Timothy Williamson: Publications

(in reverse chronological order, updated 23 November 2021)

In preparation

[a] Timothy Williamson Discusses his Philosophy, Chinese translation of lectures and
discussion with commentators given at Wuhan University in 2021, to be published in
China by academic press.

[b] Book of Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[c] ‘Is the a priori / a posteriori distinction superficial?’ and ‘Response to Boghossian’ in
Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa, and John Turri (eds.), Contemporary
Debates in Epistemology, 3rd ed. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

[d] ‘Chakrabarti and the Nyāya on knowability’.

[e] ‘Menzel on pure logic and higher-order metaphysics’ and ‘Pickel against higher-order
Primitivism’ in Peter Fritz and Nicholas Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[f] ‘Where did it come from? Where will it go?’ [on knowledge-first epistemology].

[g] ‘Is logic the study of validity?’ in Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo
Ferrari, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, and Florian Steinberger (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of the Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To appear

[a] Philosophical Methods: Timothy Williamson’s Lectures at Peking University, Chinese

translation by Zhaoqing Xu, Jingxian Liu, Hongguang Wang, Zhen Zhao, and
Shanshan Peng of lectures and discussion with commentators, edited by Zhaoqing Xu.
Beijing: Renmin University Press.

[b] ‘Moral anti-exceptionalism’, in Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, Oxford University Press.

[c] ‘Accepting a logic, accepting a theory’, in Romina Padró and Yale Weiss (eds.), Saul
Kripke on Modal Logic. New York: Springer.

[d] ‘Metametaphysics and semantics’, Metaphilosophy.

[e] ‘Epistemological consequences of Frege puzzles’, Philosophical Topics.

[f] ‘Degrees of freedom: Is good philosophy bad science?’ (Disputatio’s 25th

Anniversary Lecture), Disputatio, XIII, 61 (2021).
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[g] (with Miroslava Trajkovski) ‘Abduction, perception, emotion, feeling: body maps
and pattern recognition’, Philosophical Perspectives.

[h] ‘Epistemological ambivalence’, in Nicholas Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas,

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[i] ‘Knowledge, credence, and strength of belief’, in A.K. Flowerree and Baron Reed
(eds.), Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social World, London:
Routledge.

[j] ‘Modal epistemology and the logic of counterfactuals’, in Duncan Pritchard and
Matthew Jope (eds.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, London: Routledge.

[k] ‘E = K, but what about R?’, in Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.),
Routledge Handbook of Evidence, London: Routledge.

[l] ‘Disagreement in metaphysics’, in Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter and Richard

Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement, London:
Routledge.

[m] ‘Vaidya on Nyāya and knowledge-first epistemology’, Oxford Studies in

Epistemology.

[n] ‘Boghossian, Müller-Lyer, the parrot, and the Nazi’, in Luis Oliveira (ed.),
Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[o] ‘Justifications, excuses, and skeptical scenarios’, in J. Dutant and F. Dorsch (eds.),
The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press.
Chinese translation forthcoming in Journal of Hubei University (Philosophy and
Social Sciences), forthcoming.

[p] ‘Horvath on Gettier’s thought experiments’, in Duško Prelevič and Anand

Vaidya (eds.), Routledge Anthology of Modal Epistemology and Philosophical
Methodology. London: Routledge.

[q] ‘The counterfactual-based approach to modal epistemology’, in Otávio Bueno and

Scott Shalkowski (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Modality, London: Routledge.

[r] ‘More Oxonian scepticism about the a priori’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.),
The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent, Oxford University Press.

[s] ‘Reply to Casullo’s defence of the significance of the a priori – a posteriori

distinction’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance,
Grounds, and Extent, Oxford University Press.

[t] ‘Dunn on inferential evidence’, The Monist [special issue on infallibilism, ed.
Christos Kyriacou and Gregory Stoutenburg].

[u] ‘Can non-classical logic treat mathematics as exceptional?’, in Stephan Leuenberger

and Adam Rieger (eds.), festschrift for Alan Weir. New York: Springer.
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[v] ‘Idealized rationality in models of knowledge and probability’, in Boran Berčić,

Aleksandra Golubović, and Majda Trobok (eds.), festschrift for Nenad Smokrović.
Rijeka.

[w] ‘Introduction’ to Khaled Qutb, Summary of The Philosophy of Philosophy (in Arabic),
Cairo: Academic Bookshop.

2021

[a] The Philosophy of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (enlarged). Pp. xxxviii + 642. Oxford: Wiley
Blackwell.

[b] ‘The KK principle and rotational symmetry’, Analytic Philosophy, 62, 2 (2021): 107-
124.

[c] ‘Edgington on possible knowledge of unknown truth’, in Lee Walters and John
Hawthorne (eds.), Conditionals, Probability, and Paradox: Themes from the
Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, 195-211. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[d] ‘Edo Pivčević and metaphysical realism’, in Stipe Kutleša (ed.), Domovina, Zavičaj,
Svijet: Zbornik radova povodom 90 godina života Ede Pivčevića, 11-17. Zagreb:
Institut za filozofiju.

[e] Review of Vagueness: A Global Approach, by Kit Fine. Mind,

https://academic.oup.com/mind/advance-article-
abstract/doi/10.1093/mind/fzaa084/6048194

[f] ‘In defence of realism’, IAI News, 94 (29 January 2021),

https://iai.tv/articles/in-defence-of-realism-auid-1747?_auid=2020

[g] ‘Politics, truth and self-reference’, IAI News, 94 (23 February 2021).
https://iai.tv/articles/politics-truth-and-self-reference-auid-1758?_auid=2020

2020

[a] Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals. viii + 278 pp.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[b] (with Paul Boghossian) Debating the A Priori. xiv + 260 pp. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. TW’s contributions:
(with PB) Preface, ix-xi.
‘Understanding and inference’ (2003[b]), 46-77.
‘Reply to Boghossian on the a priori and the analytic’ (2011[h]), 86-92.
‘Boghossian and Casalegno on understanding and inference’ (2012[a]), 108-116.
‘How deep is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge?’ (2013[f]),
117-136.
‘Reply to Boghossian on the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori’,
156-167.
‘Knowing by imagining’ (2016[l]), 175-185.
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‘Reply to Boghossian on intuition, understanding, and the a priori’, 208-213.

‘Boghossian on intuition, understanding, and the a priori once again’, 227-239.
‘Closing reflections’, 240-242.

[c] Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction [paperback version of Doing

Philosophy, 2018a]. xviii + 142 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
To be translated into Japanese for Iwanami Shoten publishing house.
To be translated into Finnish for Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura ry publishing house.

[d] ‘Non-modal normativity and norms of belief’, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 90

(Normativity: The 2019 Entretiens of Institut International de Philosophie, ed. Ilkka
Niiniluoto and Sami Pihlström): 101-125.

[e] ‘Frank Ramsey and quantified modal logic’, in Cheryl Misak, Frank Ramsey: A Sheer
Excess of Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 262-263.

[f] Review of The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives,

ed. Arnon Levy and Peter Godfrey-Smith, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,
2020.04.03. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-scientific-imagination-philosophical-and-
psychological-perspectives/

[g] Interview by Miroslav Sedláček, Jazykovědné Aktuality, 57: 122-128.

https://www.jazykovednesdruzeni.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020_3-4_JA.pdf

[h] ‘Popular philosophy and populist philosophy’, Daily Nous,

http://dailynous.com/2020/06/08/popular-philosophy-populist-philosophy-guest-post-
timothy-williamson/.

