the State and political events or, indeed, between the State Part IV which deal w i t h "Political A c t i o n "

i o n " attempts t o
and capitalism, but the sheer weight of so much overdeter- evaluate African States w i t h i n the context of their achieve-
mination does not leave much room for a (theoretical) last ments, specifically in terms of the t w i n but related goals of
lonely instance of economics. When analysis is thus sacrificed genuine development and real independence. The section
to ideology we are still in the night in which all cows are dealing w i t h Africa's international relations is perhaps the
black . . . most significant in the book, and here Gonidec begins to
integrate some of the more important aspects of African
" A f r i c a n Politics" is divided into four parts, w i t h an empha-
Politics which he had alluded t o . But, as before, his dis-
sis largely, but not exclusively on the francophone States.
cussion never substantially departs f r o m the level of ideology
The first t w o parts deal w i t h "Political Forces" and "Political to the level of rigorous analysis and is often plagued by
Ideologies", and it is here that Gonidec fails to come to vague generalizations.
grips w i t h his material. The problem is one of conceptual-
But there remains in Gonidec's w o r k a major contradiction:
ization, especially in the case of "social class", and in the
his overtly ideological stand fails to uncover anything more
conflation of the category "petit-bourgeois" w i t h "bourgeois"
than a casual relationship between the State and capitalism.
(Here, Poulantzas's work would have been of great value,
While all the time arguing on behalf of a structural inter-
but the latter is never referred t o ) . The problem is not that
pretation, he is in the end defeated by straightforward
these fractions do not exist, but that Gonidec's typology of
economic determination which relegates Politics t o mere
African political forces and classes is inadequate. Moreover
superstructure. The State is, for Gonidec, in the end, the
his failure to explain and explore the relationship between
captive handmaiden of capitalism.
the national bourgeoisie and the foreign bourgeoisie — Samir
Amin's "major absent figure" — is a serious omission. The irony of it all is that Gonidec quotes, w i t h apparent
Gonidec rightly points out that the danger exists of en- approval, Engels' letter to Bloch in which Engels argues on
closing the Third World " i n a sort of intellectual g h e t t o " — behalf of a dialectical understanding of the relationship
but his response is to take sociology to task " f o r its in- between base and superstructure — that while the economic
sufficiently universal and universalizing nature". In the situation is the basis, the "various elements of the super-
process of stretching the original (marxian) categories structure, the political forms of the class struggle and its
they cease to be either analytical or normative in their consequences, the constitutions established by the victorious
applicability or content. class . . . the forms of law . . . also have an effect on the
course of historic struggles, and in many cases, predominantly
Part III deals w i t h "Political Structures". Here, the analysis
determine their f o r m . There is action and reaction among all
proceeds not f r o m the point of view of the constitutional
these factors."
lawyer but is more concerned w i t h an attempt to determine
to what extent the officially proclaimed ideologies corres- The error then lies ultimately in a structural interpretation
pond w i t h the political realities of life in contemporary of society which must of necessity be static. Perhaps the
African States. This section is more successful than the pre- final w o r d in this regard should be left to Engels: "What
ceding t w o sections in that Gonidec's wealth of information all these gentlemen lack is dialectic."
is here used to illustrate and not to stifle his argument — 1 First reviewed for " A f r i c a n Studies" •
that the gap between political practice and ideology is
great.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE -

THE CHIMURENGA WAR
by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson

Reviewed by Andre du Pisani

Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1 9 8 1 .

In this eminently readable account of pre-independent t o r y of Z A N U and its military wing Z A N L A , w h o did the
Rhodesia, the focus falls principally on the decisive phase bulk of the fighting during the final decisive seven years.
of the second Chimurenga* or war of resistance, from Through the use of interviews and official party documents,
December 1972 t o April 1980 when victory was finally especially documents of Z A N U , the reader gets a partisan
w o n at the elections by Z A N D . The book is mainly a his- but graphic portrayal of a dehumanising war.

