3rd Generation Partnership Project;

Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;

3GPP TS 33.511
V16.8.0
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for (2022-09)
the next
generation
Technical Specification

Node B (gNodeB) network product class

(Release 16)

The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP TM) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP..
The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented.
This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this
Specification.
Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP TM system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices.
 2 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Keywords
SCAS, 5G,gNodeB,network product class,
security

3GPP

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3GPP
 3 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Contents
Foreword...................................................................................................................................................5
1 Scope..............................................................................................................................................6
2 References.......................................................................................................................................6
3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations............................................................................................6
3.1 Terms...........................................................................................................................................................6
3.2 Abbreviations..............................................................................................................................................6
4 gNodeB-specific security requirements and related test cases........................................................7
4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................................7
4.2 gNodeB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases...........................7
4.2.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................................7
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test
cases.......................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP specifications – TS 33.501
[2].....................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.2.1.1 Integrity protection of RRC-signalling......................................................................................7
4.2.2.1.2 Integrity protection of user data between the UE and the gNB.................................................8
4.2.2.1.3 VOID..........................................................................................................................................8
4.2.2.1.4 RRC integrity check failure.......................................................................................................8
4.2.2.1.5 UP integrity check failure..........................................................................................................9
4.2.2.1.6 Ciphering of RRC-signalling...................................................................................................10
4.2.2.1.7 Ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB..............................................................10
4.2.2.1.8 Replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB..................................................11
4.2.2.1.9 Replay protection of RRC-signalling.......................................................................................12
4.2.2.1.10 Ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF.....................................12
4.2.2.1.11 Integrity of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF.......................................13
4.2.2.1.12 AS algorithms selection..........................................................................................................14
4.2.2.1.13 Key refresh at the gNB.............................................................................................................14
4.2.2.1.14 Bidding down prevention in Xn-handovers.............................................................................16
4.2.2.1.15 AS protection algorithm selection in gNB change...................................................................16
4.2.2.1.16 Control plane data confidentiality protection over N2/Xn interface........................................16
4.2.2.1.17 Control plane data integrity protection over N2/Xn interface.................................................16
4.2.2.1.18 Key update at the gNB on dual connectivity...........................................................................17
4.2.3 Technical Baseline...............................................................................................................................18
4.2.3.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................18
4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information.....................................................................................................18
4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general...............................................................................18
4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing........................................................18
4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage..............................................................................18
4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer..............................................................................18
4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data...............................................................................................18
4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity...............................................................................................18
4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization...................................................................................................18
4.2.3.4.1 Authentication attributes..........................................................................................................19
4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions.........................................................................................................................19
4.2.3.6 Logging..........................................................................................................................................19
4.2.4 Operating systems...............................................................................................................................19
4.2.5 Web servers.........................................................................................................................................19
4.2.6 Network devices..................................................................................................................................19
4.2.6.1 Protection of data and information................................................................................................19
4.2.6.2 Protecting availability and integrity...............................................................................................19
4.2.6.2.1 Packet filtering.........................................................................................................................19
4.2.6.2.2 Interface robustness requirements............................................................................................19
4.2.6.2.3 GTP-C Filtering.......................................................................................................................19
4.2.6.2.4 GTP-U Filtering.......................................................................................................................19

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 4 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

4.2.7 Void.....................................................................................................................................................19
4.3 gNodeB-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.......................................20
4.3.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................20
4.3.2 Technical Baseline...............................................................................................................................20
4.3.3 Operating Systems...............................................................................................................................20
4.3.4 Web Servers.........................................................................................................................................20
4.3.5 Network Devices.................................................................................................................................20
4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture................................................................................20
4.4 gNodeB-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases.............20

Annex A (informative): Change history..................................................................................................21

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 5 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Foreword
This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal
TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an
identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

x the first digit:

1 presented to TSG for information;

2 presented to TSG for approval;

3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.

y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections,
updates, etc.

z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

3GPP
 6 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

1 Scope
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the gNB network product
class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the
requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the gNB network
product class.