[i] ‘What is metaphysics?’, British Academy, 14 August 2020,

https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/blog/what-is-metaphysics/

[j] Interview by Anna Papadimitriou, Documento, 10 May 2020: 38-39.

2019

[a] ‘Evidence of evidence in epistemic logic’, in Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-
Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019: 265-297.

[b] ‘Armchair philosophy’, Philosophy and Epistemology of Science (Moscow) 56, 2

(2019): 19-25.
Chinese translation by Honguang Wang, Henan Social Science, 28, 5 (2020): 96-100.

[c] ‘Reply to Dennett, Knobe, Kuznetsov, and Stoljar on philosophical methodology’,

Philosophy and Epistemology of Science (Moscow) 56, 2 (2019): 46-52.

[d] ‘Morally loaded cases in philosophy’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, 93 (2019): 159-172.

[e] ‘In the post-truth world, we need to remember the philosophy of science’, New
 5

Statesman, 28 January 2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/01/post-truth-

world-we-need-remember-philosophy-science

2018

[a] Doing Philosophy: From Common Sense to Logical Reasoning. x + 154 pp. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Filosofar: Da Curiosidade comum ao raciocínio lógico, Portuguese translation by
Vítor Guerreiro, Lisbon: Gradiva, 2019.
O co chodzi w filozofii? Od zdziwienia do myślenia (Polish translation by Alicja
Chybińska and Bogdan Dziobkowski). Warsaw: PWN.
Chinese translation by Chuanshun Hu, Beijing: Beijing Yanshan Press, 2019.
Italian translation in preparation (il Mulino).
Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu of article based on chapters 3-4, Universitas:
Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture, 47, 8 (2020): 3-39.
Albanian translation in preparation, Alphabet J&H.

[b] ‘Alternative logics and applied mathematics’, Philosophical Issues, 28, 1, (2018):
399-424.

[c] ‘Supervaluationism and good reasoning’, Theoria: An International Journal for

Theory, History, and Foundations of Science, 33, 3 (2018): 521-537.

[d] ‘Knowledge, action, and the factive turn’, in Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018: 125-141.

[e] ‘Counterpossibles’, Topoi, 37, 3 (2018): 357-368.

[f] ‘Spaces of possibility’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 82: Metaphysics

(2018): 189-204.

[g] ‘Gibbard on meaning and normativity’, Inquiry, 61, 7 (2018): 731-741.

[h] ‘Hyman on knowledge and ability’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97,
1 (2018): 243-248.

[i] ‘Model-building as a philosophical method’, Phenomenology and Mind, 15 (2018):

16-22.

[j] ‘The future of philosophy’, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 80, 1 (2018): 101-103.

[k] Contribution to Guido Bonino and Paolo Tripodi, ‘Interviews on the history of late
analytic philosophy’, Philosophical Inquiries, 6, 1 (2018): 17-52
https://www.philinq.it/index.php/philinq/issue/view/15

[l] ‘Doing philosophy’, ‘Reply to Nigel Collins’, ‘Reply to Amanda McBride’, ‘Reply to
Edward Gibney’, ‘Reply to Hisham El Edrissi’, in The Philosopher, 106, 2 (2018): 4-
6, 9-10, 12-13, 16-17, 19-20.
 6

2017

[a] (with Jason Stanley), ‘Skill’, Noûs, 51, 4 (2017): 713-726.

[b] ‘Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology’, in Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.),

The Relevance of the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 325-346.

[c] ‘Acting on knowledge’, in J.A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-
First, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 163-181.

[d] ‘Model-building in philosophy’, in Russell Blackford and Damien Broderick (eds.),

Philosophy’s Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress. Oxford: Blackwell-
Wiley: 159-173.

[e] ‘Dummett on the relation between logics and metalogics’, in Michael Frauchiger
(ed.), Truth, Meaning, Justification, and Reality: Themes from Dummett (Lauener
Library of Analytical Philosophy). Berlin: de Gruyter. 153-175.
Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu, Trends and Comments in Logic, forthcoming.

[f] ‘Ambiguous rationality’, Episteme, 14, 3 (2017): 263-274.

[g] ‘Modality as a subject for science’, Res Philosophica, 94, 3 (2017): 415-436.

[h] ‘Counterpossibles in semantics and metaphysics’, Argumenta, 2, 2 (2017): 195-226.

[h] ‘From anti-metaphysics to metaphysics’, in Bojan Borstner and Smiljana Gartner

(eds.), Though Experiments between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad
Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 32-44.

[i] Review of Penelope Maddy, What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice
of Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, 114, 9 (2017): 492-497.

[j] ‘Science and points of view’, The Times Literary Supplement, 5979 (2017): 17-18.

[k] ‘The concept of vagueness’, cog!to (Munich), 9, 1 (2017): 14-17.

[l] ‘Theoretical philosophy and practical life’, translated by Luisa Piussi as ‘Per
migliorare il mondo basta un pò di logica’, La Repubblica, Robinson, 43: ‘Chiedilo al
filosofo’ 24 September 2017.

[m] Interview with Clifford Sosis, What is it like to be a philosopher?

http://www.whatisitliketobeaphilosopher.com/#/timothy-williamson/

[n] Interview with Joe Humphreys, Irish Times, 5 March 2017,

http://www.irishtimes.com/culture/unthinkable-how-do-we-know-anything-
1.2992520

[o] Interview https://evonews.com/business/leadership/2017/jun/21/exclusive-interview-

oxford-philosophy-professor-timothy-williamson-on-brexit-i-think-the-british-
university-system-will-suffer/; Romanian translation
http://viitorulromaniei.ro/timothy-williamson-filosoful-de-la-oxford-care-preda-la-
 7

universitatea-din-bucuresti-despre-cunoastere-si-credinta/

2016

[a] ‘Modal science’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 453-492, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 1-40.

[b] ‘Reply to Bacon, Hawthorne, and Uzquiano’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-
5 (2016): 542-547, and in Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.),
Williamson on Modality, London: Routledge, 2017: 90-95.

[c] ‘Reply to Fine’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 571-583, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 119-131.

[d] ‘Reply to Fritz’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 610-612, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 158-160.

[e] ‘Reply to Goodman’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 640-653, and
in Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 188-201.

[f] ‘Reply to Linnebo’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 677-682, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 225-230.

[g] ‘Reply to Sider’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 699-708, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 247-256.

[h] ‘Reply to Stalnaker’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 727-734, and
in Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 275-282.

[i] ‘Reply to Sullivan’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 759-765, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 307-313.

[j] ‘Reply to Vetter’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 796-802, and in
Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality, London:
Routledge, 2017: 344-350.

[k] ‘Reply to Yli-Vakkuri’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 4-5 (2016): 839-851
and in Mark McCullagh and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (eds.), Williamson on Modality,
London: Routledge, 2017: 387-399.

[l] ‘Knowing and imagining’, in Amy Kind and Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge through
Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113-123.
 8

[m] ‘Philosophical criticisms of experimental philosophy’, in Justin Sytsma and Wesley

Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley
Blackwell, pp. 22-36.

[n] ‘Absolute provability and safe knowledge of axioms’, in Leon Horsten and Philip
Welch (eds.), Gödel’s Disjunction: The Scope and Limits of Mathematical
Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-253.

[o] ‘Abductive philosophy’, Philosophical Forum, 47 (3-4): 263-280.

