Rule 110 Collated Cases

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 201572. July 9, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAEL DELFIN,

appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J : p
This is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 29 April 2011 of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said Decision, the
CA affirmed, with modification, the conviction of herein appellant Rael Delfin
for murder under Article 248 (1) of Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
The antecedents:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio) — a
51-year-old fisherman from Navotas City — was killed after being gunned
down at a store just across his home.
Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the
appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. 3 The information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO
ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wound, which caused his immediate death. ScaCEH
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter

ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of one Joan Cruz
(Joan) and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).
Joan is an eyewitness to the gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in
partner of the victim. The substance of her testimony is as follows: 5
1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing
outside Emilio's house at R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas
City. From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking over the
telephone at a store just across his house. Also at the store
during that time was the appellant who was seated on a
bench to the left of Emilio.
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2. Joan then went inside Emilio's house. Almost immediately after
going inside the house, Joan heard the sound of a gunshot.
Joan rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio shot in the
head and sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw the
appellant, now holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio.
3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous
misunderstanding between Emilio and the appellant; neither
did she observe any altercation brewing nor hear any word
spoken between Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.
Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police

physician who examined post mortem the corpse of Emilio. He issued
Medico-Legal Report No. M-608-00, 6 which revealed that Emilio died as a
consequence of two (2) gunshot wounds: one that penetrated the left side of
his head and another that penetrated his chest. Dr. Marquez testified to
affirm the contents of his report.
The defense, for its part, relied on the testimonies of the appellant7
and a certain Rene Villanueva (Rene). 8
Appellant offered the alibi that he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on
the date and time of the supposed shooting. According to the appellant, he
left for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned
at around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. Appellant also testified that he was
accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other individuals — one of
which was Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant.
However, Rene later admitted that he, the appellant and their other
companions actually left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September
2000 — not the 27th; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27 September
2000 — not the 28th. Thus, at the date and time of the supposed shooting,
Rene and the appellant were already in Navotas City.
On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision 9 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248 (1) of
the RPC. 10 Based on its assessment and evaluation of the evidence on
record, the RTC was convinced that it was the appellant who killed Emilio
and who did so with the use of treachery. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced
the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as consequential damages.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction
of the appellant. The CA, however, deleted the award of P50,000.00
consequential damages and replaced it with an award of P50,000.00 moral
damages. 11 Hence, this appeal. CAIHaE
In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under

which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the
discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in
the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the
one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant
protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of
the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of
the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an
intelligent defense thereon.
Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibi over and above the
version of the prosecution.
Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery against him.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
Variance in the Date of the
Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information
We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant
was tried, and convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the
commission of the crime as alleged in the information and as established
during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or
certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake
of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be
approximated: 12
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense ;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them

shall be included in the complaint or information.
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary

to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with

exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission different
from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be
considered as an error fatal to prosecution. 13 In such cases, the erroneous
allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence
presented during the trial 14 or may even be corrected by a formal
amendment of the information. 15
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in
the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as
established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great
that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no
longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective
allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor
can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right
of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. Such was
this Court's ruling in the case of People v. Opemia. 16 SEHaDI
I n Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18

June 1952 was filed against four (4) accused. After all of the accused entered
a plea of not guilty and during trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the
effect that the purported theft was committed in July of 1947. The
prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of the information to make
it conform to the evidence with respect to the date of theft. The trial court
rejected the motion and instead dismissed the information altogether. The
dispute reaching us in due course, we sustained the trial court's dismissal of
the information:
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in
changing the date of the commission of the crime charged from June
18, 1952 to July, 1947. In not permitting the amendment the learned
trial Judge said:
"It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise
time at which an offense was committed need not be alleged in
the complaint or information, but it is required that the act be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed as the information or
complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for
this rule is obvious. It is to apprise the accused of the
approximate date when the offense charged was committed in
order to enable him to prepare his defense and thus avoid a
surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was
lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the
information. The period of almost five years between 1947
and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one
cannot help but be led to believe that another theft
different from that committed by the Defendants in 1952
was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this
impression the accused, who came to court prepared to
face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed
by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden
surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to
prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The variance
is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their
constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the
specific charge against them and deprives them of the
opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot
be convicted of an offense with which they are not
charged.
"It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after
the Defendant has entered his plea, the information or complaint
may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant
(Rule 196, section 13). An amendment that would change
the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to
1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The difference in
date could not be attributed to a clerical error, because
the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact
that the difference is not only in the year, but also in the
month and in the last two digits of the year. It is apparent
that the proposed amendment concerns with material facts
constituting the offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the Defendants."
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the
amendment as referring to substance and not merely to form. But even
supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendants had
pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be proper only if it
would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the
court did not make good use of that discretion in disallowing
the amendment, considering that the variance sought to be
introduced thereby would appear to be really unfair to the
Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court "it violates
their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the
specific charge against them and deprives them of the
opportunity to defend themselves". 17 (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia,
but the general rule.
Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe
that there is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the
prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e., the murder of
Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that the accused may have been
caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence pointing to
commission of the murder on 27 September 2000, considering that all
documentary attachments to the information (such as the Resolution 18 of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the
Sworn Statement 19 of Joan) all referred to the murder as having been
committed on that date. Indeed, appellant never objected to such evidence
during the trial and was even able to concoct an intelligent alibi in direct
refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the
inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere
clerical error. This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting
documents point to the murder as having been committed on the 27th of
September 2000, the information's mistake is limited only to the month
when the crime was committed. 20 Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is
deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the
appellant was tried and convicted, as valid.
Appellant's Defense of Alibi
Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder
We also find unavailing the appellant's insistence on the credibility of
his alibi. On this point, we quote with approval the following discourse of the
CA, which we find to be consistent with time-honored jurisprudence: 21
Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and
its assessment of their probative weight is given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless it is ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 22
As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution
witness, Joan, was clear, candid, straightforward, positive and credible,
as against the denial and alibi of the [appellant]. She positively
identified the [appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime. . . . .
TASCDI
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-

witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction
even in a charge of murder. 23 Considering that Joan's account of how
the [appellant] killed [Emilio] was clear, credible, and positive, there is,
thus, no compelling reason to disturb the trial court's reliance on her
testimony.
As to the [appellant's] defense of denial and alibi, the same are
unavailing and worthless in the face of the positive identification by the
prosecution's witness . . . .
. . . . Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
proven that the [accused] was at some other place at the time the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis at the time [the offense was committed]. 24 . . .
.
At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his
committing the crime as even, Rene, the witness who was supposed to
corroborate his alibi, admitted that they went back home at 4:00
o'clock in the morning of September 27, 2000 and were already at
Navotas City at the time the incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly
possible for him to be present at the crime scene despite his
allegations to the contrary. Hence, based on all the foregoing evidence,
he is, without a doubt, the perpetrator of the crime.
Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery
against the appellant, we find it to be fully justified by the evidence on
record. Again, we approve of the CA's observations on this matter:
Concededly, the [appellant's] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was
sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. Before the attack was
made, [Emilio] was merely conversing with another on the phone. He
was undoubtedly in no position and without any means to defend
himself. By all indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to
evade the gunshots, to defend himself, or to retaliate. For this reason,
the [RTC] correctly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify
the offense as Murder. 25
All in all, we find no error in the conviction of the appellant.
Recoverable Damages
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, 26 we increase the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages payable by the appellant from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00.
In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay
exemplary damages in the amount P30,000.00. 27
The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable
by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil
indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; (2) that the amount
of moral damages is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and (3) that
the appellant must pay, in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages,
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. aSIDCT
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. By way of an ordinary appeal pursuant to Section 3 (c) of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court.
2. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro for the
Seventh (7th) Division of the Court of Appeals with Associate Justices Amelita
G. Tolentino and Rodil V. Zalameda concurring; rollo, pp. 2-14.
3. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 24311-MN and was raffled to
Branch 170.
4. CA rollo, p. 7.
5. TSN, 5 September 2006.
6. Records, pp. 99-101.
7. TSN dated 21 October 2008.
8. TSN dated 25 November 2008.

9. CA rollo, pp. 124-128. The decision was penned by Judge Hector B. Almeyda.
10. Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. . . . .
11. CA rollo, p. 194.
12. Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sections 6 and 11.
13. Rocaberte v. People , G.R. No. 72994, 23 January 1991, 193 SCRA 152, 156.
14. U.S. v. Cardona, 1 Phil. 381, 383 (1902).
15. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may

be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when
it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied).
16. 98 Phil. 698 (1956). Reiterated in People v. Hon. Reyes , 195 Phil. 94, 100-101
(1981).
17. People v. Opemia, id. at 700-701.
18. Records, p. 5.
19. Id. at 3.
20. See analogous cases in People v. Rivera, 144 Phil. 687, 692 (1970) and U.S. v.
Ramos, 23 Phil. 300, 307 (1912).
21. Rollo , pp. 9-11.
22. See People v. Quigod, G.R. No. 186419, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 407, 416-417.
23. See People v. Zeta , 573 Phil. 125, 145 (2008).
24. See People v. Bucayo , 577 Phil. 355, 361 (2008).
25. Rollo , p. 12.
26. People v. Lopez , G.R. No. 184596, 24 March 2014.
27. People v. Dadao , G.R. No. 201860, 22 January 2014.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175602. January 18, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PO2

EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances

constituting the elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal
prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on
January 20, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon
City. They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and
ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006,
subject to the modification that each accused pay to the heirs of each victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of
suit. 1
The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007,
however, accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the
Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin's appeal closed
and terminated. 2 Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused
in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson,
Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson, alleging: DCESaI
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with
a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND
SAYSON Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him
several times with a gun, hitting him on his face and chest, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a
gun, hitting him on his back, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON
Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the State's

evidence of guilt as follows:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Estrella
Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai
betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon
City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her
second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the
evening. Estrella's son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen
and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
Estrella's other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson
(Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella's
family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party (pp.
3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 3-4,
TSN, July 31, 2001). cASEDC
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, the celebration was

interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a
motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the
jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was
then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises
approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella
saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises
from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mother's
warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force
Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the
accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin
na kita?" Moises replied "huwag." Successive shots were thereafter
heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was
sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene
to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left
temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run
away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger
machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February
6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped

from the scene of the crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001). 6
In turn, the appellant's brief filed by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO)
rendered the version of the accused, to wit:
. . . [A]t about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a
barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on (a tricycle driver) saw accused
Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of
barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking
along Corregidor Street when Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then
holding a gun, block his (Edwin's) way. Jun Sayson poked a gun at
accused Edwin, shouting, 'Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita'. The latter
raised both his hands and said 'Wag kuya Jun, maawa ka.'
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year

old child, was walking when his way was likewise blocked but this time,
by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their stepfather.
Joselito twisted one of his (Eduardo's) hands at his back while his
(Joseltio's) stepfather held the other. Ferdinand fired a gun but
accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was positioned
behind Eduardo, was hit. He slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to
inform his family that he was hit. Heidi ran away. She saw Jun (Moises)
and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be

dead. Ferdinand stopped firing. Accused Eduardo's son approached
him crying. Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his service
firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met
General Jesus Almadin, his commanding officer (CO). He reported the
incident and sought for advice. He was told to take a rest and go back
on (sic ) the following day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He
surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused
Edwin Valdez likewise surrendered (TSN dated 05 February 2003; pp.
3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp. 2-18, 1 September
2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4;
18 February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004, pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp.
2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25). 7 HESAIT
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and
sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. 8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. 9
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State's
witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their
testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and
contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. 10
Ruling
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of
three counts of homicide due to the failure of the informations to allege the
facts and circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the State's witnesses (Susan
Sayson, Marites Sayson and Estrella Sayson) did not really see the events as
they transpired; and that they wrongly identified the two accused as the
persons who had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were
themselves the aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdez's insistence, holding thus:
In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to
discredit the testimonies of witnesses Susan, Marites and Estrella. They
claimed that a perusal of Estrella's testimony would cast doubt on her
statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The
accused-appellants claimed that Estrella Sayson did not actually see
who allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words "Gusto mo
unahin na kita?" The accused-appellants also claimed that Estrella also
failed to see who shot Moises. They likewise assailed the testimonies of
Susan and Marites as being incredible. They said that Susan testified
that she was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could
not speak; yet she was still able to give her statement on the same day
the incident allegedly happened. The accused-appellants also said that
Marites testified that she was only about five (5) meters away from
them (accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle;
but that, "interestingly," she only learned from her husband Joselito
that the accused-appellants were looking for a certain Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily

explained her purported failure to see who between the accused-
appellants threatened Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin kita?"
and who shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing
Moises because she was preventing him from approaching the
accused-appellants, who were armed with short firearms. Estrella
categorically stated that she saw the accused-appellants alight from
their motorcycle on March 1, 2000. She could not have been mistaken
about the identity of the accused-appellants for the simple reason that
they are her neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants') father
is her "cumpadre." When the incident happened, the accused-
appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from where
she and her son Moises were standing. She also saw with her own
eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of
gunshots (approximately [9] shots) coming from where the accused-
appellants were standing. 11
ASIETa
Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial court's findings of

fact, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of
their probative weight, as well as its conclusions, the Court accords high
respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CA's findings. 12 The justification for
this is that trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses by virtue of its firsthand observation of the demeanor, conduct
and attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The only time when
a reviewing court was not bound by the trial court's assessment of credibility
arises upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that
was overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case. 13
No such fact or circumstance has been brought to the Court's attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and
the treachery of human memory; and that inaccuracies noted in testimony
may even suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been
rehearsed. 14 To properly appreciate the worth of testimony, therefore, the
courts do not resort to the individual words or phrases alone but seek out the
whole impression or effect of what has been said and done. 15
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves
the aggressors who had attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated
during the trial that he dodged the bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand
(one of the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim);
that he played dead to avoid being shot at again, and walked away with his
terrified son only after the way was clear for them to leave; and that he
heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third victim) grappled for control of
a gun, and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun and Ferdinand.
16
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.

It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and
the victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the
trial court for determination based on the evidence on record. 17 The records
show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts
and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short
firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront
Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to
bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to
come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them
threatened Moises: Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises
replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall
to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that
Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot
Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito
(the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and
that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims
were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State's witnesses entirely jibed with
the physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that
Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; 18 that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselito's back and the right side of his neck; 19 and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest.
20 Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. 21 Given that physical
evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than
all witnesses put together, 22 the congruence between the testimonial
recollections and the physical evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2
Valdez and Edwin conclusive. DTCSHA
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the
felony. 23 Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. 24
Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from
the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal
responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both
accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a
common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their
acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the
betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack
that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and
immediately followed by Edwin's shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after
the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same
motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of
the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his
co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. 25 Accordingly, the
existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly
inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common
purpose and community of interest. 26
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez
guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the
informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. 27 It encompasses a wide
variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is
particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the
appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied
and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the
actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or
particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or
aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused
sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in
the complaint or information. 28 In People v. Dimaano, 29 the Court
elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. [emphasis supplied] TcHEaI
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused
"with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength did . . . assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon" the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting
[them]" on various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and
immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It
should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of
the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from
the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments
that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must
specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which
he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of
the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for
which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United States
v. Lim San: 30
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. . . . . That to which his attention should be directed, and
in which he, above all things else, should be most interested,
are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but
did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information
in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of
substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which
those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in
the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the
body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal.
In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of
no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you
commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts
alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the
name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the
province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it
is named. . . . . (emphasis supplied)
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that

aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against
the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in
the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. 31
In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged
in the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. 32
We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide. AaEcHC
Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code , the penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. 33 There being no circumstances modifying
criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from
prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum
for each count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to
suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to
pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr.,
and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo , pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (retired), with
Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and Associate Justice Monina
Arevalo-Zenarosa (retired) concurring.
2.Id., p. 57.
3.Id., p. 3.
4.Id., p. 3.
5.Id.
6.Id., p. 5.
7.Id., pp. 6-7.
8.Id., pp. 7-8.

