Untitled

79 (2015): 173 212
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF GRACE AND

CONDIGN MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT
CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN
A
CLEAR UNDERSTANDING of merit, as defined by the
Council of Trent in canon 32 of the
, will determine the nature and extent to
which an ecumenical can be made on the issue
of justification. In the debate over justification at the Council of
Trent, the council fathers addressed two questions concerning
merit. First, “Is the unjustified able to merit condignly initial
justification?”1 I will not discuss this question, since there was
no serious theologian at any point during the Tridentine
proceedings who maintained that it was possible to merit
condignly initial justification. A second question, however, did
agitate the minds of the fathers, which may be stated as, “Once
one is transformed by inhering righteousness in the process of
justification, is this justified Christian able to merit condignly?”
Prior to the Second Vatican Council, most theologians seem
to have held that Trent had actually defined the claim that the
justified Christian is able to merit condignly, while in
1
This article prescinds from any discussion of the more complicated question
concerning the role of congruous merit prior to initial justification. This topic has been
treated by Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “The Tridentine Decree on Justification in the
Light of Late Medieval Theology,” 3 (1967): 28
54; “Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent,” in H. A. Oberman,
! " !
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1992), 204 33; Hanns Rückert, “Promereri.
Eine Studie zum tridentinischen Recht fertigungsdekret als Antwort an H. A.
Oberman,” # $ 68 (1971): 162 94.
173
174 CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN
contemporary ecumenical discussions there has been a tendency

to read the Tridentine doctrine on merit purely in terms of a
gratuitous gift.2 In this article I will attempt to determine
whether the fathers of the Council of Trent intended in canon
32 of the to define a doctrine of
merit that is notionally equivalent to condign merit. To this
end, in the first part of this article I will trace the conciliar
debates and various schemata that led to the formulation of
canon 32. In the second part I will offer a reflection on the final
form of the decree in light of the debates.
2
F. X. de Abarzuza, O.F.M.Cap., , 2d ed. (Madrid:
Ediciones Studium, 1956), 3:521; Severino Gonzalez, S.J., “ ,” in Iosepho A. De
Aldama, S.J., Richardo Franco, S.J., Severino Gonzalez, S.J., Francisco A. P. Sola, S.J.,
and Iosepho F. Sagues, S.J., , 4th ed. (Madrid: Biblioteca De
Autores Cristianos, 1967), 4:694 95; Jean Herrmann, %
, 7th ed. (Lyons: E. Vitte, 1937), 326; J. M. Hervé,
, 16th ed. (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Bookshop, 1943), 3:243; H.
Hurter, S.J., , 12th ed. (Innsbruck: Libraria
Academica Wagneriana, 1908), 3:204; Ludovico Lercher, S.J., %
, 3d ed. (Innsbruck: Feliciani Rauch, 1948), 4.1:109; J. Riviere, “Mérite,”
& ' ( ) & &
' , ed. E. Amann, E. Mangenot, and A. Vacant
(Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1928), 10.1: 757; Ludwig Ott, * +
+ (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 320; Christian Pesch, , 4th
ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: B. Herder, 1916), 5:247; Joseph Pohle and Arthur Preuss,
* , - . , , 6th ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book
Co, 1929), 407; Adolphe Tanquerey, , 27th ed. (Paris:
Desclée et Socii, 1953), 3:195 96.
In postconciliar ecumenical work, theologians have tended either to read Trent by
avoiding the use of the terms and as well as the concepts thereof, or
to read the council as having affirmed merit as a reward to a promise. Carl J. Peter,
“The Decree on Justification in the Council of Trent,” in H. George Anderson, T.
Austin Murphy, and Joseph A. Burgess, . / (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1985); Karl Lehmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg,
! 0 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 66
68. Pesch argues that the Catholic Church should “take leave of the and
of ‘merit’” (Otto Hermann Pesch, “The Canons of the Tridentine Decree on
Justification: To Whom Did They Apply? To Whom Do They Apply Today?” in
. / ) 1 , 0 ed. Karl
Lehmann, trans. Michael Root and William G. Rusch [New York, N.Y.: Continuum,
1997], 191).
GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT 175
I. BACKGROUND TO CANON 32
,2 3 +
The occasion for canon 32 of the

was the denial on the part of Protestant theologians of the
doctrine of merit as it had been expressed in the medieval
period. In the late Middle Ages, the question of condign merit
was frequently discussed, perhaps most notably by St. Thomas
Aquinas (1225 74).3 Aquinas treated merit in the 1
within his questions on grace, categorizing it “as an effect
of cooperating grace.”4 He also distinguished between merit and
reward, for “a reward means something bestowed by reason of
merit.”5 Therefore, merit is a function of justice, and justice
depends on the equality between agents. Now man is not God’s
equal, so he cannot by his own nature make a claim on God.6
For Aquinas the possibility of meriting is a result of divine
ordination: in his wisdom God “will bring things to their end in
a way appropriate to their natures.”7 God is not “our debtor
simply but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should
be carried out.”8 In order to accomplish this end, God has made
this relationship possible by giving man the grace necessary to
accomplish what by the power of his nature alone he could not.
There are two types of merit: condign merit and congruous
merit. Condign merit is the right in strict justice to a reward,
3
For Aquinas’s view of merit, see Joseph Wawrykow, * ( * -
, ( ( ,' (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1995); Bernard J. F. Lonergan, * / 4 *
,' ed. J. Patout Burns (London: Darton, Longman
& Todd, 1971).
4
I II, q 114, prooem. References to the are taken from
Thomas Aquinas, (Lander, Wy.: Aquinas Institute for the Study of
Sacred Doctrine, 2012).
5
I II, q 114, a. 1.
6
Ibid.
7
Michael Root, “Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology after the
,” 20 (2004): 12.
8
I II, q 114, a. 1, ad 3.
whereas congruous merit is based on what is fitting in a given

situation. Aquinas noted that, insofar as a man’s meritorious
work proceeds from his free will, he can merit only con
gruously. By grace, however, God makes us participators in the
divine nature and adopted “sons of God.”9 Therefore, insofar as
a meritorious work proceeds from the Holy Spirit working in
man, man can merit condignly. Aquinas saw this doctrine of
merit as grounded in scriptural affirmations such as, “There is
laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge,
will render to me in that day” (2 Tim 4:8).
Concerning the object of merit, Aquinas strictly delineated
that which can and that which cannot be merited. Man cannot
merit initial justification,10 nor can one who has committed
mortal sin merit his own restoration to grace, either condignly
or congruously,11 nor can one merit the gift of final per
severance.12 Once one is an adopted son, he can condignly merit
an increase in grace.13 One may merit congruously, but never
condignly, the first grace for another, and one can also
condignly merit eternal life.14
The main elements of Aquinas’s teaching—such as the
inability to merit condignly initial justification, the necessity of
being in the state of grace, the necessity of grace for meritorious
acts, and the necessity of being in Christ—are shared by all
orthodox theologians. Nevertheless, among late medieval and
early modern theologians there were also a number of
important distinctions and emphases concerning condign merit.
Some theologians such as Thomas Netter (ca. 1375 1430)
thought that the terms and should be
avoided altogether and that one should simply speak of merit )
9
I II, q 114, a. 3.
10
I II, q 114, a. 5.
11
I II, q 114, a. 7.
12
I II, q 114, a. 9.
13
I II, q 114, a. 8.
14
I II, q 114, a. 2.
.15 John Duns Scotus (1266 1308) held that works of the
justified are condignly meritorious by virtue of the divine
promise,16 while Tommaso de Vio, O.P. (1468 1534) and
Domingo de Soto, O.P. (1494 1560) taught that works are
condignly meritorious by virtue of the works themselves.17
What marks almost all views of condign merit is that merit is
not merely a function of mercy but also a function of justice.
Martin Luther found this language of merit deeply troubling,
but he and later Lutheran theologians were perfectly willing to
grant the use of the term as long as it was essentially reduced to
a form of mercy, removing any notion of justice from its
meaning.18 As early as 1518, Luther appears to have denied
15
Thomas Netter, 5 ,
' ! (Venice: Apud Iordanum Zilettum,
1571), 3: fol. 25.
16
Scotus is sometimes understood as affirming that merit is based solely on the
divine acceptation. Andreas Vega, . 67 .
8 ) 4 )9
8 : 9
(Cologne: Apud Geruinum Calenium & Haeredes Quentelios, 1572 [repr. Ridgewood,
N.J., The Gregg Press, 1964]), 789. Richard Cross argues that Scotus acknowledged
both condign and congruous merit. For Scotus, merit is not based on mere acceptation
since this would be a gross form of voluntarism. Scotus’s doctrine of merit includes
other aspects. “For example Scotus argues that God loves acts ‘according to their
goodness’ and that God ‘accepts them with reference to some good which ought to be
justly awarded to it’” (Richard Cross, [New York: Oxford University Press,
1999], 103). On Bonaventure see Constantino Ferraro,
3 (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1956).
17
Tommaso de Vio,
,' (Antwerp: Apud Viduam & Haeredes Joannis Stelsii, 1576)
on q. 114, a. 3. Cajetan’s later . " puts a much
stronger emphasis on the pact made between God and man. Tommaso de Vio, 4
7 ' .
. . ; '
< . . ' ; ' = ='
' ' ) . % ' "
8 ' (Lyon: Apud
haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1562), 290.
18
See, e.g., Chemnitz, !) % ' )
) 8 ' :
formally the doctrine of merit. 19 Later, in 3

