4 Times of India, New Delhi, June 23, 1974.
5 The Pioneer (Lucknow), June 26, 1974.

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1130 V. P. DUTT

Indeed, the R.S.S. had not hid its admiration for Hitler during
the struggle against fascism in Europe. The late chief of the R.S.S.,
Golwalkar, expressed this admiration in unambiguous terms in his
book Our Nationhood Defined in which he said: "The national pride
of the Germans is the talk of the whole world. The Germans drove
out of their country the Jews only in order to maintain their racial
and cultural purity. Germany has shown that it is very difficult for
fundamentally different races to bring together. This is a lesson which
India could learn and profit by."
The Indian people gave unto themselves a democratic, secular,
federal constitution in which all communities had equal rights and in
which no one would be discriminated against on grounds of faith,
creed, color or race. India, as we have said earlier, is a continental
polity. It is not only a country of vast size, but also of diverse religions,
language groups, and cultural units. There are Hindus, Muslims,
Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, and various other religious communities.
Practically, all religions of the world are present in India. There are
15 major nationally recognized languages. The unity and integrity of
such a country as India can be maintained only if this vast diversity
is acknowledged, tolerated, and given adequate place in the polity
and the power structure of the country. Not only all the communities
and language groups but all the various areas of India from Nagaland
to Kashmir must feel that they are equal partners in the progress of
the country and co-sharers both in its advance and its adversity.
The R.S.S. and its political wing, the Jan Sangh, not only spread
prejudices against the non-Hindu communities of India, but they were
also traditionally contemptuous of the so-called low castes. The R.S.S.
was based almost entirely on the urban middle class but with its top
leadership firmly entrenched in the hands of a small Brahman group
from a particular section of Maharashtra. That it was anti-Muslim and
anti-Christian can hardly be doubted. In an interview in Delhi in June
1971, the then leader of the R.S.S., Golwalkar, said that he did not
believe that Muslims belonged to the national mainstream of India.
His views led the Hindustan Times to write editorially that Golwalkar
had come close to advocating the "master race" theory.6
The R.S.S. was also preaching hatred against other communities.
On Christians, the R.S.S. said: "So far as Christians are concerned, to a
superficial observer they appear quite harmless. They are not only
irreligious but anti-national." One can see that there are good reasons
why traditionally the Harijans (Untouchables) have determinedly
kept away from the Jan Sangh and the R.S.S.
It is these forces that had captured the movement of this hotch-
potch of joint opposition that had come into existence. What was
tragic was that Jayaprakash Narayan gave respectability to these forces.

6 See the Hindustan Times issues for the month of June 1971.

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1131

Presiding over a conference of the R.S.S., Jayaprakash Narayan said

that if the R.S.S. was fascist, then he was also a fascist. It was Atal
Behari Vajpayee, one of the top leaders of the Jan Sangh, who in a
paper prepared for the Bharatiya Jan Sangh Conference at Hyderabad
in September 1974, said that the battle against the Government would
have to be fought on the streets of India. He added: "The only way
open to India is an open confrontation between the Government and
the people. The situation demands two immediate steps-to blow up
the entrenched political power structure and a well-defined programme
of this confrontation leading towards a total Revolution."7
It was Nanaji Deshmukh, General Secretary of the Jan Sangh, who
drafted the program of the Joint Opposition front, which included the
following. First, if the Supreme Court gave a conditional stay (in the
Prime Minister's election case), the opposition parties should organize
a Delhi Bandh to demand the resignation of the Prime Minister.
Second, 21 Opposition MPs should meet the Prime Minister to demand
her resignation and, in case she refused to comply, start an indefinite
dharna (sit down strike) outside her residence. Third, the organization
of processions and demonstrations by students and youth, in various
areas of Delhi; the gherao of industrialists and businessmen supporting
the Prime Minister; gate meetings outside mills and factories in and
around Delhi; lunch hour meetings of Central Government employees;
demonstrations outside the Prime Minister's residence by various sec-
tions of the people, including teachers, doctors, lawyers, students,
slum dwellers, businessmen, women, scooter and taxi drivers, construc-
tion workers, etc.; the beating of thalis (brass eating plates - equivalent
of tolling of bells) from rooftops in the night; and bringing out hand-
bills against the Prime Minister.