18
 Using a wide canvas, the authors trace the evolution of Chapters 7 and 8 which respectively focus on the Portugese
Z A N L A ' s military strategy, the development of the war Coup d ' Etat and on Detente, make fascinating reading. The
f r o m Mozambique, the mass mobilisation and political behind the scenes activities of Tiny Rowland, chief of
education which were to lay the groundwork of Z A N U ' s Lonrho, Kaunda, Vorster and Smith to respond to the de-
election victory, and Robert Mugabe's emergence and teriorating situation in Mozambique, are brought into sharp
ascendancy as supreme leader. Interwoven w i t h all this are focus. Especially illuminating is the authorsf discussion of
the seemingly endless diplomatic exercises to end the the acrimony between Kaunda and Nyerere over detente
Rhodesian conflict, and the complacency and lack of realism w i t h Pretoria.
of white political leadership in the face of a growing guerrilla
offensive. The strengths and weaknesses of the book are best demon-
strated in Chapter 9 entitled T h e other side of detente'.
The book comprises fourteen chapters, each of which is While Lusaka and Pretoria pursued detente, the Rhodesians
well researched and informative. The first t w o chapters developed a strategy t o destroy the guerrillas f r o m w i t h i n ,
set the stage and regional and international contexts of to subvert and divide Z A N U and Z A P U until they ceased
the Rhodesian conflict. We learn of Soviet, Chinese and t o be a force in the bargaining. This strategy, like detente
Western interests and involvement in the conflict, and of the itself, nearly succeeded, but not only because as the writers
Frontline States. Particularly impressive is the authors' assert, " i t was overcome by the resolve of Black liberation
treatment of the personalised nature of the relationships forces". The Rhodesian counter-revolutionary strategy
between Frelimo, Samora Machel, Marcelino dos Santos on
failed for both political and military reasons. Politically,
the one hand, and the Z A N U military and political leader-
Smith underestimated the commitment of the frontline
ship, on the other. Z A N L A ' s use of the Tete province in
states to the struggle as well as the extent t o which local
Mozambique as an operational base in 1973 is rightly seen
administration had collapsed in rural areas. For example,
as a turning point in the political and military strategy of
by July 1977 already some 300 schools had been forced t o
Z A P U , and ultimately in the war itself. However, the authors
close, leaving more than 40,000 children w i t h o u t schools.
largely fail to explain w h y this was so. The North-Eastem
border of Rhodesia w i t h Mozambique not only afforded
the guerrillas w i t h admirably suited geographic and demo- Militarily, the vital element of providing permanent and
graphic factors — dense vegetation and high population participatory protection at the local level had always been
density —, but the area had suffered decades of adminis- lacking in the Rhodesian counter-insurgency strategy.
trative neglect, while the Shona in the area, the Korekore, Numerous 'search and destroy' operations were launched,
intersects across the Tete province, thus easing the in- but a 'clear and hold-' type operation had never been
filtration of guerrillas f r o m Mozambique into the North- introduced in a satisfactory manner. The authors also
east. A final factor was the lack of physical impediment neglect important elements of Rhodesian counter-strategy
comparable to the Zambezi river on the common national like the idea of a modified cordon sanitaire along the
border. With active F R E L I M O concurrence, Z A N L A was Mozambiquean border, and especially the many 'pseudo-
presented w i t h an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y . operations', whereby members of the counter-insurgency
forces posing as insurgents engaged in intelligence gathering
Chapter 3 outlines the historical thread of European especially in the North-East (Mount Darwin, Rusape, Bindura)
colonialism, and domination and of Shona revolt. Sketchy, and also in Botswana. The partial treatment of the war by
as it is, it provides both continuity and perspective on Martin and Johnson thus ignores the aspect of counter-
what follows. Central themes introduced in this chapter, insurgency, and tends to treat it as residual.
are further developed \n Chapter 4 : notably, inequalities in Chapter 10 traces the rise t o power of Robert Mugabe, which
land distribution, in educational o p p o r t u n i t y and in labour is directly correlated t o the intensifying conflict between
conditions and job opportunities. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Z A N U . This
chapter is particularly illuminating because it emphasises the
In chapter 5 the reader gets an insight into Z A N U mobi- international dimensions of the Rhodesian conflict, as well
lization and recruitment. The opening of the north-eastern as the Z A N U / Z A P U rivalry for the succession to white rule.
front through the Tete province in Mozambique and its In the next t w o chapters we learn of the attempts by Samora
implications for the nature and scale of recruitment are Machel of Mozambique and Nyerere of Tanzania to unify
analysed. Against the backdrop of mass mobilisation and bickering Z A N U and Z A P U in the Zimbabwe People's A r m y
recruitment, the failure of the Smith regime's efforts t o (ZIPA), and the unsuccessful Kissinger diplomatic safari to
seek alternative legitimate leadership t o negotiate w i t h , resolve the Rhodesian enigma. Especially interesting is the
are juxtaposed. Especially valuable, is the authors' succinct growing personal animosity between Vorster and Smith and
treatment of Smith's counter-revolutionary strategies, which
between Muller and van der B y l , over the Rhodesian
were premised on the exploitation of nationalist ambitions
impasse.
and rivalries whereby Smith was able to keep them divided
and continue to rule while undermining the efforts of the The last t w o chapters focus on the prelude to Lancaster
guerrillas by raising false hopes for a settlement. and independence. The air of inevitability ascribed t o
events by the authors, coupled t o their lack of time pers-
In the next chapter we learn about the political costs for
pective, tend t o somewhat distort the focus on these
the regime of its inconsistent use of force, the patchy apocalyptic events. While Martin and Johnson have pro-
nature of Rhodesian intelligence and the effectivity of vided what is probably the best account yet of the first
Z A N L A strategy of political education.

