THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

THE DARK SIDE OF

THE DIALECTIC: TOWARD
A NEW OBJECTIVITY

Seventh Geary Lecture, 1974

ALVIN W. GOULDNER
 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

THE DARK SIDE OF.

THE DIALECTIC: TOWARD
A NEW OBJECTIVITY

ALVIN W. GOULDNER

Seventh Gear)J Lecture, 1974

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Alvin W. Gouldner is the Max Weber Research
Professor of Social Theory at Washington University,
St. Louis, and Professor at the Sociology Institute,
University of Amsterdam. This Paper has been accepted
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 The Dark Side of the Dialectic: Toward a New Objectivity

The older notion of "objectivity" in the social sciences, as

crystallised in Max Weber’s classical formulation of the value free
doctrine, stressed an epistemology that premissed a radical separation
between the formal justification of assertions, on the one side, and
the origins, genesis, or "mode of production" of these assertions,
on the other. For my part, however, I do hot believe that a radical
distinction between genesis find justification is tenable. At the same
time, I reject a relativistic and nihilistic solution. In order for us to
bave rationalgrounds for believing in the truth of specific assertions
about the social world~ we must suppose them to have been
produced by certain kinds of people, "normal" people, pe0ple
l)aving certain talents and training, working with a genuine com-
mitment to certain justlj~ed Criteria with certain Methods, who
accept these C and M,:and who, also, apply them with technical
competence and moral sincerity.
This means that in order to have rational grounds for belie~’ing
in the truth of certain world-referring assertions, we must also have
some knowledge of how the social system of scholars must be
organised for its work; it means we must have some grounds for
confidence that the social system of science is working as it should,
effectively sanctioning conformity with methods aiming at the
fulfilment of its criteria. If, for instance, we see a community of
scholars using a reasonable method to appraise the truth value of
assertions about the world, but if this community has an internal
structure placing disproportionate power in the hands of entre-
preneurs or commissars, if it is subject to venal temptations or
vulnerable to coercion and terror, then it would be prudent to
doubt the warrantability of this intellectual community’s specific

~) 197,~ Alvin W. Gouldner. All rights reserved.

1
 assertions, even though its formal methods and criteria were
rationally defensible. For they may be cheating or unduly giving
themselves the benefit of the doubt, interpreting ambiguous
outcomes in conformity with their wishes and needs.
The classical, older notion of objectivity stressed that truth was
the product of applying specific methods to particular intellectual
tasks and data. Its focal assumption was that truth was produced
essentially by an individual scholar whose fallibility was diminished
by his disciplined conformity with a rational method. Truth was
thus the product of a right relation between the individual scholar
and the approved method. But what grounds were there for a
confidence in the scholar’s motives for conformity to the right
method? What was de-focalised here was the social aspect of the
process: namely, that the scholar as a scholar was the product of
a social system that had trained and awarded him his credentials;
that as a mature scholar he worked as a member of a scholarly
community; that he had to convince its members of the warrant-
ability of his assertions, and that he sought to do so by employing
the rules, methods, and criteria that this community sanctioned, as
a rhetoric. Tbe modem view then, sees truth as the product of a
rhetoric and collective appraisal of the warrantability of assertions
about the social world, as a world-referencing judgement that is
collectively constructed and which does not have an unmediated
availability, either as subjective "intuition" or as objective
"evidence".
Modem notions of objectivity, then, are sensitive to the manner
in which truth is speech about reality, that truth is speech-medlated
reality, and is aware that the judgement of truth must be a judgement
of the warrantability of specific speeches.
If the older form of objectivity focused unreflexively on references
to the social world, the modern form of objectivity seeks to link
speech to the dialogue of the speaking subjects who constitute the
community of scholars. Here the imputed warrantability of a
speech is not simply a matter of individual judgements about
correspondence between it and the social world, but rests on the
consensus of speakers socially related to one another th specific ways
allowing confidence in their capacity and willingness to learn and
employ the requisite methods required by justified criteria. Over
and above these concerns for the formal correctness of speech, our
imputations about the warrantability of truth claims must also rest
on a confidence in the willingness and capacity of this community
of scholars to speak truly about the social world. The focus here,
then, is on the nature of the social arrangements and cultural
commitments conducive to speaking truly.
It cannot be reiterated too often, or too emphatically, that the
sociology of cognition is not primarily interested in the reliability
of facts or isolated propositions. For it, reliability is an avenue to
truth, but truth is not seen as limited to facts; the factual remains
vulnerable to partiality. Things claimed may be factually so, and
statements made may be logically and factua/ly correct; but that is
not necessarily "truth". For the sociology of cognition, truth comes
down to the perspectives by which even logical and factually correct
propositions may be limited. Truth has to do with the limits of
reason. It may, for example, be correct that colonially subjugated
people are, on the average, less willing to work than their overlords.
[ can imagine that some researches might yield such a conclusion;
but if they did not also assert why that was, or what it was that had
made the subjugated less willing to work, or did not inquire into.
the source of this, the analysis would, from our standpoint, be
lacking in truth qua "objectivity". For it would have failed to affirm
tile limits of the factual and was, therefore, unable to give a larger,
more "balanced" understanding of the subjugated persons’ un-
willingness to work. Assertions, then, can be "correct" without
being "true". In this view, truth necessarily implies correctness; but
correctness does not necessarily imply truth. So truth, from the
perspective of a sociology of cognition, means the clarification of
tile limits of actuality, the clarification of the conditions of the actual.
This, in turn, is a question of counterbalancing "good news" with
bad, and of seeing that the determination of "what is" is not just a
technical interest (to pure scientists) but always has implications for
everyday life. Events, then, are not just either cognitively correct or
incorrect; they are, also, happenings that confirm or frustrate the
expectations that men develop in their everyday roles.
"What is" is not merely information technically relevant to
scientific hypotheses, but is also always "news" relevant to everyday
life. The reception of "news" is structured by how it impinges on
people’s hopes and aspirations in the various everyday roles they
play. The reception depends in part on whether it is "good news"
that is welcome, or "bad news" that is unwelcome and therefore
denied or readily forgotten. One more readily credits good news.
News consonant with a person’s beliefs about theworld, and about
the self holding them, will be more readily credited as true and
remembered; news dissonant with beliefs held about the world and
about the self is more likely to be resisted and doubted; judgements
concerning its correctness are more likely to be tabled until further
tests of its warrantability may be made.
To put it otherwise: good news tends to be credited more
readily--by those to whom it is good news--than bad news,
because it is dissonance-reducing.* Bad news is credited less readily
--by those for whom it is bad news--because it is dissonance-
generating. So the actual process of crediting and discrediting of
a "report" never depends only on "evidence" hut also depends
upon its character as "news"--which is to say, upon the implications
and relevance of the report for the interests, ambitions, policies,
commitments and plans of men in their everyday life and as meaning
---endowed by ordinary language. Information is news when it has
relevance to men’s intentions in their everyday world; and it is this
relevance that also influences its reception. News is the information
of the Lebensweh. Good news will be "credited"; that is, it will be
more loosely tested and appraised--whatever the criterion em-
ployed--before being accepted, than bad news. Bad news will be
more loosely tested, before being rejected, than will good news.
Whether a report is credited or discredited, tested loosely or tested
rigorously, varies with the power and prestige of those persons
or groups affirming it, and also with its implication for the everyday
life of those to whom it is asserted.
It was in this vein that Immanuel Kant remarked: "... the balance
of the understanding is not wholly impartial and one of its aims
which bears the inscription, ’hope for the future’, has a mechanical
advantage such that even a slight reason falling onto its i~an will
raise the other, loaded with speculations far weightier in themselves.
This is the sole error which I cannot and indeed would not wish to
remove."
Here, it would seem, Kant speaks to a structure of sentiments--
"optimism"--appropriate to, required by~ or at least tolerable
within, the limits of inquiry pursued by practical reason, and whose

* Here dissonance is an aspect of the syntagmatics of language. It is the

perception ofa coniunction or combination of "things" at variance with those
permitted by a grammar or culture---i.e., dissonance is the grotesque.