2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present
document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or
non-specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including
a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same
Release as the present document.

[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[2] 3GPP TS 33.501 (Release 15): "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".

[3] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".

[4] 3GPP TS 33.216: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the evolved Node B (eNB)
network product class".

[5] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP
network product classes".

[6] 3GPP TS 38.331: "NR; Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol specification".

3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations

3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term
defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An
abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in
3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

5GC 5G Core Network

AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
gNB NR Node B
NG Next Generation
NG-RAN 5G Radio Access Network
SMF Session Management Function

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 7 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

4 gNodeB-specific security requirements and related

test cases

4.1 Introduction
gNB specific security requirements include both requirements derived from gNB-specific security functional
requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to gNB as described in TR 33.926 [5].
Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117
[3] and are not repeated in the present document.

4.2 gNodeB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements

and related test cases
4.2.1 Introduction
Present clause contains gNB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.

4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP

specifications and related test cases

4.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP

specifications – TS 33.501 [2]

4.2.2.1.1 Integrity protection of RRC-signalling

Requirement Name: Integrity protection of RRC-signalling

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support integrity protection of RRC-signalling over the NG RAN air
interface" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.2 – Control plane data integrity protection.

Test Case:

Test Name: TC_CP_DATA_INT_RRC-SIGN_gNB

Purpose: To verify that the RRC-signalling data sent between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface are integrity
protected.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE may be simulated.

- Tester shall have access to the integrity algorithm and the integrity protection keys.

- The tester can capture the message via the NG RAN air interface, or can capture the message at the UE.

Execution Steps:

1. The NIA0 is disabled at UE and gNB.

2. gNB sends AS SMC message to the UE, and UE responses AS SMP.

3. Check any RRC message sent by gNB after sending AS SMC and before UE enters CM-Idle state is integrity
protected.

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 8 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Expected Results:

Any RRC-signalling over the NG RAN air interface is integrity protected after gNB sending AS SMC.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.2 Integrity protection of user data between the UE and the gNB
Requirement Name: Integrity protection of user data between the UE and the gNB.

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support integrity protection of user data packets over the NG RAN air
interface" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3.

NOTE: This requirement does not apply to the gNB that is used as a secondary node connecting to the EPC.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.4 – User plane data integrity protection.

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-INT_gNB

Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are integrity protected over the NG RAN air interface.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE may be simulated.

- Tester shall enable the user plane integrity protection and ensure NIA0 is not used.

- Tester shall have knowledge of integrity algorithm and integrity protection keys.

- The tester can capture the message via the NG RAN air interface, or can capture the message at the UE.

Execution Steps:

1. The NIA0 is disabled at UE and gNB.

2. gNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration with integrity protection indication "on".

3. Check any User data sent by gNB after sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration and before UE enters CM-Idle
state is Integrity protected.

Expected Results:

Any user plane packets sent between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface after gNB sending
RRCConnectionReconfiguration is integrity protected.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.3 VOID

4.2.2.1.4 RRC integrity check failure

Requirement Name: RRC integrity check failure

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.5.1

Requirement Description: "The RRC integrity checks shall be performed both in the ME and the gNB. In case failed
integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I) is detected after the start of integrity protection, the concerned message
shall be discarded. This can happen on the gNB side or on the ME side." as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.5.1.

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 9 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Threat References: TR 33.926 [4], clause D.2.2.2, Control plane data integrity protection

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-CP-DATA-RRC-INT-CHECK_gNB

Purpose:

Verify that RRC integrity check failure is handled correctly by the gNB.

Pre-Conditions:

Test environment with a UE. The UE may be simulated. RRC integrity protection is activated at the gNB.

Execution Steps

1a) The UE sends a RRC message to the gNB without MAC-I; or

1b)The UE sends a RRC message to the gNB with a wrong MAC-I.

2b)The gNB verifies the integrity of the RRC message from the UE.