5 , he argued that the Scholastics were actually worse than the
Pelagians, since the Pelagians at least “confess and assert con
dign merit, simply, candidly, and ingenuously, calling a spade a
spade and a fig a fig, and teaching what they really believe.”20
By the time of his * (1535), Luther’s
venom against the doctrine of merit was rather more pro
nounced, for he called it the “theology of the antichristian
kingdom”21 and the “tricks of Satan.”22 When Luther stated,
“Trying to merit grace is trying to placate God with sins,”23 he
clearly included works both before and after grace.24
There are several reasons why Luther had a fundamental
problem with either the justified or the unjustified meriting
anything . First, there is a basic anthropological
problem in Luther’s doctrine of concupiscence. “A good work,
well done, is a venial sin according to the mercy of God, but a
mortal sin according to the judgment of God”25 and therefore
' 8 ' > > (Frankfurt am

Main: Feierabend & Hüter, 1566), 933.
19
Reinhard Schinzer, 7 ? "
! + , Theologische Existenz heute [n.F.], n. 168 (München:
Kaiser, 1971), 53 54.
20
Martin Luther, 3 5 , vol. 33 of " @ 5 + , ed. Philip S.
Watson and Helmut Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 268 (hereafter "5).
21
Martin Luther, * (1535) ("5 27:124).
22
Ibid. ("5 27:125).
23
Ibid. ("5 27:126). See also E. Disley, “Degrees of Glory: Protestant Doctrine and
the Concept of Rewards Hereafter,” 42 (1991): 85 95,
105, which shows how the early Protestants opposed the idea of condign merit
especially. On Calvin’s doctrine of merit, see Charles Raith II, “Calvin's Critique of
Merit, and Why Aquinas (Mostly) Agrees,” ! 20 (2011): 135 66; Charles
Raith II, “Aquinas and Calvin on Merit, Part II: Condignity and Participation,”
! 21 (2012): 195 210. Calvin’s views on merit, however, were not important at
the Council in the debates on justification, where he was mentioned only three times:
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1911), 5:269.42; 435.27; 487.32 (hereafter ).

24
Luther, * (1535) ("5 27:127).
25
, " . " 6[ , ,
, " . 3 " 6] (1520) (5 , . [Weimar:
Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1897 (hereafter 5,)] 7:138.25 28, 138.37 139.1);
could never be pleasing to God. Second, Luther argued that

merit, understood as a right to a reward, presupposes that man
can make a claim on God in justice, but God is not a debtor to
any person. Third, Luther introduced into Protestant thought a
radical separation of law and gospel which was subsequently
advanced as doctrine in the Lutheran confessional documents.26
For Luther law and gospel are not just distinct but also
antithetical.27 The gospel does not demand one’s works in
justice or command one to do anything but invites one simply
to receive the offered grace of the forgiveness of sins and
eternal salvation.28
Luther was correct that the major schools of late medieval
thought, whether Dominican or Franciscan, made merit at least
in part a function of justice. In these schools “condign merit” is
partly measured by justice, and thus it gives a real claim to a
reward. As we will see, to most of the council fathers of Trent
Luther’s position on merit was inconsistent with the deposit of
faith.
32 ) 3 +
After much delay, the Council of Trent finally opened on

December 13, 1545, with four cardinals, four archbishops,
twenty one bishops, and five superior generals of mendicant
“Omne opus iusti damnabile est et peccatum mortale, si iudicio Dei iudicetur” (5,
7:138.29 30).
26
! 5 A1B, in 3 + 1 $
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), 790 91.
27
Luther writes, “lex est negatio Christi” (5, 40 2:18.4 5). “Hic iterum videmus
Legem et Evangelium quae inter se longissime distincta et plus quam contradictoria
separata sunt, affectu coniunctissima esse” (% *
[5, 40 1:520.25 26]). On the issue of law and gospel, see G. Söhngen,
“Gesetz und Evangelium,” 14 (1960): 81 105; F. Böckle, * C
* * ! + D+ (Lucerne: Räber
Verlag, 1965); O. Pesch, “Law and Gospel: Luther’s Teaching in the Light of the
Disintegration of Normative Morality,” 34 (1970): 84 113.
28
5, 36:30 31.
orders present.29 The council was to be presided over by three

papal legates, Cardinals Giovanni Maria Ciocchi del Monte,
Marcello Cervini, and Reginald Pole, two of whom were later
elected pope. Early on it was decided that the council would
deal simultaneously with questions of dogma and reform, such
that at each session there would be a dogmatic decree affirming
the faith of the Church and a reform decree.30 The council also
intentionally avoided attempting to resolve those matters that
had been debated by the various Catholic schools of thought
which were not contrary to the Catholic faith. It also decided
not to condemn heretics by name, choosing instead to condemn
those errors that were thought to trespass on the teaching of
Christ and his Church.31
As was customary in councils, one of the first acts was to
profess solemnly the Nicene Constantinopolitan Creed (in the
third session). The council wished to take up first the questions
of original sin and justification, to which the issue of merit was
tied, but on February 7 the legates decided instead to take up
the issue of Scripture and Tradition.32 The council debated these
issues, eventually approving its decree in the fourth session, on
April 8, 1546.33 It then took up the question of original sin on
May 24, 1546 and approved the decree in the fifth session, on
June 17, 1546.34
29
John W. O’Malley, 5 - (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 75.
30
Hubert Jedin, , - , vol. 2, trans. Dom Ernest Graf,
O.S.B. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1957 61), 52 53. Ludwig von Pastor,
- , 3d ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder
Book Co., 1950), 12:253.
31
Hubert Jedin, “Council of Trent and Reunion: Historical Notes,” -
3 (1962): 8 9.
32
Jedin, - , 2:53.
33
Ibid., 2:90.
34
Ibid., 2:132, 160.
2 3
The discussion on the doctrine of justification opened on

June 21.35 On June 22, 1546, the legates proposed six questions
on justification to the minor theologians (theologians who were
not bishops).36 Unfortunately, we do not know by whom or
how the questions were formed.37 The questions were as
follows:
1. What is meant by justification both as regards the name and the thing?
2. What are the causes of justification? What is God’s part in the process and
what is man’s?
3. How are the faithful to understand the assertion that man is saved by faith?
4. Do works play a role in the process of justification—both before and
after—and in what way? What is the role of the sacraments in that process?
5. What is the process of justification—what precedes, accompanies, and
follows it?
6. By what proofs from scripture, the Fathers, councils, and the apostolic
traditions is the Catholic doctrine supported?38
It is immediately evident that five of the six questions come

down to the issue of agency: who is the agent, or who are the
agents, in the act of justification? Is it man alone, or is it God
alone, or is it a dual agency? This is significant, for any doctrine
of merit in the proper sense is dependent on a type of dual
agency.
From June 22 until June 28, the discussion of these questions
occurred in six congregations of theologians.39 While most of
the speeches of the minor theologians have been lost, Marcus
Laureus, O.P., wrote a brief summary of their discussions,
concluding that the theologians were in agreement that “works
done after justification conserve and increase justification and
35
5:257.
36
5:261.26 35. On the role of minor theologians at Trent, see Nelson H.
Minnich, “The Voice of Theologians in General Councils from Pisa to Trent,”
59 (1998): 420 41.
37
Jedin, - , 2:176.
38
Ibid.
39
5:262 81. Jedin, - , 2:177 80.
are meritorious of eternal life when they are informed by the

grace and merits of Christ.” He also noted that “most of the
theologians affirmed that . . . works done after justification are
meritorious of eternal life.”40
We also have preserved the lengthy speech of the papal
theologian Alphonsus Salmeron, S.J. (1515 85), delivered on
June 23. This speech was primarily concerned with the issue of
first justification, but toward the end Salmeron affirmed that
good works performed after justification are meritorious.41 He
also identified ten errors that he wanted condemned by the
council, the last four of which directly concern the ability of the
justified to merit: (1) the justified are incapable of fulfilling the
law, and they sin in all their works; (2) the justified cannot
increase in justification; (3) the justified are not able to merit
eternal life; and (4) the justified are not able to perform works
of satisfaction.42
On June 30, 1546, the legates presented to the general
congregation a brief document entitled
which was read to the fathers by Cardinal Del
Monte.43 This document had emerged from the discussions of
the minor theologians and contained two important elements
crucial to subsequent discussions. First and most importantly,
the document distinguished three states ( ) in the
process of justification. The first state ( ) is that
initial justification whereby a person is made a believer out of
an unbeliever.44 The second state ( ) finds the
justified individual in a state of grace, living a life faithful to
40
“Opera vero post iustificationem conservant et augent iustitiam et sunt meritoria
vitae aeternae, cum sint informata gratia et meritis Christi. In haec sententia omnes
convenerunt, quamvis supradiciti quatuor visi sunt extenuasse meritum operum. Et
maior pars theologorum dixit, quod opera disponentia ad iustificationem sunt meritoria
iustificationis de congruo, opera vero post iustificationem sunt meritoria vitae aeternae
de condigno” ( 5:280.38 44).
41
5:272.14 15.
42
5:272.24 28.
43
Jedin, - , 2:181.
44
5:281 82.
Christ and attempting to obtain the end, heaven, which Christ

