HYPERSONIC MISSILES: KEY ELEMENTS

Hypersonic missiles Hypersonic missiles Hypersonic missile

are firstly defined follow a non-ballistic are capable to
by their ability to atmospheric manoeuvre and to
reach and maintain trajectory, flying change the point of
hypersonic speeds, between 18 and 60 ml impact throughout
i.e. speeds in altitude. all their flight.
exceeding Mach 5.
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HYPERSONIC MISSILES AND BALLISTIC MISSILES
Ballistic missiles (BM) fly at It is possible to
much higher altitudes than predict the
hypersonic missiles and follow destination of any
relatively predictable given ballistic
trajectories. missile payload
by using space-
A typical BM will travel in based and
outer space with an arch-shaped ground-based
trajectory. early-warning
systems.

Hypersonic missiles follow a

Maneuverability
non-ballistic trajectory; they
and unusual
would operate at altitudes
altitudes can result
significantly below those of in their being
ballistic missiles. invisible to early-
Moreover…. warning systems
They are capable to maneuver for much of their
during all their flight. trajectory
 Summarizing the key differences
What is setting the difference between ballistic missiles and
hypersonic missiles?

Both can reach hypersonic speeds

BUT
1) Trajecotry and altitude
Hypersonic missiles follow a non-ballistic atmospheric trajectory
for part or all of their flight.
Ballistic missiles follow an arch-shaped and relatively
predictable trajectory. Ballistic missiles travel in outer space for
most of their flight.

2) Manoeuvrability
Hypersonic missiles: change course up to the last minutes of
flight
Ballistic missiles: predictable ballistic trajectory. Only if
equipped with a Maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV) they
offer a chance to maneuver in the terminal phase of their flight
(30 seconds before impact)
BALLISTIC MISSILE DETECTION…
Space-based early-warning systems can track
a ballistic missile in the boost-phase of its
flight.

This allows an opponent to make a first

assessment of the target of the missile and to
calculate the warning-time at his disposal.

After the detection by satellites systems, a

ballistic missile would then be detected from
thousands of miles away by powerful ground-
based early-warning radars, which would
further confirm the trajectory and the impact
point.

It is estimated that space assets would

guarantee a warning-time of approximately 30
minutes in the case of an ICBM travelling
from the Russian bases of Dombarovsky or
Tatishchevo to U.S. Warren Air Force base.
…AND HYPERSONIC DETECTION
Hypersonic missiles, like ICBMs, will be detectible in
their initial boost-phase by satellite early warning
systems.

Thereafter, by flying at lower altitudes than ballistic

missiles, they will cease to be detectible.

After the “unobservable” phase, hypersonic missiles

flying at heights between 18 and 25 miles will become
detectible when travelling within about 250 to 370
miles of a ground-based radar.

Even if detected, there will be a high degree of

uncertainty about their destinations.

In a context in which an early-warning radar, like the

U.S. Pave Paws radar or the Russian Voronezh radar, is
the target, the early-warning-time would be limited to
two and a half minutes in the case of a hypersonic
missile travelling at Mach 10.
 HGV
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (Long-range capability)
HCM
Hypersonic Cruise Missile (Tactical-range capability)

• An HGV is an unpowered vehicle capable of gliding on

• An HCM is a cruise missile capable of operating at
the upper atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. It is equipped
hypersonic speeds, flying at 20 km to 50 km in altitude.
with a small propulsion system for orientation and
directional control. • In concept, these systems consist of two stages: the first-
• Mounted atop of a large rocket, usually an existing type stage rocket booster and the second stage powered by a
of ICBM, which will propel the HGV at hypersonic scramjet engine which generates thrust from a supersonic
speeds. airflow.
• Release from the booster rocket can take place between 25 • HCMs will fly at lower altitudes than HGVs, i.e. between 12
miles and 60 miles above the earth’s surface. Then, the HGV miles and 30 miles above the earth’s surface.
will glide to its target along a relatively flat trajectory.
 Hypersonic and great power competition
Hypersonic missiles:

• Compress the warning-time that will

follow the detection of a hypersonic
strike (and the time at disposal to
decision-makers to elaborate and
communicate a response)

• The targets of a hypersonic strike will

be unpredictable, holding large areas at
risk.