Chinese translation by Liu Jingxian, Philosophical Trends, 7 (2017): 101-107.

[p] Contributions to Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley (eds.), The Stone Reader:
Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments, New York: Norton/Liveright, 2016:
‘Logic and neutrality’, pp. 162-165; ‘Reclaiming the imagination’, pp. 179-182;
‘What is naturalism?’, pp. 243-246; ‘On ducking challenges to naturalism’, pp. 251-
254.

[q] ‘Abstract of Modal Logic as Metaphysics’, Analysis, 76 (2): 153-155.

[r] ‘Replies to King, deRosset, and Kment’, Analysis, 76 (2): 201-222.

[s] Interview in Thomas Adajian and Tracy Lupher (eds.), Philosophy of Logic: 5
Questions, London/New York: Automatic Press, pp. 195-205.
Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu, Journal of Hubei University (Philosophy and
Social Science), 40, 4 (2013): 20-25.

[t] ‘Philosophy as a scientific discipline’, interview with Hans Robin Solberg and Max
Johannes Kippersund, Filosofisk Supplement (Oslo), 3 (2016): 28-34.

[u] Interview with Michael Hesse, Hohe Luft, 3 (2016): 54-58.

2015

[a] Tetralogue (I’m Right, You’re Wrong). Pp. 153. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015. Paperback, 2017.
Korean translation, with introduction by TW for Korean readers, Gom books, 2016,
pp. 220.
Io ho ragione e tu hai torto: Un dialogo filosofico, Italian translation with
introduction by Diego Marconi, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016.
Yo tengo razón y tú te equivocas: Filosofia en el tren, Spanish translation by Javier
Suarez Diaz, introduction by Luis M. Valdés Villanueva. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos,
2017.
Turkish translation, Pegasus, in preparation.
Ich habe recht. Du nicht. Gespräche über Philosophie, German translation by Ute
Kurse-Ebeling, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2017.
Persian translation by Kamran Shahbazi and Saeideh Bayat, Tehran: Kargadan, 2017.
Simplified Chinese translation by Xu Zhaoqing, Shanghai: Shanghai People
Publishing House, 2017.
J’ai raison, tu as tort! Dialogue philosophique, French translation by A. Dang Van.
 9

Paris: Éliott Éditions, 2022.

Romanian translation by Mircea Dumitru, in preparation.
Azerbaijani translation, Parlaq Imzalar.
Croatian translation, TIM Press, in preparation.

[b] ‘A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic’, Philosophical Studies, 172 (2015): 129-
140.

[c] ‘Knowing and believing, acting and intending’, Chinese Journal of Philosophy, 42,
S1 (2015): 525-539.

[d] ‘Knowledge and belief’, in A. Byrne, J. Cohen, G. Rosen and S. Shiffrin, eds., The
Norton Introduction to Philosophy, New York: W.W Norton & Co.: 124-130.

[e] ‘Laudatio: Professor Ruth Barcan Marcus’, in M. Frauchiger (ed.), Modalities,

Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas: Themes from Barcan Marcus. (Lauener
Library of Analytical Philosophy, ed. by D. Føllesdal, W. K. Essler and M.
Frauchiger, vol. 3) Berlin, Boston, Peking: De Gruyter, 2015: 11-16.

[f] ‘Barcan formulas in second-order logic’, in M. Frauchiger (ed.), Modalities, Identity,

Belief, and Moral Dilemmas: Themes from Barcan Marcus. (Lauener Library of
Analytical Philosophy, ed. by D. Føllesdal, W. K. Essler and M. Frauchiger, vol. 3)
Berlin, Boston, Peking: De Gruyter, 2015: 51-74.

[g] ‘Philosophical dialogues’, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 70 (2015): 27-33.

[h] Review of Peter Unger, Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy, in Times
Literary Supplement, 5833 (2015): 22-23.

[i] ‘Should philosophers be loners?’, (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), The
New York Times, 16 March 2015, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-
stone/?_r=0

2014

[a] ‘Logic, metalogic, and neutrality’, Erkenntnis, 79, 2 (2014): 211-231.

[b] ‘Very improbable knowing’, Erkenntnis, 79, 5 (2014): 971-999.

Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 34 (2014).

[c] ‘Précis of Modal Logic as Metaphysics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research, 88, 3 (2014): 713-716.

[d] ‘Replies to Bricker, Divers, and Sullivan on Modal Logic as Metaphysics’,

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, 3 (2014): 744-764.

[e] ‘How did we get here from there? The transformation of analytic philosophy’,
Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 27 (2014): 7-37.
Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu, World Philosophy, 4 (2015): 5-24.
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[e] ‘Winners, losers, believers, doubters’, in C. Moloney (ed.), Barbara Kruger, Oxford:
Modern Art Oxford, 2014, pp. 57-61.

[f] ‘Filozofia filozofie: rozhovor s Timothym Williamsonom’ [translated interview],

Filozofia [Bratislava], 69, 4 (2014): 366-373.

[g] ‘Classical investigations’, in R. Marshall (ed.), Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and

Answers with 25 Top Philosophers, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 222-234.
Printed version of 2009[o].

2013

[a] Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Pp. xvi + 464. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Paperback, 2015.
Chinese translation by Lifeng Zhang, Beijing: China Renmin University Press,
forthcoming.

[b] Identity and Discrimination, updated edition. Pp. xiv + 182. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell.

[c] Chinese translation of Knowledge and its Limits and of interview with TW by Chen
Bo. Pp. 459. Beijing: People’s Publishing House.

[d] ‘Gettier cases in epistemic logic’, Inquiry, 56, 1 (2013): 1-14.

[e] ‘Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases
in Epistemic Logic’, Inquiry, 56, 1 (2013): 77-96.

[f] ‘How deep is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge?’, in A.
Casullo and J. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University
Press: 291-312.

[g] ‘Knowledge first’, in M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in
Epistemology, 2nd ed., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013: 1-9.

[h] ‘Knowledge still first’, in M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary
Debates in Epistemology, 2nd ed., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013: 22-25.

[i] ‘Anti-exceptionalism about philosophy’, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 13, 37

(2013): 1-3.

[j] ‘Replies to Trobok, Smokrović, and Miščević on the philosophy of philosophy’,

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 13, 37 (2013): 49-64.

[k] ‘What is naturalism?’, in M. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methods, London: Routledge,

2013, pp. 30-32.

[l] ‘The unclarity of naturalism’, in M. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methods, London:

Routledge, 2013, pp. 36-38.
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[m] ‘Review on Logic Philosophy’ [Chinese translation], Journal of Hubei University

(Philosophy and Social Science), 40, 3 (2013): 20-25.

[n] Review of J. Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction, in Philosophy,

88, 345 (2013): 467-474.

[o] Review of P. Horwich, Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, European Journal of

Philosophy, 21, (2013): 7-10.

[p] ‘In memoriam: Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921-2012)’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,
19, 1 (2013): 123-126.

[q] ‘Modality and metaphysics’ (interview with Richard Marshall, 3:AM Magazine, 13
September 2013, http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/modality-and-metaphysics

2012

[a] ‘Boghossian and Casalegno on understanding and inference’, Dialectica, 66, 2

(2012): 237-47.

[b] ‘Wright and Casalegno on meaning and assertibility’, Dialectica, 66, 2 (2012): 267-
71.