4
 whole point of course is aimed ultimately at that survik, al of men
in everyday life which requires the maintenance of their morale.
Truth implies survival~ suggests Kant, but’ survival does not
necessarily require truth. Precisely. We will return to that point
shortly. The implication seems to be that sometimes, if men are to
continue to strive to live, they must sometimes lie to themselves
and to one another.
Still~ the issue is not just a general, abstract choice between a
life-giving myth and a life-wearying truth. We would be foolish,
indeed, to forget the practical danger of a self-sealing optimism that,
all too ready to discount di~culties and to find hope in the world,
underestimates the costs and overestimates the rewards possible in
given projects, thus generating the very disappointment and
pessimism whose debilitating dangers to survival.had already been
foreseen. The issue, then, is never actually that of hope versus
no-hope-in-general; it is always a question of the specific estimate
of thegrounds for pursuing one concrete commitment as against
others. The problem is always that of making an accurate and:
hence realistic judgement of specific policies; of being able ~con-
tinually to see that some reports are consonant with one policy or
command~ hut dissonant with another.i
The problem, then, is to avoid censorship: selective silence about,
or repression of, those reports dissonant with our policies, and the
~,elective, dramatic focalisation of reports confirming our policies.
The Kantian problem, if it is to be stated more explicitly, is that of
maintaining a realistic appraisal of out own specific policies and,
especially, of not ignoring reports that augur our failure, nor of
overatressing events that intimate our success--and, conversely, in
judging our adversaries’ situation. The problem is to be able to
maintain this realism in the concrete appraisal of specific alternatives
without, however, fostering a cumulative pessimism that diminishes
the energies men are willing to expend to achieve their goals and
their survival.
In this view, "objectivity" comes down to a question of the
relation between the theorist, on the one side, and the nature of his
relationship to "good news" and "bad news", on the other. More
specifically, objectivity has to do with the continued openness or
access of persons to "hostile" reports; the lack or loss of objectivity
is an underestimate of the negative implications of reports; it is
an under-estimate of our adversary’s strengths and an over-estimate
of ours, so that one remains silent about bad news and is redundantly
communicative about good news.
In broaching the problem of objectivity, the im’dal question, of
course, is that of its meo.,dng and not whether any doctrine it
advocates or implies is true. On this limited issue, i.e., the meaning
of "obiectivity", let me say at once that there is little ground for
interpreting it as part of, and from within the standpoint of some
technical, extraordinary, language. "Objectivity" is fundamentally
rooted in everyday concerns, indeed, in the most mundane of
concerns: it is tacitly grounded in our interest in whether those who
speak are our friends or enemies, and whetber they share or oppose
our purposes.
, From the standpoint of ordinary language, there is not, and
never has been, anything particularly mysterious about the meaning
of objectivity. Most ordinary language speakers will agree, and l
fully concur, that in this framework objectivity correctly refers to
"seeing the whole picture" in the specific sense not of seeing all its
innumerable details but, rather, in the sense of "not taking sides"
among adversaries. Objectivity thus means not being biased in
favour of one’s own side or against our adversaries, particularly
in our cognitive work. Obiectivity in cognition thus means something
parallel to "realism" in politics. It means, in short, facing the bad
news and not exaggerating the good news.
¯ Obiectivity, then, is not neutralio~ which, in the conventional
sense, means taking no sides between adversaries; nor does objec-
tivity mean indifference to or lack of preference for the survival or
victory of one side as against another. It is precisely because men
want their side to triumph that their need for "realism" may at
times counter-balance their tendency to ignore bad news or over-
emphasise good news. Indeed, it might well be argued that
obiectivity is useful, if not always necessary, to the victory of our
own side. Objectivity is a critique of the cognitive vulnerabilities
generated by people’s struggle on behalf of their everyday interests.
A concern with objectivity is a concern with the limits of rational
discourse that are grounded in (hut often obscures) the vulnerability
of truth to subversion by interests or desires. "Desires" or
"interests" refer to circumstances that some speakers take as
"givens" and are therefore not mediated, or produced by, rational
discourse. "Interests", therefore, may be either practical, economic
interests, or an interest in a theoretical or scientific paradigm; in
6
both cases, these set limits on what may be made problematic.
To affirm objectivity as a morality of cognition, however, is not,
of course to suggest that the effects of interest (and desire) on
cognition have in fact been vanquished by reason, and that rational
discourse is without a non-rational limit. Quite the contrary. The
legitimate implication of affirming objectivity focalises the common
vulnerability of truth and reason to desire and interest; it calls
attention to the limits imposed on what may be made an object of
rational critique. Still, to problematise objectivity is not only a
warning; it is also a promise. If it is, on the one side, a critique of the
pretensions of the rational, it is, on the other side, the Utopian vision
of a rationality that would be superior to that which is. Problema-
tising objectivity intimates the possible existence of a common
interest in universal reason that may transcend particular and
divisive group interests. However groups are riven, a concept of
"objectivity" implies that they have a common interest in reason
that will abide even when their particular, divisive interests wane.
For example: to acknowledge a virtue in the enemy is to exhibit
a generosity of spirit that no defeat may extinguish. To affirm the
i~nportanee of reason in tile midst of struggle is to speak on behalf
of the human species’ long-range interests; it is to raise questions
about the relative value of what men may be dying for at that
momem; it is surely to make reference to a dignity that the victors
may not strip from the vanquished and in which the latter may
indeed excel their conquerors. To speak of objectiv!ty~ then, reminds
us that there will be a time after the struggle; a time when men will
once more have to make peace with themselves and what they have
done, or have had done to them. To speak of objectivity, is to
raise a question about whether we can live with and through
victory alone. It is to speak of "reconciliation".
Still, it is one thing to say objectivity is, but quite another to
project it as an Utopia. Since sclaolars are pledged to truth-speaking
they will want, and will lay claim t% objectivity. Paradoxically,
their claim to the reality of their objectivity thus makes an ideology
of objectivity; they affirm objectivity now partly because it is to
their interest to do so, when it is often the case that it is only the
morality (rather than the reality) of objectivity that can be affirmed.
In this, the scholar, like other men, bends truth to need; he conceals
the bad news whose very affirmation is of the essence of objectivity.
In claiming that objectivity ~, in taking the promise of it for the
7
achievement, the scholar exhibits his lack of objectivity. He thereby
makes objectivity an ideology that functions to conceal his lack
of objectivity.
Bad news or "hostile information", is news discrepant with a
man’s purposes; good news or "friendly information" is news
consonant with, and colffirming of, men’s values and intentions. In
short, information by itself is neither hostile nor friendly; it is not
in itself bad news or good, but depends on its implications for the
intentions of some specifiable men. The same bits of information
may be both hostile or friendly, bad news and good, to different
persons or different groups. The power and the stability of a
government is thus hostile information to a revolutionary who has
given his life to the hope of a revolution. Indeed, any report that
limits the possibility of world-transformation, whether suggesting
that society or human nature inherently limit the amount and variety
of social change possible, is hostile information and bad news to
revolutionaries. Correspondingly, reports of the fragility of govern-
ment are hostile information and had news to the conservative who
favours the status quo. It is thus not information about the state of
the worldper se but, rather, reports about the social world in relation
to the purposes of some men that makes a report either good news
or bad news.
What is bad news, we have said, depends on people’s purposes.
There is, therefore, no news that is glad tidings for all persons
and in a/l times. What is repressed and, therefore, what needs
speaking must then vary with each group and with the historical
position in which that group finds itself. To speak the truth, then,
or to be "objective", is not to say the same one thing to all persons.
It is not to repeat the same message at all times. The truth is not
something that can be spoken, once for all.
In Peter Berger’s Invitation to Sociology, he argues that the utility