Expected Results:

The RRC message is discarded by the gNB after step 1a) or after step 2b).

Expected format of evidence:

Sample copies of the log files.

4.2.2.1.5 UP integrity check failure

Requirement Name: UP integrity check failure

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.6.4

Requirement Description: "If the gNB or the UE receives a PDCP PDU which fails integrity check with faulty or
missing MAC-I after the start of integrity protection, the PDU shall be discarded." as specified in TS 33.501 [2],
clause 6.6.4.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [4], clause D.2.2.4, User plane data integrity protection

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-RRC-INT-CHECK_gNB

Purpose:

Verify that UP integrity check failure is handled correctly by the gNB.

Pre-Conditions:

Test environment with a UE. The UE may be simulated. UP integrity protection is activated at the gNB.

Execution Steps

1a) The UE sends a PDCP PDU to the gNB without MAC-I; or

1b)The UE sends a PDCP PDU to the gNB with a wrong MAC-I.

2b)The gNB verifies the integrity of the PDCP PDU from the UE.

Expected Results:

The PDCP PDU is discarded by the gNB after step 1a) or after step 2b).

Expected format of evidence:

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 10 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.6 Ciphering of RRC-signalling

Requirement Name: Ciphering of RRC-signalling

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support ciphering of RRC-signalling over the NG RAN air interface" as
specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.1 – Control plane data confidentiality protection.

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-CP-DATA-CIP-RRC-SIGN_gNB

Purpose: To verify that the RRC-signalling data sent between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface are
confidentiality protected.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE may be simulated.

- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface or can capture the message at the UE.

Execution Steps:

1. The UE sends a Registraton Request to the AMF.

2. The AMF sends a KgNB and the UE security capability to the gNB.

3. The gNB selects an algorithm and sends AS SMC to the UE.

4. The gNB receive AS SMP from the UE.Expected Results:

Control plane packets sent to the UE after the gNB sends AS SMC is ciphered.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.7 Ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB

Requirement Name: Ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall provide ciphering of user data packets between the UE and the gNB on NG
RAN air interface" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.3 – User plane data confidentiality protection at gNB

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-CIP_gNB

Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are confidentiality protected over the NG RAN air interface.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE may be simulated.

- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface or can capture the message at the UE.

Execution Steps:

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 11 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

1. The UE sends PDU session establishment Request to the SMF.

2. The SMF sends a UP security policy with UP ciphering required or preferred to the gNB.

3. The gNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration with ciphering protection indication "on".

4. Check any user data sent by the gNB after sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration and before the UE enters into
CM-Idle state.

Expected Results:

The user plane packets sent to the UE after the gNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration is confidentiality protected.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.8 Replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB
Requirement Name: Replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB.

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3

Requirement Description: "the gNB shall support integrity protection and replay protection of user data between the
UE and the gNB" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.4 – User plane data integrity protection.

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-REPLAY_gNB

Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are replay protected over the NG RAN air interface.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE may be simulated.

- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface.

- The tester shall active the user plane integrity protection of the RRC-signalling packets.

Execution Steps:

1. The tester shall capture the user plane data sent between UE and gNB using any network analyser over the NG
RAN air interface.

2. Tester shall filter user plane data packets sent between UE and gNB.

3. Tester shall replay the captured user plane packets or shall use any packet crafting tool to create a user plane
packet similar to the captured user plane packet and replay to the gNB.

4. Tester shall check whether the replayed user plane packets were processed by the gNB by capturing over NG
RAN air interface to see if any corresponding response message is received from the gNB.

5. Tester shall confirm that gNB provides replay protection by dropping/ignoring the replayed packet if no
corresponding response is received from the gNB to the replayed packet.

6. Tester shall verify from the result that if the replayed user plane packets are not accepted by gNB, the NG RAN
air interface is replay protected.

Expected Results:

The user plane packets sent between the UE and gNB over the NG air interface is replay protected.

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 12 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.9 Replay protection of RRC-signalling

Requirement Name: Replay protection of RRC-signalling.

