A Confucian Look at Internet Censorship in China

Yubo Kou, Bryan Semaan, Bonnie Nardi

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 A Confucian Look at Internet Censorship in China

Yubo Kou1, Bryan Semaan2, and Bonnie Nardi3

1Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
2Schoolof Information Studies, Syracuse University, NY, USA
3
Department of Informatics, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. China’s Internet censorship practices are sophisticated and pervasive.

Academic research and media reports have examined the Chinese government’s
varied, expansive methods of censorship and Chinese citizens’ techniques of
subverting them, but little attention has been paid to understanding how Chi-
nese citizens think about censorship in their everyday lives. We conducted a
qualitative study of Chinese mainland citizens who circumvented censorship.
We found seemingly contradictory attitudes and practices among our partici-
pants. They showed proficiency at bypassing censorship, but were sometimes
comfortable with censored information. They were willing to share sensitive in-
formation with others, but saw the benefits of limiting the public’s access to in-
formation under certain circumstances. We examine how the complex, nuanced
attitudes toward censorship resonate with the classic teachings of Confucian-
ism, China’s traditional philosophical and ethical system.

Keywords: Censorship ·China ·Confucianism ·social media.

1 Introduction

The human-computer interaction community has investigated censorship in online

venues with respect to critical issues such as corporate policies, online community
norms, and self-disclosure practices [1–4]. In this paper, we focus on censorship in
non-Western, non-democratic contexts. We define censorship broadly as government
monitoring and suppression of information, communication, media, and/or speech
that the government deems objectionable and harmful.
One non-Western country which is often used as a context to explore censorship is
China—widely considered to be an authoritarian state with one of the most sophisti-
cated, strict, and comprehensive systems of censorship in the world [5, 6]. However,
previous literature about censorship in China often treats the human-censorship rela-
tionship as a “momentary, ahistorical HCI situation” [7], in which censorship exists to
oppress and people are expected to resist. Scholars and journalists have investigated
the implementation, maintenance, and development of censorship, and measured its
effectiveness [5, 8–11]. On the citizen side, the focus has been on techniques for citi-
zens to circumvent censorship [12–16]. However, little attention has been paid to
Chinese citizens’ varied practices and complex attitudes towards censorship. Con-

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2017. Published by Springer International
Publishing Switzerland 2017. All Rights Reserved
sistent with Kuutti and Bannon’s call to the turn to practice [7], this paper concerns
Chinese citizens’ practices and attitudes related to censorship, as they are embedded
in contemporary cultural, historical conditions.
We examine how censorship is viewed and practiced in China, and Chinese atti-
tudes and perspectives towards censorship. We approach these questions through a
qualitative study using interviews and document analysis. We interviewed 32 main-
land Chinese citizens and collected online interactions made available to us by our
informants, triangulating interview and document data. Participants reported both
circumventing and supporting censorship—they considered censorship both a con-
straint and a choice. To frame this finding, we draw on Confucianism—China’s tradi-
tional ethical and philosophical system dating back over 2500 years. We use it as a
lens to describe participants’ thoughts and actions. Participants emphasized creative,
contextualized adaptation to censorship. They viewed censorship as a government
action to protect societal stability, even though they sometimes felt the needed to find
ways around it. We argue that participants are embedded in particular philosophical
and cultural conditions within which they have developed localized approaches to-
wards censorship. We discuss how sociohistorical factors influenced our participants’
experiences with censorship, and we reflect on implications for design.
The Western view of censorship is largely critical and negative. However, here we
seek to provide a situated perspective of censorship emerging through routine practice
in an environment where censorship is the norm. It is possible that this situated view
will not align with the mainstream attitude of the academic community or with certain
global perspectives on censorship. We present qualitative data on how Chinese citi-
zens themselves understand and manage censorship.