of sociology derives from its truth. Forgetting Kant, he suggests
that knowledge is useful because true, and that people are helped
by sociology only if it is true. This, of course, premises that there
is no ideology in sociology, the very assumption that should be
questioned rather than merely posited, and makes very dubious
assumptions about the nature of usefulness. It is only if we define
the useful as the true, and thus commit a tautology, that we must
suppose only the true to be useful. But persons are disposed to
reject bad news, and to welcome good news, quite apart from their
8
 truth. And indeed, riley’are disposed to define news as truth when
it is good news, and as untruth~ as hypothesis; or as mere opinion,
when it is bad news,
The "good" spy, says Berger, is the onewho tells it as it is,
rather than telling the spy-master the good news he hopes for or
suppresses the bad news he fears. But the point is precisely that some
people do press us for good news and wish to avoid hearing the
bad, and indeed, such people are often located at the top and have
power over us. In this hierarchical setting they can impose their
preferences upon news gatherers and bringers, whether they are
spies or sociologists. Those managing any hierarchy have a common
and limiting interest: they want to show that their management of
affairs is successful; that under their administration the group is
achieving its goals and is forging ahead of its competitors. They,
therefore, do not welcome news of their adversaries’ achievements
and of their own failures, and they generate costs for those who
bring them such news. They will tell them: "Go back and look
again!" And again! Essentially, it is not simply information useful
for the instrumental achievement of their objectives that the
managers of groups seek. They also want information that is
consistent with an image of themselves as managers who ai’e
successful. Commonly, then, they prefer those who support their
public credibility, rather than truth speakers.
This is obviously not a peculiarity of spy organisations; it is true
of any organisation with its own special interests, whether venal
corporations or revolutionary parties. There is, therefore,-a grave
difficulty in speaking truth to those by whom one is employed, for
whom one "works", or on whom one is dependent. This danger is
not simply the concrete hazard of employment with its economic
dependence; the hazard is common to all who are dependent on
those pursuing goals other than truth. Certainly it is a hazard of
"capitalist" economic systems; but it is surely as true of "socialist"
societies as well.
There are two points here. First, the question of how a commit-
ment to other desires or interests imposes limits on true speaking
and~ secondly~ how these other values limit truth speakers through
a dependence that can take diverse forms, whether economic,
political, or certain more "psychological" forms of human bondage.
’.’Desire" no less than interest can foster dependencies; as Willard
Waller understood, those who love most~ are dependent on those
loving less. Bad news is not appreciated by those on whom we are
dependent, either for love or money; and any truth we may seek
is subject to the hazards of such dependence. "Smoke gets in your
eyes", says the song, when we are in love. We are blinded by
venality, property interests, and the wish to secure material advan-
tage; we are no less blinded by lust, passion, love, our need to
believe in our loved ones, our fears of death and hopes for
immortality.
Those on whom we are dependent have leverage through which
they may require news carriers to speed good news and to hesitate
to bring the bad at all. The favourable medical diagnosis is heard
clearly the first time, is rejoiced in, and it firmly closes the painful
question. Unfavourable diagnoses, however, need to be repeated
and double-checked. A fundamental social function of reflexive
social theorists, then, is to help people deal with the interest-related
and desire-related character of news. Fundamentally, the task of the
reflexive social theorist is to help people to remain critical and
sceptical of good news, to insist that even tiffs be double-checked and,
correspondingly, to help people to accept bad news and to remember
it. The function of the reflexive social theorists, the Socratic theorist,
is to stress the connectedness of news and of men’s interests, and to
remind us of how news is grounded in interest and desire.
A central function of such theorists, then, is to help a society
develop and maintain a consciousness of the connection between
interesq desire, social being, material groundedness, on the one
side, and information, reports, news, and all references to social
worlds~ on the other. On another level, the task is to re-integrate
the theofist-and-his-life-in-society with theory, theory-products,
and theory-performances. The task of a reflexive, Socratic theory is
to help people maintain access to what their society is silent about,
and t0 what they, as members of that society or as some limited part
of it, will regard as bad news.
"Objectivity", then~ is not neutrality; it is realism concerning our
own situation, desires, and interests. Here "realism" means being
aware of the continual vulnerability of reason to interest and desire,
of the limits that interest and desire impose on rational discourse.
Objectivity, then~ is a wholeness paradoxically pursued by stressing
insistently and one-sidedly the repressed and silenced side of things.
It is the effort to overcome the varied and changing limitations of
I0
persons and groups through the recovery of what their lives have
systematically repressed, distorted, and lost.
At this point, then, it becomes obvious that there are really two
tasks for reflexive social theory. One is to know what is, and to
speak it. The other is to convince and pursuade the other~ to help
him be and remain open to what is, particularly to reports hostile
to his purposes, to bad news. There is little point of knowing and
asserting truths to those who do not want to know them, who will
not hear or understand them, and who are disposed to reject them,
who will soon conveniently forget or distort them. There is no
solution to this unless we know how "what is" bears on people’s
purposes, and unless we know what to do about distortions of
hearing as well as of speaking. Clearly, it would seem that a critical
and Socratic social theory differs from "normal" academic social
theory precisely in its reflexivlfy; in its concern with whether we
know what is knowable, with whether we use what is known, if
we think about it at all or why we do not, and with what social
arrangements are conducive to knowing or inhibiting it. An
emancipatory and Socratic social theory is centrally concerned with
maintaining an openness between technical discourse and everyday
life, between extraordinary and ordinary languages, between pure
reason and practical reason.
I do not wish to be taken to suggest that bad news is only news
bearing on injury to base and selfish interests, and that it is particu-
laristic interest alone that distorts truth. Ideology is not the only
failure of truth. Our most noble values often corrupt knowledge
by making us want to seem to be living in conformity with our
theory and morality. The shame and guilt at failing to achieve our
highest values, as well as threats to our meanest interests, both
dispose us to distort communications that are discrepant with the
person we hope to be taken for.
It is commonly and correctly stressed that systems of social
domination and hierarchy foster vested interests among the
privileged elite and that these in turn may limit their receptivities to
truth, distort their communication, and result in ideologised belief.
Ruling classes and other elites will, if they can, conceal what injures
their interests and they will publicise what advances them. Here
truth is certainly limited by selfish interest.
Yet truth is also imparied by love and altruistic caring. One
distorts communication to protect comrades, friends, and loved ones.
One sometimes lies even at the cost of injuring one’s own narrow
and personal interest, in order to protect a larger group. The
protection of a community, like the pursuit of any other value, is
by no means identical with the requirements of seeking, seeing, and
saying the truth. The difficulty in securing the truth about social
worlds is only partly (and perhaps only trivially) inhibited by the
weakness of our technical instrumentation or our mathematics. Far
more penetrating in their distorting effects on our knowledge of
social worlds are our selfish and our altruistic concerns, our interests
and our desires, our hates and loves, our meanest and noblest
intentions. The pressure to distort truth is grounded in both our
private and our communal commitments, and not only in the
disparity between them. In short, "ideology" is not the only
distortion of speech.
Can we suppose, then, that what is called an "emancipatory
critical theory" is itself devoid of impulses to distort communica-
tion? Can we suppose that a theory seeking the universal emancipa-
tion of mankind entails no contradictions with truth and embodies
no motives to distort communication? In so far as human "emanci-
pation" means something more than an interest in truth and
undistorted communication, we must suppose that these other
values will generate tensions and contradictions for truth speaking.
Should we not expect that even a critical emancipatory theory will
shy away from bad news, will repress or distort it. Is this not one
implication of Kant’s contention that hope for the future is the
