Sailors work on flight deck as aircraft carrier USS

Nimitz, conducting maritime security operations

and theater security cooperation efforts, transits
Straits of Malacca (U.S. Navy/Derek A. Harkins)

Fighting More Fires

with Less Water
Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design
By Tyrone L. Groh and Richard J. Bailey, Jr.

In the last decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post–Cold War peace dividend
to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate
efforts to pivot to new global realities. We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to
lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership.
—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 2011

magine that you are the fire chief organize and conduct these programs. that your city is not rife with arsonists.

I for a mid-sized community. The

city council informs you that it is
reducing your budget this year by 30
In every previous year, you have used
the entire budget to train and equip
your firefighters and to respond to
However, will you now have sufficient
resources to accomplish your primary
mission? Put another way, is putting out
percent. It is redirecting these funds fire emergencies in the city. You know fires or preventing them a better use of
for community outreach and fire-pre- that outreach is important and may your resources?
vention education programs. Ironically, indeed help to lower the incidence of This fire-fighting/prevention
the council has also instructed you to fires in the city—assuming, of course, metaphor helps to inform a current and
pressing military conundrum. With lim-
ited and shrinking budgets, how should
Lieutenant Colonel Tyrone L. Groh, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the
the United States balance efforts to pre-
College of Global Security and Intelligence Studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, pare for war versus efforts to prevent war?
Arizona. Colonel Richard J. Bailey, Jr., USAF, is a Professor of Strategy and Security Studies and the Dean Does the adage “an ounce of prevention
of Students at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Groh and Bailey  101

PLAN rear admiral drinks sample of purified water at disaster site in Biang, Brunei Darussalam, as engineers with China, Singapore, and the United States
demonstrate water purification capabilities (U.S. Marines/Kasey Peacock)

is worth a pound of cure” hold in this every conflict, but they should reduce reminded of the significant costs of two
context? We argue it does. America has the number of conflicts and preserve wars in lives and dollars and struggling
to find a way to optimize its resources resources for when they are needed most. with domestic challenges, was growing
without losing sight of the fact that the Such an activity requires a coherent vision weary of military and foreign entangle-
primary responsibility of its Armed Forces that maps out how to move from the ments. Thus, the “Pivot to Asia” required
is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. present situation toward a desired future a nuanced approach to promote and
Theater commands, such as U.S. Pacific environment. protect national interests abroad while at
Command, are already working on using Let us consider a real-world example. the same time obviating increasing public
engagements to create favorable condi- In November 2011, Secretary of State concern for America’s continual involve-
tions if any actor attempts to challenge its Hillary Clinton signaled two notewor- ment in world affairs.
interests in the region. thy shifts in U.S. policy. The first was One solution seeks to make military
We argue that, first, U.S. political geographic: namely a transition from at- engagement less lethal; U.S. forces
and military leaders must conceptualize tention on the Middle East to a stronger should rebalance efforts to focus on
Phase Zero operations more broadly focus on the Asia-Pacific region. The dialogue, key leader interaction, build-
than simply shaping the preconflict battle second sought to change fundamentally ing partner capacities and capabilities,
zone; rather, they should think of them the type of international engagement to encouraging bilateral and multilateral
as a complex, long-term, grand preventa- which the United States, particularly its cooperation, and cultivating endur-
tive strategy. Second, military planners Armed Forces, had grown accustomed, a ing international norms that support
should seek indicators for potential change that reflected a more preventative American interests. The U.S. military,
leverage points that help senior military rather than responsive mentality.1 The de- however, needs to be careful about when
leaders make educated, efficient, and cade-long combat operations in Iraq and and where it chooses to engage; gains
effective decisions regarding the use of Afghanistan were showing their first signs in one place often mean lost ground in
U.S. assets. These efforts will not prevent of winding down. The American public, another. For example, engagements with