• Potentially overcome the most

advanced missile defense systems Map 1. China’s Nuclear and Conventional Missile Bases and Launch
Brigades. (Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s
Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2
(Fall 2015), p. 43)
 Why the Hypersonic Arms race?
The recent resurgence of the attempts to militarize
hypersonic technologies are part of the U.S.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) programme.
Why they did not mount existing ICBMs with
Objective: develop fast, long-range, non-nuclear weapons conventional warhead in order to do so?
capable of striking targets anywhere in the world “within one The U.S. did attempt to do that but the program did
hour of time”. not receive funding as the Congress was concerned
that Russia could misinterpret the launch as a
Objective: reduce the reliance of forward-deployed bases; also nuclear strike.
allow the United States to reach targets deep inside an
enemy’s territory if that area is out of the range of U.S. forces
deployed at bases or on naval forces in the region. Why they cannot use UAVs mounted with with
Objective: overcome adversaries’ air defenses or other existing missiles?
capabilities, in particolar A2/AD capabilities, that could deny Drones have proven to be usually highly susceptible
U.S. aircraft access to critical targets. to being shot down by modest air-defense systems.

Long-range hypersonic missile strikes could prove valuable if Blinding enemy’s sensors and crippling warfighting
launched early, as a “leading-edge” capability to degrade an capabilities at the outbreak of a conflict between
opponent’s key defensive systems. the U.S. and a peer competitor is an objective of
utmost importance (e.g. AirSea Battle strategy).
 The United States, China and Russia are by far the nations
with the most developed hypersonic technologies.
It has been reported that both Russia and China share the concern that “the most important reason to prioritize
hypersonic technology development is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly
sophisticated U.S. military technology”

The United States: Russia: China:

Russia has fielded in December China has tested the “DF-ZF” HGV
The 2018 National Defense Strategy 2019 two “Avangard” HGVs. at least nine times since 2014.
identifies hypersonic weapons as one
of the key technologies “[ensuring The plan is to deploy twelve
the United States] will be able to China is close to field the
Avangard systems of this type at
fight and win the wars of the future.” Lingyun-1 an hypersonic cruise
Dombarovskiy by 2027.
missile.
Funding requests have increased
from $181.3 million in FY2017 to The Avangard is supposedly
armed with a nuclear warhead. It is reported that China could
$3.2 billion for Army, Navy, and Air
field conventionally armed HGVs
Force conventional long-range strike Russia is close to field the in support of its anti-access/area
programs in FY2021. Zirkon hypersonic cruise denial strategy
missiles.
The U.S. are testing various hypersonic
weapon systems, both gliders and cruise Zirkon is expected to serve as a
missiles. multi-purpose tactical weapon
 KEY DESTABILIZING FACTORS: RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS:
Warhead ambiguity: referred as the complexity or • Only the United States have conceived the
the inability to discern if a hypersonic missile is development of hypersonic missile only as a
carrying a nuclear or a conventional warhead. conventional system.

• At present it is not known if China or Russia are going

Target ambiguity: Due to the steering ability of to put nuclear warheads on hypersonic missiles.
HCMs and HGVs, states could believe that their
nuclear forces are been targeted while the weapons is
intended to hit conventional forces. • The U.S. might carry out long-range precision
strikes against hostile objectives without crossing
Destination ambiguity: An observing state could the nuclear threshold.
mistakenly assume that a hypersonic missile is
striking its territory while the real target is located, for
example, in the territory of a neighbor state. • The U.S. might feel more confident and freer to
conduct long-range hypersonic strikes, with the risk
of crossing an adversary “red line” increasing the
risks of escalation.
The case of two equally-matched possessor-states of
conventional/nuclear hypersonic missiles:
Lets look at their nuclear forces balance: The possession of hypersonic nuclear missiles will not
necessarily bring about an imbalance of nuclear forces if both continue to respect agreed
warhead deployment limits.

Will there still be a balance? Yes, but that balance will be unstable because the characteristics of
hypersonic missile will be perceived as enhancing first strike capabilities.

What are the potential dangers?

1) The super-accuracy of these weapons could lead one state to believe that a surgical low-yield
nuclear attack might be acceptable to an adversary while the other state would see any use of
these weapons as an existential threat.

