FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 224610. October 13, 2021 ]

VINES REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RODEL RET, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

1
Petitioner Vines Realty Corporation (VRC) assails the Decision dated July 3, 2015, and
2
Resolution dated May 12, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130895 which
ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to review and reinvestigate the case for
possible reversion proceedings on the subject property.

Antecedents

The subject property originally formed part of a 144.62 hectares land situated in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte. The San Mauricio Mining Company (SMMC) had twenty (20)
3
mineral claims on the property. By Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 19, 1957, SMMC
transferred its surface rights in favor of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation (NASSCO),
a government-owned and controlled corporation.

4
By Proclamation No. 500, Series of 1968, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President
Marcos) reserved 170.2890 hectares of land, including the subject property as site for
NASSCO's pier, warehouse, and smelting plant in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

On December 6, 1975, former President Marcos further issued Presidential Decree No.
837 (PD 837) transferring ownership of the entire 170.2890 hectares to the name of NASSCO,
thus:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 837

AN ACT TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF JOSE PANGANIBAN,
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, ISLAND OF LUZON TO THE NATIONAL
SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION (NASSCO) AND AUTHORIZING THE
DISPOSITION THEREOF

WHEREAS, in pursuance of the national policy of allowing the private sector

to take over enterprises pioneered by the government when the private sector is
ready and capable to continue and improve a particular government endeavor
and in the interest of the National government, various government performance
evaluation and/or study groups have recommended the disposition of all
NASSCO properties and units, including the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant at
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte;

WHEREAS, under Proclamation No. 500 dated December 23, 1968, a parcel of
land situated in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Province of Camarines
Norte, Island of Luzon[,] Bounded on the W[est], along lines
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16, by Mambulao Bay; on the N[orth], along
lines 16-17-18-19-20-21, by Forest Reserve; and on the E[ast] and S[outh], along
lines 21-22-23-24-25-26-27-1 by project No. 2. Block VI (Alien & Disp.) LC-403,
containing an area of approximately 170.2890 hectares, more or less, has been
withdrawn from sale and settlement and reserved for pier, warehouse[,] and
smelting plant site purposes under the administration of the NASSCO;

WHEREAS, as mandated under Republic Act 1396, NASSCO constructed,

established [,] and operated in said site a big iron smelting plant with pier and
other plant facilities known as the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant;

WHEREAS, in order to facilitate the disposition of all assets of NASSCO

including the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant, there is a need to transfer
ownership of said parcel of land to the NASSCO;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,

by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution of the Philippines,
hereby decree as follows:

SECTION 1. The title to and ownership of that certain parcel of

land, situated in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Province of
Camarines Norte, Island of Luzon, bounded on the W[est], along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16, by Mambulao Bay; on
the N[orth], along lines 16-17-18-19-20-21, by Forest Reserve; and
on the E[ast] and S[outh], along lines 21-22-23-24-25-26-27-1; by
project No. 2, Block VI (Alien & Disp.) LC-403, containing an area
of approximately 170.2890 hectares, is hereby transferred to and
vested in the NASSCO.

SECTION 2. The said parcel of land herein conveyed shall be

resurveyed by the Bureau of Lands within fifteen (15) days from
 the promulgation of this Decree to ascertain its actual location
and boundaries. Thereafter, the proper Register of Deeds shall
register the same and issue the corresponding certificate of title
to the NASSCO.

SECTION 3. Any provision of law, proclamation, ordinance,

rules[,] and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the
NASSCO may transfer absolute ownership of said parcel of land
or any portion thereof and convey the same to persons or
corporations qualified to acquire land under the Constitution,
either through public bidding or through negotiations, as the
interest of the government warrants.

SECTION 4. All laws, executive orders, proclamation, rules[,]

and regulations or part thereof inconsistent with this Decree are
hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.

SECTION 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila this 6th day of December, in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-Five.

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-440 was thus issued in favor of NASSCO.