2 Background

2.1 Confucianism in Contemporary Chinese Society

Confucius (551 – 479BCE) developed a comprehensive system of philosophy and
ethics covering morality, politics, economy, family life, and education [17]. Through-
out China’s history, most dynasties respected, emphasized, and developed Confucian-
ism as the official ideology governing the activities of citizens and the government in
the public and private spheres of social life [18–20]. Confucianism continues to have
significant impact over Chinese citizens’ thoughts and actions [21–24].
Confucianism is conceptualized by its five virtues (五常): benevolence, righteous-
ness, propriety, wisdom, and integrity [20, 25, 26].
The first virtue, Benevolence (仁), describes how people should manifest love and
compassion for others. For example, a person might exhibit benevolence by helping
disadvantaged individuals or groups.
The second virtue, Righteousness (义), emphasizes how a person’s thoughts and
actions should conform to his or her own beliefs, and the person should resist tempta-
tion. For instance, as our study participants told us, on social media a person should
speak about public events through reasoned and factual discourse as opposed to rely-
ing solely on personal opinions.
The third virtue, Propriety (礼), refers to how a person should respect behavioral
norms that maintain social structures, such as hierarchy. In other words, people should
value stability and harmony over radicalism in resolving issues. Confucian teachings
encourage people to cope with problems in a harmonious way consistent with both
propriety and benevolence. People should avoid confrontation and seek peaceful al-
ternatives.
The fourth virtue, Wisdom ( 智 ), elaborates how a person should develop
knowledge regarding what constitutes right and wrong. For instance, a person should
develop knowledge about public events before engaging in public discussion. Ac-
knowledging the differences in people’s abilities, experiences, and backgrounds, Con-
fucius believed in diverse methods of educating, accommodating, and serving people,
rather than a single universal program of action [26]. For example, Confucius argued
that “students have different abilities, backgrounds, and knowledge. There should be
different approaches to teaching them” [27]. Confucianism stresses that each person
can increase wisdom through education and self-cultivation.
The final virtue, Integrity (信), illustrates how a person’s own words and deeds
support the collective good. For example, if a person promises to support a collective
action in specific ways, he or she should do so.
With a central focus on individual virtues, Confucianism lends itself to a paternal-
istic governance model that relies on political leaders to promote and live by example,
thus embodying the virtues. Confucianism attaches considerable responsibility and
duty to the government, stressing that the government should govern through virtuous
action, and by taking care of the people [25]. At the same time, Confucianism
acknowledges people as the basis of the state. Xunzi (310 – 235BCE), a Confucian
scholar, compared people and the government to water and a boat, noting that “water
can support the boat… water can also overturn the boat” [28]. The government thus
must pay close attention to maintaining a harmonious relationship with the people.
According to decades of research [29–34] by the late Duke University political sci-
entist Tianjian Shi and his colleagues, Confucianism has significantly affected con-
temporary Chinese citizens’ political beliefs and values. Shi and Lu argued that Chi-
nese citizens draw on Confucianism as a means of understanding politics and democ-
racy as a paternalistic model [32]. Confucianism emphasizes the steady hand of elites
in delivering governance. Confucianism insists that a government’s performance and
care for its people are more important than procedural arrangements such as fair elec-
tions. Confucianism limits the scope of ordinary citizens’ political participation in
communicating their concerns to political leaders. Political leaders are expected to
make decisions based on their own judgments. Ordinary citizens only oppose the
government under extreme conditions, such as when political leaders significantly
deviate from expected norms and the virtues of Confucianism.
2.2 Manifestations of Confucianism: Censorship Practices in China
The Chinese government regulates Internet infrastructure, as well as commercial
and social use of the Internet [5]. When observing through the lens of Confucianism,
we can understand this political system as government leaders having taken it upon
themselves to make Internet censorship decisions for the public good.
The Great Firewall, for example, is the primary technical means of restricting in-
formation access at the infrastructure level. It blocks foreign websites deemed unde-
sirable by the government such as Facebook and Twitter, regulates access and con-
tent, and monitors citizens’ Internet use. At the national level, the government con-
trols the gateways to international networks and licenses the operation of Internet
service providers. These paternalistic practices manifest in several ways. For example,
citizens must use real name to register with Internet service providers [5, 6, 35]. A
special Internet police unit enforces the government’s censorship regulations [5, 36].
MacKinnon, a renowned Internet freedom advocate and former journalist, describes a
broad range of government tactics, including cyber-attacks against targeted individu-
als, device and network control, domain-name control, localized disconnection and
restriction, surveillance through identity registration, monitoring software, the com-
pliance of Internet companies, and paid online commentators [6].
Censorship laws and regulations are pervasive, yet ambiguous. Businesses and in-
dividuals face difficulties in complying. Roberts, a political scientist who studies cen-
sorship and propaganda in China, commented that Chinese users often guess what
types of information are permissible or forbidden [37]. By using abstract terms such
as national interest, social order, and national unity, the government gives itself con-
siderable flexibility in the interpretation of its basic governing principles, as well as
the possibility for manipulation [5, 38]. To comply with the ambiguity of regulations,
businesses have adopted sweeping self-censorship mechanisms [5, 39]. For example,
both domestic and foreign Internet corporations such as Google and Yahoo! have
altered their products to accommodate censorship requirements. A study of keyword
blocking on Weibo, the largest micro-blogging service in China, conducted during the
2012 Chinese National Congress election, reported that Weibo actively manipulated
and filtered the search results of certain government officials’ names [10]. The gov-
ernment has developed censorship strategies that vary across regions. For example,
Bamman et al. studied China’s content deletion practices on social media and found
stricter censorship in outlying provinces such as Tibet, a region the government con-
siders unstable [8].
Censorship targets content perceived to have the potential to spark collective ac-
tion. King et al. conducted an analysis of deleted social media content on the Chinese
Internet [40]. They reported that censorship allowed criticism of government but si-
lenced comments that represented, reinforced, or spurred offline collective action. In
an analysis of the Internet’s political impact, Givens and MacDonald explained that
online exposure of corruption and malfeasance at lower levels of government can help
the central government monitor local agents [12]. The government tolerates citizens’
online debates around their frustrating experiences with government practices as long
as those debates do not develop into offline actions. Such an eventuality could, in the
government’s view, cause societal instability. When viewed from the perspective of
Confucianism, the government uses online venues to channel citizens’ dissatisfaction
to avoid confrontations between citizens and government, and to promote peaceful
conflict resolution.