2) An irresponsible leadership could wish to use nuclear or conventionally armed hypersonic

systems and accept a low-yield nuclear strike in return. If both sides being willing to accept
mutual hypersonic low-yield nuclear strikes, the one who would then find himself at a
disadvantage could prefer to escalate.
 Russian Nuclear doctrine countermoves:
The 2014 Russian Military Doctrine regards as a “military threat”, as well as a risk
for their deterrent capability, the “deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of
high-precision weapons”.

The doctrine considers conventional hypersonic conventional weapons (or strategic

non-nuclear high-precision weapons) to be equivalent to nuclear weapons in terms
of their implications for deterrence.

The Russian perspective of the potential of hypersonic weapons is strictly tied to the
consideration of the U.S. BMD deployment in Romania and Poland

It seems that Moscow believes that the coupled deployment of the U.S. antiballistic
missile defense system and development of hypersonic technologies increases the
potential for a successful U.S. preemptive strike against Russian nuclear missiles
Russia fear the increase in the risk of a successful U.S.
preemptive strike against Russia’s land-based strategic
nuclear forces
 China perspectives:

China’s perception is shaped by the fact that U.S. CPGS weapons could force China into a
“disadvantaged, passive position” by weakening the Chinese nuclear counterstrike capability.

It is also reported that China is worried about the potential combination of high-precision
warhead delivery methods with low-yield nuclear warheads; such weapons would be
“tactically usable”.

These factors are contributing to the Chinese decision to raise the alert of nuclear forces and
build a launch-on-warning capability.
 A surgical low-yield nuclear strike could boost the confidence of an irresponsible leadership that the attack is “acceptable”

*The B61 bombs (0.3-kiloton

yield), set to detonate at an
altitude that maximizes
effectiveness while
minimizing fallout. The
fallout patterns and casualty
figures were generated using
unclassified U.S. Defense
Department software, called
Hazard Prediction and
Assessment Capability. (Keir A. A rogue state armed with a nuclear weapon
Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The New Era
of Counterforce: Technological Change
and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,
International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4
(Spring 2017), pp. 9–49).

These scenario are particularly risky if one considers that our nuclear era is characterized by the “substitution of crises for wars.”
Nuclear competition is a “competition in risk taking”. In the words of former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “The ability
to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art (…) If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the
brink, you are lost.” It’s the art of going until the threshold of war to leverage and to exploit on the opponent’s desire to avoid war.
 **http://www.eastpendulum.com/oth-gbr-ces-radars-tres-longues-portees-chinois

Let’s consider a scenario in which the U.S. launch a small fleet

of conventional air-launched HCMs from the Philippine Sea
towards the Fujian Province (facing the Taiwan Strait).

The Mach 8 HCMs would fly the 800 miles to their targets in
about 10 minutes. Their mission would be the destruction of
coastal defences, as well as communication nodes and power
plants, in order to disable Chinese command-and-control
capabilities

Several Chinese early-warning radars pointed at Taiwan would

detect the incoming HCMs flying as low as 12-15 miles in
altitude from about 500 miles away. This would provide about
6 minutes warning-time.
How would the Chinese government cope with such a short
decision time and with target and warhead ambiguities,
especially with warhead ambiguity?
Could the use of hypersonic weapons at an early stage of a
conventional conflict result in such damage to vital Chinese
assets that Chinese decision-makers would decide to escalate to
an all-out war?
 Which kind of Arms Control measures?
Short-term measures Negotiation of a Treaty

Unilateral: Different deployment sites

Numerical limits on the deployment of
for nuclear and conventional
conventional and nuclear hypersonic missiles.
hypersonic missiles
On-site inspections to lower the risks
Unilateral: enhance the survivability of early
associated with the warhead ambiguity
warning and command-and-control assets

Multilateral: Exchanging assurances that Fixed places of deployment of hypersonic

early-warning radars and satellite will not missiles following the model of the ABM treaty
be targeted

Multilateral: Sharing information about

“red lines”, to reduce escalatory risks
Matteo Frigoli is a graduate who has recently obtained a master’s degree in Law and
International Studies at the University of Parma (Italy).

His focus is on arms control and conflict studies, on the effects and causes of the
weaponization of outer space and on the impact of emerging technologies on international
security. He worked as an external researcher for the European Space Policy Institute and for
the Center for Geopolitical and International Studies.

He is now working as Strategy&Defense Manager at Mondo Internazionale (Italian based

ONG).
Mail: [email protected]