desires for him. The third state ( ) is the restoration
to justification after the justified has fallen. This tripartite
division allowed for conceptual clarity in dealing with the place
of works and merit in the Christian life.
Second, the document offered a list of errors, and these
twenty two errors were arranged under the tripartite division. It
is useful for identifying what was thought to be at issue at this
stage in the debate, particularly as it pertains to the second state
of justification ( ). There are two
errors that draw our attention:
7. Good works following justice signify only themselves, and they do not
justify, that is merit an increase of justice.
8. The works of the just do not merit eternal life.45
These errors do not qualify the term in any way and

therefore leave open the possibility that it could be understood
as either congruous or condign merit. Nevertheless, we are able
to come to a conclusion about the meaning of the term in these
errors by looking at another error. Error five condemns the
proposition that “the good works of the just are sins and merit
hell,”46 and this can only refer to a merit based on justice. Hell,
as Catholic theologians of the time agreed, can only be said to
be merited in justice. At this stage it would appear that the term
in errors seven and eight was used univocally for condign
merit. While these errors would “play no role” in subsequent
debate,47 they are useful for telling us what was in the mind of
the council fathers at this point.
From July 15 to July 23, the council fathers discussed the
issues dealing with the second and third stages of justification in
45
“7. Quod opera bona sequentia iustitiam eam tantum significant, nec iustificant, id
est iustitiae augmentum merentur. 8. Quod opera iusti non merentur vitam aeternam”
( 5:282.20 23).
46
“5. Quod omnia opera iustificati sint peccata et infernum mereantur” (
5:282.19).
47
Jedin, - , 2:182.
eight general congregations.48 As they did, the theological battle

over justification and merit became increasingly antagonistic, as
illustrated in the infamous behavior of two bishops. Already in
late June, Dionisio de Zanettini, known by his nickname
Grechetto, the Franciscan bishop of Chironissa, had accused the
entire Augustinian Order of being infected by the teachings of
Luther.49 Then, during a speech to the general congregation of
July 17, 1546, Tommaso Sanfelice, the bishop of La Cava,
reasserted the theory of double justification and explicitly
denied the value of good works.50 This only confirmed some of
Zanettini’s suspicions about the extent of the infection. As the
council fathers were preparing to leave, Zanettini insulted
Sanfelice to another bishop, muttering under his breath that “he
is either a knave or a fool.” This sentiment was encouraged by
the bishop of Bertinoro, who added that he had often told
Sanfelice that he “does not understand these things at all.”
Sanfelice overheard these remarks and reproached his insulter
by asking, “What are you saying?” Zanettini repeated his
words: “Yes, you are either a knave or a fool.” Sanfelice
grabbed Zanettini’s beard, shaking him so violently that he was
left with a handful of hair. Zanettini, unruffled by the violence
done to his person, shouted, “I have said that the Bishop of La
Cava is either a knave or a fool, and I shall prove it!”51 Sanfelice
had struck a bishop, a crime punishable by excommunication,
and he was immediately imprisoned in a local monastery.
Aside from this excitement, very little was said about merit
during the debates on the second and third states of
justification. On July 16, a number of fathers raised the
question of the value of good works and merit. The view of the
archbishop of Armaugh, Robert Wauchope, is important, for he
became one of the drafters of the so called July draft, which was
the first form of the decree. The archbishop affirmed that,
48
5:340 84.
49
10:539.19. Jedin, - , 2:181.
50
5:352 54.
51
This story is recounted in Jedin, - , 2:191. See also
von Pastor, - , 12:341.
without the grace of God, man can do nothing on his own.

After justification, however, “works increase justice and are the
fruits but not the signs of justification.” He continued, “Works
after justification merit and a reward is owed to them
, insofar as they proceed from the grace of God.”
These good works which come from the Holy Spirit also
proceed from our free will by the grace of God.52
The issue came up again on July 20, when Juan Fonseca,
bishop of Castellamare, outlined the different types of works
and their relationship to merit. He divided man’s works into
four categories. First, works that proceed merely from man’s
will and are not meritorious. Second, works that are aided by
prevenient grace and are meritorious . Third, works
that proceed from justifying grace and are meritorious
. Fourth, works that proceed from the Holy Spirit and
are meritorious . Fonseca also specified the two
objects of merit as an increase in grace and eternal life. He
finally noted that just as evil merits evil, so good merits good. If
one’s observance of the commandments is not meritorious, then
any transgressions of the commandments could hardly be
demeritorious.53
In the general congregation on July 23, the debate over merit
continued. Girolamo Seripando (1493 1563), the General of
the Hermits of St. Augustine, the order to which Luther had
belonged, did not directly take up the issue of double justice but
it pervaded his thought. This is most evident when he came to
the question of merit. Seripando asked “Whether the works by
which we are led to eternal life can be called merits?” He
52
“Opera post iusticationem augent iustitiam et sunt fructus, non signa iusticationis.
Item sacramenta etiam augent gratiam post iusticationem, quae opera post iusticationem
merentur et debetur eis merces, etiam de condigno, quatenus sc. procedunt a gratia Dei”
( 5:346.8 13). Angelo Massarelli also summarized the opinion of an unnamed
council father who held that justice received was increased and that “Opera non sunt
signa, sed fructus iustificationis, et tunc meretur et debetur eis merces de condigno”
( 5:379.11 12). I suspect that this is actually a summary of Robert Wauchope’s view,
but it is not certain.
53
5:363.
answered that eternal life is called a reward and a grace;

however, while works E F be called merits, they E F be
called gifts.54 He warned of the pride that is associated with
those who speak of their merits; while heaven can be spoken of
in terms of wage, this should be understood as a grace.55 He
therefore logically concluded that if man is crowned, he is
crowned on account of mercy and not on account of his
merits.56
Seripando was followed by the General of the Carmelites,
Nicolas Audet, who set forth with perspicuity the Catholic
doctrine on the power of grace in the regenerate. Audet’s keen
piece began with a consideration of the transformation that
takes place in the Christian as a son of God. Through good
works the justified is able not only to conserve but also to
increase his justification. Audet clearly rejected any suggestion
that the works of the righteous are in themselves mortal sin
which is not imputed to us on account of the divine mercy.
Rather, the good works are not only from God but also from
man when moved by the grace of God. This is clear from
Christ’s words that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit
(Matt 7:18). Finally, Audet insisted that merit does not detract
from the grace of God or the merits of Christ. It rather exalts
the power of God’s grace since it shows how man’s fallen
nature has been elevated so that man is an adopted son of God
and therefore is able to merit.57
The General of the Servites, Agostino Bonucci, spoke last.
According to the summary of his speech, it was clearly a
response to Audet. He first stated that the justified are
conserved in justice principally by the grace of God, a position
that his opponents would not deny; but he went on to argue
that while good works increase justice, they do not do so
“effectively” but from the goodness of God and by the merits of
54
5:373.38 41.
55
5:373.42 46.
56
5:374.1.
57
5:377.10 19.
Christ. The good works are meritorious of eternal life in so far

as God accepts them and not in so far as they are our own.58
After these debates, four prelates, Cornelio Musso, Giacomo

Giacomelli, Benedetto de’Nobili, and Robert Wauchope, were
chosen by secret ballot in order to draw up the first draft of a
decree, which became known as the July draft.59 The draft was
presented to the general congregation on July 24, 1546 and
contained an introduction, three chapters, and twenty one
canons.60 This draft clearly rejected a number of points that
were essential to the views of the Reformers and to the
adherents of double justice. First, it rejected any understanding
of the justified person as remaining in sin (canon 4).61 It also
anathematized the restriction of justification to remission of sins
alone (canon 5) and the denial of justification as also a gift of
righteousness ( ). Thus the justified has not
only put off the old man, but put on the new, that is, not only
has he died to sin, but he also lives in justice.62 Canon 6 made it
clear that this gift of righteousness that makes us just is not the
righteousness of Christ but is the habit ( . ) of grace.63
This transformative understanding of justification logically
entailed a certain doctrine of merit and excluded another. There
were two canons that dealt with the merit of the justified
Christian: canons 14 and 15. Each of these short canons was
followed by a longer explanation of the canon. Canon 14
58
5:370.47 54.
59
Jedin, - , 2:193. There is debate over the authorship
of this first draft. The draft was originally thought to be the work of Andres de Vega.
See Jedin, - , 2:193; Alister E. McGrath, % ,
- , 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 258.
60
5:384 91.
61
5:386.12 17.
62
5:386.18 24.
63
5:386.25 33.
anathematized those who deny that good works increase grace

then asserted that good works of the justified are
not only the fruits but also the “cause of justification.”64 Canon
15 introduced several themes that would persist throughout
subsequent drafts of the decree. First, the canon anathematized
anyone who says that “merit is pride” when speaking of the
works of the justified.65 In the explanatory portion the draft
noted that Christians are instructed by the Scriptures “to do
good,” “to be rich in good deeds,” and “to lay up treasure for
themselves” (1 Tim 6:18 19). It went on to affirm that those
who, like Moses, seek a reward do not sin. Second, while the
canon did not use the phrase “true merit” ( ), it
was the first to modify with : “The merit of
those works is true.”66 To make it clear that this is a true merit
and not merely a merit ' , the canon specified that
this “crown of justice” is given “by the just judge.”67 The canon
also specified only two objects of this merit: an “increase of
grace” and “the glory of eternal life.” The canon was also clear
that it is only the justified who are able to merit and that this is
on account of being engrafted into Christ.
In the subsequent discussions on the July draft, the
comments of the theologians were on the whole positive. All
but five of the theologians wanted to see the term .
retained, and nothing significant was said on the canon on
merit.68 The council fathers began to discuss the July draft on
August 13 in a general congregation, and on the whole they
seemed content with the doctrine of the decree but did not like
its style or structure.69 In the general congregation of August 17,
many of the fathers admitted to being unprepared to discuss the
July draft. Canon 15, however, did not come under scrutiny;
64
5:389.15.
65
“Si quis dixerit, de bonis operibus iustificati hominis loquens: . )
: anathema sit” ( 5:389.16 17).
66
“Verum enim est meritum operum illorum” ( 5:389.16 21).
67
5:389.16 33.
68
5:392 93.
69
5:402 5.
the reference to merit being true appears to have been

