Issue No.

23 – October 2008
October 2008 Issue No. 23

From the Editor

E-Jets NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical

items. This newsletter, compiled by Embraer Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings
the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best
practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and
efficiency in daily operation.

E-Jets NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and

dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be
shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance.
Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to Embraer Customers.

Earlier editions of E-Jets NEWS publication can be found at Flyembraer Portal at

http://www.flyembraer.com

- Login (enter username and password);

- Select “Maintenance” and then “Technical Support”;

- Select “E-Jets NEWS for Operators”;

- Click on desired E-Jets NEWS.

If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-Jets
NEWS is needed, please contact the local Embraer Field Service Representative.
General questions or comments about the E-Jets NEWS publication can be
addressed to:

E-Jets NEWS

Tel: +55 12 3927 7075

Fax: +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: [email protected]

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The articles published in E-Jets NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A
property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third
party without EMBRAER’s written consent. Also, no article published should be considered
authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

Page 1
October 2008 Issue No. 23

Integrity Tests (I-BIT) Tips – That means that the test was interrupted
Update during its execution for any reason and a
power-down/power-up sequence was not
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 performed in accordance with the
instructions of the I-BIT TASK. Thus, in
As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS that scenario the test will not pass
Releases No. 12 and No. 21, Embraer is because, once the BIT is in the NVM
willing to share some additional tips FCM, a power reset is required to clear it.
concerning the Flight Controls Integrity
test (AMM Task 27-00-00-710-801-A).

Scenario 1 Scenario 3

During the L/ROB AIL TEST and L/RIB Another scenario identified in the FHDB
AIL TEST, it has been identified that the analysis was the test did not pass due to
test will not pass. the hydraulic P-BIT had not been run
(daily switch configuration had not been
Based on the test result, the referred completed).
AMM TASK has been revised to include
the following instruction. Whenever it is necessary to turn on the
hydraulics during the TASK make sure
TURN THE YOKE TO ONE OF THE that the daily switch configuration is
STOPS AND HOLD IT FOR 1 SECOND. complete (hydraulic PBIT runs). If it is not
THEN TURN IT TO THE OTHER STOP complete, the test will not pass. The daily
AND HOLD IT AGAIN FOR 1 OR 2 switch configuration is completed
SECONDS. THEN RELEASE THE (hydraulic PBIT runs) after 2 minutes
YOKE. NO MORE THAN 5 CYCLES have elapsed.
ARE NECESSARY TO DO THE
AILERON TEST.
“TAILSTRIKE PROT FAIL” CAS
Message being displayed –
Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190

Embraer is about to release the SNL 190-

27-0038 R01 in order to inform operators
on "TAILSTRIKE PROT FAIL” Advisory
CAS Message occurrence during flight
since either the condition of dual sensor
compensated radar altitude is not valid
(loss of communication between RA and
antennas and RA oscillation) or failure of
the Proximity Sensor Electronic Module
(PSEM).

As an interim solution, Embraer

recommends the accomplishment of FIM
Figure included in the AMM. Task 27-03-00-810-987A.

The final solution will be addressed

Scenario 2 through Load 23.

During further analyses of the FHDB

concerning the events which the test did
not pass, it was identified the test was not
performed according to the AMM TASK
27-00-00-710-801-A.

Page 2
October 2008 Issue No. 23

New Wing Anti-Ice Slat Hoses – -06 PSEM – Update

Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As an update to E-Jets NEWS Release
As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS No. 18, article “-06 PSEM Service
Releases No. 17 and No. 22, Embraer Bulletin issued”, the -06 PSEM was
informs that a service bulletin to introduce factory-incorporated in Jan/2008 for the
the new wing A-I slat hoses is scheduled EMBRAER 170 from aircraft MSN
to be released in March 2009. 17000205 and on and for the EMBRAER
190 on aircraft MSN 19000109, 00140,
SNLs 170-30-0013 and 190-30-0011, 00148, 00150 and from 00152 and on.
which provide further information
regarding this subject, have been revised With the purpose of evaluating the
accordingly. effectiveness of the solution, using
Embraer´s FHDB database, EFTC
Mechanical Group has analyzed 6.000
power-ups for 49 different aircraft
Slat actuator Jammed due to equipped with the -06 PSEM. The
mis-rigging – Update analyzed scenarios were CAS messages
“LG NO DISPATCH” and “BRK
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 CONTROL FAULT” simultaneously
displayed after power up, and CAS
As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS message “BRK CONTROL FAULT”
Release No. 21, Embraer emphasizes displayed on power up and
that if the slat surface is found out of simultaneously correlated to BCM1
rigging, a SLAT FAIL, correlated with FAULT, OUTBD 28V INPUT PWR
SLAT SURFACE JAMMED/ FAULT, BCM2 FAULT and INBD 28V
UNDERSPEED, may occur during slat INPUT PWR FAULT.
retraction, particularly, when the Flap/Slat
lever is moved from position 1 to zero.