3 Related Work

Censorship has been a controversial issue inciting heated debates, with one side
stressing the necessity of controlling inappropriate information such as pornography,
and the other side upholding principles of Internet freedom [41, 42]. Governments
often cite practical reasons for implementing Internet censorship. Singapore, for ex-
ample, pays considerable attention to censoring information in online political debates
which might cause public “panic” [43]. Australia applies censorship with a focus on
child pornography sites as well as hate speech and violence [44]. In the human-
computer interaction literature, much discussion is centered on how people censor
their own social media behavior for purposes such as privacy, and self-protection [3,
45]. Another strand of research concerns algorithmic censorship [46], where social
media algorithms are used to suppress certain topics.
Censorship impacts information seeking. Wilson categorized barriers to infor-
mation seeking into personal, interpersonal, and environmental [47]. Censorship does
not stop information seeking; people often seek alternative information sources [48].
Gunther and Snyder found that people in censored news environments are more criti-
cal in selecting news sources [49].
Researchers have reported numerous means by which Chinese citizens circumvent
censorship. Citizens use proxy servers to visit blocked sites, and email and instant
messaging to share sensitive information [50–53]. They discuss sensitive topics using
substitutes for blocked keywords [54, 55]. For example, “harmony 和谐” refers to the
government’s official ideology that prescribes an ideal society in which each person
has sufficient resources to live and grow. People use the term “river crab 河蟹,” a
homophone of “和谐” to satirize this ideology [56].
Only a handful of studies have examined perceptions of censorship among Chinese
citizens. Wang and Mark [19] surveyed 721 Chinese citizens, finding that respond-
ents’ demographic backgrounds, experience of using the Internet, and personality
were associated with their attitudes towards censorship. They reported that people
with more Internet usage over time tended to accommodate censorship. The authors
suggest that we can expect that people in China will increasingly accept censorship as
a normal consequence of Internet use. Roberts’ [37] study of blogs found that censor-
ship did not deter the spread of information or induce self-censorship. Bloggers real-
ized that they would receive little punishment except deletion of their posts. Such
deletion might even serve as a “badge of honor” and help them gain followers. Cen-
sorship motivated these bloggers to continue writing on political topics.
4 Methods

Interviews and document collection took place between April, 2014 and January,
2016. We studied several major political events in China, including the Umbrella
Movement, the National People’s Congress’ plenary sessions, and the crackdown on
government corruption in which high-profile government officials were arrested and
sentenced. We recruited our interviewees on Weibo, the largest Chinese micro-
blogging site. We first used keywords to locate online debates and conversations re-
garding the political events, identifying Weibo users who participated in relevant
discussions. We then contacted these people through Weibo’s private messaging func-
tion for an interview. We conducted 32 semi-structured, open-ended interviews with
mainland Chinese residents. Participants included 19 males and 13 females between
the ages of 18 and 46 (with an average age of 29). They included graduate students,
government employees, editors, journalists, engineers, programmers, freelancers, and
stock market traders. Our sample corresponds to the demographics of Weibo users
who are educated and tech-savvy [57] and of course does not represent the whole
Chinese population.
The first author, who conducted the interviews, is a native Chinese speaker. We
asked participants to describe how they perceived Internet censorship in China, how
they sought information about political events, and whether they experienced censor-
ship. We asked participants to describe situations in which they encountered censor-
ship, and how they dealt with it. With permission, we followed all participants’ social
media accounts. Some followed ours in return. The social media platforms included
Weibo and popular online Chinese forums such as tianya.cn and Baidu Tieba. We
read and archived participants’ posts and comments which we triangulated with our
interview data. All interview and social media data were translated into English by the
first author. We use pseudonyms to protect participants’ identities.
We followed a grounded theory approach [58] to analyze the data. We first read
through the data, and then, through rounds of discussion, we identified broad themes.
Using open coding, we identified specific patterns related to censorship. Once we had
identified Confucianism as a theme, we found quotes in which participants’ thoughts
resonated with Confucian teachings or in which participants directly quoted words
from Confucius. We present these quotes in the Findings section and develop discus-
sion points to support our cultural analysis.

5 Findings

Participants deployed various strategies to circumvent censorship, consistent with