Campaign of Calumny

A veritable campaign of hatred and calumny against individuals

in the Congress Party and against the Prime Minister in particular was
unleashed. The kind of scurrilous campaign that was carried on against
Mrs. Indira Gandhi was unique in contemporary history. The Jan
Sangh and the R.S.S. were the agencies used for spreading the most
fantastic rumors. This climate of violence and calumny resulted in the
assassination of the Railway Minister, L. N. Mishra, and an attempt on
the life of the Chief Justice, A. N. Ray. It hardly needs any omniscience
to conclude that the ultimate and the real target was the Prime Minister
herself.
A general state of lawlessness was created in the country. The uni-f
versities were deliberately destabilized and students were utilized not
just for normal political activities, but to bring down the entire political

7 From this author's copy of the paper.

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1132 V. P. DUTT

system. The situation could be summed up as: No one would be

allowed to teach, no one would be allowed to study, and no one would
be allowed to work. If students used unfair means or cheated in
examinations, many would rise in their defense as if cheating was a
fundamental right! This encouraged a small section of the students
to bring to a standstill all normal work of the universities, to abuse
fellow-students and teachers, to use physical force against Principals
and Vice Chancellors, and to burn buses and indulge in violence and
vandalism.
The role of a section of the press in this whole situation was most
unfortunate. Some newspapers, including some big ones, contributed to
the buildup of an atmosphere of tension, agitation, and anarchy. They
had no comment to make when the opposition used blatantly un-
democratic means, adopted tactics of gherao and intimidation, staged
dharnas in Parliament and State Assemblies, and used the most
vituperative language in their political campaigns. They adopted a "see
no evil, speak no evil, hear no evil" policy where the opposition was
concerned, but they were ready to pounce upon the Congress Party and
the Government for any major or minor, real or fancied, lapse. They
gave respectability to rumors and some of them became openly partisan.
This, by itself, is not necessarily objectionable, however wrong it
might have been for any newspaper to adopt such a course of action.
But some of these newspapers appeared not only to tolerate the extra
constitutional methods adopted by the opposition front and the atmos-
phere of lawlessness and violence being created in the country, but even
to encourage it by ignoring the undemocratic strategy on the part of the
opposition and by magnifying what the Congress and the Government
said or did that was considered to be wrong. In fact, they believed that
they had become kingmakers in India and were doing everything to
establish a situation in which not the people, but the press of India,
would decide who would rule the country.
The judgment delivered by the one-member bench of the Allaha-
bad High Court in regard to the election petition by one of the opposi-
tion members, Raj Narain, against the Prime Minister, served the
purpose of the opposition, which immediately tried to precipitate
matters in the pursuit of the strategy they had already embarked upon
for producing conditions of disruption and collapse so that they could
come into power.
The fog which enshrouds the Prime Minister's election case and
subsequent developments must be lifted. The mist of misunderstanding,
mistrust, misstatements and misinterpretations need to be cleared.
Facts have been half-told; crucial points slurred over. Evocative
phrases have been used making a mockery of the meaning of words.
The word "corruption" has been bandied around inside and outside
the country with scant regard to either truth or normal usage.