9.Id., p. 17.
10.Id., p. 11.
11.Rollo , pp. 13-14 (bold emphases are in the original text).
12.People v. Darilay , G.R. Nos. 139751-752, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 45, 54.
13.People v. Santiago , G.R. Nos. 137542-43, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256;
People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260;
People v. Pacheco , G.R. No. 142887, March 2, 2004, 424 SCRA 164, 174;
People v. Genita, Jr., G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 343, 349;
People v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153-
154; Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150433, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209,
219-220; Bricenio v. People , G.R. No. 154804, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 489,
495; People v. Taan , G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230;
People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537,
547; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA
306.
14.People v. Ebrada , G.R. No. 122774, September 26, 1998, 296 SCRA 353, 365.
15.People v. Gailo , G.R. No. 116233, October. 13, 1999, 316 SCRA 733, 748.
16.Rollo , pp. 6-7.
17.Garcia v. People , G.R. No. 144699, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 221, 228.
18.Exhibits K and L.
19.Exhibit D.
20.Exhibits Q and R.
21.TSN, May 23, 2000, pp. 3-13; September 12, 2000, pp. 2-7.
22.People v. Bardaje , No. L-29271, August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 388, 399; People v.
Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 127818, November 11, 1998, 298 SCRA 450, 463.
23.Art. 8, 2nd Par., Revised Penal Code; Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
135619, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 514, 527; People v. Ogapay , No. L-
28566, August 21, 1975, 66 SCRA 209, 214.
24.People v. Cabrera , G.R. No. 105992, February 1, 1995, 241 SCRA 28, 34.
25.People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384, 404; People
v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137364, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 572, 580.
26.People v. Natipravat , No. L-69876, November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 483, 492;
People v. Bausing , G.R. No. 64965, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 355, 364; People
v. Merabueno, G.R. No. 87179, December 14, 1994, 239 SCRA 197, 203-204.
27.Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code.
28.Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA
298, 327.
29.G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-667.
30.United States v. Lim San , 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

31.Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
32.Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
33.Article 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183652. February 25, 2015.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION,
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision 1 of

the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN.
The CA reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal
Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana,
Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's
failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private

respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with
Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold
Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, 3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of March 25, 2004
at Alson's Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating
liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March
26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte
and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside
said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL
OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA
while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her
against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels,

entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. 5
Following pre-trial, 6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John

Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:

On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school
graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother
to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to
perform for an election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the
plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a
graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan,
Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson's Palace, which was
merely a walking distance away from Gemeno's house. Outside the Alson's
Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second
floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo.
Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their
graduation, to which the rest agreed. HaECDI
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks —
two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle
for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass
containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At
first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before.
During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was
AAA's turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took
her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less
five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto's lap.
Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap.
This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face
with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that
time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot.
They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say,
"Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She
likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto's
lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the
Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to
refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell
asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the
stairs, and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she
saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that
place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep
and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she
saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having
intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in
her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana
was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop.
Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell
unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all
alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on
but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the
bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After
dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their
house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told
them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to
the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the
morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock
position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear
likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the
defense witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana,
Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemeno's house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to
attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson's Palace, owned by
the latter's family. When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that
they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about
11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson's Palace but could not
find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to
celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two
(2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana,

Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but
did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil
Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno
told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell
her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto's lap. She even
showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed
Batoctoy's crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then
approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the
same and AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other
again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola

was at the Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and
Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to
accompany her to Alson's Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to
the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oporto's lap. Fiel told AAA to
go home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the
eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then
went back to the lodging house.
After thirty minutes, they went to Alson's Palace again, and saw AAA and
Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck.
Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and
instead instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she
has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the
lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him,
"Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No.
4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a
single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked
at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed
her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Carampatana
likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA
and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in
between AAA's legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on
his shorts and went back to Alson's Palace to get some sleep. When he left,
Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA
saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem."
Alquizola thus started kissing AAA's breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his
pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and
Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had
intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson's
Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to
the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they
just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before
7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana,

Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It,
however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads: CAaSHI
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment

is hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him
to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay
AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer
a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum;
to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

as ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the
court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of
civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,

Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of
said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly

and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused

Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and
deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the
requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26

March 2004 and detained since then up to the present. Accused
Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained
since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise
surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the
custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and
subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17
September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an order
of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused
Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to

the CA. On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
reversing the trial court's ruling and, consequently, acquitted private
respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision
on appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED. 8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private

respondents' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the
version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress.
She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before
the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for
help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court
further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old
hymenal laceration on AAA's genitalia, giving the impression that she has had
some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA's
mother's unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to
her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her
child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for
Certiorari 9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private
respondents' conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 10
The private respondents present the following arguments in their

Comment dated November 7, 2008 to assail the petition: cEHITA
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY

AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON
THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL

OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES. 11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1,
2009. It assigns the following errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF

ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be
tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence
thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their
purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes
place, the rules should be liberally construed. 13 Liberal construction of the
rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or
suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation,
is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice
requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on sheer technicalities. 14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error

proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal
case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15 Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said
judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and
void. 16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner's prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. 17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the
Court said in People v. Santiago: 18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of
the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there
is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1,

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil
aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant. 19 acCTSE
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the
State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to
represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and
the CA is solely vested in the OSG. 20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the
instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved
party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain
the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in
the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in
Dela Rosa v. CA, 21 where the Court sustained the private offended party's right
in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the
validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General's
intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is
proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People of
the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner's cause in its Comment,
22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the
sake of argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without
violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for
petitioner's failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute
and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved. 24
Here, petitioner's case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the
same questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially
revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent
necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the
interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And,
as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due
process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion
when it is shown that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or
that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its
authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice. 25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse
of judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial
court's findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private
respondents' narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a

court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 26 There
is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes
beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. 27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden
of proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the

evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the
prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts 28 of the case
was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful
perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the
testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto, 29 Carampatana, 30 and
Alquizola, 31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate court
merely echoed the private respondents' testimonies, particularly those as to
the specific events that transpired during the crucial period — from the dinner
at Gemeno's house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As
a result, it presented the private respondents' account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently
utilized to support its ruling of acquittal. IDEHCa
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider

the entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. 32
It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of
the other. It cannot appreciate one party's cause and brush the other aside.
This rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties
tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but
the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA's
blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of
that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of
petitioner's right to due process. 33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of
the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the
whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never
cried out for help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters
the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time
of the assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is
committed —
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or

is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through
force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. 34 Here, the
accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could
handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the
latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private
respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed
to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical
resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy
by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. 35 The
appellate court never provided any reason why AAA's testimony should deserve
scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In
reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by
itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible.
Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped,
and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense,
the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the
accused is the complainant's testimony itself. 36 The trial court correctly ruled
that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened
herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying
the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing
experience. 37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated
her. She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters
still prevailed. The RTC found AAA's testimony simple and candid, indicating
that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her
answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and
straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. 38 Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep,
when did you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside

the bottle of Emperador Brandy. TAEDcS
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining
contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they
insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were
carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy
carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxx xxx xxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was
awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened
that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was
on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying don't because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he

sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO:
We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.
IATSHE
xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. GENERALAO:
May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO:
Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was
there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: I could not remember, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: After that, what happened?
A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw
Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don't.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found
Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you
said that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you
saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o'clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the
defense. It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and
incredible. 40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly
invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The
accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court
only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand,
catching the court by surprise. 41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that
when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between
him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden of
evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs
convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the
intercourse was indeed consensua1. 42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon
the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is
the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal
cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. 43 Burden of evidence
is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the
trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created
against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of
proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for
him of the issue in litigation. 44 However, when the accused alleges consensual
sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and
credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the
offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by
substantial evidence. 45 caCEDA
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of

AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them.
Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA
lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they
kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed
AAA's lower garments and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed
himself in between AAA's legs and had intercourse with her. 46 On the other
hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three
times. While Carampatana was removing AAA's shirt and brassiere, Oporto was
watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear,
and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes
down. When Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA,
according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis
so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola
on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and
again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he
woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with
AAA for the third and last time. 47 Despite said shameless admission, however,
the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance
on AAA's part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA
had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply
because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not
have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy
and exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the
accused after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. 48 To be
believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances. 49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great

weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses'
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than
the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. 50 Matters of
credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position
than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. 51 The
appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and
have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must
be given due deference. 52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to
show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact
of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed
conclusive and binding. 53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician
found old hymenal laceration on AAA's private organ. The lack of a fresh
hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual
encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the
fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina
becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration.
It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering
the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her
previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was
sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It
must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the
incident, having just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar
case, 54 the Court held:
. . . Indeed, no woman would have consented to have
sexual intercourse with two men — or three, according to Antonio
Gallardo — in the presence of each other, unless she were a
prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record
before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-
year high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her
testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her
youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why
Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime
charged. 55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and be subjected to
public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true. 56 And even if she were
indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove
that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of
loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim
of rape. The victim's moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this
case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered
unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex
with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman
against her consent. 57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential
elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape
cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the
vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a
conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of
the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape. 58 acCITS
Neither does AAA's mother's act of hitting her after learning about the
rape prove anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react
differently." 59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation,
and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 60 At most, it merely indicates
the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had
been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when
there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive
in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full
faith and credence. 61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she
still need to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept
it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the
act of making love with any of the private respondents, 62 nor was she shown to
have been in a relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved.
63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to
save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into
the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating
the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply
because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in
prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private
respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that
has been debased. 64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces
of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as
presented by AAA in support of her complaint, 65 contrary to common human
experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the
crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the
conspiracy because his participation in the crime was uncertain, 66 citing
People v. Lobrigo. 67 It found that his participation was not in furtherance of the
plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape. 68 The Court, however, finds that the
RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola's liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a
mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof
as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the
malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective
pursued in concert. 69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the
parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. 70
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to
Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on
material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were

carrying weapons during the mauling and whether they participated
in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that
they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is
not necessary. In this case, the rule is not applicable because
conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their
exact participation in the crime is uncertain. 71 (Emphasis Supplied)
I n People v. Dela Torre , 72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower
courts that there was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually
ravished the victim based on the testimony of the private complainant
that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and
that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and
fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held
liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the
three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the
young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA],
his tacit and spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her
towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent
the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he
was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime. 73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola's participation in

the crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging
House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and
furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto
and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the
bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA's lips, breasts,
and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of
any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally
guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as
mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, 74 he
waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the
whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon
to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the accused-appellant. 75 IcDHaT
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single
Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a
general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective. 76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting
duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary
knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for
his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Non-compliance with this rule is a
ground 78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a
motion to quash before he enters his plea, 79 otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived. 80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the
Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived
their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed
to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of
the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of. 81
There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they "took
turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004. 82
Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same
reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to
the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned
himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand,
Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty
for each offense. 83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable
for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with
conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of
the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of
rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted
his sexual organ into AAA's mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape
through sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the
Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape
through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or
more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B
of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset
the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
them, 84 for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty
upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion
perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of
prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the
maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the
Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape
committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, 87 which extends even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the
crime when he was still a child, 88 and provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows: 89
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may
be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR,
in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the

foregoing provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to
accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-
one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in
each case. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way
of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders
judgment: TASCDI
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly
and severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four
(4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its
appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the
execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
*
Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per

Special Order No. 1934 dated February 11, 2015.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Romulo V.

Borja and Mario V. Lopez; concurring; rollo, pp. 69-103.
2. Penned by Judge Jacob T. Malik; rollo, pp. 28-67.
3. In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 426; citing Rule on Violence Against
Women and their Children, Sec. 40; Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act," the real names of the rape
victims will not be disclosed. The Court will instead use fictitious initials to
represent them throughout the decision. The personal circumstances of the
victims or any other information tending to establish or compromise their
identities will likewise be withheld.
4. Records, pp. 39-40.
5. Id. at 58, 86, 157-162.

6. Id. at 157-172.
7. Rollo, pp. 66-67.
8. Id. at 102. (Emphasis in the original)

9. Id. at 3-27.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 241-242.
12. Id. at 292, 298.
13. Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. CA, G.R. No. 165155, April 13,
2010, 618 SCRA 181, 184.
14. Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22,
2010, 635 SCRA 637, 645.
15. M. GUBAT, THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 481

(3rd ed. 2009).
16. Id. at 481-482.
17. Goodland Company, Inc. v. Co and Chan, G.R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011,
662 SCRA 692, 701.
18. 255 Phil. 851 (1989).

19. People v. Santiago, supra, at 861-862. (Emphasis ours)
20. Bautista v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521, 534.
21. 323 Phil. 596 (1996).
22. Rollo, pp. 272-301.

23. Merciales v. CA, 429 Phil. 70, 79 (2002).
24. Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 323.
25. People v. CA, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012.
26. Yu v. Reyes Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.
27. Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in Chemplex
(Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, 156 Phil. 408, 457 (1974).
28. Rollo, pp. 72-78.
29. Id. at 38-41.
30. Id. at 46-48.

31. Id. at 42-43.
32. Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, 504 Phil. 242, 249 (2005).
33. Id.
34. People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 245, 255.
35. People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 712 (1999).
36. People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 453 (2001).
37. Rollo, p. 55.

38. Id.
39. Rollo, pp. 49-53.
40. Id. at 58-59.
41. Id. at 57-58.

42. People v. Alcober, G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 479, 488.
43. Timbal v. CA, 423 Phil. 617, 623 (2001).
44. People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 761, 772.
45. People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004).

46. Rollo, p. 48.
47. Id. at 40-41.
48. Id. at 60.
49. People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 553.
50. People v. Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 335, 349.
51. Valbueco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA
57, 77.
52. People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 412, 421.
53. People v. Apattad, supra note 50, at 350.

54. People v. Soriano, 146 Phil. 585 (1970).
55. Id. at 589. (Emphasis ours)
56. People v. Zabala, 456 Phil. 237, 243.
57. People v. Baluya, 430 Phil. 349, 363 (2002).

58. People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).
59. People v. Buenviaje, 408 Phil. 342, 346 (2001).
60. People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698, 714 (2003).

61. People v. Balya, supra note 57.
62. People v. Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 185, 192.
63. People v. Ramos, 467 Phil. 376, 389 (2004).
64. People v. Baluya, supra note 57, at 364.

65. Chemplex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, supra note 27.
66. Rollo, p. 63.
67. 410 Phil. 283, 291 (2001).
68. Rollo, p. 62.

69. People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 722-723 (1968).
70. People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 527.
71. People v. Jabonera, supra note 67. (Emphasis ours)
72. 588 Phil. 937 (2008).

73. People v. Dela Torre, supra, at 943. (Citations omitted)
74. Rollo, p. 81.
75. Supra note 44.
76. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 13.

77. Supra note 15, at 90.
78. Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
xxx xxx xxx
79. Section 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea, the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information.
80. People v. Lucena, 408 Phil. 172, 191 (2001).
81. Supra note 15, at 91; citing Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 9th
ed., p. 271.
82. Supra note 4.

83. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Section 3.
84. Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. 3.
85. Revised Penal Code, Art. 64 (2).
86. People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.

87. Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL
UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
88. People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011.
89. People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159517-18. June 30, 2009.]
HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN , petitioners, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS (BSP), and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION (PDIC), respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan (petitioners) appeal

by certiorari the August 5, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649.
The antecedents.
Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the
President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21,
1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank,
petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan
applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J.
Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each, when in
fact they did not.
Accordingly, on May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia
charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, with
violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General
Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of
the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI
Rules). The inculpatory portion of the Information reads: CSEHIa
That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in his capacity as
President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan
with Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch amounting to Php15
million, without the consent and written approval of the majority of the
directors of the bank, by using the name of one depositor VIRGILIO J.
MALANG of San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said
loan, and once in possession of the said amount of Php14,775,000.00,
net of interest converted the same to his own personal use and benefit,
in flagrant violation of the said law. 2
On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial

document was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan, viz.:

That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel,
Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by
direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and
taking advantage of their position as President of Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank of San Miguel-San
Miguel Branch, a duly organized banking institutions under Philippine
Laws, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, willfully and feloniously falsify loan documents
consisting of loan application/information sheet, and promissory note
dated June 27, 1997, disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction,
credit proposal report, manager' s check no. 06514 dated June 27,
1997 and undated RBSM-San Miguel Branch check voucher, by making
it appear that one VIRGILIO J. MALANG filed the aforementioned
documents when in truth and in fact, VIRGILIO J. MALANG did not
participate in the execution of said loan document and that by virtue of
said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the
accused credited the loan proceeds of the loan amounting to
Php14,775,000.00, net of interest, to the account of VIRGILIO J.
MALANG with the RBSM and thereafter converted the same amount to
their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its creditors and the
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas in the amount of Php14,775,000.00. ECTIcS
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and

1720-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge
Petrita Braga Dime.
Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as
amended, was filed against Soriano, this time, covering the P15,000,000.00
loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol. The information reads:
That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in his capacity as
President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan
with Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a domestic rural
ba[n]king institution created, organized and existing under Philippine
laws, amounting to Php15.0 million, knowing fully well that the same
has been done by him without the written approval of the majority of
[the] board of directors of the said bank and which consent and
approval the said accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the
same upon the record of said banking institution and to transmit a copy
of which to the supervising department of the said bank, as required by
the General Banking Act, by using the name of one depositor ROGELIO
MAÑAOL of San Jose, San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of
the said loan, and once in possession of the said amount of Php15.0
million, converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, in
flagrant violation of the said law. 4
TIHDAa
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for obtaining said loan. Thus:
That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel,
Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
a c c u s e d HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as
principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their position as President of Rural
Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank of San
Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a duly organized banking institutions under
Philippine Laws, conspiring confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully and feloniously falsify loan
documents consisting of loan application/information sheet and
promissory note dated August 21, 1997, by making it appear that one
ROGELIO MAÑAOL filled up the application/information sheet and
filed the aforementioned loan documents when in truth and in fact,
ROGELIO MAÑAOL did not participate in the execution of said loan
document and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and
intent to cause damage, the accused succeeded in securing a loan in
the amount of Php15.0 million, from Rural Bank of San Miguel-San
Miguel Branch in the name of ROGELIO MAÑAOL, which amount of
Php15.0 million representing loan proceeds the accused deposited to
the account of ROGELIO MAÑAOL maintained with Rural Bank of San
Miguel and thereafter converted the same amount to their own
personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural
Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its creditors, the Bangko
Sentral Ng Pilipinas and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation in
the amount of Php15.0 million.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively,

and were raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
caSEAH
Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case Nos.

1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 (pending before Branch 14), and also in
Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000 (pending with Branch
77), on grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically, petitioners argued
that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano
was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further
argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an
offense.
In an Order 6 dated November 15, 2000, RTC Branch 77 denied the
motion to quash. Rejecting petitioners' arguments, it held:
Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that the complaint or information must charge but only one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses. Under this Rule, the
Information is defective when it charges two (2) or more offenses. The
rule enjoining the charging of two (2) or more offenses in one
information has for its aim to give the defendant the necessary
knowledge of the charge to enable him to prove his defense (People vs.
Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234, cited in Herrera Remedial Law IV., p. 72). While
Section 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Ru les of Court provides as one
of the grounds where the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information, considering Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules as
aforestated, it is apparent that the said ground refers to a situation
where the accused is being charged in one information or criminal
complaint for more than one offense. The record shows that two (2)
Informations were filed against the herein accused, one in Criminal
Case No. 1980-M-2000 against accused Hilario P. Soriano for Violation
of Sec. 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended by PD 1795, and another one in
Criminal Case No. 1981-M-2000 against accused Hilario P. Soriano and
Rosalinda Ilagan for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents. Thus, each Information charges only one offense. DcTAIH
Even assuming that the two (2) cases arose from the same facts,
if they violate two (2) or more provisions of the law, a prosecution
under one will not bar a prosecution under another (Pp. vs. Tac-an, 182
SCRA 601; Lamera v. Court of Appeals , 198 SCRA 186, cited in Herrera
Criminal Procedure, Vol. 4, p. 453).
Upon the foregoing, this Court finds that there is no basis to

quash the Informations filed in these two (2) cases as the accused are
being charged therein with only one offense in each Information. As to
the assertion of the accused that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, this Court finds that the allegations of both parties are
evidentiary and the same can only be determined after a full blown
trial on the merits of these cases where both parties will be given a
chance to present their evidence in support of their respective
positions.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DISMISSED and the

arraignment of both accused and the pre-trial of these cases scheduled
on December 4, 2000 at 10:00 o' clock in the morning, shall proceed as
scheduled. 7 CIAcSa
Petitioners' motion to quash informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-

M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 before Branch 14 likewise suffered the same fate,
as Judge Braga Dime denied the same in an Order 8 dated November 27,
2000, holding that:
Duplicity in criminal pleading is the joinder of two or more distinct
and separate offenses in the same court of an indictment or
information. (41 Am. Jur. 2d 1011). Whether two offenses are charged
in an information, or otherwise, must not be made to depend upon the
evidence presented at the trial court but upon the facts alleged in the
information (Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI , 79 Phil. 165).
Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes
provided by law and the offense is alleged to have been committed in
two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient. The
allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the
offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and
the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness
(Jurado v. Suy Yan , L-30714, April 30, 1971) SEIDAC
A perusal of the criminal information filed in the above-entitled

cases indubitably show that each information charges only but one
offense. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 1719-M-2000, Accused Hilario P.
Soriano is charged only with violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337, as
amended by PD 1796, while in Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000,
Accused Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan are charged only with
Estafa thru falsification of commercial document.
On the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an

offense
xxx xxx xxx
[b]y simply reading the information filed against the Accused

Hilario P. Soriano, in Crim. Case No. 1719-M-2000 it is clear that the
allegations, which is hypothetically admitted by said accused, in the
same information set out an offense for violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337
as amended by PD No. 1795. CIcTAE
Finally, Accused, in addition to the two (2) grounds aforesaid,

cited prematurity and lack of probable cause which would warrant the
quashal of the two (2) informations.
These additional grounds relied upon by the Accused for the

quashal of the two (2) informations must necessarily fail because they
are not one of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rul es of Court which this Court shall not consider, in
accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash, dated

September 1, 2000 filed by both Accused is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit. ETCcSa
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the

Orders of Branch 77 and Branch 14. The petitions were docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649. By decision 10 of August 5, 2003, the CA, which
priorly consolidated the petitions, sustained the denial of petitioners'
separate motions to quash:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, these
petitions are DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED. The
assailed Orders dated November 15, 2000 and February 12, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case
Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, entitled, "People of the
Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and People of the Philippines vs.
Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan ", respectively, in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 64648 and the Orders dated November 27, 2000 and March 9,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan in
Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and People of the Philippines vs.
Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan ", respectively, in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 64649 are affirmed. 11 AHCcET
Petitioners are now before this Court, submitting for resolution the
same matters argued before the RTC and the CA. They insist that RTC
Branch 14 and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying their motions to
quash informations. Thus, they posit that the CA committed reversible error
in dismissing their petitions for certiorari.
The appeal should be denied.
The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes
capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious,
usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful
and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative. 12 DHITcS
We reviewed the records before us, and we discerned no caprice or

arbitrariness on the part of the RTC in denying the motions.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the
ground that more than one (1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano
was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification
of commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they
claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be
quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to
quash the Information under Section 3 (e), Rule 117 13 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information
to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. 14
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that
charges more than one offense. 15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of Offense. — A complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single

Information charges more than one offense. 16 HcSCED
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information
charging more than one offense, but with more than one information, each
charging a different offense — violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other
hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one
offense only, because all the charges filed against him proceed from and are
based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that
he cannot be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document,
considering that he is already being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
TDcCIS
The contention has no merit.

Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident
might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, 17
thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People, 18 this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple
charges against the accused, held:
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that
a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution
of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is
the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense ." In People v.
Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same
act are not "the same" — DSETac
. . . if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional

fact or element which the other does not, . . . . Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against

petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with
settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are

differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the
failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling
requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer,
stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e., lack of written
approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such
approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP
supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud
or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for
estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges
against Soriano was, therefore, proper. IDATCE
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the

informations, contending that the same do not constitute an offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on
Section 3 (a), 19 Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the offense charged as defined by law. 20 The trial court may not consider a
situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under
the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the
offense. 21 DACaTI
We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material
allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the
informations alleged that Soriano was the president of RBSMI, while Ilagan
was then its general manager; that during their tenure, Soriano, with the
direct participation of Ilagan, and by using the names of Virgilio Malang and
Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain loans without complying with
the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in
violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337 22 as amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge
petitioners with estafa thru falsification of commercial document. They
allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio
Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not
in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the promissory
notes and other bank records. CHDTEA
The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements
of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) 23 of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods
or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender,
or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is
demand made by the offended party to the offender.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further
alleged the following essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) 24
of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means — that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage. The informations in Criminal Case Nos.
1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed
against petitioners. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motions.

In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash
an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to
enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. 25 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have
gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to
quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case
that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari.
Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition. EATCcI
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. EASIHa
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired), with Associate

Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice) and Rosmari D.
Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 57-67.
2. Id. at 211-212.
3. Id. at 214-215.
4. Id. at 71.
5. Id. at 68-69.
6. Id. at 93-97.
7. Id. at 96-97.
8. Id. at 240-243.
9. Id. at 241-243.
10. Supra note 1.
11. Id. at 66-67.
12. Torres v. Abundo, Sr., G.R. No. 174263, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 564,
565.
13. Sec. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
xxx xxx xxx
(e) That more than one (1) offense is charged except in those cases in which
the existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx xxx xxx
14. Loney v. People , G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 194, 209.
15. Id. at 208.
16. Id.
17. Loney v. People, supra, See Nierras v. Dacuycuy , G.R. Nos. 59568-76, 11
January 1990, 181 SCRA 1; People v. Doriquez , 133 Phil. 295 (1968); People
v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472 (1923); People v. Cabrera , 43 Phil. 64 (1922); United
States v. Capurro, et al., 7 Phil. 24 (1906).
18. Supra at 209-210, 212.
19. Section 3. Grounds . — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
20. Caballero v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 137355-58, September 25, 2007, 534
SCRA 30, 43.
21. Torres v. Hon. Garchitorena , 442 Phil. 765, 777 (2002).

22. Sec. 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly
or indirectly, for himself or as the representative or agent of other, borrow
any of the deposits of funds of such banks, nor shall he become a guarantor,
indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or in any manner be
an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it, except with the
written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, excluding the
director concerned. Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of
the corporation and a copy of such entry shall be transmitted forthwith to the
Superintendent of Banks. The office of any director or officer of a bank who
violates the provisions of this section shall immediately become vacant and
the director or officer shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one
year nor more than ten years and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor
more than ten thousand pesos.
The Monetary Board may regulate the amount of credit accommodations that
may be extended, directly or indirectly, by banking institutions to their
directors, officers, or stockholders. However, the outstanding credit
accommodations which a bank may extend to each of its stockholders
owning two per cent (2%) or more of the subscribed capital stock, its
directors, or its officers, shall be limited to an amount equivalent to the
respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital
contribution in the bank: Provided, however, That loans and advances to
officers in the form of fringe benefits granted in accordance with rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board shall not be subject
to the preceding limitation.
23. ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxx xxx xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,

goods, or any personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.
24. ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts

executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess, power,

influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx

25. Sasot v. People, G.R. No. 143193, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 138, 145.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135808. October 6, 2008.]
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.

INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S. RECTO,
RENE S. VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA,
FRANCISCO ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY and SANTIAGO
TANCHAN, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Decision, 1 dated 20 August 1998, rendered by the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) from taking cognizance of or initiating any
action against the respondent corporation Interport Resources Corporation
(IRC) and members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel S. Recto,
Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, Antonio Reina, Francisco Anonuevo, Joseph
Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act. In the same Decision of the appellate court, all the
proceedings taken against the respondents, including the assailed SEC
Omnibus Orders of 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995, were declared void.
HDCAaS
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.

On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a
Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the
Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of
Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), 2 which would own and operate a 102
megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement also
stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with
National Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-generating barge
was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-September of 1994. In
exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC
amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44
million. 3
On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of
Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate
property in Makati. Under the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont
Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall extend or arrange a loan required to
pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. 4
IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the
approval of the agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the
Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the
SEC could not receive it. Upon the advice of the SEC, the IRC sent the press
release on the morning of 9 August 1994. 5
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors,
respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider
information. On 16 August 1994, the SEC Chairman issued a directive
requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed all principal officers
of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department
(BED) of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately disclose the
information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. 6
In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter
dated 16 August 1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto copies of the
Memorandum of Agreement. Its directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and
Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the SEC on 22 August 1994 to explain
IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material information as required
under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. 7 SCaIcA
On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that

IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the
Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its
negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the
officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in
violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities
Act. 8
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994,
which was superseded by an Amended Omnibus Motion, filed on 18 October
1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority to investigate the subject
matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, 9 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon
the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC. Respondents
also claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered
that the respondents appear before the SEC and "show cause why no
administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them", and,
thus, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents. Lastly, they sought to
have their cases tried jointly given the identical factual situations
surrounding the alleged violation committed by the respondents. 10
Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24
October 1994, wherein they moved for discontinuance of the investigations
and the proceedings before the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and
the investigating officials had become reasonably free from prejudice and
public pressure. 11
No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the
aforementioned motions, but on 25 January 1995, the SEC issued an
Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same in this wise: 12
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the
Commission resolves and hereby rules:
1. To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide
the instant case in accordance with the Rules of Practice and
Procedure Before the Prosecution and Enforcement Department
(PED), Securities and Exchange Commission, to be composed of
Attys. James K. Abugan, Medardo Devera (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department), and Jose Aquino (Brokers and Exchanges
Department), which is hereby directed to expeditiously resolve the
case by conducting continuous hearings, if possible. EIcTAD
2. To recall the show cause orders dated September 19,

1994 requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why no
administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them.
3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 13
questioning the creation of the special investigating panel to hear the case
and the denial of the Motion for Continuance. The SEC denied
reconsideration in its Omnibus Order dated 30 March 1995. 14
The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals docketed
as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, questioning the Omnibus Orders dated 25 January
1995 and 30 March 1995. 15 During the proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, respondents filed a Supplemental Motion 16 dated 16 May 1995,
wherein they prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating and proceeding with the
hearing of the case against respondents herein. On 5 May 1995, the Court of
Appeals granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction,
which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative case against the respondents herein. 17
On 23 October 1995, the SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC
Omnibus Orders so that the case may be investigated by the PED in
accordance with the SEC Rules and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not
by the special body whose creation the SEC had earlier ordered. 18 EaTCSA
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision 19 on 20 August 1998. It

determined that there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding
disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities
Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise
noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any
suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may
possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due
process and equal protection. It further resolved that absent any
implementing rules, the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed
Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of re-filing the same case against the
respondents. 20
The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice and
Procedure Before the PED, which took effect on 14 April 1990, did not
comply with the statutory requirements contained in the Administrative
Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the Rules of Practice and Procedure
Before the PED affords a party the right to be present but without the right to
cross-examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of Section 12
(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code. 21
In the dispositive portion of its Decision, dated 20 August 1998, the
Court of Appeals ruled that: 22
WHEREFORE, [herein petitioner SEC's] Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders is hereby DENIED. The petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is GRANTED. Consequently, all
proceedings taken against [herein respondents] in this case, including
the Omnibus Orders of January 25, 1995 and March 30, 1995 are
declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby made permanent and, accordingly, [SEC] is hereby
prohibited from taking cognizance or initiating any action, be
they civil, criminal, or administrative against [respondents] with
respect to Sections 8 (Procedure for Registration), 30 (Insider's duty
to disclose when trading) and 36 (Directors, Officers and Principal
Stockholders) in relation to Sections 46 (Administrative sanctions) 56
(Penalties) 44 (Liabilities of Controlling persons) and 45
(Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses) of the
Revised Securities Act and Section 144 (Violations of the Code) of the
Corporation Code. (Emphasis provided.) DSHcTC
The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution 23 issued on 30 September 1998.
Hence, the present petition, which relies on the following grounds: 24
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO QUASH THE ASSAILED SEC OMNIBUS ORDERS
DATED JANUARY 25 AND MARCH 30, 1995.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO
STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR PETITIONER SEC TO
INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT CORPORATION AND ITS
DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO
DISCLOSED [sic] WHEN TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND
PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND THE SICD RULES
OF PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS 25 ARE
INVALID AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted that while
this case was pending in this Court, Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known
as the Securities Regulation Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was
already repealed as provided for in Section 76 of the Securities Regulation
Code: cSIADH
SEC. 76. Repealing Clause . — The Revised Securities Act