Barely three (3) weeks later, by Deed of Sale dated December 29, 1975, NASSCO sold the
land to Philippine Smelters Corporation (PSC), a private corporation chaired by Jose T.
Marcelo, Jr. (Marcelo). By virtue thereof, the land was titled in the name of PSC under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13060, later subdivided into TCT Nos. 13502 to 13521.

Claiming to have retained its mining rights over the property despite the earlier sale of its
surface rights to NASSCO, PSC's predecessor in interest, SMMC caused the annotation of an
adverse claim on OCT No. 0-440, which got carried over to subsequent titles. Thus, in 1977,
PSC filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) – Camarines Norte Civil Case No. 2882,
entitled "Phil. Smelters Corp., plaintiff v. San Mauricio Mining Co., and Marsman & Co., Inc.
third party plaintiffs v. NASSCO, et. al.," for quieting of title. PSC specifically prayed for the
"Removal of Cloud over [its] Torrens Certificates of Title, and Declaration of Nullity of
Adverse Claim and Damages."

After due proceedings, CFI-Branch III rendered judgment, ordering the cancellation of
SMMC's adverse claim, declaring PSC as the true and absolute owner of the land, and
awarding the possession of the land, including the surface rights thereon to PSC. In G.R.
5
Nos. L-47859 & L-57132, entitled SMMC v. Ancheta (San Mauricio), the Court affirmed the
ruling under Decision dated July 10, 1981. The Court held that SMMC no longer had any
vested right in the property since NASSCO already sold the land to PSC. The aforesaid
decision had long become final and executory.
 In 1986, PSC closed its operations after Marcelo suffered a heart attack and moved to the
United States. Consequently, PSC creditors Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), PISO
Bank, and Conrad C. Leviste (Leviste) of petitioner VRC – went after the assets of PSC to
6
satisfy their respective claims.

For its part, petitioner, through Leviste, initiated Civil Case No. 5703 against PSC and
obtained a favorable money judgment which got executed over a portion of the 170.2890
hectares property. On April 25, 1990, petitioner purchased the additional portions of the
property at a public auction sale. Petitioner, thus, eventually became the owner of 93 hectares
7
of the original 170.2890 hectares property.

Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted writs of possession and demolition
against the informal settlers occupying these portions. The Court of Appeals subsequently
8
affirmed with finality.

But the informal settlers remained adamant. This time, claiming to be tenants of the
property, they sought relief from the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) - Region V in Legaspi City through DARAB Case No. 119-CN. The complaint was,
nonetheless dismissed on two grounds: first, for lack of merit, and second, on ground of res
9
judicata.

Meantime, the enforcement of the writs of possession and demolition was suspended
upon the request of the Municipal Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan of Jose Panganiban. But
on December 11, 1992, alias writs of possession and demolition were issued only to be halted
again, still at the instance of the informal settlers and the local government officials. Hence,
petitioner charged the informal settlers with indirect contempt. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals gave affirmative relief to petitioner and cited the informal settlers for
10
indirect contempt.

By Letter dated April 7, 1999, the informal settlers, otherwise known as the residents of
Barangay Bagongbayan, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, through their leader, herein
respondent Rodel Ret, along with others (respondent et al.), wrote then Governor Emmanuel
B. Pimentel to cause an investigation on the issuance of OCT No. 0-440 which they claimed
was tainted with fraud. They, too, asserted that most of the residents of Bagongbayan have
been in physical possession of different portions of the land even before World War II.
Together with the local government, they had introduced improvements thereon, including
public streets, town plaza, chapel, public school, barangay hall, and public and private
cemeteries. These improvements are now covered by OCT No. 0-440 and its derivative titles
all in the name of petitioner.

After several endorsements, the letter ended up with then Secretary Antonio Cerilles of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) who, by Memorandum dated
September 15, 1999, ordered the City Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
Daet, Camarines Norte to conduct the desired investigation and submit its report and
recommendation.