what has been reported in previous studies [12, 15, 52, 59]. We discuss how partici-
pants encountered censorship and how they made decisions regarding censorship.
5.1 Censorship as Routine Experience
Our participants explained that censorship sometimes had a negative impact on
their online or offline activities. When asked how they dealt with these difficulties,
they stressed the importance of adaptation. Adaptation was not to endure or accept
with resignation, but to manage difficulties in a pragmatic and flexible manner, with
the ultimate goal of living in harmony. Dealing with censorship became a routine
practice in participants’ daily lives, not something remarkable or with totalitarian
overtones as it might be in other national contexts.
Almost all our participants said that they disliked censorship, citing the increased
difficulties in information seeking and communication. Despite this unfavorable view,
however, most (n=26) said that they did not consider censorship a major obstacle in
their everyday online communication. They managed it in a smooth, routine fashion.
For example, Leiyu, a 21-year-old college student, said:
The government blocks Facebook, Twitter, and some news websites. But it
doesn’t matter. A lot of Chinese are working and studying abroad. They share a lot
of content on their Chinese social media accounts. I have two Weibo friends who
live in Canada and post a lot of news. I don’t really seek a lot of information that is
classified as sensitive, but still I can get a lot just by following people on Weibo.
Participants felt that they generally enjoyed the freedom to obtain information and
communicate ideas from the online venues they used. For ordinary online communi-
cation, censorship did not limit their ability to engage in conversation and share in-
formation. The Confucian ideal of harmony was a routine experience for our study
participants; they did not feel stressed about their ability to find information or com-
municate. Maintaining a harmonious, non-confrontational relationship with other
people and the government was a consistent goal mentioned in the interviews. Partici-
pants frequently referred to Confucius, quoting him to answer questions. For example,
when we asked whether participants enjoyed encountering different opinions in online
discussions, one answered, “The exemplary person is harmonious and open-minded to
difference. The petty person can group easily but they do not stay together for long.
君子和而不同，小人同而不和” [26]. When we asked about the ideal relationship
between people with different opinions, they sometimes referred to Confucian teach-
ings, “One should not impose on others what he himself does not desire. 己所不欲勿
施于人” [26].
Our participants discussed using word substitutes in their daily online communica-
tion to avoid words that might be censored, similar to previous studies’ findings [6,
14]. However, participants said that in some cases, they did not use substitutes with
the purpose of circumventing censorship, but as a way of rendering online conversa-
tion fun, casual, and hip. For example, Zhelu, a 37-year-old writer, said:
Many times it is not about escaping the sensitive keyword check. It is because
the young Internet generation devises a lot of new substitutes every day. I use these
terms simply because it’s more fun and more casual in online chat. It makes me
feel young and fashionable.
Use of such word substitutes was an everyday routine practice that made commu-
nication more enjoyable. Matters of language are delicate; every utterance has more
than one interpretation. The use of symbols such as the river crab does not necessarily
denote a reaction to censorship, as Zhelu explained. We received similar responses
from six other participants. Xuanwu, a 24-year-old graduate student, mentioned how
he and his friends did not type in formal written Chinese, but used a lot of emoticons,
punctuation, and even typos, for fun and word play. The use of substitutes functioned
as a mundane action to sustain harmonious, playful communication. Previous studies
emphasized word substitutes as a way to circumvent censorship. Our participants
sometimes did that, but in many cases, the purpose of word substitutes was for de-
lightful, entertaining communication.
Most participants (n=27) found that mechanisms of censorship were not employed
for every communication channel, but only a select set of online public venues and a
particular set of topics, most of which concerned political events or government deci-
sions. For example, Mingyue, a graduate student, noted:
I feel that the government does not or cannot monitor and control most of the
online places I am using to speak with others. Me and my friends oftentimes say
whatever we like in Weibo’s reply area, WeChat, tianya, and baidu tieba. Some-
times the content can be pretty sensitive. But our conversations are never inter-
rupted.
WeChat is the largest instant messaging tool in China. Like Mingyue, other partic-
ipants experienced few interruptions caused by censorship in their daily communica-
tion regarding mundane topics. Censorship did not strike them as an obstacle to their
online communication, compared to other circumstances they brought up in inter-
views, such as the difficulty of navigating a variety of information sources in search
of desired information, or network speed.

Deciding whether to circumvent censorship.

All participants (n=32) reported that they were aware that much of the information
to which they had direct access had been examined, filtered, and altered by the gov-
ernment, consistent with other research [6, 60]. Leiyu said:
I visit Weibo every day. I follow more than one hundred accounts, which gives
me many posts to read. However, I think I just read them for entertainment purpos-
es. I glance through Weibo when I am having lunch alone. … I think it is perhaps
because I do not fully trust the information in the posts. The government or
Weibo’s administration team have censored and tailored a lot of it.
Leiyu was cautious with respect to what he was reading, and adjusted his expecta-
tions and subsequent interpretations of news he believed was filtered and modified by
government censors. Awareness of censorship encouraged participants to be particu-
larly cautious towards political news. Wen, another college student, told us:
I feel I know little about it [a political event], mostly because the central gov-
ernment has largely limited my right and ability to obtain information. If the gov-
ernment does not allow transparency, there is no truth.
Circumventing censorship was not the only choice available to our participants.
The decision to circumvent, or not to, was based on participants’ interests and time.
Fifteen participants decided to circumvent based on the strength of their interest in
specific information or events. They attempted to find as much information as possi-
ble if events triggered strong interest. Otherwise, they would be content with the cen-
sored information. Leiyu described the process:
If I were interested in particular topics, such as the Umbrella Movement, I
would rather check out original information in other venues.
Similarly, Cangqing, a 34-year-old engineer, described how his interest in the Um-
brella Movement called for use of services such as Weibo and Baidu since he felt
information on television was censored. He knew digital materials were also cen-
sored, but online venues offered him more opportunities to discover new knowledge,
e.g., by using a variety of keywords, thus weakening the effect of censorship. Twenty-
two participants mentioned that although some Chinese keywords were banned, their
English equivalents were not (see Figure 1).

Fig. 1. To the left is the English warning message for searching sensitive keyword (雨伞运动)
in Chinese on Weibo, indicating that the Chinese word for the Umbrella Movement was banned
on Weibo. The right side shows the results of searching sensitive keyword (Umbrella Move-
ment) in English on Weibo, where the words were not banned. The first author performed these
two searches on his smartphone after an interviewee mentioned this phenomenon.

Many participants (n=21) chose to follow particular stories of interest to them in

which they would invest more time. Ming, a 26-year-old programmer, said:
There are too many important political issues worth my attention, such as the
economic bubble, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the National Peo-
ple’s Congress. I cannot really spend the equal amount of time and effort studying
every single event... There are priorities. For events with lower priority, I am fine
with just reading the state media. I do not necessarily trust what the state media
says. For news that I am really interested in, I will definitely climb the wall and see
what Western media says.
Ming’s response represented a common strategy of ignoring censorship when news
events were not of significant interest. When participants did want to know more, they
found ways to do so. This strategy aligns with Confucian philosophy—people were
pragmatic with respect to how they dealt with and viewed censorship and made deci-
sions about when to just live with it. The choice of circumventing or not was subject
to participants’ agendas and interests.
 Our participants viewed censorship as one constraint, among the many other con-
straints they dealt with in their lives on a daily basis. They followed a flexible and
situational decision making process in managing censorship.