102  Features / Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015
India may deepen Indo-U.S. relations, Figure 1. Hypothetical Chronology of Phases Zero through Five
but they hamper U.S. relations with
China and Pakistan. It is no surprise that
the key to these types of efforts is to make
the gains outweigh the losses in the long
term. Properly considered, Phase Zero Phase One through Five
operations should do just that. We must
stop considering Phase Zero as a means
to prepare for major combat operations
(MCOs). Phase Zero operations must be-
come tied to the long-term vision within Phase Zero Phase Zero Phase Zero Phase Zero Phase Zero
which short periods of Phases I through
V operations occur (see figure 1). Our
hope is that such a vision minimizes the
likelihood that decisions will be made means accepting less control globally in implementing efforts that will avoid or
based on short-term gains with no con- exchange for less conflict or less expense alleviate the need to use lethal force.
sideration for potential long-term losses. in dealing with conflicts in less critical In the next section, we explore Phase
Figure 1 depicts a significant oversim- areas should they arise. In other words, Zero operations and illustrate how their
plification, but it illustrates the point that Phase Zero operations cultivate relation- etymology and process structure are still
Phase Zero operations should be ongo- ships in places where we can count on rooted in an MCO construct and there-
ing, with the intent of preventing the partners for support in areas important, fore may hamper effective Phase Zero
frequency and severity of MCOs when but not necessarily vital, to U.S. national planning. Finally, we offer a modified
they do occur. security interests. As a result, Phase Zero Phase Zero operational design model for
Despite even the most successful operations should help America make consideration based on the concepts of
Phase Zero efforts, MCOs will still be more resources available when it chooses inflection points and emerging opportuni-
necessary from time to time, so the the specific places in which it will defend ties, a model that has the potential to
Armed Forces must remain prepared for its most important interests. Additionally, optimize the conceptualization and plan-
those eventualities. If done well, however, Phase Zero operations can potentially ning of this recently articulated military
Phase Zero operations should support decrease the resources required to defend enterprise.
MCOs either directly or indirectly. The interests in vital locations based on the re-
problem we are trying to fix is the use of lationships developed in peripheral areas. The Long Game
Phase Zero operations to support and The second part of our argument calls In 2001, the United States undertook
prepare for a potential MCO; this kind for a modification to operational design a prodigious military effort to rid the
of thinking potentially undermines the when applied to Phase Zero operations. world of dangerous terrorist networks
long-term pursuit of an advantageous Operational design has the potential to that could operate on a global scale.
geopolitical environment in exchange for enhance military decisionmaking. As The enormity of that effort precluded
more short-term objectives.2 General James Mattis, USMC, declared the United States from doing it alone.
Consider a Phase Zero engagement in 2009, “The complex nature of cur- The 2010 National Security Strategy
with India. U.S. policymakers consider rent and projected challenges requires (NSS) described the need for engage-
the Straits of Malacca a potential area of that commanders routinely integrate ment for the purposes of “combat-
conflict. Cultivating relationships in the careful thinking, creativity, and foresight. ing violent extremism, stopping the
region not only allows for a combined Commanders must address each situa- proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
effort should conflict become necessary, tion on its own terms and in its unique addressing the challenges of climate
but also focuses limited resources toward political and strategic context rather change, armed conflict, and pandemic
prevention while reserving others for than attempting to fit the situation to disease.”4 Phase Zero, as defined by
unforeseen circumstances. The change a preferred template.”3 While we sup- General Charles Wald, USAF, was
we propose requires a mental shift from port the use of operational design as the intended to preserve U.S. resources
a concept of Phase Zero operations that preferred process to help military plan- by accomplishing those tasks through
support universal American dominance in ners, operational design for Phase Zero engagement rather than through lethal
every region and theater to one of focus- should be modified from the template we means. The current view articulated in
ing on efforts that minimize conflict—or, use for MCO. Using MCO operational Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation
just as importantly, the American role design processes can confuse Phase Zero Planning, however, undermines this
in conflicts—and enable America to planning because there is a significant broader perspective of Phase Zero and
retain the resources necessary to ensure difference in focus between planning to bounds the idea to shaping operations
dominance in the most vital areas. This implement the use of lethal force and that support MCO.

