Ex-Post Project Evaluation 2019:

Package IV-5 (Indonesia, Bangladesh)

December 2020

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY

OPMAC Corporation

EV
JR
20-50
 Disclaimer

This report compiles the result of the ex-post evaluations. These are conducted by external
evaluators to ensure objectivity, and the views and recommendations herein do not necessarily
reflect the official views and opinions of JICA. JICA is not responsible for the accuracy of the
English translation, and the Japanese version shall prevail in the event of any inconsistency with
the English version.

Minor amendments may be made when the contents of this report is posted on JICA’s website.

Comments by JICA and/or the Counterpart Agencies may be added at the end of the evaluation
report when the views held by them differ from those of the external evaluator.

No part of this report may be copied or reprinted without the consent of JICA.
Republic of Indonesia
FY2019 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese ODA Loan
“Tanjung Priok Access Road Construction Project (I) (II)”
External Evaluator: Keishi Miyazaki, OPMAC Corporation
0. Summary
The objective of this project was to alleviate traffic congestion by improving access from the
Jakarta area to Tanjung Priok Port by introducing a traffic surveillance system and constructing
an access road connecting the northeastern part of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road and the Jakarta
harbor road, thereby contributing to improvement of the investment climate in Java. The relevance
of the objective is high, as it is consistent with Indonesia's development plan and development
needs, as well as with Japan's ODA policy.
While the project cost was within the plan, the efficiency is fair as the project period
significantly exceeded the plan. The operation and effect indicators such as the traffic volume of
general roads around Tanjung Priok Port and Tanjung Priok Access Road did not achieve the
target values. Meanwhile the target values for travel time between Tanjung Priok Port and Jakarta
City, as well as four surrounding areas, were only partially achieved. For general roads, however,
it is difficult to accurately determine the degree of achievement of the goals as the preconditions
at the time of appraisal and the time of ex-post evaluation were different. This project was also
found to improve access between Tanjung Priok Port and the industrial areas in and around the
Jakarta metropolitan area. As the development of transportation infrastructure, including logistics,
is a key element in improving the investment climate, it is believed that this project has made a
certain contribution to improving the investment climate in Java, mainly in areas around Jakarta.
For these reasons, the effectiveness and impact of the project are fair. Under the executing
agency's supervision, the operation and maintenance of the road constructed by this project are
outsourced to a private operator. The private operator owns the equipment necessary for
maintenance and provides training for their staff. The private operator covers the necessary
operation and maintenance costs, and the project site visit conducted as part of this ex-post
evaluation confirmed that the facilities constructed by this project were in a good condition. From
the above, it can be said that the sustainability of the project effects is high.
In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1
1. Project Description

Project Location Tanjung Priok Access Road

1.1 Background
Tanjung Priok Port, an international gateway for imports and exports, is located in the
northeastern part of the capital city, Jakarta. Due to traffic congestion, accessing the port was
time-consuming, and it was one of the reasons why regional economic growth was stagnant. In
2003, the cross-sectional traffic around Tanjung Priok Port was about 47,000 to 97,000 PCU1 /
day, the average traveling speed was 15 to 33 km / hour, and the ratio of traffic volume to traffic
capacity was 0.84 to 1.72. Depending on the route, traffic volume had already exceeded traffic
capacity. Cross-section traffic is projected to increase from approximately 81,000 to 157,000 PCU
/ day in 2015 to approximately 113,000 to 210,000 PCU / day in 2025, further exacerbating the
situation. With the newly constructed toll road that connects directly to Tanjung Priok Port,
capacity would increase, traffic would be controlled, and thus traffic congestion around the port
would be alleviated. The toll road would also serve to respond promptly to future increases in
traffic demand.

1.2 Project Outline

The objective of this project is to alleviate traffic congestion by improving access from the
Jakarta area to Tanjung Priok Port by introducing a traffic surveillance system and constructing
an access road (total length 12.1 km) connecting the northeastern part of the Jakarta Outer Ring
Road and the Jakarta harbor road, thereby contributing to the improvement of the investment
climate in Java.

1 PCU (Passenger Car Unit) is a metric that compares traffic variables to passenger cars by multiplying the number of
different modes of transport such as trucks, buses, passenger cars, and motorcycles by a certain coefficient.

2
 Phase Phase I Phase II
Loan Approved Amount 26,306 million yen 26,620 million yen
/ Disbursed Amount / 17,911 million yen / 23,125 million yen
Exchange of Notes
March 29, 2005 March 28, 2006
Date/Loan Agreement
/ March 31, 2005 / March 29, 2006
Signing Date
Interest Rate 0.40%
Repayment Period 40 years
Terms and Condition
(Grace Period) (10 years)
Condition for Procurement Japan tied (STEP)
Borrower / Executing Republic of Indonesia / Directorate General of Highways (DGH),
Agencies Ministry of Public Works and Housing
Project Completion March 2018
Target Area Jakarta
Main Contractor(s)  PT. Hutama Karya (Indonesia) / Sumitomo Mitsui Construction
Co., Ltd. (Japan) (JV)
 PT. Waskita Karya (Indonesia) / Kajima Corporation (Japan)
(JV)
 PT. Jaya Konstrusi Manggala Pralama (Indonesia) / Obayashi
(Japan) (JV)
Consultant(s)  PT. Multi Phi Beta (Indonesia) / PT. Cipta Strada (Indonesia) /
(Over 1 billion yen) PT. Tata Guna Patria (Indonesia) / PT Hasfarm Dian Konsultan
(Indonesia) / PT. Ciriatama Nusawidya Consult (Indonesia) /
Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. (Japan) / Yachiyo Engineering Co., Ltd.
(Japan) (JV)
 PT. Virama Karya (Indonesia) / PT. Indec Internusa (Indonesia) /
PT. Pola Agung Consulting (Indonesia) / PT. Bina Asih
(Indonesia) / PT. Guteg Harindo (Indonesia) / Japan Bridge &
Structure Institute Inc. (Japan) / Katahira & Engineering
International (Japan) (JV)
Related Studies  Feasibility Study on Jakarta Outer Ring Road and Tanjung Priok
(Feasibility Studies, etc.) Access Road in Indonesia, JETRO (January 2004)
 Special Assistance for Project Implementation (SAPI) on
Tanjung Priok Access Road, JICA (November 2010)
Related Projects None

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluators
Keishi Miyazaki, (OPMAC Corporation)

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This ex-post evaluation study was conducted with the following schedule.

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 Duration of the Study: November 2019 - December 2020
Duration of the Field Study: February 3, 2020 - February 19, 2020

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study

Due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, the 2nd field study, planned for June 2020, was canceled.
As an alternative, the external evaluator conducted a field survey in Jakarta remotely, with the
support of a local consultant. There was therefore a limitation in the collection of some of the data
and information.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B2)

3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③3)
3.1.1 Consistency with the Development Plan of Indonesia
At the time of appraisal, the Economic Policy Package 4 in 2003 after the IMF program
concluded, set the following development goals in the transportation sector: (1) to rehabilitate
distressed infrastructure and strengthen the collaboration of different transportation modes, (2)
to develop infrastructure in areas where economic development is expected, and (3) to expand
opportunities for the private sector to enter into transportation infrastructure development. The
completion of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road, which functions as a ring road together with the
Tanjung Priok Access Road, was particularly emphasized. In addition, the National Medium-
Term Development Plan (RPJMN) (2005-2009) set out priority areas such as macroeconomic
stability, poverty reduction, and improvement of the investment climate, and promoted the
improvement of the domestic investment climate and infrastructure. Furthermore, the
improvement of infrastructure services in metropolitan areas was highlighted to promote the
sustainable growth of metropolises. At the time of appraisal, the completion of the Jakarta Outer
Ring Road, including the Tanjung Priok Access Road, was a priority, and the emphasis was on
improving the investment climate and necessary infrastructure. This project was consistent with
these policies.
At the time of ex-post evaluation, the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN)
(2015-2019) which is a 5-year development plan, had nine priority issues. Under these, the
development priority agenda are: (1) human and community development, (2) leading / priority
sector development, and (3) fair growth through the minimization of regional disparities. The
plan highlighted infrastructure development for connectivity and accessibility, and included
strengthening the maritime sector, integrating remote and frontier regions, a modal shift from
road transport to railway transport, and the introduction of urban mobility. This project aimed to

2 A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

3 ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low
4 Presidential Instruction No.5/2003

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 improve access between Tanjung Priok Port and the city of Jakarta and its surrounding areas,
and is therefore consistent with the above-mentioned “Infrastructure development for
connectivity and accessibility.”

3.1.2 Consistency with the Development Needs of Indonesia

Regarding the development needs at the (1,000 Ton)

time of appraisal, as described in 1.1 70,000

60,000
Background, the time needed to access the 50,000

port was lengthy significantly due to 40,000

30,000
chronic traffic congestion around Tanjung 20,000

Priok Port, and this was recognized as one 10,000

0
of the causes of the stagnation of economic 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Loading Unloading Total
growth in the region.
Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS)
At the time of ex-post evaluation, the
cargo handling volume at Tanjung Priok Figure 1: Tanjung Priok Port Cargo Handling
Port had increased from 38 million tons in Volume
2005 to 47 million tons in 2018 (Figure 1). The expansion of the port container terminal was
underway, and the volume of cargo handled at the port is expected to continue to increase.5 In
the suburbs of the eastern part of Jakarta, centering on Bekasi District, West Java, special
economic zones and
industrial parks are being Tanjung Priok Port Tanjung Priok Access Road

developed, and at the time

Cilincing
of ex-post evaluation as
Jakarta Outer Ring Road
well, most imports and
exports were going
through Tanjung Priok
Port.
At the time of ex-post
evaluation, construction
work of the Jakarta Outer Jakarta Outer Ring Road 2

Ring Road 2 (JORR2)

length (110 km) is
underway, and 90% of the Source: Document provided by JICA

total area is scheduled to Figure 2: Major Toll Roads in Jakarta Metropolitan Area

5 Japanese ODA loan “Patimban Port Development Project (Phase I)” (2017-2023) is underway to build a new port
(container terminal, car terminal, etc.) in Patimban, Subang district, West Java, in eastern Jakarta. Patimban Port is
expected to compliment the functions of Tanjung Priok Port in the future.

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 be completed by the end of 2020 (Figure 2). Cilincing, the eastern end of JORR2, will be
connected to the Tanjung Priok Access Road, and after completion, it is expected that it will
become a new route from the surrounding area to Tanjung Priok Port avoiding the heavily
congested central Jakarta.
The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) has conducted an annual survey on Japanese
companies operating in Indonesia. According to the annual survey in 2019, when asked about
“Trade facilitation measures necessary for improving trade transactions in Indonesia”, 16.1% of
respondents answered that they recognized “Improvement of logistics to ports and borders”6 as
being important. On the other hand, 43.5% of the respondents cited “Deficiencies in logistical
infrastructure (ports, roads, warehouses, etc.)” as “issues considered problematic compared to
other countries”. Infrastructure development has been promoted through the efforts of the
Indonesian government, but the satisfaction level of Japanese companies in regard to the current
level of infrastructure is not necessarily high. The demand for improvements in logistical
infrastructure continues to be high, according to the survey results.
In light of the above, it can be seen that there was a strong need for the development with this
project, which includes key logistical infrastructure connecting the industrial areas of the Jakarta
metropolitan area and its surrounding areas with the international import / export port of Tanjung
Priok, both at the time of appraisal and ex-post evaluation.

3.1.3 Consistency with Japan’s ODA Policy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Country Assistance Program for the Republic of Indonesia
(November 2004) stipulated assistance to realize “sustainable economic growth led by the
private sector” as one of the priority areas. This included the enhancement of the economic
infrastructure to improve the investment climate. In addition, JICA's Overseas Economic
Cooperation Strategy (April 2005) stipulates the development of infrastructure for sustainable
growth as a priority, and in the case of Indonesia, the development of economic infrastructure
to improve the investment climate. Furthermore, it is assumed that trailers and other heavy traffic
will frequently use the Tanjung Priok Access Road and therefore a highly durable structure is
required. However, during construction of the structure the existing general roads around
Tanjung Priok Port would be chronically congested. In order to minimize the impact on road
traffic during construction, it was necessary to reduce the size of the substructure and shorten
the onsite construction period. From these perspectives, Japanese technology such as precast PC

6 2019 survey results. The most common responses to “Trade facilitation measures necessary for improving trade
transactions in Indonesia” were “Enrichment of information regarding trade systems and procedures” (53.6% of valid
responses), “Unified understanding regarding tariff classification evaluation between port authorities and persons in
charge” (44.0%), “Application and available / usable operation of ruling system in advance” (43.4%), “Expediting and
simplifying import license procedures” (41.4%), etc.

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 floor slabs, steel girders and steel bridge piers were employed, meeting the conditions of the
Special Terms for Economic Partnership (STEP).

Based on the above, this project is highly relevant to Indonesia's development plan and
development needs, as well as to Japan’s ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ②)

3.2.1 Project Outputs
This project involved the construction of the Tanjung Priok Access Road (total length 12.1
km) connecting the northeastern part of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road and the Jakarta harbor road
and the introduction of a traffic surveillance system. Table 1 compares the planned and actual
project outputs.

Table 1: Planned and Actual Project Outputs

Plan
Item Actual
(At the time of Phase I and Phase II Appraisal)
1. Construction of Total length: 12.05 km (elevated road) Total length: 11.40 km (elevated road)
Tanjung Priok <Phase I scope>
Access Road • Section E-1 = 3.4 km • Section E-1 = 3.4 km
• Section E-2 = 4.18 km • Section E-2 = 2.74 km
<Phase II scope>
• Section NS Link = 2.24 km • Section E2-A = 1.92 km
• Section W-1 = 2.84 km • Section NS Link = 2.24 km
• Section W-2 = 2.91 km • Section NS Direct = 1.1 km
(additional scope)
• Section W-1: Not implemented
(Outside the scope)
• Section W-2: Not implemented
(Outside the scope)
2. Installation of <Phase II scope>
Traffic • Traffic Information Center • Not implemented (scoping out)
Surveillance • Traffic Surveillance such as CCTV
System (TSS) • Traffic Information Control System such as
Traffic Information Providing System and
Traffic Information Communication
• Axle Load Scale and Control System
3. Consulting • Preparation of detailed engineering design, • Same as planned
Services assistance of tender and construction
supervision for target road section
• Preparation of detailed engineering design,
assistance of tender and construction
supervision for target road section for TSS
<Phase I scope>
• International experts: 473 M/M • International experts: 418 M/M
• Local experts: 684 M/M • Local experts: 958 M/M
<Phase II scope>
• International experts: 447 M/M • International experts: 422 M/M
• Local experts: 618 M/M • Local experts: 710 M/M
• Supporting staff: 1,320 M/M • Supporting staff: 2,738 M/M
Source: Documents provided by JICA and DGH

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 The total length of the output was 11.4 km, which was comparable to the planned 12.05 km.
On the other hand, as a result of the detailed design, the project cost greatly exceeded the initial
plan, and consequently, the route was changed. Specifically, as a result of the detailed design
completed in December 2007, it became evident that the total project cost would increase to 1.8
times the total loan amount for Phase I and Phase II. The main reasons for this were (1) soaring
construction prices from 2007 to 2008, (2) a 10-15% increase in design live load due to the
adoption of new Indonesian design standards revised after the second appraisal, (3) the adoption
of bridge types with spans longer than initially planned, based on the actual land usage, (4) the
addition and extension of connection ramps to strengthen access with port facilities, and (5) the
burden of improvement costs for related roads associated with the implementation of this project.
At the time of the Phase II appraisal, the risk of an increase in project costs due to soaring steel
prices was considered, however it was assumed that this could be covered by setting the physical
contingency for civil work at 10%. In conclusion, the rise in construction prices in (1) was due
to steel price increases beyond the scope forecasted at the time of appraisal. In addition, there
was a possibility that (2), (3), (4), and (5) were difficult to predict at the time of appraisal as they
were conditions altered at the stage of detailed design.
Based on the above, the executing agency additionally included the connection ramp (1.1 km
for NS Direct section) in the scope, while reducing the scale of each procurement package as
well as repackaging. However in the end, of the targets for Phase II, the construction of W-1 and
W-2 sections, and the introduction of the traffic surveillance system were not implemented as
these were to be included in future development by the Indonesian government and therefore no
longer under the scope of the ODA loan project. Regarding the consulting services, the inputs
of local consultants and supporting staff were increased from the original plan due to the
additional scope for NS Direct. While this resulted in a route change, there is an interchange that
directly connects to Tanjung Priok Port from the Tanjung Priok Access Road, and therefore
access to the port will not be restricted. The route of Tanjung Priok Access Road is shown in
Figure 3.

8
 Source: Document provided by JICA

Figure 3: Route of Tanjung Priok Access Road

Insufficient Bridge Column Strength in the E2-A Section

In May 2014, during the implementation of this project, some of the bridge columns in the E2-
A section were found to have insufficient strength of concrete. Following a technical study, it
was determined that improvement through reinforcements would be difficult and therefore the
executing agency decided to demolish it to rebuild. After this, based on a recovery plan
submitted by the contractor, reconstruction work was carried out on the problematic bridge
columns (reconstruction costs were fully covered by the contractor). This recovery plan was
implemented as planned and quality standards were met.

Accidents during Implementation and Safety Measures

Six accidents (one death, six injuries) occurred during the implementation of the project, all of
which were caused by human error.7 JICA dispatched safety management experts at least three
times 8 around the timing of the accidents to help improve the safety management of the
contractors. Meanwhile, the contractors also assigned safety management engineers to morning
meetings and safety management workshops to strengthen the safety management system
through education and guidance. The safety management system of consultants and contractors
was drastically reviewed9 in particular with the dispatch of safety management experts in July

7 October 22, 2012: 1 accident (1 dead), February 12, 2013: 1 accident (1 injured), March 11, 2013: 2 accidents (2
injured), June 1, 2013: 1 accident (1 injured), December 30, 2015: 1 accident (2 injured).
8 October 2012, February 2013, July 2013
9 Specifically, a new Safety Manager was hired to supervise the former Chief Safety Officer and Safety Officer. In

9
 2013. As a result, the number of accidents after this dispatch was contained to one in December
2015 (two injured).
With this, it can be said that the support of JICA's safety management team played a certain
part in decreasing the number of accidents during construction and enhancing the safety
management system.
According to the Indonesia Toll Road Authority (Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol, hereinafter
referred to as “BPJT”), the agency responsible for maintaining the Tanjung Priok Access Road
after completion, a feasibility study on the W1 and W2 sections was conducted. The study found
issues in financial resources and land acquisition, and at the time of ex-post evaluation, there
was no concrete project plan in place. In addition, the new ETC (Electronic Toll Collection
System)10 planned to be introduced on the Jakarta Outer Ring Road from 2021 is currently a
high priority, and therefore the introduction of the traffic surveillance system has been postponed,
and there is no specific schedule for its implementation. On the other hand, according to DGH,
the NS Direct section is designed to cater for the future traffic volume only up to 2025, so it is
still very urgent to construct W1 and W2 sections.

3.2.2 Project Inputs

3.2.2.1 Project Cost
The actual project cost was 47,578 million yen, compared with the planned project cost of
64,714 million yen. The main factors for the project cost reduction are as described in “3.2.1
Output”. The targeted roads for this project underwent route changes from the planned “E-1,
E-2, W-1, W-2, NS-Link” (12.05 km) route to the actual “E-1, E-2, E-2A, NS-Link, NS-Direct”
(11.4 km) route. This route change does not deviate from the project objectives in that the
purpose of providing access roads to the port as part of the Outer Ring Road remains unchanged,
and therefore this should be considered as a route change (change in specifications) rather than
an increase or decrease in output. On the other hand, the planned traffic surveillance system
which was not implemented, is regarded as a partial reduction in output. Therefore, it was
decided that the project cost, which excludes the traffic surveillance system cost from the
planned project cost, should be compared with the actual project cost. While the revised

addition, one Safety Officer was assigned to each construction area, increasing the number of assigned officers to five.
As a daily activity, a toolbox meeting (where construction workers communicate on work descriptions and setups,
issues and methods to prevent accidents and disasters) was held after the morning meeting at each construction site
(about 100 to 200 people), and safety patrols were conducted by Safety Officers. Weekly activities include weekly
safety patrols and safety personnel meetings participated in by all Directors, Safety Managers, Chief Safety Officers
and Safety Officers, while monthly activities include monthly safety meetings with the participation of all workers in
construction areas. In addition, safety management workshops were held to provide safety work guidance and education
for workers, as well as safety education to new employees with little work experience.
10 The current system employs the E-ticket method, in which the driver directly taps the touch panel of the toll gate

with a card containing an IC chip to pay the toll. The new system will introduce a method that automatically pays tolls
with wireless communication between the transmission antenna and an on-board unit equipped with the ETC card
mounted on the vehicle.