source of an "error"--one he does not and cannot wish to remove.
The problem, in short, is that of the relationship between various
values, between saying what is, on the one hand, and other values--
such as survival or community, on the other--which this may be
intended to further or which may be necessary if it itself is to be
furthered. A key question is always Why does one want to know
the truth? Is it sought for its own sake alone, and without regard
to its other cultural consequences? Or is it sought also, at least in
some part, because it is believed that speaking truly will further
other ends which are also viewed as desirable. Essentially one must
suppose that, for critical theory, emancipation and truth are not
totally identical; one must suppose that truth serves emancipation
and life, the part the whole. Otherwise, critical theory would simply
be a social theory of rationality--and it must be confessed that in
Jiirgen Habermas’ brilliant version of social theory, this seems to
 be its tendency. "Emancipation" is to critical theory what "goodness"
was to Platonism. It is grounded in~ but not limited to, reason. It
implies the presence of certain other (than cognitive) values and
thus implies that these must somehow be integrated with truth.
Yet anyone who accepts other values as transcending (or
independent of) truth and reason, for example, emancipation, human
survival, or social cohesion--is under pressure to be silent about,
or to distort communication concerning, events dissonant with these
values. Indeed, he may even--as Plato was, with his "noble lie"--be
led deliberately to assert as true what he knows is not. In so far as
we take responsibility either for maintaining a social system that
exists~ the status quo~ or seek to construct a new society, we
necessarily create certain hazards for truth speaking. In opting for
emancipation~ then~ we do not avoid all such hazards, but most
probably generate certain new ones.
But there are hazards on all sides~ and dangers to truth in each
commitment--whether to the status quo, or against it and in favour
of change and a new system. Moreover, if we say truth and reason
are lirnhed by interest and desire, we must also add emphatically
that interest and desire generate motives and energies for efforts at
rational discourse. The dialectic of rational discourse is this: as
Nieztsche correcdy saw, with no such interests and desires there
would be little and certainly less truth and reason; but the very
interests and desires that promote reason simultaneously [ira& it.
Interests and desires give birth to a reason and truth that are bornl
with a limit, and on whose birth certificate there is also written in an
invisible ink a death sentence. This, then, is far from an argument
for the status quo or against changing it. Nor is there any intention
of suggesting an equivalence of dang&s to the truth in each choice.
What is intended however, is to deny unequivocally that an
emancipatory theory does not create distinctive dangers of its own
for truth speaking. These may be comparatively negligible when an
emancipatory theory operates within the confines of an "old
regime", within some status qtto that it seeks to transcend. For~
then, its task is to speak the silences maintained by the old society
and to display what has been concealed, so that its own "one-
sidedness" may not deter it from exposing the bad news which
the old society wishes to repress.
Correspondingly~ the standpoint offered here provides a basis
tbr judging those social theorists who claim to make an uncon-
ditional commitment to truth. Such a commitment to an "uncondi-
tional" truth is a kind of false consciousness, unless the theorist also
loosens his attachment to the status quo, limits or rejects his own
responsibility for its welfare, and reduces or liquidates his invest-"
ments in social roles grounded in the status quo. In actual fact, then,
the practical alternatives come down to these: (i) the social theorist
accommodates himself to the status quo or some variant of it, while
affirming his commitment to objectivity and truth, thus inevitably
involving himself in truth-qualifying and speech-distorting social
circumstances that lend support to the already great credibility of
the status quo. That is one possibility. The other (2) is that the
theorist accepts truth-seeking and speaking as in part contributive
to a larger social emancipation, sees the hazards this poses for
truth-speaking, pursues a role for himself as breaking the silences
systematically imposed by the status quo, while all the while aware
that he is gradually imposing new silences that may later grow into
institutionalised repressions, with the advent of the new society
he seeks. The first is the most likely and realistic of alternatives.
The second is a transcending possibility.
It may be contended that the reason our communal involvements
distort communication is because they are not really altruistic, being
only a species of slightly expanded egoism, and that if our com-
munities were not selfishly "ours", and if they were not at war with
others, then they would not distort truth. In other words, it may be
held that without conflict between universalistic and particularistic
interests, there would be no motives to distort communication. But
this would be mistakenly to suppose that ideology is the only
pathology of cognition. At least three things may be briefly
mentioned in this connection: First, that the idea of a unity between
particularistic and universalistic interests is a regulative ideal
toward which men may strive; but if we wish to remain armed
against the hazards to truth, we had better not confuse this ideal
with the reality of the social conflicts that exist. To strive toward
a social reconstruction which will not induce distorted communica-
tion is quite different from fantasising that this reconstruction has
already been accomplished. Such a reconstruction can only be
deterred, not advanced, by a confusion between our hopes for
human unity and our appraisal of what is.
Second, even if all social conflicts within the human species
were eliminated, this is no reason to suppose that the interests of
14
tile human species and those of other species are identical. There
remains the problem of the imperialism of the human species
vLr-a-vis others. \Vhat is called the unity of particularistic and
universal interests is usually only a universalism of human interests--
in other words, it is a limited "humanism". Universalism is the
ideology of humanistic imperialism.
Third~ and finally, even if we suppose the total elimination of all
conflicts within the human species and between it and other species,
the problem of bad news remains. To eliminate conflict.is not to
eliminate all limits. For example, the point is not only that a man
rejects the bad news of his death, but the news that all men are
mortal. That death is universal does not make our own particular
death any more acceptable. There is also ageing; there is failure even
among the loving and co-operative; there is entropy; there are suns
that burn out. To deny this is to hold that there are no limits on
men; and nothing is so certain as the limitedness of men who think
themselves without limits. Often enough, an acknowledgement of
the tragic dimension is little more than apology for ndt 6xerting
ourselves to make life better; it is thus an accommodation to what
is, and an ideology congenial to the advantaged. Often enough
however, the denial of any place for the tragic is little morethan an
inability to face the bad news that all change is a "slow boring of
hard boards". The denial of the tragic in part expresses a fear that
men will fail to do all they can unless they are made to believe that
what they bring is total Utopia. But this is much tile same kind of
distorted estimate of men as was premised by those "enlighteners"
who believed that men would obey no moral rules at all unless the3)
believed in go3 and bell.
The problem of objectivity is, in the first instance, grounded in
a socially constituted, historically emergent, distinction between
technical languages and ordinary (or as they are sometimes called
natural) languages. Objectivity is grounded in the claim of the
technical language to have, and be able to live by, a set of rules
independent of those of ordinary, everyday life. In effect, to evaluate
a technical discipline in terms of its autonomy is to evaluate it in
terms of whether it conforms to its own claims and values; it asks
that the technical discipline dance to its own music.
To allege a breach of objectivity is to imply that the rules of the
ordinary language have infiltrated a situation which, according to
the rules of the technical language game, should have been controlled
by the tei:hnical grammar. The fundamental self-image of a technical
discipline~--as Heidegger says of the "mathematical project,"--or
at least its most fundamental aspiration, is toward a self-
groundedness.
The critique of "’ideology" launched by Marx and Engels was
above all meant to expose the speciousness of that aspiration, to
reveal that the technical language game was not self-grounded as
claimed, but was actually grounded in the ordinary language game.
Marx and Engels’ critique of self-groundedness, however, was
blunted by their own Promethean vision. In effect, Marxism argued
that the social "sciences" were not self-grounded; that this claim
was an expression of a false consciousness serving to occlude the
reality: i.e.~ that the social sciences expressed partisan interests
rooted in the society’s everyday life, and served to further the
interests of the society’s hegemonic class and, indeed, to transform
its "power" into a legitimated authority.