This situation occurs due to slat track

stops at the roller, in the mis-rigged point,
before reaching the Slat full retract
position, thereby increasing the torque in
the actuator.

The analysis indicated that both failure

modes are being addressed on the -06
PSEM. The final analysis of the -06
PSEM effectiveness will be performed no
later than December 2008. At present,
the -06 PSEM has been provided on
attrition basis.

Page 3
October 2008 Issue No. 23

Service Bulletin for Brake Engine High Force Connectors

assembly Inspection
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
Embraer and GE have been investigating
Brake carbon disk failure due to catalytic occurrences of range/disagree faults
oxidation is an issue that has particularly caused by electrical micro-arcing on the
affected EMBRAER 170. However, W1/W2 cable connectors pins.
EMBRAER 190 is under the same
condition. Refer to E-Jets NEWS Release The root cause investigation showed that
No. 20. standard pin to socket clamping force,
combined with engine vibration, can
MEGGITT (Brake manufacturer) issued result in micro-arcing induced silicon
inspection SB´s for the EMBRAER 170 contamination (Figure 1). Micro-arcing
last year. With some events recently can then affect the pin-to-socket
registered for EMBRAER 190, an resistance and possibly lead to
equivalent SB was released for that fleet. intermittent range/disagree FADEC
Therefore, the following SB´s are faults.
currently available for this purpose:

• EMBRAER 170:

o MEGGITT SB 90000583-32-04
issued in August 2007 recommended
inspection to be done after 1000 cycles
(not to exceed 1400 cycles) with
continued inspections at every tire
change (not to exceed 400 cycles).

• EMBRAER 190:

o MEGGITT SB 90002340-32-04
issued in September 2008
recommended inspection to be done Figure 1 - Signs of Pin Arcing
after 1000 cycles (not to exceed 1400
cycles) with continued inspections at As already presented in the EOC USA
every tire change (not to exceed 700 (June 2008), the applicable FIM tasks in
cycles). the Engine Manual have been revised
(April 2007) as an interim solution to
include a recommendation to clean the
W1/W2 cable connectors.
CMC Remote Terminal and DLS
According to the feedback received from
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Operators, the results of the cleaning of
the connectors have been positive and
Embraer recommends that in order to have eliminated some fault reports.
avoid issues with the CMC Remote
Terminal and DLS it is necessary to As a final solution, GE issued the SB 73-
follow the installation instructions as 0021 (August 2008) to introduce
described in Honeywell TNLs A23-9999- improved W1 yellow and W2 blue
023 and A23-9999-030. It is important to harnesses with high force connectors
remember that both should be installed (Figure 2) in the Fuel Metering Unit
and run under the Windows 2000 or (FMU), Operability Bleed Valve (OBV),
Windows XP operational systems using N1, N2, T2 and Variable Geometry (VG)
administrative rights. CMC Remote actuator connectors.
Terminal and DLS were not tested under
Windows Vista and Honeywell does not
currently support the use of Windows
Vista for the Remote Terminal and DLS.

Page 4
October 2008 Issue No. 23

The new design increases the clamping SB 170-24-0045 and 190-24-

force between the harness socket and 0015 Electrical Power –
pin. This will decrease the risk of micro-
arcing, electrical intermittent and resulting inspection and replacement of
FADEC faults. RAT (Ram Air Turbine) cable
assembly
This Service Bulletin can be
accomplished either on-wing, when the Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
affected part (W1 / W2 Harness) is
removed, or at a shop visit. EMBRAER Embraer calls operator’s attention to
and GE recommend the application of regarding the accomplishment of the
this Service Bulletin. SB´s 170-24-0045 and 190-24-0015 on
their fleet and inventory in order to
substitute all RAT’s cable assembly
manufactured with incorrect material,
identified under date code M08807 or
M13407.