10
 planned project cost was 58,639 million yen, excluding the traffic surveillance system cost, the
actual project cost of 47,578 million yen was within the plan (ratio against plan: 81%), as shown
in Table 2.

Table 2: Planned and Actual Project Costs

Plan Actual
Item Phase I Phase II Total Revised (Note 1) Phase I Phase II Total
(Mill. JPY) (Mill. JPY) (Mill. JPY) (Mill. JPY) (Mill. JPY) (Mill. JPY) (Mill. JPY)
Construction works 17,815 20,503 38,318 32,243 15,702 22,651 38,353
Price escalation 4,240 1,917 6,157 6,157 34 49 83
Physical
2,206 2,242 4,448 4,448 0 0 0
contingency
Consulting services 2,410 1,958 4,368 4,368 1,191 1,454 2,645
Land acquisition 429 3,395 3,824 3,824 0 4,323 4,323
Administration 1,183 1,088 2,271 2,271 983 1,191 2,274
Tax and duties 2,666 2,662 5,328 5,328 0 0 0
Total 30,949 33,765 64,714 58,639 17,910 29,668 47,578
Source: Documents provided by JICA and Response to questionnaires by DGH.
Note 1: Revised project cost is the planned project cost minus 6,073 million yen which is the cost of traffic surveillance
system unimplemented by the project.
Note 2: Each cost includes tax and duties.
Note 3: Since the actual land acquisition cost for each phase was not identified, all actual land acquisition cost is
mentioned as that of Phase II.
Note 4: Exchange rates used: 1 rupiah=0.012 yen (September 2004) for the Phase I appraisal, 1 rupiah=0.0115 yen
(September 2005) for the Phase II appraisal, 1 rupiah=0.0098 yen (Average between 2005 and 2017) for the ex-post
evaluation.

3.2.2.2 Project Period

The actual project period was 157 months (March 2005 - March 2018), significantly
exceeding the planned project period of 82 months (March 2005 - December 2011) (ratio
against plan: 191%) confirmed at the time of the Phase I appraisal (Table 3).

Table 3: Planned and Actual Project Period

Plan Actual
Item
At Phase I Appraisal Phase I Scope Phase II Scope
Signing of Loan March 2005 March 2005 (Phase I) March 2005
Agreement (Phase II) March 2006
Selection of consultants Mar. 2005 – Feb. 2006 Apr. 2005 – Nov. 2006 Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2010
Consulting services Mar. 2006 – Dec. 2010 Jan. 2007 – Mar. 2018 Dec. 2010 – Dec. 2016
Detailed design and Mar. 2006 – Mar. 2008 (Detailed design) (Procurement)
procurement for main Nov. 2006 – Mar 2008 Apr. 2010 – Jun. 2011
contractors (Procurement) Aug. 2012 – Nov. 2013
Dec. 2007 – Nov. 2013
Land acquisition and Feb. 2005 – Apr. 2006 Feb. 2011 – Dec. 2013 Feb. 2011 – Sep. 2014
Resettlement
Construction works Apr. 2008 – Dec. 2010 Jan. 2009 – Mar. 2017 Mar. 2011 – Dec. 2016
Warranty period Jan. 2011 – Dec. 2011 Apr. 2017 – Mar. 2018 Jan. 2017 – Dec. 2017
Project completion Dec. 2011 Mar. 2018 Dec. 2017
Source: Documents provided by JICA and Response to questionnaires by DGH.
Note: The project completion is defined as the end of warranty period.

11
 The reasons for the delay were: (1) the delay in the selection of consultants, particularly for
Phase I, which was due to a single bidding, (2) the extended detailed design period due to scope
changes such as the addition of connection ramps (NS Direct section), and (3) the delay in, and
lengthened procurement procedure of the main contractor due to the review of each
procurement package scope and repackaging, (4) the delay in, and lengthened construction
work due to the timing of land acquisition, and (5) the delay in the construction period due to
the reconstruction of the bridge columns due to the insufficient bridge column strength in the
E2-A section.

3.2.3 Results of Calculations for Internal Rates of Return (Reference only)

(1) Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR)
The Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) of this project was 4.9% at the time of the Phase
I appraisal and 4.0% at the time of the Phase II appraisal. Table 4 shows the preconditions for
the FIRR. The FIRR was not recalculated as it was difficult to collect the data necessary for
recalculation at the time of ex-post evaluation. On the other hand, considering the result of EIRR
recalculation as described later, it seems that even if the FIRR recalculation had been feasible,
the results would have dropped to a negative value.

Table 4: Financial Internal Rate of Return at the Time of Project Appraisal

Item Phase I Appraisal Phase II Appraisal
Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 4.9% 4.0%
Cost Project cost, Operation and Project cost, Operation and
maintenance cost maintenance cost
Benefit Toll fee Toll fee
Project life 30 years 30 years
Source: Document provided by JICA

(2) Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR)

The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of this project was 33.8% at the time of the
Phase I appraisal and 30.7% at the time of the Phase II appraisal. Table 5 shows the preconditions
for the EIRR. The EIRR recalculated at the time of ex-post evaluation was 5.4%, which was
significantly lower than the EIRR at the time of appraisal. The main reason for this was a
decrease in benefits as the actual traffic volume was lower than expected at the time of appraisal
and so on. For the IRR calculation at the appraisal, the starting point of the project life was
defined as the year of project completion. Meanwhile, the starting point of project life was
redefined as the year of the loan agreement signing at the time of ex-post evaluation. When the
EIRR at the time of appraisal was calculated under the same conditions, the results were the
same at 30.7%.

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 Table 5: Economic Internal Rate of Return at the Time of Project Appraisal
Item Phase I Appraisal Phase II Appraisal
Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 33.8% 30.7%
Cost Project cost excluding tax, Project cost excluding tax,
operation and maintenance cost operation and maintenance cost
Benefit Savings in the operating cost of Savings in the operating cost of
vehicles, reduction of travelling vehicles, reduction of travelling
time time
Project life 30 years 30 years
Source: Document provided by JICA

Although the project cost was within the plan, the project period significantly exceeded the plan.
Therefore, the efficiency of this project is fair.

Facilities constructed by the Project

Tanjung Priok Access Road Bridge Column Toll Station

3.3 Effectiveness and Impacts11 (Rating: ②)

3.3.1 Effectiveness
3.3.1.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators)
The operation and effect indicators of the project are shown in Table 6. In this ex-post
evaluation, project completion was deemed in March 2018, the end of the warranty period,
although construction work was completed in March 2017, and the Access Road has been in
service since April 2017.

11 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with Consideration of Impacts.

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 Table 6 :Operation and Effect Indicators
Baseline Target Actual
2004 2012 2018 2019 2020
Indicators
1 year after Project 1 year after 2 years after
completion completion completion completion
1. Annual Average Daily Traffic
(AADT) (No. of vehicle / day)
a) General roads 70,058 42,000 185,947 (Note1) N.A. 123,986 (Note2)
b) Tanjung Priok Access Road ― 78,400 21,048 21,950 17,675
2. Travel time from Tanjung
Priok Port (minutes)
a) From JICT-1 Terminal to
29 15 N.A. N.A. 11 (Note3)
Cakung I.C. (13 km)
b) From JICT-1 Terminal to
106 47 N.A. N.A. 43.5 (Note3)
Cikarang (43 km)
c) From JICT-1 Terminal to Not
70 47 N.A. N.A.
Citeureup (43 km) measured
d) From JICT-1 Terminal to Not
174 79 N.A. N.A.
Balaraja (72 km) measured
Source: Documents provided by JICA and BPJT.
Note 1: Data provided by BPJT (surveyed on January 4, 2018).
Note 2: A sample traffic volume survey by the JICA evaluation team (surveyed on March 19, 2020). The survey point
was at Janpea road (JL. Janpea) connecting to the main entrance of the port.
Note 3: Actual date measured by the JICA evaluation team. The travel times between Tanjung Priok Port and Citeureup
as well as Tanjung Priok Port and Balaraja were not measured by the team.
Note 4: Regarding the actual traffic volume of Tanjung Priok Access Road, the 2018 data covers 9 months from April
to December, the 2019 data covers 12 months from January to December, and the 2020 data covers 7 months from
January to July.

(1) Average Annual Traffic

The actual traffic volume on general roads was 185,947 vehicles per day in 2018. Data for
the actual traffic volume one year after completion of the project (2019), the target year, could
not be obtained from the executing agency. The ex-post evaluation team therefore conducted a
sample traffic volume survey in March 2020, and the actual traffic volume then was 123,986
vehicles per day. These actual values did not achieve the target value of 42,000 vehicles or less
per day, which was a significant increase from the 2004 baseline value of 70,058 vehicles per
day.
The main reason for this is that the
(1,000 cars)
general roads around Tanjung Priok Port 20,000
18,000

were widened from 4-lane roads to 6-lane 16,000

14,000

roads (some sections are elevated) at the 12,000

10,000

same time as the completion of the

8,000
6,000
4,000
project, and therefore the transportation 2,000
0
capacity of the roads increased. The 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
No. of Registered Vehicle

traffic volume of general roads in the Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS)

target year initially set (2012) was a Figure 4: Registered Vehicles in the Jakarta
predicted traffic volume assuming a 4-

14
 lane road, but since 2018, the general roads have been widened to 6 lanes. With this, the
preconditions for the transport capacity of general roads differed greatly between the time of
appraisal and ex-post evaluation. Since 2012, the number of registered vehicles in the Jakarta
metropolitan area has increased by an average of about 8% annually (Figure 4). Considering
the above, it is difficult to judge the degree of achievement by simply comparing the target
value set at the time of appraisal with the actual value of the ex-post evaluation year.
Regarding the traffic volume of the Access Road, the actual traffic volume after opening was
21,048 vehicles per day in 2018, 21,950 vehicles per day in 2019, and 17,675 vehicles per day
in 2020, which were far below the target value of 78,400 vehicles or more per day. The factor
that contributed to the actual value decrease of 2020 compared to the previous year is thought
to be that economic and social activities have been severely restricted throughout Indonesia,
including the Jakarta metropolitan area, due to the coronavirus infection pandemic since March
2020.

Table 7: Breakdown of Traffic Volume by Type of Vehicle at Tanjung Priok Access Road
2018 2019 2020
Item Traffic Traffic Traffic
Ratio Ratio Ratio
volume volume volume
(%) (%) (%)
(vehicle / day) (vehicle / day) (vehicle / day)
Category I (ordinary vehicles) 16,899 80.3 16,863 76.8 12,562 71.1
Category II (bus, two axle) 1,578 7.5 1,448 6.6 1,307 7.4
Category III (three axle) 1,013 4.8 1,409 6.4 1,288 7.3
Category IV (four axle) 836 4.0 1,092 5.0 1,317 7.5
Category V (four or more axle) 722 3.4 1,138 5.2 1,201 6.8
Total 21,048 100.0 21,950 100.0 17,675 100.0
Source: BPJT
Note: Regarding the traffic volume, the 2018 date covers 9 months from April to December, the 2019 data covers 12
months from January to December, and the 2020 date covers 7 months from January to July.

Table 7 shows the breakdown of vehicle types that used the Access Road from 2018 to 2020.
Category I (ordinary vehicles) accounts for more than 70% of the total, while category V (four
or more axle), which includes large transport vehicles such as container trucks, is 5-6%.
However, looking at trends over the past three years, the proportion of category I has been
declining each year, while the ratios of other categories have increased.
The factors for the low usage rate of large vehicles are as follows: (1) Due to the traffic
regulations of Jakarta City, the use of category III to V vehicles is restricted on toll roads
(including the Access Road) in the city from 6 am to 9 am. (2) The timing of container imports
and exports is concentrated on a specific day of the week or time, and at these times traffic
stays within the port premises, resulting in a long wait to enter the port. Therefore, drivers tend
to avoid using the Access Road and prefer to wait in line on general roads (general roads allow
drivers to step out of the car to use the restroom, eat, and smoke cigarettes, while on highways,

15
 drivers are required to wait inside the car for a long period of time). (3) Drivers are more likely
to use general roads because it is expensive (because of the highway toll) to use the Tanjung
Priok Access Road, which covers a relatively short distance, only for the purpose of accessing
the Tanjung Priok Port from Jakarta City. (4) The Cakung area on the east side of Tanjung
Priok port is home to shipping company container depots (facilities for storing, cleaning,
inspecting, and repairing containers). Therefore, many container trucks use general roads
instead of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road and do not use the Access Road.
On the other hand, the Jakarta Outer Ring Road 2, which is scheduled to open by the end of
2020 with the exception of some areas, will be connected to the Jakarta Outer Ring Road and
Access Road by Cilincing, which will most likely lead to an increase in the usage of the Access
Road.

(2) Travel Time from Tanjung Priok Port

BPJT has not measured the actual time required from Tanjung Priok Port to Cakung (13 km),
Cikarang (43 km), Citeureup (43 km), and Balaraja (72 km). When the ex-post evaluation team
measured the two sections between the port and Cakung and Cikarang, the times recorded were
11 minutes (target value 15 minutes) and 43.5 minutes (target value 47 minutes), respectively,
and both achieved the target values. The Second Jakarta-Cikampek Expressway12 (38 km)
opened in December 2019, and this is considered to have significantly contributed to the shorter
travel time between Tanjung Priok Port and Cikarang. However, these times required were
measured during the week starting from March 15, 2020, which is when the effects of the
coronavirus infection pandemic on economic activity in Indonesia began. It cannot be denied,
and is important to note, that the traffic volume may have been slightly lighter than that at
normal times.
On the other hand, the existing road network between the Tanjung Priok Port and Citeureup
in southern Jakarta and Balaraja in western Jakarta has not changed significantly. As for freight
transportation on the route between the southern and eastern parts of Jakarta and the port, the
effects of this project in regards to time reduction appear to be limited because the Inner Ring
Road, which is constantly congested, is mainly used (Figure 5).

12 A four-lane elevated expressway built on the existing Jakarta-Cikampek Expressway (First Jakarta-Cikampek
Expressway) connecting Jakarta and the eastern industrial area. Within Category I, only passenger vehicles other than
buses and trucks can enter, and large vehicles are not allowed. It is connected to the Jakarta Outer Ring Road at Cikunir
and the Jakarta Outer Ring Road 2 at Cibitung.

16
 Source: Prepared by the External Evaluator by using Google Map.

Figure 5: Locations of Cakung, Cikarang, Citeureup and Balaraja

3.3.1.2 Qualitative Effects (Other Effects)

(1) Alleviation of Traffic Congestion
The key informant interview 13 conducted during the ex-post evaluation found that the
logistics companies and the local businesses along the general roads around Tanjung Priok Port
noticed less traffic congestion after the project implementation than before, and that the flow
of vehicles had improved. The main reason for this is that at the timing of project completion,
the general roads around the port were widened from 4-lane roads to 6-lane roads, and therefore,
the transportation capacity of the roads increased. However, on certain days and times when
import and export container cargo is concentrated (import cargo on Monday and Tuesday,
export cargo on Thursday and Friday from 4 pm to 2 am), congestion may occur with container
trucks waiting to enter the port premises occupying one lane and forming a long line. As
mentioned above, the transportation time between industrial parks located in the eastern
suburbs of Jakarta, such as Cikarang and Bekasi, and the Tanjung Priok Port has reduced. This
project is presumed to have contributed to the alleviation of this traffic congestion, in addition
to the effect of the newly constructed Second Jakarta-Cikampek Expressway. Additionally,
according to one logistics company, replacing manual toll collection with the current E-ticket
method on all toll roads has also helped reduce traffic congestion and time.

(2) Improved Access to Tanjung Priok Port

The key informant interview found that the container freight transportation time between the
industrial park around Cikarang and Tanjung Priok Port took 5-6 hours before project

13 The targets of the key informant interview are as follows: Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, Jakarta
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, JETRO Jakarta office, one container terminal operating company (NPCT1), two
logistic companies, three industrial park management companies (Cakung, Cikarang, Citeureup), two industrial park
tenant companies (manufacturers) (Cikarang), three local businesses along the general roads around Tanjung Priok Port
(grocery store, rope dealer, automobile repair shop).

17
 implementation, compared to 2 to 3 hours at the time of ex-post evaluation. As mentioned
above, it has been acknowledged that travel time between Tanjung Priok Port and the areas of
Cakung in East Jakarta and Cikarang (West Java) in the eastern suburbs of Jakarta has reduced.
Even in the industrial park in the Cakung area, which is relatively close to Tanjung Priok Port,
many companies use only one section of the Access Road to avoid traffic congestion in the city.
Those within the industrial park in Cakung have noticed that access to the port from the area
has improved. This project also included the construction of an interchange that connects the
Access Road directly to the gateway of the port, and this has become the shortest route to
Tanjung Priok Port using the Access Road and the Jakarta Outer Ring Road, improving the
convenience of the port’s import and export cargo transportation.
On the other hand, according to the Jakarta Chamber of Commerce and Industry, many of the
large vehicles heading for Tanjung Priok Port from Citeureup in southern Jakarta and Balaraja
in western Jakarta, choose the Inner Ring Road (without using the Access Road) and general
roads to reach the port. This is due to the fact that using the Inner Ring Road already costs a
toll (17,000 rupiah for large vehicles) and that continuing onto the Access Road to enter the
port further increases the cost with an additional 30,000 rupiah. Due to the high tolls for even
short distances on the Access Road, many large vehicles tend not to choose the Access Road
after considering both the additional charges and the benefits of saving time. Meanwhile, the
route from Cikarang and Cikampek in eastern Jakarta to the port is connected to the Outer Ring
Road via the Jakarta-Cikampek Expressway, and the toll for the Access Road section is
integrated into the Outer Ring Road toll (30,000 rupiah for large vehicles), so there is no
additional charge. Considering these facts, it seems that, compared to before project
implementation, the project’s impact on improving access between the port and southern and
eastern Jakarta is limited.

3.3.2 Impacts
3.3.2.1 Intended Impacts
(1) Improvement of Investment Climate
(a) Ease of logistics between Tanjung Priok Port and Industrial Parks on Java Island
As mentioned above, with the access improvements between Tanjung Priok Port and Cakung
in East Jakarta and Cikarang (West Java) in the eastern suburbs of Jakarta, the logistics related
to Tanjung Priok Port imports and exports has become smoother from the point of view of the
industrial parks and tenant companies in those areas. Even for logistics companies,
transportation efficiency and turnover rates have improved. While before project
implementation freight transportation between the port and the industrial areas in the eastern
suburbs of Jakarta such as Cikarang and Bekasi took place once a day, now it takes place about
twice a day. Business efficiency for these companies has also improved. In the past, it was

18
difficult to predict transportation time due to traffic congestion and drivers would often return
between 9-10pm. Now, however, the situation has improved, and drivers are able to return to
the company between 6-7pm. Similarly, shorter transportation time has helped with
predictability and reduced overtime for warehouse employees.

(b) Reduction of Distribution Costs between Tanjung Priok Port and Industrial Parks on Java
Island
Through interviews with logistics companies and tenant companies within the industrial parks,
it became apparent that although the frequency of container transportation delivery has
increased, distribution fees are based on individual contracts between the logistics company
and its customer and are not necessarily determined by transportation time and costs. Therefore
smooth distribution does not immediately lead to a reduction in distribution costs. On the other
hand, the amount of cargo handled by logistics companies has increased due to the increased
number of deliveries, and as a result, company profits have also increased. With the shorter
transportation time, the punctuality of transportation times has improved, and logistics
companies have been able to gain more customer trust, which has been a positive impact. In
addition, tenant companies no longer need to pay extra overtime wages to employees who
unload cargo as imported cargo now arrives earlier due to both the shortened transportation
time and the fact that the times of cargo arrival, loading and unloading are predictable. With
employees finishing their work during business hours, companies have also seen improvements
in their business efficiency.

(c) Others
Cargo handling volume at Tanjung Priok
(Million USD)

Port increased to 58 million tons per year in 35,000

30,000
2012, but has remained at the level of 45 to 25,000

47 million tons per year for the last three 20,000

15,000
years (2016-2018), as shown in Figure 1.
10,000

The amount of domestic investment in the 5,000

Special Capital Province of Jakarta (DKI

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Jakarta) increased significantly from 8.5

DKI Jakarta Indonesia

Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS)

million rupiah in 2012 to 47 million rupiah
Figure 6: Foreign Investment in Jakarta
in 2017 and 49 million rupiah in 2018. The
amount of foreign investment in DKI Jakarta temporarily increased to 17.8 million dollars in
2014, but has remained at the level of 3 to 4 million dollars since then. On the other hand, the
amount of foreign investment in Indonesia has been on the rise since 2010, and remained
steadily at a high level of 29 to 32 million dollars per year for the last three years (2016-2018)

19
 as shown in Figure 6. According to the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board, investment
from countries such as China, Malaysia, the United States, and Singapore has increased since
2017, and in recent years, investment in the infrastructure sector has been noticeably increasing.
Although various factors such as Indonesia’s investment policy, industrial policy and
macroeconomics may have triggered the increase in cargo handling volume as well as domestic
and overseas investment, the Board recognizes that the improvements in the access to Tanjung
Priok Port achieved through the project have contributed to further investment around Jakarta
to a certain extent.
Regarding the improvement of the investment climate, the following issues have also been
recognized.