Marxism held that the social sciences were grounded in class
interests and that its technical performances were shaped by extra-
technical interests. Marxism contended that, on the one hand, the
hegemonic class constituted a grounding for the social sciences and
that the latter served to strengthen their class hegemony. On tile
other, Marxism also held that the proletariat and its different, anti-
hegemonic and anti-capitalist interests, provided a different ground-
ing for the social sciences; a grounding not bound by the limits of
the hegemonic class, and instead permitted a critique of that
hegemonic class and of the society it dominated.
This~ at least, is one reading of the Marxist theory of ideology and
critique. That theory fails, however, if and when it implies that the
proletariat-in-being is a universal class; when it assumes, that is~
that this class can transcend all limits or already does so; that it can,
therefore~ ground a social science that will not have its own impulse
to avoid bad news and over-dramatise good news.
To raise the problem of objectivity is to focus on the interface
between technical and ordinary language games. Specifically, to
allege a failure of objectivity is to reproach a speaker with speaking
the wrong language in some situation. The reproach is that he has
not limited himself to the technical language game and to the special
interests and desires it sanctions; that he has allowed an intrusion of
rules of the oral;nat’)language game thus implying that the social
16
scientist has become like any ordinary man, surrendering to~ his
everyday partisanship or egoism. .
The reverse situation can, of course, also occur. The technical
language game and its interests and desires can spill over into the
ordinary language game. But this is not defined as a failure of
"objectivity". Sometimes it is seen as a failure of"communication"
and expressed as a critique of "jargon". It is also often viewed, by
the ordinary language speakers, as a failure of commitment~ as a kind
of callousness to their needs or suffering and as an effort to maintain
distance from these. To claim a failure of "objectivity", however,
commonly means that the speaker has become too involved in
everyday life, rather than having "detached" himself from. these.
To repeat: an alleged failure of objectivity is an allegation that those
claiming to have transcended ordinary language games have not
actually done so; have failed to play the technical game by its own
rules because of the imputed intrusion of the self-intel"ests and
personal desires grounded in their ordinary language game.
To charge someone with a lack of obiectivity is to define him
as a deviant who fails to play the game properly. It is primarily
those who speak technical languages and who have publicly claimed
themselves capable of being above partisanship in their truth claims
that are vulnerable to such reproach. In ordinary-language games,
players are commonly expected to be concerned with advancing
their own interests in everyday life; they are expected to accom-
modate truth to these interests, i.e.~ to "compromise". The normal,
ordinary-language speaker is normally expected to see and say
what furthers his interests and desires, and he is not regarded as
unnatural for doing so. High values that demand more "a!truism"
tend to be confined to segregated situations, occasions, or roles.
Objectivity, then, is the sought virtue of those who claim to have
transcended the normal limits on truth in everyday life. The lack
of objectivity, correspondingly, is the deviance of those who, it is
claimed, have failed to keep that promise. If the claim to objectivity
is often a specious claim grounding elite pretensions, the critique
of objectivity is often an attack on elitism as such, on the claim to
a kind of superiority; still, while not intending to do so,.il; may
nonetheless come to see an), effort toward a strengthened rational!ty
as the grounding of a new elite. It may, therefore, counterpose to
"objectivity" a Protagorean relativism in which it is held that truth
rests on interests and hence each man’s truth is as good as another
17
and which may then culminate in nihilism. For its part, Marxism
sought to avoid such a relativism, not by denying that truth was
grounded in interest, but by denying thtzt all ~terests were equal,
particularly in their effects upon truth claims.
Various interpretations of the failure to adhere to the rules of a
technical language game are, of course, possible and common. One
is that the failure is sometimes due to "cheating", that is, deliberately
violating the rules to procure a personal advantage: to "score".
Here, it is certainly implied that the deviant player might have
behaved otherwise. It is also sometimes understood that deviance
from technical rules might not be deliberately intended because~ it
is held, a player "lost his head", or became "tired". This is not a
technical error but more nearly like an "accident" or an inadvertence.
The paradigm of a lack of objectivity, however, is neither a
deliberate violation of technical rules, such as lying, nor an inad-
vertance. It is, rather, an unintended and unaware conformity to
rules of the ordinary language when one should have been, and
indeed, assumes he has been, heeding the technical rules alone.
Here, the ordinary language game is seen as exerting an unrelenting
but subliminal pressure on the technical language game.
The assumption required is that the former, ordinary language is
just more elemental and paleo symbolic, more fascinating or invol-
ving, and less escapable than the technical language game. One can
well imagine men giving up technical language games, indeed, all
technical language games, and still surviving. But one cannot
imagine human survival without playing some ordinary language
game. Such an estimate of the relative positions of technical and
ordinary languages, as respectively linguistic super and infra-
structures, seems essentially correct. As Roman Jacobson remarks,
technical languages are transforms of natural languages. Technical
languages axe grounded in ordinary languages, they are elaborated
linguistic codes grounded in restricted linguistic codes, but not the
other way around. We must thus suppose that there is continual
pressure and temptation to violate or surrender the rules of tech-
nical languages and to conform to ordinary usage when we should
be (or think we are) conforming to technical usage.*
* Elsewhere, in a paper on "Revolutionary Intellectuals", I develop the
theme that this "regression" to ordinary language may be rational, when
problem-s01ving in technical languages reaches an impasse. It is precisely this
"regression" that is one major source of "creativity".
r8
 This view of their inter-relationship leads to two different (but
not contradictory) judgements. In one, we can say that it is possible
for men to hew to the rules of technical games; we can say, it is
possible to be objective. In the other view, we make problematic
the capacity to fulfil that resolve, and we exhibit the forces under-
mining objectivity. In individual cases, we hold, some men will be
more objective than others, and some efforts at objectivity will be
more successful than others. Still, in considering a set of cases, it
seems likely that intrusions into the technical language game will
commonly occur from the ordinary language game. In some part,
but only in part, objectivity depends upon moral commitment and
resolve and thus its failure is, indeed, partly a moral failure. But a
moral commitment to objectivity may or may not coincide with
other conditions. Tile moral resolve may be reinforced or under-
mined by, may be made more rewarding or more costly by, certain
social, cultural, political and economic forces. Increasing or decreas-
ing "bias" is tbus not just a matter of a moral resolve, for that
resolve in itself is grounded in other conditions. From this stand-
point, then, the strengtltening of objectivity is a matter of building
all those other social institutions and structures that reinforce men’s
resolve to speak truly and strengthen their abilhy to accept and
remember bad news and critically to examine good news.
Having raised the problem of speaking "bad news" we must also
address the question of the "negative dialectic". There are, we might
say, different kinds of negative dialectics. One of these negative
dialectics is not ours; tile characterological infrastructure of this
other negative dialectic is the eternal return of Oedipal rebellion. In
this negative dialectic, eternal repetition creates the illusion of
development; there is an eternal youth killing an eternal old king
who is eternally reborn and killed once again. In this negative
dialectic, the youthful slayer never grows up, never grows old and
ugly, and never needs to be killed in his turn. This is the negative
dialectic for those Peter Pans who never grow up, but merely age.
This negative dialectic is a Nietzschean fantasy, unenlightened by
Freud. It regresses to a pre-Hegelian romanticism of infinite
yearning; it is lacking, therefore, in a transcendence of youth for it
has no vision of wisdom; it has little talent for existence in the
present; slyly biding its pleasures, it embroiders them as dutiful
rebellion.
In this negative dialectic, which is not ours, there is resentment
 and rage at sad endings; there is no gut-courage to see that bad
news--the really terrible and tragic news---is in the end unavoid-
able; in this negative dialectic there is an inability to carry on in the
face of what is, after all, only an ancient horror. This alien negative
dialectic, then, proclaims a C-6"tterdA’mmerung of endless struggle,