sufficient. 70
!2 .
The legates, however, appear to have decided that the July

draft was inadequate on the very day it was set before the
council, for on that day Cervini called for Seripando and
requested him to draw up a new draft.71 Seripando drew up a
draft known as preliminary draft A (hereafter Draft A) which
was submitted to the legates on August 11. He was asked two
weeks later to rewrite the document, which was done by August
29 and was known as preliminary draft B (hereafter Draft B).72
Although neither was presented to the council, these two drafts
are important, for Seripando effectively introduced into
subsequent decrees long doctrinal chapters preceding the
canons, whereas previous decrees were essentially a list of
canons with theological explanations appended to the canons.
Draft A used the term .73 Draft B is noteworthy for two
key reasons. First, it introduced the notion of double justice: the
eighth chapter was entitled .74 Here Seripando
avoided an explicit discussion of imputed or infused
righteousness, instead preferring biblical terms. Second, the
draft contained a number of points that retreated from some
positions of the July draft. Both chapter 15 and canon 8
employed the term in reference to the justified;75 and
while Seripando preferred to speak principally in terms of
promise and a reward, he also spoke in terms of justice. He
explicitly mentioned “the just judge” who will render to every
man according to his works. Both Draft A and Draft B are
notable in that Seripando appears to have taken the effort to
70
5:408 9.
71
Jedin, - , 2:239.
72
Ibid., 2:240.
73
5:821 28.
74
5:829.
75
5:831 32.
incorporate the majority views on merit that were clearly

inconsistent with his own personal theological views, even
introducing the term .
Cervini found Seripando’s Draft B inadequate and had it re
vised.76 After consultation with a large number of theologians
and bishops, he presented this draft, now known as the
September draft, to the general congregation on September 23,
1546.77 The draft was considerably longer than the July draft,
with eleven chapters and twenty one canons.78 In Seripando’s
opinion, Draft B was so “deformed” that he could no longer
either recognize or approve it.79
For our purposes, there are a couple of key points that must
be noted about the September draft. First, the draft was clear
that one may not merit initial justification and that all works
that precede justification are excluded from initial justification
as “merits properly [ ] called.”80 The use of the term
as a qualifier of merit is helpful, for it makes clear two
things. First, the fathers understood that there is a distinction
between merit properly called and a quasi merit, and they
intended to make this distinction in non Scholastic terms.
Second, the draft clearly attempted to delineate a transformative
understanding of justification whereby it is not only the
forgiveness of sin but also the transformation into God’s friend.
The draft was equally clear that they “are not two justices which
are given to us. . . . There is one justice of God through Jesus
Christ by which we are not merely considered to be just but we
are named and are truly just.”81 This clearly excludes Luther’s
view as well as Seripando’s. Finally the decree explicitly linked
76
Jedin, - , 2:241; Jean Rivière, “La doctrine du mérite
au concile de Trente,” 7 (1927): 274.
77
5:420 27.
78
5:426 27.
79
2:430.3 5.
80
5:423.16 19.
81
“Ita non sunt duae iustitiae, quae nobis dantur, Dei et Christi, sed una iustitia Dei
per Iesum Christum, (hoc est caritas ipsa vel gratia), qua iustificati non modo
reputamur, sed vere iusti nominamur et sumus” ( 5:423.34 36).
its transformationalist understanding with its teaching on works

and merits so that those who are justified are called to eternal
life, which is both a promise and a reward to good works. God’s
grace is a fountain leading man to perform works.
The canons presented a clearer understanding of merit.
Canon 21 reads:
If anyone says that the justified man, who has become a living member of
Jesus Christ, does not merit eternal life by his good works, or that the good
works of the just are the gift of God in such a way that through His grace they
are not good merits: anathema sit.82
One may note several things about this canon. First, the subject
of the canon is the justified. Second, the good works performed
are not the result of grace in such a way that they are not also
merits. Finally, the use of the word “true” as a modifier of merit
is now absent from the text. This is probably due to the in
fluence of Seripando’s preliminary drafts, which spoke of merit
but dropped the “true” of the July draft.
The September draft was immediately taken up by the minor
theologians in three congregations of theologians held
September 27 29.83 Unfortunately, their interventions are only
summarized, and so it is difficult to understand precisely what
they were getting at. There was only a single objection to canon
21 recorded: Jean de Conseil, O.F.M., wanted the term .
deleted, but no explanation is given.84 There is one point
in these discussions, however, concerning merit prior to initial
justification that helps to clarify how the council understood the
term . The theologians repeatedly discussed the issue of
“merit properly [ ] called” with respect to good works
prior to initial justification. A number of the theologians argued
that all merit is excluded prior to justification, not just merit in
82
“Si quis hominem iustificatum et vivum Christi Iesu membrum effectum dixerit
non mereri bonis operibus vitam aeternam; aut bona opera iustorum ita esse dona Dei,
ut per eius gratiam non sint etiam bona merita: anathema sit” ( 5:427.47 49).
83
5:432 33 (27th edition); 5:433 34; 436 440 (28th edition).
84
5:432.31 32. 439.14 15.
the proper sense.85 Thus the qualification of merit by the term

signifies a merit partially grounded in justice.
From October 1 to October 12, fifty eight fathers of the
council discussed the September draft in nine general
congregations.86 The bishops, like the theologians before them,
repeatedly took up the question of with respect to good
works prior to initial justification. On the whole they expressed
disapproval of the phrase and wished to deny all merit prior to
justification. For our purposes, what is interesting is that
although the expression “merit ” was non Scholastic, it
was understood as the conceptual equivalent of the Scholastic
“condign merit.” The General of the Conventuals, Bonaventura
Costacciaro, O.F.M.Conv., for example, was clear that
congruous merit, or “improper merit” ( ' 2 is
distinct from condign merit, which is “proper” or “true”
merit.87
During the nine days on which the draft was discussed, only
one of the council fathers took up the issue of merit in canon
21. Costacciaro explicitly affirmed Aquinas’s discussion of
condign merit, concluding that a just man may both “justly”
seek a reward and “can : expect a reward before the
tribunal of God” for his works.88 He not only used the adverb
“justly” but immediately noted that the context of the reward is
the just tribunal of God. For Costacciaro, man is able to fulfill
the law through grace according to the substance of the works
and according to the intention of the one who commands, that
is, God. Most interesting is that Costacciaro does not appear to
have noticed the subtle change that took place between the July
and September drafts, and he appears still to have been reading
“merit” in the sense of condign merit.89
85
5:439. 43 44; 441.29 34.
86
Jedin, - , 2:244. There were no general
congregations on October 3, 4, and 10 ( 5:442 97).
87
5:480.8 13. See also 5:452.34 36.
88
5:483.27 37.
89
Hubert Jedin, " (St. Louis:
B. Herder Book Co., 1947), 357.
The debates over the September draft reveal that the council
fathers were preoccupied with the issues of double justification
and the certainty of salvation.90 On October 15, therefore, the
legates decided to pose two questions to the minor theologians
on these two issues.91 Seripando had originally composed the
question on double justification, and in his form the question
contained no discussion of merit. The question, to Seripando’s
chagrin, was revised by Cardinal Del Monte. Del Monte
introduced a crucial phrase that would help to bring the issue of
merit in the justified to the fore. The new question asked,
Has the justified, who has performed good works in a state of grace and with
the help of actual grace—both which stem from the merits of Christ—and
who has thus preserved inherent justice, so completely met the claims of
divine justice . :
. ?92
The question now directly related the issue of double justi

fication to the issue of merit.
The theologians discussed these two questions from October
15 to October 26,93 and there were only five supporters of
double justice: Aurelius of Rocca Contracta, Marianus of Feltre,
Stephen Sestino, Lorenzo Mazochi, and Antonio Solis.94 What
90
On double justification, see Stephan Ehses, “Johannes Groppers
Rechtfertigungslehre auf dem Konzil von Trient,” D < G
, + G $ 20 (1906): 17588; Jedin, "
, 348 92; J. F. McCue, “Double Justification at the
Council of Trent: Piety and Theology in Sixteenth Century Roman Catholicism,” in
Carter Lindberg and George W. Forell, eds., !
- * 5 / (Kirksville, Mo.: Sixteenth Century Journal
Publ., Northeast Missouri State Univ, 1984), 39 56; Paul Pas, “La doctrine de la double
justice au Concile de Trente,” ! " 30 (1954): 553;
E. Yarnold, “Duplex iustitia: The Sixteenth Century and the Twentieth,” in Henry
Chadwick and G. R. Evans, eds., , ! - -
+ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 213 22.
91
Jedin, - , 2:249.
92
Ibid.
93
5:523 633.
94
See Jedin on the three Augustinians. Jedin, - , 2:254.
McGrath, % , 262.
united all five was their belief that the reception of inhering
righteousness leaves man radically incomplete so that his works
are equally incomplete without a second justice applied.95 Merit
in the proper sense is simply not possible. Marianus of Feltre,
for example, used the theory of the application of the justice of
Christ to argue that the good works of the just are not
meritorious but are meritorious only “
' .”96
These five theologians were a distinct minority: by the end of
the debate of the theologians on October 26, over twenty eight
theologians had rejected double justification.97 Many of these
supported a doctrine of merit based in some respect on justice.
Ludovidcus Vitriarius, O.F.M., for example, stated quite bluntly
that eternal life is a matter of justice, since God is bound by his
own law to give “according to one’s works.”98 Other theo
logians expressed similar attitudes.
It was the Jesuit theologian Diego Laínez who, on the last
day of the discussion of the theologians, gave “the most com
prehensive refutation of the doctrine of two fold justice.”99
Laínez was one of the early companions of Ignatius of Loyola
and a founding member of the Jesuits. Pope Paul III, impressed
with the new order, had asked Ignatius to send some men to
serve as the personal theologians of the pope at the council;
Ignatius personally chose Laínez, who was already well known
to both the pope and the cardinals for his theological
expertise.100
(Antonio Solis) 5:576.31 35; (Lorenzo Mazochi) 5:581 90; (Stephen