(Batas Pambansa Blg. 178), as amended, in its entirety, and Sections
2, 4 and 8 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, are hereby
repealed. All other laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the
Securities Regulation Code has taken the place of the Revised Securities Act.
The Court now proceeds with a discussion of the present case.
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act do not require the
enactment of implementing rules to
make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or
administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents without
violating their right to due process and equal protection, citing as its basis
the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 26 This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may
concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds
these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that every law has in
its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of
the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding for all intents and purposes. 27 The mere absence of implementing
rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given. In People v. Rosenthal,
28 this Court ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule

that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of
uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will
support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and
ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to
secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense
and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the
instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of
those intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)
HDTSIE
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 29 the Court underlined the

importance of the presumption of validity of laws and the careful
consideration with which the judiciary strikes down as invalid acts of the
legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments
are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department
a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory
is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to
make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers'
providing general regulations for various and varying details of
management. 30 To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render
ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would
empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying
the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating
to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to
fully know. 31 It is well established that administrative authorities have the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and
to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry
into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules
and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative
or deviate from the mandate of the statute. 32 Moreover, where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no
impediment to its implementation. cHSIDa
The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 33

shows a glaring error. In the cited case, this Court found unconstitutional an
ordinance which gave the board of supervisors authority to refuse
permission to carry on laundries located in buildings that were not made of
brick and stone, because it violated the equal protection clause and was
highly discriminatory and hostile to Chinese residents and not because the
standards provided therein were vague or ambiguous.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity inSections
30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, such that the acts proscribed
and/or required would not be understood by a person of ordinary
intelligence.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads:
Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading . — (a)
It shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer,
if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer or
the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider
proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party to
the transaction (or his agent) is identified, (a) the insider proves that
the other party knows it, or (b) that other party in fact knows it from
the insider or otherwise.
(b) "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer
of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former
relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special
significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally
available, or (4) a person who learns such a fact from any of the
foregoing insiders as defined in this subsection, with knowledge that
the person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider.
(c) A fact is "of special significance" if (a) in addition to
being material it would be likely, on being made generally available,
to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) a
reasonable person would consider it especially important under the
circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of such
factors as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference
from information generally available previously, and its nature and
reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in
subsection (b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he knows of a fact of
special significance by virtue of his being an insider.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of
nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct.
The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud, committed
when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed
investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other
party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to
disclose or abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone; and second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing. 34 CSEHcT
In the United States (U.S.), the obligation to disclose or abstain has

been traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders", particularly officers,
directors, or controlling stockholders, but that definition has since been
expanded. 35 The term "insiders" now includes persons whose relationship or
former relationship to the issuer gives or gave them access to a fact of
special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally
available, and one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the
person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders have the
duty to disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which,
if known, would affect their investment judgment. In some cases, however,
there may be valid corporate reasons for the nondisclosure of material
information. Where such reasons exist, an issuer's decision not to make any
public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as a violation of insider
trading. At the same time, the undisclosed information should not be
improperly used for non-corporate purposes, particularly to disadvantage
other persons with whom an insider might transact, and therefore the insider
must abstain from entering into transactions involving such securities. 36
Respondents further aver that under Section 30 of the Revised
Securities Act, the SEC still needed to define the following terms: "material
fact", "reasonable person", "nature and reliability" and "generally
available". 37 In determining whether or not these terms are vague, these
terms must be evaluated in the context of Section 30 of the Revised
Securities Act. To fully understand how the terms were used in the
aforementioned provision, a discussion of what the law recognizes as a fact
of special significance is required, since the duty to disclose such fact or to
abstain from any transaction is imposed on the insider only in connection
with a fact of special significance.
Under the law, what is required to be disclosed is a fact of "special
significance" which may be (a) a material fact which would be likely, on
being made generally available, to affect the market price of a security to a
significant extent, or (b) one which a reasonable person would consider
especially important in determining his course of action with regard to the
shares of stock. TCDHaE
(a) Material Fact — The concept of a "material fact" is not a new

one. As early as 1973, the Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by
Corporations Whose Securities Are Listed In Any Stock Exchange or
Registered/Licensed Under the Securities Act, issued by the SEC on 29
January 1973, explained that "[a] fact is material if it induces or tends to
induce or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of its securities." Thus,
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act provides that if a fact affects the
sale or purchase of securities, as well as its price, then the insider would be
required to disclose such information to the other party to the transaction
involving the securities. This is the first definition given to a "fact of special
significance".
(b.1) Reasonable Person — The second definition given to a fact
of special significance involves the judgment of a "reasonable person".
Contrary to the allegations of the respondents, a "reasonable person" is not
a problematic legal concept that needs to be clarified for the purpose of
giving effect to a statute; rather, it is the standard on which most of our
legal doctrines stand. The doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the
"reasonable man" as the standard. 38 A purchaser in good faith must also
take into account facts which put a "reasonable man" on his guard. 39 In
addition, it is the belief of the reasonable and prudent man that an offense
was committed that sets the criteria for probable cause for a warrant of
arrest. 40 This Court, in such cases, differentiated the reasonable and
prudent man from "a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or
a judge", and identified him as "the average man on the street", who weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have in abundance.
41 In the same vein, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly determined its
standards by the actual significance in the deliberations of a "reasonable
investor", when it ruled in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 42 that the
determination of materiality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences
a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him." EcTDCI
(b.2) Nature and Reliability — The factors affecting the second

definition of a "fact of special significance", which is of such importance that
it is expected to affect the judgment of a reasonable man, were substantially
lifted from a test of materiality pronounced in the case In the Matter of
Investors Management Co., Inc.: 43
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether
information is material under this test are the degree of its specificity,
the extent to which it differs from information previously publicly
disseminated, and its reliability in light of its nature and source and
the circumstances under which it was received.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the "nature and reliability" of a
significant fact in determining the course of action a reasonable person
takes regarding securities must be clearly viewed in connection with the
particular circumstances of a case. To enumerate all circumstances that
would render the "nature and reliability" of a fact to be of special
significance is close to impossible. Nevertheless, the proper adjudicative
body would undoubtedly be able to determine if facts of a certain "nature
and reliability" can influence a reasonable person's decision to retain, sell or
buy securities, and thereafter explain and justify its factual findings in its
decision.
(c) Materiality Concept — A discussion of the "materiality
concept" would be relevant to both a material fact which would affect the
market price of a security to a significant extent and/or a fact which a
reasonable person would consider in determining his or her cause of action
with regard to the shares of stock. Significantly, what is referred to in our
laws as a fact of special significance is referred to in the U.S. as the
"materiality concept" and the latter is similarly not provided with a precise
definition. In Basic v. Levinson, 44 the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against
confining materiality to a rigid formula, stating thus:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that
requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances.
But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the
purposes of the Securities Act and Congress' policy decisions. Any
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as
materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive. DIEACH
Moreover, materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of

both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." 45 In
drafting the Securities Act of 1934, the U.S. Congress put emphasis on the
limitations to the definition of materiality:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be
desirable to have absolute certainty in the application of the
materiality concept, it is its view that such a goal is illusory and
unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature and
it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula.
The Committee's advice to the [SEC] is to avoid this quest for
certainty and to continue consideration of materiality on a
case-by-case basis as disclosure problems are identified.
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (Comm.Print
1977). (Emphasis provided.) 46
(d) Generally Available — Section 30 of the Revised Securities
Act allows the insider the defense that in a transaction of securities, where
the insider is in possession of facts of special significance, such information
is "generally available" to the public. Whether information found in a
newspaper, a specialized magazine, or any cyberspace media be sufficient
for the term "generally available" is a matter which may be adjudged given
the particular circumstances of the case. The standards cannot remain at a
standstill. A medium, which is widely used today was, at some previous point
in time, inaccessible to most. Furthermore, it would be difficult to
approximate how the rules may be applied to the instant case, where
investigation has not even been started. Respondents failed to allege that
the negotiations of their agreement with GHB were made known to the
public through any form of media for there to be a proper appreciation of the
issue presented.
Section 36 (a) of the Revised Securities Act
As regards Section 36 (a) of the Revised Securities Act, respondents
claim that the term "beneficial ownership" is vague and that it requires
implementing rules to give effect to the law. Section 36 (a) of the Revised
Securities Act is a straightforward provision that imposes upon (1) a
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security
or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to
submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer's securities
and such changes in his or her ownership thereof. The said provision reads:
EICSDT
Sec. 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders .

— (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than ten per centum of any [class] of any equity security
which is registered pursuant to this Act, or who is [a] director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the
registration of such security on a securities exchange or by the
effective date of a registration statement or within ten days after he
becomes such a beneficial owner, director or officer, a statement with
the Commission and, if such security is registered on a securities
exchange, also with the exchange, of the amount of all equity
securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and
within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall
file with the Commission, and if such security is registered on a
securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange, a statement
indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar
month. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 36 (a) refers to the "beneficial owner". Beneficial owner has been
defined in the following manner:
[F]irst, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property
(also called "equitable ownership"); and second, to refer to the power
of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the
shareholder is not registered in the corporation's books as the owner.
Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked ownership,
which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership,
as against possession of the bare title to property. 47
Even assuming that the term "beneficial ownership" was vague, it would not
affect respondents' case, where the respondents are directors and/or officers
of the corporation, who are specifically required to comply with the
reportorial requirements under Section 36 (a) of the Revised Securities Act.
The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 48 IaEHSD
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to

promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent unscrupulous
individuals, who by their positions obtain non-public information, from taking
advantage of an uninformed public. No individual would invest in a market
which can be manipulated by a limited number of corporate insiders. Such
reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities market. To
avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities
Act prevented the unfair use of non-public information in securities
transactions, while Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions
entered into by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities of
their companies.
In the case In the Matter of Investor's Management Co., 49 it was
cautioned that "the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions", which
include the provisions on insider trading, should not be "circumscribed by
fine distinctions and rigid classifications." The ambit of anti-fraud provisions
is necessarily broad so as to embrace the infinite variety of deceptive
conduct. 50
In Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, 51 this Court brushed
aside a contention, similar to that made by the respondents in this case, that
certain words or phrases used in a statute do not set determinate standards,
declaring that:
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable",
"declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as
they do not set determinate and determinable standards. This
stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary
meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of
reasonable intelligence. . . . . The fear of petitioners that these words
will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is
thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of
similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
Among the words or phrases that this Court upheld as valid standards were
"simplicity and dignity", 52 "public interest", 53 and "interests of law and
order". 54
The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February 1982. The

fact that the Full Disclosure Rules were promulgated by the SEC only on 24
July 1996 does not render ineffective in the meantime Section 36 of the
Revised Securities Act. It is already unequivocal that the Revised Securities
Act requires full disclosure and the Full Disclosure Rules were issued to make
the enforcement of the law more consistent, efficient and effective. It is
equally reasonable to state that the disclosure forms later provided by the
SEC, do not, in any way imply that no compliance was required before the
forms were provided. The effectivity of a statute which imposes reportorial
requirements cannot be suspended by the issuance of specified forms,
especially where compliance therewith may be made even without such
forms. The forms merely made more efficient the processing of requirements
already identified by the statute. cEAIHa
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake
when it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be
had against the respondents in connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing rules. These
provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. Their
requirements are specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable. In particular, Section 8 55 of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration of
securities and the particular matters which need to be reported in the
registration statement thereof. The Decision, dated 20 August 1998,
provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC from such
requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity
of these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to
prevent the SEC from exercising its authority to investigate respondents for
violation of Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act.
II. The right to cross-examination is not
absolute and cannot be demanded
during investigative proceedings
before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals
pronounced that the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure was invalid since
Section 8, Rule V 56 thereof failed to provide for the parties' right to cross-
examination, in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987 particularly
Section 12 (3), Chapter 3, Book VII thereof. This ruling is incorrect.
Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure,
categorically stated that the proceedings before the PED are summary in
nature:
Section 4. Nature of Proceedings. — Subject to the
requirements of due process, proceedings before the "PED" shall be
summary in nature not necessarily adhering to or following the
technical rules of evidence obtaining in the courts of law. The Rules of
Court may apply in said proceedings in suppletory character
whenever practicable. DSEaHT
Rule V of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure further specified

that:
Section 5. Submission of Documents. — During the
preliminary conference/hearing, or immediately thereafter, the
Hearing Officer may require the parties to simultaneously submit
their respective verified position papers accompanied by all
supporting documents and the affidavits of their witnesses, if any
which shall take the place of their direct testimony. The parties shall
furnish each other with copies of the position papers together with
the supporting affidavits and documents submitted by them.
Section 6. Determination of necessity of hearing. —
Immediately after the submission by the parties of their position
papers and supporting documents, the Hearing Officer shall
determine whether there is a need for a formal hearing. At this stage,
he may, in his discretion, and for the purpose of making such
determination, elicit pertinent facts or information, including
documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness to complete,
as far as possible, the facts of the case. Facts or information so
elicited may serve as basis for his clarification or simplifications of the
issues in the case. Admissions and stipulation of facts to abbreviate
the proceedings shall be encouraged.
Section 7. Disposition of Case. — If the Hearing Officer finds
no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their
position papers and supporting documents, he shall so inform the
parties stating the reasons therefor and shall ask them to
acknowledge the fact that they were so informed by signing the
minutes of the hearing and the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.
As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may require the
parties to submit their respective verified position papers, together with all
supporting documents and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing was not
mandatory; it was within the discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine
whether there was a need for a formal hearing. Since, according to the
foregoing rules, the holding of a hearing before the PED is discretionary, then
the right to cross-examination could not have been demanded by either
party.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code, entitled "Adjudication", does not affect the
investigatory functions of the agencies. The law creating the PED, Section 8
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, defines the authority granted
to the PED, thus: caIDSH
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall

have, subject to the Commission's control and supervision, the
exclusive authority to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio,
any act or omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees of corporations,
or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders,
officers or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or
representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations
administered and enforced by the Commission; to file and
prosecute in accordance with law and rules and regulations issued
by the Commission and in appropriate cases, the corresponding
criminal or civil case before the Commission or the proper court or
body upon prima facie finding of violation of any laws or rules and
regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; and to
perform such other powers and functions as may be provided by law
or duly delegated to it by the Commission. (Emphasis provided.)
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and
regulations promulgated by the SEC and to file and prosecute such cases. It
fails to mention any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is concerned.
Thus, the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure need not comply with the
provisions of the Administrative Code on adjudication, particularly Section 12
(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 57 this Court sets out the
distinction between investigative and adjudicative functions, thus:
"Investigate", commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely;
inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into" xx to subject to
an official probe xx: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of an
investigation, of course is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or
track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry"; "to inquire; to make an investigation",
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2
Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."
"Adjudicate", commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle.
The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to
pass judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."
In a legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise
of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge
in its strictest sense"; and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
There is no merit to the respondent's averment that the sections under
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, do not distinguish between
investigative and adjudicatory functions. Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code, is unequivocally entitled "Adjudication".
Respondents insist that the PED performs adjudicative functions, as
enumerated under Section 1 (h) and (j), Rule II; and Section 2 (4), Rule VII of
the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department is primarily charged with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Suspends or revokes, after proper notice and hearing in
accordance with these Rules, the franchise or certificate of
registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of
the following grounds:
1. Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation

can do or is doing to the great prejudice of or damage to the
general public; TAaEIc
3. Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of

the Commission restraining commission of acts which would
amount to a grave violation of its franchise;
xxx xxx xxx