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Groh and Bailey  103

Sailors stand watch on bow of Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell as ship enters Straits of Malacca in support of security and
stability in Indo-Asia-Pacific region (U.S. Navy/Paul Kelly)

Phase Zero operations should focus engagement is the primary focus. For commanders. The information available
on building cooperative relationships with example, the United States Agency for and progress achieved during Phase Zero
states around the world in a way that will International Development states, “The are relatively opaque and ambiguous.
enhance continued national security and most important thing we can do is prevent Therefore, senior leaders are not going
prosperity. In many cases, military chan- conflict in the first place. This is smarter, to be able to measure success by any
nels offer opportunities to gain access to safer, and less costly than sending in sol- observable—or for that matter, report-
and build trust between both new and diers.”7 For the Department of Defense, able—account over short periods of time.
existing partners. Military education, however, the majority of effort focuses This makes motivating the people doing
training, and exchanges provide easy op- on organizing, training, and equipping the Phase Zero mission challenging and
portunities for engagement without the forces to fight and win the country’s wars. increases the difficulty of measuring
high levels of political scrutiny that often Making matters worse, military planning performance at the highest levels of com-
accompany similar opportunities at the and training for Phase I–V operations mand. Senior leaders have to adapt from
diplomatic level. As an added benefit, compete for resources with Phase Zero seeking progress-oriented, task-driven
such activity builds epistemic communities requirements. Money spent building constructs, such as operational planning
among those at lower levels based on their relationships and increasing the capacity for major combat operations, to open
shared experiences.5 Such advantages can of others takes away from money avail- time horizons and outcomes that are
lead to greater influence at higher levels able to make U.S. forces more capable. fraught with ambiguity. Phase Zero must
when difficult diplomatic incidents occur Additionally, the rotation of commanders include considerations and preparations
(for example, the arrest of an Indian dip- in the different geographic combatant for incongruities between executing
lomat in December 2013).6 Phase Zero commands places a premium on short- planned activities and responding to a po-
requires a high level of integration be- term investments—those that support tential or actual crisis that would hinder
tween geographic combatant commands emphasis on Phases I–V. progress toward the desired condition.
and the Country Teams led by each U.S. Phase Zero, properly conceived and Phase Zero should be about prevent-
Ambassador. For many other agencies in conducted, requires a long-term invest- ing conflicts, but it should also be a
the U.S. Government, nonlethal foreign ment strategy that transcends successive commitment to cultivating partners and

104  Features / Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015
building relationships that enable the Figure 2. Acquisitions Lag-Time and Workarounds
United States to achieve and maintain Objectives
Lines of
security and prosperity. In a world of Operation
Phase I Phase II
Deter Seize Initiative
Phase III
Stabilize
Phase IV
Enable
Operational
COG Operational Strategic
growing scarcity, the Nation will have to Prevent
Demonstrate
compromise more to achieve both. The Preclusion 1
1
2 6 9 Vul: C4ISR alliance resolve
escalation and
widening of
to deter Vul
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review al- A
2
B C D E
4 conflict

Endstate
Restore security
ludes to this quest: COIN
11 13
BLA
Counter BLA
insurgency
and stability
in AUR and PER

5 Ensure
Contribute to
Our sustained attention and engagement Security 3 restoration of
uninterrupted
access to region
7 8 12 14 regional peace
will be important in shaping emerging and security
and its energy
sources
Aurigan
global trends, both positive and negative. 10 Security Ensure saftey

Unprecedented levels of global connect- Forces of alliance

Enable HA nationals in AUR

edness provide common incentives for 3 4 5

Enable evacuation Ensure FoM
and HA ops for HA
international cooperation and shared Decisive Points
norms of behavior, and the growing capac- Main Plan
1. IO dominance achieved 6. Vul isolated 12. Energy resources secured
Sequel
A. FEBA A defended
ity of some regional partners provides an 2. Lodgment secured 7. Govt. locations secured 13. BLA begins negotiation B. Air superiority established
3. Capella Int. Airport secured 8. Strategic infrastructures secured 14. Aurigan security forces capable C. Vul OEF culminated
opportunity for countries to play greater 4. Allied noncombatans secured 9. Vul ceases BLA support D. TBM/WMD threat neutralized
5. HA ops enabled 10. Kandar Valley secured E. Vul offensive forces destroyed
and even leading roles in advancing 11. Insurgency contained

mutual security interests in their respective Decision Points Endstate: A peaceful, stable, and secure region with the
1. Initiate sequel 1 – deterrence fails
regions.8 2. Commit op reserve to FEBA A
sovereignty of each state secure within internationally
recognized borders, not threatened by external aggression,
3. Aurigan government collapses with respect for the human rights of each individual and
4. Vul terminates hostilities with freedom of access to the international community.
Our concept of Phase Zero opera- 5. BLA collapses