[c] ‘Teacher for life’, (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), The New York Times,
4 January 2012 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/remembering-
michael-dummett/

[d] ‘Logic and neutrality’ (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), The New York
Times, 13 May 2012 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/
To be reprinted in P. Catapano and S. Critchley (eds.), The Stone Reader, New York:
Norton/Liveright, 2015.

2011

[a] ‘Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof’, Metaphilosophy, 42, 3 (2011): 215-
29.

[b] ‘Improbable knowing’, in T. Dougherty, ed., Evidentialism and its Discontents,

Oxford University Press, 2011: 147-164.

[c] ‘Metaphysics and higher-order modal logic’, in C. Kanzian, W. Löffler, and J.

Quitterer, eds., The Way Things Are: Studies in Ontology, Frankfurt: ontos verlag,
2011, pp. 17-36.

[d] ‘Logics and metalogics’, in C. Cellucci, E. Grosholz, and E. Ippoliti, eds., Logic and
Knowledge, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2011: 81-100.

[e] ‘Discussion’, in C. Cellucci, E. Grosholz, and E. Ippoliti, eds., Logic and Knowledge,
 12

Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2011: 117-121.

[f] ‘Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research, 82, 2 (2011): 470-1.
Reprinted in Analisi: Annuario/Bollettino della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica,
Mimesis, Milan, 2011: 79-80.

[g] ‘Reply to Peacocke’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82, 2 (2011): 481
-7.

[h] ‘Reply to Boghossian’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82, 2 (2011):

498-506.

[i] ‘Reply to Stalnaker’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82, 2 (2011): 515-
23.

[j] ‘Reply to Horwich’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82, 2 (2011): 534-
42.

[k] ‘Three Wittgensteinians and a naturalist on The Philosophy of Philosophy’, in Analisi:

Annuario/Bollettino della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica, Mimesis, Milan,
2011: 127-37.

[l] ‘Knowledge first epistemology’, in S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard, eds., Routledge

Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2011: 208-218.

[m] ‘Felsefe felsefesi nedir?’ [‘What is the philosophy of philosophy?’], trans. into
Turkish, Felsefe Tartışmaları: A Turkish Journal of Philosophy, 46 (2011): 1-17.

[n] Interview by Chen Bo, Theoria 77, 1 (2011): 4-31.

[o] ‘What is naturalism?’ (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), The New York
Times, 4 September 2011 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/
To be reprinted in P. Catapano and S. Critchley (eds.), The Stone Reader, New York:
Norton/Liveright, 2015.

[p] ‘On ducking challenges to naturalism’, (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’),
The New York Times, 28 September 2011
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/
To be reprinted in P. Catapano and S. Critchley (eds.), The Stone Reader, New York:
Norton/Liveright, 2015.

[q] Comment in S. Pyke (photographer), Philosophers, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2011: 210.

2010

[a] ‘Necessitism, contingentism and plural quantification’, Mind, 119, 475 (2010): 657
-748.
 13

[b] ‘Modal logic within counterfactual logic’, in A. Hoffman and B. Hale, eds., Modality:
Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 81-
96.

[c] Self-profile in J. Dancy, E. Sosa and M. Steup, eds., A Companion to Epistemology,

2nd ed., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010: 199-204.

[d] ‘Zaključivanje, referencija i semantika pejorativa’ (trans. Z. Čuljak), in Z. Čuljak, ed.,

Spoznaja i interpretacija. Radovi međunarodnog simpozija “Cognition and
Interpretation”, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, 10-11.10.2003, Zagreb: Institut za
filozofiju, 2010: 1-23.

[e] Interview in V.F. Hendricks and O. Roy, eds., Epistemic Logic: 5 Questions, New
York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, 2010: 249-261.
Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu, Henan Social Science, 25, 5, (2017): 100-105.

[f] Interview on vagueness in D. Edmonds and N. Warburton, eds., Philosophy Bites,

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 142-151.
Online version at http://philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=244823

[g] Interview by Lev Lamberov (in Russian translation), Analytica, 4 (2010): 122-138
http://www.philosophy.ru/analytica/pdf/2010/11.pdf

[h] Interview in Iphilo (Geneva), (2010): 11-14.

[i] ‘Modality & other matters’ (interview by Paal Antonsen), Perspectives: International
Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy (Dublin), 3 (2010): 16-29.

[j] ‘Anti-exceptionalism’, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 50, 3 (2010): 116-117.

[k] Review of Reason in Philosophy by Robert Brandom, The Times Literary

Supplement 5579 (2010): 22-23.

[l] ‘Reclaiming the Imagination’ (online, in ‘The Stone’, under ‘Opinionator’), The New
York Times, 15 August 2010 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/
To be reprinted in P. Catapano and S. Critchley (eds.), The Stone Reader, New York:
Norton/Liveright, 2015.

2009

[a] ‘Replies to critics’, in P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., Williamson on

Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 279-384.

[b] ‘Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives’, in J. Almog and P. Leonardi,
eds., The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 137-
158.

[c] ‘Conditionals and actuality’, Erkenntnis, 70, 2 (2009): 135-150.

[d] ‘Tennant’s troubles’, in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox,
 14

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 183-204 .

[e] ‘Knowledge of counterfactuals’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Epistemology (Royal Institute of

Philosophy Supplement: 64), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 45-64.

[f] ‘Probability and danger’ The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 4 (2009): 1-35.
http://www.amherstlecture.org/williamson2009/
Reprinted with Chinese abstract in Yi Jiang (ed.), Analytic Philosophy in China 2009,
Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2010: 1-34.

[g] ‘Abstract of The Philosophy of Philosophy’, Analysis 69, 1 (2009): 99-100.

[h] ‘Replies to Kornblith, Jackson and Moore’, ibid: 125-135.

[i] ‘Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy’, Philosophical Studies, 145, 3 (2009): 431
-434.

[j] ‘Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg’, Philosophical Studies, 145, 3 (2009):
465-476.

[k] ‘Logic and philosophy in the twenty-first century’, in F. Stoutland, ed., Philosophical
Probings: Essays on von Wright’s Later Work, New York, London: Automatic Press /
VIP, 2009: 199-208.
Chinese translation by Liuhua Zhang, Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and
Social Science), 46, 1 (2009): 45-54.

[l] ‘The use of pejoratives’, in D. Whiting, ed., The Later Wittgenstein on Language,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009: 45-62.

[m] ‘Plato goes pop’ (commentary), The Times Literary Supplement, 5529 (2009): 15.

[n] Interview with Julian Baggini, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 45, 2 (2009): 21-30.

[o] ‘Classical investigations’, interview with Richard Marshall, 3:AM Magazine (2009):
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/classical-investigations-timothy-williamson/.
Printed as 2014 [f].

2008

[a] ‘Why epistemology can’t be operationalized’, in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New

Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: 277-300.

[b] ‘Logic and philosophy in the twenty-first century’, translated into Chinese by Chen
Bo, Journal of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), 46, 1
(2009): 45-54.

[c] Interview with Chen Bo, Studies in Logic, 1, 3 (2008): 79-108.

Online version at http://www.frchina.net/data/personArticle.php?id=7660
Chinese translation in The Academic Journal of Jinyang (2009).
Published with a preface by Koji Nakatogawa, Annals of the Japan Association for
 15

Philosophy of Science 18 (2009): 57-87.

Revised and updated version 2011 [m].

[d] Interview in V.F. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., Epistemology: 5 Questions, New
York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, 2008: 323-334.

[e] Interview, Filosofisk Supplement (Oslo), 4, 2 (2008): 35-39.