denying all possibility of reconciliation. For, to it, only struggle is
real. Such a negative dialectic generates an infinite rage against the
world because it rejects and denies all fulfilment in the present, and
can therefore have no hope for the future. This negative dialectic
is the desperate ideology of those strange souls who are brimful
oflife-energies~ yet who remain widlout hope, which may sometimes
happen to those who are stranded historically. It is a disguise by
which energy conceals that it has failed to make its rendezvous with
purpose; that it has lost touch--in Alfred North Whitehead’s
terms--~th the "upward trend". Having its faith in reason sorely
shaken, this negative dialectic invokes "life" against reason, claiming
that even movement without a rational goal is better than none. For
this desperate~ nerve-toru, negative dialectic, movement becomes
edged with a streak of the diabolical, with a readiness for mad
alliances; for better these, it believes, than the surrender to a death-
welcoming passivity and to the rot of the nerve. It rejects recon-
ciliation, then, as the fa§ade of surrender-to-death.
I sympathise. Yet I have differences with that negative dialectic.
It is not my form of the negative dialectic; it is kith, but not kin.
For one thing, I would launch no critique of What Is with the bland
confidence that I differ profoundly from what I reject. Our own
negative dialectic knows that it shares a common human corrupt-
ability~ whose sprouting only waits. We do not think ourselves
better men but only later men. We know that those whom we
oppose are our fathers and that we, their enemies, are their children.
We know, in short, that the struggle is internecine. We are certain
that the past has taught us the most cultivated vices; but doubt that
it has bequeathed us only its corruptions. We know that our virtues
as well as our vices have a certain inherited grounding, and that if
the past has taught us obedience, it has also fostered our courage
to rebellion. We know~ then~ that some forms of the negative
dialectic are grounded in compulsiveness and that this is not
emancipation but part of what we need emancipation from.
Above all, we know that our fathers will die and that we do not
ao
always need to kill .them. Our kind of reconciliation cultivates the
capacity to wait, as well as to strike.
To be reconciled:
to accept ourselves as the product of a past that we reject, while
knowing that our skill and will in conquering it are past-
grounded too;
to recognise that we will not accomplish all that we had sought,
without struggling for it the less;
to know that we often act in more anger than the target itself
deserves and to know that in this respect, too, we reproduce
the limits of that enemy-past;
to accept the defective and crippled destiny that is ours without
self-pity, without blinking at its defectiveness, and without
denying our duty to resist the present.
To be reconciled: to have grasped that reconciliation is only one
modality of existence and is not the culminating terminus, but the
ever-present, sweet underside of struggle. Reconciliation and
struggle are the mutual groundings of human existence. It is not
that it is only the strugglers who need reconciliation, yet it is only
they who can achieve it, but not through struggle. A life without
struggle would need no reconciliation, nor be capable of it; for
reconciliation is the transcendence of struggle. Struggle and
reconciliation: the Yin and Yang of social being.
The strength of the present, and its capacity to resist its enemies,
is profoundly protected by its control over and readiness to use its
power;to use open force if necessary with that steady callousness
sometimes sanctified as tradition. The power of the present, how-
ever, derives also from its ability to co-opt and to corrupt its~
opposition. Correspondingly, that power has its reciprocal condition
in men’s fear of violence, in our need for parents and gods to
protect us, in our egoistic ambitions, and in our reluctance to forgo
sweet comfort. We are there, trained, ready and waiting to respond
appropriately to the terrors and the temptations that are also there.
Our own desires and interests are the underside of the system’s
power and brutality.
But add this: there is.an’element of reason even in Opportunism,
venality, andmadness. The’system does not control simply through
its brutalities or corruptions.
 Is it selfishness and irrationality if we choose our sensuous
existence, the sight of swaying flowers, the smell of baking bread,
the touch of a willing lover, the fulfilling care of a wanting child;
is it irrational of us to prefer our enjoyment of these to their
asceticism, to their hatred of enjoyment, to their eagerness for
dying and killing? Their words promise a better world. But for
whom? Is it for us? Are we so irrational to choose their untestable
words against the evidence of our experience?
Consider the countless complaints that some intellectuals have
lodged against the Western working classes, against the "cor-
ruption" of the American working class, its "consumeristic
fetishism", its apolitical privatisation, its toleration of labour
bureaucrats. Or again, consider similar complaints against the
working classes of Italy and France; their accommodation to the
status quo; their docile acceptance of the Communist parties in these
countries; their betrayal of the events of May t968, and so on. But
yet, is this corruption or prudence? \Vhat are the concrete alterna-
fives they face? To whom should the French proletariat have gone
over in May i968--to bearded striplings whom they had never seen
before; or to those like themselves who shared their work, their
lives, and their tastes.
In France and in Italy, the Communist parties are, compared to
some of the alternatives, not just pillars of the social order but
veritable paragons of rationality; at least, relatively and com-
paratively speaking. To say they have "betrayed the revolution" is
the accusative semantic of an alternative translation that says: one
can still talk with them. The charge against them now is not merely
that they are "the agent of a foreign power"--that was the critique
of an older generation--but, most fundamentally, that they have
not yet killed their enemies. The charges now come from a younger
generation, being their critique from the "left"; it boils down to
saying that the Communist parties have lost their taste for killing
and that they still continue talking with the agents of the system:
that they vowed to bury.
Who, then, has more sanity today? Who, more rationality?
Ch~’s rationality lies bur~ed with his bones in Bolivia. Is it not
rational to distinguish between courage and machismo? What of the
ritual political murders by Indian Naxalites (4,ooo of them within
one year), the invokers of instant revolution? These holy murderers
randomly slaughtered the class enemy, chanting litanies as they slit
their victims’ throats, literally dipping their hands in their blood;
proclaiming revolutionary slogans, they symbolically fuse the
vermillion of tile Tantras and the red of revolution and "blood.
(Richard Schechner, A Letter from Calcutta, Salrnagunth’, Winter
1974, p. 56.) Are the Naxalites, tile Tupameros, the kidnappers,
the mailers of letter bombs, the urban machine-gunners, the hi-
jackers, the gunmen with cyanide bullets; are they the agents of a
higher rationality than the system they seek to destroy? It is hard
to believe.
It is more likely by far that the system they oppose also survives
for some good reasons: because it has a measure of rationality;
because it gives some people some of the things they want, whether
or not others hold they should want them; because, to some degree,
it enables most people to live the way most people have wanted to
live since time immemorial; caring for their families, raising their
children, doing their work. Beyond the callousness, repressiveness,
and brutality of; the system, there are shreds of rationality that
protect it; and’ when that thins there remains the obvious lack of
rationality of so many of the visible alternatives. Whocan’blz/m~/
the Italians, the French, and the American pr01etariats,-indfiding
the Communist masses, for lacking a revolutionary ardour’when
such ardour might simply succeed .in reproducing another Russian
"socialism"? Would it be an expression of these proletariats’
rationality were they to spill the river of blood required on behalf
of another grey, paranoic, dull, bureaucratic monstrosity? .....
The old regimes survive, then, partly because of their own
rationality~and the& own brutallty--and partly because of the
irrationality and brutality of the alternatives. Perhaps the western
working class might create a new political order better than those.
But would it be’rational for the Communist masses themselves to
suppose that tile Stalinist bureaucracies that still largely control
their own party apparatus could achieve that something better, or
even have a will to do so? What is rational is to countenance and
to encourage their party’s betrayal of such a revolution, precisely
because had they made it, it would have had no rational issi~e. In
short, much of the proletariat’s accommodation to the present is,
given its alternatives, rational. It is intellectual arrogance---the
arrogance of some intellectuals--to suppose that the accommodation
of the proletariat is merely an expression of their "false conscious-
ness" or their political gullibility.
23
 In the West (and it is primarily of this I speak and not of the
great depressed and exploited sections of Asia or Africa), a strange
world situation has developed: The dominant society, a bourgeois