Sestino) 5:607 11; (Aurelius of Rocca Contracta) 5:561 64.
96
5:599.4 10.
97
Pas, “La doctrine de la double justice au Concile de Trente,” 51 52.
98
Jedin, - , 2:256.
99
Ibid., 2:257; Jedin, , 373. Laínez’s speech is contained in 5:612 29,
and in Hartmann Grisar, . " ́ C H
) - * (Innsbruck:
F. Rauch; Neo Eboraci: Fr. Pustet, 1886).
100
Juan de Polanco, who became Secretary of the Society of Jesus and an early
historian of the order, writes, “Since the learning and piety of Fathers James Laynez and
Alphonsus Salmeron were well known to the pontiff and to the principal cardinals of
Laínez began his speech with a simple analogy of a powerful

and wealthy king who wants to share his wealth with his
subjects. The king has a beloved son who deserved ( )
to inherit all the treasures of the kingdom. The king’s son has
three servants to whom he offers the reward of a precious jewel,
but all three are sick and powerless to fight. To the first servant
the son says, “Only believe in me, and I, who merited
[ ] the riches of the king’s riches, will gratuitously
obtain the jewel for you.” The second servant is given a large
sum of money so that he can redeem himself and be partially
healed, buy a horse and weapons, and fight to obtain the jewel.
To the third, the son gives freedom, health, and weapons as a
gift so that he can fight bravely and merit ( ) the jewel.101
The state of the first servant is that of the Protestant with
merely imputed righteousness. The state of the second reflects
the theory of double justice, according to which the servant is
not completely healed. This stresses the inadequacy of the
servant despite the gifts. The state of the last servant is one in
which the servant has been completely healed by the gifts so
that the corresponding merits are adequate for obtaining the
jewel. Immediately, one should notice a rather striking fact:
Laínez’s assault was not based simply on the nature of inhering
righteousness but rather on the relation of inhering righteous
ness to merit. Laínez then engaged in a lengthy refutation of
imputed righteousness, repeatedly returning to the various
Catholic doctrines and practices related to merit.
There are, according to Laínez, twelve arguments against the
doctrine of double justification, and many of these relate
directly to merit. First, it must be recalled that the rejection of
merit is based on the imperfection of inhering justice. Laínez
took up this issue first, arguing that inhering justice is not
absolutely imperfect: the very possibility of merit suggests that it
the Roman Curia, in this current year both were sent as theologians of the Pope”
(Joseph Ficther, " C [St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944], 57). See
C. E. Maxcey, “Double Justice, Diego Laynez, and the Council of Trent,”
- 48 (1979): 269 78.
101
5:612.11 14.
is not.102 He further noted that both Scripture and the doctors

of the Church teach that that one can merit eternal life.103
Laínez also argued that double justification leads to a denial of
the Catholic doctrines of purgatory and satisfaction. In purga
tory, the imperfections of those who die in the state of grace are
atoned. Yet if one admits of a second imputed justice that
supplies for these imperfections, purgatory is rendered super
fluous.104 Moreover, Laínez suggested that double justice
undermines the Catholic doctrine of satisfaction. This is of
some import, for between merit and satisfaction there is not a
formal but only a material distinction based on their respective
effects. Satisfaction is the full payment of a debt, that is, it is
nothing more than compensation for an injury done to
another.105 It is therefore part of justice and not merely a part of
mercy. Lastly, the credal affirmation that Christ will come to
judge the living and the dead, for example, would be emptied of
any significance if Christ does not render to the just a reward
for their works.106 Laínez rather forcefully asserted that imputed
justice “sins against the throne of justice, and makes it into a
throne of mercy.”107
While Laínez’s speech was devastating to the adherents of
double justice and their peculiar doctrine of merit, the council
fathers had already shown themselves to be utterly unsym
pathetic to the theory. The Florentine conventual Clemente
Tomasini observed, “I know no doctor who taught it, nor did I
find it in Scripture,” and Gentian Hervet dismissed the theory
of double justice as “newly excogitated.”108 Subsequently, the
102
5:614.25 26.
103
5:615.15 20.
104
5:615.45 616.8.
105
Satisfaction takes on the character of punishment. See
) ' ) ,
ed. Petrus Rodríguez et al. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana/Ediciones Univ. de
Navarra, 1989), 876.
106
5:616.16 25.
107
5:617.32.
108
Jedin, - , 2:257.
drafts of the decrees were increasingly altered so that merit was

not only affirmed but also specifically based on justice and not
simply on mercy.
/2 I .
What was now clear to the council fathers was that the
notion of double justice could in no way be affirmed, for it
entailed in part a rejection of true merit in the justified.
Although Seripando’s view of double justice was now defeated,
he was again entrusted with revising the draft;109 this was the
draft of October 31.110 After ten days of drafting, it was given to
Del Monte to modify. The “November draft” was presented to
the general congregation on November 5, 1546.111 There were a
number of important structural and doctrinal modifications
introduced into the discussion. This draft now addressed the
question of the “causes” of justification first raised on June 22
and delineated these in Aristotelian terms. Trent is sometimes
faulted for the insertion of Aristotelian causation into an
otherwise biblical presentation; however, the genius of this
insertion is that it helps to make clear two central claims: the
theocentric/Christocentric orientation of justification and the
relationship between God’s work and man’s. Perhaps most
importantly, the draft identified “the formal cause of justi
fication” as “the righteousness of God” (
), a phrase that had been in Seripando’s October
31 draft. The introduction of this schema of causation
eventually led, as we will see, to the exclusion of the theory of
double justification.112
There were, however, also a number of important dif
ferences between Seripando’s October 31 draft and Del Monte’s
November 5 draft in the formulation of chapter 16 and canon
109
Jedin, , 377.
110
5:510 17.
111
5:634 41.
112
5:636.36 37; 512.12 20.
31 on the fruit of justification and merit. Although chapter 14

of Seripando’s draft used the term , it seems to be
understood in terms of reward.113 Del Monte’s text was quite a
bit stronger:
nothing further should be said to be lacking in the justified to prevent them

(provided they have acted with that affection of love which is required in this
mortal life) from being regarded as having fully satisfied the divine law and as
being bedewed by divine grace, having merited [ ] eternal life.114
There are two things to note about this passage. First, the
descriptor “truly” ( ) before merit is absent. Second, Del
Monte’s text asserts that it is possible to satisfy the law “fully.”
Seripando wrote in marginalia that “the whole passage seems to
be the work of a man who does not know whereof he speaks, or
who is fearful of falling into Lutheran errors.”115
Canon 30 of the November draft reads:
If anyone says that man having been justified and made a living member of
Jesus Christ, by good works, which he performs through the grace of God and
the merit of Christ, does not truly merit eternal life, or that those good works
are the gifts of God in such a way that they are not also the good merits of a
man: let him anathema.116
There are a number of points to make about this canon. First,

and most importantly, it significantly intensified the council’s
position on merit. Canon 31 of Seripando’s draft anathematized
those who deny that one can “merit [ ] with good works
113
5:515.12ff.
114
“nihil ipsis iustificatis amplius deesse dicendum est, quominus plene (dummodo
eo caritatis affectu, qui in huius vitae mortalis cursu requiritur, operati fuerint) divinae
legi satisfecisse ac velut undique divina gratia irrorati, aeternam vitam promeruisse
censeantur” ( 5:639.33 36).
115
Jedin, , 378.
116
“Si quis hominem iustificatum et vivum Christi Iesu membrum effectum, dixerit
bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Christi meritum proficiscuntur, non vere
mereri vitam aeternam, aut ipsa bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam bona
hominis merita: anathema sit” ( 5:641.40 43).
an increase in grace.”117 Del Monte’s draft, now canon 30,