A total of 8 suspect RAT´s were delivered

to the field with the aforementioned date
codes. Further information regarding
reason, applicability and compliance can
be found on the subject Service Bulletins.

Figure 2 - High Force Connector Flight Phase Change on the

FHDB
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
New Wheel Part Number
Released Some Messages <NO MAINT MSG
NAME> can be verified on the FHDB
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 Maintenance Message file. Such events
are recorded to allow identifying the exact
Embraer recently issued PIL 190-32- moment of a flight phase change (from
0039 introducing new wheel PN CLIMB to TAKE OFF for instance). At the
900002317-2 for the EMBRAER 190/195 same time, the states <NO MAINT MSG
aircraft. NUMBER> and <NO MAINT MSG
TYPE> are also recorded in the fields
This new wheel incorporates a tungsten "Maint Msg Code" and "Maint Msg Type"
carbide coating on the keys in order to respectively.
reduce the friction against the brake rotor
lugs and, consequently, prevent brake
damage due to excessive axial loads.
This same coating was also implemented SPDA 26-Slot Chassis PN
in the rotor lugs of new brake assembly 1707944 – Incorrect Torque
PN 90002340-1.
Label
MEGGITT issued SB 900002317-32-02
presenting the instructions to convert the Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
old wheel into the new one. The AIPC will
SNLs 170-24-0036 and 190-24-0030
be revised soon to present the new part
were issued to inform Operators about
numbers.
SPDA 26-slot chassis with an incorrect
EMBRAER 170 and EMBRAER 190 now torque label that was found during
have similar modifications introduced on production line at Embraer. These
brake and wheels, which intends to documents bring information regarding
address the events of brake damage in analysis, tests and recommended
the fleet. actions.
Page 5
October 2008 Issue No. 23

TRU Dust Accumulation – Information on the AMS-CMC

Screen Filter Sampling Trim System Page for Single-
Program Results Zone Aircraft
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

Due to dust accumulated inside the TRU Embraer calls operator´s attention to the
PN 5913148-3 in the Fleet, a fact that the CMC Trim System
maintenance task for cleaning the entire Parameters Page, under System
TRU unit was required by the Diagnostics-Air Conditioning Systems, is
Certification Authorities at each 1800 FH the same for dual and single-zone
(Maintenance Review Board). aircraft. However, not all the information
are used for both configurations.
Some Operators requested a simpler Therefore, the information below are
solution concerning the TRU dust issue. normally shown on this page for single-
A screen filter to be installed in the TRU zone aircraft:
air inlet was suggested as a feasible
proposal to make easier and faster the a) The 'cabin temp control'-'duct supply
TRU maintenance task. temp' indication displays "XXXXX" under
the column 'AFT'. This is due to the AMS
To evaluate its effectiveness, a filter logic tries to get signals from a sensor
sampling from a total of six aircraft of four that does not exist in that configuration.
different operators was performed from (See the picture below.)
April 2007 to April 2008. Embraer
analyzed all the data collected during the b) The 'set temp' and 'actual temp'
sampling program and found the indications under the same column 'AFT'
following results: display a repetition of the information
from the 'FWD' column.
• Time duration between TRU
screens cleaning shall be 400FH c) The 'zone trim valve parameters'
should be disregarded.
• Time duration between TRU
removal and cleaning shall be In case the CMC pages are used to help
2800FH troubleshooting temperature control
difficulties on a single-zone aircraft, a
Analyzing the maintenance hours after better option would be the 'Pack System
19800FH to assess the benefit between Temperature Parameters Page'.
the current solution (TRU Cleaning) and
the proposed solution (TRU and Screen
Filter cleaning), the conclusion was the
proposed solution increases maintenance
cost around 4.5 times.

Besides the maintenance cost increase,

to implement this solution in the field, it
would be necessary a new TRU
qualification and such costs would be
included into a charging Service Bulletin.

Taking into consideration all involved

costs and the lack of economic benefits
of the TRU screen filter solution to
operators, Embraer will close this item
assuming the current solution (TRU
cleaning every 1800FH) is the best way
to deal with the TRU dust accumulation
issue.