(i) Lack of Roads exclusively used by Heavy Vehicles Connecting Major Industrial Parks
In the areas around Jakarta, transportation infrastructure between industrial parks and the city
of Jakarta as well as the ports is improving. However, there are very few roads or bridges
directly connecting industrial parks in the same area on the outskirts of Jakarta which can
accommodate heavy vehicles. For this reason, it is necessary for many heavy vehicles to make
a detour and go through toll roads even when going to a nearby industrial park. In improving
transportation infrastructure, developing roads suitable for heavy vehicles that connect major
industrial parks is also a key issue.

(ii) Import and Export Procedure Time

It has been pointed out that Indonesia has a longer import procedure (document procedure)
compared to Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In addition to improving
transportation infrastructure, speeding up port procedures is also a necessary task.

(iii) Structural Issues within Indonesia's Logistics Industry

In Indonesia, forwarder14 regulations (multi-license regulations) require separate companies
to carry out forwarding and truck transportation, which is an obstacle to logistical efficiency.
There are also restrictions on foreign-affiliated forwarding companies, which make it difficult
to generate competition in the industry and therefore costs remain high.

Based on the above, it can be said that this project has had a positive impact to a certain extent
in promoting smooth logistics between Tanjung Priok Port and industrial parks on Java Island,
especially Cakung in East Jakarta and Cikarang (West Java) in the eastern suburbs of Jakarta.
The development of the transportation infrastructure, including logistics, is key to improving

14 A forwarder means an operator who does not have a means of transportation by themselves, uses ships, aircraft,
railroads, trucks, etc., and directly contracts with the shipper to transport freight.

20
the investment climate, and, therefore, this project has made a certain contribution to improving
the investment climate on Java Island, centering on the areas around Jakarta.

3.3.2.2 Other Positive and Negative Impacts

(1) Impact on the Natural Environment
This project was classified as Category A because it falls under the highly influential sector
listed in the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Guidelines for Confirmation of
Environmental and Social Consideration (established in April 2002). As project sites were
located in the residential, commercial, and industrial areas of northern Jakarta, which did not
include nature reserves, valuable natural ecosystems, flora and fauna, or important landscapes,
no impact on them was foreseen. Prior to project implementation, an Environmental
Assessment Report, an Environmental Management Plan and an Environmental Monitoring
Plan were prepared in accordance with Indonesia’s domestic procedures, and approved by
Indonesia’s Ministry of the Environment in December 2004.
Regarding environmental monitoring during the construction phase, quantitative
measurements of air, noise, and water quality were carried out based on the Environmental
Monitoring Plan, and the contractor submitted an Environmental Monitoring Report to the
executing agency every three months. In terms of air, noise and water quality, cases exceeding
Indonesia’s environmental standards were reported. According to the Environmental
Monitoring Report, air and noise levels were above standard values due to multiple factors such
as construction work and an increase in traffic volume, and it is difficult to identify whether
this was directly caused by the construction work of this project. Regarding the water quality,
which was also above standard levels, the possibilities of impact of excavation, foundation
work, concrete work and operation of heavy machinery on site have been analyzed. As
countermeasures against these, for air quality, (1) the main road was watered to suppress
powder dust, (2) dirt on roads was cleaned, and (3) cargo on trucks was covered, for noise (4)
appropriate work process procedures were implemented to suppress the noise and vibration of
foundation work, and for water quality, (5) appropriate management of waste at the disposal
site was carried out.

(2) Resettlement and Land Acquisition

For the construction of the Tanjung Priok Access Road, 145,569 m2 of land was acquired. The
actual land acquisition area was reduced against the planned land acquisition area of 161,886
m2 because of the cancelation of W1 and W2 sections (Table 8).

21
 Table 8: Land Acquisition
Breakdown
Plan (Note1) Actual Land owned by Indonesia
Section Land acquisition by DGH
(m )
2 (m )
2 Port Corporation No.2
(Target of the project
(PELINDO II)
budget)
(Public Land)
E1 0 0 0 0
E2、E2A 117,6663 130,286 25,461 104,825
NS Link 11,325 11,325 5,650 5,675
NS Direct 3,958 3,958 3,958 0
W1 4,334 0 0 0
W2 24,606 0 0 0
Total 161,886 145,569 35,069 110,500
Source: Special Assistance for Project Implementation (SAPI) for Tanjung Priok Access Road Project (2010) and
documents provided by DGH
Note 1: The planned land acquisition areas were quoted from the SAPI report (2010). The planned land area included
the public land.
Note 2: The actual land acquisition areas included the land acquired for widening of the existing roads from 4 lanes to
6 lanes in addition to the land acquired by this project.

At the time of appraisal, a total of 72 households, 14 legal dwellers and 58 illegal dwellers,
were confirmed as the number of households subject to resettlement along the planned route.
However, in reality, a total of 364 households, 273 legal dwellers (including shops)15 and 91
illegal dwellers, were estimated to be subject to relocation. These relocated households
included those relocated by the widening of the existing roads which was out of the project
scope. This procedure was implemented based on the relevant Indonesian domestic laws. The
procedures for land acquisition and relocation of the dwellers were carried out by the executing
agency DGH and the Jakarta Provincial Government based on the Land Acquisition and
Resettlement Action Plan. Specifically, a land acquisition committee was set up to determine
land owners and evaluate land prices, as well as to provide compensation using reacquisition
prices of land and buildings for legal dwellers and stores, and loss compensation of buildings
to illegal dwellers. These procedures were carried out appropriately in accordance with
Indonesia’s domestic law as well as related laws and regulations. On the other hand, according
to the executing agency, there were cases of complaints about the land purchase price indicated
by the committee, and 83 cases were under dispute. All these cases were settled in 2015.

(3) Measures Against Infectious Diseases such as AIDS

As a large number of workers were mobilized for civil engineering work in areas with a high
HIV/AIDS infection rate, workshops on HIV/AIDS were held under this project for all workers
at least once a year as a preventive measure to raise awareness. In addition, blood tests were

15 The land acquisition and resettlement report provided by the executing agency did not mention the specific number
of households and stores to be relocated and only that 273 areas of land were acquired from citizens and 91 areas of
public land managed by the community. As there is usually one household living in one area (one block), it is
estimated that the households to be relocated included 273 legal dwellers and 91 illegal dwellers.

22
 conducted semi-annually for all workers. According to the Indonesia consultant who engaged
with this project, these preventive measures were effective.

The operation and effect indicators regarding traffic volume on the general roads around
Tanjung Priok Port and the Tanjung Priok Access Road were not achieved and only some of the
operation and effect indicators regarding the travel time between Tanjung Priok Port and Jakarta
City along with four surrounding areas were achieved. However, alleviation of traffic congestion
on general roads around Tanjung Priok Port and improvement of access between Tanjung Priok
Port and the industrial areas in the Jakarta metropolitan area and eastern area have been
recognized. In addition, a certain contribution was made to improving the investment climate,
such as the creation of smoother logistics between Tanjung Priok Port and the industrial parks in
the Jakarta metropolitan area and the eastern area.
This project has achieved its objectives to some extent. Therefore, the effectiveness and impacts
of the project are fair.

3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ③)

3.4.1 Institutional / Organizational Aspects of Operation and Maintenance
<BPJT>
After completion, the Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPTJ) under the Ministry of Public
Works and Public Housing has responsibility for the Tanjung Priok Access Road. BPJT is a
regulatory body for toll road projects, and is also the organization that manages PPP operators
of toll roads including the Tanjung Priok Port Access Road. However, the actual operation and
maintenance work is outsourced to a private operator under a concession agreement. The Jakarta
Outer Ring Road is divided into 7 sections and is operated and maintained by 4 private operators.
The Tanjung Priok Access Road is also operated and maintained by a private operator based on
a 40-year concession agreement, and BPJT regulates, evaluates, and supervises the private
operator of the toll road. There are 113 BPJT staff, and 6 staff from the Operation and
Maintenance Department are in charge of the Access Road. The organization chart of BPJT is
shown in Figure 7.

23
 Indonesia Toll Road Authority
(BPJT)

Secretary

Board Member
Board Member Board Member Board Member
(Ministry of Public Works
(Ministry of Finance) (Professional) (Academic)
and Housing)

Operation and Maintenance

General Affairs Section Investment Section Engineering Section Funding Section
Section

Legal and Public Relations Investment Preparation and Operation and Maintenance
Division Technical Planning Division Planning Division
Service Division Division I

Administration and Staffing Investment Supervision Construction Supervision Operation and Maintenance
Division II Implementation Division
Division Division Division

Finance Division

Source: BPJT
Figure 7: Organizational Chart of Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPJT)

<Private Road Operator>

The state-owned company PT. Hutama Karya has been in charge of the operation and
maintenance of the Tanjung Priok Access Road since 2018, based on a 40-year concession
agreement. The company participated in the construction work of the second phase of this project
as a member (contractor) of the joint venture, and also constructed, operated and maintained the
trans-Sumatra Toll Road (2,765 km) under a concession agreement with the Indonesian
government.
The Tanjung Priok Access Road is under the supervision of the company’s branch office. At
the branch office, 8 full-time employees of PT. Hutama Karya (branch manager, operations
manager, safety management manager, finance manager, accounting manager, traffic
management manager, toll collection manager), and 207 temporary employees (from seven
contractors under consignment agreements) carry out daily operation and maintenance work.

3.4.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

<BPJT>
BPJT conducts on-site inspections once or twice a year to check whether private operators
satisfy minimum safety standards, and to evaluate quarterly reports submitted by these operators.
The quarterly report includes the results of operation and maintenance work, the number of
vehicles that have passed the toll stations (by vehicle type), the monthly revenue of the toll gates,
and the number of accidents each month. In addition, staff training is conducted every year (three
times a year) to promote understanding of the PPP scheme for toll roads.

24
 <Private Road Operator>
The on-site branch manager of PT. Hutama Karya has 13 years of work experience at the
company, and has been the branch manager of the Tanjung Priok Access Road since the
company entered the concession agreement. Surveillance cameras are installed at 26 locations
on the Access Road, and the headquarters and on-site branch office monitor them 24 hours a day.
The company owns maintenance equipment such as ambulances, patrol vehicles, towing
vehicles, maintenance vehicles, and special vehicles for elevated inspections, and uses them for
the operation and maintenance of the Access Road. The branch inspects truck overload twice a
month in cooperation with the police.16
Employees of PT. Hutama Karya headquarters and the operations manager of the branch
receive training conducted by DGH related to traffic management, construction management,
and safety management, and share the training information with branch employees, including
temporary staff. In addition, the company’s in-house training covers topics such as service,
project management and leadership, and staff members receive this training as needed. The
branch office evaluates the performance of temporary staff based on performance evaluation
indicators every month and every 6 months. Indicators include attendance status, status of work
implementation according to schedule, communication skills, and handling of lost and found
items. Based on this performance evaluation, every year the most outstanding staff are
commended and given the choice to become full-time employees of PT. Hutama Karya.

3.4.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

<BPJT>
BPJT supervises the operation and maintenance of private operators as part of their routine
work, and therefore there is no special budget for this supervision work. If a facility is damaged
due to unavoidable occurrences such as natural disasters, repairs are covered by insurance. Any
other incidents are covered by the private operators under a concession agreement.

<Private Road Operator>

According to the concession contract, PT. Hutama Karya will receive 30.2% of the toll revenue
for the entire Jakarta Outer Ring Road. Once the toll revenue is collected by the company’s
headquarters, the headquarters then allocates the budget for operation and maintenance of the
Access Road to the branch. However, in addition to toll revenue, concession contracts also allow
revenue from advertising and other businesses. There is no financial support from the
government such as government subsidies for PT. Hutama Karya. The operation and
maintenance costs borne by the company include the maintenance costs for structures such as
bridges and columns of elevated roads, as well as road surfaces, fences, and toll gates. Table 9

16 According to the branch, 40% of the vehicles inspected so far were overloaded.

25
 shows the operation and maintenance costs of the Tanjung Priok Access Road. According to the
branch manager, the necessary operation and maintenance costs were allocated. As for tolls, the
initial toll price is decided by the Department of Transportation based on the concession plan,
and a revision of toll prices is permitted every two years in accordance with inflation.

Table 9: Operation and Maintenance Cost for Tanjung Priok Access Road
Unite: Rupiah
Item 2018 2019 2020
Operation cost 88,250,932,258 93,421,554,379 98,895,123,250
Maintenance cost - 6,847,597,048 7,121,500,930
Total 88,250,932,258 100,269,151,427 106,016,624,180
Source: BPJT

3.4.4 Status of Operation and Maintenance

The paved surfaces and structures of the project facilities are kept in good condition, and no
particular issues have been found. PT. Hutama Karya formulated an Operation and
Maintenance Plan that complies with the Toll Road Maintenance Plan, Toll Road Maintenance
Guidelines and the Service Level Agreement (SLA) / Standar Pelayanan Minimum (SPM)
established by the Indonesian government, and operates and maintains the Access Road based
on this plan (Table 10). PT. Hutama Karya has mentioned that the soundproof wall installed on
part of the road is made in Japan, and if damaged, a replacement would need to be procured
from Japan, which would be a costly burden.

Table 10: Maintenance Plan for Tanjung Priok Access Road

Type Frequency Contents
Routine Maintenace Every day Inspection of elevated structure of road, cleaning of drainage
Periodic Maintenance Every 2 weeks Cleaning of concrete barriers (fences) at toll gates
Major Maintenance Every 3 years Repair of cracks on the road surface, marking of carriage lanes,
replacement of broken street lamps, signage, and guard rails
Source: PT. Hutama Karya

According to the on-site inspection conducted by the evaluator, the project facilities have
been kept in good condition. When compared with other sections of the Jakarta Outer Ring
Road, which are operated and maintained by a different private operator, the road quality,
cleanliness, and the friendliness of the toll station staff were good.

No major problems have been observed in the institutional aspects, technical aspects, financial
aspects and the current status of the operation and maintenance system. Therefore, the
sustainability of the project effects is high.

26
4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations
4.1 Conclusion
The objective of this project was to alleviate traffic congestion by improving access from the
Jakarta area to Tanjung Priok Port by introducing a traffic surveillance system and constructing
an access road connecting the northeastern part of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road and the Jakarta
harbor road, thereby contributing to improvement of the investment climate in Java. The relevance
of the objective is high, as it is consistent with Indonesia's development plan and development
needs, as well as with Japan's ODA policy.
While the project cost was within the plan, the efficiency is fair as the project period
significantly exceeded the plan. The operation and effect indicators such as the traffic volume of
general roads around Tanjung Priok Port and Tanjung Priok Access Road did not achieve the
target values. Meanwhile the target values for travel time between Tanjung Priok Port and Jakarta
City, as well as four surrounding areas, were only partially achieved. For general roads, however,
it is difficult to accurately determine the degree of achievement of the goals as the preconditions
at the time of appraisal and the time of ex-post evaluation were different. This project was also
found to improve access between Tanjung Priok Port and the industrial areas in and around the
Jakarta metropolitan area. As the development of transportation infrastructure, including logistics,
is a key element in improving the investment climate, it is believed that this project has made a
certain contribution to improving the investment climate in Java, mainly in areas around Jakarta.
For these reasons, the effectiveness and impact of the project are fair. Under the executing
agency's supervision, the operation and maintenance of the road constructed by this project are
outsourced to a private operator. The private operator owns the equipment necessary for
maintenance and provides training for their staff. The private operator covers the necessary
operation and maintenance costs, and the project site visit conducted as part of this ex-post
evaluation confirmed that the facilities constructed by this project were in a good condition. From
the above, it can be said that the sustainability of the project effects is high.
In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations
4.2.1 Recommendations to the Executing Agency
The introduction of a traffic surveillance system for the entire Jakarta Outer Ring Road was
planned within this project, but due to a change of scope triggered by soaring costs, it was
removed from the project scope and will be developed by the Indonesian government in the
future. As traffic surveillance systems play an important role in ensuring the safety, smoothness,
and comfort of toll roads, it is proposed that consideration of introducing this system continue.
In addition, the NS Direct section is designed to accommodate future traffic volume only up
to 2025, and therefore the necessity for the construction of W1 and W2 sections, which were

27
 also removed from the project scope, remains high. Therefore, it is proposed that specific plans
for the construction of W1 and W2 sections should be considered.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

None.

4.3 Lessons Learned

Necessity to Evaluate Operation and Effect Indicators
For this project, (1) the annual average traffic volume (vehicles / day) on general roads and
access roads, and (2) the required time to travel between Tanjung Priok Port and four locations in
and around Jakarta were set as operation and effect indicators. The target road for this project is
a part of the Jakarta Ring Road, and has a distance of only 11.4 km. However, of the four locations
shown in the time required index, only Cakung (13 km) is close to the project road, while Cikarang
(43 km), Citeureup (43 km), and Balaraja (72 km) are located outside Jakarta. Tanjung Priok Port
can be accessed from these three locations by using existing routes such as general roads and
different toll roads, but the time required will vary depending on the road conditions at the time.
Despite these differences in conditions, the target value was set assuming that the time required
between the port and these three locations would decrease uniformly after the completion of the
Tanjung Priok Access Road, which was not appropriate for accurately analyzing the effectiveness
of the project. In the future, when using reduction of travel time as an operation and effect
indicator in similar projects, it should be required that the relationship between the target project
and the target section used for measuring the effect of shorter travel time is analyzed together
with other factors external to the project which might also affect the shorter travel time. The target
section and target value as an aforementioned indicator should be set after certain preconditions
have been clarified.

End

28
Comparison of the Original and Actual Scope of the Project

Item Plan Actual

1. Project Outputs Total length: 12.05 km (elevated road) Total length: 11.40 km (elevated road)
(1) Construction of
Tanjung Priok Access <Phase I scope> <Phase I scope>
Road • Section E-1 = 3.4 km • Section E-1 = 3.4 km
• Section E-2 = 4.18 km • Section E-2 = 2.74 km

<Phase II scope> <Phase II scope>

• Section NS Link = 2.24 km • Section E2-A = 1.92 km
• Section W-1 = 2.84 km • Section NS Link = 2.24 km
• Section W-2 = 2.91 km • Section NS Direct = 1.1 km
(additional scope)
• Section W-1: Not implemented
(outside the scope)
• Section W-2: Not implemented
(outside the scope)
(2) Installation of Traffic <Phase II scope>
Surveillance System • Traffic Information Center • Not implemented (outside the scope)
(TSS) • Traffic Surveillance such as CCTV
• Traffic Information Control System
such as Traffic Information Providing
System and Traffic Information
Communication
• Axle Load Scale and Control System
(3) Consulting Services • Preparation of detailed engineering • Same as planned
design, assistance of tender and
construction supervision for target road
section
• Preparation of detailed engineering
design, assistance of tender and
construction supervision for target road
section for TSS
<Phase I scope> <Phase I scope>
• International experts: 473 M/M • International experts: 418 M/M
• Local experts: 684 M/M • Local experts: 958 M/M

<Phase II scope> <Phase II scope>

• International experts: 447 M/M • International experts: 422 M/M
• Local experts: 618 M/M • Local experts: 710 M/M
• Supporting staff: 1,320 M/M • Supporting staff: 2,738 M/M
2. Project Period March 2005 – December 2011 March 2005 – March 2018
(82 months) (157 months)
(At the time of Phase I appraisal)
3. Project Cost
- Amount Paid in 21,295 million yen N.A.
Foreign Currency
- Amount Paid in 43,419 million yen N.A.
Local Currency (3,689,931 million rupiah)
- Total 64,714 million yen 47,578 million yen
- ODA Loan Portion 52,926 million yen 41,036 million yen
- Exchange Rate 1 rupiah = 0.012 yen 1 rupiah = 0.0098 yen
(As of September 2004) (Average between 2005 and 2017)
1 rupiah = 0.0115 yen
(As of September 2005)
4. Final Disbursement (Phase I) January 2018 / (Phase II) December 2016

29
People’s Republic of Bangladesh
FY2019 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese ODA Loan
“South-Western Bangladesh Rural Development Project”
External Evaluator: Tomoo Mochida, OPMAC Corporation
0. Summary
The objective of the project was to increase economic opportunities for the rural poor and
improve their access to social services, by the construction and rehabilitation of rural
infrastructure such as roads, bridges and markets, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and
the alleviation of economic disparities in South-West Bangladesh. Both at the appraisal phase and
at the ex-post evaluation, the policy direction of the Bangladeshi government to reduce poverty
by enhancing networks of rural roads and Growth Centers (hereinafter referred to as “GCs”) /
Rural Markets (hereinafter referred to as “RMs”) remained unchanged and the project matched
the development needs of the project area. This project was also consistent with the aid policies
of Japan. Therefore, its relevance is high. The project largely achieved its outputs as originally
planned. However, both the project cost and the project period exceeded the original plan.
Therefore, the efficiency of the project is low. It is assumed that the project contributed to an
increase in traffic volume and expansion of the transportation networks. Furthermore,
improvement of economic opportunities for the poor and a redress of social disparities have been
recognized since improvements in access to social services, an increase in household income, and
employment generation in transportation businesses and the private sector have been observed.
Furthermore, participation of women in the project proceeded and their economic capacity was
enhanced. Thus, the effectiveness and impacts of the project are high. The operation and
maintenance after completion of the project has been carried out as part of their regular work by
the Local Government Engineering Department (hereinafter referred to as “LGED”), the
executing agency. In terms of the operation and maintenance system of LGED and its technical
and financial aspects as well as the status of the operation and maintenance conditions, no serious
issue adversely affecting the project effects was found. For the above reasons, the sustainability
of the project effects is high.
In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1
1. Project Description

Project Location At the site of road maintenance (Barisal)

1.1 Background
In Bangladesh, the poverty rate is high and urban and rural disparity poses a particular challenge.
Development of rural infrastructure has been an important policy to reduce poverty in rural areas
and the Government of Bangladesh (hereinafter referred to as “GOB”) has strived to develop rural
infrastructure by increasing development budgets and mobilizing foreign assistance. Moreover,
in developing rural infrastructure, GOB has centered its priority on rural roads which are regarded
as particularly important among the various types of rural infrastructure. It has set forth an
integrated development policy together with facilities such as GCs and RMs, which have
synergetic effects with rural roads. In the case of rural roads in particular, it is an increasingly
important issue that the quality of the existing roads is upgraded rather than networks expanded
by the construction of new roads. However, except for Upazila1 roads that have been developed
with foreign assistance such as from the Asian Development Bank, the demand and supply gap is
still found to be large. As the South-Western region, where the project was implemented, is
characterized by its soft ground and is prone to flood damages, it is difficult to construct and
maintain rural infrastructure. As a result, the development of rural infrastructure has not
progressed. As this delayed development is one of the factors limiting economic development in
the region, GOB regards the region as a priority area for rural infrastructure development. While
the poverty ratio shows a declining tendency across the country, it is hard to see improvement in
the conditions in the South-Western region, and, comparatively, the region lags behind other
regions in economic development.
The project aimed to develop rural infrastructure as a measure to redress gaps between the rich
and poor in the South-Western region, one of the regions where the need for development of rural

1 The administration system of Bangladesh is multi-layered consisting of Divisions, Districts, Sub-districts (also called
“Upazila”), and Unions in the case of rural areas.