2007

[a] The Philosophy of Philosophy. Pp. xiv + 332. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
Chinese translations of Introduction and Chapter 1 by Changshen Chen in World
Philosophy (Beijing), 5 (2009): 29-42.
Spanish translation by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, Mexico City: Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México, 2016.
Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu and Hongguang Wang, Beijing: The Commercial
Press, forthcoming.

[b] ‘On being justified in one’s head’, in M. Timmons, J. Greco and A. Mele, eds.,
Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert
Audi, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 106-122.
Reprinted in M. Arsenijević and Ž. Lazović, eds., Explanatory Gap: Essays in
Memory of Nikola Grahek, Belgrade: Faculty of Philosophy, University of
Belgrade, 2007 (appeared 2011): 163-184.

[c] ‘How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?’, Analysis, 67, 3 (2007): 173-180.

[d] ‘Logical deviance and semantic competence’, Rivista di Estetica, 34, 1 (2007): 121-
142.
Reprinted as ‘Sceptical conclusions about epistemological analyticity’, in P.
Frascolla,, Marconi, D. and Voltolini, A., eds., Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and
Metaphilosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 188-211.

[e] ‘Concepciones metafísicas de la analiticidad’ (translation by Miguel Ángel Fernández

Vargas of ‘Metaphysical conceptions of analyticity’), Dianoia, 52, 58 (2007): 3-26.

[f] ‘Philosophical knowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals’, Grazer Philosophische

Studien, 74 (2007): 89-123, and in C. Beyer and A. Burri, eds., Philosophical
Knowledge — Its Possibility and Scope, Amsterdam: Rodopi.

[g] ‘Knowledge within the margin for error’, Mind, 116, 463 (2007): 723-726.

2006

[a] ‘Indicative versus subjunctive conditionals, congruential versus non-hyperintensional

contexts’, in E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, eds., Philosophical Issues, Volume 16:
Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006: 310-333.

[b] ‘“Conceptual truth”’. The Aristotelian Society, sup. vol. 80 (2006): 1-41.
 16

[c] ‘Absolute identity and absolute generality’, in A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, eds.,
Absolute Generality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006: 369-389.
Similar version in Z. Novak and A. Simonyi, eds., Truth, Reference and
Realism, Budapest: CEU Press, 2011: 177-205.

[d] ‘Stalnaker on the interaction of modality with quantification and identity’, in J.

Thomson and A. Byrne, eds., Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of
Robert Stalnaker, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006: 123-147.

[e] (with Igor Douven), ‘Generalizing the Lottery Paradox’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 57, 4 (2006): 755-779.

[f] ‘Can cognition be factorised into internal and external components?’, in R. Stainton,
ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006: 291-306.
Ukrainian translation by I. Hrabovskyy in A. Synytsya (ed.) Anthology of
Contemporary Philosophy, or Beetle Leaves a Box, L’viv: Litopys, 2014, pp.
93-118.
Chinese translation of the volume to appear.

[g] ‘Must do better’, in P. Greenough and M. Lynch, eds., Truth and Realism, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006: 177-187.

[h] ‘Probability and the notion of luminosity’, Bulletin of Life and Death Studies, 2
(2006): 103-112.
Japanese translation by A. Iwamoto in Journal of Death and Life Studies
(Tokyo), 6 (2005): 315-330.

[i] Interview, Novi List (Rijeka), Znanost & obrazovanje, 24 September 2006: 2-3.

2005

[a] ‘Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking’

(Presidential Address), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105, 1 (2005): 1-23.

[b] (with Michael Fara), ‘Counterparts and actuality’, Mind 114, 453 (2005): 1-30.

[c] ‘Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge’,

Philosophical Quarterly 55, 219 (2005): 213-235.

[d] ‘Knowledge, context and the agent’s point of view’, in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.),
Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford: Clarendon
Press 2005: 91-114.

[e] (with Claudio Pizzi), ‘Conditional excluded middle in systems of consequential

implication’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 34, 4 (2005): 333-362.

[f] ‘Knowledge and scepticism’, in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook
of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 681-700.
 17

[g] ‘Précis of Knowledge and its Limits’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
70, 2 (2005): 431-435.

[h] ‘Replies to commentators’, ibid.: 468-491.

[i] Interview in V. Hendricks and J. Symons, eds., Formal Philosophy, New York and
London: Automatic Press, 2005: 209-222.

2004

[a] ‘Philosophical “intuitions” and scepticism about judgement’, Dialectica 58, 1 (2004):
109-153.

[b] ‘Past the linguistic turn?’, in B. Leiter, ed., The Future for Philosophy, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004: 106-128.
To be reprinted in J. E. Ford, ed., The Ontic Return, London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009.
Reprinted in Spanish translation as ‘¿Hemos superado el giro lingüístico?’ by
G. Rodríguez Espinosa and M. Ponte Azcárate in D. Pérez Chico and M.
Barroso Ramos, eds., Pluralidad de la filosofia analitica, Plaza y Valdes,
Madrid/Mexico: CSIC Press Service, 2007: 155-188.

[c] ‘Some computational constraints in epistemic logic’, in D. Gabbay, S. Rahman, J. M.

Torres and J. P. van Bendegem, eds., Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science
(Cognitive Science Series), Oxford and Paris: Hermes, 2004: 437-456.

[d] ‘Computational limits and epistemic logic’, in W. Löffler and P. Weingartner, eds.,
Knowledge and Belief. Wissen und Glauben (Proceedings of the 26th International
Wittgenstein Symposium), Vienna: ÖBV-HPT, 2004: 126-140.
To be republished in H. Arló-Costa, J. van Benthem, and V.F. Hendricks (eds.),
Readings in Formal Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, to
appear.

[e] ‘Reply to McGee and McLaughlin’, Linguistics and Philosophy 27, 1 (2004): 113
-122.

[f] ‘Sosa on abilities, concepts and externalism’, in J. Greco, ed., Philosophers and Their
Critics: Ernest Sosa, Oxford: Blackwell: 2004: 263-271.

[g] (with Agustín Rayo), ‘Formal semantics and unrestricted quantification’,

in E. Assenza, D. Chiricò and P. Perconti (eds.), Logic, Ontology and Linguistics/
Logica, Ontologia, Linguistica (Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi, 1), Rubbettino: Soveria
Mannelli, 2004: 131-147.

[h] ‘Summary of Knowledge and its Limits’, Philosophical Books 45, 4 (2004): 283-284.

[i] ‘Replies to commentators’, ibid., 313-323.

[j] ‘Armchair philosophy and counterfactual thinking’, in W. Østreng (ed.), Synergies:

Interdisciplinary Communications, Oslo: Centre for Advanced Study at the
 18

Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 2003/2004: 106-108.

2003

[a] ‘Everything’, Philosophical Perspectives 17, 1 (2003): 415-465.

Selected for P. Grim, K. Baynes and G. Mar (eds.), The Philosopher’s Annual 26
(2003).

[b] ‘Understanding and inference’ (in symposium on ‘Blind Reasoning’), The

Aristotelian Society, sup. vol. 77 (2003): 249-293.

[c] ‘Vagueness in reality’, in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 690-715.

[d] (with Agustín Rayo), ‘A completeness theorem for unrestricted first-order languages’,
in J. C. Beall, ed., Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2003: 331-356.

[e] ‘Truth and borderline cases’, in K. Korta and J.M. Larrazabal, eds., Truth, Rationality,
Cognition and Music (Proceedings of ICCS ‘01, Seventh International Colloquium on
Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, 2001), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003: 45-67.

