Introduction To Con Ict Resolution: Concepts and Definitions: Why A Third Edition?

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CHAP T E R 1

Introduction to Conict Resolution: Concepts and Denitions

In this third edition of our book we bring the survey of the conict resolution eld up to date at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-rst century. Conict resolution as a dened specialist eld came of age in the post-Cold War era. It also found itself face to face with fundamental new challenges, many of which have come into even sharper focus since the rst and second editions of this book.

Why a Third Edition?


The rst edition of the book (1999) was written at a time when, despite setbacks, conict resolution approaches in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding were widely seen for the rst time to be central in global politics in the context of what US President George Bush senior had (somewhat reluctantly) called a new world order. His successor, Bill Clinton, and UN Secretary-General Ko Annan both broadly subscribed to what we identify as the cosmopolitan worldview shared by many if not most of the founders of the conict resolution eld. The aim of the rst edition of the book was to explain what this meant. The second edition (2005) coincided with the apogee of the neo-con reaction, associated particularly with the administration of President George W. Bush junior. The global war on terror had come to dominate the stage, and conict resolution appeared to have been marginalized and its cosmopolitan values either dismissed or co-opted and discredited. The aim of the second edition was to rescue the conict resolution enterprise from this entanglement, and to reassert its distinctive nature and contribution in the rst decade of the twenty-rst century. This third edition (2011) appears at a particularly uncertain moment in world history, with the promise of a new US administration once again ready to embrace conict resolution approaches in wider foreign policy formulation, but with mounting challenges from rising non-western powers (notably China), increasingly complex links between state failure and international terrorism, a severely shaken global economy, and embroilment in Afghanistan and Iraq continuing to wreak a erce backlash against the whole concept of a liberal peace in which conict resolution is often seen to be implicated. The aim of the third edition is to clarify the role of conict resolution at the beginning of the second decade of the century and to redene its cosmopolitan values in this
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uncertain and complex environment. Our central argument is that systemic complexity of this kind may make conict resolution more difcult, but for the same reason renders it all the more relevant and urgent. As a dened eld of study, conict resolution started in the 1950s and 1960s. This was at the height of the Cold War, when the development of nuclear weapons and the conict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival. A group of pioneers from different disciplines saw the value of studying conict as a general phenomenon, with similar properties whether it occurs in international relations, domestic politics, industrial relations, communities or families or between individuals. They saw the potential of applying approaches that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediation settings to conicts in general, including civil and international conicts. A handful of people in North America and Europe began to establish research groups to develop these new ideas. They were not taken very seriously. The international relations profession had its own categories for understanding international conict and did not welcome the interlopers. Nor was the combination of analysis and practice implicit in the new ideas easy to reconcile with established scholarly institutions or the traditions of practitioners such as diplomats and politicians. Nevertheless, the new ideas attracted interest, and the eld began to grow and spread. Scholarly journals in conict resolution were created. Institutions to study the eld were established, and their number rapidly increased. The eld developed its own subdivisions, with different groups studying international crises, internal wars, social conicts and approaches ranging from negotiation and mediation to experimental games. By the 1980s, conict resolution ideas were increasingly making a difference in real conicts. In South Africa, for example, the Centre for Intergroup Studies was applying the approaches that had emerged in the eld to the developing confrontation between apartheid and its challengers, with impressive results. In the Middle East, a peace process was getting under way in which negotiators on both sides had gained experience both of each other and of conict resolution through problem-solving workshops. In Northern Ireland, groups inspired by the new approach had set up community relations initiatives that were not only reaching across community divides but were also becoming an accepted responsibility of local government. In war-torn regions of Africa and South-East Asia, development workers and humanitarian agencies were seeing the need to take account of conict and conict resolution as an integral part of their activities. By the closing years of the Cold War, the climate for conict resolution was changing radically. With relations between the superpowers improving, the ideological and military competition that had fuelled many regional conicts was fading away. Protracted regional conicts in Southern Africa, Central America, and East Asia moved towards settlements. It seemed that the UN could return to play the role its founders expected.

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The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to a close the long period in which a single international conict dominated the international system. Instead, internal conicts, ethnic conicts, conicts over secession and power struggles within countries became the norm in the 1990s. These reected not so much struggles between competing centres of power, of the kind that had characterized international conict for most of the 350 years since the peace of Westphalia, as the fragmentation and breakdown of state structures, economies and whole societies. At their extreme, in parts of Africa, the new wars witnessed the return of mercenary armies and underpaid militias, which preyed on civilian populations, and were fed as much by what were meant to be overt ows of international aid as by covert criminal international networks. In this new climate, the attention of scholars of international relations and comparative politics turned to exactly the type of conict that had preoccupied the conict resolution thinkers for many years. A richer crossfertilization of ideas developed between conict resolution and these traditional elds. At the same time, practitioners from various backgrounds were attracted to conict resolution. International statesmen began to use the language, and international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) set up conict resolution mechanisms and conict prevention centres. A former president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, became one of the most active leaders of a conict resolution non-governmental organization (NGO). The Nyerere Foundation was established with comparable aims for Africa. Development and aid workers, who had earlier tended to see their function as non-political, now became interested in linking their expertise to conict resolution approaches, because so many of the areas with which they were most concerned were conict zones complex humanitarian emergencies were seen also to be complex political emergencies. A similar cross-fertilization took place with international peacekeepers. Overseas development ministries in several countries set up conict units and began funding conict prevention and resolution initiatives on a signicant scale. International nancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also took on conict prevention roles. The UN secretary-general declared the prevention of violent conict to be a central goal for the international community in the new millennium. How to achieve a peaceful settlement of disputes between states was a familiar theme in the international relations and strategic studies literature and had always been part of the stock-in-trade of international diplomacy. Less familiar was the challenge to statist international organizations of managing non-state conicts. A greater degree of impact, however, also brought greater scrutiny and the development of searching critiques from different quarters. The second and third editions of our book have been largely prompted by these. Conict resolution had always been controversial, both in relation to outside disciplines and internally among its different protagonists and schools. It also drew