(j) Imposes charges, fines and fees, which by law, it is
authorized to collect;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. Powers of the Hearing Officer . — The Hearing
Officer shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
4. To cite and/or declare any person in direct or indirect
contempt in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court. ACaTIc
Even assuming that these are adjudicative functions, the PED, in the
instant case, exercised its investigative powers; thus, respondents do not
have the requisite standing to assail the validity of the rules on adjudication.
A valid source of a statute or a rule can only be contested by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 58 In the instant case,
respondents are only being investigated by the PED for their alleged failure
to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into by
its directors involving IRC shares. The respondents have not shown
themselves to be under any imminent danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the exercise of adjudicative functions by the SEC. They
are not being or about to be subjected by the PED to charges, fees or fines;
to citations for contempt; or to the cancellation of their certificate of
registration under Section 1 (h), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
To repeat, the only powers which the PED was likely to exercise over
the respondents were investigative in nature, to wit:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department is primarily charged with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Initiates proper investigation of corporations and partnerships or
persons, their books, records and other properties and assets,
involving their business transactions, in coordination with the
operating department involved;
xxx xxx xxx

e. Files and prosecutes civil or criminal cases before the
Commission and other courts of justice involving violations of
laws and decrees enforced by the Commission and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder; caAICE
f. Prosecutes erring directors, officers and stockholders of

corporations and partnerships, commercial paper issuers or
persons in accordance with the pertinent rules on procedures;
The authority granted to the PED under Section 1 (b), (e), and (f), Rule
II of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, need not comply with Section
12, Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code, which affects only the
adjudicatory functions of administrative bodies. Thus, the PED would still be
able to investigate the respondents under its rules for their alleged failure to
disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into by its
directors involving IRC shares.
This is not to say that administrative bodies performing adjudicative
functions are required to strictly comply with the requirements of Chapter 3,
Rule VII of the Administrative Code, particularly, the right to cross-
examination. It should be noted that under Section 2.2 of Executive Order
No. 26, issued on 7 October 1992, abbreviated proceedings are prescribed in
the disposition of administrative cases:
2. Abbreviation of Proceedings. All administrative agencies
are hereby directed to adopt and include in their respective Rules of
Procedure the following provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
2.2 Rules adopting, unless otherwise provided by special
laws and without prejudice to Section 12, Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the mandatory use of affidavits in lieu of
direct testimonies and the preferred use of depositions whenever
practicable and convenient.
As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, such as the National Labor Relations Commission and the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, created under laws which
authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence. 59 In fact, the hearings before
such agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings. 60 Thus, it is not
necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be
cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require otherwise
would negate the summary nature of the administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings. 61 In Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation
v. Factoran, Jr., 62 this Court stated that: ASTcEa
[I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are

supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that
findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence.
Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative
finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due process, what is
required, among other things, is that every litigant be given reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant
evidence in his favor. 63
III. The Securities Regulation Code did
not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of
the Revised Securities Act since said
provisions were reenacted in the new
law.
The Securities Regulation Code absolutely repealed the Revised
Securities Act. While the absolute repeal of a law generally deprives a court
of its authority to penalize the person charged with the violation of the old
law prior to its appeal, an exception to this rule comes about when the
repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. The
Court, in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, sets down the rules in such
instances: 64 IaDcTC
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of

depriving the court of its authority to punish a person charged with
violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an
unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of
rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such
that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who
committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the
rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute
that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions.
Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former
statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law.
In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment
continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are
not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is
more favorable to the accused. (Emphasis provided.)
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the
respondents despite the repeal, since Sections 8, 65 12, 66 26, 67 27 68 and
23 69 of the Securities Regulation Code impose duties that are substantially
similar to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the repealed Revised Securities Act.
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which previously provided for
the registration of securities and the information that needs to be included in
the registration statements, was expanded under Section 12, in connection
with Section 8 of the Securities Regulation Code. Further details of the
information required to be disclosed by the registrant are explained in the
Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation
Code, issued on 30 December 2003, particularly Sections 8 and 12 thereof.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been reenacted as Section
27 of the Securities Regulation Code, still penalizing an insider's misuse of
material and non-public information about the issuer, for the purpose of
protecting public investors. Section 26 of the Securities Regulation Code
even widens the coverage of punishable acts, which intend to defraud public
investors through various devices, misinformation and omissions.
Section 23 of the Securities Regulation Code was practically lifted from
Section 36 (a) of the Revised Securities Act. Both provisions impose upon (1)
a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity
security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the
obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the
issuer's securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof. HDATCc
Clearly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the courts of their
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law that was
repealed; in this case, the Revised Securities Act.
IV. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to
investigate violations of the Revised
Securities Act, reenacted in the
Securities Regulation Code, despite
the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulation Code clearly provides that
criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations enforced or
administered by the SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for preliminary investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains limited
investigatory powers. 70 Additionally, the SEC may still impose the
appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned
law. 71
In Morato v. Court of Appeals, 72 the cases therein were still pending
before the PED for investigation and the SEC for resolution when the
Securities Regulation Code was enacted. The case before the SEC involved
an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject matter of the other case
investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and violations of
pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of directors. The enactment
of the Securities Regulation Code did not result in the dismissal of the cases;
rather, this Court ordered the transfer of one case to the proper regional trial
court and the SEC to continue with the investigation of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the
SEC already commenced the investigative proceedings against respondents
as early as 1994. Respondents were called to appear before the SEC and
explain their failure to disclose pertinent information on 14 August 1994.
Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already made initial findings that
respondents failed to make timely disclosures of their negotiations with GHB,
ordered a special investigating panel to hear the case. The investigative
proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals, which became permanent by virtue of the
Decision, dated 20 August 1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the
pendency of this case, the Securities Regulation Code repealed the Revised
Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive
SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the case; or the regional trial
court, to hear any case which may later be filed against the respondents. AcDaEH
V. The instant case has not yet prescribed.

Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and
academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed against them
resulting from the SEC's investigation of this case has already prescribed. 73
They point out that the prescription period applicable to offenses punished
under special laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve
years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act
No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Act." 74 Since the offense was committed in 1994,
they reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this
case moot. Such position, however, is incongruent with the factual
circumstances of this case, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts
the prescription period. 75 A preliminary investigation is essentially a
determination whether an offense has been committed, and whether there is
probable cause for the accused to have committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed or whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. 76
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled
Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations
as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is
about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a finding that a person
has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution. HTAIcD

While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails
substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan, 77
this Court enunciated that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC,
which determines the existence of probable cause, before a preliminary
investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case, the
complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the ground that it
should have been filed first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a
violation of the Securities Regulation Code, wherein the procedure for
criminal prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the Revised
Securities Act. 78 This Court affirmed the dismissal, which it explained thus:
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a
criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by the
SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that
there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ.
Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural
requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code
is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge
and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a
special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence,
all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules
and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is
criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1
earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner
committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal
complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion
can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner's complaint.aIAHcE
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation

undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a criminal case may be
referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it is imperative that the criminal
prosecution be initiated before the SEC, the administrative agency with the
special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings
against the respondents as early as 1994. This investigation effectively
interrupted the prescription period. However, said proceedings were
disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on 5
May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil,
or administrative case against the respondents herein. 79 Thereafter, on 20
August 1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision in C.A. G.R.
SP. No. 37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and
prohibiting the SEC from taking cognizance of and initiating any action
against herein respondents. The SEC was bound to comply with the
aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals enjoining it from continuing with the investigation of
respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from the injunctive writs
would be sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes
in defiance of such orders will be considered void for having been taken
against an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or judicial
body would likewise be impossible pending the injunctive writs issued by the
Court of Appeals. Given the ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan, 80
the DOJ itself could not have taken cognizance of the case and conducted its
preliminary investigation without a prior determination of probable cause by
the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was not enjoined by the Court of
Appeals from conducting a preliminary investigation, any preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile effort since the
SEC had only started with its investigation when respondents themselves
applied for and were granted an injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary
investigation or filed a criminal case against the respondents during the time
that issues on the effectivity of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act and the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure were still pending
before the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals declared the
aforementioned statutory and regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no
civil, criminal or administrative case may be filed against the respondents for
violations thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there was no
statutory provision which respondents could be accused of violating. DcCEHI
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of

the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August 1998 that either the
SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any kind of investigation against the
respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a
finding of probable cause in accordance with the doctrine pronounced in
Baviera v. Paglinawan . 81 In this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating
a preliminary investigation since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals
from continuing with its investigation. Such a situation leaves the
prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can
conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the first place,
sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do
in order to break the impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of
Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest opportunity in this case.
Therefore, the period during which the SEC was prevented from continuing
with its investigation should not be counted against it. The law on the
prescription period was never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an
impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed way
beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy,
they would still be barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is
accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of
offenses punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulation Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an
investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of
probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary
investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in
1995, soon after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents,
effectively interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose
of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such
investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period. ECSHAD
VI. The Court of Appeals was justified in

denying SEC's Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders dated
23 October 1995.
The SEC avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied its
Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, dated 23 October 1995, in
the light of its admission that the PED had the sole authority to investigate
the present case. On this matter, this Court cannot agree with the SEC.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals denied the SEC's Motion
for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, since it found other issues that
were more important than whether or not the PED was the proper body to
investigate the matter. Its refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no
criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed against the respondents
under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations. Moreover, the validity of
the PED Rules on Practice and Procedure was also raised as an issue. The
Court of Appeals, thus, reasoned that if the quashal of the orders was
granted, then it would be deprived of the opportunity to determine the
validity of the aforementioned rules and statutory provisions. In addition, the
SEC would merely pursue the same case without the Court of Appeals having
determined whether or not it may do so in accordance with due process
requirements. Absent a determination of whether the SEC may file a case
against the respondents based on the assailed provisions of the Revised
Securities Act, it would have been improper for the Court of Appeals to grant
the SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders.
IN ALL, this Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to
render effective Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act; nor was
the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure invalid, prior to the enactment of
the Securities Regulation Code, for failure to provide parties with the right to
cross-examine the witnesses presented against them. Thus, the respondents
may be investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper rules of
procedure of the Securities Regulation Code for violations of Sections 8, 30,
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. 82
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. This
Court hereby REVERSES the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 20 August 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the
permanent injunction issued pursuant thereto. This Court further DECLARES
that the investigation of the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act may be undertaken by the proper
authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulation Code. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Velasco, Jr., Reyes and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Quisumbing, J., see dissenting opinion.
Puno, C.J., Austria-Maritnez, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., join in the
Seperate Concurring Opinion of J. Tinga.
Corona, J., is on official leave.
Nachura, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
I dissent because the majority opinion is patently contrary to the

express provision of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
The majority opinion holds that the administrative investigation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period for violation of the Securities Regulation Code (Code).
The majority opinion holds: AEaSTC
. . . It should be noted that the SEC started investigative

proceedings against the respondents as early as 1994. This
investigation effectively interrupted the prescriptive period.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the
SEC in 1995 (sic), soon after they discovered the questionable
acts made by the respondents, effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period. (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling of the majority violates Section 2 of Act No. 3326 entitled
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and To Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
To Run. Section 2 provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. , 1 the Court ruled that the proceedings referred
to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings and not
administrative proceedings. The Court held:
. . . This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act
No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party."
The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are " judicial
proceedings", contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General
that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that
we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SIcCTD
Indeed, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 expressly refers to the "institution

of judicial proceedings". Contrary to the majority opinion's claim that "a
preliminary investigation interrupts the prescriptive period", only the
institution of judicial proceedings can interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus, in the present case, since no criminal case was
filed in any court against respondents since 1994 for violation of the Code,
the prescriptive period of twelve years under Section 1 2 of Act No. 3326 has
now expired.
The fact that the Court of Appeals enjoined the SEC from filing any
criminal, civil or administrative case against respondents for violation of the
Code is immaterial. The SEC has no jurisdiction to institute judicial
proceedings against respondents for criminal violation of the Code. Even if
the Court of Appeals did not issue the injunction, the SEC could still not have
instituted any judicial proceedings against respondents for criminal violation
of the Code. The Code empowers the SEC to conduct only administrative
investigations and to impose fines and other administrative
sanctions 3 against violators of the Code. Section 54.2 of the Code states
that the "imposition of . . . administrative sanctions shall be without
prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the individuals responsible
for the violation." Thus, the criminal charges may proceed separately
and independently of the administrative proceedings.
Under Section 53.1 of the Code, 4 jurisdiction to institute judicial
proceedings against respondents for criminal violation of the Code lies
exclusively with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Section 53.1 of the Code
expressly states that "all criminal complaints for violations of this
Code . . . shall be referred to the Department of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court."
No court ever enjoined the DOJ to institute judicial proceedings against
respondents for criminal violation of the Code. Nothing prevented the DOJ's
National Bureau of Investigation from investigating the alleged criminal
violations of the Code by respondents. Thereafter, the DOJ could have
conducted a preliminary investigation and instituted judicial proceedings
against respondents. The DOJ did not and prescription has now set in. DEHaAS
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
TINGA, J., concurring:
While I fully concur with the ponencia ably penned by Justice Chico-
Nazario, I write separately to highlight the factual and legal background
behind the legal proscription against the blight that is "insider trading". This
case is the farthest yet this Court has explored the matter, and it is
heartening that our decision today affirms the viability for prosecutions
against insider trading, an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital
securities market. This case bears special significance, even if it does not
dwell on the guilt or innocence of petitioners who are charged with insider
trading, simply because the arguments raised by them essentially assail the
validity of our laws against insider trading. Since we deny certiorari and
debunk the challenge, our ruling will embolden our securities regulators to
investigate and prosecute insider trading cases, thereby ensuring a more
stable, mature and investor-friendly stock market.
The securities market, when active and vibrant, is an effective engine
of economic growth. It is more able to channel capital as it tends to favor
start-up and venture capital companies. To remain attractive to investors,
however, the stock market should be fair and orderly. All the regulations, all
the requirements, all the procedures and all the people in the industry
should strive to achieve this avowed objective. Manipulative devices and
deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right
into the heart of the securities industry. When someone trades in the market
with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside
information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms
become worthless. Given enough of stock market scandals coupled with the
related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain
of capital. And investors would eventually feel more secure with their money
invested elsewhere. 1
The securities market is imbued with public interest and as such it is
regulated. Specifically, the reasons given for securities regulation are (1) to
protect investors, (2) to supply the informational needs of investors, (3) to
ensure that stock prices conform to the fundamental value of the companies
traded, (4) to allow shareholders to gain greater control over their corporate
managers, and (5) to foster economic growth, innovation and access to
capital. 2 ISTECA
In checking securities fraud, regulation of the stock market assumes