society, that transformed itself into corporate neo-capitalism,
produced a revolutionary critique of itself in a Marxism and social-
ism; but this was never enacted there, in the land of its birth, but
only e!sewhere, in relatively "undeveloped" societies. For the West,
the ’~contradictions" of capitalism produced a socialist solution that
only men gasping /n extremis would grasp at. In the West, the
imperialist brutality, scandal-ridden, and domestic callousness of
corporate capitalism are all too evident. But so, too, are the
pathologies and political monstrosities of its supposed antithesis, the
Socialist States that were supposed to transcend the ills of Capitalism.
The uniqueness of our era in the West is this: we have lived, and
still five, thrqugh a desperate political malaise, while, at the same
time, We have also out-lived the desperate revolutionary remedies
that had been thought to solve it. The old illness remains, but it is
now complicated by the fact that the remedies proposed for it have
not really improved upon it at all. We live at a time, then, when
the West’s political past and its political future, have, for the time,
exhausted themselves. In such a time, it is diffacuh to hope for a
reconciliation with what is, or for rescue from it even by some
painful but necessary remedy. In such a time, then, it is easy to
understand how a bitter negative dialectic, such as that discussed
critically above, could flourish.
Fundamentally, that negative dialectic was the last gasp of
Enlightenment progress; its despair was the despair of those whose
deepest instincts are always to go forward, to transcend, to climb,
but who, once having seen Stalinism at close hand, simply saw no
way forward. Worse than that, having also seen Naziism close-up,
they had seen vividly how much horror the present might yet
spew up. Caught between the barbarism born of the old societies
and the barbarism of the new society supposed to transcend it, they
had little to hope or to reach for; stranded and abandoned by
history they were left with only the "great refusal" of the negative
dialectic. The lineal logic of their residual belief in progress,
sublimated and rationalised as a hoped-for transcendence of the
present by a future born of it, had simply collapsed. How could one
think of any reconciliation with a society that could produce
Naziism, that still retained this once realised potentiality? And if
during tile war against Naziism one had remained quiet about
Stalinism, to ensure that nothing would mar the unity of the forces
needed to stamp out Naziism, in time the disciplined silence left
many with a burned-out deadness, without hope for a future. There
was nothing to which one could any more say, yes. That negative
dialectic exhibits that a belief in history, as the site of hope, had
come to an end.
Our own different standpoint is not that of a negative dialectic,
but rather, of what we may call a dark dialectic. Its hopes for the
future are slim. It expects an increasing grimness and grezness.
Rather than pushing forward with confidence that we know the
way, we see the growing failure of the most visible historical
alternatives, which all seem profoundly flawed. We think that what
is necessary is an effort, once again, to re-think the historical
position; this, of course, must be anathema to those "frieficls" to
whom history has already confided its intentions. As the ne,w
Chinese say, "Build deep shelters, stock it with grain, and never
seek hegemony". Rather than sounding tile call for a new forward
march, we suspect that the time is coming fast when we had better
build new kinds of fortresses, to husband some of the intellectual
goods that we still have, and to prepare for a long siege, i ¯
’ It-is only When the present dissolution of traditional’cUltural
patterns is seen through the pre-vision of a residual Enlightenment
expectation of progress that the deteriorating present is taken to
be the precursor to transcending revolution. Without the jgranny
spectacles of progress, however, all that we may be sure;.of is the
deepening crisis and dissolution of the old order. It is a’time of
anomle that is upon us in the West, and of that only ma~/we be
sure. Only those with faith, however, will be confident that this
anomie is the birth pangs of a better social order. There is only the
thinnest line, as Eric Hobsbawm argues, between the lootZseeking
criminal and the political rebel. But random urban murder/; do not,
surely, pre-figure barricades; rape is not necessarily the ro)~al road
to revolution. When Marx said that the choice was socialism or
barbarism he did not count upon a situation in which tile for~es of
barbarism might out-speed those of socialism, let alone conceive
that socialism itself might pioneer new styles in barbarism (although
the Paris manuscripts seem at points to suggest just that). A dark
dialectic does not believe "history is on our side" and, therefore,
it looks elsewhere than to history for reconciliation.
 The problem of reconciliation arises of course in the relation
between ourselves, our ambitions, and the world. If the world was
totally at our disposal there would be no problem of reconciling
ourselves. To make the world "ours" is a matter of work, reflection,
and struggle. But may we suppose that given enough time, these
would indeed make the world ours? And if we do, if we are
victorious in work, thought, and struggle, and finally win the world,
is there any guarantee that it will be all that we had wanted? Is there
any compelling reason to assume that possession of the world
ensures its loveability?
Of course, we can always assume that if the world once conquered
turns out not to be what was wanted, we will simply remake it.
\Ve are then faced wida dte following choice: eidaer we assume that
no reconciliation is necessary, since men can always make the world
what they want it to be; or we accept the need for some reconcilia-
tion, simply because there really are others in the world; beings who
like us want to be themselves, and not us, and not be subiect to our
dominion. If the world is more nearly like that, reconciliation is a
requirement of reason. Above all, it means an acceptance of the
limbs of our own power. The rejection of reconciliation is the
modern fantasy of newly empowered persons who, released from
an ancient bondage, now imagine they have unlimited power. But
dais is an illusion and an anomie. Our reconsideration of recon-
ciliation is no new plea for an ancient resignation; it is a post-modern
opposition to a humanistic imperialism; it is a struggle against the
anomic quest for power; it is an argument that men must transcend
the idiot dialectic between slavery and godhood. But this will not
satisfy those eternal youths who still place their highest hopes in
politics, nor was it meant to.
The problem of reconciliation is a great and hallowed topic, a
form of intellectual heroism, we might say, that philosophy
inherited from theology. Perhaps, rather than talking about recon-
ciliation in the grand manner we would do better to speak quietly,
as witnesses of our time, about the need for modesty. To talk of
"modesty" is the witnesses’ way of talking of reconciliation.
Modesty is a key requirement as compelling in its claim on social
theorists today as "obiectivity" or "rigour" and is perhaps particu-
larly appropriate for the grim period ahead. It deserves to have
just a word said about, and for, it.
To begin with, we might remember the modesty of the "pro-
z6
fessional"--and let us say at once, it gave modesty a bad name.
The professional’s "modesty": to operate within the narrow confines
of his technical interests and departmental boundaries; to accept
these excruciating limits at the cost of all human relevance and even
of simple human liveliness; and patiently to mould one’s little
"brick" of knowledge contentedly adding it to the "wall" of
"science"; making one’s contribution to the future anonymously--
modestly? The professional’s modesty is to accept the paradigm
he has received, along with the limits it embodies, and to wish to
be no more than a "normal scientist". The modesty of the sober
professional is a thing that really needs "remembering". For it is
questionable whether, or how much, still exists now after the heady
era of the professional sociologist as confidant and guide to states-
men; as prime contractor for the sociological pyramids of the
welfare-warfare State; as Great Publicists who publicly eulogise
their own fictitious achievements chanting "Happy Birthday To
Me, Happy Birthday Dearly Beloved, Happy Birthday To Me".*
Modesty requires us to renounce, what Pierre Bourdieu calls,
"the logic peculiar to the French intellectual field that requires
every intellectual to pronounce himself totally on each and every
problem. Every intellectual felt himself perpetually put on notice
by all others . . . to justify his intellectual status by a political
commitment in keeping with his public image, and, more specifi-
cally, to examine all the political consequences of his political
options .... ’\Ve must miss nothing of our time,’ Sartre wrote in
the Manifesto with which he introduced the first number of Temps
Modernes . . . it is always tile same chasing after the latest aliena-
tion." (Pierre Bourdieu, "Sociology and Philosophy in France
since 194~: Death and Resurrection of Philosophy Without A
Subject," Social Research, Spring, I967, pp. I74-7~.)
Modesty: however, is not ambition castrated. Considering the
calamity of things today, we cannot be too ambitious. True
"ambition" is only the unity of theory and practice on behalf of
hope.
What, then, is the modesty needed? It is "pessimism of the