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persistent re from critics at different points along the political and intellectual spectrum, from neo-realists to neo-Marxists. After the high hopes of the early 1990s, three developments in particular took the gloss off what were no doubt often unrealistic expectations of rapid results. First, there were the difculties that international interveners encountered in chaotic war zones, such as in Bosnia (19925) and Somalia (19923). A number of analysts pointed to the impact of globalization on the weakening of vulnerable states, the provision of cheap weaponry suitable for asymmetric war, and the generation of shadow economies that made new wars self-perpetuating and protable. Conict resolution was seen to be incapable of addressing this nexus. Second, there was the collapse of the IsraeliPalestinian Oslo peace process with the launch of the second intifada or uprising in September 2000. The Oslo process had been hailed at the time as an example of success for classic conict resolution approaches. Third came the shock of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, together with the kaleidoscope of events that followed, summed up as the global war on terror (GWOT). Western global hegemony had elicited a global jihadist reaction. What possible answer could conict resolution have to what was seen as the lethal combination of rogue or failed states, trans-border crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the fanatical ideologues of international terrorism? Behind these political challenges lay more precisely focused intellectual challenges. Three of these in particular will be engaged with in the course of this book. First a variant of the traditional realist criticism of conict resolution, in which international politics is seen as a struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable groups with power and coercion as the only ultimate currency, and soft power approaches of conict resolution dismissed as ineffective and dangerous the crushing of Tamil military resistance by government forces in Sri Lanka in 2009 is seen as a salutary example here. Second a variant of the traditional Marxist criticism, which sees liberal conict resolution as naive and theoretically uncritical, since it attempts to reconcile interests that should not be reconciled, fails to take sides in unequal and unjust struggles, and lacks an analysis within a properly global perspective of the forces of exploitation and oppression. In general, in response to both of these criticisms, whereas realist theory and much Marxist theory considers violence as unavoidable and integral to the nature of conict, such determinism is rejected in conict resolution. Here there are always seen to be other options, and direct violence is regarded as an avoidable consequence of human choice. Our third set of critics, exemplied in Paul Salems Critique of western conict resolution from a non-western perspective (1993; see also Salem, 1997), argue that the western assumptions on which conict resolution rests are not applicable universally. In response to these and other criticisms, this book argues in Part II that, on the contrary, the developing tradition of thinking about conict and conict

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resolution is all the more relevant as the xed structures of sovereignty and governance break down. All over the world, societies are facing stresses from population growth, structural change in the world economy, migration into cities, environmental degradation and rapid social change. Societies with institutions, rules or norms for managing conict and well-established traditions of governance are generally better able to accommodate peacefully to change; those with weaker governance, fragile social bonds and little consensus on values or traditions are more likely to buckle. Strengthening the capacity of conict resolution within societies and political institutions, especially preventatively, is a vital part of the response to the phenomena of warlordism and ethnonationalism. We argue that conict resolution has a role to play, even in war zones, since building peace constituencies and understandings across divided communities is an essential element of humanitarian engagement. We argue that conict resolution is an integral part of work for development, social justice and social transformation that aims to tackle the problems of which mercenaries and child soldiers are symptoms. We argue for a broad understanding of conict resolution, to include not only mediation between the parties but also efforts to address the wider context in which international actors, domestic constituencies and intra-party relationships sustain violent conicts. We maintain that, although many of the recent theories and practices of conict resolution may have been articulated more vociferously in the West, their deep roots reach into far older world traditions from which they draw their inspiration. Indeed, every culture and society has its own version of what is, after all, a general social and political need. The point is not to abandon conict resolution because it is western, but to nd ways to enrich western and non-western traditions through their mutual encounter. And, nally, this applies all the more urgently to the phenomenon of international terrorism. Conict resolution teaches that short-term denial strategies on their own will fail unless accompanied by and embedded within middle-term persuasion strategies, long-term prevention strategies, and international coordination and legitimation strategies. We will look at this in more detail at the end of chapter 11. And we will discuss the theoretical debate between conict resolution and its critics more fully in a new chapter chapter 19.

Conict Resolution Models


Here we offer a brief initial sketch of the conict resolution eld, followed by an introduction to some of the best-known models that have been found to be useful in it. This introduction is selective and indicative, not systematic, let alone exhaustive. The rest of the book will ll in the gaps. Conict is a universal feature of human society. It takes its origins in economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization all of which are inherently conictual and becomes overt through the formation of conict parties, which come

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to have, or are perceived to have, mutually incompatible goals. The identity of the conict parties, the levels at which the conict is contested, and the issues fought over (scarce resources, unequal relations, competing values) may vary over time and may themselves be disputed. Conicts are dynamic as they escalate and de-escalate, and are constituted by a complex interplay of attitudes and behaviours that can assume a reality of their own. Third parties are likely to be involved as the conict develops, and may themselves thereby become parties in an extended conict. An important point to note from the outset is how early theorists in the eld such as Morton Deutsch (1949, 1973) distinguished between destructive and constructive conict, suggesting that the former was to be avoided but the latter was a necessary and valuable aspect of human creativity. This remains key for understanding the normative orientation of the conict resolution eld as a whole, as will be emphasized below. The new eld of conict resolution in the 1950s dened itself in relation to the challenge of understanding and transforming destructive human conicts of this kind. In contrast to older established elds, such as international relations, conict resolution was to be: multilevel: analysis and resolution had to embrace all levels of conict: intra-personal (inner conict), interpersonal, intergroup (families, neighbourhoods, afliations), international, regional, global, and the complex interplays between them; multidisciplinary: in order to learn how to address complex conict systems adequately, the new eld had to draw on many disciplines, including politics, international relations, strategic studies, development studies, individual and social psychology, etc.; multicultural: since human conict is a worldwide phenomenon within an increasingly intricate and interconnected local/global cultural web, this had to be a truly cooperative international enterprise, in terms of both the geographical locations where conict is encountered and the conict resolution initiatives deployed to address them; both analytic and normative: the foundation of the study of conict was to be systematic analysis and interpretation of the statistics of deadly quarrels (polymology), but this was to be combined from the outset with the normative aim of learning how better thereby to transform actually or potentially violent conict into non-violent processes of social, political and other forms of change; both theoretical and practical: the conict resolution eld was to be constituted by a constant mutual interplay between theory and practice: only when theoretical understanding and practical experience of what works and what does not work are connected can properly informed experience develop. Conicts have been variously dened in relation to ghts, games and debates (Rapoport, 1960). This remains controversial. For example, some have