2
infrastructure is still high while improvements in poverty conditions tend to lag behind other
regions and the amount of assistance from donors is low.

1.2 Project Outline

The objective of the project is to increase economic opportunities for the rural poor and improve
their access to social services in rural areas in the South-Western part of Bangladesh by the
construction and rehabilitation of rural infrastructure such as roads, bridges and market-related
infrastructure, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and the alleviation of economic
disparities in the project area.

<ODA Loan Project>

Loan Approved Amount /
14,246 million yen / 14,235 million yen
Disbursed Amount
Exchange of Notes Date /
March 2010 / March 2010
Loan Agreement Signing Date
Interest Rate 0.01%
Repayment Period 40 years
Terms and Conditions
(Grace Period) (10 years)
Conditions for Procurement General Untied
The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh /
Borrower /
Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and
Executing Agency
Cooperatives (hereinafter refer to as “MLGRDC”) / LGED
Project Completion June 2018
Target Area South-West Bangladesh2
Main Contractor(s)
None
(Over 1 billion yen)
Resource Planning and Management Consultants (Pvt) Ltd.
Main Consultant(s) (Bangladesh) / BCL Associates Ltd. (Bangladesh) / Kranti
(Over 100 million yen) Associates Ltd. (Bangladesh) / IC Net Ltd. (Japan) / Hifab
International AB (Sweden)
(1) Feasibility Study Report on South-Western
Bangladesh Rural Infrastructure Development Project
Related Studies (Feasibility (SWBRIDP) (LGED, 2007)
Studies, etc.) (2) JICA Special Assistance for Project Formulation
(SAPROF) for South-Western Bangladesh Rural
Development Project (SWBRDP) (JICA, 2009)

2 The project area covers 14 districts in the South-Western Region. The 14 districts are Faridpur, Rajbari, Gopalganj,
Madaripur and Shariatpur in Dhaka division, Kulna, Bagerhat and Satkhira in Khulna division, Barisal, Jhalokathi,
Pirojpur, Bhola, Patuakhali and Barguna in Barisal division.

3
 [Technical Cooperation]
- Rural Development Engineering Center Setting-up
Project (2003)
- Strengthening of Activities in Rural Development
Engineering Center (RDEC) Project Phase 2 (2007)
[ODA Loan project]
- Northern Rural Infrastructure Development Project
(1999)
Related Projects - Greater Faridpur Rural Infrastructure Development
Project (2001)
- Eastern Bangladesh Rural Infrastructure Development
Project (2005)
[Grant]
- The project for Improvement of Portable Steel Bridges for
Feeder Roads (2000) (2001)
- The Project for the Provision of Portable Steel Bridges on
Upazila and Union Roads (2005) (2006) (2007)

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluator
Tomoo Mochida, OPMAC Corporation

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This ex-post evaluation study was conducted with the following schedule.
Duration of the Study: November 2019 - December 2020
Duration of the Field Study: February 8, 2020 - February 22, 2020

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study

A series of monitoring surveys (baseline, mid-term and end-line surveys) was conducted during
the project period. In the surveys, a relatively large number of samples were selected through a
random sampling process (i.e., 1,800 samples) and panel data analysis was conducted using these
samples. However, the qualitative survey conducted under this ex-post evaluation does not
necessarily target the same groups of samples for interview. The sampling was not performed
through a random process and the samples were small in size.3 In this ex-post evaluation report,
the results of the qualitative survey were compared with the relevant data collected through the
monitoring surveys carried out during the project period. However, the results of the qualitative

3 The areas for the qualitative survey were selected out of roads and markets developed or not developed under the
project in the 14 districts. Interviews were conducted with a total of 259 people such as residents living adjacent to
roads and markets, users of roads and markets, Market Management Councils, the staff of local governments, the staff
of local offices of the executing agency, and women’s group members. Face-to-face individual interviews were
conducted, but group interviews were also occasionally carried out for some of the questions with groups of three
persons.

4
survey conducted under this ex-post evaluation are different from those of the monitoring surveys
conducted during the project period in terms of representativeness and accuracy.
Furthermore, it was not possible to collect some of the information on facts concerning
relocation and land acquisition, such as the number of households subject to compensation
payment. After the first field study, Coronavirus disease (COVID - 19) spread widely in
Bangladesh and restrictions on entering into country were imposed to prevent further spread of
infection. Restrictions on overseas travel for the survey were also put in place by JICA. As a result,
it turned out to be not possible to reconfirm these points through direct interviews with staff in
charge of the local offices of the executing agency and affected residents during the second field
survey as initially scheduled.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B4)

3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③5)
3.1.1 Consistency with the Development Plan of Bangladesh
At the time of appraisal, GOB pointed out the importance of the functions performed by rural
infrastructure in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (hereinafter referred to as “PRSP”),
particularly the strategic importance of upgrading the quality of existing roads and the related
infrastructure, which had synergy effects with road development. Furthermore, the Rural Road
Master Plan (2005) prepared by LGED based on the higher-level plans such as PRSP presented
an implementation plan for rural infrastructure (including roads, markets and government office
buildings) over a period of 20 years from 2005 to 2025.
At the time of the ex-post evaluation, five-year plans had replaced the role of PRSP. The 7th
five-year plan (2016 – 2020) takes up issues of rural development and the identification of
priority areas (such as poverty reduction through employment generation and the
implementation of programs including those for rural infrastructure). The project remains
consistent with the description of the development of rural roads and rural markets in the 7th
five-year plan. Furthermore, in connection with the changes in policy direction, the executing
agency pointed out a shift from ensuring the connectivity of infrastructure, emphasized up until
then, to strengthening transportation capacity in order to meet increasing traffic volumes.
Thus, the project is considered to have been consistent with development policy at the time of
the appraisal as well as at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

3.1.2 Consistency with the Development Needs of Bangladesh

At the time of appraisal, the South-Western region of the country lagged behind in terms of
improvement in poverty conditions. In addition, the amount of damage caused by natural

4 A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

5 ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

5
 disasters was significant. Therefore, the need for the enhancement of the sustainability of various
types of infrastructure and the meeting of the development needs of infrastructure by paying
attention particularly to resilience towards flood damages, etc., was high.
The poverty ratio6 of the South-Western region is shown in Table 1 below. Although the
poverty ratio exhibits a downward trend, the ratio in Barisal remains higher throughout than the
national average.

Table 1: Change of Poverty Ratio

Unit: %
Year 2005 2010 2016
National 25.1 17.6 12.9
Barisal Division 35.6 26.7 14.5
Dhaka Division 19.9 15.6 7.2
Khulna Division 31.6 15.4 12.4
Source: The World Bank, Poverty Maps of Bangladesh – 2010,
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh and
Preliminary Report on Household Income Expenditure Survey 2016.

Damage caused by the natural disasters (flood damage) which have recently occurred in the
South-Western region are shown in the table below. The project area suffered a great deal of
damage due to floods, soil erosion and cyclones.

Table 2: Damages of Rural Roads caused by Disaster in the South-Western region

Information of Roads Information of Structure
Total
Total Total Ratio of
Division Total tentative Total tentative tentative cost
affected affected (b) (%)
cost to repair cost to repair to repair
length length
Unit km Lakh Tk Note 3 m Lakh Tk Note 3 Lakh Tk Note 3 %
Kulna
(Total of 3 Districts in the 264.13 16,981.00 14.00 112.00 17,093.00 2.0%
project area)
Barisal 1,033.38 65,152.91 887.16 7,097.28 72,250.19 8.5%
Dhaka (Western Part) Note1 445.72 27,766.18 434.00 3,472.00 31,238.18 3.7%
Sub-total (a)Note2 1,743.23 109,900.09 1,335.16 10,681.28 120,581.37 14.3%
Total (b) 10,544.05 660,639.15 23,158.03 185,264.24 845,903.39 100.0%
Ratio (a)/(b) (%) 16.5% 16.6% 5.8% 5.8% 14.3% 14.3%
Source: LGED, Damage Assessment Report of Rural Roads (Flood and Landslide 2017; Cyclone 2016 and 2017),
September 2017
Note 1: Dhaka (Western Part) includes 5 districts including Faridupur.
Note 2: Total of 14 Districts under the project area
Note 3: Lakh Tk means 100,000 Taka.

6 The poverty ratio described in Table 1 represents the ratio of poor households (Head Count Rates using the Lower
Poverty Line) calculated by applying the Lower Poverty Line (total expenditures consisting of the cost of acquiring a
basic food basket and the cost of consuming non-food items are equal to the food poverty line).

6
 At the time of the ex-post evaluation, revision of the road design standards was in progress in
order to cope with the increasing traffic volume. The revised standards were scheduled to be
approved at the Planning Commission of the Ministry of Plan within 2020. In parallel with an
increase in traffic volume, the issue of traffic safety has become a matter of growing concern.
As shown in the figure below (Changes in the Number of Deaths due to Traffic Accidents), the
number of deaths in 2019 recorded a significant increase.7

Source: Bangladesh Police and Bangladesh Road Transport Authority

Quoted from Dhaka Tribune dated on February 12, 2020

Figure 1: Change in the Numbers of Deaths due to Traffic Accidents

As seen above, the development needs of rural infrastructure remain recognized at the ex-post
evaluation as was the case at the appraisal.

3.1.3 Consistency with Japan’s ODA Policy

Japan’s Country Assistance Program for Bangladesh (2006) at the time of appraisal set
“poverty reduction through economic growth” as one of its goals. In addition, with regard to
economic growth, which is one of the priority goals set forth in JICA’s “Country Assistance
Implementation Policy” (2009), focused assistance is to be placed on the development of
infrastructure in rural areas. In the implementation policy, because the country is exposed to the
threat of natural disasters and as it is regarded as a partner in the Cool Earth Promotion
Programme,8 efforts to cope with climate changes were planned. The objective of the project is
to increase economic opportunities for the poor and improve their access to social services,
thereby contributing to redressing economic disparities and poverty reduction. In the light of the

7 The project scope includes installation of road signs. It is noted that Road Safety Unit is set up at LGED head office,
which oversees improvement of road safety.
8 The Cool Earth Promotion Programme is the framework for international financial assistance presented by the then

Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan in January 2008 on the occasion of the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum
at Davos, Switzerland in order to support measures to cope with climate changes in developing countries.

7
 project objective and the rural infrastructure development to achieve the objective, the
implementation of this project is considered to be consistent with the assistance policy of Japan.

This project has been highly relevant to Bangladesh’s development policy and development
needs, as well as to Japan’s ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ①)

3.2.1 Project Outputs
The project was designed to develop rural infrastructure in 14 districts in the South-Western
region of Bangladesh. Under the project, various activities were conducted to produce the
outputs such as the construction and upgrading of roads and bridges, the development of rural
markets, and the capacity development of government officials, contractors and construction
workers, Market Management Committees (hereinafter referred to as “MMC”), the poor women
of Labor Contracting Societies (hereinafter referred to as “LCS”) and consulting services. The
final outputs are compared with the planned outputs at the appraisal stage in Table 3.
Actual outputs were more or less the same as those planned although minor changes were
observed. For instance, the actual length of improved Upazila roads was reduced by 68.2 km
from 1,034.5 km to 966.3 km. This is because parts of the roads had already been improved by
the Roads and Highways Department or improvements had been implemented by LGED under
other projects. Adjustments of works were made based on the actual field conditions revealed
by detailed surveys or based on changes in priority in other cases. Upazila road networks were
completed. The length of bridges and culverts of Upazila roads was extended from 7,961.9 m to
9,635.52 m. This is due to the results of the engineering survey conducted prior to the detailed
design, particularly to changes caused by the construction of large bridges for which
hydrological and morphological studies were newly required.9 It is reported that the reasons for
changes in the number of GCs were due to the limited availability of land and space. The length
of plantation and caretaking on Upazila and Union roads was reduced from 1,185 km to 112 km
because plantation works had been already completed under other projects (by LGED or Forest
Department).

9 According to LGED, it was agreed at the time of appraisal that 10 large bridges with a length of span stretching over
100 m would be constructed under the project. Out of these 10 bridges, 4 large bridges were constructed after 6 bridges
were excluded from the project. The span length of these bridges was increased to ensure that ships could pass
underneath the bridges. For example, the span of a bridge at Uzipur in Barisal District was lengthened from a planned
length of 180 m to 560 m.

8
 Table 3: Comparison between Planned and Actual Outputs
No. Description Plan Actual
1 Construction and Improvement of Roads and Bridges
Improvement of Upazila Roads 1,034.5 km (112 roads) 966.30 km
Improvement of Union Roads 66.7 km (18 roads) 99.96 km
Construction of Bridges and Culverts on Upazila Roads 7,961.9 m 9,635.52 m
Construction of Bridges and Culverts on Union Roads 339.0 m 951.24 m
Protection and strengthening of shoulders:
- Tree planting and caretaking of Upazila and Union - 1,185 km - 112 km
Roads:
- Maintenance of village roads: - 1,400 km - 1,400 km
- Procurement of vehicles and equipment: - One set (vehicles, - Vehicles (Jeep,
motorcycles, Pick-up),
vibratory road motorcycles,
rollers, office vibratory road
equipment) rollers, Laptop,
photocopiers, etc.
2 Development of GCs / RMs
- GCs - 38 GCs - 35 GCs
- RMs - 12 RMs - 12 RMs
3 Training and Capacity Development of government 40,988 Trainee-days 43,467 Trainee-days
officials, contractors and construction workers, MMC,
LCS members and poor women
- Training of LGED officials
- Training of contractors and construction workers
- Training of Upazila / Union representatives
- Training of MMC members
- Training of LCS members
4 Consulting services
- Package 1: Review of Detailed Design, Tendering - Package 1: - Package 1:
Assistance, Construction Supervision International: International:
99 man-months 99.3 man-months
National: National:
1,149 man-months 1,138.6 man-months
- Package 2: Training and Capacity Development - Package 2: Training - Package 2: Training
and Capacity and Capacity
Development Development
- Package 3: Baseline Survey - Package 3: Baseline - Package 3: Baseline
Survey Survey
- Package 4: Hydrological and Morphological studies - Package 4: - Package 4:
Hydrological and Hydrological and
Morphological Morphological
studies studies
Source: Documents provided by JICA

3.2.2 Project Inputs

3.2.2.1 Project Cost
While the original project cost was 20,052 million yen (out of which the amount covered by
ODA Loan was 14,246 million yen), the actual cost was 20,425 million yen (out of which the
amount covered by ODA Loan was 14,235 million yen), which was slightly above the plan
(101.8% of the planned amount). The amounts of the foreign and local currency breakdowns
and the breakdowns of the project cost by item are shown in the table below.

9
 Table 4: Plan and Actual of Project Cost Breakdowns
Unit: Million Yen (Planned and Actual Amounts converted in Yen)
Planned Amount Actual Amount
Foreign Currency Local Currency
Total
Item Portion Portion ODA
Total GOB
ODA ODA ODA Loan
Total Total Total
Loan Loan Loan
Civil Works 0 0 13,705 11,649 13,705 11,649 18,834 13,550 5,284
Procurement of Vehicles
70 70 141 141 211 211 178 140 38
and Equipment
Consulting Services 315 315 441 441 756 756 556 545 11
Price escalation 4 4 1,158 984 1,162 987 0 0 0
Physical Contingencies 4 4 750 639 754 642 0 0 0
Interest during
5 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 5
construction
Acquisition of Land 0 0 80 0 80 0 172 0 172
Administration Costs 0 0 833 0 833 0 620 0 620
Taxes (Value Added
Taxes and Custom 0 0 2,547 0 2,547 0 59 0 59
Duties)
Total 397 392 19,655 13,853 20,052 14,246 20,425 14,235 6,190
Source: Documents provided by JICA
Note: The planned cost is converted at 1 Taka = 1.33 yen (in 2009) and the actual cost is converted using the average
exchange rate (1 Taka = 1.28 yen) from 2010 to 2017 (International Financial Statistics, IMF). As the amount less
than million yen is rounded off, costs of each item do not necessarily add up.

As civil works for the improvement of roads and markets were procured through Local
Competitive Bidding (hereinafter referred to as “LCB”), LGED also pointed out cost reductions
resulting from the application of LCB. However, the costs of civil works increased for various
reasons such as increases in construction materials and labor costs, an increase in the
transportation costs of materials due to difficulties in gaining access to the project sites,
protective works for sustainable pavements, and an increase in the length of bridge spans. As
a result, reallocation of the loan amount among different categories within the loan amount was
also necessary.

3.2.2.2 Project Period

While the planned period of the project was from March 2010 to December 2014 (58
months), the project period was actually from March 2010 to June 2018 (100 months),
exceeding the planned period by 172%. Major factors behind this delay include delays in the
employment of consultants, detailed surveys, design and procurement for the large bridges,
non-performance of contracts by contractors, re-contracting procedures10 and delays in land
acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that hydrological and morphological studies, etc.,
were newly required for construction of some large bridges because of the length of the span.

10It is reported that under the project, over 600 contract / packages were concluded, out of which more than 30 contracts
were terminated or cancelled for various reasons such as non-performance of contractors (documents provided by JICA).

10
 3.2.3 Results of Calculations for Internal Rates of Return (Reference only)
Economic Internal Rates of Return (hereinafter referred to as “EIRR”) of the project were
calculated at the time of the project appraisal as follows:

Table 5: EIRR at the time of Project Appraisal

Project Project
Benefits Costs EIRR
Component Life
Upazila roads Reduction in Vehicle Capital cost 20 years EIRR range from 8.1% to 50.0%
Operating Costs (VOC) of and operation per Upazila Road (112 roads in
motorized and non-motorized and total, average: 26.1%)
Union roads vehicles maintenance EIRR range from 23.4% to 38.9%
cost excluding per Union Road (18 roads in total,
taxes average: 31.0%)
GCs Difference in spoilage of 20 years EIRR range from 25.8% to 74.1%
perishable goods in the market per Market (38 markets in total,
before and after development average: 56.8%)
Source: Documents provided by JICA

At the time of the project appraisal, benefits and costs were calculated by referring to the results
of the traffic surveys by road and sales of agricultural and fishery products at the markets by
product, and EIRR estimated by road and market. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, it was
not possible to estimate benefits based on results of traffic surveys by road and sales of
agriculture and fishery projects by market. It was not possible either to collect data on the project
costs by road and market (all the costs were grouped into a single category under civil works in
the documents provided by JICA). Accordingly, EIRR was not calculated at the time of the ex-
post evaluation.