* if anyone thinks this an overdrawn parody, let him consult ]rving Louis
Horowitz’s "novelised" account of the first ten years of Trar~-.4ction, magesteri-
ally self-entitled, "On Entering the Tenth Year of Trans-action: The Relation-
ship of Social Science and Critical Journalism," no less. Socieo,, Nov.-Dec.
197z, Vo]. 1o, no. ].
intelligence and optimism of the will". It is the ferocious struggle
to keep a clear mind in the face of. terrible news. Modesty is a
striving for personal objectivity; for that objectivity which begins
at home. Modesty, then, is a realism about our own work that
knows that the measure of its achievement is neither proportionate
to the world’s need, nor to our own.
Modesty is also admitting one’s mistakes. In public. How can
one even imagine that an intellectual discipline can have an institu-
tionalised norm of modesty when none of its members e~,er, ever,
admit a mistake publicly. Modesty is the certainty that one must
make mistakes, because one has tried so hard. Modesty is not the
avoidance of mistakes and the protection of one’s ego by pedestrian,
risk-free undertakings. Modesty. is not like atheism. The atheist
claims he does not believe in God, but he acts like Prometheus. The
truly modest know that they are neither God nor Prometheus.
Modesty is to know that one cannot trust oneself, and to trust that
this condition is improving.
In the decades ahead, it behoves theorists to eschew Comteian
or positivistic sociologies that compare themselves to the high and
exact sciences. Whatever else it is, surely that is an all too familiar
/m-modesty. And it is immodesty, too~ when it is said that we shall
make no assumptions, but simply "tell it as it "s.. This is the
immodest delusion of those who think they are self-grounded and
self-created, and whose minds, like God’s, can shed themselves of
all presuppositions. To be modest is also to reject the pretentious-
ness, the sham, and the shop-worn excuse which claims that
sociology’s weaknesses are due to its being a "young" and
"immature" discipline. The modest remember that they are part
of a human effort at self-knowing whose antiquity is attested to by
a certain inscription on a certain temple at Delphi.
There is, of course, more than one form of immodesty. For
example, there are those who feel that they already possess all that
is needed to be the makers and shakers of entire worlds. Who feel
powerful (and righteous) enough to bring the old world crashing
down and a new, better world into existence. Yet if their’s is not
the virtue of modesty, neither is it the vice of complacency; and
sometimes it is the virtue of compassion for man’s suffering. But
even that oaklike human virtue can be suffocated by arrogance. The
personal integrity and courage of many Marxists deserves to be
respected, but not their claims on behalf of their theory. Concerning
28
these~ we may say what we have said about the claims put forward
by academic, "normal" sociology: No one will ever accuse you of
being too modest!
Marxist immodesty: When Louis Althusser speaks of Marx as
having made "the greatest discovery of human history..." (.Letu~
and Philosophy And Other Essays, p. 7). And what of the wheel?-
Of fire or agriculture?
The modesty called for here, then, says simply: Let others present
themselves as the practitioners of a high and rigorous science of
society; let others present themselves as the Tarzans of revolutionary
politics. An ape is still an ape~ as Hans Werner Henze tells us, even
if it has been taught to cry "Geist! Geist!" Exaggerated claims are
not a mark of genius; Engels told us long ago what they are
symptomatic of~ in his last words on D/Jhring.
Were we proper pagans we might make a sacrifice to the building
of a better world, and circumcise our illusions about ourselves. We
believe the truth must be, or might be made, just barely enough to
live by. In any event, in this project for modesty~ it is certain that
we will receive the unstinting encouragement of our critics.