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used conict to refer both to consensual conicts over interests (disputants want the same thing) and to dissensual conicts over values (disputants do not want the same thing) (Aubert, 1963); others, however, have called the former disputes that require settlement and have reserved the term conict for deeper struggles over unsatised human needs that require resolution (Burton, 1990a). We will not enter this discussion here, and are happy to use the term conict to refer to the widest set of circumstances in which conict parties perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals although we do see a difference between conicts, on the one hand, and sporting encounters, economic competitions and legal cases, in which the rules of contestation are not themselves called into question, on the other. But we must at the outset address the current debate within the eld between conict resolution and conict transformation although we will then set this aside as well. In this book we see conict transformation as the deepest level of the conict resolution tradition, rather than as a separate venture, as some would prefer (Vyrynen, 1991; Rupesinghe, 1995; Jabri, 1996; Francis, 2002; Lederach, 2003). John Paul Lederach, for example, downgrades conict resolution in comparison with conict transformation on the grounds that it is content-centred rather than relationship-centred, aims at immediate agreement rather than long-term process, and is committed only to de-escalation rather than also including escalation to pursue constructive change (2003: 33). This is something of a caricature of the eld, and is reminiscent of the way in which in an earlier period John Burton caricatured dispute settlement in comparison with the deeper process of conict resolution, which he dened in much the same way as Lederach and others now dene conict transformation. In our view it does not matter in the end which label is used as the umbrella term (candidates have included conict regulation, conict engagement and conict management as well as conict resolution and conict transformation), so long as the eld itself is coherent enough to contain the substance of what is being advocated in each case. We believe that the eld does retain its coherence, that it is best left intact, and that conict resolvers and conict transformers are essentially engaged in the same enterprise as shown in titles of books such as Dukess Resolving Public Conict: Transforming Community and Governance (1996). We continue to use conict resolution as the generic term here for four reasons. First, because it was the earliest term used to dene the new eld (the 1957 Journal of Conict Resolution). Second, because it is still the most widely used term among analysts and practitioners recent examples are Morton Deutsch and Peter Colemans edited volume The Handbook of Conict Resolution (2000), Peter Wallensteens Understanding Conict Resolution (2007), and The Sage Handbook of Conict Resolution (2009), edited by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and William Zartman. Third, because conict resolution is the term that is most familiar in the media and among the general public. Fourth because the term conict transformation is in itself inherently indeterminate unless further qualied transformation in

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which direction? As explained in the preface, conict resolution has from the start encompassed conict settlement at one end of the spectrum and conict transformation at the other. As is made explicit historically in chapter 2, and theoretically in chapter 19, there have always been tensions between the two.

Framework Models
We begin by offering a simplied model of Johan Galtungs seminal thinking on the relationship between conict, violence and peace. As described in chapter 2, Galtung was one of the founders of the eld, and the breadth of his understanding of the structural and cultural roots of violence is a corrective to those who caricature conict resolution as purely relational, symmetrical or psychological.

Galtungs models of conict, violence and peace


In the late 1960s Johan Galtung (1969; see also 1996: 72) proposed an inuential model of conict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conicts. He suggested that conict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices (see gure 1.1). Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conict situation, which includes the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the conict parties generated by what Chris Mitchell calls a mis-match between social values and social structure (1981a: 18). In a symmetric conict, the contradiction is dened by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conict, it is dened by the parties, their relationship and the conict of interests inherent in the relationship. Attitude includes the parties perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often inuenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (desire, will) elements. Analysts who emphasize these subjective aspects are said to have an expressive view of the sources of conict (for example: a social conict exists when two
Contradiction Structural violence Peacebuilding

Attitude

Behaviour

Cultural violence

Direct violence

Peacemaking

Peacekeeping

Figure 1.1 Galtungs models of conict, violence and peace

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or more parties believe they have incompatible objectives; Kriesberg 1982: 17). Behaviour is the third component. It can involve cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such as structural relationships, competing material interests or behaviours are said to have an instrumental view of the sources of conict (for example: there is conict whenever incompatible actions occur . . . an action that is incompatible with another action prevents, obstructs, interferes, injures or in some way makes the latter less likely to be effective; Deutsch 1973: 10). Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conict. A conict structure without conictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) one. Galtung sees conict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and inuencing one another. As the dynamic develops, it becomes a manifest conict formation, as parties interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Parties then organize around this structure to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conictual behaviour. And so the conict formation starts to grow and intensify. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating secondary conicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original, core conict. Eventually, however, resolving the conict must involve a set of dynamic changes that mean de-escalation of conict behaviour, a change in attitudes, and a transformation of the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conict structure. A related idea due to Galtung (1990) is the distinction between direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). We end direct violence by changing conict behaviour, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. These responses relate in turn to broader strategies of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking (see gure 1.1). Galtung dened negative peace as the cessation of direct violence and positive peace as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well. These are slightly deceptive terms. Negative peace is not to be despised (the term negative is a bit unfortunate in this respect). At an intrapersonal level, anyone who has been unable to sleep through grief, remorse (for the past), anxiety (for the future), etc., will know the blessings of a peaceful mind. The same goes at the family level for anyone who has suffered violence or abuse, or, at a community level, discrimination, persecution, ethnic cleansing, genocide, or, at the international level, the terrible destruction of war. Over all of this since 1945 has hung the threat of nuclear holocaust.

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On the other hand, negative peace on its own can be coupled with repression, deprivation, exploitation, injustice. Pax Romana, pax Britannica and pax Sovietica were all associated with the forcible crushing of legitimate human aspirations. As the Latin historian of the conquest of Britain in the rst century AD said of the victorious Roman general: he made a wasteland and called it peace. There was negative peace in Hungary after 1956. There is negative peace today (more or less) in Tibet. Positive peace, in contrast, includes the key ideas of legitimacy and justice. An unjust structure or relationship in this terminology is not a peaceful one. In order to achieve positive peace, therefore, injustice must be removed. This also operates at all the different levels, from unjust economic relations between North and South, through unjust political relations between majority and minority groups within a country, to unjust personal relations between individuals. It applies to all the various types of differences that distinguish sets of human beings: differences of race (the idea that some races are superior to others), gender (male domination), class (perpetuation of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage through birth, not merit), etc. At an intrapersonal level positive peace goes beyond absence of anxiety and embraces the idea of deep inner peace through integrity (wholeness) of being, physical, emotional, spiritual. Some believe that inner peace of this kind is the ultimate underpinning of lasting world peace. Positive peace is also deeply problematic, however. For example, injustice usually amounts to perceived injustice, and we are immediately plunged into a highly controversial and complicated arena, which virtually includes the whole of politics. Nothing is more characteristic of violent conict than the fact that all parties genuinely believe that they are victims of injustice, and that therefore justice is on their side. Both pray to God for victory. Linked to this is the well-known paradox that many of those who battle against perceived injustice themselves use force in order to do so. Again, there is a danger here of doctrinaire activists forcing people to be free (Rousseaus phrase). The fact that people may not realize that they are exploited (in the eyes of the activist) is interpreted as brainwashing or false consciousness. It is seen as the problem of the happy slave. The conclusion may then be to try to coerce them into revolt. Behind all of this, the problem of imputation can be seen to be a deep and questionable one. On the other hand, there undoubtedly is exploitation and injustice, much of which is institutionalized and also culturally and psychologically internalized. The exploiters may even be as unaware as anyone else of the overall situation and, indeed, genuinely believe that there is no injustice.