5.2 Seeing Advantages and Disadvantages of Censorship

Participants (n=21) refrained from denouncing censorship as purely evil and re-
pressive. In fact, they found some value in the restraints it imposes. They expressed
concern regarding the dangers of an uncontrolled flow of information, particularly
rumors. Cheng, a 30-year-old accountant, noted:
I have found that rumors often cause a lot of troubles in China. People are pan-
icked easily. For example, recently there was a rumor on Weibo that a group of
human traffickers secretly moved to my hometown. Suddenly all the parents began
to pick up their children. They waited outside school gates and blocked the local
traffic for hours. Later it turned out that this was a false rumor made up by a ran-
dom high school student who was bored one day. So yeah, I think the government
should take more responsibility in monitoring this kind of online information.
Similar concerns with resolving rumors were voiced by twenty other participants.
They stressed that the government should deploy sensible strategies when managing
the Internet. This attitude signifies a trust in paternalistic structures that give the gov-
ernment considerable agency in utilizing censorship strategies considered best for the
country. This attitude reflects participants’ consideration of the Confucian virtue of
propriety which explicitly attaches importance to the maintenance of the existing
hierarchy and the rule of the government.
Participants held cautious attitudes towards expressing online opinions but not be-
cause of censorship. Situ, a 23-year-old government employee, said:
I see a lot of people making immediate, rash comments after reading one single
piece of news. They do not even know whether it is true or not. Does this do any
good to our online space and our society? Is this really the so-called freedom of
speech? I think this is nothing but irresponsible.
Similarly, Xiaotu, a 32-year-old editor, reflected on her own online behavior:
I used to be a student. I fully understand that students are emotional and do not
apprehend public issues in an objective and comprehensive way. When I was in
middle and high school, I admired Western societies a lot. I thought every aspect of
Western society was better than that of China. Whenever there was a certain terri-
ble public issue, I blamed the Chinese government…[Now] I am grateful for my
college education. I learned a lot about our history and society during that time.
Now I have a mature mind. I try to understand those issues rather than rushing to
blame China. I see many Weibo users speak in the exact same way I did as a high
school student. They easily make accusations that someone is part of the 50-cent
party or that they are brainwashed. Their minds are still immature, but they will
eventually grow up in the future.
Many participants (n=18) acknowledged the utilitarian value of digital technolo-
gies in facilitating expression. However, they were worried about the irresponsible
use of these technologies in the name of freedom of speech. They wanted to include
consideration of the negative side of online debates in their assessment of freedom of
speech and censorship, articulating a desire for careful, harmonious communication,
consistent with Confucian teachings. When describing their perceptions of censorship,
participants often emphasized peaceful, harmonious online communication, using a
Confucian saying: “Harmony is the most precious. 和为贵” [26]. For example, one
participant said, “I do not like to argue with others online. This often ends up no-
where. People should treat each other in a nicer way. After all, harmony is the most
precious.”
Many participants (n=23) commented on international conflicts between China and
other countries, endorsing certain of the Chinese government’s actions to regulate
online speech in China to manage international tensions. As Xuanwu noted:
Our Internet is already in chaos. The Chinese government is not the only one
having paid commentators, for sure. Western governments and others are also hir-
ing people to create and circulate opinions about democratizing China or colo-
nizing China again. They probably want a Chinese version of the Arab Spring. I
believe censorship is necessary to resist some of these influences.
Participants (n=22) agreed that the government is responsible for shepherding use
of the Internet, a paternalistic notion derived from Confucianism. Gushi, a 46-year-
old stock market trader, discussed how censorship directed online discussion in a
constructive way:
Young people are relatively reckless and idealistic. When they have lived for
more than 40 years, they will gain a comprehensive understanding of both society
and life. At that point, they will begin to think about public issues in a mature
way... However, young people are occupying the Internet. Their time and energy
should be better spent on their own work and life. Putting a barrier on their online
activity is not necessarily a bad thing.
However, approving of certain acts of censorship did not mean that participants
agreed with every aspect and practice of censorship perpetrated by the government.
Tang, 35-year-old government employee, said:
Censorship is a necessary mechanism to protect societal stability and harmony.
There is no absolute freedom of speech. If the government does not rein in what
circulates on the Internet, a lot of public issues can easily spiral out of control.
However, I do think censorship’s current shape is a bit too strict. For example,
some keywords can suddenly become unsearchable for no obvious reason.
A graduate student expressed her dissatisfaction with the strictness of Chinese cen-
sorship. She said:
Although I can see the point in censorship, it is sometimes too strict. For in-
stance, a while ago I wrote a blog with hundreds of words. But I could not submit
it because the blog site said the blog contained some sensitive keyword. I checked
the whole blog again and again but failed to find any sensitive word. Eventually I
had to give up. I simply don’t understand why it has to be so strict. What harm can
that blog do?
Participants had expectations regarding the appropriate degree of strictness that
should be applied. In many cases, the current degree was deemed overly strict.
 Participants’ attitudes towards censorship seem contradictory. On the one hand,
participants showed a somewhat accepting attitude towards censorship in pointing out
its advantages, and stressing the government’s responsibility to manage the Internet.
On the other hand, participants saw that censorship hindered some of their online
experiences. Their attitudes reflected acceptance of a paternalistic social order that
attaches a strong expectation of responsibility for the common weal to the govern-
ment. However, this acceptance did not mean that participants could not have their
own ideas regarding governance or be frustrated at certain government actions.