tions can enhance American security,

but it requires a shift in perspective. The design into a mechanistic process that This section does not review the
unipolar moment is waning, and the essentially requires those involved to details of operational design. Jeffrey
United States must come to grips with “fill in the blanks.” It has produced a Reilly and others have done a fine job of
a complicated post–Cold War global culture that unknowingly believes that explaining that process, and we whole-
system that offers rewards to its members the process itself, rather than the critical heartedly support its more widespread
more equitably than it did in the last thinking for which operational design use. Reilly’s model provides a useful and
decade of the 20th century. The United was created, is the end product. effective method of planning for Phases
States no longer has the means required Figure 2 illustrates an example of I through V. But upon examination, it
to influence the global system in a way an operational design product depict- is clear that operational design (as it is
that makes it the clearly dominant power. ing lines of operation.9 The yellow stars currently used) is based on a construct of
This state of affairs is foreign to planning indicate decision points where there is major combat operations. Three aspects
for major combat operations—an en- an expectation of a commander’s deci- of current operational design highlight
deavor in which there is usually a winner sion; this decision typically either takes this foundation: military end state, center
and a loser. advantage of exploited opportunities or of gravity, and decisive points.
rebalances an effort based on changes in In major combat operations, joint
Facilitating Quality the operational environment. In addition doctrine defines the military endstate as
Decisionmaking to expected shifts or advances in the op- the “set of required conditions that defines
To stay ahead of the frenetic pace of erational effort, staffs should analyze the achievement of all military objectives.”10
today’s military commanders, effective operational environment to identify po- The guidance is unclear as to the best way
staff members use operational design to tential emerging situations, so that if they to define that endstate. But without ques-
make sense of the complex operational do arise, they may provide advantageous tion, the term itself connotes (and actually
environment, distill military efforts into opportunities. Ultimately, operational de- denotes) a cessation of military activities:
categorized segments, and determine sign is a mechanism that, when properly “It normally represents a point in time
nodes that require commanders’ deci- applied, helps staffs to think about the and/or circumstances beyond which the
sions. Ideally, staffs will attempt to contextual and temporal complexities of President does not require the military in-
predict these decision points and inform the environment that they are operating strument of national power as the primary
the commander of the factors he or she in. This awareness enables them to assist means to achieve remaining national ob-
should consider when making those their commanders in conceptualizing the jectives.”11 As the analysis in the previous
critical decisions. Turnover on military environment and overall operation and to section indicated, no such end point exists
staffs and a lack of continuity among make educated decisions about applying in Phase Zero. Rather, the centerpiece of
planners, however, have prompted many limited resources in support of a coherent Phase Zero operations is the cultivation of
in the U.S. military to turn operational strategic vision. enduring, synergistic relationships.