A conict escalation and de-escalation model


Conicts are dynamic and can develop and change at astonishing speed. They can also take long periods of time to gestate unnoticed before they suddenly erupt into overt violence. The process of conict escalation is complex and

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War Violence Polarization Contradiction Difference Ceasefire Agreement Normalization Reconciliation

Figure 1.2 Conict escalation and de-escalation

unpredictable. New issues and conict parties can emerge, internal power struggles can alter tactics and goals, and secondary conicts and spirals can further complicate the situation. The same is true of de-escalation, with unexpected breakthroughs and setbacks changing the dynamics, with advances in one area or at one level being offset by relapses at others, and with the actions of third parties inuencing the outcome in unforeseen ways. Here we offer the simplest model in which escalation phases move along a normal distribution curve, from the initial differences that are part of all social developments, through the emergence of an original contradiction that may or may not remain latent, on up through the process of polarization in which antagonistic parties form and the conict becomes manifest, and culminating in the outbreak of direct violence and war (see gure 1.2). As we will see in chapter 3, escalation models such as this are popular with those who try to nd objective criteria for measuring statistical changes in conict levels in different countries from year to year. They are also used by those who attempt to match appropriate conict resolution strategies to them (Glasl, 1982; Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

The hourglass model: a spectrum of conict resolution responses


Here we combine Galtungs ideas on conict and violence with escalation/ de-escalation phases to produce the hourglass model of conict resolution responses (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999a) (see gure 1.3). The hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterizes conict escalation (top half of the hourglass model) and the widening of political space that characterizes conict de-escalation (bottom half of the hourglass model). As the space narrows and widens, so different conict resolution responses become more or less appropriate or possible. Following Roger Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly (1991), this is a contingency and complementarity model, in which contingency refers to the nature and phase of the conict

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Conflict transformation

Difference Contradiction

Cultural peacebuilding Structural peacebuilding Peacemaking Peacekeeping

Conflict settlement

Polarization Violence

Conflict containment

WAR

War limitation

Ceasefire Conflict settlement Agreement Normalization Conflict transformation Reconciliation

Peacekeeping Peacemaking Structural peacebuilding Cultural peacebuilding

Note: in de-escalation phases conflict resolution tasks must be initiated at the same time and are nested. They cannot be undertaken sequentially as may be possible in escalation phases see chapters 5 and 8. We suggest that what is sometimes called deep peacemaking (which includes reconciliation) is best seen as part of cultural peacebuilding.

Figure 1.3 The hourglass model: conict containment, conict settlement and conict transformation

and complementarity to the combination of appropriate responses that need to be worked together to maximize chances of success in conict resolution. Conict transformation is seen to encompass the deepest levels of cultural and structural peacebuilding. Conict settlement (which many critics wrongly identify with conict resolution) corresponds to what we call elite peacemaking in other words, negotiation or mediation among the main protagonists with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Conict containment includes preventive peacekeeping, war limitation and post-ceasere peacekeeping. War limitation is made up of attempts to constrain the ghting geographically, to mitigate and alleviate its intensity, and to bring about its termination at the earliest possible moment. In this model we distinguish between the elite peacemaking that forms the substance of conict settlement and the deeper levels of peacemaking (including reconciliation and education) that are better seen as part of cultural peacebuilding.

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In chapter 5 (Preventing Violent Conict) we will look at the top half of the hourglass model. In chapter 6 (Containing Violent Conict: Peacekeeping) we will look at the conict containment components. In chapter 7 (Ending Violent Conict: Peacemaking) we will look at the conict settlement components. And in chapters 810 (Postwar Reconstruction; Peacebuilding; Reconciliation) we will look at the bottom half of the hourglass model. Table 1.1 indicates the range of complementary processes and techniques relevant to the hourglass model of escalation and de-escalation offered in this book and elaborated below.

The conict tree


Another inuential framework model is the conict tree, as developed and applied in particular in the Responding to Conict Programme at Birmingham (see gure 1.4).

Fear Looting Raiding Effects > Hatred & suspicion Killing Land alienation Unfair representation

Core problem >

Corrupt political leaders Causes > Colonial boundaries

Freedom & equity Unequal development Current constituencies Law

Source: Fisher, S., et al. 2000. Working With Conflict, London: Zed Books, p. 29

Figure 1.4 The conict tree: an example from Kenya

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Table 1.1 Conict resolution techniques, complementarity and the hourglass model
Stage of conict Strategic response Examples of responses and capacity

Difference

Cultural peacebuilding

Problem-solving Support for indigenous disputeresolution institutions and CR training Fact-nding missions and peace commissions Culture of toleration and respect Multiple and inclusive identities Development assistance Civil society development Governance training and institution building Human rights training Track II mediation and problem-solving Institutional capacity Constitutional and legal provision Legitimacy and social justice. Special envoys and ofcial mediation Negotiation Coercive diplomacy Preventive peacekeeping Interposition Crisis management and containment Peace enforcement Peace support and stabilization Preventive peacekeeping Disarmament and security sector reform Condence building and security enhancing measures Security in the community through police training Electoral and constitutional reform Power sharing and de-centralization of power Problem-solving Collective security and cooperation arrangements Economic resource cooperation and development Alternative defence Commissions of enquiry/truth and justice commissions Peace media development Peace and conict awareness education and training Cultural exchanges and initiatives, sport as reconciliation Problem-solving as future imaging

Contradiction

Structural peacebuilding

Polarization

Elite peacemaking

Violence War Ceasere

Peacekeeping War limitation Peacekeeping

Agreement

Elite peacemaking

Normalization

Structural peacebuilding

Reconciliation

Cultural peacebuilding

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Classical Ideas
Here is a selection of classic conict resolution models. We have seen above how conict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. But the way we deal with conict is a matter of habit and choice. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices.

Conict approaches
One typical habit in conict is to give very high priority to defending ones own interests. If Cains interests clash with Abels, Cain is inclined to ignore Abels interests or actively to damage them. Leaders of nations are expected to defend the national interest and to defeat the interests of others if they come into conict. But this is not the only possible response. Figure 1.5 illustrates ve approaches to conict, distinguished by whether concern for Self and concern for Other is high or low. Cain has high concern for Self and low concern for Other: this is a contending style. Another alternative is to yield: this implies more concern for the interests of Other than Self. Another is to avoid conict and withdraw: this suggests low concern for both Self and Other. Yet another is to balance concern for the interests of Self and Other, leading to a search for accommodation and compromise. And there is a fth alternative, seen by many in the conict resolution eld as the one to be recommended where possible: high regard for the interests of both Self and Other. This implies strong assertion of ones own interest but equal awareness of the aspirations and needs of the other, generating energy to search for a creative problem-solving outcome.