The project cost slightly exceeded the plan, but the project period significantly exceeded the
plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is low.

3.3 Effectiveness and Impacts11 (Rating: ③)

3.3.1 Effectiveness
In evaluating effectiveness of the project, as development and improvement of roads and
bridges were implemented under this project, an initial analysis was made of the traffic survey
results and the perceptions of the local residents towards benefits derived from the development
of road networks. Following this, analyses were conducted on whether or not improvement had
been realized as a result of the development of roads and bridges in terms of improvement of
economic opportunities for the poor residing in the project area (such as employment
opportunities and opportunities for starting new businesses), economic conditions (total
household income, living conditions and household savings), and access to social services.

11 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impacts.

11
 3.3.1.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators)
(1) Traffic survey results and relevant indicators
Because data comparable to the indicators and target values set at the appraisal was not
available at the time of the ex-post evaluation, the results of the traffic surveys (baseline and
end-line surveys) conducted during the project period are compared, as in the table below.

Table 6: Traffic Survey Results (Actual Data during the Project Period)
Unit: Vehicles/day
Farmer’s Market Day Ordinary Market Day
(Haat Day) Annual (Non Haat Day) Annual
Growth Growth
Type Baseline End-line (B)/(A)^ Baseline End-line (D)/(C)^
Note 1 Mid-term Note 1 Note 1 Mid-term Note 1
Note 1 (1/4)-1 Note 1 (1/4)-1
2012 2016 (%) 2012 2016 (%)
2013 2013
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Truck 27 23 37 8.2% 15 17 27 15.8%
Bus 6 15 16 27.8% 5 13 13 27.0%
Minibus 18 20 15 -4.5% 16 11 10 -11.1%
Car / Jeep 21 23 23 2.3% 12 19 12 0.0%
Tempo / Small motor
81 113 128 12.1% 42 67 81 17.8%
vehicle
Motor Cycle 202 199 225 2.7% 141 137 156 2.6%
Rickshaw / Van / Cart 177 179 190 1.8% 110 105 122 2.6%
Bicycle 172 180 216 5.9% 119 122 149 5.8%
Auto rickshaw 129 139 161 5.7% 100 108 143 9.4%
Total 835 891 1,012 4.9% 560 598 712 6.2%
Source: EADS (Environment, Agriculture and Development Studies Ltd., hereinafter referred to as “EADS”), Final
Evaluation Study of SWBRDP (2017) (P.57)
Note 1: Baseline survey (conducted at 30 locations in mid-2012), mid-term survey (conducted at 30 locations in mid-
2013) and end-line survey (conducted at 29 locations around the end of 2016). Traffic surveys were conducted for 2
days on Haat Days and Non-Haat Days for 15 hours from 6:00 am to 9:00 pm. The table above shows the average
traffic count results at all the locations surveyed. Haat days are “Farmer’s Market Days” when more farmers come to
market to sell agricultural produce and so on on a temporary basis one or two days per week other than permanent
shops.
Note 2: Traffic volumes of the respective vehicle types do not necessarily add up due to rounding after the decimal
point.

The traffic volume exhibits an increasing trend although the tendency differs depending on
the type of vehicle. As seen from the table above, the growth rate12 for motorcycles, minibuses,
jeeps and so on was not as high as estimated at the time of the appraisal, but that for buses,
tempo / small motor vehicles, and trucks exceeded the targets. A decrease in the traffic volume
of minibuses at the time of the end-line survey possibly resulted from substitution effects
caused by an increase in the traffic volume of buses, implying shifts of traffic volumes taking
place among different types of vehicles.

12 At the time of the appraisal, the target year was set at 2016 with the target traffic volumes. If the annual growth rates
of traffic volumes are calculated in comparison with the traffic volumes in the base year (2008), the rates are 10.2% for
motorcycles, 10.8% for minibuses (“pick-ups and microbuses” as the original indicator), and 9.1% for jeeps (“jeeps,
cars and taxis” as the original indicator).

12
 Table 7: Answers from Interviewees with regard to Benefits from Road Improvement
Unit: Number of Group Responses
Data taken at Respective Qualitative Survey at Ex-post
Surveys during Project Evaluation (Group Interviews with
Indicators of Benefits Period Local Residents: Total of 25 groups)
Mid End- Non-Target
Baseline Target area Total
Term Line area
Survey period 2012 2013 2016 2020
Frequency Note 1 702 1,261 1,606 15 3 18
Travel time reduced
% 39 70.1 89.2 78.9 50.0 72.0
Frequency Note 1 498 1,126 1,225 9 3 12
Travel cost reduced
% 27.7 62.6 68.1 47.4 50.0 48.0
Frequency Note 1 631 1,141 1,327 18 4 22
Destinations increased
% 35.1 63.4 73.7 94.7 66.7 88.0
Travel Frequency Frequency Note 1 589 1,218 1,341 19 4 23
increased % 32.7 67.7 74.5 100.0 66.7 92.0
Frequency Note 1 654 1,483 1,574 19 4 23
Access to school easier
% 36.3 82.4 87.4 100.0 66.7 92.0
Access to health Frequency Note 1 623 1,448 1,539 19 4 23
services easier % 34.6 80.4 85.5 100.0 66.7 92.0
Access to markets Frequency Note 1 638 1,446 1,589 19 4 23
improved % 35.4 Note2 80.3 71.6 100.0 66.7 92.0
Access to banks, etc., Frequency Note 1 558 1,255 1,438 19 4 23
improved % 31 69.7 89.2 100.0 66.7 92.0
Availability of essential Frequency Note 1 548 1,202 1,307 17 4 21
commodities increased % 30.4 66.8 89.2 89.5 66.7 84.0
Availability of Frequency Note 1 521 1,195 1,402 19 5 24
agricultural and other
inputs improved % 28.9 66.4 77.9 100.0 83.3 96.0
Number of means of Frequency Note 1 505 1,179 1,568 19 4 23
transport increased % 28.1 65.5 87.1 100.0 66.7 92.0
Road safety improved FrequencyNote 1 - - - 1 1 2
(Frequency of traffic
accidents decreased) % - - - 5.3 16.7 8.0
Environmental Frequency Note 1 - - - 1 0 1
conditions improved
(air pollution improved) % - - - 5.3 0.0 4.0
Environmental Frequency Note 1 - - - 1 0 1
conditions improved
(traffic noise improved) % - - - 5.3 0.0 4.0
Source: The data during the project period was taken from EADS, Final Evaluation Study of SWBRDP (2017) (P.33).
The data at the ex-post evaluation is based on the results of the qualitative survey conducted from February to March
2020.
Note 1: During the project period, the baseline survey (mid-2012), the mid-term survey (mid-2013), and the end-line
survey (around the end of 2016) were conducted for 1,800 households randomly sampled and continuously surveyed
as panel data where observations are for the same subjects each time. The questions for the respective indicators were
set as “Travel / transportation time,” “Travel / transportation cost,” etc., with the corresponding options for answers to
each indicator being “Favorable Change,” “No Change,” ”Unfavorable Change” and ”Do not know.” Although it is not
clearly stated in the report, it is considered that the above table shows an obvious “Favorable Change” as a sum of
responses with “reduced” travel / transportation time, “reduced” travel / transportation cost, and so on. Meanwhile, in
the ex-post evaluation, options for answers were presented as “Increased,” “No Change,” and “Reduced” for questions
such as “Travel / transportation time” and “Travel / transportation cost.” The summary of the answers in the table above
is based on the answers from group interviews with 25 groups, consisting of 3 persons per group.
Note 2: The original value shows 81.6%, but the value has been replaced because it is considered to be a typographical
error.

13
 Table 7 summarizes the responses from interviewees with regard to the benefits of road
development. The number of samples at the time of the ex-post evaluation was rather small and
responses are not from identical beneficiaries constantly followed unlike for the data collected
during the project period. However, if compared with the data taken during the project period,
the rate of positive perceptions of the benefits arising from road development (such as travel
time, destination, frequency and access to social services) shows an increasing tendency
throughout as well as after the project period. In particular, the table shows that a larger
proportion of the respondents from the target areas of the project point out increasing benefits.
On the other hand, the number of respondents who answered that there had been a reduction in
travel costs was about half at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Furthermore, respondents
recognized lower benefits in terms of improved road safety (i.e., decrease in the frequency of
traffic accidents) and improved environmental conditions (i.e., improved air pollutions and
traffic noises), although these aspects were not monitored during the project period.

3.3.1.2 Qualitative Effects (Other Effects)

(1) Improvement of Access to Social Services
Based on the evaluation through the sample survey described in Table 7 above, access to
social services such as schools and health centers show a tendency of improvement.

(2) Improvement of Economic Opportunities of the Poor

The following table summarizes responses from local residents and women (a total of 28
groups) with regard to increased / improved or decreased / worsened conditions of economic
opportunities (employment opportunities and opportunities of starting a new business) and
economic conditions (total household income, living conditions and household savings). Most
of the respondents answered “Increased / Improved” or “Increased / Improved Slightly” for all
the question items (85% of the respondents under “Total”).
Responses of the local residents with regard to employment opportunities refer to labor at
various places such as shops that sell iron construction materials and cement, brickfields, jute
mills, rice mills, construction sites, and fish processing factories. They also include rental
services for automobiles and motorcycles, and transport workers. There was also a case where
an existing jute mill provided employees with commuter bus services following the
improvement of roads. Various business opportunities were also pointed out. These include
retail shops for agricultural inputs and construction materials, vehicle repair shops, rice mills,
groceries, agent banking services, cow fattening, poultry farms, and fish farms. The answers
are not necessarily limited to employment opportunities and new business opportunities of the
poor. However, they ostensibly represent a picture of increasing tendencies of employment and
new business opportunities, which can be accessed by the poor in the project area.

14
 Table 8: Results of Interview with Local Residents and Women about Economic Opportunities
and Conditions
Unit: Number of Group Responses
Total Living
Opportunities Your
Employment income of conditions Ratio of
Rating of starting a household Total
Opportunities your of your Total
new business savings
household household
5: Increased /
4 6 4 6 4 24 17%
Improved
4: Increased /
17 15 21 19 23 95 68%
Improved Slightly
3: Same 7 7 3 3 1 21 15%
2: Decreased /
0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Worsened Slightly
1: Decreased /
0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Worsened
Total 28 28 28 28 28 140 100%
(5+4)/Total 75% 75% 89% 89% 96% 85% -
Source: Results of the Qualitative Survey under the ex-post evaluation

3.3.2 Impacts
3.3.2.1 Realization of Impacts
The extent to which the impact was realized has been examined in terms of the following: (1)
poverty reduction, (2) redressing of social disparities in the project area (increased participation
of women in society), and (3) mitigations of the risks of climate change.

(1) Poverty Reduction

Average household income13 from the main income sources in nominal terms increased from
87,335 Taka / year (in May – June 2012) to 169,322 Taka / year (in September – October 2016)
as shown in the table below. As the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 2012 to
2016 was 6.5% per year, the real growth rate of the household income was 10.8% per year.
Some of the households surveyed have secondary income sources. At the time of the baseline
survey in 2012, the number of households that had secondary income sources was 307, with
the amount being 94,044 Taka / year. At the time of the end-line survey in 2016, the number
of households was 389 with the secondary household income being 161,113 Taka / year. The
real growth rate of the secondary income was calculated at 7.4% per year.
Types sources of the main income at the end-line survey are compared with those at the time
of the baseline survey. The number of households who answered “transport driver / helper,”
“agriculture” and “private sector” had increased while the number of households that answered
“daily labor” decreased. Meanwhile, the number of households who have secondary incomes

13 According to documents provided by JICA, analysis is made separately on main and secondary income sources. The
“average household income” represents the amount of household income in nominal terms from the main income source.
(the number of samples at the time of the baseline survey is 1,782 households while it is 1,800 households at the end-
line survey.)

15
 had increased by 82 households at the time of the end-line survey. The income sources were
mainly daily labor, fishing, and traders. If the conditions of the main and secondary income
sources are comprehensively evaluated, it can be inferred from the sample survey that there
have been increases in the employment opportunities such as drivers / helpers, employees in
the private sector and workers in the agriculture and fishery sectors. It is considered that the
improvement of the rural road network and the development of markets had promoted entries
into the transport business, and the vitalization of trade and agriculture.
The increasing trend of household income is also seen in the qualitative survey conducted
under the ex-post evaluation. The table below compares changes in housing structures at the
times of the survey conducted during the project period and the qualitative survey performed
under the ex-post evaluation. From the project period through to the time of the ex-post
evaluation, those who answered that their housing structure was of tin walls and a tin roof
accounted for about 60% of the total. However, the ratio of those who answered that their
structures were of earthen walls and a tin roof tended to decrease. Meanwhile, that of those
who answered that their structures were of Pucca walls and a Pucca roof, which are relatively
strong because of more sustainable construction materials, exhibited an increasing tendency.

Table 9: Changes in Housing Structure

During the Project Implementation Data collected at the time of the Ex-
House Type
Period post Evaluation
Baseline Mid-term End-line 3 years ago Ex-post
Wall Roof Survey Survey Survey Evaluation
(2012) (2013) (2016) (2017) (2020)
Earthen Tin 23.3% 20.6% 12.3% 7.5% 2.9%
Tin Tin 58.4% 61.1% 58.9% 49.3% 59.4%
Pucca Note 1 Tin 12.2% 13.1% 19.8% 17.9% 23.2%
Pucca Note 1 Pucca Note 1 2.6% 2.6% 3.1% 7.5% 10.1%
Others - 3.50% 2.60% 5.90% 17.80% 4.40%
Total (%) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total sample size 1,800 1,800 1,800 67 Note 2 69 Note 2
Source: Results of the qualitative survey conducted during the ex-post evaluation
Note 1: Pucca Housing means houses built with high quality construction materials.
Note 2: The interview survey was conducted with a total of 75 local residents.

Furthermore, according to answers from 75 local residents about the main durable goods
purchased over the last three years (in and after 2017), mobile phones accounted for about 67%
of the respondents, agriculture machinery about 23%, refrigerators about 17% and televisions
20%.

The following table summarizes the responses about changes that had taken place in the past
three years. The question was designed with a view to analyzing the factors behind income
increases, mainly in the agriculture sector, in connection with the implementation of the

16
 project.14 As many groups of respondents pointed out increases in agricultural products and
sales, it is considered that increases in agricultural production have contributed to increases in
income. Furthermore, respondents replied that they had increased their use of hybrid seeds /
seedlings for higher production as well as their use of chemical fertilizers. Meanwhile,
respondents rarely replied that they had increased their production areas and an only limited
number of responded referred to an increased frequency of cultivation times. Accordingly, it is
assumed that inputs of hybrid seeds and chemical fertilizers have contributed to productivity
increase.15 As seen in Table 7 the item “availability of agricultural and other inputs improved”
continued to be recognized during the project period and in the period after the completion of
the project. Thus, a causal relationship between the effect of improvement of the road networks
and increases in agriculture income can be inferred.

Table 10: Changes in the Past 3 Years in and after 2017

Unit: Number of Group Responses
No. of Groups that % of (A)
No Description
answered “Increase” (A) out of 25
1 Production volume of agricultural products 21 84%
2 Sales volume of agricultural products 21 84%
3 Sales value of agricultural products in terms of Taka values 18 72%
4 Variety of seeds / seedlings 23 92%
5 Hybrid seeds / seedlings for increased production 25 100%
6 Use of chemical fertilizers 23 92%
7 Use of organic fertilizers 5 20%
8 Use of chemical pesticides 19 76%
9 Production area (cultivated lands) 1 4%
Frequency of cultivation times (for example, from 1 time to
10 12 48%
3 times a year)
11 Spoilage of agricultural products during transportation 3 12%
12 Transportation costs of agricultural products 14 56%
Source: Results of the qualitative survey conducted under the ex-post evaluation
Note: Results of interviews with 25 groups, each group consisting of three local residents, are summarized.

Furthermore, local residents (25 groups) were asked about the places where they sell their
agricultural products. In comparison with the practice in the past, an increase was observed in
such cases where agricultural products are sold to traders who come to farm gates (an increase
from 9 groups (36%) three years ago to 23 groups (92%) at the time of the ex-post evaluation)
and where agriculture products are transported and sold at GCs (an increase from 16 groups
(64%) three years ago to 25 groups (100%) at the time of the ex-post evaluation). There is a
growing mobility among the traders and producers themselves.

14 Results of interviews with 25 groups, each group consisting of three local residents, are summarized.
15 When the qualitative survey was conducted, progress of residential land development was observed in parallel with
an increase in the population. The effects of increases in productivity are also pointed out in the Final Evaluation Report
(P.25).

17
 (2) Redressing of Social Disparity in the Project Area
According to the evaluation conducted during the project period, in terms of disparity in the
project area, the participation of women in economic activities such as agriculture, sales of
agricultural products and engagement in shop-keeping gradually increased, as shown in Table
11. Furthermore, the duration for which women received education now tends to be more
prolonged. It is considered that implementation of the project positively affected the promotion
of women’s participation in economic activities and society, as well as their economic
activities.16
The project strived to promote the participation of women by making use of LCS. In the
qualitative survey conducted during the ex-post evaluation, 9 women engaged in LCS were
asked how they utilized the amount of money saved though their engagement in the LCS
activities. Their responses include the starting of a small business (shops in the market), cow
fattening and goat rearing, savings in banks, and investment in money lending. Although the
scope of works for tree plantation by LCS was substantially reduced in comparison with the
original scope, it is considered that, based on the responses from members who participated in
LCS, the project contributed to increases in opportunities for economic activities by women,
and causal relationships are inferred between the project and women’s participation / activities.

Table 11: Redressing of Social Disparity (Increase of Women’s Participation in Society)

Baseline Survey End-line Survey
Indicators
(2012) (2016)
Women (aged>15) engaged mainly in household chores 73.3% 65.4%
Engaged in agriculture on their own farm 19.7% 25.1%
Engaged in marketing farm produces 10.1% 12.0%
Women taking care of children’s education 13.6% 18.4%
Year of Education of Sample Female Population Age 7 +
No formal education 19.7% 16.5%
1-5 years 45.8% 39.0%
6-10 years 29.8% 36.1%
11-12 years 3.6% 5.8%
13-14 years 0.8% 2.32%
15-17 years 0.3% 0.22%
Source: EADS, Final Evaluation Study of SWBRDP (2017) (P.54-55)

16 As shown in Table 7 above, access to schools, health services and markets have been greatly improved. One person
interviewed during the site survey, who works for a relatively well-known school, said the number of students had
increased at his school because, coupled with an increase in the population, students had become able to commute from
greater distances by using the improved roads. Interviews with a group of women who have experience in working as
LCS members revealed that household savings increased because sources of income were diversified and also because
more family members came to be involved in income generating activities. They planned to make use of savings for
future needs such as health services and education for children.

18
 Table 12: Use of Savings from LCS
Use of Savings (Total Number of Respondents: 9 persons)
Built a new house
Started a small business (shops in the market) (Number of responses: 2 persons)
Invested in money lending
Spent total money for medical treatment purposes
Spent partially for goat rearing
Built a new house, Cow fattening
Deposited in the Bank
Savings still in hand, planned to purchase cow
Source: Results of the qualitative survey conducted under the ex-post evaluation

(3) Mitigation of Possible Risks caused by Climate Change

As the project targeted areas where natural disasters such as floods frequently occur and cause
damage, the project was expected to contribute to the mitigation of the risks associated with
climate change which the country is exposed to. The following table summarizes responses to
questions regarding the capacity of local residents and roads to cope with natural disasters. As
those who reside adjacent to roads improved under the project answered either that capacity
had “Increased” or “Increased slightly,” it is considered that the improvement of the capacity
to cope with natural disasters has been recognized.