quite a few forms, the most common being disclosure regulation and
financial activity regulation.
Disclosure regulation requires issuers of securities to make public a
large amount of financial information to actual and potential investors. The
standard justification for disclosure rules is that the managers of the issuing
firm have more information about the financial health and future of the firm
than investors who own or are considering the purchase of the firm's
securities. Financial activity regulation consists of rules about traders of
securities and trading on or off the stock exchange. A prime example of this
form of regulation is the set of rules against trading by insiders. 3
I.
In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities
based on knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at
the time. 4 Such activity is generally prohibited in many jurisdictions,
including our own, though the particular scope and definition of "insider
trading" depends on the legislation or case law of each jurisdiction. In the
United States, the rule has been stated as "that anyone who, for trading for
his own account in the securities of a corporation has 'access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone' may not take 'advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing', i.e., the investing public." 5
It would be useful to examine the historical evolution of the rule.
In the United States, legal abhorrence of insider trading preceded the
modern securities market. Prior to 1900, it was treatise law that the doctrine
that officers and directors of corporations are trustees of the stockholders
does not extend to their private dealings with stockholders or others, though
in such dealings they take advantage of knowledge gained through their
official position. 6 Under that doctrine, the misrepresentation or fraudulent
concealment of a material fact by such corporate officers or directors gave
rise to liability based on general fraud as understood in common law, yet
such liability would arise only if the defendant actively prevented the plaintiff
from looking into or inquiring upon the affairs or condition of the corporation
and its prospects for dividends. 7 The rule, as understood then, did not
encompass a positive duty for public disclosure of any material information
pertinent to a corporation and/or its securities. EHTSCD
The first paradigm shift came with a decision in 1903 of the Georgia
Supreme Court in Oliver v. Oliver, 8 which pronounced that the shareholder
had a right to disclosure, and the corporation a corresponding duty to
disclose such material information, based on the principle that "[w]here the
director obtains the information giving added value to the stock by virtue of
his official position, he holds the information in trust for the benefit of [the
shareholders]." 9 Subsequent state jurisprudence affirmed this fiduciary
obligation to disclose material nonpublic information to shareholders before
trading with them, otherwise known as the "minority" or the "duty to
disclose" rule. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909 expressed
preference for a different rule in Strong v. Repide, 10 acknowledging that the
corporate directors generally owed no duty to disclose material facts when
trading with shareholders, unless there were "special circumstances" that
gave rise to such duty. The "special circumstances", as identified in Strong,
were the concealment of identity by the defendant, and the failure to
disclose significant facts having a dramatic impact on the stock price.
Both the "special circumstances" and "duty to disclose" rules gained
adherents in the next several years. In the meantime, the 1920s saw the
unprecedented popularity of the stock market with the general public, which
was widely taken advantage of by corporations and brokers through
unscrupulous practices. The American stock market collapse of October
1929, which helped trigger the worldwide Great Depression, left fully half of
the $25 million worth of securities floated during the post-First World War
period as worthless, to the injury of thousands of individuals who had
invested their life savings in those securities. 11 The consequent wellspring
of concern over the welfare of the investors animated the passage of the first
U.S. federal securities laws, such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which declared that "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation
and control of such transactions." 12 cATDIH
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided that:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of the national securities exchange — . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. 13
It is this provision which stands as the core statutory authority
prohibiting insider trading under U.S. federal law. 14 Yet the provision itself
does not utilize the term "insider trading", and indeed doubts have been
expressed whether it was intended at all by the U.S. Congress to impose a
ban on insider trading through the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 15 At the
same time, the provision did grant to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (U.S. SEC) the authority to promulgate rules and regulations "as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." This power was exercised by the U.S. SEC in 1942, when it
enacted Rule 10b-5, which has been described as "the foundation on which
the modern insider trading prohibition rests." 16 The Rule reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to

omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business

which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, TAacIE

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17
Again, the rule by itself did not provide for an explicit prohibition on
insider trading practices, and commentators have expressed doubts whether
the U.S. SEC in 1942 had indeed contemplated that the rule work to such
effect. 18 Yet undoubtedly the Rule created a powerful anti-fraud weapon, 19
and it would finally be applied by the U.S. SEC as a prohibition against
insider trading in the 1961 case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 20
The facts of that case hew closely to our traditional understanding of
insider trading. A corporate director of Curtiss-Wright Corporation had told
one of his business partners, Gimpel, that the board of directors had decided
to reduce the company's quarterly dividend. Armed with such information
even before the news was announced, Gimpel sold several thousand shares
in the corporation's stock held in customer accounts over which he had
discretionary trading authority. When the news of the reduced dividend was
publicly disclosed, the corporation's share prices predictably dropped, and
the owners of the sold shares were able to avoid injury. The U.S. SEC ruled
that Gimpel had violated Rule 10b-5, even though he was not an insider
privy to the confidential material information, but merely a "tippee" of that
insider. In doing so, the U.S. SEC formulated the "disclose or abstain" rule,
requiring that an insider in possession of material nonpublic information
must disclose such information before trading or, if disclosure is impossible
or improper, abstain from trading. 21 HDaACI
Not long after, the American federal courts adopted the principles
pronounced by the U.S. SEC in Cady, Roberts, and the rule evolved that
insider trading was deemed a form of securities fraud within the U.S. SEC's
regulatory jurisdiction. 22 Subsequently, jurisprudential limitations were
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, ruling for example that an insider bears
a duty to disclose on the basis of a fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence as between him and the shareholders; 23 or that a tippee is liable
for insider trading only if the tipper breached a fiduciary relationship by
disclosing information to the tippee, who knew or had reason to know of the
breach of duty. 24 In response to these decisions, the U.S. SEC promulgated
Rule 14e-3, which specifically prohibited insiders of the bidder and the target
company from divulging confidential information about a tender offer to
persons that are likely to violate the rule by trading on the basis of that
information. 25
In the United Kingdom, insider trading is considered as a type of
"market abuse" assuming the form of behavior "based on information which
is not generally available to those using the market but which, if available to
a regular user of the market, would or would be likely to be regarded by him
as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in investments of
the kind in question should be effected." 26
The Philippines has adopted statutory regulations in the trading of
securities, tracing in fact as far back as 1936, or just two years after the
enactment of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The then National
Assembly of the Philippines enacted in 1936 Commonwealth Act No. 83, also
known as the Securities Act, 27 designed to regulate the sale of securities
and to create a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for that purpose.
Notably, Com. Act No. 83 did not contain any explicit provision prohibiting
insider trading in precise terms, even as it contained specific provisions
prohibiting the manipulation of stock prices 28 or the employment of
manipulative and deceptive devices. 29 This silence is unsurprising,
considering that American federal law had similarly failed to enact so specific
a prohibition and that Rule 10b-5 of the U.S. SEC had not yet come into
existence then. CADacT
However, in January of 1973, the SEC would issue a set of rules,30

which required specific insiders to "make a reasonably full, fair and accurate
disclosure of every material fact relating or affecting it which is of interest to
investors." 31 It was explained therein that a fact is material if it "induces or
tends to induce or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of the securities of
the issuing corporation, such as an acquisition of mining claims, patent or
formula, real estate, or similar capital assets; discovery of mineral ores;
declaration of dividends; executing a contract of merger or consolidation;
rights offering; and any other important event or happening." 32
The enactment of the Revised Securities Act in 1980 (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 178, as amended) provided for the first time a specific statutory
prohibition in Philippine law against insider trading. This was embodied in
Section 30 of the law, which provides:
Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading. — (a) It
shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if
he knows a fact of special signifinace with respest to the issuer or the
security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider proves
that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party to the
transaction (or his agent ) is identified, (a) the insider proves that the
other party knows it, or (b) that other party in fact knows it from the
insider or otherwise.
(b) "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer
of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former
relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special
significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally
available, or (4) a person who learns such a fact from any of the
foregoing insiders as defined in this subsection, with knowledge that
the person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider.
(c) A fact is "of special significance" if (a) in addition to
being material it would be likely, on being made generally available,
to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) a
reasonable person would consider it especially important under the
circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of such
factors as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference
from information generally available previously, and its nature and
reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in
subsection (b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he knows of a fact of
special significance by virtue of his being an insider. TcIHDa
Contrary to the claims of respondents, such terms as "material fact",

"reasonable person", "nature and reliability" and "generally available" as
utilized in Section 30 do not suffer from the vice of vagueness and do not
necessitate an administrative rule to supply definitions of the terms either.
For example, as the ponente points out, the 1973 Rules already provided for
a definition of a "material fact", a definition that was actually incorporated in
Section 30.
Yet there is an underlying dangerous implication to respondents'
arguments which makes the Court's rejection thereof even more laudable.
The ability of the SEC to effectively regulate the securities market depends
on the breadth of its discretion to undertake regulatory activities. The
intractable adherents of laissez-faire absolutism may decry the fact that
there exists an SEC in the first place, yet it is that body which assures the
protection of interests of ordinary stockholders and investors in the capital
markets, interests which may be overlooked by the issuers of securities and
their corporate overseers whose own interests may not necessarily align
with that of the investing public. A "free market" that is not a "fair market" is
not truly free, even if left unshackled by the State as it would in fact be
shackled by the uninhibited greed of only the largest players.
Respondents essentially contend that the SEC is precluded from
enforcing its statutory powers unless it first translates the statute into a
more comprehensive set of rules. Without denigrating the SEC's delegated
rule-making power, each provision of the law already constitutes an
executable command from the legislature. Any refusal on the part of the SEC
to enforce the statute on the premise that it had yet to undergo the gauntlet
of administrative interpretation is derelict to that body's legal mandate. By
no means is the Congress impervious to the concern that certain statutory
provisions are best enforced only after an administrative regulation
implementing the same is promulgated. In such cases, the legislature is
solicitous enough to specifically condition the enforcement of the statute
upon the promulgation of the relevant administrative rules. Yet in cases
where the legislature does not see fit to impose such a conditionality, the
body tasked with enforcing the law has no choice but to do so. Any quibbling
as to the precise meaning of the statutory language would be duly resolved
through the exercise of judicial review. cHITCS
It bears notice that unlike the American experience where the U.S.
Congress has not seen fit to specifically legislate prohibitions on insider
trading, relying instead on the discretion of the U.S. SEC to penalize such
acts, our own legislature has proven to be more pro-active in that regard,
legislating such prohibition, not once, but twice. The Revised Securities Act
was later superseded by the Securities Regulation Code of 2000 (Rep. Act
No. 8799), a law which is admittedly more precise and ambitious in its
regulation of such activity. The passage of that law is praiseworthy insofar as
it strengthens the State's commitment to combat insider trading. And the
promulgation of this decision confirms that the judiciary will not hesitate in
performing its part in seeing to it that our securities laws are properly
implemented and enforced.
III
Now, on the issue of prescription.
The issue boils down to the determination of whether the investigation
conducted by the SEC pursuant to Section 45 33 of the Revised Securities Act
in 1994 tolled the running of the period of prescription. I submit it did.
Firstly, this Court, in ruling in Baviera v. Paglinawan 34 that the
Department of Justice cannot conduct a preliminary investigation for the
determination of probable cause for offenses under the Revised Securities
Code, without an investigation first had by the SEC, essentially underscored
that the exercise is a two-stage process. The procedure is similar to the two-
phase preliminary investigation prior to the prosecution of a criminal case in
court under the old rules. 35 The venerable J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Olarte 36
finally settled a long standing jurisprudential conflict at the time by holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. The court gave
three reasons in support of its decision, thus:
. . . Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first the text of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in
the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for
action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control. All that the victim of the offense may do not on his part to
initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 37
aDcETC
The same reasons which moved the Court in 1967 to declare that the
mere filing of the complaint, whether for purposes of preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation should interrupt the prescription of
the criminal action inspire the Court's ruling in this case.
It should be emphasized that Sec. 45 of the Revised Securities Act
invests the SEC with the power to "make such investigations as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to
violate any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and
may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in writing, under
oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated" and to refer
criminal complaints for violations of the Act to the Department of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court.
The SEC's investigatory powers are obviously akin to the preliminary
examination stage mentioned in People v. Olarte . The SEC's investigation
and determination that there was indeed a violation of the provisions of the
Revised Securities Act would set the stage for any further proceedings, such
as preliminary investigation, that may be conducted by the DOJ after the
case is referred to it by the SEC.
Secondly, Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 38 provides in part:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)
STaCIA
Act No. 3326 was approved on 4 December 1926, at a time that the
function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
vested in the justices of the peace. The prevailing rule at the time, embodied
in the early case of U.S. v. Lazada 39 and later affirmed in People v. Joson, 40
is that the prescription of the offense is halted once the complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the
filing of the complaint signifies the institution of criminal proceedings against
the accused. 41 People v. Parao 42 — a case which affirmed the power of the
then municipal president to conduct preliminary investigation in the absence
of the justice of the peace and of the auxiliary justice of the peace when the
same could not be deferred without prejudice to the interest of justice —
established the correlative rule that the first step taken in the investigation
or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceedings
which suspends the prescription of the offense. 43 But although the second
Olarte 44 case made an affirmative ruling that the preliminary investigation
is not part of the action proper, the Court therein nevertheless declared that
such investigation is quasi-judicial in nature and that as such, the mere filing
of the complaint with the justice of the peace should stall the exhaustion of
the prescriptive period of the offense charged.
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2
of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old
law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
change for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the modifier "judicial" should be taken to refer to the trial
and judgment stage only and not to the earlier investigation phase. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the
guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution as provided by
law shall suffice to toll prescription.
Thus, in the case at bar, the initiation of investigative proceedings
against respondents, halted only by the injunctive orders issued by the Court
of Appeals upon their application no less, should and did interrupt the period
of prescription. CADacT

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui with Associate Justices Angelina

Sandoval-Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 31-38.
aIcDCH
2. GEHI is a subsidiary wholly owned by GHB. CA rollo, p. 51.

3. Id. at 46-49.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 5-6.
6. Rollo, pp. 9-10.
7. CA rollo, p. 6; Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by Corporations
Whose Securities Are Listed in Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed
Under the Securities Act, issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
on 8 February 1973; see rollo, p. 65.
8. Rollo, p. 10.
9. SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject to
the Commission's control and supervision, the exclusive authority to
investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the Board of
Directors/Trustees of corporations, or of partnerships, or of other
associations, or of their stockholders, officers or partners, including any
fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law or
rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; to file
and prosecute in accordance with law and rules and regulations issued by
the Commission and in appropriate cases, the corresponding criminal or civil
case before the Commission or the proper court or body upon prima facie
finding of violation of any laws or rules and regulations administered and
enforced by the Commission; and to perform such other powers and
functions as may be provided by law or duly delegated to it by the
Commission.
10. CA rollo, pp. 68-94.
11. Id. at 95-107.

12. Id. at 39-43.
13. Id. at 152-162.
14. Id. at 44.
15. Id. at 1-37. cCAIaD
16. CA rollo, pp. 214-230.

17. Id. at 237-238.
18. Id. at 269-270.
19. Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui with Associate Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo,
pp. 31-38.

20. Id. at 35-36.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Id. at 37. DaTEIc
23. Id. at 40-41.

24. Id. at 14.
25. The Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) Rules of
Procedure on Administrative Actions/Proceedings took effect on 29 December
1996, after the violations allegedly took place.
26. 118 U.S. 356.
27. Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications v.

Mabalot, 428 Phil. 154, 164 (2002); Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345 Phil.
962, 979 (1997).
28. 68 Phil. 328, 348 (1939).

29. G.R. No. 100883, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 516, 523.
30. Geukeko v. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712-713 (1957).

31. Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940).
32. Del Mar v. The Philippine Veterans Administration, 151-A Phil. 792, 802
(1973).
33. Supra note 23.

34. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
35. Id. citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. Rep. No.
792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). A significant purpose of the Exchange Act
was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office. cSIACD
36. In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 SEC 633, 29 July 1971;
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F. 2d 833,
13 August 1968.
37. Rollo, p. 459.
38. Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. (Emphasis provided.) McKee v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 68102-03, 16 July 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 539, citing
Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-73998, 14 November
1988, 167 SCRA 363, 373.
39. Dela Cruz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72981, 29 January
1988, 157 SCRA 660, 671 and Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858,
874 (1996).
40. Webb v. Hon. de Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 779 (1995).
41. Id. at 780.
42. 48 L ed 2d 757, 766 (1976).
43. Supra note 33.

44. 99 L ed 2d 194, 211 (1988).
45. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 (1968). CaSAcH
46. Basic v. Levinson, supra note 41 at 211.

47. La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 1
December 2004, 445 SCRA 1, 155-156, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
edition.
48. Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, 392 Phil. 518, 528 (2000), citing Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333,
358.
49. Supra note 33.
50. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 11 L ed 2d 237, 247 (1963).
51. 346 Phil. 321, 362 (1997).
52. Balbuna v. Hon. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150, 154 (1960).
53. People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328, 342 (1939). EaIDAT
54. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 702 (1919).

55. Sec. 8. Procedure for registration . — (a) All securities required to be
registered under subsection (a) of Section four of this Act shall be registered
through the filing by the issuer or by any dealer or underwriter interested in
the sale thereof, in the office of the Commission, of a sworn registration
statement with respect to such securities, containing or having attached
thereto, the following:
(1) Name of issuer and, if incorporated, place of incorporation.