It was Land Management Officer (LMO) III Fortunata Z. Hemady (Hemady) who got tasked
to do the initial investigation and submit the required Report and Recommendation, which
she promptly complied with. Under her Report and Recommendation dated November 6,
2000, addressed to CENRO, she recommended the filing of reversion proceedings on the
entire 170 hectares land in view of certain alleged irregularities pertaining to the acquisition
of title or titles thereto by PSC. The CENRO and Provincial Environment & Natural Resources
11
Office (PENRO) – Camarines Norte favorably endorsed the report to DENR-Region V. By
Memorandum dated June 4, 2001, however, Regional Executive Director Oscar Hamada
(Director Hamada), citing San Mauricio, reversed the recommendation on the ground of res
12
judicata.

Undaunted, respondent et al., filed with the Office of the President (OP) a
Letter-Complaint dated April 25, 2004, to compel the DENR to render an early resolution of
13
their land problem. Acting thereon, the OP referred the Letter-Complaint to the DENR,
which in turn, directed petitioner to comment thereon. Through its Comment/Opposition
dated May 16, 2007, petitioner asserted that since it bought the subject property at public
auction, it ought to be protected as a purchaser for value in good faith.

Meantime, on May 6, 2016, the DENR issued a status quo ante order and directed
petitioner to allow Bagongbayan residents to use the ingress and egress at the pier as
previously practiced.

Rulings of the DENR Secretary

14
In DENR Case No. 8490, then DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. rendered his
15
Decision dated February 12, 2008, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and lifting the
status quo ante, viz.:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

letter-complaint dated April 25, 2004[,] filed by Kgd. Rodel T.
Ret, Alberto C. Manait, et al., is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the status quo ante earlier issued is LIFTED.

16
SO ORDERED.

He ruled that there was no irregularity in the issuance of OCT No. 0-440 and its derivative
titles. He pointed to the San Mauricio case which upheld the decision of the trial court on the
legality of the sale, transfer, and conveyance of the property by SMMC to NASSCO, the
predecessor in interest of PSC.
 He further referred to the consistent rulings of the different government agencies and
courts of law upholding OCX No. 0-440 and its subsequent TCTs. These rulings constituted
res judicata to the present case.

17
The DENR Secretary denied reconsideration under Order dated July 31, 2009.

Rulings of the Office of the President

18 19
On appeal via O.P. Case No. 09-H-422, the OP, by Decision dated May 13, 2011,
dismissed the appeal of respondent et al., for lack of cause of action. The OP ruled that
respondent et al., are not proper parties-in-interest since they themselves asserted that the
subject property was in fact part of the public domain. Hence, it is the OSG alone which may
file a complaint for cancellation and reversion of the property on behalf of the Republic upon
recommendation of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) or DENR. But it appears that the
DENR already dismissed the complaint; there was, therefore, no basis for the OSG to initiate
reversion proceedings and seek the cancellation of OCT No. 0-440 and its derivative titles.

20
By Resolution dated May 22, 2013, the OP denied the motion for reconsideration of
respondent, et al., and remanded the case to the DENR for proper disposition.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On further petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, respondent alone
faulted the OP for ruling that he and his co-complainants lacked a cause of action to seek the
reversion proceeding on the property. He asserted that both the CENRO and PENRO actually
endorsed Hemady's Investigation Report dated November 6, 2000, which found that OCT No.
0-440 and its derivative titles had been irregularly issued. Too, the dismissal of the complaint
based on res judicata was improper since reversion is an entirely different matter from the
earlier cases filed.

While respondent agreed with the OP that there should be a recommendation from the
DENR before the OSG can initiate reversion proceedings, the OP may nevertheless review the
DENR's findings here and accordingly direct the OSG to file the necessary complaint or
petition. Its refusal to review the dispositions of the DENR was a gross abdication of its duty
21
to exercise control and supervision over the Executive Branch.