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support integrity protection and replay protection of RRC-signalling " as
specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.2 – Control plane data integrity protection.

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-RRC-REPLAY_gNB

Purpose: To verify the replay protection of RRC-signalling between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments.

- Tester shall have knowledge of the integrity algorithm and the corresponding protection keys.

- The tester shall have access to the NG RANs air interface.

- The tester shall active the integrity protection of RRC-signalling.

Execution Steps:

1. The tester shall capture the data sent between UE and the gNB using any network analyser over the NG RAN air
interface.

2. Tester shall filter RRC signalling packets.

3. Tester shall check for the RRC SQN of the filtered RRC signalling packets and shall use any packet crafting tool
to create RRC signalling packets similar to the captured packets or the tester shall replay the captured RRC
uplink packet to the gNB to perform the replay attack over gNB.

4. Tester shall check whether the replayed RRC signalling packets were processed by the gNB or not, by capturing
over NG RAN air interface to see if any corresponding response message is received from the gNB.

5. Tester shall confirm that gNB provides replay protection by dropping/ignoring the replayed packet if no
corresponding response is sent by the gNB to the replayed packet.

Expected Results:

The RRC signalling over the NG RAN air interface is replay protected.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.10 Ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF
Requirement Name: Ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall activate ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF"
as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.8 – Security Policy Enforcement.

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 13 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-CIP-SMF

Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are confidentiality protected based on the security policy sent by the SMF
via AMF

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE and the 5GC may
be simulated.

- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface.

- The tester shall have knowledge of the RRC and UP ciphering algorithm and protection keys.

- RRC ciphering is already activated at the gNB.

Execution Steps:

1. The tester triggers PDU session establishment procedure by sending PDU session establishment request
message.

2. Tester shall trigger the SMF to send the UP security policy with ciphering protection "required" or "not needed"
to the gNB.

3. The tester shall capture the RRC connection reconfiguration procedure between gNB to UE over NG RAN air
interface. And filter the RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by gNB to UE.

4. The tester shall decrypt the RRC connection Reconfiguration message and retrieve the UP ciphering protection
indication presenting in the decrypted message.

5. The tester shall verify if the UP security policy received at gNB is same as the UP ciphering protection
indication notified by the gNB to the UE in the RRC connection Reconfiguration message.

6. Tester shall capture the RRC connection Reconfiguration complete message sent between UE and gNB.

6a. Tester shall capture the user plane data sent between UE and gNB using any network analyser.

7. Tester shall check that the captured UP data is activated/de-activated according to the UP security policy.

Expected Results:

When the received UP cipher protection indication is set to “required”, the captured user plane data appear to be garbled
(i.e. no longer plaintext) and the user plane packets are confidentiality protected based on the UP security policy sent by
the SMF.

When the received UP cipher protection indication is set to "not needed", the captured user plane data appear to be
plaintext and the user plane packets are not confidentiality protected based on the UP security policy sent by the SMF.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.11 Integrity of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF
Requirement Name: Integrity of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2

Requirement Description: "The gNB shall provide integrity protection of user data based on the security policy sent by
the SMF" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.8 – Security Policy Enforcement.

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 14 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Test Case:

Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-INT-SMF

Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are integrity protected based on the security policy sent by the SMF.

Pre-Condition:

- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE and the 5GC may
be simulated.

- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface.

- The tester shall have knowledge of the integrity algorithm and protection keys.

- RRC integrity and cipher are already activated at the gNB.

Execution Steps:

1. The tester triggers PDU session establishment procedure by sending PDU session establishment request
message.

2. Tester shall trigger the SMF to send the UP security policy with integrity protection is "required" or "not needed"
to the gNB.

3. The tester shall capture the RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by gNB to UE over NG RAN air
interface.

4. The tester shall decrypt the RRC connection reconfiguration message and retrieve the UP integrity protection
indication presenting in the decrypted message.

5. Tester shall check whether UP integrity is enabled /disabled to verify if the UP security policy received at gNB is
same as the UP integrity protection indication notified by the gNB to the UE in the RRC connection
reconfiguration message.