(2) The location of the issuer's principal business office, and if such issuer is a
non-resident or its place of office is outside of the Philippines, the name and
address of its agent in the Philippines authorized to receive notice.
(3) The names and addresses of the directors or persons performing similar
functions, and the chief executive, financial and accounting officers, chosen
or to be chosen, if the issuer be a corporation, association, trust, or other
entity; of all the partners, if the issuer be a partnership; and of the issuer, if
the issuer be an individual; and of the promoters in the case of a business to
be formed.
(4) The names and addresses of the underwriters.
(5) The general character of the business actually transacted or to be

transacted by, and the organization and financial structure of, the issuer
including identities of all companies controlling, controlled by or commonly
controlled with the issuer.
(6) The names and addresses of all persons, if any, owning of record or
beneficially, if known, more than ten (10%) per centum in the aggregate of
the outstanding stock of the issuer as of a date within twenty days prior to
the filing of the registration statement.
(7) The amount of securities of the issuer held by any person specified in
subparagraphs (3), (4), and (6) of this subsection, as of a date within twenty
days prior to the filing of the registration statement, and, if possible, as of
one year prior thereto, and the amount of the securities, for which the
registration statement is filed, to which such persons have indicated their
intention to subscribe. ISEHTa
(8) A statement of the capitalization of the issuer and of all companies

controlling, controlled by or commonly controlled with the issuer, including
the authorized and outstanding amounts of its capital stock and the
proportion thereof paid up; the number and classes of shares in which such
capital stock is divided; par value thereof, or if it has no par value, the stated
or assigned value thereof; a description of the respective voting rights,
preferences, conversion and exchange rights, rights to dividends, profits, or
capital of each class, with respect to each other class, including the
retirement and liquidation rights or values thereof.
(9) A copy of the security for the registration of which application is made.
(10) A copy of any circular, prospectus, advertisement, letter, or
communication to be used for the public offering of the security.
(11) A statement of the securities, if any, covered by options outstanding or

to be created in connection with the security to be offered, together with the
names and addresses of all persons, if any, to be allotted more than ten
(10%) per centum in the aggregate of such options.
(12) The amount of capital stock of each class issued or included in the
shares of stock to be offered. HTAIcD
(13) The amount of the funded indebtedness outstanding and to be created

by the security to be offered, with a brief statement of the date, maturity,
and character of such debt, rate of interest, character or amortization
provisions, other terms and conditions thereof and the security, if any,
therefor. If substitution of any security is permissible, a summarized
statement of the conditions under which such substitution is permitted. If
substitution is permissible without notice, a specific statement to that effect.
(14) The specific purposes in detail and the approximate amounts to be

devoted to such purposes, so far as determinable, for which the security to
be offered is to supply funds, and if the funds are to be raised in part from
other sources, the amounts and the sources thereof.
(15) The remuneration, paid or estimated to be paid, by the issuer or its

predecessor, directly or indirectly, during the past year and the ensuing year
to (a) the directors or persons performing similar functions, and (b) its
officers and other persons, naming them whenever such remuneration
exceeded sixty thousand (P60,000.00) pesos during any such year.
(16) The amount of issue of the security to be offered.

(17) The estimated net proceeds to be derived from the security to be
offered.
(18) The price at which the security is proposed to be offered to the public or
the method by which such price is computed and any variation therefrom at
which any portion of such security is proposed to be offered to persons or
classes of persons, other than the underwriters, naming them or specifying
the class. A variation in price may be proposed prior to the date of the public
offering of the security by filing an amended registration statement.
(19) All commissions or discounts paid or to be paid, directly or indirectly, by

the issuer to the underwriters in respect of the sale of the security to be
offered. Commissions shall include all cash, securities, contracts, or anything
of value, paid, to be set aside, or disposed of, or understanding with or for
the benefit of any other person in which any underwriter is interested, made
in connection with the sale of such security. A commission paid or to be paid
in connection with the sale of such security by a person in which the issuer
has an interest or which is controlled by, or under common control with, the
issuer shall be deemed to have been paid by the issuer. Where any such
commission is paid, the amount of such commission paid to each underwriter
shall be stated. DaESIC
(20) The amount or estimated amounts, itemized in reasonable detail, of

expenses, other than commission specified in the next preceding paragraph,
incurred or to be incurred by or for the account of the issuer in connection
with the sale of the security to be offered or properly chargeable thereto,
including legal, engineering, certification, authentication, and other charges.
(21) The net proceeds derived from any security sold by the issuer during
the two years preceding the filing of the registration statement, the price at
which such security was offered to the public, and the names of the principal
underwriters of such security.
(22) Any amount paid within two years preceding the filing of the registration
statement or intended to be paid to any promoter and the consideration for
any such payment.
(23) The names and addresses of the vendors and the purchase price of any
property or goodwill, acquired or to be acquired, not in the ordinary course of
business, which is to be defrayed in whole or in part from the proceeds of the
security to be offered, the amount of any commission payable to any person
in connection with such acquisition, and the name or names of such person
or persons, together with any expense incurred or to be incurred in
connection with such acquisition, including the cost of borrowing money to
finance such acquisition.
(24) Full particulars of the nature and extent of the interest, if any, of every
director, principal executive officer, and of every stockholder holding more
than ten (10%) per centum in the aggregate of the stock of the issuer, in any
property acquired, not in the ordinary course of business of the issuer, within
two years preceding the filing of the registration statement or proposed to be
acquired at such date.
(25) The names and addresses of independent counsel who have passed on
the legality of the issue.

(26) Dates of and parties to, and the general effect concisely stated of every
material contract made, not in the ordinary course of business, which
contract is to be executed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the
registration statement or which has been executed not more than two years
before such filing. Any management contract or contract providing for special
bonuses or profit-sharing arrangements, and every material patent or
contract for a material patent right, and every contract by or with a public
utility company or an affiliate thereof, providing for the giving or receiving of
technical or financial advice or service shall be deemed a material contract.
Any contract, whether or not made in the ordinary course of business with
any stockholder, whether a natural or juridical person, owning more than ten
(10%) per centum of the shares of the issuer shall be deemed a material
contract for the purpose of this Act.
(27) A balance sheet as of a date not more than ninety days prior to the date
of the filing of the registration statement showing all of the assets of the
issuer, the nature and cost thereof, whenever determinable with intangible
items segregated, including any loan to or from any officer, director,
stockholder or person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the
issuer, or person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer. In
the event any such assets consist of shares of stock in other companies, the
balance sheet and profit and loss statements of such companies for the past
three years shall likewise be enclosed. All the liabilities of the issuer,
including surplus of the issuer, showing how and from what sources such
surplus was created, all as of a date not more than ninety days prior to the
filing of the registration statement. If such statement is not certified by an
independent certified public accountant, in addition to the balance sheet
required to be submitted under this schedule, a similar detailed balance
sheet of the assets and liabilities of the issuer, certified by an independent
certified public accountant, of a date not more than one year prior to the
filing of the registration statement, shall be submitted. ECDaTI
(28) A profit and loss statement of the issuer showing earnings and income,
the nature and source thereof, and the expenses and fixed charges in such
detail and such form as the Commission shall prescribe for the latest fiscal
year for which such statement is available and for the two preceding fiscal
years, year by year, or, if such issuer has been in actual business for less
than three years, then for such time as the issuer has been in actual
business, year by year. If the date of the filing of the registration statement is
more than six months after the close of the last fiscal year, a statement from
such closing date to the latest practicable date. Such statement shall show
what the practice of the issuer has been during the three years or lesser
period as to the character of the charges, dividends or other distributions
made against its various surplus accounts, and as to depreciation, depletion,
and maintenance charges, and if stock dividends or avails from the sale of
rights have been credited to income, they shall be shown separately with
statement of the basis upon which credit is computed. Such statement shall
also differentiate between recurring and nonrecurring income and between
any investment and operating income. Such statement shall be certified by
an independent certified public accountant.
(29) Any liabilities of the issuer to companies controlling or controlled by the

issuer shall be disclosed in full detail as to use of the proceeds thereof, the
maturity and repayment schedule, nature of security thereof, the rate of
interest and other terms and conditions thereof. If the proceeds, or any part
of the proceeds, of the security to be issued is to be applied directly or
indirectly to the purchase of any business, a profit and loss statement of such
business, certified by an independent certified public accountant, meeting
the requirements of subparagraph (28) of this subsection, for the three
preceding fiscal years, together with a balance sheet, similarly certified, of
such business, meeting the requirements of subparagraph (27) hereof of a
date not more than ninety days prior to the filing of the registration
statement or at the date such business was acquired by the issuer more than
ninety days prior to the filing of the registration statement.cSaCDT
(30) A copy of any agreement or agreements or, if identical agreements are

used, the forms thereof made with any underwriter, including all contracts
and agreements referred to in subparagraph (19) hereof.
(31) A copy of the opinion or opinions of independent counsel in respect to

the legality of the issue.
(32) A copy of all material contracts referred to in subparagraph (26) hereof,

but no disclosure shall be required by the Commission of any portion of any
such contract if the disclosure of such portion would impair the value of the
contract and would not be necessary for the protection of the investors.
(33) A detailed statement showing the items of cash, property, services,
patents, goodwill, and any other consideration for which securities have been
or are to be issued in payment.
(34) The amount of cash to be paid as promotion fees, or of capital stock

which is to be set aside and disposed of as promotion stock, and a statement
of all stock issued from time to time as promotion stock.
(35) In connection with securities issued by a person engaged in the business
of developing, exploiting or operating mineral claims, a sworn statement of a
mining engineer stating the ore possibilities of the mine and such other
information in connection therewith as will show the quality of the ore in such
claims, and the unit cost of extracting it.
(36) Unless previously filed and registered with the Commission and brought
up to date:
(a) A copy of its articles of incorporation with all amendments thereof and its
existing by-laws or instruments corresponding thereto, whatever the name, if
the issuer be a corporation; CTaSEI
(b) A copy of all instruments by which the trust is created or declared and in
which it is accepted and acknowledged, if the issuer is a trust;
(c) A copy of its articles of partnership or association and all the papers
pertaining to its organization, if the issuer is a partnership, unincorporated
association, joint-stock company, syndicate, or any other form of
organization.
(37) A copy of the underlying agreements or indentures affecting any stock,
bonds, or debentures offered or to be offered by the issuer and outstanding
on the part of companies controlling or controlled by the issuer.
(38) Where the issuer or registrant is not formed, organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines or is not domiciled in the Philippines, a
written power of attorney, certified and authenticated in accordance with
law, designating some individual person, who must be a resident of the
Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served
in all actions or other legal proceedings against him, and consenting that
service upon such resident agent shall be admitted as valid and proper
service upon the issuer or registrant, and if at any time that service cannot
be made upon such resident agent, service shall be made upon the
Commission.
Additional information or documents, including written information from an

expert, may be required, or anyone of the above requirements may be
dispensed with, depending on the necessity thereof for the protection of the
public investors, or their applicability to the class of securities sought to be
registered, as the case may be.
The registration statement shall be signed by the issuer, its principal
executive officer, its principal operating officer, its principal financial officer,
its comptroller or principal accounting officer or persons performing similar
functions. The written consent of the expert named as having certified any
part of the registration statement or any document used in connection
therewith shall also be filed.
Upon filing of the registration statement, the registrant shall pay to the
Commission a fee of not more than one-tenth of one per centum of the
maximum aggregate price at which such securities are proposed to be
offered and the fact of such filing shall be immediately published by the
Commission, at the expense of the registrant, in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, once a week for two consecutive weeks,
reciting that a registration statement for the sale of such security has been
filed with it, and that the aforesaid registration statement, as well as the
papers attached thereto, are open to inspection during business hours, by
interested parties, and copies thereof, photostatic or otherwise, shall be
furnished to every applicant at such reasonable charge as the Commission
may prescribe. DSIaAE
Any interested party may file an opposition to the registration within ten
days from the publication.
If after the completion of the aforesaid publication, the Commission finds that
the registration statement together with all the other papers and documents
attached thereto, is on its face complete and that the requirements and
conditions for the protection of the investors have been complied with, and
unless there are grounds to reject a registration statement as herein
provided, it shall as soon as feasible enter an order making the registration
effective, and issue to the registrant a permit reciting that such person, its
brokers or agents, are entitled to offer the securities named in said
certificate, with such terms and conditions as it may impose in the public
interest and for the protection of investors.
The Commission shall, however, advise the public that the issuance of such
permit shall not be deemed a finding by the Commission that the registration
statement is true and accurate on its face or that it does not contain an
untrue statement of fact or omit to state a material fact, or be held to mean
that the Commission has in any way given approval to the security included
in the registration statement. Every permit and any other statement, printed
or otherwise, for public consumption, that makes reference to such permit
shall clearly and distinctively state that the issuance thereof is only
permissive and does not constitute a recommendation or endorsement of the
securities permitted to be offered for sale. It shall be unlawful to make, or
cause to be made, to any prospective purchaser any representation contrary
to the foregoing. caHASI
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission, for the guidance of

investors, may require issuers to submit their securities to rating by
securities rating agencies accredited by the Commission, to provide all
information necessary therefor, and to report such rating in the registration
statement and prospectus, if any, offering the securities.
If any change occurs in the facts set forth in the registration statement, it
shall be the obligation of the issuer, dealer or underwriter who filed the
original registration statement to submit to the Commission for approval an
amended registration statement.
The Commission, in its order, may fix the maximum amount of commission
or other form of remuneration to be paid in cash or otherwise, directly or
indirectly, for or in connection with the sale or offering for sale of such
securities in the Philippines and the maximum amount of compensation
which the issuer shall pay for mining claims and mineral rights for which
provision is made by the issuer for payment in cash or securities. The
amount of compensation which shall be paid the owner or holder of such
mining claims or mineral rights shall be a fair valuation thereof, as may be
fixed by the Commission, after consultation with the Bureau of Mines, and
after receiving such technical information as the issuer or dealer or the
owner or owners of such claims may care to submit in the premises. cSIADH
A copy of the order of the Commission making the registration effective,

together with the registration statement, shall be transmitted to the
exchange wherein the security may be listed and shall be available for
inspection by any interested party during reasonable hours on any business
day.
The order shall likewise be published, at the expense of the registrant, once
in a newspaper of general circulation within ten days from its promulgation.
The same rules shall apply to any amendment to the registration statement.
56. Section 8. Order of Investigation. — The parties shall be afforded an

opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the Hearing Officer
which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
57. G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483, 495-496.
58. Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, supra note 45 at 528, citing Sanidad v.