Table 13: Responses to Questions regarding the Capacity of Local Residents and Roads
to cope with Natural Disasters
Unit: Number of Responses / Number of Group Responses Note2
Local Residents live adjacent to the following roads
Question 1Note 1 Question 2Note 1 Total Ratio
Targeted Roads Non-targeted Roads
5: Increased 5: Decreased 45 / 8 38% / 36% 6/2 17% / 33% 51 / 10 33% / 36%
4: Increased 4: Decreased
60 / 14 51% / 64% 22 / 2 61% / 33% 82 / 16 54% / 57%
slightly slightly
3: Same 3: Same 4/0 3% / 0% 3/0 8% / 0% 7/0 5% / 0%
2: Decreased 2: Increased
8/0 7% / 0% 5/2 14% / 33% 13 / 2 8% / 7%
Slightly slightly
1: Decreased 1: Increased 0/0 0% / 0% 0/0 0% / 0% 0/0 0% / 0%
Total 117 / 22 100% / 100% 36 / 6 100% / 100% 153 / 28 100% / 100%
Source: Results of the qualitative survey conducted under the ex-post evaluation
Note 1: “Question 1: Do you observe a decrease or an increase in the capacity of local residents and Upazila / Union
roads to cope with natural disasters in the last 3 years (from 2017 until now)?” (Respondents: groups of local residents,
women groups who used to work as LCS members, users of roads and GCs / RMs, local government officials, and
LGED officials). “Question 2: Compared with the conditions 3 years ago (around 2017), how frequently were you
prevented from visiting the Growth Center or Rural Market because of closure of Upazila / Union roads due to damage
caused by disasters such as floods and cyclones?” (Respondents: Market sellers)
Note 2: The “Number of Responses” is a sum of responses from the users of roads and GCs / RMs, local government
officials, LGED officials, and market sellers. On the other hand, the “Number of Group Responses” is a sum of
responses from groups of local residents and women groups who used to work as LCS members.
Note 3: Each item does not necessarily add up due to rounding.

With regard to the “increased capacity” to cope with natural disasters, respondents point out
a number of concrete examples such as agile mobilization of emergency support activities

19
during the time of disasters, the quick arrival of fire services and ambulances, increased
availability of goods at markets and the prompt delivery of goods to affected areas, less damage
incurred during disasters, reduction of recovery time, and quick evacuation. A causal
relationship between improved rural roads and the increased capacity to cope with natural
disasters is assumed from their responses. It is noted that some local residents who reside away
from targeted areas answered that the capacity had “decreased slightly”.

3.3.2.2 Other Positive and Negative Impacts

(1) Benefits to Local Residents in the Project Area and Surrounding Areas
As shown in Table 7, responses from local residents adjacent to the targeted roads are
compared with those from local residents not adjacent. As seen from the table, the project has
brought a positive impact not only to the improved road sections, but also more broadly to the
areas near improved sections that form part of the network.
At the time of the appraisal, another Japanese ODA loan project entitled “Rural Electrification
Upgradation Project” (the Loan Agreement was signed in March 2010) was under
consideration. Since the project area of the Rural Electrification Upgradation Project partly
overlaps with that of this project, synergy effects were expected, particularly on rural markets.
So far as was seen during the site survey of the ex-post evaluation, coordination in terms of the
areas to be targeted was not deemed to have taken place with the Rural Electrification
Upgradation Project. However, as seen from the monitoring results during the project period
(Table 14) and the result of the qualitative survey conducted during the ex-post evaluation, it
is considered that the conditions of electrification gradually improved. During the interviews
with MMC at markets at the time of the ex-post evaluation, 13 persons (62%) out of 21
interviewed answered “Improved Slightly” or “Improved.”

Table 14: Conditions of Electrification

Baseline Survey Mid-term Survey End-line Survey
Item
in 2012 in 2013 in 2016
Electricity Connections 48.7% 58.0% 76.1%
Source: EADS, Final Evaluation Study of SWBRDP (2017) (P.21)

(2) Impacts on the Natural Environment

This project is classified into Category B because it is not classified with large-scale projects
in the road sector in accordance with the Japan International Cooperation Agency Guidelines
for Environmental and Social Considerations (2010). Its potential adverse impacts on the
environment are considered less adverse. In addition, the project does not fall into the category
of projects with sensitive characteristics, or with sensitive areas, as described in the said
guidelines. Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) reports for this project were approved by

20
 the Department of Environment (DOE) under the Ministry of Environment and Forests in April
2009. For four large bridges having a span length of more than 100 m and another two bridges,
which were initially included but later taken out of the project scope during the project period,
LGED obtained approval of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports in May and
November 2012 from DOE. LGED obtained Environmental Clearance Certificates (ECC) from
DOE and No Objection to the Contract (NOC) from JICA prior to contracts being awarded. In
addition, appropriate mitigation measures against water pollution, noise and air pollution were
taken during the project period. The consultant and LGED staff constantly monitored whether
or not the mitigation measures were complied with.

(3) Resettlement and Land Acquisition

It was reported that 235 project affected households were listed and that affected persons were
engaged in village road maintenance works (an income generating program under the project),
according to documents provided by JICA. However, at interviews held at LGED, it was
explained that although houses were partly affected, relocation of residents did not take place
and a Resettlement Action Plan was not prepared.17 When houses needed to be partly set back
due to road widening works, LGED extended support to affected households in the form of the
provision of employment opportunities 18 as members of LCS, instead of making cash
compensation to them. However, according to the site survey and the qualitative survey,
comments were received on the relocation of local residents. This may be due to differences in
the interpretation of what the relocation of residents means. There might also be the possibility
that LGED head office did not necessarily receive and capture accurate information on
relocation in the field. With regard to land acquisition, 11.35 ha of land was acquired and 134
million Taka19 of compensation was paid to landowners according to the governmental rules
of Bangladesh.

This project has mostly achieved its objectives. Therefore, the effectiveness and impacts of the
project are high.

17 Other than setting back of structures due to the widening of roads, land acquisition took place at the sites where
bridges were newly constructed. It was confirmed that LGED paid compensation for the land acquisition. Furthermore,
during the site survey, it was heard that relocation also took place at the site where a bridge was constructed. According
to the local residents interviewed, people were informed of the construction schedule and compensation packages prior
to the commencement of the construction works. LGED pointed out that the local people perceived benefits derived
from the construction of bridges and explained that payment of the compensation had been made. There was no issue
being reported concerning the land acquisition.
18 According to LGED, the number of local residents who received employment opportunities was about 10% of the

affected households.
19 According to the documents provided JICA, the amount was spent on land acquisition, but the amount may have

included compensations for the relocation of local residents necessitated by the construction works of bridges and so
on.

21
3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ③)
3.4.1 Institutional / Organizational Aspects of Operation and Maintenance
The executing agency of the project is LGED of MLGRDC. The actual number of personnel
working at LGED was about 9,000 at the time of the ex-post evaluation although there were
13,394 positions (the actual number is less than 70% of the number of the positions). It is pointed
out that this shortage is not due to budgetary constraints but due to the lengthy period required
for the recruitment of new staff. At the time of the site survey of the ex-post evaluation in
February 2020, LGED was in the middle of its recruitment process of new staff. It is noted out
that the staff members employed on a project basis are not included in the above number of
positions.
Routine maintenance of roads is carried out off and on pavement every month and as required.
Off pavement maintenance works include earth works on shoulders and slopes performed by
LCS. On pavement maintenance works are carried out by Mobile Maintenance Teams
(hereinafter referred to as “MMT”)20 consisting of 5 members per team, which are set at a
district level. The maintenance works include the repair of potholes. Periodic maintenance
includes resealing, overlaying and rehabilitation. Periodic maintenance is conducted by local
construction contractors, which are procured through competitive bidding processes. Emergency
maintenance works (for example, repair works of parts damaged by floods, which take place
every year) are carried out as required and contractors are selected through a bidding process.
After completion of the project, GCs, RMs and ghats were placed under the administrative
jurisdiction of local governments. The routine maintenance of GCs, RMs and ghats is supposed
to be carried out by MMC and periodic maintenance is carried out by the local governments, the
owners of the facilities.

3.4.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

As described later, LGED operates and maintains roads by making use of the Rural Road Asset
Management System with a software called the Road & Structure Database Management
System-VIII (RSDMS-VIII). Furthermore, LGED utilizes the Guideline for Implementation of
Rural Roads and Culverts Maintenance Program (June 2010) prepared with the support of JICA.
In addition, LGED was in the middle of revising the design standards in order to cope with an
increasing traffic volume at the time of the site survey conducted under the ex-post evaluation
in February 2020. During the project period, domestic and overseas trainings were conducted
for LGED staff and others. After completion of the project, LGED’s learning process of

20 MMT consists of five members: one foreman, two skilled and two semi-skilled laborers. Depending on the size of
a district and the number of Upazila, the number of MMT ranges from two to three groups per district. The Sub-
Assistant Engineer of the district coordinates works with MMTs.

22
operation and maintenance techniques is continued through On-the-Job Training since LGED
used to be engaged in maintenance works of rural roads over a long period of time.

3.4.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

LGED runs the Rural Road Asset Management System using the aforementioned software
called RSDMS-VIII. LGED classifies the surface conditions of roads into four categories based
on the International Roughness Index and estimates the needs for maintenance budgets by
category. However, as traffic surveys are not conducted on a regular basis, traffic data is not
utilized for the Asset Management System.
The budgets (both development and current budgets) to be appropriated during the Fiscal Year
2019/20 will be one-fourth of the funds needed, but the growth rate is 53.8% over the budgets
of the previous year. LGED points out that no maintenance budgets would be appropriated for
three years after the completion of sub-projects. In order to make effective use of the limited
budget amounts, prioritization of the use of maintenance budgets is discussed at district level
based on such factors as the traffic volume (although traffic surveys are not conducted for this
purpose), connectivity and road conditions. With limited budgets, LGED carries out
maintenance through prioritization (maintenance budgets are appropriated by focusing on roads,
which are classified into “Bad” or “Poor” out of the four categories mentioned below).

Source: LGED

Figure 2: Funds Needed for O&M and Budgetary Appropriation over the Years

3.4.4 Status of Operation and Maintenance

O&M needs during the Fiscal Year 2019/2020 were estimated by applying the following
categories (“Good,” “Fair,” “Poor” and “Bad”) to rural roads based on the roughness survey.
While the following table does not describe the road conditions limited only to the roads in the
project area, it is noted that roads classified into “Good” or “Fair” account for more than 60%
on a nation-wide basis.

23
 Table 15: Classification of Conditions and Lengths of Rural Roads
Category Road Length (km) Ratio
Good 39,582 34%
Fair 33,762 29%
Poor 24,448 21%
Bad 18,627 16%
Total 116,419 100%
Source: LGED

The following table summarizes the results of the qualitative survey. While responses of
“Satisfied / Improved” or “Satisfied to some extent / Improved slightly” account for 80%, it is
noted that responses of “Dissatisfied to some extent / Worsened slightly” also account for 13%.
During the qualitative survey period, damage to pavement roads, such as stripped asphalt
pavements and potholes, were occasionally observed. One local resident also commented that
paved roads were not necessarily strong enough to cope with the current traffic volume. However,
surveys of the road conditions are regularly conducted and maintenance works corresponding to
the results of each survey is carried out, prioritizing the roads to be maintained. It is considered
that measures have been taken so as not to pose serious hinderances to the realization of the
project effects.

Table 16: Perceptions of Road Conditions

Unit: Number of Responses
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Rating Type 5 Type 6 Total
Rating Scale
Scale for (Type 1 -
Rating for Types Local Local Market Ratio
Women LGED Types Drivers Type 6 in
1 to 4 Residents Government Sellers total)
5 to 6
Interview Methods Group Individual Individual
5 Satisfied 8 2 6 9 Improved 9 13 47 34%
Satisfied to Improved
4 12 1 7 5 22 18 65 46%
some extent slightly
Neither
3 dissatisfied 2 0 1 0 Same 3 3 9 6%
nor satisfied
Dissatisfied
Worsened
2 to some 2 0 0 0 8 8 18 13%
slightly
extent
1 Dissatisfied 1 0 0 0 Worsened 0 0 1 1%
Total 25 3 14 14 Total 42 42 140 100%
[(5)+(4)]/Total 80% 100% 93% 100% 74% 74% 80% 80%
Source: Results of the qualitative survey conducted at the time of the ex-post evaluation

The following table summarizes responses from sellers at markets and market users / drivers
with respect to the conditions of the markets. It is noted that responses of “Worsened” are
occasionally observed with regard to toilet facilities, waste disposal systems and the overall
cleanness of the market.

24
 Table 17: Responses from Sellers at Markets and Users / Drivers of Roads and Markets
Unit: Number of Responses
Indicator Worsened (1) No Change (2) Improved (3)
Sellers at Markets: Total Number of Interviewees 42 persons (the percentages represent the ratio of 42)
Toilet facilities 11 26% 16 38% 15 36%
Waste disposal system 5 12% 29 69% 8 19%
Overall cleanness of the market 2 5% 23 55% 17 40%
Users / Drivers of Roads and Markets: Total Number of Interviewees 84 persons (the percentages represent the ratio
of 84)
Toilet facilities 27 32% 27 32% 30 36%
Waste disposal system 9 11% 60 71% 14 17%
Overall cleanness of the market 9 11% 37 44% 36 43%
Source: Results of the qualitative survey conducted during the ex-post evaluation

MMC members were interviewed about the availability of the water supply, the conditions of
the drainage system and the availability of cleaning and waste disposal systems. Some of the
respondents answered that they had “Worsened Slightly” or “Worsened” with regard to the
conditions of these facilities over the last three years. As GCs and RMs are placed under the
administrative jurisdiction of local governments, continual maintenance works of markets are
beyond LGED’s jurisdiction. However, LGED is in the position to be ready to extend its support
if required.

As described above, there exist some concerns over the continual maintenance of markets.
However, as far as the operation and maintenance of the project, in which LGED plays the role
of the executing agency, is concerned, no major problems have been observed in the institutional
/ organizational, technical, financial aspects or in the current status. Therefore, the sustainability
of the project effects is high.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion
The objective of the project was to increase economic opportunities for the rural poor and
improve their access to social services, by the construction and rehabilitation of rural
infrastructure such as roads, bridges and markets, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and
the alleviation of economic disparities in South-West Bangladesh. Both at the appraisal phase and
at the ex-post evaluation, the policy direction of the Bangladeshi government to reduce poverty
by enhancing networks of rural roads and GCs / RMs remained unchanged and the project
matched the development needs of the project area. This project was also consistent with the aid
policies of Japan. Therefore, its relevance is high. The project largely achieved its outputs as
originally planned. However, both the project cost and the project period exceeded the original
plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is low. It is assumed that the project contributed to
an increase in traffic volume and expansion of the transportation networks. Furthermore,

25
improvement of economic opportunities for the poor and a redress of social disparities have been
recognized since improvements in access to social services, an increase in household income, and
employment generation in transportation businesses and the private sector have been observed.
Furthermore, participation of women in the project proceeded and their economic capacity was
enhanced. Thus, the effectiveness and impacts of the project are high. The operation and
maintenance after completion of the project has been carried out as part of their regular work by
LGED, the executing agency. In terms of the operation and maintenance system of LGED and its
technical and financial aspects as well as the status of the operation and maintenance conditions,
no serious issue adversely affecting the project effects was found. For the above reasons, the
sustainability of the project effects is high.
In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations
4.2.1 Recommendations to the Executing Agency
Enhancement of the Asset Management System
LGED adopted RSDMS-VIII for the Rural Road Asset Management System in order to grasp
current road conditions and O&M needs. However, the road traffic data is yet to be incorporated
in the system. In order to improve and maintain road conditions while coping with growing
traffic needs, it is recommended that regular traffic surveys are conducted and that the survey
results are utilized in the Asset Management System in the mid-term. In parallel, data
management should be shifted from the current desktop-based system to the web-based RSDMS.

Environmental and Social Considerations

The policy direction for the improvement of rural roads is being changed from the
improvement of connectivity to enhancement of transportation capacity. In order to strengthen
transportation capacity, rural roads are expected to be widened to a larger extent than that
implemented so far. It is considered that far more people could subsequently be affected by such
road widening works compared to in the past. For this purpose, it is deemed important that
LGED set up a team or a section specializing in examination of the satisfaction of requirements
of, and confirming compliance with, the guidelines and procedures on environmental and social
considerations set by the Government, JICA and other donor agencies in the mid-term.

Review and update of the Road Master Plan (2005)

The project was formulated based on the Road Master Plan (2005). At the time of the site
survey, however, it was difficult to confirm whether or not the achievement level of the Road
Master Plan (2005) had been reviewed. It was also not clear if preparation of the updated road
master plan had been started based on the current conditions. It is recommended that LGED start

26
 reviewing the Road Master Plan (2005) and preparing for the new road master plan based on
the results of the review.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

None

4.3 Lessons Learned

Consideration of more rational procurement packages
Under the project, the number of civil works contracts / packages exceeded 600, out of which
more than 30 contracts / packages were terminated or cancelled. While the reasons behind the
mid-term terminations or cancellations include problems with the poor performance of
contractors, the ability of LGED to successfully manage many contracts / packages, including the
construction contracts for large bridges, is highly commendable. On the other hand, in the case of
rural development projects where the construction works are carried out through many local
construction contracts, there is some room for improvement of current practice such as combining
small local contracts into fewer contract packages. Such improvements could make contract
administration easier. There is also room for improvement of the prequalification and technical
evaluation of contractors. In rural infrastructure development projects being carried out in areas
where construction works have many construction contracts, the executing agency should prepare
construction contract packages in a rational manner, which will be easier to manage, and set up
stringent technical evaluation criteria to screen the capacity of local contractors from the stage of
detailed design to the preparation of procurement documents.

Incorporation of operation and maintenance budgets in the project costs of ODA loans
Under rural infrastructure development projects where the project sites are scattered over a
geographically extensive area, many sub-projects will be implemented in a comparatively longer
period of time. In some cases, the executing agency of the project may not receive the operation
and maintenance budgets allocated during a certain period of time right after completion of the
construction works simply because the road section was newly constructed. Therefore, at the time
of the appraisal, JICA and the executing agency should examine whether or not the government
allocates O&M budgets after the completion of construction works. In the case where the
government has the policy that O&M budgets are not allocated for a certain period of time after
the completion of the construction works, the appropriateness of allocating O&M budgets out of
the concerned ODA loan should be discussed.

27
Implementation of studies that adversely affect progress of the project at the project formulation
stage
Large bridges were expected to be constructed under the project. Foreseeing the risks of
obstructing the operation of ships sailing underneath the bridges, it was found necessary to elevate
the height of the bridges, which resulted in the prolongation of the bridge lengths. In parallel, it
was necessary to conduct hydrological and morphological studies and EIA to obtain the
Environmental Clearance Certificates. Accordingly, the project period was significantly
prolonged and delayed in comparison with the original plan. When it is deemed necessary to
conduct prior or preparatory studies that are likely to have a large impact on the duration of the
project period, JICA and the executing agency should examine the necessity of conducting such
prior or preparatory studies at the time of project formulation and, if they are found to be necessary,
they should implement such studies as part of the project formulation activities.