[f] ‘O hrpi i apsolutno svemu’ (interview), Prolegomena (Zagreb), 2, 2 (2003): 289-293.

2002

[a] ‘Necessary existents’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Logic, Thought and Language (Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 51), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002: 233-251.

[b] ‘Vagueness, identity, and Leibniz’s Law’, in A. Bottani, M. Carrara and P. Giaretta,
eds., Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics (Topoi
Library, vol. 4), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002: 273-303.

[c] ‘Horgan on vagueness’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002): 273-285, and in J.

Brandl and O. Markić, eds., Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002: 273-285.

[d] ‘Epistemicist models: Comments on Gómez-Torrente and Graff’, Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 64, 1 (2002): 143-150.

[e] ‘Reply to Machina and Deutsch on vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error’, Acta
Analytica 17, 29 (2002): 47-61.

[f] ‘Peacocke’s theory of modality’, in symposium on C.A.B. Peacocke, Being Known, in

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64, 3 (2002): 650-655.

[g] ‘Soames on vagueness’, in symposium on Understanding Truth, S. Soames,

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 2 (2002): 422-428.
 19

[h] (edited with Delia Graff [Delia Graff Fara]), Vagueness (The International Research
Library of Philosophy 27). Pp. xxviii + 508. Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002.
Includes (with D. Graff) ‘Introduction’, ibid.: xi-xxviii.

[i] ‘On vagueness’ (interview), in J. Baggini and J. Stangroom, eds., New British
Philosophy: The Interviews, London: Routledge, 2002: 147-162.

[j] Untitled piece (on the occasion of the exhibition ‘24 Hours’ by David Connearn) in
D. Connearn, ed., Hours, Edinburgh: The Talbot Rice Gallery, 2002: 14.

2001

[a] (with Jason Stanley), ‘Knowing how’, The Journal of Philosophy 98, 8 (2001): 411-
444.
Reprinted in P. Grim, P. Ludlow and G. Mar, eds., The Philosopher’s Annual 26,
Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2002: 237-271.
Chinese translation by Xinyu Hu and Song Pan, Thought and Culture 10 (2011): 1-37.

[b] ‘Vagueness, indeterminacy and social meaning’, in C. Grant and D. McLaughlin,

eds., Language-Meaning-Social Construction: Interdisciplinary Studies (Critical
Studies, vol. 16), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001: 61-76.
Reprinted in P. Hanks, ed., Lexicology: Critical Concepts in Linguistics, vol. 1,
London: Routledge, 2007.

[c] ‘Comments on Michael Williams Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic

Standards’. Philosophical Studies 103, 1 (2001): 25-33.

[d] ‘Possibilia’, in J. Branquinho and D. Murcho, eds., Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico

-Filosóficos, Lisbon: Ediçes Gradiva, and Brasilia: University of Brasilia Press, 2001:
546-548, and in revised edition, J. Branquinho, D. Murcho and N. G. Gomes, eds.,
São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006: 604-606.

[e] ‘Some philosophical aspects of reasoning about knowledge’, in J. van Bentham, ed.,
Rationality and Knowledge: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference (TARK 2001),
San Francisco: Morgan Kaufman, 2001: 97.

[f] ‘Ethics, supervenience and Ramsey sentences’, in symposium on F. Jackson, From

Metaphysics to Ethics, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, 3 (2001):
625-630.

2000

[a] Knowledge and Its Limits. Pp. xi + 340. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Paperback (with corrections) 2002.
Chinese translation by Zhanfeng Liu and Li Chen, with interview of TW by Chen Bo,
459 pp., Beijing: People’s Publishing House.
New Chinese translation by Zhaoqing Xu, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, in
Preparation.
 20

Chapter 1 trans. P. Egré as ‘La connaissance est-elle un état d’esprit?’, in J. Dutant

and P. Engel (eds.), Philosophie de la Connaissance, Paris: Vrin, 2005: 259-303, and
in E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl and M. McGrath, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd
edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008: 213-230.
Arabic translation, Manaa.net publishing house, Saudi Arabia, to appear.

[b] (with Miroslava Andjelković), ‘Truth, falsity and borderline cases’, Philosophical
Topics 28, 1 (2000): 211-244.

[c] ‘The necessary framework of objects’, Topoi 19, 2 (2000): 201-208.

[d] ‘Scepticism and evidence’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 3 (2000):
613-628.

[e] ‘Tennant on knowable truth’, Ratio 13, 2 (2000): 99-114.

[f] ‘Semantic paradox and semantic change’, in A. Kanamori, ed., Analytic Philosophy
and Logic: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 6,
Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000: 113-124.

[g] ‘Skepticism, semantic externalism and Keith’s Mom’, Southern Journal of

Philosophy 38 (2000, Spindel Conference supplement on ‘The Role of the Empirical
(And of the A Priori) in Epistemology’): 149-158.

[h] ‘Margins for error: a reply’, The Philosophical Quarterly 50, 198 (2000): 76-81.

1999

[a] ‘On the structure of higher-order vagueness’, Mind 108, 429 (1999): 127-143.
Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., Vagueness, Aldershot: Ashgate /
Dartmouth, 2002: 239-251.

[b] ‘Existence and contingency’, Aristotelian Society, sup. vol. 73 (1999): 181-203.
With printer’s errors corrected, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, 1
(2000): 117-139.

[c] ‘Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula’, Dialectica 53, 3/4 (1999): 253-270.

[d] (with Nicolao Bonini, Dan Osherson and Riccardo Viale), ‘On the psychology of
vague predicates’, Mind and Language 14, 4 (1999): 377-393.

[e] ‘Rational failures of the KK principle’, in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms,

eds., The Logic of Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 101-118.

[f] ‘A note on satisfaction, truth and the empty domain’, Analysis 49, 1 (1999): 3-8.

[g] ‘Andjelković on bivalence: a reply’, Acta Analytica 14, 23 (1999): 35-38.

[h] ‘Schiffer on the epistemic theory of vagueness’, Philosophical Perspectives 13

(1999): 505-517.
 21

[i] Review of A.W. Moore, Points of View, in Philosophical Books 40, 1 (1999): 43-45.

1998

[a] ‘Bare possibilia’, Erkenntnis 48, 2&3 (1998): 257-273.

Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković with English summary in
Theoria (Belgrade) 41, 4 (1998): 83-99.

[b] ‘Conditionalizing on knowledge’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
49, 1 (1998): 89-121.
To be republished in H. Arló-Costa, J. van Benthem, and V.F. Hendricks (eds.),
Readings in Formal Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, to
appear.

[c] ‘Iterated operators’, in T.J. Smiley, ed., Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998, Proceedings of the British Academy 95 (1998): 85-133.

[d] ‘Indefinite extensibility’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 55 (1998): 1-24 and in J.

Brandl and P. Sullivan, eds., New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett,
Amsterdam and Atlanta GA Rodopi, 1999: 1-24.

[e] ‘The broadness of the mental: some logical considerations’, Philosophical

Perspectives 12 (1998): 389-410.

[f] ‘Continuum many maximal consistent normal bimodal logics with inverses’, Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39, 1 (1998): 128-134.

[g] ‘Dwa wyklady o wiedzy i przekonaniach’ (‘Two lectures on knowledge and belief’),
translated by M. Iwanicki, S. Judycki & T. Szubka, in P. Gutowski and T. Szubka,
eds., Filozofia brytyjska u schylku XX wieku, Lublin: TN KUL, 1998: 313-334.