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1133

The issues in themselves were simple enough. The Prime Minister,

Mrs. Gandhi, won a landslide victory in her constituency of Rae
Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh and a massive electoral verdict for her party
in the parliamentary elections in 1971. Mrs. Gandhi's own majority
was well over one hundred thousand, and her Congress Party secured
some 350 seats in a house of 524.
Raj Narain, the Prime Minister's electoral opponent who had
lost heavily, brought forward fourteen charges of "corrupt practices"
against her, which included bribery, corruption, lavish expenditure
and illegal soliciting of votes, etc. In fact, the Allahabad High Court
judge who heard the election petition dismissed all the graver charges
which normally connote corruption in the accepted sense of the term
the world over. He did not accept any charge of bribery or illegal
soliciting of votes. He also did not accept the charge that Mrs. Gandhi
had exceeded the limit of election expenses allowed under the law.
The judge upheld only two points, both not really directly related to
individual decisions of the Prime Minister but on the basis of which
he allowed the appeal of Raj Narain and declared the election invalid.
The first point concerned the erection of a rostrum by officials
in two of Mrs. Gandhi's election meetings in Rae Bareilly and the
supply of electric power by the U.P. Government officials at these two
meetings. This he regarded as an impermissible practice. The judge,
however, observed that the police authorities in various states had the
obligation to make arrangements for the security of the Prime Minister
even when she was a candidate herself, and he had no objection to the
barricades constructed by the police authorities in connection with
such security arrangements.
It is necessary to point out here that arrangements which are
uniformly made by all states for the security of the Prime Minister in-
clude the construction of rostrums. It was obviously, therefore, a tech-
nical point in the interpretation of law.
The second point on which the judge gave an adverse judgment
against the Prime Minister concerned the question of the date from
which the resignation of an official became effective. The judge
accepted that the official concerned had resigned on January 13, 1971,
but held that the resignation could not be effective until the formal
signing of the letter of acceptance on January 25, by the President of
India. He therefore held that the concerned official technically con-
tinued to be in service, even though he did not attend office and did
not draw his salary during that period, and concluded that any election
work that he might have done was illegal. It is obvious that this again
is a technical question of interpretation of law in which no direct
personal decision of the Prime Minister was involved.
The same judge also gave immediately after delivering his verdict
an absolute stay order for 20 days in order to allow Mrs. Gandhi to

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1134 V. P. DUTT

appeal to the Supreme Court against the High Court's judgment. Can
anyone in conscience really assert that any moral impropriety was
involved in these issues? A mountain was made out of a molehill.
Some opposition leaders and parties clamored for the Prime
Minister's resignation even before the Supreme Court had heard her
appeal and given its judgment. They started a campaign in the country
and said that she was under a cloud and, therefore, must resign. Every
dispassionate observer could see that no serious charge of moral tur-
pitude, or of financial or political corruption was involved. By giving
an absolute stay order the judge himself was, in fact, suspending his own
judgment until a superior court could decide upon the issues.

Travesty of Justice

Some people demanded the Prime Minister's resignation then and

there. A novel principle of justice was being propagated that a lower
court's judgment should be given effect to even before the higher court
had time to consider the issue and that a person must be deemed to be
held guilty until proved innocent by the superior court, even though
the lower court had itself stayed the operation of its own jugdment.
If such a principle of legal justice were to be accepted in the
world whereby every verdict of the lower court should be carried
out even while the higher court was seized of the issue, one can imagine
the travesty of justice that it would lead to. And yet this was precisely
what some people started demanding. As Justice P. B. Mukerjee, retired
Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, pointed out at that time,
to suggest the resignation of the Prime Minister "is really an attempt
to make the stay order ineffective and thereby to nullify the order of
the court." The position was that as long as the stay order lasted, the
situation remained as if the judgment had not been delivered during
that period.
The Prime Minister appealed to the Supreme Court and, in
accordance with the due processes of law, the vacation judge heard the
preliminary plea for a stay order until a full bench appointed by the
Chief Justice could consider the issues involved in the appeal. Justice
V. R. Krishna Iyer, who heard the stay order appeal, gave his judg-
ment on June 24. He said that there was no legal embargo on Mrs.
Gandhi continuing as Prime Minister. He held that she would continue
to enjoy all the privileges and prerogatives of the Prime Minister until
the full bench of the Supreme Court had declared itself on the appeal.
He also said that her disqualification as a member of parliament would
be held in abeyance until the decision of the Supreme Court on the
appeal. It was only on one point that the Supreme Court judge im-
posed restrictions: he said that until the disposal of the appeal, Mrs.
Gandhi could not vote as member of parliament nor draw her salary
and other allowances as a member during this period. He made it clear