Yielding

Problem solving

Concern for Other

Compromising

Withdrawal

Contending

Concern for Self


Source: from Katz and Lawyer, 1985

Figure 1.5 Five approaches to conict

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Winlose 1 Cains satisfaction

Winwin 4

0 Loselose

2 Losewin Abels satisfaction

Figure 1.6 Zero-sum and non-zero-sum outcomes

Winlose, loselose, winwin outcomes


What happens when the conict approaches of two parties are considered together? Parties to conicts are usually inclined to see their interests as diametrically opposed. The possible outcomes are seen to be winlose (one wins, the other loses) or compromise (they split their difference). But there is a much more common outcome in violent conicts: both lose. If neither is able to impose an outcome or is prepared to compromise, the conictants may impose such massive costs on each other that all the parties end up worse off than they would have been had another strategy been adopted. In conict resolution analysis this is found to be a much more common outcome than is generally supposed. When this becomes clear to the parties (often, regrettably, late in the day), there is a strong motive based on self-interest for moving towards other outcomes, such as compromise or winwin (dened here not as an ideal future, as is often supposed, but one in which all parties would be better off). The spectrum of such outcomes may well be wider than conictants think. But by then positions may be so entrenched, passions so strongly aroused, and intransigent leaders so strongly ensconced that change nevertheless proves impossible. This is the all too familiar situation in intractable conict a topic to which we return in chapter 18. Traditionally, the task of conict resolution has been seen as helping parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum1 (Selfs gain is Others loss) to reperceive it as a non-zero-sum conict (in which both may gain or both may lose), and then to assist parties to move in the positive-sum direction. Figure 1.6 shows various possible outcomes of the conict between Cain and Abel. Any point towards the right is better for Abel, any point towards the top is better for Cain. In the Bible, the prize is the Lords favour. Cain sees the situation as

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Table 1.2 Prisoners Dilemma


Cooperate Defect

Cooperate Defect

3, 3 5, 0

0, 5 1, 1

a zero-sum conict: at point 1 (his best outcome) he gets the Lords favour, at 2 (his worst) the Lord favours Abel. All the other possibilities lie on the line from 1 to 2 in which the Lord divides his favour, more or less equally, between the two brothers. Point 3 represents a possible compromise position. But it is the other diagonal, representing the non-zero-sum outcomes, that is the more interesting from a conict resolution perspective: the mutual loss that actually occurred, at 0, when Abel was slain and Cain lost the Lords favour, and the mutual gain that they missed, at 4, if each had been his brothers keeper.

Prisoners Dilemma and the evolution of cooperation


Prisoners Dilemma is a simple representation in game theory that clearly illustrates the tendency for contending strategies to end in loselose outcomes. Two players (prisoners accused of crime) each have two choices: to cooperate with each other (remain silent) or to defect (inform on the other). The choices must be made in ignorance of what the other will do (they are kept in separate cells). The possible pay-offs are given in table 1.2. It can be seen that, whatever choice the other may make, each player considered singly gains a higher pay-off by choosing to defect (if the other cooperates, defection earns 5 points rather than 3; if the other defects, defection earns 1 point rather than 0). So the only rational course is to defect. But this is not the best outcome for either, since, whereas mutual defection earns 1 point each, mutual cooperation would have earned both of them 3 points. So the individually rational choice turns out to deliver a mutual loselose outcome. The collectively rational choice is for both to cooperate, reaching the elusive winwin outcome (point 4 in gure 1.5). But if both could communicate and agree to go for mutual cooperation, how can each guarantee that the other will not subsequently defect, tempted by the 5 point prize? In this kind of social trap, self-interested parties can readily get stuck at loselose outcomes. The trap depends on the game being played only once. If each move is part of a sequence of repeated games, there are possibilities for cooperative behaviour to evolve. In a well-known series of experiments, Robert Axelrod (1984) invited experts to submit programs for a Prisoners Dilemma competition run on computer. A spectrum of nice and nasty strategies was submitted and each was tested in pairs against all the others in repeated interactions. The surprise clear overall winner was a simple strategy called Tit-for-Tat (submitted by the conict resolution analyst Anatol Rapoport), which began by cooperating on the rst move and thereafter copied what the other had done on the

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previous move. The repeated overall success of Tit-for-Tat shows, in Richard Dawkinss phrase, that, contrary to a widely held view about competitive environments of this kind (including Darwinian natural selection), nice guys nish rst (Dawkins, 1989: 20233). Tit-for-Tat is not a pushover. It hits back when the other defects. But, crucially, it initially cooperates (it is generous), and it bears no grudges (it is forgiving). Its responses are also predictable and reliable (it has clarity of behaviour). For the evolution of cooperation to get going in a mle of competing strategies, there must be a critical if at rst quite small number of initially cooperating strategies, and the shadow of the future must be a long one: interaction must not be conned to just one game (for example, with one player able to wipe out another in one go). But, so long as these conditions operate, even though nasty guys may seem to do well at rst, nice guys come out on top in the end.2 Natural selection favours cooperation. But even Tit-for-Tat can be locked into mutually destructive conict if the other persists in competitive play, as happens in intractable conicts, where mutual suspicion (lack of trust) and the security dilemma (your defence is factored into my worst-case planning as offensive threat and vice versa), as well as ideological commitment and the self-interest of intransigent parties in the continuation of the conict, perpetuate mutual retaliation. Another way of springing the trap, therefore, is to follow the conict resolution route and to change the players perceptions and calculations of gain and eventually relationship by reframing the conict as a shared problem. All key stakeholders must be persuaded that existing strategies lead to a loselose impasse and that preferable alternatives are available and will be to their advantage. Remaining irreconcilable spoilers must simply be defeated. Perceived pay-off rules can be altered in ways such as: by increasing scarce resources (enlarging the cake); by offering bold gestures on less important issues in order to reduce tension and build trust (logrolling and graduated reciprocal strategies); by creating new options not included in the original demands (brainstorming); by looking for superordinate goals such as mutual economic gains that neither party can achieve on its own e.g. joint membership of the EU (superordination); by compensating those prepared to make concessions (compensation); by increasing the penalties for those who are not (penalization). So taking account of the future relationship (for example, between two communities who will have to live together) is one way out of the trap. Another is to take the social context into account. Imagine, for example, that the prisoners know that there is an agency outside which will punish them if they defect and reward them if they cooperate. This can change their pay-offs and hence the outcome. A similar change occurs if, instead of considering only their own

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interests, the parties also attach value to the interests of each other: social players are not trapped. Among recent extensions of game theory is Michael Bacharachs posthumously published Beyond Individual Choice (2006), which extends rational actor models to include the different ways in which agents frame the problem and organize themselves into teams to attain common goals.