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Groh and Bailey  105

 to put it concisely, the military strategist
works backward from an endstate to
conduct a center of gravity analysis on the
enemy, determine critical vulnerabilities
that illuminate decisive points, and then
(with military planners) group similar
decisive points into clearly defined lines
of operation or effort. As Keith Dickson
writes, “By determining the critical
vulnerabilities of the enemy center(s) of
gravity, planners have a means to deter-
mine decisive points related to attacking
those critical vulnerabilities.”16 In MCOs,
this seems fairly straightforward. Decisive
points are aptly named because they
designate where military efforts can con-
Cavalry scout and Indian army counterpart provide security for fellow soldiers during patrol through
forests of Himalayas during exercise Yudh Abhyas (DOD/Mylinda DuRousseau)
centrate forces to enable mission success.
But like endstate and centers of gravity,
The term center of gravity finds its of gravity to guide the development of the term decisive point signifies a finite
origin in Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal actual target sets.14 In Phase Zero opera- effort directed at an enemy force within
1832 treatise On War: “[One] must tions, however, there is no clearly defined a specified timeframe. Phase Zero efforts
keep the dominant characteristics of enemy against which commanders can are radically different, often open-ended
both belligerents in mind. Out of these direct their focus. How will a commander efforts without a defined enemy and
characteristics a certain center of grav- know where to place limited resources to without a specified culmination point.
ity develops, the hub of all power and have the optimal outcome? Ultimately, a We are not suggesting turning mili-
movement, on which everything de- center of gravity analysis for Phase Zero tary forces into full-time diplomats, but
pends. That is the point against which operational designs (at least as it is used we firmly acknowledge that the military
all our energies should be directed.”12 In today) is problematic. Services have a large role to play in Phase
MCOs, a commander looks for ways to Joint doctrine posits that a thorough Zero. To increase effectiveness, planning
direct friendly forces in effective ways. center of gravity analysis will shed light efforts require a significant shift from
Understandably, this is done in an effort on possible decisive points: current conceptions to allow a more pro-
to minimize losses and prevent prolonged ductive relationship between military and
confrontation. Therefore, the most A decisive point is a geographic place, other government agencies—especially
frequently used rule of thumb is that if specific key event, critical factor, or func- Country Teams working under their
you can discover the enemy’s center of tion that, when acted upon, allows a Ambassadors. This effort is put forth with
gravity and direct your efforts there, you commander to gain a marked advantage the recognition that the military’s great-
will have the greatest effect. In addition, over an adversary or contributes materially est asset is its ability, when called upon, to
if you conduct a center of gravity analysis to achieving success. . . . Although decisive wage war to meet national objectives and
on your own forces, you can better con- points are not COGs [centers of gravity], to organize, train, and equip its forces
sider defensive posturing. they are the keys to attacking protected so that its readiness serves as a constant
As Antulio Echevarria explains, COGs or defending them. Decisive points deterrent to would-be aggressors.
however, the U.S. military’s definition can be thought of as a way to relate what During Phase Zero operations, the
of center of gravity has both evolved is “critical” to what is “vulnerable.” military still exercises its traditional influ-
and diverged over time. The concept Consequently, commanders and their staffs ence but in a different way and with
should not, in fact, be “applied to every must analyze the operational environment significantly different political objectives.
kind of war or operation; if it is, the term and determine which systems’ nodes or Thus, the military Services must be much
may become overused and meaningless links or key events offer the best opportunity more creative in how they think about and
or be conflated with political-military to affect the enemy’s COGs or to gain or plan these efforts. Creative thinking might
objectives.”13 Centers of gravity were the maintain the initiative.15 be defined as “consciously generating
centerpiece of John Warden’s Five-Ring new and useful ideas, and re-evaluating
Model, used most famously in the plan- Consider, from the perspective of or combining old ideas, to develop new
ning of the air campaign in Operation major combat operations, the logical and useful perspectives in order to satisfy
Desert Storm and also in Joe Strange flow of endstate, center of gravity, and a need.”17 But optimizing creative think-
and Richard Iron’s Critical Vulnerability decisive points. What follows is perhaps ing requires a dismantling of framed
construct, which drills down from centers an oversimplification of the process. But approaches. As Susan Carter eloquently