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1135

that he was deciding so because of the precedents established by the

Supreme Court in the last 20 years in such cases. Again, therefore, this
was a technical issue.
But not many people outside the country know about some of the
other observations made by the Supreme Court Judge. Justice Krishna
Iyer agreed that the Prime Minister had been cleared from the "graver
electoral vices set out in section 123 of the act." He also dismissed the
opposing counsel's plea that she had come with "unclean hands" to the
Supreme Court. He agreed that neither she nor the Congress Party
had done anything wrong in the Party's reaffirming its faith in her
leadership. He also did not accept the opposing counsel's plea that the
stay order of the High Court had been obtained under false pretexts.
He hinted that the provisions contained in the People's Representation
Act (under which the judgment of the Allahabad High Court was
delivered) were draconian and should invite the attention of a
vigilant and alert legislature. He also said that in the "first flush" he
was inclined to give an absolute stay order, but had desisted from doing
so because of the precedents established earlier, but he maintained that
there was practically no difference between the stay order that he was
giving and the stay order asked for by the Prime Minister's counsel.
Despite the judgment of the Allahabad High Court giving an
absolute stay order till the Supreme Court considered the issue and
despite the subsequent judgment by Justice Krishna Iyer, some of the
opposition parties and their leaders embarked upon a countrywide
campaign to bring down the Government. As we have noted earlier,
even before the Allahabad High Court judgment, they had sought to
create conditions that would result in the forcible dissolution of elected
legislatures, and elected representatives of the people were prevented
from discharging their functions. The minority was dictating to the
majority.

Unprincipled Opposition Stand

These opposition parties and leaders made it clear that they

would not accept the restraints of democratic functioning, or limits
of the law. They would not even wait for the verdict of the people
in the forthcoming elections which were scheduled for early 1976.
One of the leaders of this opposition front, Morarji Desai, admitted in
an interview to an Italian correspondent that the opposition had to
"make hay while the sun shines." He said that they could not wait
till the next general election because the people would get tired by
then. He also told her that they would not win the general election
against Indira Gandhi because of her superior resources. This of course
did not deter Morarji Desai from demanding and fighting elections in
Gujarat where, even though the Congress emerged as the largest party,
the opposition front formed the Government through an understanding

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1136 V. P. DUTT

with some of these parties against whose leaders they had themselves
earlier campaigned.
Quite early this section of the opposition was campaigning for
open insurrection. Jayaprakash Narayan as well as other leaders of this
opposition front appealed to the people not to pay any taxes to the
Government. The peasants were asked to refuse to deliver the levy on
foodgrain production. The police and the army were incited to disobey
the Government's order. One of the foremost opposition leaders even
criticized Justice Krishna Iyer for his observations on Mrs. Gandhi's
continuance as the Prime Minister. Public aspersions were also cast on
the Chief Justice of India. These forces gave notice of their intention
to march on the Prime Minister's house and to bring about confronta-
tion, bloodshed and violence. The entire campaign was designed to
create a situation of total disruption and disintegration in order to
capture power. Indeed, they were working for nothing else than an
extra-constitutional coup d'eftat. No democracy can function with such
gross violation of all the democratic norms.
One can imagine what would have been the fate of British
democracy if, before the last elections, Wilson had carried on a cam-
paign for the overthrow of Heath, not through elections but through
direct action. If he had asked the British people not to pay income tax
to Heath's Government; if he had appealed to the farmers not to turn
in their foodgrains to Heath's Government; if he had called upon
government servants to disobey the orders of the Government; if he
had publicly called upon the army to revolt against the established
Government! Similarly, what would happen to democracy in the
United States if the Democratic candidate, James Carter, had called
for the overthrow of President Ford through agitations and violence,
by calling upon the people to stop paying taxes, upon the farmers
to refrain from selling foodgrains to the authorities, upon the govern-
ment servants to disregard the orders of the Government, and finally,
upon the army to revolt against Ford and to join the people in over-
throwing him! If such a thing were to happen, American democracy
would have breathed its last. This was precisely what was attempted
in India.
This was the background to the declaration of the state of emer-
gency by the President on June 25, 1975, in order to avert conditions
of chaos and lawlessness that were deliberately sought to be created
by some opposition parties. Any impression that a dictatorship has
been foisted upon the people is both misconceived and mischievous. An
emergency was declared according to the provisions of the Constitution.
Article 352 of the Constitution lays down the procedures and conditions
under which an emergency may be declared. All the constitutional
procedures have been abided by. Not a single step has been taken in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution. It is precisely to meet

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 THE EMERGENCY IN INDIA 1137

such a situation that the framers of the Constitution included the pro-
visions concerning the declaration of emergency within the Consti-
tution.