6. Tester shall capture the user plane data sent between UE and gNB using any network analyser.

7. The tester shall check whether the user plane data packet contains a message authentication code.

Expected Results:
When the received UP integrity protection is set to "required", the user plane data packet contains a message
authentication code and the user plane packets are integrity protected based on the security policy sent by the SMF.

When the received UP interity protection is set to "not needed", the user plane data packet message authentication code
is not present and the user plane packets are not integrity protected based on the security policy sent by the SMF.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

4.2.2.1.12 AS algorithms selection

Requirement Name: AS algorithms selection

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.7.3.0 and clause 5.11.2.

Requirement Description:"The serving network shall select the algorithms to use dependent on: the UE security
capabilities of the UE, the configured allowed list of security capabilities of the currently serving network entity." as
specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.11.2".

"Each gNB shall be configured via network management with lists of algorithms which are allowed for usage. There
shall be one list for integrity algorithms, and one for ciphering algorithms. These lists shall be ordered according to a
priority decided by the operator." as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.7.3.0.

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 15 3GPP TS 33.511 V16.8.0 (2022-09)

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], D.2.2.5 – AS algorithm selection and use

Test Case: the test case in subclause 4.2.2.1.5 of TS 33.216 [4]

4.2.2.1.13 Key refresh at the gNB

Requirement Name: Key refresh at the gNB

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.9.4.1; TS 38.331 [6], clause 5.3.1.2

Requirement Description: "Key refresh shall be possible for KgNB, KRRC-enc, KRRC-int, KUP-int, and KUP-enc and shall be
initiated by the gNB when a PDCP COUNTs are about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with
the same KgNB." as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.9.4.1.

"The network is responsible for avoiding reuse of the COUNT with the same RB identity and with the same key,
e.g. due to the transfer of large volumes of data, release and establishment of new RBs, and multiple termination
point changes for RLC-UM bearers. In order to avoid such re-use, the network may e.g. use different RB identities
for RB establishments, change the AS security key, or an RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE/RRC_INACTIVE
and then to RRC_CONNECTED transition." as specified in TS 38.331 [6], clause 5.3.1.2.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.7 Key Reuse

Test Case :

Test Name: TC_GNB_KEY_REFRESH_DRB_ID

Purpose:

Verify that the gNB performs KgNB refresh when DRB-IDs are about to be reused under the following conditions:

- the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity while the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0, or

- the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around.

Pre-Conditions:

The UE, AMF and SMF may be simulated.

Execution Steps

1) The gNB sends the AS Security Mode Command message to the UE.

2) The UE responds with the AS Security Mode Complete message.

3) A DRB is set up.

4) DRB is set up and torn down for multiple times within one active radio connection without the UE going to idle
(e.g. by the UE making multiple IMS calls, or by the SMF requesting PDU session modification and deactivation
via the AMF), until the DRB ID is reused.

Expected Results:

Before DRB ID reuse, the gNB takes a new KgNB into use by e.g. triggering an intra-cell handover or triggering a
transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED.

Expected format of evidence:

Part of log that shows all the DRB identities and the intra-cell handover or the transition from RRC_CONNECTED to
RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED. This part can be presented, for example, as a
screenshot.

4.2.2.1.14 Bidding down prevention in Xn-handovers

Requirement Name: Bidding Down Prevention

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.7.3.1

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Requirement Description: "In the Path-Switch message, the target gNB shall send the UE's 5G security capabilities, UP
security policy with corresponding PDU session ID received from the source gNB to the AMF." as specified in
TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.7.3.1."

Threat References: TR 33.926 [4], clause D.2.2.6 Bidding Down on Xn-Handover

Test Case: the test case in subclause 4.2.2.1.10 of TS 33.216 [4]

4.2.2.1.15 AS protection algorithm selection in gNB change

Requirement Name: AS protection algorithm selection in gNB change.