5.3 Developing Skills of Circumvention

Confucius believed that the resources a person is entitled to should equal the per-
son’s capacities, or wisdom. Otherwise, the person not only wastes resources, but may
also abuse the resources. Our online observations and interviews with participants
revealed a similar belief, namely, that the amount of information a person can access
should be commensurate with their abilities.
In online discussions on social media, we often came across people debating the in-
fluence of censorship over freedom of speech. Here is an excerpt from a conversation
on Weibo:
Gangli: Mainlanders are confined in cages. We know nothing besides what the
government wants us to know.
Yuyi: How would you define cage? In fact, the government does not confine peo-
ple. Only people can confine themselves. How do you expect a person to jump out
of the box if he only reads party newspapers every day? If you cannot think for
yourself, how can climbing the wall help? It does nothing except put new biases in-
to your head.
Yuyi dismissed the idea that censorship is an overwhelming obstacle that prevents
people from obtaining information. She emphasized individual agency as the key to
understanding public events. Gangli, however, used strong imagery to describe what
he considered excessive government control. Without “thinking for yourself,” con-
suming more information does not help. “[P]eople should develop the ability of criti-
cal thinking,” said Gushi. He quoted Confucius in saying that “learning without
thought means labor lost. 学而不思则罔.” In other words, the individual bears re-
sponsibility for behaving pragmatically and sensibly.
Our participants (n=22) often described circumvention of censorship as a personal
choice. Leng, a 29-year-old office worker, said:
I find the idea of brainwashing funny. Even in the Chinese media, there are so
many sources with very different information and opinions. The government cannot
really ban them all. You can find them only if you want to. Otherwise, even if you
live in the West with many, many media choices, you can still be very narrow-
minded.
Leng and many other participants stressed the importance of individual agency in
managing censorship. For them, exposure to information did not guarantee insight or
knowledge. The ability to understand and reflect on information was more important.
 Participants (n=17) associated circumvention practices with the willingness to
learn. Guzi, a 29-year-old graduate student, remarked:
I think it’s not that hard to use VPN tools or proxy servers to visit Facebook or
Twitter. Any person with basic computer knowledge can learn it, as long as they
are willing to.
Participants associated finding filtered, sensitive information with just doing a bit
of extra work. They recognized the extra effort required to find information in certain
circumstances, and believed that it was up to them to do it if they so desired.
When asked how they managed censorship, 28 participants stressed mastering
know-how of general strategies rather than the specific technical means of circumven-
tion. For them, it was important to be flexible and to be able to adapt to new tech-
niques as well as new information sources. For example, Leiyu explained:
It’s not about knowing which specific site to find certain information. After all,
that site can be gone any time. The point is to know how you can find the site con-
taining desired information.
Li, a 24-year-old graduate student, elaborated on what constitutes know-how:
You have to keep your mind open to new tools and browsing new websites. New
tools can always surprise you! My friend once introduced a website storing a lot of
YouTube videos. I’m sure a lot of them are forbidden in China. I was amazed by its
rich content.
As we have noted, previous work has shown the numerous ways Chinese citizens
bypass censorship [6, 14, 59]. Here we emphasize participants’ flexibility in adopting
and learning new tools and finding new resources in order to expand their knowledge,
as well as their pragmatic attitude towards censorship, and their willingness to help
others find the information they need.
Participants sympathized with like-minded people who wanted more information.
Many reported practices of sharing information with others, even strangers. Zi, a 29-
year-old graduate student, explained her willingness to share information, saying:
I do not mind sharing sensitive information with people online, even if I do not
know them. This is because I fully understand how it feels when you desire some
information. In the past, somebody shared information with me as well.
We asked participants whether and why they were willing to share sensitive infor-
mation. Xingxi laughed and quoted Confucius, saying that “a good person is always
ready to help others attain their aims. 君子成人之美” [26]. He further asked, “Why
shouldn’t I send out the information if it helps others and does me no harm?”
Participants linked circumventing censorship to their own sensible, resourceful
practices. Managing censorship is much like managing other aspects of life for Chi-
nese citizens. Acts of circumvention do not connote a deep refusal of government
initiatives as they might in the West. On the contrary, they allow citizens to find what
they want to know, while still observing the appropriateness of hierarchy as formulat-
ed in Confucian principles.
5.4 Summary
Our participants emphasized a willingness and capacity to deal with censorship and
obtain information. Participants agreed that the information a person could access
depended on his or her own capacity and effort. Such a view not only reflects flexibil-
ity and pragmatism in dealing with constraints, but also the deep-rooted Confucian
values regarding how resources should be distributed in society.
What participants said they thought or did
Attitudes Supported censorship for societal stability (2, 3)
Criticized censorship for blocking information (2, 5)
Practices Consumed censored information (3, 4)
Circumvented censorship to obtain desired information (1, 2, 3, 4)

Table 1. Links between participants’ attitudes and practices and the five virtues. 1 =
benevolence, 2 = righteousness, 3 = propriety, 4 = wisdom, 5 =integrity.
Table 1 summarizes the links between participants’ attitudes and practices in
relation to the five virtues in Confucianism. Participants saw advantages to censorship
in maintaining societal stability, resonating with righteousness, propriety, and
integrity, as they agreed that censorship was correct in maintaining propriety. They
did not shy away from criticizing the government for its strictness in censorship,
showing their sense of righteousness and integrity. Participants consumed censored
information as they respected propriety, and believed that even censored information
could contribute to their knowledge and wisdom. They shared information with
strangers, manifesting the virtue of benevolence and righteousness. They emphasized
circumvention rather than protest and confrontation, respecting propriety.