[h] ‘Identity’, in E.J. Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London and New
York: Routledge, 1998, vol. 4: 675-678.
Reprinted in E.J. Craig, ed., The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
London and New York: Routledge, 2005: 435-437.
‘Identity’ (excerpt from the above), in E.J. Craig, ed., Concise Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 2000: 381.

[i] ‘Lexical competence and semantic externalism’, translated into Italian by F.

Bertolucci, discussion piece on Lexical Competence, D. Marconi, Iride 11, 24 (1998):
397-401.

[j] Review of G. Usberti, Significato e conoscenza: Per una critica del

neoverificazionismo, in Dialectica 52, 1 (1998): 63-69.

[k] (with Paolo Crivelli), review of G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, A New Introduction
to Modal Logic, in The Philosophical Review 107, 3 (1998): 471-474.

[l] Review of A. Miller, Philosophy of Language, in The Times Literary Supplement

 22

4984 (1998): 35.

[m] (edited) issue on vagueness, The Monist, 81, 2 (1998).

1997

[a] ‘Knowledge as evidence’, Mind 106, 424 (1997): 717-741.

[b] (with Lloyd Humberstone) ‘Inverses for normal modal operators’, Studia Logica 59, 1
(1997): 33-64.

[c] (with Claudio Pizzi), ‘Strong Boethius’ Thesis and consequential implication’,
Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, 5 (1997): 569-588.

[d] ‘Imagination, stipulation and vagueness’, in E. Villanueva, ed., Philosophical Issues

8: Truth, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1997: 215-228.
Russian translation by A. Veruk and N. Zubkova, Analytica 4 (2010): 105-121
http://www.philosophy.ru/analytica/pdf/2010/10.pdf

[e] ‘Replies to commentators’, ibid.: 255-265.

[f] (with Mark Sainsbury), ‘Sorites’, in R. Hale and C.J.G. Wright, eds., A Companion to
the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997: 458-484.

[g] ‘The necessity of ignorance’.

Extracts translated into Hungarian as ‘A tudatlanság szükségessége’, in B. Petho,
ed., poszt-posztmodern: A Kilencvenes Évek (post-postmodern: The Nineties),
Budapest: Platon, 1997: 461-463.
Full version translated into Spanish by E. Romerales as ‘La necesidad de la
ignorancia. Lógica, indeterminación y metafísica’ in A. López Cuenca, ed.,
Resistiendo al oleaje: Reflexiones tras un siglo de filosofía analítica. Madrid:
Cuaderno Gris, 1999: 189-201.

[h] ‘Précis of Vagueness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 4 (1997):

921-928.

[i] ‘Replies to commentators’, ibid.: 945-953.

[j] ‘Epistemic conception of vagueness’, ‘Higher-order vagueness’, ‘Indiscriminability’,

‘Ontological conception of vagueness’, ‘S4 principle’, ‘S5 principle’ and ‘Semantic
conception of vagueness’, in ‘Glossary’, in R. Hale and C.J.G. Wright, eds., A
Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997: 661-662, 666,
667, 674-675, 682, 682 and 682 respectively.

[k] ‘Vizi e virtù della vaghezza’ (‘What is the problem of vagueness?’), Il Sole 24-ore
(Domenica) 265 (1997): 32 .
Reprinted in Rivista di Estetica 7 (1998): 75-77.

[l] ‘Reference’ and ‘Sense’, in D.M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
 23

Supplement, New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1997: 499-502 and 531-532
respectively.

[m] ‘Sense, validity and context’, in symposium on J.J. Campbell, Past, Space and Self, in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 3 (1997): 649-654.

[n] Review of W.P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth, in The Journal of Philosophy
94, 2 (1997): 103-106.

1996

[a] ‘Knowing and asserting’, The Philosophical Review 105, 4 (1996): 489-523.
To be reprinted in A. Kasher, ed., Pragmatics: Critical Concepts II, London:
Routledge, 2010.

[b] ‘Cognitive homelessness’, The Journal of Philosophy 93, 11 (1996): 554-573.

Italian translation to appear in collection of papers on epistemology, Milan: Mimesis.

[c] ‘Self-knowledge and embedded operators’, Analysis 56, 4 (1996): 202-209.

[d] (with Hyun Song Shin) ‘How much common belief is necessary for a convention?’,
Games and Economic Behavior 13 (1996): 252-268.
Earlier version distributed as CARESS Working Paper #92-32, University of
Pennsylvania, 1992.
Reprinted in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, eds., The Logic of Strategy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 119-136.

[e] ‘Admissible rules in modal systems with the Brouwerian axiom’, Journal of the
Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics 4, 2 (1996): 283-303.

[f] ‘The necessity and determinacy of distinctness’, in S. Lovibond and S. Williams, eds.,
Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996: 1-17.

[g] ‘What makes it a heap?’, Erkenntnis 44, 3 (1996): 327-339.

Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., Vagueness, Aldershot: Ashgate /
Dartmouth, 2002: 239-251.

[h] ‘Putnam on the sorites paradox’, Philosophical Papers 25, 1 (1996): 47-56.
Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., Vagueness, Aldershot: Ashgate /
Dartmouth, 2002: 497-506.

[i] ‘Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness’, Analysis 56, 1 (1996): 39-45.

[j] ‘Unreflective realism’, in symposium on C.J.G. Wright, Truth and Objectivity, in

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, 4 (1996): 905-909.

[k] Review of G. Boolos, The Logic of Provability, in The Philosophical Quarterly 46,
182 (1996): 110-116.
 24

[l] Review of W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman and N. Asher, eds., Modality, Morality

and Belief: Essays in Honour of Ruth Barcan Marcus, in Philosophy 71, 275 (1996):
167-172.

[m] Review of G. Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, in British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 47, 2 (1996): 331-334.

[n] Review of M. Pinkal, Logic and Lexicon, in History and Philosophy of Logic 17, 2
(1996): 92-93.

[o] Review of S. Shapiro, ed., The Limits of Logic, in History and Philosophy of Logic
17, 3 (1996): 175-176.

[p] Review of D. Stalker, ed., Grue! The New Riddle of Induction, in The Times Literary
Supplement 4847 (1996): 27.

1995

[a] ‘Is knowing a state of mind?’, Mind 104, 415 (1995): 533-565.

[b] ‘Definiteness and knowability’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1995, Spindel

Conference supplement): 171-191.

[c] (with Jason Stanley) ‘Quantifiers and context-dependence’, Analysis 55, 4 (1995):
291-295.

[d] ‘Does assertibility satisfy the S4 axiom?’, Crítica 27, 81 (1995): 3-22.

[e] ‘Realism and anti-realism’ and ‘Vague objects’, in T. Honderich, ed., The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995: 746-748 and 894
respectively.

[f] Review of R.B. Marcus, Modalities, in Philosophical Books 36, 2 (1995): 120-122.

1994

[a] Vagueness. Pp. xiii + 325. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Paperback 1996.
Pp. 185-189 and 198-215 reprinted in S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, eds., Philosophy of
Language: The Central Topics, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
Chinese translation by Qinghui Su, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2019.

[b] ‘Non-genuine MacIntosh logics’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 23, 1 (1994): 87

-101.