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clauses 6.7.3.1 and 6.7.3.2

Requirement Description: "The target gNB shall select the algorithm with highest priority from the UE's 5G security
capabilities according to the locally configured prioritized list of algorithms (this applies for both integrity and
ciphering algorithms). The chosen algorithms shall be indicated to the UE in the Handover Command message if the
target gNB selects different algorithms compared to the source gNB " as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.7.3.1, and
clause 6.7.3.2.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], D.2.2.5 – AS algorithm selection and use

Test Case: the test case in subclause 4.2.2.1.11 of TS 33.216 [4]

4.2.2.1.16 Control plane data confidentiality protection over N2/Xn interface

Requirement Name: Control plane data confidentiality protection over N2/Xn interface

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clauses 9.2 and 9.4

Requirement Description: "The transport of control plane data over N2 shall be integrity, confidentiality and
replay-protected." "The transport of control plane data and user data over Xn shall be integrity, confidentiality and
replay-protected." as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clauses 9.2 and 9.4.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.1 – Control plane data confidentiality protection.

Test Case: the test case in subclause 4.2.2.1.1 of TS 33.216 [4]

4.2.2.1.17 Control plane data integrity protection over N2/Xn interface

Requirement Name: Control plane data integrity protection over N2/Xn interface

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501[2], clauses 9.2 and 9.4

Requirement Description: "The transport of control plane data over N2 shall be integrity, confidentiality and
replay-protected." "The transport of control plane data and user data over Xn shall be integrity, confidentiality and
replay-protected." as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clauses 9.2 and 9.4.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.2 – Control plane data integrity protection.

Test Case: the test case in subclause 4.2.2.1.2 of TS 33.216 [4].

4.2.2.1.18 Key update at the gNB on dual connectivity

Requirement Name: Key update at the gNB on dual connectivity

Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.10.2.1; clause 6.10.2.2.1.

Requirement Description: "When executing the procedure for adding subsequent radio bearer(s) to the same SN, the
MN shall, for each new radio bearer, assign a radio bearer identity that has not previously been used since the last K SN
change. If the MN cannot allocate an unused radio bearer identity for a new radio bearer in the SN, due to radio bearer
identity space exhaustion, the MN shall increment the SN Counter and compute a fresh KSN, and then shall perform a
SN Modification procedure to update the KSN" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.10.2.1.

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NOTE: The following testcases are only tested when the NR-NR DC, NE-DC and EN-DC scenarios are
deployed.

Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.7 Key Reuse

Test Case :

Test Name: TC_GNB_DC_KEY_UPDATE_DRB_ID

Purpose:

Verify that the gNB under test acting as a Master Node (MN) performs KSN update when DRB-IDs are about to be
reused.

Pre-Conditions:

- Test environment with a gNB or ng-eNB acting as the Secondary Node (SN), which may be simulated

- Test environment with a UE, SMF and AMF, which may be simulated

Execution Steps

1. The gNB under test establishes RRC connection and AS security context with the UE.

2. The gNB under test establishes security context between the UE and the SN for the given AS security context
shared between the gNB under test and the UE; and generates a KSN sent to the SN.

3. A SCG bearer is set up between the UE and the SN.

4. The gNB under test is triggered to execute the SN Modification procedure to provide additional available DRB
IDs to be used for SN terminated bearers (e.g. by the UE making multiple IMS calls, or by the SMF requesting
PDU session modification and deactivation via the AMF), until the DRB IDs are reused.

Expected Results:

- Before DRB ID reuse, the gNB under test generates a new KSN and sends it via the SN Modification Request
message to the SN.

Expected format of evidence:

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. text representation of the captured SN Modification Request message.

4.2.3 Technical Baseline

4.2.3.1 Introduction
The present clause provides baseline technical requirements.

4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information

4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.1 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.2 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.3 of TS 33.117 [3].

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4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data

The requirement and testcase in clause 4.2.3.2.5 of TS 33.117 [3] are not applicable to the gNB network products.