28
Comparison of the Original and Actual Scope of the Project
Item Plan Actual
1. Project Outputs
Construction and Improvement of Roads and
Bridges
Improvement of Upazila Roads 1,034.5 km (112 roads) 966.30 km
Improvement of Union Roads 66.7 km (18 roads) 99.96 km
Construction of Bridges and Culverts on 7,961.9 m 9,635.52 m
Upazila Roads
Construction of Bridges and Culverts on Union 339.0 m 951.24 m
Roads
Protection and strengthening of shoulders:
- Tree planting and caretaking of Upazila and - 1,185 km - 112 km
Union Roads:
- Maintenance of village roads: - 1,400 km - 1,400 km
- Procurement of vehicles and equipment: - One set (vehicles, - Vehicles (Jeep, Pick-up),
motorcycles, vibratory motorcycles, vibratory road
road rollers, office rollers, Laptop,
equipment) photocopiers, etc.
Development of GCs / RMs
- GCs - 38 GCs - 35 GCs
- RMs - 12 RMs - 12 RMs
Training and Capacity Development of 40,988 Trainee-days 43,467 Trainee-days
government officials, contractors and
construction workers, MMC, LCS members
and poor women.
- Training of LGED officials
- Training of contractors and construction
workers
- Training of Upazila / Union representatives
- Training of MMC members
- Training of LCS members
Consulting services
- Package 1: Review of Detailed Design, - Package 1: - Package 1:
Tendering Assistance, Construction International: 99 man- International: 99.3 man-
Supervision months months
National: 1,149 man- National: 1,138.6 man-
months months
- Package 2: Training and Capacity - Package 2: Training and - Package 2: Training and
Development Capacity Development Capacity Development
- Package 3: Baseline Survey - Package 3: Baseline - Package 3: Baseline Survey
Survey - Package 4: Hydrological
- Package 4: Hydrological and Morphological - Package 4: Hydrological and Morphological studies
studies and Morphological studies
2. Project Period March 2010 – December March 2010 – June 2018
2014 (58 months) (100 months)
3. Project Cost
Amount Paid in Foreign Currency 397 million yen NA

Amount Paid in Local Currency 19,655 million yen NA

(14,778 million Taka) (NA)

Total 20,052 million yen 20,425 million yen

ODA Loan Portion 14,246 million yen 14,235 million yen

Exchange Rate 1 Taka = 1.33 yen 1 Taka = 1.28 yen

(As of November 2009) (Average between January
2010 and December 2017)
4. Final Disbursement March 2017

29
People’s Republic of Bangladesh
FY2019 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project
“The Improvement of the Capacity of Public Food Storage”
External Evaluator: Nobuyuki Kobayashi, OPMAC Corporation
0. Summary
The objective of this project was to increase storage capacity by the construction of a rice
warehouse in the Bogra district, a granary area located in the north-western part of Bangladesh,
thereby contributing to a stable food supply and food security nationwide, including in disaster
periods. At the planning phase and at the ex-post evaluation, it was the policy of the Bangladeshi
government to enhance and maintain food grain storage facilities. At the ex-post evaluation, the
existing facilities needed to be rebuilt while the Bangladeshi government was increasing the
amount of rice supply through its food programs. The scope of this project was also consistent
with the aid policies of Japan. Therefore, its relevance is high. A solar power system was added
to the scope of the project. Taking into consideration the additional project scope, the project cost
was within the plan and the project period was as planned. Therefore, efficiency of the project is
high. Regarding the achievement level of the quantitative indicators, the “Inventory turnover”
was mostly achieved, but achievement of “Storage amount of rice” and “Frequency of pest control”
were moderate. It was difficult to analyze the impact quantitatively. However, the warehouse
shipped rice to a wide area and was also being used to stock wheat at the ex-post evaluation. Thus,
effectiveness and impacts of the project are fair. In terms of the institutional/organizational aspect,
although staff numbers were slightly tight, this issue did not affect warehouse operations severely.
For the technical aspect, periodic training was an issue. For the financial aspect, an increase in
the organizational budget did not reach the requirement estimated at the planning phase, though
the organizational budget was increasing. In the status of the operation and maintenance, no
serious damage to the project effects was found. For the above reasons, sustainability of the
project effects is fair.
In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1
1. Project Description

Project Location The warehouse constructed by this project

1.1 Background
At the end of the 2000s, when this project was formulated, Bangladesh had a population of 146.6
million people (preliminary figure in July 2009). It was estimated that approximately 40% of the
population did not have access to sufficient food due to poverty. Moreover, the country also faced
the problem that at periods of natural disaster the supply of food often became tight, and the
market price of food volatile. The Bangladeshi government ensured access to food for the poor
and tried to stabilize market prices through the Public Food Distribution System. However, it was
pointed out that food quality often deteriorated during storage because many food grain storage
facilities owned by the Bangladeshi government had become obsolete. Therefore, attention
became focused on the construction of a modern warehouse capable of controlling humidity and
temperature which would be a technological model for food storage. Santahar in the Bogra district,
where the project constructed the warehouse, is in the north-western part of Bangladesh, and its
surrounding area is one of the country’s most important granary areas.
Japan had supported the construction of food warehouses in Bangladesh for a long period. From
1977 to 1986, grant aid was provided for the construction of food warehouses (total storage
capacity: 115,000 tons). In 2009, it was decided that a food warehouse would be constructed with
the counterpart fund of the Grant Aid for Debt Relief.
With this background, the Bangladeshi government requested that Japan provide grant aid in
2009 for the construction of a multi-story warehouse capable of humidity and temperature control
and the equipment for cargo handling and monitoring.

1.2 Project Outline

The objective of this project is to increase a storage capacity by the construction of rice
warehouse in the Bogra district, a granary area located in the north western part of Bangladesh,
thereby contributing to a stable food supply and food security nationwide, including in disaster
periods.

2
 Grant Limit / (Detailed Design) 42 million yen / 41million yen
Actual Grant Amount (Construction) 2,156 million yen / 1,966 million yen
Exchange of Notes Date (Detailed Design) January 2012 / February 2012
/ Grant Agreement Date (Construction) June 2012 / June 2012
Executing Agency Directorate General of Food, Ministry of Food1
Project Completion June 2016
Target Area Santahar, Bogra District
(Construction) Shimizu Corporation
Main Contractors
(Equipment) Sirius Corporation
Main Consultant Kokusai Kogyo Co., Ltd.
Preparatory Survey October 2010 – January 2012
Related Projects None

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluator
Nobuyuki Kobayashi, OPMAC Corporation

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This ex-post evaluation study was conducted with the following schedule.
Duration of the Study: November 2019 – December 2020
Duration of the Field Study: January 4, 2020 – January 13, 2020

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study

At the planning phase, the planned impact of this project was defined as “a stable food supply
and food security nationwide, including in disaster periods” and indicators (food assistance for
poor households and food assistance for people affected by natural disasters) to measure this
impact were set. However, the amount of actual shipping from the project warehouse by public
food assistance programs could not be obtained. The achievement levels of the indicators were
estimated by using the shipping amount, the storage amount, and the storage capacity at the ex-
post evaluation. For this reason, the indicators for the impact were not based on actual figures.

1 At the ex-post evaluation. The name of the executing agency was the Directorate General of Food, Ministry of Food
and Disaster Management at the ex-ante evaluation.

3
3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B2)
3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③3)
3.1.1 Consistency with the Development Plan of Bangladesh
At the planning phase of this project, the National Development Plan National Strategy for
Accelerated Poverty Reduction II (Revised) FY2009-11 (2009) had five strategic blocks, of
which “Strategy Block IV: Social Protection for the Vulnerable” mentioned food security. The
plan stipulated that the government would prepare an adequate amount of food stock and
strengthen food grain storage capacity. In the sector plan National Food Policy 2006 (2006), one
of the major policies was fair intervention in the food grain market for price stabilization. The
government had the policy of controlling the food grain price by increasing or decreasing
government storage in the case of significant price change. For this policy, the government set
the goal of building food grain warehouses with a capacity of 1 million tons. Moreover, the
National Food Policy Plan of Action 2008-2015 (2008) had the policy of modernizing
government storage facilities for the improvement of food stock management.
At the ex-post evaluation, the national development plan, the Seventh Five Year Plan FY2016-
FY2020 (2015) stated that food security was to follow the goals, priority areas, and actions set
in the aforementioned sector plans (National Food Policy 2006 and National Food Policy Plan
of Action 2008-2015). In addition, the plan mentioned that government stock was one of the
policy tools to support food producers and consumers, and that the government would maintain
the public storage facilities with an adequate capacity. According to officers of the executing
agency, the Directorate General of Food (DGF), no succeeding plans were formulated either for
the National Food Policy 2006 or the National Food Policy Plan of Action 2008-20154 and,
therefore, both plans were also referred to at the time of the ex-post evaluation.
At the planning phase and the ex-post evaluation, the Bangladeshi government had emphasized
the policy of enhancing and maintaining food grain storage facilities for food security in its
national development plans. The same sector plans were referred to at both the pre- and the post-
project period. The plans focused on the stabilization of food grain prices through the adjustment
of government stock and an increase in food storage facilities was planned as a tool to implement
the policy. This project increased the public food storage capacity and contributed to the stable
supply of food grain. Therefore, the project was consistent with food security and price
stabilization of food grain, both of which were emphasized in the national development plans
and the sector plans.

2 A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

3 ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low
4 According to DGF officers, the 8th Five-Year Plan, which was being formulated at the ex-post evaluation, mentioned

the development of food storage facilities.

4
 3.1.2 Consistency with the Development Needs of Bangladesh
At the planning phase, the Bangladesh government procured rice (mainly domestic rice) and
wheat through the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) and provided food assistance mainly
to poor households. The main purposes of PFDS include (1) food supply to poor households
who suffer from shortage of food, (2) food supply during emergencies such as natural disasters,
(3) stabilization of food prices to increase domestic production, and (4) food grain supply toward
prevention of price surges. Nevertheless, domestic food stocks were exhausted when domestic
agricultural production declined due to the large cyclone Sidr in 2007. It was evident that storage
capacity was insufficient. Moreover, grain prices increased worldwide in 2007 and 2008 and, in
particular, the price of rice rose significantly due to the export bans of major exporting countries.
The increase in food prices had a serious impact on the livelihoods of the poor and caused
political and social unrest in several developing countries including Bangladesh. Bangladesh
produced 32 million tons of rice in FY2009-10 5 but the Ministry of Food and Disaster
Management had the storage facilities for only 1.54 million tons 6 in March 2010. The
government was expected to require storage facilities with a capacity of 3 million tons in 2015.
Furthermore, many existing food grain warehouses were one-story simple warehouses without
sufficient control of temperature, humidity, and pests, and therefore damage to food grain stock
occurred due to deterioration and the decay of grain.
At the ex-post evaluation, PFDS was increasing the supply of rice. While a total of 1.30 million
tons were supplied in FY2009-10 (Paid: 0.49 million tons, Grant: 0.82 million tons), a total of
2.07 million tons were supplied in FY2018-19 (Paid: 0.97 million tons, Grant: 1.10 million tons).
The main purposes of PFDS remained unchanged at the ex-post evaluation. The Bangladeshi
government’s food grain warehouses (rice and wheat) had the capacity of 2.12 million tons (1.83
million tons for rice) in December 2019, but the government planned to expand its capacity to
2.70 million tons (2.4 million tons for rice) by December 2021. Many of the existing storage
facilities were old and 45% of the large-scale storage facilities, such as Central Storage Depot
(CSD), were over 40 years old.7 Due to deterioration, CSD could not use 14% of its storage
capacity.
Rice supply through PFDS increased in the period from the ex-ante evaluation to the ex-post
evaluation, and the storage capacity of rice was necessary for the operation of PFDS. PFDS used
the warehouse constructed by this project. At the ex-post evaluation, the existing facilities were
aging but the Bangladeshi government was increasing the amount of the rice supply through
PFDS. This showed a strong demand for the enhancement of storage capacity by the construction
of warehouses.

5 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2014) “Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics- 2012”

6 JICA (2012) “People’s Republic of Bangladesh: Preparatory Survey Report for the Improvement of the Capacity of
Public Food Storage”
7 International Food Policy Research Institute (2019) “Public food grain storage facilities in Bangladesh”

5
 3.1.3 Consistency with Japan’s ODA Policy
At the planning phase, the Country Assistance Program for Bangladesh (2007), promulgated
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, set “economic growth” as a priority area and focused on
infrastructure development in rural areas for poverty reduction. Moreover, the plan emphasized
disaster management in the program objective “Social Development and Human Security” and
had the policy of supporting disaster mitigation and the improvement of emergency measures in
a natural disaster. Following the aid policy, in 2009 the Debt Relief Grand Assistance
Counterpart Fund (DRGA-CF) was used to build warehouses with a capacity of 0.11 million
tons in the northern region, and the Japan Debt Cancellation Fund (JDCF) was used to construct
a wheat silo with a capacity of 0.05 million tons in the south-western part of the country (Mongla
port).
The long-term goal of this project was to ensure a stable supply of food grain, including in
disaster periods, and food security. The implementation of the project has contributed to
infrastructure development in rural areas for poverty reduction and the enhancement of disaster
management, both of which were emphasized by the Country Assistance Program of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan also supported the construction of food grain warehouses
with other assistance schemes. Thus, this project was consistent with the preceding aid policies
and assistance with the emphasis on food security.

This project has been highly relevant to the country’s development plan and development needs,
as well as Japan’s ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ③)

3.2.1 Project Outputs
This project constructed a multi-story warehouse for rice (16 storage chambers in total) in
Santahar, Bogra District, with Japanese assistance, and also provided equipment for cargo
handling equipment and monitoring. In project implementation, consulting services were
provided for detailed design, construction and procurement management, and technical
assistance. The Bangladeshi government carried out ancillary works for the warehouse (such as
the construction of auxiliary facilities, rail tracks, etc.). The scope of this project is shown in the
table below.

6
 Table 1: The Scope of this Project (Plan and Actual)
Plan Actual
a) Construction and Procurement of Equipment a) Construction and Procurement of Equipment
 Multistory rice warehouse: maximum capacity  Multistory rice warehouse: maximum capacity
25,740 tons, including air conditioning equipment 25,740 tons, including air conditioning equipment
 Cargo handling equipment: 4 forklifts and 26,000 and solar power system
palettes  Cargo handling equipment: Same as left
 Monitoring equipment: 4 moisture meters, 4 grain  Monitoring equipment: Same as left
thermometers, and 4 thermo-hygrometers

b) Consulting service b) Consulting service

 Detailed design, construction and procurement  Same as left
management, capacity building program
(Technical assistance for maintenance of air
conditioning equipment, loading, moving, and
storage of rice bags using pallets, and warehouse
operation/inventory management)
Source: documents provided by JICA, the preparatory survey report

The scope of this project was almost as planned for both the Japanese side and the Bangladeshi
side. The major change in the project scope was the addition of a solar power system to the
warehouse. Since blackouts have occurred frequently in Bangladesh, the system had the
advantage of the operation of air conditioning equipment during blackouts in daytime, and was
expected to contribute to a reduction in electricity costs.

Inside the storage chamber Air-conditioners

Forklifts Moisture meters

7
 3.2.2 Project Inputs
3.2.2.1 Project Cost
The project cost incurred by the Japanese side was adjusted for evaluation purposes taking
into consideration the addition of the solar power generation system to the project scope. Some
of the cost items financed by the Bangladeshi side were not available and, for this reason, the
planned cost was adjusted for accurate comparison. The planned and the actual project costs
were compared reflecting these adjustments.
Concerning the total project cost, the planned amount after adjustment was JPY 2,467 million
(Japanese side: JPY 2,398 million, Bangladeshi side: JPY 69 million), while the actual costs
were JPY 2,383 million (Japanese side: JPY 2,007 million, Bangladeshi side: JPY 376 million),
which was within the plan (97% of the plan).
Concerning the project cost for the Japanese side, the actual amount was JPY 2,007 million
(84% of the plan) while the planned amount after adjustment was JPY 2,398 million. 8
According to the construction supervision consultant, the contractor who won the tender for
the warehouse had conducted construction works in Bangladesh and was an established
business foundation. For this reason, the company could conduct construction works efficiently
and its bid price fell below the price estimation. On the other hand, for solar panels, bidding
prices exceeded the price estimation, and the tender was re-issued twice. There were three
reasons for the price hike for solar panels: (1) the price of solar panels soared due to the
worldwide boom in solar power generation, (2) transportation costs in Bangladesh increased
due to political unrest, and (3) it was necessary to respect the quality of procured equipment.
Concerning the project cost for the Bangladeshi side, the planned amount after adjustment
was JPY 69 million 9 and the actual amount was JPY 376 million (545% of the plan). 10
Construction costs of facilities such as office buildings adjacent to the warehouse and railways
to transport rice exceeded the planned amount.

3.2.2.2 Project Period

Since the solar power system had been added to the project scope, the planned and actual
months for the project period were compared reflecting the change. Moreover, construction
was delayed due to political unrest occurring in the project period. Therefore, judgement was
made taking delays caused by political unrest into consideration.

8 At the planning phase, the planned amount for the Japanese side was JPY 2,198 million. Due to the expansion of the
project scope, solar panels (181 million yen) and the foundation for solar power generation system (19 million yen)
were added to the planned amount.
9 At the planning phase, the planned amount for the Bangladeshi side was 614 million yen. As the actual costs for

tariffs, VAT, and various fees could not be obtained, the total amount for these expenses (545 million yen) was
subtracted from the planned amount.
10 Calculated with the average rate of IFS for the project implementation period.

8
 The project period was from the commencement of the detailed design in March 2012 to the
completion of the solar power system in June 2016 (4 years and 4 months, 52 months). The
project period was originally planned to be 2 years and 9 months (33 months). Since the solar
power system was installed on the rooftop of the warehouse, 18 months, the period from the
completion of the warehouse (December 2014) to the completion of the solar power system
(June 2016), was added to the planned period. In addition, traffic was cut off by Hartal11 during
the project period. A delay in construction work of approximately one month occurred due to
this force majeure which could not be attributed to the contractor. Compared with the planned
period (4 years and 4 months, 52 months), the actual period was 100% of the plan, which was
as planned.

Both the project cost and project period were within the plan. Therefore, efficiency of the project
is high.

3.3 Effectiveness and Impacts12 (Rating: ②)

3.3.1 Effectiveness
As the effectiveness of this project was defined as “an increase in storage capacity”, and the
indicators “Storage of rice,” “Inventory turnover” and “Frequency of pest control” were selected
for the measurement of project effect. Judgment was made based on these indicators. Since this
project installed air conditioning equipment, the temperature and humidity inside the chambers
for rice storage were additionally analyzed. As mentioned above, a solar power system was also
added to the project scope and, therefore, its effectiveness was also assessed.

3.3.1.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators)

(1) Storage amount of rice
The maximum capacity of the warehouse constructed by this project was 25,740 tons.
However, the appropriate capacity was 19,512 tons under normal operations as the maximum
capacity included the use of spaces which were difficult to move in and out of efficiently. The
actual storage amount of rice was 14,445 tons at the end of 2019 which was approximately
70% of the target. Immediately after the warehouse started operation, it was difficult to pile up
stacks to the height assumed at the planning phase. At the time, it had been planned that a 50kg
bag would be used but the upper side of the bag was not flat. In addition, as broken bags were
often repaired and reused in Bangladesh, the uneven shape of the bags made it even more
difficult to pile them up to the height initially planned. After 2019, however, a 30kg bag was

11 Political protests in Bangladesh. As participants blocked roads and prevented the operation of public transportation,
materials and personnel could not be moved. Thus, project implementation was delayed.
12 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impacts.

9
 introduced and this made it easier to pile up stacks. The improvement of stacking resulted in a
significant increase of storage.

Table 2: Storage Amount of Rice

Baseline Target Actual*
2011 2017 2016 2017 2018 2019
3 Years After Completion 1 Year After 2 Years After 2 Years After
Completion Year Completion Completion Completion
Storage amount
- 19,512 - 0 5,622 14,445
(ton)
Source: documents provided by JICA and DGF
Note: * The actual amounts were the storage at the end of December for each year.

(2) Inventory turnover

An inventory turnover was planned once per year. The actual inventory turnover rate was
0.87 times/year in 2019 and almost reached the target. Out of the three harvest seasons for rice
in Bangladesh, the rice for two seasons was being stored at the ex-post evaluation. According
to DGF officers, the stocked rice was shipped within about one year. The warehouse was
operated under the principle that long-term storage exceeding one year was not allowed.

Table 3: Inventory Turnover

Baseline Target Actual
2011 2017 2016 2017 2018 2019
3 Years After Completion 1 Year After 2 Years After 2 Years After
Completion Year Completion Completion Completion
Inventory
turnover* - 1.00 - 2.38 0.22 0.87
(times / year)
Source: documents provided by JICA and DGF
Note: * Inventory turnover = Shipment amount from the warehouse ÷ Inventory amount (monthly average)

(3) Frequency of pest control per storage chamber

The frequency of pest control per storage chamber was used as an indicator for the quality of
stocked rice and a comparison was made with another rice warehouse in the vicinity (Santahar
CSD13). Two types of pest control, spraying and fumigation, were used. Fumigation is more
effective than spraying but spraying is easier to carry out. In the project warehouse, fumigation
took place less frequently than in the existing warehouse, while spraying was more frequent.
Therefore, the impact of this project on the frequency of pest control was moderate. In the
warehouse constructed by this project, storage chamber No.1 was sprayed 11 times and

13 To specifically show the effect on rice quality of the air conditioning equipment installed by this project, Santahar
CSD was chosen because the depot consists of conventional flat warehouses in the same climate as the warehouse
funded by this project.

10
 fumigated 5 times. Pest outbreaks occurred more easily in the storage chamber because
rainwater occasionally leaked into the chamber during the rainy season.

Table 4: Frequency of Pest Control per Storage Chamber

Baseline Target* Actual
2011 FY2018-19 FY2015-16 FY2016-17 FY2017-18 FY2018-19
3 Years After Completion 1 Year After 2 Years After 2 Years After
Completion Year Completion Completion Completion
Spraying
- 3.81 - - - 5.53
(times / year)
Fumigation
- 2.50 - - - 2.33
(times / year)
Source: documents provided by JICA and DGF
Note: * The target is the data from the nearby rice warehouse (Santahar CSD) for 2018-19

(4) Temperature and Humidity

The warehouse constructed by this project stored parboiled rice 14 and used the air
conditioning equipment to preserve the rice. According to the construction supervision
consultant, the storage chambers should have a temperature below 30℃ and a humidity of 65%
to 70%. Temperature and humidity were measured at storage chambers No. 3 – No. 16 during
the site survey.15 In the storage chambers, the temperature was from 22.8°C to 25°C and the
humidity was from 49% to 56%. Concerning the temperature and humidity control inside the
chambers, dryness was a major problem. It tends to be dry inside the warehouse in the winter
season as the temperature drops and the rainfall decreases. According to DGF officers, the air
conditioners and the dehumidifiers were used during the rainy season.