Page 6
October 2008 Issue No. 23

Brake Assembly New Part Misalignment Indication

Number between LH and RH Aileron
Surfaces on Neutral Position in
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
the FCS Synoptic Page
Regarding the Brake Carbon disk failure
found during EMBRAER 190 service, Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
Embraer informs that the Operator has a Embraer has received some reports from
new option to convert the Brake
EMBRAER 190 operators concerning
Assembly at the next Overhaul. SB
Aileron Deflection not reaching full travel
90002340-32-03 was issued in August
indication on the Flight Controls Synoptic
2008 by Meggitt ABS for the EMBRAER
Page.
190 series Aircraft.
Further inspection revealed that the fuse
The Rotating Disks have Tungsten-
rivet of the Aileron LVDT Support Fitting
Carbide (low friction) coated rotor
was found sheared, allowing the support
channels. These coated rotor channels
to rotate over the remaining one, causing
will reduce friction and wear at the wheel
the subject LVDT to indicate a spurious
key-to-rotor channel interface and will
position of the aileron surface. In one of
reduce wheel loads into the rotor.
the reported cases, both rivets were
The Pressure Plate has an improved sheared and damage to the aileron
oxidation protection to minimize the surface was reported.
oxidation impact.
As an interim solution, Embraer issued
Brake Assemblies 90002340, IC2008-190/07404 with an advanced
90002340PR, 90002340-1 and release of FIM task 27-10-00-810-807A -
90002340-1PR are fully interchangeable. Aileron neutral indication (on FC synoptic
New and used carbon disks cannot be page – LH and RH) misaligned, caused
intermixed in a single brake assembly. by the fuse rivet shearing on the Aileron
LVDT Support Fitting. The FIM task
PIL 190-32-0041 was released in August revision will be released on Feb/2009.
2008 to inform the operators about the
availability of the CARBON BRAKE SNL 190-57-002 was released in order to
ASSY new part number. inform all EMBRAER 190 Operators
about this issue.

Bleed Fail without Correlation

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

Embraer has analyzed some events of

Bleed Fail CAS messages without CMC
correlations. DVDR readouts show that
they were caused by bleed over
temperature (above 260 degrees C for 3
seconds) events. The current logic was
not able to trigger the correlated CMC
message in such cases.

Black Label 9 will address this kind of

event.
The root cause of this issue is still under
investigation by Embraer and as soon
Embraer has some results, all operators
will be informed.

Page 7
October 2008 Issue No. 23

Engine Trend Reports FIM = Fault Isolation Manual

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 FOD = Foreign Object Damage

Embraer has received questions from FOL = Flight Operations Letter

operators regarding generation and
transmission of engine trend reports. To LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information
better address these questions and share
LRU = Line Replaceable Unit
with all operators information related to
this subject, Embraer has issued SNL´s LVDT = Linear Variable Differential-
190-71-0004 and 170-71-0006. Transducer
The intent of these Service Newsletters is MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List
to provide information to the Operators
regarding the process of transmitting NVM = Non-Volatile Memory
engine trend reports on the EMBRAER
170/190 via ACARS to GE and also to OB = Operational Bulletins
the airlines themselves. Besides, this
document also brings relevant PIL = Parts Information Letters
information about the parameters
transmitted, triggering conditions and PN = Part Number
format of these reports.
PSEM = Proximity Sensor Electronic
Module

Acronyms RAT = Ram Air Turbine

AD = Airworthiness Directive SB = Service Bulletin

AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog SN = Serial Number

AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual SNL = Service Newsletter

AMS = Air Management System SPDA = Secondary Power Distribution

Assembly
ANAC = Agência Nacional de Aviação
Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority) TRU = Transformer Rectifier Unit

AOM = Airplane Operations Manual Note: All abbreviations used in

EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be
BCM = Brake Control Module found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

CAS = Crew Alerting System

CMC = Central Maintenance Computer

CMM = Component Maintenance Manual

DLS = Data Load System

DVDR = Digital Voice-Data Recorder

EICAS = Engine Indicating and Crew

Alerting System

EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual

FCM = Flight Controls Module

FHDB = Fault History Database

Page 8