6 Discussion

Few studies have explored the ways in which Chinese citizens view and experience
censorship. Through a qualitative study of Chinese citizens’ attitudes toward and
practices of censorship, we discovered the routineness of managing censorship, and
the acceptance and approval of certain forms of censorship. These findings conflict in
some important ways with mainstream thoughts regarding censorship, such as the
United Nations’ declaration of Internet access as a basic human right [61]. We argue
that it is important to understand censorship practices by drawing connections to the
specific historical national context.
We have traced participants’ attitudes toward censorship to the ancient teachings of
Confucianism. Ample research has documented that contemporary Chinese citizens
continue to seek to cultivate themselves through reading Confucius’ classic works and
through following the doctrines of Confucianism [21–23, 62–64]. Our work is inter-
pretive, drawing on our knowledge of Confucianism in the Chinese context. Without
this larger situated framing, we cannot explain actions that seem contradictory. It is
within the larger philosophical system of Confucianism with its emphasis on harmo-
ny, pragmatism, and paternalism that participants’ responses to censorship become
logical and comprehensible.
Our study participants’ attitudes and practices manifested the Confucian virtues in
concrete ways. Participants valued benevolence and propriety over confrontation in
relations with others. They chose to accept censorship as a circumstance, and to ex-
plore alternatives to bypassing it, rather than subverting it. They made individual
choices to obtain sensitive information in order to improve their own righteousness,
wisdom, and integrity. They were willing to share sensitive information with others
who expressed need. At the same time, participants placed considerable responsibility
for and trust in the government to manage the public sphere. Acts of circumvention
and sharing sensitive information with others did not connote the kind of ideological
and practical resistance to and rejection of government actions that they might con-
note in other sociohistorical contexts.
Our contributions to the HCI literature are three-fold: First, we contribute to the in-
formation seeking literature by presenting a nuanced and culturally-situated analysis
of information seeking practice in a heavily-censored environment. Second, the study
develops a situated, emic interpretation of censorship that is still missing in the litera-
ture. Third, our contribution lies in using Confucianism as an interpretive lens to ana-
lyze contemporary Chinese technology practices.

6.1 Citizens and Censorship in China

Previous work has tended to frame censorship as a repressive, top-down tool em-
ployed by the Chinese government [6, 19, 51, 60, 65, 66]. Our investigation points to
the role of Chinese citizens themselves in the formation, maintenance, and develop-
ment of censorship. Participants’ tolerance of and compliance with censorship stands
in sharp contrast to research that assumes that Chinese citizens should resist and rebel.
Our study participants reported that they would engage in confrontations with the
Chinese government only under the most extreme circumstances. For example, one
participant said that he would “participate in collective actions if government deci-
sions threaten normal life, such as building chemical plants too close to a residential
area.” Participants’ common strategy was to adapt, and to find ways to overcome
problems quietly. If they could not solve the problems, they preferred to endure, sur-
vive, and succeed in their endeavors by turning their attention to other matters in life.
We thus suggest the importance of considering the cultural and sociohistorical di-
mensions of censorship. In China, certain circumstances such as Confucian values and
beliefs existed before censorship and before the current regime that exercises it. While
our study brings attention to the consequences of Confucianism on censorship prac-
tices and attitudes, we do not exclude possible connections between censorship and
other Chinese cultural elements such as Taoism and Buddhism. These would require
further study. We have noted participants’ acceptance of certain Western liberal forms
of civic engagement such as public deliberation. Participants acknowledged the power
of collective action in influencing government decisions. Chinese citizens’ attitudes
and practices are in a state of flux, and yet they are, at the same time, informed by a
venerable tradition that has lasted for millennia. Fundamental changes will take time
to emerge, and as they evolve, they will be informed by Chinese history and society.

6.2 Expanding the Paradigm for Research in Civic Engagement and Politics
Developed within Western universities and corporations, much HCI research on
civic engagement and politics has naturally followed conventions of democratic tradi-
tions in assessing how digital technologies can contribute to the betterment of society
[67–69]. This paradigm is evident in studies of online political deliberation [70–72],
social movements [73–76], local community engagement [77–82], citizen news gen-
eration and news seeking behaviors [83, 84], and citizen participation in political
campaigns [85, 86]. These studies highlight the culture of participatory democracy in
which ordinary citizens can and should engage in discussion of public issues. In con-
trast, contemporary China follows a paternalistic model of governance. Consequently,
even actions such as circumvention that appear to meet Western expectations, might
actually have different rationales for Chinese citizens. Our findings indicate that cir-
cumvention and sharing sensitive information in the Chinese context connote not an
attitude of subversion, nor of opposition to censorship, but a pragmatic, routine, utili-
tarian means of obtaining desired information.
We argue that censorship and its related attitudes and practices can be better under-
stood if we consider specific national contexts. The significance of linking censorship
to its sociohistorical context speaks to several critical strands of related work, such as
postcolonial computing [67], feminist HCI [87], and political economy in HCI [88].
Postcolonial computing examines how research and design can be understood as “cul-
turally located and power laden.” Feminist HCI provides a critical perspective for
looking at the existing body of knowledge about censorship as primarily situated in
the Western context. Political economy indicates that technology is embedded in the
wider political economy and is not intelligible without consideration of that political
economy. These perspectives are developing as crucial resources that are beginning to
shift the paradigm in HCI. We favor taking them into account as much as possible as
we move forward. We attempted to do so in our analysis by situating seemingly con-
tradictory findings about Chinese attitudes toward censorship in a sociopolitical con-
text with deep roots in the ethical system of Confucianism, examining this system as
it plays out in the politics of contemporary China.