22
Petitioner defended the decision of the OP.

Dispositions of the Court of Appeals

23
By Decision dated July 3, 2015, in CA-G.R. SP No. 130895, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition and ordered the OSG to review and reinvestigate the case for possible
reversion proceedings, thus:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Office of the President are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a new one be entered directing the Solicitor General to

review and reinvestigate the factual underpinnings of this case
with the end-in-view of a reversion proceedings, if it be so
warranted.

24
IT IS SO ORDERED.

It held that the OP failed to consider Hemady's Investigation Report dated November 6,
2000, which noted certain irregularities in PSC's acquisition of title and recommended the
filing of reversion proceedings on the land, viz.:

"a) Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 13060 to Phil. Smelter

Corporation, covering 261 parcels of land with an area of
230.2893 Has., the area of which does not conform with the
Survey Plan and PD 837, and the issuance of this TCT-13060 in
favor of Phil. Smelter, was made despite the lack of Presidential
approval as required in the Deed of Sale (ANNEXES F & G)

b) This TCT No. 13060 of Phil. Smelter Corporation covers

Lot 1 to 261, Rs-05-000001, wherein several of these lots are
foreshore lands, more particularly lots in Sheets 2, 3, 4, 5 & 9
especially Lot 260, Rs-05-000001 which is a subject of FLA (V-5)
99, which area are still underwater as verified by the
undersigned during the ocular inspection on August 8,
25
2000." (Underlining in the original)

xxxx

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts, the

undersigned arrived at a conclusion that the issuance of OCT
No. 0-440 and its succeeding TCT's are irregular, it appearing
that the objective in the issuance of PD 837 particularly
wherein the private sector is ready and capable to continue and
improve a particular government endeavor and in the interest
of the national government did not materialized [sic], instead,
the property was used as collateral in a loan from the bank for
their own personal interest, it appearing that Philippine Smelter
Corporation closed its operations for many years. Besides, the
area appearing in the titles does not conform with the technical
description as contained in Presidential Proclamation No. 500
which was confirmed by PD 837, and even the foreshore areas
were issued titles particularly from Lot 1 to Lot 260,
 Rs-05-000001, wherein under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 141, Sec 59 shall be dispensed to private parties by lease
only and not otherwise, hence, my recommendation that OCT
No. 0-440 and its succeeding TCTs be cancelled, and the land
subject matter thereto be reverted to the mass of public domain
and be disposed under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
26
141, as amended." (Emphases, italics, and underlining not
ours)

xxxx

The Court of Appeals zeroed in on some alleged discrepancies concerning the

measurement of petitioner’s supposed property, the technical descriptions of the subject lots
vis-a-vis the survey plan, and the classification of the subject lots being foreshore lands
which may only be disposed of to private parties by lease. According to the Court of Appeals,
these matters should have alerted the DENR, more so, the OP to take a second hard look at
the complaint and direct the OSG to conduct further investigation for the purpose of
determining whether the subject lots are indeed covered by the ruling in San Mauricio. Only
then could it be determined whether there is an identity of subject matter and causes of
action, and consequently, whether the complaint of respondent and his co-complainants was
indeed dismissible on the ground of res judicata.

At any rate, San Mauricio merely settled PSC's ownership of the 170.2890 hectares of land
in OCT No. 0-440; it did not involve the reversion of OCT No. 0-440 for having encroached
upon foreshore lands and lands for public use, and for being beyond the area indicated in
both Proclamation No. 500 and PD 837.

Finally, the lack of recommendation or endorsement from the DENR to the OSG to file
reversion should not have prevented the OP from directing the OSG to conduct a further
investigation on the matter. Considerations of public interest and social justice should prevail
over technicalities of law as thousands of people stand to be displaced by the dispositions of
the DENR. A town plaza, chapel, school, barangay hall, public streets, and cemetery would
accrue in favor of petitioner if the concept of res judicata is hastily applied.