Positions, interests and needs


How can the parties reframe their positions if they are diametrically opposed, as they often are? One of the classical ideas in conict resolution is to distinguish between the positions held by the parties and their underlying interests and needs. For example, Egypt and Israel quarrel over Sinai. Each claims sovereignty and their positions seem incompatible. But in negotiations it turns out that Egypts main interest is in national territorial integrity and Israels main interest is in security. So the political space is found for what came to be the Camp David settlement. Interests are often easier to reconcile than positions, since there are usually several positions that might satisfy them. Matters may be more difcult if the conict is over values (which are often non-negotiable) or relationships, which may need to be changed to resolve the conict, although the same principle of looking for a deeper level of compatible underlying motives applies. Some analysts take this to the limit by identifying basic human needs (for example, identity, security, survival) as lying at the roots of other motives. Intractable conicts are seen to result from the denial of such needs, and conict can only be resolved when such needs are satised. Basic human needs are seen to be generic and non-negotiable. But the hopeful argument of these analysts is that, whereas interests may be subject to relative scarcity, basic needs are not (for example, security for one party is reinforced by security for the other). As long as the conict is translated into the language of needs, an outcome that satises both sides needs can be found (see gure 1.7).

Third-party intervention
Where two parties are reacting to each others actions, it is easy for a spiral of hostility and escalation to develop through positive feedback. The entry of a third party may change the conict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to lter or reect back the messages, attitudes and behaviour of the conictants. This intervention may dampen the feedback spiral. Although all third parties make some difference, pure mediators have traditionally been seen as powerless their communications are powerful, but they bring to bear no new material resources of their own. In other situations there may also be powerful third parties whose entry alters not only the

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Person A

Person B

Positions

Interests

shared interests and values

Needs

shared needs and fears

Source: from Floyer Acland, 1995: 50

Figure 1.7 Positions, interests and needs

communication structure but also the power balance. Such third parties may change the parties behaviour as well as their communications by judicious use of the carrot and the stick (positive and negative inducement); and they may support one outcome rather than another. Of course, by taking action, powerful third parties may nd themselves sucked into the conict as a full party. Figure 1.8 illustrates how third parties may act as arbiters (with or without the consent of the conict parties) or may try to facilitate negotiations or mediate between the parties (coercively or non-coercively).

Three faces of power


It may seem strange to call pure mediators powerless when they may provide the impetus to resolve the conict. This is because the term power is ambiguous. On the one hand, it means the power to command, order, enforce coercive or hard power. On the other, it means the power to induce cooperation, to legitimize, to inspire persuasive or soft power. Hard power has always been important in violent conict, but soft power may be more important in conicts managed peacefully. Kenneth Boulding (1989) calls the former threat power (do what I want or I will do what you dont want). Following earlier theorists of managementlabour negotiations, he then further distinguishes between two forms of soft power: exchange power, associated with bargaining and the compromising approach (do what I want and I will do what you want), and integrative power, associated with persuasion and transformative long-term problem-solving (together we can do something that is better for both of us). This roughly coincides with Joseph Nyes distinction between military, economic and legitimacy power: the United States has a huge preponderance of the rst, a large share

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Third party Arbitration

Party A

Negotiation

Party B

Coercive Enforcement Non-forcible coercion Mediation with muscle

Mediation Third party

Non-coercive Pure mediation Conciliation/problem-solving Good offices

Figure 1.8 Coercive and non-coercive third party intervention

Table 1.3 Three faces of power


Threat power Exchange power Integrative power

Destructive productive creative

Productive destructive creative

Creative productive destructive

Source: from Boulding, 1989: 25

of the second, but only a limited and highly ambiguous measure of the third (Nye, 2002, 2004). Nye concludes that soft power is more important, even from a self-interested perspective, than many unreconstructed realists may suppose. Conict resolvers try to shift emphasis away from the use of threat power and towards the use of exchange and integrative power (see table 1.3). Third parties such as politicians and governments may use all these forms of power. In terms of third-party intervention (see gure 1.8) it is helpful to distinguish between powerful mediators, or mediators with muscle, who bring their power resources to bear, and powerless mediators, whose role is conned to communication and facilitation. Track I diplomacy involves ofcial governmental or intergovernmental representatives, who may use good

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ofces, mediation, and sticks and carrots to seek or force an outcome, typically along the winlose or bargaining line (between the points 1, 3 and 2 in gure 1.6). Track II diplomacy, in contrast, involves unofcial mediators who do not have carrots or sticks. They work with the parties or their constituencies to facilitate agreements, encouraging the parties to see their predicament as lying along the loselose to winwin line (between points 0, 3 and 4 in gure 1.6) and to nd mutually satisfactory outcomes.

Symmetric and asymmetric conicts


So far we have been considering conicts of interest between relatively similar parties. These are examples of symmetric conicts. Conict may also arise between dissimilar parties, such as between a majority and a minority, an established government and a group of rebels, a master and his servant, an employer and her employees. These are asymmetric conicts. Here the root of the conict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. It may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conict. Classical conict resolution, in some views, applies only to symmetric conicts. In asymmetric conicts the structure is such that the top dog always wins, the underdog always loses. The only way to resolve the conict is to change the structure, but this can never be in the interests of the top dog. So there are no winwin outcomes, and the third party has to join forces with the underdog to bring about a resolution. From another point of view, however, even asymmetric conicts impose costs on both parties. It is oppressive to be an oppressor, even if not so oppressive as to be oppressed. There are costs for the top dogs in sustaining themselves in power and keeping the underdogs down. In severe asymmetric conicts the cost of the relationship becomes unbearable for both sides. This then opens the possibility for conict resolution through a shift from the existing structure of relationships to another. The role of the third party is to assist with this transformation, if necessary confronting the top dog. This means transforming what were unpeaceful, unbalanced relationships into peaceful and dynamic ones. Figure 1.9 illustrates how the passage from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships may involve a temporary increase in overt conict as people become aware of imbalances of power and injustice affecting them (stage 1, education or conscientization), organize themselves and articulate their grievances (stage 2, confrontation), come to terms in a more equal way with those who held a preponderance of power over them (stage 3, negotiation) and nally join in restructuring a more equitable and just relationship (stage 4, resolution). There are many ways in which this can be approached without using coercion. There is the Gandhian tactic of speaking truth to power, inuencing and persuading

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Unpeaceful relations

Peaceful relations 4 Peaceful development

Balanced power

3 Negotiation

Unbalanced power

1 Conscientization

2 Confrontation

Latent conflict

Overt conflict

Source: from Curle, 1971, and Lederach, 1995

Figure 1.9 Transforming asymmetric conicts (I)

the power-holders. Then there are the tactics of mobilizing popular movements, increasing solidarity, making demonstrations of resolve, establishing a demand for change. Raising awareness of the conict among those who are external or internal supporters of the top dog may start to weaken the regime (as did, for example, the opponents of apartheid in South Africa). The unequal power structure is unbalanced and is held up by props of various kinds; removing the props may make the unbalanced structure collapse. Another tactic is to strengthen and empower the underdogs. The underdogs may withdraw from the unbalanced relationship and start building anew the parallel institutions approach. Non-violence uses soft power to move towards a more balanced relationship.