Commission on Elections, supra note 45 at 358; and Valmonte v. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, 22 September 1987, Resolution.
59. Rabago v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82868, 5 August
1991, 200 SCRA 158, 164-165; Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 110637, 7 October 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 532.
60. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Tongson, 459 Phil. 742, 753 (2003).
61. Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 56 at 534.
62. G.R. No. L-75501, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 54.
63. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Tongson, supra note 57 at 753. cTDIaC
64. 416 Phil. 722, 746-747 (2001).
65. SEC. 8. Requirement of Registration of Securities. —
8.1. Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or distribution within the
Philippines, without a registration statement duly filed with and approved by
the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the securities, in such
form and with such substance as the Commission may prescribe, shall be
made available to each prospective purchaser.
8.2. The Commission may conditionally approve the registration statement

under such terms as it may deem necessary.
8.3. The Commission may specify the terms and conditions under which any
written communication, including any summary prospectus, shall be deemed
not to constitute an offer for sale under this Section.
8.4. A record of the registration of securities shall be kept in a Register of

Securities in which shall be recorded orders entered by the Commission with
respect to such securities. Such register and all documents or information
with respect to the securities registered therein shall be open to public
inspection at reasonable hours on business days.
8.5. The Commission may audit the financial statements, assets and other
information of a firm applying for registration of its securities whenever it
deems the same necessary to insure full disclosure or to protect the interest
of the investors and the public in general.
66. SEC. 12. Procedure for Registration of Securities. —

12.1. All securities required to be registered under Subsection 8.1 shall be
registered through the filing by the issuer in the main office of the
Commission, of a sworn registration statement with respect to such
securities, in such form and containing such information and documents as
the Commission shall prescribe. The registration statement shall include any
prospectus required or permitted to be delivered under Subsections 8.2, 8.3
and 8.4. aACEID
12.2. In promulgating rules governing the content of any registration

statement (including any prospectus made a part thereof or annexed
thereto), the Commission may require the registration statement to contain
such information or documents as it may, by rule, prescribe. It may dispense
with any such requirement, or may require additional information or
documents, including written information from an expert, depending on the
necessity thereof or their applicability to the class of securities sought to be
registered.
12.3. The information required for the registration of any kind, and all
securities, shall include, among others, the effect of the securities issue on
ownership, on the mix of ownership, especially foreign and local ownership.
12.4. The registration statement shall be signed by the issuer's executive
officer, its principal operating officer, its principal financial officer, its
comptroller, principal accounting officer, its corporate secretary or persons
performing similar functions accompanied by a duly verified resolution of the
board of directors of the issuer corporation. The written consent of the expert
named as having certified any part of the registration statement or any
document used in connection therewith shall also be filed. Where the
registration statement includes shares to be sold by selling shareholders, a
written certification by such selling shareholders as to the accuracy of any
part of the registration statement contributed to by such selling shareholders
shall also be filed.
12.5. a) Upon filing of the registration statement, the issuer shall pay to the
Commission a fee of not more than one-tenth (1/10) of one per centum (1%)
of the maximum aggregate price at which such securities are proposed to be
offered. The Commission shall prescribe by rule diminishing fees in inverse
proportion to the value of the aggregate price of the offering.
b) Notice of the filing of the registration statement shall be immediately

published by the issuer, at its own expense, in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, or
in such other manner as the Commission by rule shall prescribe, reciting that
a registration statement for the sale of such security has been filed, and that
the aforesaid registration statement, as well as the papers attached thereto
are open to inspection at the Commission during business hours, and copies
thereof, photostatic or otherwise, shall be furnished to interested parties at
such reasonable charge as the Commission may prescribe. DACIHc
12.6. Within forty-five (45) days after the date of filing of the registration
statement, or by such later date to which the issuer has consented, the
Commission shall declare the registration statement effective or rejected,
unless the applicant is allowed to amend the registration statement as
provided in Section 14 hereof. The Commission shall enter an order declaring
the registration statement to be effective if it finds that the registration
statement together with all the other papers and documents attached
thereto, is on its face complete and that the requirements have been
complied with. The Commission may impose such terms and conditions as
may be necessary or appropriate for the protection of the investors. CcaDHT
12.7. Upon effectivity of the registration statement, the issuer shall state
under oath in every prospectus that all registration requirements have been
met and that all information are true and correct as represented by the
issuer or the one making the statement. Any untrue statement of fact or
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statement therein not misleading shall constitute fraud.
67. SEC. 26. Fraudulent Transactions. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities
to:
26.1. Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;

26.2. Obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading; or
26.3. Engage in any act, transaction, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
68. SEC. 27. Insider's Duty to Disclose When Trading. —
27.1. It shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer,
while in possession of material information with respect to the issuer or the
security that is not generally available to the public, unless: (a) The insider
proves that the information was not gained from such relationship; or (b) If
the other party selling to or buying from the insider (or his agent) is
identified, the insider proves: (i) that he disclosed the information to the
other party, or (ii) that he had reason to believe that the other party
otherwise is also in possession of the information. A purchase or sale of a
security of the issuer made by an insider defined in Subsection 3.8, or such
insider's spouse or relatives by affinity or consanguinity within the second
degree, legitimate or common-law, shall be presumed to have been effected
while in possession of material non-public information if transacted after
such information came into existence but prior to dissemination of such
information to the public and the lapse of a reasonable time for the market to
absorb such information: Provided, however, That this presumption shall be
rebutted upon a showing by the purchaser or seller that he was not aware of
the material non-public information at the time of the purchase or sale. EHaCTA
27.2. For purposes of this Section, information is "material non-public" if: (a)
It has not been generally disclosed to the public and would likely affect the
market price of the security after being disseminated to the public and the
lapse of a reasonable time for the market to absorb the information; or (b)
would be considered by a reasonable person important under the
circumstances in determining his course of action whether to buy, sell or
hold a security.
27.3. It shall be unlawful for any insider to communicate material non-public

information about the issuer or the security to any person who, by virtue of
the communication, becomes an insider as defined in Subsection 3.8, where
the insider communicating the information knows or has reason to believe
that such person will likely buy or sell a security of the issuer while in
possession of such information.
27.4. a) It shall be unlawful where a tender offer has commenced or is about

to commence for:
(i) Any person (other than the tender offeror) who is in possession of material
non-public information relating to such tender offer, to buy or sell the
securities of the issuer that are sought or to be sought by such tender offer if
such person knows or has reason to believe that the information is non-
public and has been acquired directly or indirectly from the tender offeror,
those acting on its behalf, the issuer of the securities sought or to be sought
by such tender offer, or any insider of such issuer; and
(ii) Any tender offeror, those acting on its behalf, the issuer of the securities
sought or to be sought by such tender offer, and any insider of such issuer to
communicate material non-public information relating to the tender offer to
any other person where such communication is likely to result in a violation
of Subsection 27.4 (a) (i).
(b) For purposes of this subsection the term "securities of the issuer sought or
to be sought by such tender offer" shall include any securities convertible or
exchangeable into such securities or any options or rights in any of the
foregoing securities. ECTIHa
69. SEC. 23. Transactions of Directors, Officers and Principal Stockholders. —
23.1. Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than ten per centum (10%) of any class of any equity security which satisfies
the requirements of Subsection 17.2, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time either such requirement is first
satisfied or within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner,
director, or officer, a statement with the Commission and, if such security is
listed for trading on an Exchange, also with the Exchange, of the amount of
all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and
within ten (10) days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with
the Commission, and if such security is listed for trading on an Exchange,
shall also file with the Exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the
close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have
occurred during such calendar month.
70. SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses. — 53.1 The
Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or
any rule of an Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency,
other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to
file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the
Commission shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning
the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish information
concerning any such violations, and to investigate any fact, condition,
practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the
enforcement of the provisions of this Code, in prescribing of rules and
regulations thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis for
recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Code
relates: Provided, however, That any person requested or subpoenaed to
produce documents or testify in any investigation shall simultaneously be
notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation: Provided, further, That
all criminal complaints for violations of this Code, and the implementing rules
and regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be
referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and
prosecution before the proper court: Provided, furthermore, That in instances
where the law allows independent civil or criminal proceedings of violations
arising from the same act, the Commission shall take appropriate action to
implement the same: Provided, finally, That the investigation, prosecution,
and trial of such cases shall be given priority. EICScD
71. SEC. 54. Administrative Sanctions. — 54.1 If after due notice and hearing,
the Commission finds that: (a) There is a violation of this Code, its rules, or its
orders; (b) Any registered broker or dealer, associated person thereof has
failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations, another
person subject to supervision who commits any such violation; (c) Any
registrant or other person has, in a registration statement or in other reports,
applications, accounts, records or documents required by law or rules to be
filed with the Commission, made any untrue statement of a material fact, or
omitted to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading; or, in the case of an
underwriter, has failed to conduct an inquiry with reasonable diligence to
insure that a registration statement is accurate and complete in all material
respects; or (d) Any person has refused to permit any lawful examinations
into its affairs, it shall in its discretion, and subject only to the limitations
hereinafter prescribed, impose any or all of the following sanctions as may be
appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances.
72. G.R. No. 141510, 13 August 2004, 436 SCRA 438, 458.
73. Rollo, p. 649-652.

74. Section 1. Violation penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years
or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the
crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years: provided,
however, That all offenses against any law or par of law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
(Emphasis provided.) ADCEcI
75. Llenes v. Dicdican, G.R. No. 122274, 31 July 1986, 260 SCRA 207, 217-220;
and Baytan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 153945, 4 February 2003,
396 SCRA 703, 713.
76. Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 360 SCRA 618,
623.
77. G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007.
78. The Revised Securities Act provides that: aSTAcH
Sec. 45. Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses. — (a) The

Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or
is about to violate any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation
thereunder, and may require or permit any person to file with it a
statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall
determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be
investigated. The Commission is authorized, in its discretion, to publish
information concerning any such violations, and to investigate any fact,
condition, practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in
the enforcement of the provisions of this Act, in the prescribing of rules and
recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Act
relates: Provided, however, That no such investigation shall be conducted
unless the person investigated is furnished with a copy of any complaint
which may have been the cause of the initiation of the investigation or is
all criminal complaints for violations of this Act, and the implementing rules
referred to the National Prosecution Service of the Ministry of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court: and,
Provided, finally, That the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases
shall be given priority. (Emphasis provided.)
The Securities Regulation Code provides that:
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses. — 53.1. The

Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or
any rule of an Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency,
other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to
file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the
Commission shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning
the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish information
concerning any such violations, and to investigate any fact, condition,
practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the
enforcement of the provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and
recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Code
relates: Provided, however, That any person requested or subpoenaed to
produce documents or testify in any investigation shall simultaneously be
all criminal complaints for violations of this Code, and the implementing rules
referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and
prosecution before the proper court: Provided, furthermore, That in instances
where the law allows independent civil or criminal proceedings of violations
arising from the same act, the Commission shall take appropriate action to
implement the same: Provided, finally, That the investigation, prosecution,
and trial of such cases shall be given priority.
79. Rollo, p. 32.

80. G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 170. DcITHE
81. Id.
82. Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, known as the Securities Regulation
Code, enacted on 19 July 2000, reads:
5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving
intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be
resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
DaAISH
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1991, 211 SCRA 277.

2. Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides: "Violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: (a) after a year for offences punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years
or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offence punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the
crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months."
(Emphasis supplied) CIETDc
3. Section 54 of the Securities Regulation Code provides: "Administrative

Sanctions. — 54.1. If, after due notice and hearing, the Commission finds
that: (a) There is a violation of this Code, its rules, or its orders; (b) Any
registered broker or dealer, associated person thereof has failed reasonably
to supervise, with a view to preventing violations, another person subject to
supervision who commits any such violation; (c) Any registrant or other
person has, in a registration statement or in other reports, applications,
accounts, records or documents required by law or rules to be filed with the
Commission, made any untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted to
state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading; or, in the case of an underwriter, has
failed to conduct an inquiry with reasonable diligence to insure that a
registration statement is accurate and complete in all material respects; or
(d) Any person has refused to permit any lawful examinations into its affairs,
it shall, in its discretion, and subject only to the limitations hereinafter
prescribed, impose any or all of the following sanctions as may be
appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances:
(i) Suspension, or revocation of any registration for the offering of securities;
(ii) A fine of no less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) nor more than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus not more than Two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) for each day of continuing violation;
(iii) In the case of a violation of Sections 19.2, 20, 24, 26 and 27,
disqualification from being an officer, member of the Board of Directors, or
person performing similar functions, of an issuer required to file reports
under Section 17 of this Code or any other act, rule or regulation
administered by the Commission;
(iv) In the case of a violation of Section 34, a fine of no more than three (3)
times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the purchase, sale or
communication proscribed by such Section; and
(v) Other penalties within the power of the Commission to impose.

54.2. The imposition of the foregoing administrative sanctions shall be
without prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the individuals
responsible for the violation.
54.3. The Commission shall have the power to issue writs of execution to
enforce the provisions of this Section and to enforce payment of the fees and
other dues collectible under this Code.

4. Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides that "all criminal
complaints for violations of this Code, and the implementing rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred
to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and
prosecution before the proper court." Section 45 of the old Revised
Securities Act contained substantially the same provision. DACTSa
TINGA, J., concurring:
1. See COLIN CHAPMAN, How the Stock Market Works (1988 ed.), pp. 151-152.
2. See R. JENNINGS, H. MARSH, JR., J. COFFEE, JR. AND J. SALGIMAN, SECURITIES

REGULATION: Cases and Materials (8th ed., 1998), pp. 1-6.
3. F. Babozzi and F. Modigliani, Capital Markets (3rd ed., 2006).

4. "Generally speaking, insider trading is trading in securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information." S. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002 ed.), p. 519.
5. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961); cited in Texas Gulf
Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
6. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4 at 520 citing H.L. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of a
Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 Mich. L. Rev. 267, 267
(1910).
7. Id., citing Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 589 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.1868).
8. 45 S.E. 232 (Ga.1903). aECTcA
9. Id.
10. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
11. See R. JENNINGS, H. MARSH JR., J. COFFEE JR. AND J. SELIGMAN, supra note
2 at 2; citing H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
12. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. Â§ 78j (b).
14. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4 at 525.
15. Id. at 526.

16. Id. at 527.
17. 17 CFR Â§240.10b-5.
18. "According to one account, the decision to adopt the rule and model it on
section 17 (a) [of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act] was arrived at without
any deliberation, with the only official discussion consisting of one SEC
Commissioner reportedly observing, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" T.L.
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed., 2002), at 571; citing
J. Blackmun, dissenting, Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 767 (1975).
19. Id. at 570-571.

20. Supra note 5. CSAcTa
21. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4 at 528.
22. Particularly, through the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), which has been described as "the first of the truly seminal
insider trading cases", even though much of its core insider trading holding
had since been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. See BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 4, at 529.
23. U.S. v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

24. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1984).
25. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 537.
26. Financial Securities and Markets Act of 2000, Part VIII (118) (2) (a).
27. See Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 83 (1936).

28. See Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 83 (1936).
29. See Sec. 21, Com. Act No. 83 (1936). EDIaSH
30. Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by Corporations whose

Securities are Listed in any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under the
Revised Securities Act, dated 29 January 1973.
31. See R. MORALES, The Philippine Securities Regulation Code (Annotated)
(2002 ed.) at 199.
32. Id.
33. A similar provision is found in Section 53 of the Securities Regulation Code
of 2008.
34. G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 515.
35. The first phase was the preliminary examination for the determination of
the fact of commission of the offense and the existence of probable cause, as
well as the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The second phase was the
preliminary investigation proper (after arrest, for the determination of
whether there was a prima facie case against the accused and whether the
issuance of the arrest warrant was justified).
36. 125 Phil. 895 (1967).
37. Id.
38. Entitled "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATION
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPALS ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO ACT."
39. 9 Phil. 509 (1908).
40. 46 Phil. 380.

41. 9 Phil. 509, 511.
42. 52 Phil. 712 (1929).

43. 52 Phil. 712, 715. HIAEaC
44. G.R. No. L-22465, 28 February 1967.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 201572. July 9, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAEL DELFIN,

This is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 29 April 2011 of the

When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter

Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police

In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under

When an oﬀense is committed by more than one person, all of them

Sec. 11. Date of commission of the oﬀense. — It is not necessary

Since the date of commission of the oﬀense is not required with

I n Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

5. TSN, 5 September 2006.

6. Records, pp. 99-101.

7. TSN dated 21 October 2008.

8. TSN dated 25 November 2008.

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1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

11. CA rollo, p. 194.

12. Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sections 6 and 11.

14. U.S. v. Cardona, 1 Phil. 381, 383 (1902).

15. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may

17. People v. Opemia, id. at 700-701.

24. See People v. Bucayo , 577 Phil. 355, 361 (2008).

25. Rollo , p. 12.

26. People v. Lopez , G.R. No. 184596, 24 March 2014.

27. People v. Dadao , G.R. No. 201860, 22 January 2014.

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[G.R. No. 175602. January 18, 2012.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiﬀ-appellee, vs. PO2

The suﬃciency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances

Criminal Case No. 00-90718

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City,

Criminal Case No. 00-90719

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City,

Criminal Case No. 00-90720

The Oﬃce of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the State's

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, the celebration was

After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped

Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year

Accused Eduardo ducked during the ﬁring. He pretended to be

On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. 9

We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily

Considering that the CA thereby aﬃrmed the trial court's ﬁndings of

The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.

Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

7.Id., pp. 6-7.

8.Id., pp. 7-8.

11.Rollo , pp. 13-14 (bold emphases are in the original text).

16.Rollo , pp. 6-7.

30.United States v. Lim San , 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

32.Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

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[G.R. No. 183652. February 25, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, petitioners, vs. COURT

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision 1 of