4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.3 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization

4.2.3.4.1 Authentication attributes

gNB-specific adaptation to clause 4.2.3.4.2.1 of TS 33.117 [2] is:

Dual-factor authentication by combining several authentication options as noted in clause 4.2.3.4.2.1 of TS 33.117 [2]
for higher level of security is not applicable to the gNB.

Apart from the above exception, there are no other gNB-specific adaptations to clause 4.2.3.4.2 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.5 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.3.6 Logging
There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.6 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.4 Operating systems

The gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.117 [3] are:

For the requirement defined in clause 4.2.4.1.1.2 Handling of ICMP of TS 33.117[3]:

- Echo Reply can be sent by default.

- In case of remote base station auto deployment, Router Advertisement can be processed. Apart from the above
exceptions, there are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.5 Web servers

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.5 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.6 Network devices

4.2.6.1 Protection of data and information

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.6.2 Protecting availability and integrity

4.2.6.2.1 Packet filtering

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6.2.1 of TS 33.117 [3].

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4.2.6.2.2 Interface robustness requirements

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6.2.2 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.6.2.3 GTP-C Filtering

The requirement and testcase in clause 4.2.6.2.3 of TS 33.117 [3] is not applicable to gNB network products.

4.2.6.2.4 GTP-U Filtering

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6.2.4 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.2.7 Void

4.3 gNodeB-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and

related test cases.
4.3.1 Introduction
The present clause contains gNB-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.

4.3.2 Technical Baseline

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.2 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.3.3 Operating Systems

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.3 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.3.4 Web Servers

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.4 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.3.5 Network Devices

There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.5 of TS 33.117 [3].

4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture

The requirements and test cases in clause 4.3.6 of TS 33.117 [3] are not applicable to the gNB network products.

4.4 gNodeB-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing

requirements and related test cases
There are no gNB-specific additions to clause 4.4 of TS 33.117 [3].

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Annex A (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date Meeting TDoc CR R Cat Subject/Comment New
ev version
2019-06 SA#84 Upgrade to change control version 16.0.0
2019-09 SA#85 SP-190688 0001 - F Add abbreviation and correct references 16.1.0
2019-09 SA#85 SP-190688 0002 1 F Editorial corrections on the threat references of some test cases 16.1.0
2019-09 SA#85 SP-190688 0003 1 F Update requirements and test cases for gNB SCAS 16.1.0
2019-09 SA#85 SP-190688 0005 - F Correction to test case requirement reference 16.1.0
2019-12 SA#86 SP-191138 0006 - F Adding the expected evidence 16.2.0
2019-12 SA#86 SP-191138 0007 1 F Update testcases for gNB SCAS 16.2.0
2019-12 SA#86 SP-191138 0008 - F Fix the reference numbers 16.2.0
2019-12 SA#86 SP-191138 0010 1 F Corrections for clean-up and alignment 16.2.0
2020-03 SA#87E SP-200136 0011 1 B Complete the test cases of key refresh at the gNB 16.3.0
2020-03 SA#87E SP-200136 0012 - B A new test case for key update at the gNB on dual connectivity 16.3.0
2020-07 SA#88E SP-200358 0013 1 F Update testcase in gNB SCAS 16.4.0
2020-07 SA#88E SP-200358 0014 1 F Remove mismatched threat references and test steps 16.4.0
2020-09 SA#89E SP-200703 0015 - F gNB-specific adaptation to account protection by authentication 16.5.0
attribute
2021-03 SA#91e SP-210117 0019 1 F gNB Cipher Security Policy Verification 16.6.0
2021-03 SA#91e SP-210117 0020 1 F gNB Integrity Security Policy Verification 16.6.0
2021-06 SA#92e SP-210446 0021 - F Editorial correction in clause 4.2.2.1.5 16.7.0
2021-06 SA#92e SP-210446 0023 1 F Update conditions of testcases 16.7.0
2021-09 SA#97e SP-220887 0028 1 F Corrections for gNB test cases 16.8.0

3GPP