Perspective

The declaration of Emergency cleared the air to some extent. The

threat of chaos and disruption and the overwhelming of the political
system by undemocratic methods was averted. The din and the noise
subsided and the clouds of violence were lifted. The question, in this
writer's mind, is not whether some particular action by some particular
functionary or even by the Government as a whole ought or ought not
to have been taken after the proclamation of the emergency, but the
real question is the rationale and the factors responsible for the
proclamation of the emergency and the response the people have given
to the emergency. The moral fiber of the people was being eroded. The
country was becoming flabby and inviting ridicule and contempt by
those very elements at home and abroad who now display a rather
sudden and touching concern for "democracy" in India.
There have been certain incidental gains of the emergency. It was
an ingathering process. The return of confidence among the people
became a prominent feature of the situation obtaining after the emer-
gency. A sense of discipline reappeared with the general realization
that not to work was not a fundamental right! Smuggling, which had
become a serious economic menace, and hoarding were effectively cur-
tailed. Industrial and agricultural production proceeded apace. Price
stability was ensured and the dogs of inflation were put under leash.
This provided very substantial relief to the people.
In the wake of the emergency came the 20-point economic program
announced by the Prime Minister on July 1, 1975.8 The program re-
leased more enthusiasm among the people. Why it did so was not hard
to discover, because it addressed itself to real problems and it signified
a new strategy of economic development. This strategy was simple, yet
the only effective one for a country like India, placing primary empha-
sis on dealing with the problems of those who were the most deprived,
the 40% of the population below the poverty line-the mass of rural
India. It provided some relief to them so as to ameliorate their condi-
tions. Bonded labor was freed, agricultural wages were fixed and en-
hanced, house and land sites were sought to be provided for the Hari-
jans, and the process of land reforms sought to be speeded up.
On the other hand, the program strove to strengthen the apparatus
of production, to increase production and to stabilize and enlarge the
infrastructure of distribution. Thus many concessions were given to

8 Text in Economic Times (New Delhi), July 2, 1976.

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1138 V. P. DUTT

industry and industrial production rose appreciably. Scarcity disap-

peared and commodities of common use became available in fair supply.
The distribution machinery for articles of basic commodities was
strengthened so as to prevent another economic crisis.
Many people abroad, some with ulterior purposes and some with
good intentions, have expressed misgivings about one aspect of the
emergency, that is press censorship. The Prime Minister has herself
said on many occasions that India is fully committed to democracy
and a free press and that she did not like the imposition of censorship
in normal circumstances. But it must be realized that the emergency is
an abnormal situation designed to meet unusual conditions. An emer-
gency is not declared under normal conditions. If it is accepted that the
situation was highly abnormal, it also follows logically that the emer-
gency regulations would have to apply to all sections, including the
press. It would be an odd argument that the highly abnormal situation
under which an emergency had to be declared did not exist for the
press, but only for other sections of the community. We have also noted
earlier that in the creation of a situation of anarchy and lawlessness
and in resorting to flagrantly undemocratic methods, the role of a sec-
tion of the press, particularly some of the big press, was highly dubious.
It encouraged and gave comfort to those forces which were making a
mockery of all norms and rules of democracy. Some remedial action
was needed so that the press would not become a party to the use of
highly undemocratic methods and tactics.
It should be noted at the same time that gradually the procedures
about press regulations have been eased and that already there is a
system of self-regulation rather than one of pre-censorship. What ob-
tains in an emergency cannot be compared with what should obtain in
a normal situation.
Our perception in India on the declaration of the emergency was
not that of an effort to stifle intellectual dissent and smother democracy
but rather an effort to control those forces which had no commitment
to democracy, many of whom were openly committed to a fascist kind
of philosophy, so that democracy was not allowed to be subverted and
supplanted by a chauvinistic dictatorship. The emergency is an interim
measure to check disintegration and violent disruption and to restore
the democratic health of the country so that society can proceed on an
orderly, peaceful, and constitutional basis. It is not an end in itself,
but the problem before the country is to retain the gains that came its
way in the wake of the emergency when it gradually moves on to a
postemergency era.

V. P. DUTT is a Professor at Delhi University and was formerly Pro-Vice-Chancellor

of that institution.

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