[c] (with Hyun Song Shin) ‘Representing the knowledge of Turing machines’, Theory
and Decision 37 (1994): 125-146.
Reprinted in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin and H.S. Shin, eds.,
Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions, Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1997: 169-190.
 25

[d] ‘Never say never’, Topoi 13, 2 (1994): 135-145.

[e] ‘Vagueness’, in D. Bolinger, A. McIntosh et al., eds., The Encyclopedia of Language

and Linguistics, Oxford: Pergamon, 1994, vol. 9: 4869-4871.
Updated version in P. Lamarque, ed., Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of
Language, Oxford: Pergamon, 1997: 204-205.

[f] Review of C.J.G. Wright, Truth and Objectivity, in International Journal of

Philosophical Studies 2, 1 (1994): 130-144.

[g] Review of A. Gupta and N. Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, in International
Studies in The Philosophy of Science 8, 2 (1994): 164-168.

1993

[a] ‘Verificationism and non-distributive knowledge’, Australasian Journal of

Philosophy 71, 1 (1993): 78-86.

[b] ‘Some admissible rules in non-normal modal systems’, Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 34, 3, (1993): 378-400.

[c] ‘The early history of sorites paradoxes’, Argumento (Lisbon) 3, 5/6 (1993): 35-44.

[d] Review of J. Dancy and E. Sosa, eds., A Companion to Epistemology, in The Times
Literary Supplement 4698 (1993): 10.

1992

[a] ‘On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 21, 1 (1992):
63-89.

[b] ‘An alternative rule of disjunction in modal logic’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 33, 1 (1992): 89-100.

[c] ‘Inexact knowledge’, Mind 101, 402 (1992): 217-42.

Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković as ‘Neegzaktno znanje’,
Theoria (Belgrade) 38, 4 (1995): 87-114.
Reprinted in Bulgarian translation in M. Stoicheva-Pantaleeva, ed., A Reader in
Contemporary Oxford Philosophy (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 1996).

[d] ‘Vagueness and ignorance’, Aristotelian Society, sup. 66 (1992): 145-162.

Reprinted in R. Keefe and P. Smith, eds., Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge MA:
MIT Press, 1997: 265-280.
Reprinted in M. Rea, ed., Metaphysics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, London:
Routledge, 2007.
Reprinted in D. Byrne and M. Kölbel, eds., Arguing about Language, London:
Routledge, 2010.
 26

Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković as ‘Nejasnost i neznanje’,

Theoria (Belgrade) 38, 4 (1995): 71-86.
To be reprinted in Italian translation in G. Ronzitti, ed., La Vaghezza (e-book),
Italian Web Site of Philosophy, http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/index.html.

[e] Review of G. Vision, Modern Anti-Realism and Manufactured Truth, in The

Philosophical Review 101, 4 (1992): 420-422.

1991

[a] ‘A relation between namesakes in modal logic’, Bulletin of the Section of Logic
(Polish Academy of Sciences) 20, 3/4 (1991): 129-137.

[b] ‘Fregean directions’, Analysis 51, 4 (1991): 194-195.

[c] ‘Abstract/concrete’, in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics

and Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1991, vol. I: 4-5.

1990

[a] Identity and Discrimination. Pp. ix + 173. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
2nd edition (revised). Pp. xiv + 182. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

[b] ‘Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic
55, 1 (1990): 297-314.

[c] ‘Verification, falsification and cancellation in KT’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 31, 2 (1990): 286-290.

[d] ‘Necessary identity and necessary existence’, in R. Haller and J. Brandl, eds.,
Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International
Wittgenstein-Symposium, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990, vol. I: 168-175.

[e] Review of R. Sorensen, Blindspots, in Mind 99, 393 (1990): 137-140.

[f] Review of M. Tiles, The Philosophy of Set Theory, in The Times Higher Education
Supplement 901 (1990): 22.

[g] Review of A. Appiah, For Truth in Semantics, in Linguistics and Philosophy 13, 1
(1990): 129-135.

[h] Review of N. Cocchiarella, Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the

Problem of Universals, in Linguistics and Philosophy 13, 2 (1990): 265-271.

[i] Review of P. Simons, Parts, in Grazer Philosophische Studien 38 (1990): 201-210.

[j] Review of D. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, in The Times

Literary Supplement 4572 (1990): 1241.
 27

1989

[a] ‘Being and being so’, Acta Analytica 4 (1989): 93-114.

[b] ‘Kriteriji identiteta: tko ih treba?’ (‘Criteria of identity: who needs them?’), translated
into Croatian by M. Palmović with English summary, Filozofska Istraživanja 9, 4
(1989): 1383-1393.

[c] Review of D. Marconi, L’eredità di Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Books 30, 1

(1989): 30-33.

1988

[a] ‘First order logics for comparative similarity’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
29, 4 (1988): 457-481.

[b] ‘Assertion, denial and some cancellation rules in modal logic’, Journal of
Philosophical Logic 17, 3 (1988): 299-318.

[c] ‘Equivocation and existence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1987/8):

109-127.

[d] ‘Knowability and constructivism’, The Philosophical Quarterly 38, 153 (1988): 422
-432.

[e] ‘Bivalence and subjunctive conditionals’, Synthese 75, 3 (1988): 405-421.

[f] ‘The contingent a priori: a reply’, Analysis 48, 4 (1988): 218-221.

[g] ‘On rigidity and persistence’, Logique et Analyse 121/2 (1988): 89-91.

[h] (with David Berman) ‘Locke on particles: a reply to Nuchelmans’, Logique et

Analyse, 123/4 (1988): 213-215.

[i] ‘The unknown’ Cogito 2, 2 (1988): 30-32.

Polish translation to appear in Filozofuj!, April 2018.

[j] Review of R. Hale, Abstract Objects, in Mind 97, 387 (1988): 487-490.

[k] Review of J. Foster and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley, in Berkeley

Newsletter 10 (1987/8): 5-7.

[l] Review of M. Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, in The Times Literary Supplement 4489
(1988): 748.

1987

[a] ‘On the paradox of knowability’, Mind 96, 382 (1987): 256-261.
 28

[b] ‘On knowledge of the unknowable’, Analysis 47, 3 (1987): 154-158.

[c] ‘Invertible definitions’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28, 2 (1987): 244-258.

[d] ‘Anthropocentrism and truth’, Philosophia 17, 1 (1987): 33-53.

1986

[a] ‘Criteria of identity and the Axiom of Choice’, The Journal of Philosophy 83, 7
(1986): 380-394.
Reprinted in H.W. Noonan, ed., Identity, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993: 419-433.

[b] ‘The contingent a priori: has it anything to do with indexicals?’, Analysis 46, 3
(1986): 113-117.

[c] ‘Realism and the burden of proof’, Irish Philosophical Journal 3, 1 (1986): 42-57.

[d] Review of T. Burke, The Philosophy of Popper, in Hermathena 140 (1986): 114-115.

1985

[a] ‘Converse relations’, The Philosophical Review 94, 2 (1985): 249-262.

[b] ‘Antropocentrizam i istina’, translated into Serbian by D. Božin with English

summary, Filozofska Istraživanja (Zagreb) 5, 3 (1985): 501-515.

1984

[a] ‘The infinite commitment of finite minds’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14, 2
(1984): 235-255.

[b] ‘Argument u prilog Platonizmu’ (‘An argument for Platonism’, translated into Serbian
by D. Božin), Dometi (Rijeka) 17, 12 (1984): 43-58.

1982

[a] ‘Intuitionism disproved?’, Analysis 42, 4 (1982): 203-207.