27
In Resolution dated May 12, 2016, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now seeks to reverse and set aside the dispositions of the Court of Appeals. It
faults the Court of Appeals for heavily relying on Hemady's Investigation Report dated
November 6, 2000, although her findings were already rejected by her superior Director
Hamada in his Memorandum dated June 4, 2001. It, too, repleads the decision of the OP that
the OSG cannot pursue reversion proceedings, sans a recommendation from the LMB or
DENR. At any rate, respondent's claim is already barred by res judicata.
 28
In his Comment/Opposition, respondent ripostes that there is no reason to reverse the
dispositions of the Court of Appeals. The alleged Memorandum dated June 4, 2001 of
Director Hamada, was never raised in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals and
should not be considered for the first time on appeal before the Court. Even if it is
considered, the totality of facts would still support the conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

29 30
The parties thereafter filed their respective Reply and briefs.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

The OSG may not initiate

reversion proceedings, sans
the recommendation of the
LMB or DENR

Reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the
mass of the public domain; it is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and
disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations, or when a person obtains a title
under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered
31
under the Torrens system as they form part of the public domain.

Under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), the Public Land Act, it is the
OSG alone which may file a complaint for reversion of property in behalf of the Republic,
thus:

SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of

lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.

xxxx

Corollarily, Section 13, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, Series of
1987, the Administrative Code of 1987, ordains that only the President may compel the OSG
to institute reversion proceedings:

SECTION 13. Power to Direct Escheat or Reversion

Proceedings. - The President shall direct the Solicitor General
to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all lands
transferred or assigned to persons disqualified under the
Constitution to acquire land.

xxxx
 This power of the President to direct the OSG to institute reversion proceedings is part of
the President's executive control and supervision under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution which unequivocally states:

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the

executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.

xxxx

As a matter of procedural and administrative policy, though, the President directs the
OSG to file a complaint for cancellation and reversion of property only upon recommendation
of the LMB or DENR.

This executive policy is not without basis.

32
In Republic v. The Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera, the Court decreed that the State bears
the burden to prove that the land previously decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant
constitutes land which cannot be owned by private individuals. This is owed to the nature of
reversion proceedings, the outcome of which may upset the stability of registered titles
through the cancellation of the original title and others that emanate from it. This is also
consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.

Indeed, the nature of reversion proceedings puts the onus probandi on the State. In order
to ensure that the State would be able to discharge this burden, the LMB or DENR first
determines whether there is ground to file a case for reversion and whether the State has
sufficient evidence to prove its claim. Without a recommendation and evidentiary
documentation from LMB and DENR, the OSG could not possibly prosecute its case for
reversion; it would not be able to discharge its burden of proof.

Here, respondent wanted the DENR to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of OCT No. 0-440 on allegations of fraud. But the DENR dismissed their letter
complaint upon its finding that no legal basis existed for the OSG to initiate reversion
proceedings and seek the cancellation of OCT No. 0-440 and its derivative titles. It ruled that
San Mauricio operates as res judicata to any reversion proceeding the OSG may file. This
ruling was affirmed by the OP. In other words, the requisite recommendation to file the
reversion case was not forthcoming. Without it, the OSG cannot be compelled to file a
complaint for reversion, lest it violates Section 101 of CA 141.

The Court cannot encroach

on the executive prerogative
to determine whether to file
a reversion case

In reversing the dispositions of the OP, the Court of Appeals held that res judicata was
inapplicable as there was no identity of cause of action and subject matter between San
Mauricio and respondents sought after the complaint for reversion. Hence, it directed the
OSG to conduct its own investigation on the matter for a possible filing of reversion
proceeding.

But whether the DENR and the OP correctly invoked res judicata, and whether fraud
attended the issuance of OCT No. 0-440 for that matter, are beside the point. The OP already
found it wise not to direct the OSG to file reversion proceedings over the subject property.
Who are we to convince, much less, compel it to do otherwise?

33
In PSALM v. CIR, the Court ruled that the power of control vested by the Constitution in
the President cannot be diminished by the Legislature, nor intruded upon by the Judiciary,
thus:

34
x x x In Carpio v. Executive Secretary, the Court expounded on the
President's control over all the executive departments, bureaus and offices,
thus:

This presidential power of control over the executive

branch of government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us,
in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the
power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter. It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of
Chief Executive."

Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control

powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency." As the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have
to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of

a single executive, "all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
 the Chief Executive[,] presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."

Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is

directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department."

This power of control vested by the Constitution in the President cannot

35
be diminished by law. As held in Rufino v. Endriga, Congress cannot by law
deprive the President of his power of control, thus:

The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a

government office in the Executive branch outside the control
of the President in the guise of insulating that office from
politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the
Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the
President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President
of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive x x
x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive
branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the
Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain
lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court.
This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely
structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches.

Clearly, the President's constitutional power of control over all the

executive departments, bureaus[,] and offices cannot be curtailed or
diminished by law. "Since the Constitution has given the President the power
of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which
can curtail such power." This constitutional power of control of the President
cannot be diminished by the CTA. Thus, if two executive offices or agencies
cannot agree, it is only proper and logical that the President, as the sole
Executive who under the Constitution has control over both offices or
agencies in dispute, should resolve the dispute instead of the courts. The
judiciary should not intrude in this executive function of determining which is
correct between the opposing government offices or agencies, which are both
under the sole control of the President. Under his constitutional power of
control, the President decides the dispute between the two executive offices.
The judiciary cannot substitute its decision over that of the President. Only
after the President has decided or settled the dispute can the courts'
jurisdiction be invoked. Until such time, the judiciary should not interfere
since the issue is not yet ripe for judicial adjudication. Otherwise, the
judiciary would infringe on the President's exercise of his constitutional
 36
power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
(Emphases and italics supplied)

xxxx

Indubitably, this prohibition against legislative and judicial intrusions is hinged on the
doctrine of separation of powers. Under this doctrine, each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
37
sphere, subject to checks and balances.

Only when there is an actual case or controversy may the jurisdiction of the courts be
invoked. This requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of
government. It is bound by the doctrine of separation of powers and will not rule on any
matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation if there is no actual or
sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The courts interpret laws, but the
38
ambiguities may only be clarified in an actual case or controversy.

There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, opposite legal
39
claims susceptible of judicial resolution." There must be a real and substantial
controversy, with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties, and
40
admitting of specific relief that courts can grant.

To repeat, the Court of Appeals here directed the OSG to review and reinvestigate the
issuance of OCT No. 0-440 for possible reversion proceedings. But again, whether to
investigate possible reversion cases or file reversion proceedings are pure matters of
executive prerogative which the Court cannot encroach. It is a discretionary power which
inheres in the office of the Chief Executive, the exercise of which, where the laws are silent, is
guided only by the officer's sense of public interest.

Otherwise stated, there appears to be no actual case or controversy here as the courts do
not have the authority to grant the relief sought by respondent, lest the courts violate the
doctrine of separation of powers and the President's constitutional power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
41
and reproduced under Section 1, Chapter 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code.

At any rate, the Court cannot possibly direct the OSG to conduct its own investigation on
the merits of respondent's claim. Certainly, the knowledge and expertise on the technical
aspect of reversion belong to the LMB and the DENR, not the OSG.

Lest it be misunderstood, though, we are not ruling here that San Mauricio indeed bars
reversion proceedings over the subject property. We, too, are declining to rule on whether
OCT No. 0-440 was fraudulently issued. We shall reserve our discussions thereon when an
actual case for reversion over the subject property has been filed. All we are saying is that
the Court ought not to interfere with the President's prerogative to file a reversion case or
not, as here.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated July 3, 2015 and Resolution dated May 12, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130895 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated May 13, 2011 and Resolution dated May
22, 2013 of the Office of the President dismissing the appeal
docketed as O.P. Case No. 09-H-422, as well as the Decision
dated February 12, 2008 and Order dated July 31, 2009 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

M. Lopez, J., on official leave.