significantly intensified Seripando’s text by the addition of
“truly to merit” ( ). Second, the subject who performs
merit is the justified who merits through the grace of God.
Third, man’s merit is not reducible to the merit of Christ. Merit
is at least in part also the merit of the agent performing the
good works. This is, of course, necessary since man may
cooperate with God through grace so that the works he
performs are his works.
The majority of bishops were in support of the proposed
changes. The November decree underwent extensive debate in
fourteen general congregations from November 9 through
December 1.118 Decisively, on November 23, the Jesuit Claude
Le Jay, who suggested that the “one” in the phrase “the formal
cause of justification is the righteousness of God” (
) should be moved so that it now read
“the formal cause” of justification “is the righteousness of
God” ( ).”119 This was a substan
tial step toward formally excluding the theory of double justice.
These discussions surrounding the draft primarily concerned the
issue of double justice, but the issue of merit surfaced
repeatedly, and in each case it was based in part on some
conception of justice. Thus Balthazar Heredia, O.P., Juan Bernal
de Luco, Sebastiano Pighino, Bonaventura Costacciaro, and
Tommaso Stella, O.P., all took up the topic in a similar
respect.120
On November 26 and 27, Seripando delivered a speech that
was intended as one last push of a position that was dying a
117
“dixerit non mereri bonis operibus gratiae augmentum” ( 5:517.18 20).
118
The fourteen General Congregations were held on November 9 ( 5:643), 10
( 5:644), 12 ( 5:646), 13 ( 5:648), 18 ( 5:643), 19 ( 5:650), 20
( 5:652), 22 ( 5:656), 23 ( 5:658), 24 ( 5:659), 26 ( 5:662), 27
( 5:664), 29 ( 5:676), and December 1 ( 5:678).
119
5:658.24 26.
120
Balthazar Heredia, O.P.) 5:646.21 5; (Juan Bernal de Luco) 5:653.22 24;
(Sebastiano Pighino) 5:651.37 41; (Bonaventura Costacciaro) 5:662.42 44;
(Tommaso Stella, O.P.) 5:678.10 17.
slow death. He had already in his short treatise on good works

repeatedly referred to the works of the justified as menstrual
cloths (Isa 64:6).121 In this speech he went on to argue that the
only true justice is the justice of Christ, thereby implying the
radical insufficiency of any other justice. He then argued that
eternal life is a grace which God awards us not in justice but in
mercy.122 Such a position was hardly compatible with a doctrine
of merit. Seripando raised again the question of works and
suggested that the justice of our works cannot be considered
perfect, giving a series of reasons why this is so.123 He
concluded by appealing to the fathers: if the justice of our
works is so flawed, what recourse does anyone have other than
appealing to mercy?124
On the basis of these discussions the legates decided to revise
the November draft. The council fathers met in eight general
congregations from December 7 through December 17.125 It was
during this period that the council finally decided to exclude
once and for all the doctrine of double justification. On De
cember 11, during the discussion of chapter 8, the “one formal
cause” was replaced by “sole formal cause” (
) of justification. The draft now affirmed that “the sole
formal cause” of justification “is the justice of God, not that by
which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just in
His sight.”126 This is important, for not only was double justice
excluded, but the phrase also made it impossible to argue that
one’s transformation is so radically incomplete that one needs a
second application of Christ’s justice. This deprived the
adherents of double justice of one of their main arguments
121
12:632.11 15; 635.36 42.
122
12:632.11 15.
123
5:669.23 24.
124
5:670.14 16.
125
Jedin, - , 2:293.
126
“Demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos
coram iustos facit” ( 5:700.25). On the development and importance of the phrase
“unica formalis causa,” see Christopher J. Malloy, ! , '
(New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 69 78.
against a doctrine of “true merit.” Chapter 16 was discussed on

December 14 and canon 32 (formerly canon 30) on December
15 and 16. The fathers’ suggestions for the revision of chapter
16 were relatively minor,127 and the fathers had no real
objection to canon 32. The few objections mostly suggested that
either the identification of an increase in eternal life or the
attainment of glory were superfluous as objects of merit in the
canon.128 In the case of both chapter 16 and canon 32, no one
objected to the notion of true merit.
The legates then decided to select only those bishops who
were theologians to review the draft again. This was done in
eighteen conferences, held from December 17 to December 31,
but these conferences only touched on our topic lightly.129
Chapter 16 was discussed again in a general congregation on
January 2 and 5,130 but nothing further of relevance developed;
the same is true for canon 32, which was discussed again on
January 6,131 and the final form was presented on January 10.132
II. THE FINAL DECREE
The final decree, the was unani

mously accepted on January 13, 1547 in the sixth session by the
fifty nine bishops present.133 It is a masterpiece of theology.
There are a number of points in the n not
touched upon in the above historical analysis that help to
contextualize and lay the foundation for a proper understanding
of chapter 16 and canon 32. Among other things, the decree
formally repudiates the merely imputed righteousness of
Protestant theology and the theory of double justification in
favor of inhering righteousness. This entails a corresponding
127
5:710 12.
128
5:717.19 20; 717.32 33; 719.45; 720.30 31; 723.38 40.
129
Jedin, - , 2:293.
130
5:753; 758 59.
131
5:760 62.
132
5:778.7 11.
133
Jedin, - , 2:304, 307.
affirmation of merit and the exclusion of all views that make

merit into something other than merit in the justified. This can
be most clearly seen in the language of chapter 16 and canon
32.
In chapter 7, the council explains that initial justification has
two aspects: the forgiveness of sins and the sanctification and
renewal of the interior man.134 In canon 11, the council anathe
matizes those who claim that initial justification consists in “the
remission of sin alone.”135 God not only mercifully forgives sins
but also transforms the sinner internally, constantly sustaining
him so that the justified man is a new creation who is both
gifted and who, by living the life that Christ wills for all men, is
able to obtain the reward of eternal life. Trent is clear that this
transformation in man occurs through the infusion of inhering
righteousness or sanctifying grace, which it holds is the “sole
formal cause of justification.”136
The transformation that takes place in justification has
profound implications for the nature of Christian life after
initial justification. Trent affirms that after initial justification,
one’s justification is not static but is capable of growth: there is
an ongoing transformation that takes place in the justified
Christian. Thus Trent defines that “through observance of the
commandments of God and of the Church, they increase in that
very justice received through the grace of Christ, by faith
cooperating in good works, and they are even more justified.”137
It cannot be stressed enough that this is a growth in justification
itself.138 This growth, of course, is impossible according to many
134
Peter Hünermann, Helmut Hoping, Robert L. Fastiggi, Anne Englund Nash, and
Heinrich Denzinger, eds.,
/ , 43rd edition (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012)
(hereafter -), 1528.
135
- 1561.
136
- 1529. Christopher J. Malloy, “The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in
the Joint Declaration,” 62 (2001): 93 120.
137
- 1535.
138
Post Tridentine Lutheran confessional documents make it clear that one may not
increase one’s justification through works. The Lutheran view is stated in the
, It is clear from God’s Word that faith is the only real means through
Protestant theologians, given their understanding of justification

as the mere imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which is
the same in all Christians.139
There are two fundamental elements that make it possible
for the justified Christian to fulfill the law. First, the council
defines that Christ is a “lawgiver” and anathematizes those who
teach that the gospel is “a mere absolute promise of eternal life,
without the condition of observing the commandments.”140
Furthermore, law and gospel are not antithetical, for the gospel
contains within itself the law of Christ, which reveals the divine
will for man. This law is not impossible for the justified to
observe, since he has been engrafted into Christ. Second, the
justified man is a new creation, and this new objective
condition, accomplished by the infusion of sanctifying grace,
leads not only to the possibility but even to the necessity of
observing the commandments for salvation. Indeed, in canon 18
Trent anathematizes those who teach that “the commandments
which righteousness and salvation not only are received but also are preserved by God.
Therefore, it is proper to reject the decree of the Council of Trent and whatever else is
used to support the opinion that our good works preserve salvation or that our works
either completely or only in part preserve and maintain the righteousness received by
faith or even faith itself” ( , 4:35; in Robert Kolb, Timothy J. Wengert,
and Charles P. Arand, 3 + !
" [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000], 580).
139
, , , 4:195 96, in 3 +
1 $ , 198.
140
- 1570 and 1571. The issue of law and gospel has been largely ignored in
ecumenical discussions. See Dietz Lange, J. 7 0 * ?C
" ,. , C $ C
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 38.
Saint John Paul II was quite emphatic about Christ’s role: “From the very lips of Jesus,
the new Moses, man is once again given the commandments of the Decalogue. Jesus
himself definitively confirms them and proposes them to us as the way and condition of
salvation. The commandments are linked to a promise” (7 12). In John
Paul II’s general audience of October 14, 1987, he stated that Christ “conducted himself
as a lawgiver” but not merely with “the authority of a divine envoy or legate as in the
case of Moses” (John Paul II, , [Boston:
Pauline Books & Media, 1996], 231 32).
of God are impossible to observe even for the man who is