106  Features / Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015
puts it, “Word choice matters. Sometimes and you only had 30 minutes of notice, program whereby the fire department
a word skews the whole thread of discus- and the same outsider arrived to assist you, fills pools for free on request. The only
sion off track by smuggling in with its would you be more likely to accept help? stipulation is that the residents must
connotations a set of ideas that are counter Perhaps. What if the outsider showed up agree to give you access to the pool water
to your own epistemological position.”18 with a moving van and 20 people to help if needed to assist in fire response. Taken
Semantics are important because words you get whatever you wanted to take with a step further, you could even encourage
have a tendency to feed biases or solidify you? Probably. Finally, what if the outsider a program whereby the fire department
frames that can stifle creative thinking. and his crew had significant experience actually subsidizes construction of more
with such situations and were willing to backyard pools in the area. In both
Inflection Points and offer advice about how to handle the of these cases, an unforeseen circum-
Emerging Opportunities evacuation? Under those conditions, an stance—the drought—actually creates an
Words or phrases such as adversary or outsider would be influential, even more opportunity for increased engagement
decisive points that military planners use so if you had practiced evacuations with that may further your long-term inter-
in operational design alter the perspec- the outsider on several previous occasions. ests. Contributing the pool water not
tive of the planning process. We argue In this example, the inflection point only strengthens your connection to the
that a shift in focus to two particular was the shift from the potential for a for- local populace (through the tacit agree-
terms will significantly change a com- est fire to the near certainty that it would ment), but also provides a distributed,
mander and staff’s view of Phase Zero occur. Planning staffs should be looking risk-mitigating resource to assist with
operations. The first term we suggest for potential inflection points and align your primary firefighting responsibilities
is inflection point, which we define as engagements that will position the United should the need arise.
the moment in time when the normal States to respond and influence the situa- Let us now build on the concept by
progression of a particular phenomenon tion. Inflection points become particularly returning to our hypothetical Phase Zero
significantly changes. For example, important because they focus resources engagement effort with India. The goals
India has a reasonably predictable water in areas with the highest level of influence of the effort are to make India a regional
supply. India’s birth rates and infant during a period of shrinking budgets and leader in international security efforts,
mortality rates remain relatively predict- severely constrained resources. Resources while at the same time fostering a bilateral
able over time as well. At some point in have to be allocated more effectively in relationship advancing U.S. interests in
the future, however, India’s population the future to enable America to maintain the region. With little warning, a massive
will exceed its water resources. That the same level of influence as it had in the typhoon hits the southern portion of the
predictable fact enables a planning staff past. Inflection points are also important Andaman Sea, threatening catastrophic
to identify a logical inflection point. because they represent likely swings in the destruction to the Andaman and Nicobar
An inflection point is particularly status quo. For Phase Zero operations, the Islands, the western coast of southern
important in the development of strategy intent is to prevent these large swings from Thailand, and the northern coast of
because it identifies a period of such in- creating conditions inimical to American Indonesia. As the United States has done
tense change that the actor experiencing interests. Identifying and preparing for in similar cases, it redirects military forces
the change has not had time to adjust inflection points put the United States in to aid (and perhaps even lead) humanitar-
to it. At best, the actor will still be in the a position to stamp out a spark before it ian relief efforts. Engagement such as this
early stages of the adaptation phase. It becomes a forest fire. is nothing new. But from a Phase Zero
is during this phase that the actor most The second term we want to intro- perspective, is it possible that the humani-
needs to find some means of adapting to duce is emerging opportunity. To illustrate tarian relief might actually create new
the new situation. An outside actor may the concept, let us refer back to the avenues for interaction with India? The
be of significant assistance and a helpful firefighter analogy and the hypothetical semantics of this point are important.
influence during this particular period. For Indian example. Suppose that as the fire No natural disaster should ever be seen
example, if you lived in an area with high chief, your community is faced with an as an opportunity per se, but in the realm
forest fire potential and learned early in unforeseen drought, which has caused of military engagement and relationship
the morning that a forest fire was going water prices to skyrocket. Coupled with cultivation, military leaders and planning
to burn your house down at midnight, this (and solely for the purpose of this staffs should consider how partnerships
you would likely resist the efforts of an scenario), you worry that there may not in unforeseen circumstances can actually
outsider coming in to assist you in your be enough fire hydrants in the area to further Phase Zero initiatives.
evacuation. You would have sufficient time meet your expected response needs. The Imagine a scenario in which India
to take the necessary safety precautions to water shortage and related cost hike are and the United States work together to
gather important documents and valuables significant enough that many residents direct a humanitarian airlift to Phuket
and be long gone when the fire took your have been priced out of filling their in western Thailand, which suffered
house. But if you imagine a scenario in backyard swimming pools. But with your the most devastating damage from the
which you were in a low fire potential area access to cheaper water, you initiate a typhoon. Where is the opportunity here?