(5) Power generation by the solar power system

This project installed a solar power system on the rooftop of the warehouse for the reduction
of electricity consumption for warehouse operations. According to DGF officers, the Santahar
silo, including the project warehouse, was supplying electricity to the power distribution
company (NESCO) at the time of the ex-post evaluation. As the amount of electricity supplied
to the grid was subtracted from the electricity consumption of the Santahar silo, the electricity
charge to the silo was reduced. The solar power system supplied 185,000kWh in 2017-18,
101,000kWh in FY2018-19, and 95,000kWh in FY2019-20 (until April). After the
commencement of power generation, the voltage of the power supplied became unstable due
to a lightning strike during the rainy season and this damaged the power receiving equipment

14Parboiling is a process before milling for the preservation of rice.

1510:00-12:00 on January 8th, 2020. Since the first and second storage chambers were under fumigation, temperature
and humidity could not be measured in either chamber.

11
of the power distribution company. For this reason, the power supply was temporarily stopped
during the rainy season and, as a result, the amount of power supply dropped after FY2018-19.

3.3.1.2 Qualitative Effects (Other Effects)

(1) Technology transfer of the operation and maintenance in modern warehouse
Through the technical assistance of the soft component, warehouse staff learned the
techniques of piling up and rotating stacks by forklifts and pallets, inventory management (such
as the First-In First-Out method), and monitoring (moisture content, grain temperature,
temperature and humidity). Intra-house rotation is a technique used when rice with a long
storage period is shipped. The method is an essential technique for the First-In First-Out method
for rice bags in warehouse operation and enables a longer storage of rice. Moreover, there was
instruction on the use of checklists for stacking according to the manuals, the use of templates
for the records of temperature/humidity control, temperature/humidity/grain temperature/grain
moisture content, and an inspection record for air conditioners and dehumidifiers.
At the time of the ex-post evaluation, acceptance
inspections of rice and bags, the labelling of stacks,
and stacking were conducted mostly in line with the
manuals. However, since the stocked rice was
shipped within one year, it is not operated First-In
First-Out by intra-house rotation. The temperature
and humidity inside and outside the storage
chambers, the grain temperature of rice, and the grain The note recording monitoring data
moisture content were also measured and recorded
daily in accordance with the manuals.

(2) Quality of stocked rice

As mentioned above, pest control by fumigation at the project warehouse was carried out less
frequently than at the existing warehouses because of the air conditioning equipment.
Warehouse staff commented that fumigation tend to turn the rice yellow and, thus, the rice at
the project warehouse was less discolored than at other warehouses. On the other hand, the
weight loss of stocked rice sometimes exceeded the DGF regulations, though this did not lead
to the disposal of rice. The weight loss of rice was 0.24% to 2.08% in FY2018-19 and exceeded
the DGF regulations (0.5%s for a storage period of 6 months, 0.75% for 9 months, 1.0% for 12
months) in some shipments. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, DGF had taken measures to
decrease weight loss by less use of air conditioners and setting the temperature higher. As a
result, the weight loss of rice decreased in FY2019-20.

12
 Table 5: Weight Loss of Stock Rice
Fiscal Year Shipment (ton) Weight loss (ton) Weight loss (%) Min. - Max.
2016-17 404.970 0.000 0 －
2017-18 600.30 4.00 0.66% 0.50% - 0.75%
2018-19 7,480.96 61.50 0.82% 0.24% - 2.08%
2019-20 14,357.82 109.10 0.76% 0.04% - 1.04%
Source: documents provided by DGF

3.3.2 Impacts
3.3.2.1 Intended Impacts
The impact of this project was assumed to be “a stable food supply and food security
nationwide, including in disaster periods.” Of the quantitative indicators set at the planning
phase, the achievement level of the indicators to measure the impact (Food assistance for poor
households and people affected by natural disasters) are analyzed. In addition, analysis was
made of the qualitative effects showing impacts expected at the planning phase (such as
enhancement of the capacity for emergency food distribution during disasters, the stability of
food prices and domestic distribution).

(1) Food assistance for poor households and people affected by natural disasters
DGF did not collect the shipping data for each food assistance program by warehouse and
were unable to find out the final use of the rice shipped from this warehouse. Therefore, the
targets for the food assistance for poor households and people affected by natural disasters are
calculated based on the normal storage of the project. The scales of benefits are estimated by
using the shipment amount, the storage amount, and the storage capacity at the ex-post
evaluation.
As shown in Table 6, while the target for the storage amount was assumed to be 19,512 tons
at the planning phase, the shipment amount was 8,271.82 tons in 2019 and the storage amount
was 14,445.44 tons at the end of 2019. According to DGF officers, the storage capacity under
normal conditions was estimated to be 17,153 tons when using only 30 kg bags with stacking
skills as they were at the ex-post evaluation. At the planning phase, food assistance for poor
households was assumed to be 30kg per month for each household, while food assistance for
people affected by natural disasters was 10kg per person. This analysis uses these assumptions.
Since the shipment volume was still insignificant in 2019, the actual benefits of the food
assistance for poor households and the victims of natural disasters are presumed to be smaller
than the targets (see Table 6). Nevertheless, the number of beneficiaries is expected to increase
in 2020 as the storage amount increased at the end of 2019. Given the storage capacity, there
is room for a further increase in the number of beneficiaries.

13
 Table 6: Food Assistance for Poor Households and People Affected by Natural Disasters
(Estimation)
Storage Shipment Storage Storage capacity
(Target) (2019) (at the end of 2019) (2020)
Tonnage 19,512.00 8,271.82 14,445.44 17,153.00
Food assistance for poor households*
650,400 275,727 481,515 571,767
(Number of beneficiary households)
Food assistance for people affected
by natural disasters 1,951,200 827,182 1,444,544 1,715,300
(Number of beneficiaries)
Source: calculated by the external evaluator based on the documents provided by DGF.
Note:* The number of beneficiary households = Storage (Target) / Shipment (2019) / Storage (at the end of 2019) /
Storage capacity (2020) ÷ Food assistance per poor household (30kg/month)
Note:** The number of beneficiaries = Storage (Target) / Shipment (2019) / Storage (at the end of 2019) / Storage
capacity (2020) ÷ Food assistance per person affected by natural disasters (10kg/person)

(2) Destination of rice shipment

As explained above, it was difficult to ascertain
the use of shipped rice. Therefore, it was also
difficult to obtain data to directly show the
expected qualitative effects. Nevertheless, there
was a wide area of destinations for rice shipment
from the project warehouse, and it can be assumed
that the project contributed to a stable supply of
food grain throughout the country.
Out of 64 districts in Bangladesh, the project
warehouse shipped rice to 22 Local Storage
Depots (LSD) in 11 districts. The 11 districts
covered a wide area of the northwest (Bogra,
Sirajganj), the southwest (Shatkhira), the central
area (Sherpur, Gazipur, Faridpur, Gopalganj,
Shariatpur), the northeast (Sylhet), and the Figure 1: Destinations of shipments

southeast (Chandpur, Lakshmipur). The districts from the warehouse

to which the project warehouse shipped rice were

scattered all over Bangladesh, and the project was expected to help reduce excesses and
shortages of rice among regions.

3.3.2.2 Other Positive and Negative Impacts

(1) Impacts on the natural environment
At the planning phase, this project was classified as Category C (a project likely to have
minimal or little adverse impact on the environment and society) in accordance with the Japan

14
International Cooperation Agency: Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations
(2010). According to the construction supervision consultants and questionnaire answers from
DGF, the implementation of this project did not require an environmental impact assessment
because the facilities constructed by the project were to be built on the site of an existing wheat
silo. Based on questionnaire answers from DGF and interviews, no environmental monitoring
was conducted during project implementation or after project completion. No serious negative
impact on the natural environment was found during project implementation or after project
completion.

(2) Resettlement and land acquisition

As mentioned above, the warehouse constructed by this project was built on the site of an
existing silo. A part of the land for the office building, an auxiliary facility of the warehouse,
was purchased from Bangladesh National Railways but the land acquisition did not require
resettlement. At the planning phase, it had been expected that residents would be relocated due
to the construction of the railway to the warehouse. The railway to the warehouse was
constructed but the track alignment was changed. The tracks were built on the existing site, and
thus the implementation of the project did not cause resettlement.

(3) Effects from displaying warehouse facilities

This project supported the construction of the first multi-story warehouse capable of humidity
and temperature control in Bangladesh. Senior officials from the Ministry of Food and DGF
frequently visited the warehouse constructed by the project to observe the modern warehouse
facility and its operations. From the end of 2014 (the completion of the warehouse building) to
May 2020 (the ex-post evaluation), senior officials from the Ministry of Food and DGF visited
the warehouse 13 times, and a total of 17 people were able to deepen their knowledge of the
modern warehouse facility and its operation. These senior officials included not only DGF
managers of warehouses management but also policymakers for national food policy such as
the Minister and the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Food and the Director General of DGF.

(4) Response to COVID-19

As a response to COVID-19, the project warehouse shipped approximately 14,000 tons of
rice to Dhaka from March 2020 to May 2020. The shipped rice was used for the food assistance
program for poor households (Vulnerable Group Development) or sold in the open market for
market stabilization. In consideration of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bangladeshi government
increased the storage of food grain for disaster relief and adopted the policy of effectively using
the warehouse during the off-season. After May 2020, the warehouse was also storing wheat
in the period from rice shipment to stockpiling.

15
 This project has achieved its objectives to some extent. Therefore, effectiveness and impacts of
the project are fair.

3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ②)

3.4.1 Institutional/Organizational Aspect of Operation and Maintenance
At the ex-post evaluation, the DGF Santahar Silo was responsible for the operation and
maintenance of the warehouse constructed by this project. The Santahar Silo was also in charge
of the operation and maintenance of the adjacent wheat silo, which was in operation before the
implementation of this project. Concerning the division of roles in operation and maintenance,
the Santahar Silo carried out the daily tasks of operation and maintenance and prepared a
maintenance plan and a budget plan, while the DGF Headquarters reviewed and approved the
maintenance plan and the budget plan. The DGF Headquarters also conducted assessment on the
necessity of maintenance work and staffing of the silo. The movement of rice were in accordance
with the instructions from the DGF Headquarters, the Regional Controller of Food, and the
District Controller of Food.
While the number of staff in the Santahar Silo was 88 (including 3 engineers) in 2016, the
number of staff in the silo was 75 (including 2 engineers) in 2019. The number of staff decreased
in the three years. According to DGF officers, the movement of rice in the warehouse was not
as frequent as in other warehouses. The silo could therefore cope with the reduction of personnel
with labor-saving thanks to cargo handling equipment and overtime work by silo staff. Although
staffing was slightly tight, no serious effect was seen in the operation of the warehouse.
At the ex-post evaluation, the responsibilities for the operation and maintenance under the
project were clearly defined. Although the number of staff decreased at the Santahar Silo, the
silo did not face any serious obstacles in its operation and maintenance. Therefore, it was
concluded that there was no problem affecting the sustainability of project effects in terms of
the institutional/organizational aspect.

3.4.2 Technical Aspect of Operation and Maintenance

Since this project constructed the first multi-story warehouse with air conditioning equipment
in Bangladesh, it implemented the soft component simultaneously and conducted training on the
use and maintenance of the equipment provided (air conditioning equipment, cargo handling
equipment, and monitoring equipment). However, as aforementioned in “3.3.1.1 Quantitative
Effects”, it was difficult to pile a stack to the height assumed at the planning phase due to the
shape of rice bags. At the ex-post evaluation, skills had been maintained through use of the
equipment. The soft component also included the instruction of warehouse operation based on
First-in First-out of rice bags by intra-house rotation so that rice with a long storage period could

16
 be shipped first. At the ex-post evaluation, however, intra-house rotation was not being
conducted.
Various manuals (warehouse management, cargo handling
equipment, air conditioning equipment) in both English and
Bengali were also prepared as part of the soft component. At
the ex-post evaluation, the manuals were kept in the office of
Santahar Silo, but the warehouse staff did not routinely refer to
them during operation. Nevertheless, operation and
maintenance was implemented almost in line with the manual.
Based on interviews with DGF officers, it was confirmed that
the use of checklists, recording formats and the manuals had
begun in the first half of 2020.
Warehouse management
According to DGF officers, there was almost no training
manual
opportunity for warehouse management or the operation and
maintenance of air conditioning equipment and cargo handling equipment after project
completion. The DGF staff officer conducted a training session once only for 2 days. At the ex-
post evaluation, a regular training program for warehouse management and the operation and
maintenance of air conditioning equipment and cargo handling equipment was not planned.
Although the soft component of this project improved capacity, and the operation and
maintenance were in line with the manuals to some extent, it took a longer period to introduce
the checklist and various recording formats. As there were very few training opportunities on
warehouse management and the provided equipment in DGF, it was difficult to provide
systematic training to newly assigned staff. Therefore, it was concluded that there were some
minor problems in the technology aspect which affect the sustainability of project effects.

3.4.3 Financial Aspect of Operation and Maintenance

The budget of DGF is divided into the purchasing budget and the organizational budget. The
operation and maintenance of the project warehouse was financed with the organizational budget
(a budget required for organizational operations such as salary, consumables, and maintenance
works). At the planning phase, the annual operation and maintenance cost of the warehouse was
estimated to be BDT 11.6 million.16 After the project started, however, a solar power system
was added to the project scope of the project and at the ex-post evaluation, warehouse operation
had not increased electricity charges.17 According to DGF officers, the solar power system on
the rooftop of the warehouse supplied electricity to the grid and the electricity charge to the

16 The maintenance costs for the building and the equipment, both of which had not occurred by the time of the ex-
post evaluation, were subtracted from the annual operation and maintenance expense estimated at the planning phase.
17 Before the operation of the warehouse, the electricity charge of the Santahar Silo was BDT 2.8 million in FY2015-

16. As at the ex-post evaluation the electricity charge was BDT 2.7 million in FY2018-19, the charge had not increased.

17
 Santahar Silo was thus partially offset. For this Table 7: The Estimated Cost for the
reason, the required expenditure was estimated to be Operation and Maintenance of the
6.4 million BDT annually if the electricity charge was Warehouse
removed from the estimated expenses for operation Unit: thousand BDT
and maintenance (see Table 7). Items Cost/Year
Salary (full-time staff) 2,700
The organizational budget of DGF had increased at
Salary (part-time staff) 800
the ex-post evaluation. The organizational budget Repainting of floor signs 400
(expenditure basis) increased from BDT 3,080 Telecommunication 90
Postal fees 40
million in FY2015-16 to BDT 4,720 million in Office supplies 70
FY2018-19, 1.5 times in four years. During this Others 2,300
Total 6,400
period, as shown in the table below, the organizational
Source: recalculated by the external evaluator
budget (expenditure basis) of the Santahar Silo also based on data of the preparatory survey.

increased. Compared with the organizational budget

of the year previous to the commencement of warehouse operation (FY2015-16: BDT 35.1
million), that of the years after warehouse operation began (FY2016-17 to FY2018-19: BDT
40.7 million on average) increased by BDT 5.6 million. The increase did not reach the estimated
increase in annual maintenance expenditure (6.4 million BDT) associated with the operation of
the warehouse. As mentioned above, it is difficult to provide training on operation and
maintenance due to the shortage in the operation and maintenance budget.

Table 8: The Organizational Budget of the Santahar Silo

Unit: BDT
FY2015 - 16 FY2016 - 17 FY2017 - 18 FY2018 - 19
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
Salary 26,409,857 16,411,238 30,599,872 31,388,178
Operation and Maintenance 8,671,877 24,565,154 9,465,970 9,798,704
Organizational budget - total 35,081,734 40,976,392 40,065,842 41,186,882
Source: DGF

Although the organizational budgets of DGF and the Santahar Silo increased, the incremental
amount of the organizational budget of the Santahar Silo was less than the required amount
estimated at the project planning. Therefore, the organizational budget of Santahar Silo might
affect the operation and maintenance of the warehouse in a long run. In terms of the financial
aspect, it is concluded that there were some minor problems affecting the sustainability of
problem effects.

3.4.4 Status of Operation and Maintenance

A site survey was conducted to assess the current status of the warehouse and the equipment
provided by the project. The results of the site survey are as follows.

18
 Warehouse: There was no significant damage in the building. All air conditioning equipment
(air conditioners and dehumidifiers) were usable and spare parts could be obtained. The air
conditioning equipment in operation was maintained (including cleaning) once every two weeks.
A dedicated distribution line to the warehouse only was installed. The warehouse had blackouts
2-3 times a year mainly in the rainy season but it recovered in 5 to 20 minutes. According to the
DGF officer, at the ex-post evaluation, the solar power system was in a usable condition and
maintenance work such as the cleaning of solar panels was performed once a week. Domestic
suppliers can obtain and install replacement parts for the solar power system.

Cargo handling equipment: All of the four forklifts were in a usable condition. When in
operation, the forklifts were cleaned daily and battery electrolyte was added. Lubricant was
applied twice a year. As some parts of the forklifts need to be replaced every four years, purchase
of these parts was planned for the future. Spare parts could be obtained from forklift dealers.
Pallets were either used in the warehouse or stored in places away from rainfall.

Monitoring equipment: Thermo-hygrometers, moisture meters, and grain thermometers (four for
each type of equipment) were stored in the warehouse, and one thermo-hygrometer, one moisture
meter, and one grain thermometer were used daily. One of the moisture meters was out of order
but it was not repaired because other meters could be used. According to DGF officers, suppliers
could be contacted for spare parts and repair services. As a calibration service was not used, the
accuracy of the thermo-hygrometers and the moisture meters were assessed by comparison with
newly purchased equipment.

The site survey found that although there was slight damage to the warehouse and the provided
equipment, they were still in a usable condition and no serious damage which would affect the
project effects was discovered. Therefore, in terms of the current status, it was concluded that
there was no problem that affected the sustainability of project effects.

Some minor problems have been observed in terms of the technical aspect and the financial.
Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion
The objective of this project was to increase storage capacity by the construction of a rice
warehouse in the Bogra district, a granary area located in the north-western part of Bangladesh,
thereby contributing to a stable food supply and food security nationwide, including in disaster
periods. At the planning phase and at the ex-post evaluation, it was the policy of the Bangladeshi

19
government to enhance and maintain food grain storage facilities. At the ex-post evaluation, the
existing facilities needed to be rebuilt while the Bangladeshi government was increasing the
amount of rice supply through its food programs. The scope of this project was also consistent
with the aid policies of Japan. Therefore, its relevance is high. A solar power system was added
to the scope of the project. Taking into consideration the additional project scope, the project cost
was within the plan and the project period was as planned. Therefore, efficiency of the project is
high. Regarding the achievement level of the quantitative indicators, the “Inventory turnover”
was mostly achieved, but achievement of “Storage amount of rice” and “Frequency of pest control”
were moderate. It was difficult to analyze the impact quantitatively. However, the warehouse
shipped rice to a wide area and was also being used to stock wheat at the ex-post evaluation. Thus,
effectiveness and impacts of the project are fair. In terms of the institutional/organizational aspect,
although staff numbers were slightly tight, this issue did not affect warehouse operations severely.
For the technical aspect, periodic training was an issue. For the financial aspect, an increase in
the organizational budget did not reach the requirement estimated at the planning phase, though
the organizational budget was increasing. In the status of the operation and maintenance, no
serious damage to the project effects was found. For the above reasons, sustainability of the
project effects is fair.
In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations
4.2.1 Recommendations to the Executing Agency
Revision of the manuals for operation and maintenance
DGF operates the warehouse almost in line with the manuals. However, it took a long time to
introduce the use of a checklist and record keeping using specified formats. Since the storage
period of rice was relatively short (approximately 1 year), the importance of intra-house rotation
of the stacks was weakened. Moreover, wheat was also being stocked at the ex-post evaluation
and this was not expected at project completion. The completion report of the soft component
also emphasized the necessity to update and modify the manuals to reflect the actual situation,
as operational conditions differed between Bangladesh and Japan. It is desirable that
inconsistencies between the contents of the manual and current operation are examined and that
the manuals are revised immediately.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

Monitoring and technical support
DGF may require technical support when the agency updates and modifies the manuals for
operation and maintenance. In tandem with the revision of the manuals, training relevant to the

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 new operational procedures will also be required. It is desirable that JICA continue to monitor
the revision of the manuals by DGF and provide technical assistance when needed by the agency.

4.3 Lessons Learned

Careful assessment on the use of rice bags in other countries
At the planning phase, the storage amount of the warehouse was set with the assumption that
50kg bags would be used. However, the upper side of 50kg bags had a small flat area, and the
shape was not uniform due to reuse of the bags. Therefore, it was difficult to stack 50kg bags to
the height assumed at the planning phase using the forklifts and the pallets. During the
implementation phase, it became clear that the conditions of the bags significantly affected the
amount of rice stock, and it took time to resolve this issue. The compatibility between the rice
storage using 50kg bags and the use of forklifts was not sufficiently examined because
Bangladesh did not stock rice with modern equipment at the planning phase of this project. It
would be meaningful to assess the compatibility of the rice storage methods and the use of
forklifts in other countries, especially those with similar economic conditions, in order to find
issues with the modernization of warehouse management at an earlier phase of the project
planning.

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