New Developments in Conict Resolution


The new patterns of major armed conict that became prominent in the 1990s suggested a more nuanced model of conict emergence and transformation. This model sees conict formations arising out of social change, leading to a process of violent or non-violent conict transformation, and resulting in further social change in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individuals or groups come to articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power structures. Figure 1.10 shows a schematic illustration of phases of conict and forms of intervention that may be feasible at different stages. A schematic lifecycle of conict sees a progression from peaceful social change,

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PREVENTION conflict formation

social PEACEBUILDING change

violent PEACEKEEPING conflict

conflict transformation PEACEMAKING


Figure 1.10 Conict dynamics and conict resolution

to conict formation, to violent conict, and then to conict transformation and back to peaceful social change. But this is not the only path. The sequence can go from conict formation to conict transformation and back to social change, avoiding violence. Or it can go from conict formation to violent conict back to the creation of fresh conicts. In response, there has been a differentiation and broadening in the scope of third-party intervention. Whereas classical conict resolution was concerned mainly with entry into the conict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways, the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the timing and nature of intervention. In the 1990s came Fisher and Keashlys (1991) complementarity and contingency model of third-party intervention, mentioned earlier, with its attempt to relate appropriate and coordinated resolution strategies (conciliation, mediation, peacekeeping) to conict phases (segregation, polarization, violence). Lederachs (1997) model of conict resolution and conict transformation levels has also been inuential, with its emphasis on bottom-up processes and the suggestion that the middle level can serve to link the other two (see gure 1.11). Francis (1994) has developed Curles original asymmetric conict model, embedding classic conict resolution strategies within wider strategies for transforming conicts of this kind (see gure 1.12). Encarnacion et al. (1990) have elaborated models of third-party intervention in order to stress the way external parties may come to be core parties as their level of involvement increases, and to emphasize the importance of embedded parties from inside the conict who often play key roles in expediting moves to resolution (see gure 1.13). William Ury (2000) has developed an inuential model, which relates what he terms third side roles in conict resolution to escalation/de-escalation conict stages (see gure 1.14). This is discussed further in chapter 14 (pp. 31819).

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Elite

High-level negotiations

Top leaders

Problem-solving workshops

Middle-level leaders

Local peace commissions

Grassroots leaders

Society
Source: from Lederach, 1997

Figure 1.11 Actors and approaches to peacebuilding

Unbalanced power oppression, injustice, latent conflict

awareness, conscientization

mobilization, empowerment

changed attitudes

negotiation, mediation

confrontation, overt conflict

changed relationship, new power balance

agreed relationship

Balanced power
Source: from Francis, 1994

Figure 1.12 Transforming asymmetric conicts (II)

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Core parties

Actively influential parties

Marginal parties

Uninvolved parties

Embedded parties

Source: from Encarnacion et al., 1990: 45

Figure 1.13 The gradient of conict involvement Destructive violence

Power Struggle

Contain

Overt Conflict

Resolve

Latent Tensions

Prevent

Third side roles to prevent escalation to destructive violence: Containing roles: Witness, Referee, Peacekeeper Resolving roles: Mediator. Arbiter, Equalizer, Healer Preventing roles: Provider, Teacher, Bridge-builder
Source: The Third Side: Harvard University Global Negotiation Project: www. thirdside.org

Figure 1.14 William Urys third side roles

In general there has been a shift from seeing third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies towards appreciating the role of internal third parties or indigenous peacemakers. Instead of outsiders offering the fora for addressing conicts in one-shot mediation efforts, the emphasis is on the need to build constituencies and capacity within societies and to learn from domestic cultures how to manage conicts in a sustained way over time. This suggests a multitrack model in place of the earlier Track I and Track II models mentioned above, in which emphasis is placed on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors what we might call Track III (see

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Track I Top leaders

UN, international and regional organizations, governments, international financial institutions

Embedded parties

Middlelevel leaders Track III Grassroots

Track II

International NGOs, churches, academics, private business

Track I: Negotiation, peacekeeping, arbitration, peace support, mediation with muscle. Exchange and threat power dominate Track II: Good offices, conciliation, pure mediation, problem-solving. Integrative and exchange power dominate Track III: Peace constituencies within the conflict, building social cohesion, common ground. Integrative and exchange power dominate
Figure 1.15 Multitrack conict resolution

gure 1.15). There is a shift towards seeing conict in its context (associated sometimes with structuralist, constructivist or discourse-based views of social reality). In even broader terms, it is useful to see both triggers for conict and transformers of conict operating at the same time across several interrelated spheres. It is this interpenetration of ecological, global, societal and personal space that in our view increasingly characterizes the conict eld (Galtung 1996) (see gure 1.16). For all these reasons it is helpful to locate contemporary armed conicts within a framework that encompasses different levels, from international (global, regional, bilateral), through state, down to societal level (identity groups, individuals). This will be exemplied in chapter 4. Most major armed conicts today are hybrid struggles that spill across the international, state and societal levels. These are trans-border conicts, which is what makes them so hard to resolve or transform. The 64year conict in Kashmir, for example, is most

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Global level Regional level State/society level Transformers e.g. Track I, II, III initiatives Contradiction Triggers/causes e.g. Arms sales, globalization, regional spillover

Attitudes

Behaviour

Figure 1.16 Spheres of cosmopolitan conict resolution

simply seen as an interstate conict between India and Pakistan going back to the time of partition after 1947. But it is deeply affected by changes at both the global level (the ending of the Cold War, the jihadist reaction against western hegemony, the war on terror) and the regional level (the Afghan wars), as well as by economic, political and ideological struggles at sub-state provincial and local levels including the cross-cutting inuence of the wider diasporas. It is at the state level that these two dimensions (external, internal) in the end mainly impact, because of the ambivalent nature of the state, at the same time the main actor on the international scene and also (in theory) the main satiser of internal social needs. Conict transformation has to operate simultaneously at all these levels from the global to the local which goes far towards dening the task of what in Part II we call cosmopolitan conict resolution.