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Groh and Bailey  107

Put simply, the partnership with India planning must become more pragmatic, Design,” October 6, 2009, in U.S. Joint Forces
Command, Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 10,
in directing airlift aid offers a chance not and spending must focus more on the Design in Military Operations—A Primer for
only to work together toward limited efficiencies of investing in prevention, Joint Warfighters, September 20, 2010, 2.
short-term goals (including, obviously, rather than paying the enormous costs 4
National Security Strategy (Washington,
assistance to the victims of the crisis), associated with cures. DC: The White House, May 2010), 3.
but also to demonstrate U.S. response Changing the way we think about
5
For more on epistemic communities, see
Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Com-
techniques in the hope that India takes a Phase Zero is a beginning to such an
munities and International Policy Coordina-
larger role in similar regional crises in the effort. Phase Zero as a means to prevent tion,” in International Organization 46, no. 1
future. Ultimately, India might be able to war is fundamentally different from the (Winter 1992).
handle such tasks independently (in a way current thinking that sees it as a means 6
On March 31, 2014, the U.S. Ambassador
resembling American-style responses). A to prepare for war. If Phase Zero think- to India, Nancy Powell, resigned after a sharp
decline in India-U.S. relations. Many believe that
larger Indian presence in disaster relief ing subsumes Phases I through V, it can
one of the events precipitating this decline was
in the region might provide area stability promote a coherent vision for how to the arrest of Deputy Consul-General Devyani
consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals conduct relations and engagements with Khobragade in New York City in December
and help India to reach its own goals other states or actors that can contribute 2013 on charges of visa fraud. For more details,
as a rising regional power. It also frees to the stability of the global commons see <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/us-
ambassador-to-india-resigns/>.
American military resources to respond and international norms. 7
For more on the United States Agency for
to crises (or worse, conflict) in areas Strategists and military planners must International Development’s mission goals, see
where the United States does not have concentrate on preventing wars before <http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do>.
similar relationships. This is the corner- they start or, at the least, forming strong 8
Department of Defense, Quadrennial
stone of Phase Zero engagement. networks of partners that make defeating Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2014), iii.
For planners, unforeseen events are just troublemakers or would-be adversaries 9
Jeffrey M. Reilly, Operational Design:
that: unforeseen. But it does not mean that much easier. To that end, the United Distilling Clarity from Complexity for Decisive
Phase Zero planning should ignore their States must identify key inflection points Action (Montgomery AL: Air University Press,
possibility (indeed, even their likelihood, and emerging opportunities that propel 2012), 78.
given the long-term nature of Phase Zero Phase Zero operations in a direction
10
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff,
operations). Any Phase Zero planning that increases the influence of either the
August 11, 2011), xxi.
should contemplate emerging opportuni- United States or its partners. In some 11
The Joint Forces Operations and Doctrine
ties that may offer immediate engagement cases, our long-term interest may require Smartbook: Guide to Joint, Multinational and In-
and foster stronger relationships; it must putting a partner’s short-term interest teragency Operations, 2nd Revised Edition (Lake-
also be flexible enough to re-prioritize first—a notion that America has not had land, FL: The Lightning Press, 2009), 3–24.
12
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
efforts accordingly. In addition, similar to to face since the end of World War II.
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince-
the branch and sequel concept of MCO The United States must become more ton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595–596.
operational design, planners should adept at shaping and nudging actors and 13
Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s
consider such diversions in terms of their conditions rather than relying on its own Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,”
impact on major lines of operation or ef- resources to fix problems. Put another Naval War College Review LVI, no. 1 (Winter
2003), 118.
fort in a Phase Zero construct. way, it is drought season, and water is 14
John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a Sys-
getting increasingly scarce. America has tem,” Airpower Journal 9 (Spring 1995), 40–55;
Conclusion to change its thinking to be more effec- Joe Strange and Richard Iron, “Understanding
A common dictum among military pro- tive at preventing fires and at conserving Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities,”
fessionals is si vis pacem, para bellum—if its precious resources so that when they U.S. Department of the Air Force.
15
The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, Joint Forces
you want peace, prepare for war. Strate- do ignite, its Armed Forces are ready. JFQ
Staff College, National Defense University,
gists and military planners continue to August 13, 2010, 4–51.
act in a way that places a high emphasis 16
Keith D. Dickson, “Operational Design:
on following this dictum. The United Notes A Methodology for Planners,” Campaigning
States needs to continue preparing its (Spring 2007), 26.
1
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Cen- 17
School of Advanced Military Studies, Art
forces against future threats; we make
tury,” Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011), of Design: Student Text Version 2.0 (Fort Leaven-
no argument against that. We argue, available at <www.foreignpolicy.com/arti- worth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,
however, that preparing for war is an cles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century>. 2010), 63.
expensive endeavor and that adjust- 2
While Phase Zero in our conceptual frame- 18
Susan Carter, “Finishing the Thesis:
ments must be made as resources work is a global enterprise, combatant command- Personal Relationship with Writing,” Wordpress.
ers will have to make decisions on the prioritiza- com, November 9, 2012. Full entry can be
become increasingly scarce and as other
tion of limited engagement resources. found at <http://doctoralwriting.wordpress.
states begin to challenge American 3
General James Mattis, USMC, “Memo- com/2012/11/>.
dominance in areas that contribute to randum for U.S. Joint Forces Command:
U.S. and global prosperity. Strategy and Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational

108  Features / Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015