(8
 (1972-1976) phase of the Rhodesian war, the subsequent on naked power by allowing government to rely on authority.
phase (1977-1980) still awaits its historian.
* 'Chimurenga' is a Shona word which has its political
The Struggle for Zimbabwe is an important book that
origins in the uprisings of the 1890s as the Africans north
deserves to be widely read by all South Africans. It under-
of the Limpopo River fought to prevent white settlers
scores the dictum that the inconsistent use of coercion by
from the south occupying their land. The word 'Chimu-
government can both speedily alienate individuals and
renga' has a number of meanings in current usage —
focus their discontent upon political institutions, and that
revolution, war, struggle or resistance. •
legitimacy is a political necessity, for it reduces dependence

POST : ORGANISER / RESEARCHER

AFRA, the Association for Rural Advancement, based in — establishing and developing contact with communities
Pietermaritzburg, Natal, is looking for a fulltime organiser/ affected by resettlement policies, where appropriate;
researcher, to start work in early 1983. — developing AFRA's usefulness as a resource organisa-
The aims of the Association have been defined broadly as: tion for communities affected by resettlement and
a) to monitor, enquire into, record and publicise all mat- for other outside groups engaged in similar or related
ters relating to the social and economic position of work;
persons in the rural areas of Natal, with special regard — administrative work in the AFRA office.
to the effects of the policy of resettlement;
We are looking for somebody with initiative, maturity, and
b) to take action and to encourage other persons and/or a commitment to rural development as well as having research
groups to take action to alleviate hardship, discrimina- and communication abilities. Previous experience in commu-
tion and oppression among such people. nity/rural development work will be a recommendation.
The responsibilities of the person appointed to the advertised The job is based in Pietermaritzburg but involves travelling
post will include the following: and so a driver's licence is essential.
— undertaking ongoing fieldwork/research into the issue Interested persons are asked to write to the AFRA Commit-
of resettlement in Natal/KwaZulu; tee, P.O. Box 2517, Pietermaritzburg, 3200 by 30 November
1982, setting out their experience, qualification, and inte-
— writing reports and factsheets dealing with the results rest in the job. More details about the job can be supplied
of this work, for publication and dissemination; on request by writing to the above address. Interviews with
suitable applicants will be arranged thereafter.

ASSOCIATION FOR RURAL ADVANCEMENT

P.O. Box 2517
Pietermaritzburg, 3200

Telephone: (0331) 57607

E D I T O R I A L BOARD

Chairman: Peter Brown

Vice-Chairman: Alan Paton
Members: F. A n t o n i e , J . A r n o t t , T . E . Beard,
N. Bromberger, M. Dyer, C. Gardner,
| P. Rutsch, J . UnterhaIter,M.H.Whisson.
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