6.3 Design for What Purpose?

Viewing censorship as a “problem,” researchers and practitioners have devised and
implemented solutions to resist or bypass censorship [89–92]. However, framing the
current situation as a set of “problems” and technological systems as “solutions,” can
be misleading [93]. Baumer and Silberman discussed when not to design, suggesting
how a specific situation can constitute “a complex and multifaceted condition with
which we must grapple” [93]. Pierce discussed the value of “undesign” in response to
concerns with the limitations and negative effects of technology [94]. Our findings
about censorship in China are in harmony with the arguments of these scholars. Cen-
sorship in the Chinese context cannot be framed as a problem to be solved. It is a
substantial element of China’s complex online context co-created by citizens and the
government. Design for the demolition of censorship is infeasible, and out of step
with the realities of China’s current sociopolitical system, as well as its lengthy histo-
ry as a nation state.
We see Confucianism as a source of inspiration for design in a Chinese cultural
context. While an in-depth analysis of how Confucianism can be useful for design is
out of the scope of this paper, and our chief objective was to present our empirical
material, we provide some preliminary suggestions. The five virtues offer insights
into design values that could guide future development. For example, the virtue of
wisdom stresses individuals’ pursuit of knowledge and information. Our participants
developed better understandings of the advantages and disadvantages of each media
source, as well as censored information, in order to make better judgments about a
public event. Still, they acknowledged that limited time and energy prevented them
from getting the full picture of an event, and they were aware that they were consum-
ing imperfect information. Social media, for example, might offer recommendation
functions to suggest news from outside the participant’s usual sources, or point to the
blogs or Twitter feeds of people who hold different views.
The virtues of righteousness and integrity indicate individual responsibility for
people’s own online behavior. Participants criticized those who made rash comments
and emphasized the need for careful thought. Today’s social media design often en-
courages users to take rapid actions such as clicking “likes” or retweeting. The speed
encouraged by social media shifts activity away from deliberate, careful reflection. It
is time to rethink the relationship between how we design social media and individual
responsibility, particularly in light of public events. Design might consider means of
encouraging critical thinking before people take actions. DiSalvo argued that design
can provoke reactions and actions via identification and articulation of public issues
[68]. He pointed to two design tactics: projection, which presents possible future con-
sequences associated with an issue, and tracing, which documents and makes known
the assemblage of materials, concepts, and ideas that impact an issue over time. Such
approach might be useful in the Chinese context. Participants’ emphasis on choice
and mastering know-how indicates the value of techniques that provide rich, diverse
information. For example, using the projection tactic, design might present possible
environmental consequences alongside a product.

6.4 Implications for HCI Studies of China

To date, most HCI studies of China adopt terminology or theories with a Western
perspective. Such an approach risks diminishing cultural differences of critical im-
portance [69]. For example, the word censorship belongs to the everyday vocabulary
of the West, but its Chinese equivalent, “审查制度,” is not an everyday word, and did
not occur within our interviews. To ask censorship-related questions, the first author
approached interviewees with a variety of terms such as “blocking website,” “post
deletion,” and “account suspension” which were more familiar to participants. From a
sociolinguistic perspective [95], this usage indicates that censorship plays a different,
and less prominent, sociocultural role than in the West. Our work demonstrates the
value of drawing from a localized perspective to develop emic interpretations of what
people think and do.
Utilizing a Confucian lens to interpret Chinese citizens’ technology practices has
important implications for HCI studies of China. We showed that the five virtues are a
useful basis for HCI work in China that concerns individuals’ behavioral and thinking
patterns, as well as Chinese social practices ranging from communication, to coordi-
nation, to organization. For example, benevolence and propriety are relevant in ana-
lyzing interpersonal communication and organizational communication where people
follow certain norms and etiquettes to treat each other in proper ways. Righteousness
and integrity are pertinent in exploring the connections between individuals’ actions
and thoughts. Wisdom can be deployed to interpret how individuals seek to cultivate
their own personality, knowledge, and skill in work and life.

7 CONCLUSION

We presented a qualitative study exploring how Chinese citizens perceive and

manage Internet censorship. Participants had nuanced attitudes and practices that did
not resolve to simple “for” or “against” behaviors and practices with respect to cen-
sorship. We showed how participants’ actions were consistent with the classic teach-
ings of Confucianism. We caution against judging whether censorship is “positive” or
“negative” in all contexts, and we caution against simple binary design suggestions
for or against censorship. We highlight the role of particular sociohistorical contexts
in influencing the formation and maintenance of censorship. Specific contexts deter-
mine how people develop ways to think about and act within their own circumstances.

8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to our participants for sharing their practices around censorship
and offering candid thoughts about China’s censorship. We thank Xinning Gui for
early discussions of the Confucian framework. We thank the anonymous reviewers at
INTERACT’2017 for their constructive and insightful feedback that helped strength-
en the paper, as well as their open-mindedness to this paper’s findings and interpre-
tive perspective which is different from the dominant view of censorship in the West.

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