Terminology
Although terminology is often confusing, with the same terms used in different ways both within the academic literature and in general usage, we offer the following denitions of how key terms are used in this book. By conict we mean the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. This suggests a broader span of time and a wider class of struggle than armed conict. We intend our usage here to apply to any political conict, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. (Some theorists, notably John Burton, have distinguished between disputes about negotiable interests

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that can be settled by compromise and more deep-seated conicts that involve human needs and can be resolved only by removing underlying causes.) Armed conict is a narrower category denoting a conict where parties on both sides resort to the use of force. It is notoriously difcult to dene, since it can encompass a continuum of situations ranging from a military overight or an attack on a civilian by a single soldier to an all-out war with massive casualties. The research community has identied a number of thresholds and rules for deciding what to count. We consider these denitions in chapter 3. Violent conict, or deadly conict, is similar to armed conict, but also includes one-sided violence such as genocides against unarmed civilians. We mean direct, physical violence. We acknowledge the strong argument in peace research for broadening the concept of violence to encompass exploitative social relations that cause unnecessary suffering, but prefer to use the now well-known term structural violence for this. Contemporary conict refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conicts at the beginning of the twenty-rst century; contemporary armed conict refers only to those that involve the use of force. Conict settlement means the reaching of an agreement between the parties to settle a political conict, so forestalling or ending an armed conict. This suggests nality, but in practice conicts that have reached settlements are often reopened later. Conict attitudes and underlying structural contradictions may not have been addressed. Conict containment involves peacekeeping and war limitation (geographical constraint, mitigation and alleviation of intensity, and termination at the earliest opportunity). Conict management, like the associated term conict regulation, has been used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of positive conict handling. Here we understand it to refer in a more limited way to the settlement and containment of violent conict. Conict resolution is a more comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conict are addressed and transformed. This implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conict has been changed. It is difcult to avoid ambiguity, since the term is used to refer both to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes and to the completion of the process. A further ambiguity is that conict resolution refers to a particular dened specialist eld (as in conict resolution journals), as well as to an activity carried on by people who may or may not use the term or even be aware of it (as in conict resolution in Central America). Nevertheless, these two senses of the term are tending to merge. Conict transformation is a term which for some analysts is a signicant step beyond conict resolution, but which in our view represents its deepest level. As claried in gure 1.3, it implies a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conict parties

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themselves and their relationships. It corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural peacebuilding. Where this becomes manifest across global cultures, linking the personal, societal, global and ecological spheres (gure 1.16), we call this cosmopolitan conict resolution. Negotiation is the process whereby parties seek to settle or resolve their conicts. Mediation involves the intervention of a third party; it is a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), although it is sometimes combined with positive and negative inducements (mediation with muscle). Conciliation or facilitation is close in meaning to pure mediation, and refers to intermediary efforts to encourage the parties to move towards negotiations, as does the more minimalist role of providing good ofces. Problem-solving is a more ambitious undertaking in which parties are invited to reconceptualize the conict with a view to nding creative, win win outcomes. Reconciliation is a longer-term process of overcoming hostility and mistrust between divided peoples. We use peacemaking in the sense of moving towards settlement of armed conict, where parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily for example, as envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the Pacic settlement of disputes (Article 33). Peacekeeping (traditionally with the consent of the conict parties) refers to the interposition of international armed forces to separate the armed forces of belligerents, often now associated with civil tasks such as monitoring and policing and supporting humanitarian intervention. Peace-enforcement is the imposition of a settlement by a powerful third party. Peacebuilding underpins the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conictants. With reference to the conict triangle (see gure 1.1), it can be suggested that peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peacekeeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peacebuilding tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conict (Galtung, 1996: 112). Finally, following the original lead of Morton Deutsch, as noted above, it is important to recognize that the aim of conict resolution is not the elimination of conict, which would be both impossible (conict is inherent in social change) and, as is made clear in Curles model of the transformation of asymmetric conicts (see gure 1.9), is often undesirable (there may need to be more, not less, conict in struggles against injustice). Rather, the aim of conict resolution is to transform actually or potentially violent conict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change. This is an unending task as new forms and sources of conict arise.

Structure of the Book


The structure of Part I of the book is based on the idea that, having described the evolution of the conict resolution eld (chapter 2), examined the statistical

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bases for analysis (chapter 3) and characterized the nature of contemporary conict (chapter 4), broad distinctions can then be made between the tasks of preventing violent conict (chapter 5), mitigating or alleviating violent conict once it has broken out while at the same time searching for ways of terminating it (chapter 6), ending violent conict (chapter 7), and ensuring that conict does not subsequently regress to violence but is lastingly transformed into peaceful processes of political and social change, including reconstruction (chapter 8), peacebuilding (chapter 9) and reconciliation (chapter 10). We are not suggesting that conicts necessarily go through these phases, but we think that this is the simplest expository structure to adopt. Part I essentially continues to update and expand the rst edition of this book. As such, it aims to serve as a comprehensive introduction to the conict resolution eld, showing how it applies across the spectrum in major contemporary conicts. Part II is also reorganized and updated, and in addition contains ve new chapters. Its aim is to relate what has been described in Part I to the broader issues and challenges that dene the transformative task of conict resolution at the beginning of the new decade. This covers the main debates about the whole nature of conict resolution that are now further dening the eld. Conict resolution remains open to these critiques from the political right (realist), from the political left (critical, post-structural), from gender perspectives (feminist), from various non-western (sometimes non-liberal) traditions and wants to go on learning from them. But in Part II the authors also explicitly defend the conict resolution tradition, including both its settlement and transformation dimensions, from criticism that seems too sweeping and dismissive. Conict resolution does not ignore hard power, but argues that hard power on its own is usually in the end ineffective, even counter-productive. And conict resolution does not uncritically reinforce existing hegemonic exclusions and dominations or turn a blind eye to alterity and difference, but continues to grapple with the perpetual challenge of determining if and how emancipatory struggles can be conducted non-violently. Chapter 11 sets the conceptual framework for Part II, notably the key cosmopolitan task of linking global to local manifestations of contemporary conict, and ends with an exposition of a conict resolution approach to terror and global order. Chapter 12 is a new chapter on environmental conict resolution. Chapter 13 (Gender and Conict Resolution), chapter 14 (Conict Resolution and the Ethics of Intervention) and chapter 15 (Culture, Religion and Conict Resolution) are updated and rewritten. Three more new chapters on conict resolution in art and popular culture (chapter 16), conict resolution, the media and the communications revolution (chapter 17), and managing linguistic intractability (chapter 18) follow, with an emphasis on the importance of global inclusion and the engagement of young people in the cosmopolitan conict resolution enterprise. Chapter 19 sums up the current theoretical debate in a series of conversations with realist, critical theoretic, post-structural and non-western critics. The book ends by

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Contemporary Conict Resolution

considering upcoming conict formations and responses and the main tasks facing the emerging fth generation in the conict resolution eld as a result (chapter 20).
Recommended reading Bercovitch et al. (2009); Burton and Dukes (1990a); Cheldelin et al. (2003); Deutsch and Coleman (2000); Fisher (1997); Jacoby (2008); Kriesberg (1998a); Mitchell and Banks (1996); Sandole (1999); Wallensteen (2007); Webel and Galtung (2007).

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