justified.”141
With this in mind, the first thing to notice about chapter 16
is that it is only concerned with the justified. To the justified,
life eternal is proposed, both as “a grace mercifully promised to
the sons of God” and “as a recompense” which, according to
the promise of God, is to be given for their good works and
merits. Christ Jesus continually infuses his virtue into the jus
tified, a virtue that always precedes, accompanies, and follows
their good works. These works make men “pleasing and
meritorious before God,” and the justified are considered to
have satisfied the divine law by these works. Because these
works are done in God, they have “truly merited” (
) eternal life. 142
Trent rejects any view that simply reduces our justice to the
justice of Christ; however, the council is clear that “our justice”
is not “considered as coming from us.” Chapter 16 asserts that
even the justice one receives in justification not only is “called
ours” but is indeed “our own personal justice” since it inheres in
us.143 This affirmation does not necessarily lead to pride, since
we are to glory “in the Lord.” Nevertheless God bestows on the
justified his gifts in such a way that these gifts become their own
merits.
This background helps to contextualize canon 32. In order
to evaluate canon 32 theologically, it will be helpful to break it
down into its constituent pieces, which will give us a better
sense of what the council intended.144 The approved canon
reads:
141
“Dei praecepta homini iustificato ad observandum esse impossibilia” ( - 1536).
See also - 1568.
142
- 1546.
143
“propria nostra iustitia” and “iustitia nostra dicitur” ( - 1547).
144
The canons carry significant doctrinal weight. On the relative doctrinal value of
canons and chapters, there is a great deal of debate over which is more significant.
George Tavard argues that the chapters are more authoritative doctrinally (George
Tavard, , ! [New York: Paulist Press, 1983], 128 n. 14).
Most theologians are arrayed against him, holding that the canons are more significant
If anyone says that the good works of the justified man are gifts of God in
such a way that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself;
or that by the good works he performs through the grace of God and the
merits of Jesus Christ (of whom he is a living member), the justified man does
not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and (provided he dies in the
state of grace) the attainment of this eternal life, as well as an increase of
glory, let him be anathema.145
The subject of the canon is the “justified man” who, by his

justification, has become a member of Christ. It is precisely the
infusion of sanctifying grace and the engrafting into Christ that
makes one able to merit, for as chapter 16 makes clear, Christ’s
influence always “precedes, accompanies, and follows” the good
actions of a justified man.146
In addition, the council fathers anathematize those who say
that merits are understood merely as the gift of God. The
doctrinally. Edward Schillebeeckx argues, for example, that “these were,

however, not discussed in detail by the Council itself and, unlike the canons, they have
no precise dogmatic value. They form, as it were, an explanatory , although
of a more official kind” (E. Schillebeeckx, ! , trans. N. D. Smith (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1968), 40 n. 35). See also E. Iserloh, “Luther and the Council of
Trent,” in K. Lehman, ed., . / ) 1
, 0 (New York: Continuum, 1997), 170; Jedin, -
, 2:309; Jedin, “Council of Trent and Reunion,” 10 12; and Francis A.
Sullivan, / 5 %
(New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 49. There are two reasons that neither side is quite
correct. First, it is not universally true that the canons received more attention than the
chapters, as is evident from the formulation of certain sections of chapter 16 of the sixth
session, for example. Second, the council itself does not seem to privilege the canons
over the chapters. Trent is quite clear that adherence to both the canons and the
chapters is necessary in order to be justified. Thus Trent states, “No one can be justified
unless he faithfully and firmly accepts the Catholic doctrine of justification, to which the
holy council has decided to add the following canons, so that all may know, not only
what they should hold and follow, but also what they should shun and avoid”
( - 1550).
145
“Si quis dixerit hominis iustifati bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam
bona ipsius iustificati merita, aut ipsum iustificatum bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei
gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum (cuius vivum membrum est) fiunt, non vere mereri
augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae aeternae (si tamen in gratia
decesserit) consecutionem, atque etiam gloriae augmentum: anathema sit” ( - 1582).
146
- 1546.
fathers deliberately phrased this canon in Augustinian terms.147

Both Luther and Seripando had suggested that merits are not
properly the merits of the one justified but rather are imputed
to him from Christ. Canon 32 is quite clear that each merit is
truly and properly “the good merits of him [ ] who is
justified” and thus in part the result of the activity of the agent.
This was necessary, since chapter 16 asserts that even the justice
one receives in justification is not only “called ours” but is even
“our own personal justice” since it inheres in us.
One should also note the use of the phrase “truly merit,”
As shown above, the fathers of Trent almost
without exception were convinced that the merit inherent in
good works is a true based upon divine justice. They
purposely employed the term to exclude the ' merit
which, in the technical terminology of the Schools, is called
. They simply refrained from using the term
, because is “a plain and
adequate term,” and they thereby avoided certain theological
controversies regarding the nature of and
147
See , s.v. “Mérite.” Augustine on this point is frequently abused on account
of a number of statements which are usually taken out of context, particularly from his
" 194. Augustine writes: “When God crowns our merits, He crowns His own gifts”
(“cum Deus coronat merita nostra, nihil aliud coronet quam munera sua?” [" 194,
5.19 ( !" 57.190). Some argue that Augustine is quite clear that merit is reducible to
grace, citing the following passage: “For, if eternal life is given in return for good works
. . . how is eternal life a grace since grace is not repayment for works. . . . It seems to
me, then, that this question can only be resolved if we understand that our good works
themselves for which eternal life is our recompense also pertain to the grace of God”
(St. Augustine, , %7 + - ,
trans. Roland J. Teske, S.J., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A., The Works of Saint Augustine:
A Translation for the 21st Century, I/26 [Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1999], 83
[hereafter 5 ,]). Augustine also writes, “If they understood our merits so that they
recognized that they were also gifts of God, this view would not have to be rejected”
(4 * / [ . . ], 6.15 [5 , I/26:81). Here
Augustine is really describing the dual agency that takes place in merit. By affirming that
“our merits” are “also” the gifts of God, he does not say that they are exclusively the
“gifts of God.”
its requisites.148 This phrase is even more significant when one

recalls that it was used prior to the Reformation against the
Scotists, whose “ was not .”149
Some contemporary scholars, such as Otto Hermann Pesch,
have argued that the Tridentine doctrine of merit can be done
away with and replaced by the original biblical concept of
reward. Merit for Pesch is simply a concept that was introduced
into theology in the postbiblical period.150 The Tridentine
concept of merit, however, cannot simply be collapsed into the
concept of reward without making the council say something
that it certainly did not intend to say. The concepts are not
identical but correlative, for, as Bellarmine explained, a reward
is that which is rendered to merit.151 Reward and merit cannot
148
Pohle and Preuss, * , - . , , 407. The
various pre Tridentine theories of condign merit were often quite elaborate and had
elements that were distinctive to particular schools of thought. Some emphasized the
divine pact and others the good works themselves. Trent sought to avoid resolving
questions that were freely debated by the schools. On the various schools prior to Trent
see Bellarmine, 15.2.5.16 22 ( . 3
, 4
vols. [Paris: Triadelphorum, 1613], 4:1009 22).
149
C. Feckes, * . 3 .
(Münster i.W.: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchh,
1925), 84 n. 251, cited in Jedin, , 364.
150
Otto Hermann Pesch, “The Canons of the Tridentine Decree on Justification: To
Whom Did They Apply? To Whom Do They Apply Today?" in Lehman, ed.,
. / , 190f.; Otto Hermann Pesch, “Die Lehre vom 'Verdienst' als
Problem für Theologie und Verkündigung,” in 5 7 +G
C KL * . (München: Schöningh, 1967), 2:1865 1907.
151
Bellarmine, , 15.2.5.2 (Paris ed., 4:970). The
(1999) must be praised for its preservation of the
distinction between merit and reward when it states: “When Catholics affirm the
‘meritorious’ character of good works, they wish to say that, according to the biblical
witness, a reward in heaven is promised to these works.” The consensus on the
preservation of this distinction is a true ecumenical advancement toward more perfect
communion. Dulles notes, however, in his discussion of the that it
“softens the opposition by teaching that when Catholics speak of merit they mean that
‘a reward in heaven is promised.’ This is true enough, but it is incomplete because it fails
to say that the reward is a just one. Without reference to justice, the true notion of merit
would be absent” (Cardinal Avery Dulles, “Justification: the Joint Declaration F
be read as synonyms in the conciliar text. The council used the

term in four crucial places: twice as a noun and twice as a
verb. If we were to conflate the two concepts, then chapter 16
would absurdly read: the justified “can also be regarded as
having truly rewarded eternal life.” And canon 32 would read
“The justified truly rewards an increase of grace, eternal life,”
etc. One can immediately see the absurd and Pelagian reading of
Trent into which one would be forced, whereby man now is the
agent rewarding some unknown subject.
In order to clarify what Trent was attempting to do, it is
useful to compare it to the Council of Nicaea. The use of the
term is analogous to the Council of Nicaea’s use of the
nonbiblical term . ( ) for Christ’s
equality to the Father in order to explain precisely the correct
meaning of revelation.152 Similarly, what was at dispute in the
controversy over merit was in part the meaning of the term
as used in the Scriptures. All parties in the dispute,
whether Protestants, adherents of double justice, or opponents
of double justice, used the term but without any
agreement as to the meaning of the substance of the doctrine.
So Trent used the extrabiblical term , not simply because it
had come to be used in the schools, but in order to define more
precisely what was meant by the biblical concept of reward.
Moreover, the Council of Nicaea felt compelled to add the
term in the phrase “true God from true God.” This was
deemed necessary in order to ensure that the Arian inter
pretation of the phrase “God from God” would be rejected. By
adding “true” to God, the council ensured that the term “God”
was being used not only univocally but in the proper sense. As
9 (2002): 115). As the acknowledges,

it does not “cover all that each church teaches about justification,” and my analysis of
the Tridentine decree shows that there is more ecumenical work to be done on the
doctrine of merit.
152
Alois Grillmeier, trans. John Bowden (London:
Mowbrays, 1975), 1:269; Khaled Anatolios, I
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Academic, 2011), 127,
283.
in the Arian controversy where all parties could happily call

Jesus “God” as long as the sense of the term “God” was left
ambiguous, so both Protestants and the adherents of double
justice could use the term as long as it was not a merit
grounded at least in part in justice.153 Like Nicaea, Trent added
the term as a modifier of merit in an attempt to ensure that
the term would be understood in the proper sense. This
usage of the term is clear from the debates above and is
confirmed by the council’s other and frequent usages of .
For example, the council in its decree denies that concupiscence
is truly and properly ( ) sin.154 Man is described as
“truly [ ] justified” in contradiction to being justified in a
merely imputed sense.155 The seven sacraments are “truly and
properly [ ]” sacraments, to distinguish Catholic
doctrine from that of many Protestants, who were willing to
employ the term “sacraments” in a broad sense.156 “True” water
must be used in baptism against those who thought that John 3
was to be understood metaphorically.157 In the Eucharist are
contained “truly [ ], really and substantially” the body and
blood together with the soul and divinity of Jesus.158 In every
case, the term “true” is used to delineate the use of a term
according to its proper (nonmetaphorical) and strict (nonbroad,
153
See note 18.
154
“If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of our Lord
Jesus Christ given in baptism, or asserts that all that is sin in the true and proper sense is
not taken away but only brushed over or not imputed, let him be anathema”
( - 1515).
155
- 1534.
156
“If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law were not all instituted by
Jesus Christ our Lord; or that there are more or fewer than seven, that is: baptism,
confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders, and matrimony; or that
any of these seven is not truly and properly a sacrament, let him be anathema”
( - 1601).
157
“Si quis dixerit, aquam veram et naturalem non esse de necessitate baptismi, atque
ideo verba illa Domini nostri lesu Christi . . .: anathema sit” ( - 1615).
158
“If anyone denies that in the sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist the body and
blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore the
whole Christ, is truly, really, and substantially contained, but says that he is in it only as
in a sign or figure or by his power: let him be anathema” ( - 1651).
fully determinate) sense—that is, as formally comprehending

the intelligible content defining the primary instance of the
term which, in the case of “merit,” implies an intrinsic worthi
ness based on a good work, as opposed to mere fittingness
based on suitable agreement.
Certain contemporary scholars have suggested that Trent’s
doctrine of merit is an “eschatological statement about grace”
rather than a “practical ethical thought.”159 This is clearly a false
dichotomy. It is true that the reward for merit is beatitude, but
this eschatological reality is the end of merit rather than merit
as such. This is clear from the fact that merit is not merely an
“eschatological statement about grace” since one merits in this
life and one of the objects of merit is an increase of grace in this
life. Second, merit occurs through the conformity of the
justified’s life to the law of Christ, in whom the justified have
been engrafted. Merit therefore has a decidedly practical ethical
dimension, since according to the council, heaven is rewarded
in part on account of one’s obedience to the commandments. It
may also be noted that heaven is lost on account of one’s
disobedience. Trent is incredulous in the face of Protestant
theology’s insistence that man is ever unable to do that which is
desired of him. Instead Trent affirms the possibility of observing
the commandments and notes that the basic stance of the
Christian is that “those who are sons of God love Christ, and
those who love him keep his words.”160
Of course, this ethical component is grounded in the
Tridentine affirmation of the conversion that takes place
through the infusion of inhering righteousness and engrafting
into Christ. This engrafting leads, as we have seen, to the
possibility of man fulfilling the law which Christ as the lawgiver
has given. This is why the sixteenth chapter is clear that the
justified “can be regarded as having entirely fulfilled the divine
law by the works they have done in the sight of God.”161 Such a
159
Pesch, “Canons of the Tridentine Decree on Justification,” 190.
160
- 1536.
161
- 1546.
position is impossible to affirm for most Protestant theologians

and adherents of double justice.
One may also note that Trent specified the true and proper
objects of merit: first, one may merit an increase in grace;
second, one may merit eternal life; and finally, one may merit
an increase in glory.162 Here we see the actual eschatological
significance of merit, which has as its end not merely a good
work but a good work that is ordered to attaining eternal
beatitude.
Finally, a clear understanding of merit, as defined by the
council in canon 32 of the , will
determine the nature and extent to which an ecumenical
can be made on the issue of justification. One
must therefore discern the dogmatic value of the Tridentine
teaching. Pesch, for example, has argued that Trent’s teaching
on merit is a “dispensable theologoumenon.”163 He attempts to
preserve the Tridentine teaching by distinguishing between the
substance of Trent’s teaching, which is binding, and the concept
and word, which are not.164 Certainly Pesch is correct to
distinguish between the term , which one could do away
with, and the substance of the doctrine that must remain. For
Pesch, however, the substance of the doctrine of merit is
reducible to the biblical concepts of fruitfulness or grace.165
There is absolutely no basis either in Scripture or the council for
such an assertion other than theological wishfulness; one must
remember that Trent’s teaching on this matter is irreformable as
such and therefore perpetually binding. While one could do
away with the word , nevertheless, the concept of merit is
part of the substance of that teaching. Vatican I defined that the
“understanding of its [the Church’s] sacred dogmas must be
perpetually retained, which Holy Mother Church has once
162
Pesch, “Canons of the Tridentine Decree on Justification,” 190f.
163
Pesch, “Die Lehre vom ‘Verdienst’,” 1905.
164
Ibid., 1902.
165
Ibid., 1907.
declared”; thus there can be no retreat from this meaning.166

Trent affirmed the content of the faith, and the substance of its
teaching is that the justified man is able to merit truly an
increase in grace and eternal life.
CONCLUSION
Both Protestant theologians and most adherents to )

were led by their peculiar theories to reduce merit to an
absolutely gratuitous reward. The council repudiated both
positions and taught that in justification not only are the sins of
the faithful forgiven but also the faithful are made innocent,
immaculate, pure, guiltless and thereby become friends and
adopted sons of God, so that there is nothing whatever to
impede their entrance into heaven. It is clear that the council
did not employ the Scholastic terms of or
merit, instead preferring terms such as ,
and to convey the essential elements of the same
teaching. What one sees in the development of the drafts with
the addition of the term before merit is that the council
wanted to make clear it was not indicating either a merit
' or a quasi merit. Moreover, there is significant
intertextual evidence that use of the term by the council
was intended to signify merit in its proper sense. The council
fathers used terms that have the same logical comprehension as
“condign merit,” insofar as it is in part a function of justice. Yet,
those theologians who believe the council’s use of “merit”
means condign merit as understood by the schools go, I believe,
too far. Moreover, some contemporary readings of the
Tridentine doctrine of merit seem in fact to be a denial of the
teaching which the council took such pains to define.
166
“Hinc sacrorum quoque dogmatum is sensus perpetuo est retinendus, quem semel
declaravit sancta mater Ecclesia, nec umquam ab eo sensu altioris intelligentiae specie et
nomine recedendum” ( - 3020).

Untitled

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Untitled

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Untitled

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

79 (2015): 173 212

THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF GRACE AND

contemporary ecumenical discussions there has been a tendency

The occasion for canon 32 of the

whereas congruous merit is based on what is fitting in a given

formally the doctrine of merit. 19 Later, in 3

' 8 ' > > (Frankfurt am

(Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1911), 5:269.42; 435.27; 487.32 (hereafter ).

could never be pleasing to God. Second, Luther argued that

After much delay, the Council of Trent finally opened on

orders present.29 The council was to be presided over by three

The discussion on the doctrine of justification opened on

It is immediately evident that five of the six questions come

are meritorious of eternal life when they are informed by the

Christ and attempting to obtain the end, heaven, which Christ

These errors do not qualify the term in any way and

eight general congregations.48 As they did, the theological battle

without the grace of God, man can do nothing on his own.

answered that eternal life is called a reward and a grace;

Christ. The good works are meritorious of eternal life in so far

After these debates, four prelates, Cornelio Musso, Giacomo

anathematized those who deny that good works increase grace

the reference to merit being true appears to have been

The legates, however, appear to have decided that the July

incorporate the majority views on merit that were clearly

its transformationalist understanding with its teaching on works

the proper sense.85 Thus the qualification of merit by the term

The question now directly related the issue of double justi

(Antonio Solis) 5:576.31 35; (Lorenzo Mazochi) 5:581 90; (Stephen

Laínez began his speech with a simple analogy of a powerful

is not.102 He further noted that both Scripture and the doctors

drafts of the decrees were increasingly altered so that merit was

31 on the fruit of justification and merit. Although chapter 14

nothing further should be said to be lacking in the justified to prevent them

There are a number of points to make about this canon. First,

an increase in grace.”117 Del Monte’s draft, now canon 30,

slow death. He had already in his short treatise on good works

against a doctrine of “true merit.” Chapter 16 was discussed on

II. THE FINAL DECREE

The final decree, the was unani

affirmation of merit and the exclusion of all views that make

Protestant theologians, given their understanding of justification

of God are impossible to observe even for the man who is

The subject of the canon is the “justified man” who, by his

doctrinally. Edward Schillebeeckx argues, for example, that “these were,

fathers deliberately phrased this canon in Augustinian terms.147

its requisites.148 This phrase is even more significant when one

be read as synonyms in the conciliar text. The council used the

9 (2002): 115). As the acknowledges,

in the Arian controversy where all parties could happily call

fully determinate) sense—that is, as formally comprehending

position is impossible to affirm for most Protestant theologians

declared”; thus there can be no retreat from this meaning.166

Both Protestant theologians and most adherents to )

You might also like